Chapter VI: The Second Empire (2)

From this interesting communication it will be noted that Napoleon III. apparently reposed more confidence in Lord Clarendon than in his own ministers; the '_hommes sérieux_' were, however, probably mythical, as the proposed Confederation of Switzerland and the Southern German States was not a project which would commend itself to practical people, and is more likely to have been conceived in his own nebulous imagination. The important conclusion to be drawn from his language is that the Emperor was, at all events, at that period, sincerely anxious to avoid war, conscious of the military power of Prussia, and extremely anxious to induce the British Government to take some step in the nature of mediation which should avert the threatened conflict and enable France to withdraw with honour. This suggestion had already been ineffectually made to Lord Stanley in the spring; but, as will be seen, a similar suggestion was again put forward in the following year and acted upon.

Before the end of 1868 changes took place both in the British and in the French Foreign Offices. The return of the Liberal party to power restored Lord Clarendon to his old post, and M. de Moustier gave place to M. de La Valette. The departure of Moustier was no loss. At Constantinople he had shown himself to be restless and overbearing; in France he was not considered to be entirely satisfactory where semi-financial matters were concerned, and he finished his career by nearly getting into a serious scrape with the Prussian Government over the question of the latter being represented on a proposed Commission at Tunis. The Emperor Napoleon, although he entertained no grievance against Lord Stanley, naturally welcomed the return to office of Lord Clarendon.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, Dec. 15, 1868.

I came back from Compiègne yesterday. During the week I was there
the Emperor seemed to be in remarkably good health and spirits, and
was to all appearance very free from care. If he has any special
plan regarding foreign politics, he is keeping it _in petto_ to
electrify the Corps Diplomatique on New Year's Day, or the Chambers
in his opening speech. He talked a great deal to me of his desire to
maintain his cordial understanding with England and of his
confidence in your helping him to do so, but he did not speak as if
he had any intention of putting our friendship to any special test
at present.

He said that the conduct of the Greeks was very annoying, but that
in dealing with them, we must make some allowance for their feeling
of nationality and not _froisser_ it too much. I observed to him
that the Greeks, by their conduct with regard to Crete, were
producing a state of things which would be absolutely intolerable,
and that they were in my opinion doing themselves much more harm
than they did the Turks. In this he seemed to concur. My Russian
colleague, Stackelberg, was in a dreadful fuss about the Turco-Greek
question. The main anxiety he expressed was, not unnaturally, for
the King and the dynasty. We might perhaps work upon Russia by
showing that the dynasty would be continually popular if Greek
aggressions, and consequently excitement and disorder in Greece, are
allowed to become chronic.

The Emperor talked a little and the Empress a great deal about
Spain; both took a gloomy view of the prospects, but neither gave
any hint of the solution to be desired.

The Crown Prince of Prussia, whose peaceful proclivities became subsequently known to the world, happened to be in England at this time, and Lord Clarendon took the opportunity of discussing the Franco-Prussian situation with him. The Crown Prince had already impressed Lord Stanley with his amiability, modesty, and good sense, but it is evident that, like many others, he had not fully realized the great sacrifices which the Germans were ready to make in the cause of national unity.

* * * * *

_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyon._

Foreign Office, Dec. 18, 1868.

My inchoate letter on the 16th was cut short by the Crown Prince of
Prussia, with whom I had an interesting conversation. He is even
more pacific than his Father, and unlike his Father would be glad to
put the army on something more like a peace footing. The King
however is unapproachable on this subject, but the Prince says that
in a year or two he will have to yield to the outcry of the people
against the increased taxation that such monster armaments entail.
He means to consult some experienced officers as to the manner in
which reduction can be made without offence to the dignity of his
martial Sire, and he said that something had been done in that
direction by postponing till January the assembling of the levies
that ought to have taken place in October. I urged strongly upon him
the necessity of maintaining the _status quo_, and particularly
warned him against the incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Baden
into the Northern Confederation. He quite entered into the reasons
for this and said it would probably be a long time before the
interests of the South would necessitate a junction with the North,
although it would ultimately be inevitable.

When I last saw you on my way home from St. Cloud I told you that
the Emperor wished me to report my conversation with him to the
Queen of Prussia--I did so. She forwarded my letter to the King and
sent me his answer, which was not only pacific but extremely
courteous to the Emperor. He said there was no fear of the _status
quo_ being changed now, but that some time or other the South and
North must be united, and that it would be far better to _calmer les
esprits_ by teaching people to expect it and not to look upon it as
a danger or a menace to France, which it would not be any more than
the existing state of things. I wrote all this to the Emperor who
assured me that the King of Prussia's opinions had interested him
much and that he agreed in his views about the inexpediency of a
Congress.--Disraeli made a bad use at the Lord Mayor's dinner of
your letter giving an account of my interview with the Emperor, for
he gave it to be understood that Stanley was successfully mediating
between France and Prussia, etc; La Tour d'Auvergne, to whom the
Emperor had told our conversation, was much annoyed and feared that
he might be thought guilty of an indiscretion.

I was glad to learn by your letter of the 15th that you thought well
of the Emperor's health, as reports have of late been rife that he
was failing both in body and mind--their object was probably, and as
usual, some Bourse speculation.

The chronic anxiety with regard to the relations between France and Prussia which prevailed at this time was partially forgotten early in 1869 in consequence of a slight crisis in the East. The Cretan Insurrection had lasted for several years, and the Turks had shown themselves incapable of suppressing it in consequence of the attitude of the Greek Government, which, supported by Russia, openly encouraged the revolutionary movement. Greek armed cruisers ran the blockade, volunteers openly showed themselves in uniform in the Greek towns, and the Greeks showed a disposition to go to war, rightly assuming that Europe would never allow their country to be reconquered. At length the situation, from the Turkish point of view, became intolerable, and in December, 1868, the Turkish Government delivered an ultimatum, which was rejected by the Greeks and diplomatic relations were broken off. The opportunity was at once seized by the Emperor Napoleon in order to propose a Conference. Conferences had, as is well known, a special attraction for Napoleon III., who delighted to figure as a magnificent and beneficent arbiter graciously condescending to settle the squabbles of inferior beings, but a Conference has also often captivated the imagination of many diplomatists besides the late Prince Gortchakoff, whose chief delight it was to make orations to his colleagues. Nothing produces so agreeable a flutter in diplomacy as the prospect of a Conference. Where shall it be held? What is to be its basis? Who are to be the representatives? What Governments shall be entitled to appear? If such a one is invited, will it be possible to exclude another? And supposing these knotty points to be satisfactorily settled, shall some Power possessing doubtful credentials be allowed a _voix consultative_, or a _voix délibérative_? In this particular case, there was no difficulty in fixing upon the place, but there was considerable difficulty with regard to the participation of Greece, as Turkey flatly refused to meet her. The prospect of a Conference was not viewed with much satisfaction by Lord Clarendon, who asked awkward but necessary questions about 'basis' and so forth, and warned Lord Lyons that he would have to be very firm with La Valette on this point, 'as I know by experience in 1856 how fickle the Emperor is, and how invariably his minister changes with him, and throws over the engagements upon which we had the best reason to rely.'

Neither did Lord Lyons look forward to it with any pleasure: 'The Conference seems likely to bring into strong light some things which would perhaps be better in the shade,' he wrote. 'For instance, an understanding between Russia and Prussia on the Eastern Question; bitterness between Austria and Russia, etc., etc. I understand that there is great rejoicing over the prospect of the Conference at the Tuileries.' Probably Lord Lyons's distaste arose partly from the fact that foreign diplomatists have a habit of coming and rehearsing to their colleagues the speeches with which they propose subsequently to electrify the assembled Conference. It is only fair to admit, however, that the Conference was brought to a fairly satisfactory conclusion. The Greeks, who had given a great deal of trouble with their consequential pretensions, were admitted under a _voix consultative_ condition, and a settlement was arrived at which enabled diplomatic relations to be resumed with Turkey. To put it shortly, the Greeks were informed that they were bound to respect the rules common to all Governments in their future dealing with the Ottoman Empire (surely not a very onerous provision), and the hope was expressed that all the causes for complaint embodied in the ultimatum of the Porte would be removed. Crete, in consequence, remained comparatively quiet for about ten years. When, however, a few days after the satisfactory conclusion of this business, the Prussian Government came forward with a proposal that there should be yet another Conference at Paris on International Postage, M. de La Valette was obliged summarily to reject it, as 'the French public was sick to death of the very word.'

Early in 1869, considerable apprehension was created by the Luxemburg railway affair. A French and a Belgian railway company whose lines adjoined, had endeavoured to bring about an amalgamation, and the Belgian Chamber, naturally afraid of the consequences which might result from French influences within Belgian territory, passed an Act prohibiting concessions of railways without the authorization of the Government. This action caused considerable ill-feeling in France, and a universal belief existed that the Belgian Government had been instigated by Bismarck. It was obvious that England could not remain indifferent to the danger of what would now be called the 'peaceful penetration' of France into Belgium,--in other words, the ultimate annexation of that country--and one of the first notes of alarm seems to have been sounded by no less a person than Queen Victoria.

* * * * *

_General Grey to Lord Clarendon._

Osborne, Jan. 14, 1869.

The Queen desired me to write to you yesterday in returning the
private letters you sent her with reference to what you said in one
of your letters of the probable designs of France in Belgium. Her
Majesty wished me to inform you that she had more than once called
the attention of the late Government to this subject. The King of
the Belgians in writing to her had repeatedly expressed his
apprehensions that either by means of a Customs convention or by the
purchase by a French company of the Luxemburg Railway to which
unusual privileges and advantages would be conceded by the French
Government, France might seek to obtain a footing in Belgium highly
dangerous to her future independence and neutrality. Her Majesty,
though hoping the King might exaggerate the danger, has invariably
expressed the strongest opinion that England was bound, not only by
the obligations of treaties, but by interests of vital importance to
herself, to maintain the integrity and independence as well as the
neutrality of Belgium; and that the best security for these
essential objects would be found in the knowledge that any
proceedings which seemed to threaten their violation would bring
England at once into the field.

Her Majesty did not mean that any official communication should be
made on the subject, but that the habitual language of our ministers
at Berlin and Paris should be such as to leave no doubt as to the
determination of England.

This communication from the Queen was followed not long afterwards by a memorandum from Mr. Gladstone, laying stress upon the fact that the 'independence of Belgium was an object of the first interest to the mind of the British People,' and hoping that it would be made clear to the French Government 'that the suspicion even of an intention on the part of France to pay less respect to the independence of Belgium than to the independence of England would at once produce a temper in the country which would put an end to the good understanding and useful and harmonious co-operation of the two Governments.' This was very clear language--especially for Mr. Gladstone--and the Ambassador was directed to hint to the French Government that Belgium was under our special protection.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, Feb. 16, 1869.

Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister, comes to me frequently about the
Grand Luxemburg Railway affair, and is very naturally in great
tribulation both for himself and his country.

M. de La Valette also loses no opportunity of speaking to me about
it, and appears also to be very much disturbed. For my own part, I
can only preach in general terms conciliation to both.

I have found M. de La Valette calm and moderate, but I am afraid
there can be no doubt that the affair is extremely annoying to the
Emperor, and that His Majesty is very angry. M. de La Valette asked
me to call upon him to-day, and told me in the strictest confidence,
though he did not pretend to have absolute proof of it, that the
whole thing was instigated by Count Bismarck. He considered that
there were three possible solutions of the question.

The first, that France should at her own risk and peril annex
Belgium to herself. To this solution M. de La Valette was himself
utterly opposed.

The second was the adoption of retaliatory financial and commercial
measures. To this he was also opposed, considering it to be
undignified, to be injurious to the interests of Frenchmen, and to
constitute a punishment for all Belgians innocent as well as guilty.

The third course was to pursue the line already taken. To admit
fully the right of the Belgian Government to act as it had done, but
to declare in very distinct terms that it had been guilty of a very
_mauvais procédé_ towards France, and that the Government of the
Emperor was deeply wounded and very seriously displeased. He said
that he was about to prepare a despatch in the above sense.

I need not say that I did all in my power to strengthen his aversion
to the two first courses, and to induce him to soften the tone of
his communication to Belgium.

He seemed however to be afraid that the Emperor would be hardly
satisfied with so little, and he declared it to be quite impossible
that any friendship could hereafter exist between the French
Government and the present Belgian Ministry. In fact, he was far
from sure that his policy would be adopted.

He talks of Bismarck and his ways in a tone which is not
comfortable, and the irritation in France against Prussia seems to
increase rather than diminish. Certainly confidence in peace has not
increased lately.

M. de La Valette may have been calm and moderate, but his Imperial Master was very much the reverse, and his conduct of the affair was a striking instance of his ineptitude. He had thoroughly frightened the Belgians, alienated public opinion in England, and aroused well-founded suspicions throughout Europe that he intended to fasten a quarrel upon Belgium in order to facilitate its eventual annexation. According to Lord Clarendon, the idea that Bismarck had prompted Belgian action was a complete mare's nest, but even if that were not so, it ought to have been plain to the Emperor that if there was one thing more than another which would gladden Prussia, it was a misunderstanding between France and England. The feeling in England at the time may be judged by Gladstone's language, who wrote to Lord Clarendon in March 12--

'That the day when this nation seriously suspects France of meaning
ill to Belgian independence will be the last day of friendship with
that country, and that then a future will open for which no man can
answer.'

This apparently was what the Emperor was unable to see.

'Bismarck is biding his time quietly,' wrote Lord Clarendon. 'If
France annexes Belgium and we take no part he will be delighted, as
France could no longer complain of Prussian aggrandisement. If we do
take part, he would be equally delighted at the rupture between
England and France, and would come to our assistance. Either way he
thinks Prussia would gain. Why should Napoleon and La Valette assist
him? A quarrel between France and England or even a coolness is the
great German desideratum.' 'I believe,' he adds in another letter,
'nothing would be more agreeable to Prussia than that the intimacy
between the two countries should be disturbed by a territorial
encroachment which would run on all fours with Prussian
aggrandisement.'

For some reason, which was not clear, the Emperor persisted in making the question a personal one, announcing that he 'could not and would not take a _soufflet_ from Belgium,' and the British Government became so apprehensive of his attitude that the somewhat unheroic course was adopted of sending a warning to the French Government, but leaving the responsibility of presenting, or of withholding it, to the Ambassador.

* * * * *

_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, March 16, 1869.

We are very anxious about the Belgian business because more or less
convinced that the Emperor is meaning mischief and intending to
establish unfriendly relations with Belgium preparatory to ulterior
designs. It is very imprudent on his part, and he will only reap
disappointment, for even if he meditates war with Prussia he could
not undertake it upon a worse pretext or one less likely to win
public opinion to his side, as it would wantonly entail an
interruption, to use a mild term, of friendly relations with
England. It is unnecessary to say that we attach extreme importance
to the maintenance unimpaired of those relations, and it is
therefore our paramount duty to omit no effort for that object.

I have accordingly, by the unanimous desire of the Cabinet, written
you a despatch calling the serious attention of the French Government
to the dangerous eventualities that we see looming in the distance,
but the mode of dealing with that despatch may be delicate and
difficult, and we therefore leave the decision on that point to your
discretion. You can either read it, or tell the substance of it at
once to La Valette, or you may keep it for a short time until some
crisis arrives when it could best be turned to account. I feel that
this is rather hard upon you, and I would much rather have been more
precise, but, on the spot, you will be such a much better judge of
opportunity than I can pretend to be here, and if the warning is to
have any success it will depend on its being given at the right
moment and in the right manner.'

One cannot help wondering whether a similar confidence in an Ambassador's judgment is still shown at the present day, the views of the so-called 'man on the spot' being now generally at a considerable discount. In this case, Lord Lyons gave reasons showing that the warning was not needed, and would not be of any advantage to Belgium, while complaining that he disliked going about with a live shell in his pocket. A few days later, however, Lord Clarendon wrote again saying that he thought that the warning would have to be addressed shortly, as public opinion in England was beginning to become excited, and attacks were being made upon the Government for not using stronger language or showing its determination to stand by Belgium, while the King of the Belgians was anxious to make his woes known through the English press. 'If,' said Lord Clarendon, 'the Emperor attaches value to the English Alliance he ought not to sacrifice it by a sneaking attempt to incorporate Belgium by means of a railway company and its employés. If he wants war it is a bad pretext for doing that which all mankind will blame him for.'

It was not unnatural that Lord Clarendon should have felt uneasy at the threatening development of this apparently insignificant railway difficulty, because it was plain that the one object which the Belgians were bent upon was to entangle us in their concerns, and to make us responsible for their conduct towards France; nor, again, was this an unreasonable proceeding upon their part, for Belgium was an artificial state, and as dependent upon foreign guarantees for her existence as Holland was dependent upon her dykes. Perhaps in order to reassure the British Government, Marshal Niel's aide-de-camp and General Fleury were sent over to London in April. They brought a message from the Marshal to the effect that France was ready for anything, and that the Emperor had only to give the word; but that to begin by a rupture with England about a miserable Belgian difference would be a _sottise_. These visitors did more to convince the French Ambassador in London that there was no danger of war than all his correspondence with the French Foreign Office, but Lord Clarendon continued to be apprehensive of the influence excited upon the Emperor by shady financiers and by an untrustworthy representative at Brussels.

* * * * *

_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, April 19, 1869.

I have never, as you know, felt any confidence in the soft sayings
and assurances of the French Government, but I did not think they
would have exposed the cloven foot so soon and completely as they
have done. No affair has given me so much pain since my return
to this place, and I foresee that out of it will grow serious
complications and an end to those friendly relations between England
and France that are so advantageous to both countries and which have
had an important influence on the politics of Europe.

What provokes me is that _sales tripotages_ should be at the bottom
of it all, and upon that I have reliable information. I know of all
the jobbery and _pots de vin_ that are passing, and yet it is to
fill the pockets of half a dozen rascals, just as in the case of
Mexico, that the Emperor allows himself to be dragged through the
mud and to imperil the most manifest interests of France.

The policy of the French Government is perfectly understood at
Berlin, where the leading object of Bismarck is to detach us from
France. We might to-morrow, if we pleased, enter into a coalition
with Prussia against France for the protection of Belgian
independence, which is a European and not an exclusively French
question; but we will do nothing of the kind so long as there is a
hope that France will act with common honesty. I wish you would
speak seriously to La Valette about the _tripoteurs_, and represent
the disgrace to his Government of playing the game of such people,
which will all come out and be known in the same way as the Jecker
bonds are now unanimously acknowledged to have been the cause of
that fatal Mexican expedition.

I send you rather a curious despatch from Loftus. Bismarck's ways
are inscrutable, and he is never to be relied upon, but he has had a
union with us against France in his head ever since the Belgian
business began, for Bernstorff, who never speaks without
instructions, has said on more than one occasion to Gladstone and to
me that though Prussia would not undertake to defend Belgium
single-handed, as that country concerned England more nearly than
Prussia, yet that we had but to say the word, and we should soon
come to terms. I treated this, as did Gladstone, rather as a _façon
de parler_ and a ruse to detach us from France, which is Bismarck's
main object, as I did not choose that Bernstorff should have to
report the slightest encouragement to the suggestion, but it _may_
come to that after all.

Colonel Walker, the British military attaché at Berlin, whom Lord Clarendon considered to be one of the most enlightened and intelligent men of his profession, was in London at the time, and he reported that there was not the slightest sign of any active military preparation in any part of Prussia, and that the idea of war was so much discouraged by the military authorities that it was no longer talked of in military circles, whereas formerly it had been the only topic of discussion. The manoeuvres were to be held in the Prussian provinces most remote from France, and there was a fixed determination to give the latter no cause for offence, not from fear of that country, for there was a conviction that Prussia would have the best of a war, but owing to internal difficulties. Colonel Walker added that the mutual indisposition of the North and South to each other was becoming so manifest that the unification of Germany was far distant.

This comforting piece of intelligence Lord Lyons was instructed to communicate to the French Foreign Minister.

The Luxemburg Railway difficulty was finally disposed of by a Commission at London, but before this took place, the Belgian Liberal Minister, M. Frère-Orban, found it necessary to pay a visit to Paris.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, April 28, 1869.

Frère-Orban had a farewell audience of the Emperor this morning. He
tells me that his Majesty was very gracious. Frère appears to have
insinuated that the business was finished. The Emperor expressed a
hope that something good would be done in the Commission. The
Emperor dwelt upon the necessity of France and Belgium being upon
the best terms in order to put a stop to all the ideas of annexation
which certain journals were continually putting forward. His Majesty
said that the annexation of Belgium to France would be disagreeable
to England, which would of itself be a reason sufficient to make him
averse from it. His Majesty had on his table the Arcolay pamphlet
which asserts that Prussia would be unable to defend South Germany
against France. He said that in an answer to this pamphlet published
at Berlin, the Belgian army was counted among the forces to act
against France, and observed that France and Belgium ought to be on
too good terms to render such an employment of the Belgian army
possible. Frère said that His Majesty had only to make Belgium feel
convinced that her independence was safe, in order to ensure her
sympathy with France. Frère appears to have been much pleased with
the audience on the whole, though he would rather the Emperor had
said distinctly that he did not expect any result from the
Commission, and looked upon the whole question as at an end. He is
very well satisfied with the result of his mission to Paris, as he
has placed the relations on a friendly footing, and conceded
absolutely nothing.

The great points now are for the Belgians not to sing songs of
triumph, and for us and everybody to avoid all appearance of having
exercised any pressure. The Emperor cannot safely take a snub from
any foreign nation, and he feels this very strongly.

It is to the Emperor's credit that, in spite of disastrous failures, he always seems to have preserved a courteous and amiable demeanour. In this particular case, it is probable that he did not know clearly what he wanted himself, and that, misled by unscrupulous advisers, he entertained vague notions as to the possibility of annexing Belgium, and then withdrawing, as best he could, when the difficulties were realized. At all events, the sole result was a rebuff and an increased want of confidence in his integrity. In short, the mismanagement of this railway affair, which should never have been allowed to attain so much importance, and the collapse of his previous attempt upon Belgium, justified the sneer levelled at him by Bismarck, who, as recorded by Busch, remarked in 1870, 'He (Napoleon III.) should have occupied----and held it as a pledge. But he is, and remains a muddle-headed fellow.' A still more scathing definition was applied to him by his distinguished countryman, M. Thiers--_une immense incapacité méconnue_.

The private correspondence in 1869 with Lord Clarendon, who was by far the most voluminous letter-writer amongst English Foreign Secretaries, contains references to many topics besides the relations between France and Prussia, such as Tunis, the Eastern Question, Spain, the internal situation in France, the inauguration of a new Prussian seaport, the Suez Canal, and a host of other subjects. Amongst these may be mentioned two projected visits of exalted personages. The Khedive Ismail was expected in England, and there was some uncertainty as to how he should be treated. In the previous year he had ingratiated himself with the Sultan of Turkey by agreeing to pay an increased tribute, and as a consideration had obtained the title of Khedive and the privilege of securing the Viceroyalty of Egypt for his own family. Being of a vain and ostentatious disposition, however, he had now fallen into disfavour with his Suzerain by reason of the royal airs which he assumed and of actions which seemed to imply that he considered himself to be an independent ruler. 'Pray let me know,' wrote Lord Clarendon, 'how the Viceroy is received at Paris. The Turkish Ambassador has been boring me with protestations against the royal receptions already given to him and which he fears may be repeated here. He yesterday showed me a telegram from Constantinople, saying that _l'effet serait fort regrettable_ if the Viceroy was lodged in the same apartment at Buckingham Palace that the Sultan occupied. He declares that this voyage through Europe is to dispose Governments favourably to recognize his independence, and that he will be backed by France against his suzerain.'

Upon making inquiries at Paris it was found that the same question had been raised there, the Turkish Ambassador having made a remonstrance against the Khedive being lodged in the Elysée, and a special request that at least the room in which the Sultan slept should not be desecrated by his obnoxious vassal. The French Foreign Minister had thereupon advised the Ambassador to consider the remonstrance about the Elysée and the bedroom as _non avenue_, as it could only serve to make the Ambassador and his Government look ridiculous. Nevertheless, M. de La Valette admitted that the Viceroy was taking too independent a line, and that the proposal to neutralize the Suez Canal was an Imperial question which should originate from the Porte, and not from the Egyptian ruler.

The other and more illustrious traveller was the Empress Eugénie, who was desirous of attending the inauguration of the Suez Canal, and who unexpectedly intimated that she wished to make a tour in India. Upon this becoming known, Queen Victoria caused her to be informed that her presence in any part of the British dominions would always be most welcome, and that every arrangement would be made for her comfort and convenience.

'The Empress talked to me last night,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'for a very
long time and with great animation, not to say enthusiasm, of her
project of going to India. She gives herself two months away from
France, during which she proposes to go to Ceylon and most of the
principal places in India except Calcutta. She repeated her thanks
to the Queen and to you, and said that as the Queen had never been
herself to India, she herself, as a Foreign Sovereign, could not
think of receiving Royal Honours, and besides, that she particularly
wished for her own sake to observe the incognito and to be allowed
to go about and see things in the quickest and most unostentatious
manner. I told her that she had only to let us know exactly what her
wishes were and every effort should be made to carry them out. She
particularly begged that her idea of going to India might not be
talked about, lest it should be discussed and criticized in the
papers. I cannot suppose she will ever really go to India, but she
is full of it now. La Valette will stop it if he can, for his own
sake; for he depends a good deal upon her support at the Palace.'

This journey, of course, never took place. La Valette prevented it by representing to the Empress that if she went to Suez she must also go to Constantinople, and thus sufficient time for a tour in India was not available.

A trivial incident in French high society which occurred about this time serves to show with what extraordinary facility the most exaggerated statements can be circulated and credited. Writing to Lord Lyons, Lord Clarendon stated that he had been informed that the former had been placed in a most disagreeable position at a party given by Princess Mathilde, at which a recitation had been delivered marked by the most furious abuse of the English, and that the Emperor had gone up to the reciting lady and ostentatiously complimented her.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, May 9, 1869.

The only foundation for the story you mention is the fact that I was
at a party at the Princesse Mathilde's at which a play was acted and
some verses recited. The room however was so small that only the
Emperor and Empress and some of the principal ladies had seats in
it. The rest of the company were dispersed in other rooms. For my
own part I was two rooms off, entirely out of sight and out of
hearing of the performance and recitation. Among the verses was, I
believe, an old ode of Victor Hugo's in praise of the First Emperor.
I have never read it, but I dare say it is not over-complimentary to
England. I hear the Emperor was affected to tears by it, but it
certainly neither placed me in an awkward situation, nor gave me any
emotion, for it was out of sight and hearing, and I did not know it
had been recited.

In June Lord Lyons received his first request to take part in a division in the House of Lords. As far as is known, he had never made any declaration as to his political views, but apparently he figured on the Whip's list as a Liberal or Whig, and Lord Clarendon wrote saying that the Conservative Lords had determined upon the suicidal course of throwing out the Irish Church Bill, and that as the House of Commons was 'capable of anything' it was imperative to prevent such a disaster; that every vote in the Lords was of value, and that if he had no serious objection it was desirable that he should come over and vote on the second Reading. The answer to this appeal strikes one as a model of common sense.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, June 6, 1869.

I am very much obliged by your kind consideration in not _pressing_
me on the subject of coming over to vote on the Irish Church Bill.
I will frankly say that I have a very strong disinclination to do
so. The professional objections are too obvious to mention, and I
have another feeling which would make me hesitate. I have as yet
never taken any part whatever in home politics. If I ever come to
live in England, I shall of course endeavour to take a political
line and to be of any use I can. In the meantime I should have great
difficulty in reconciling myself to the idea of now and then giving
a sort of blind vote, either for the sake of party, or from
deference to friends however much I might value and esteem them.

In other words, he knew scarcely anything about the merits or demerits of the Bill which he was expected to support, and was, of all men, the least inclined to give a vote on a question with which he was unacquainted. Lord Clarendon, however, doubtless much against his inclination, was compelled to return to the charge.

* * * * *

_Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._

June 12, 1869.

I am writing in the Cabinet room, and by the unanimous desire of my
colleagues, to request that, unless you object to the Irish Church
Bill, you will come over and give us the benefit of your vote on
Friday.

It is not often that the vote of the Ambassador at Paris is wanted,
and if I remember rightly, Cowley only once or twice sent me his
proxy; but proxies are now abolished, and the real presence is
necessary. Every vote is of importance, as the question is one of
great gravity not only as respects the Irish Church but the conflict
between the two Houses that is impending, and that must if possible
be averted.

Gladstone has just expressed a strong opinion as to the duty of a
peer not to abstain from voting when he is not disabled from doing
so, and does not admit that diplomatic convenience is a sufficient
reason against his doing so.

I hope therefore you will come over if you are not opposed to the
Bill.

It being practically impossible to resist an intimation of this kind from an official chief, Lord Lyons reluctantly went over to London to vote, and as he had not yet even taken his seat, took the precaution of asking a trusty friend in the Foreign Office to find out what the necessary formalities were. The following somewhat naïve communication possesses a modern interest as it discloses the fact that backwoodsmen were as much in existence then as they are now.

* * * * *

_Mr. Staveley to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, June 16, 1869.

Not being able to get any reliable information in the Foreign Office
as to your _modus operandi_ in regard to taking your seat to-morrow,
I have been down to the House of Lords this afternoon and saw one of
the clerks in the Crown Office, who says that all you have to do is
to present yourself at the Peers' entrance to-morrow not later than
4.45 p.m., when you will receive from the clerk in attendance for
that purpose the necessary writ to enable you to take your seat.

Nothing further is necessary, and many peers presented themselves
and took their seats for the first time this session, for the debate
of Monday last, with no further formalities.

The obvious comment on this incident is that Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues were totally wanting in a sense of proportion, and their action justifies the belief that the eminent persons who govern this country are sometimes literally incapable of looking beyond the next division list in Parliament.

If a British Ambassador is to inspire confidence in his countrymen it is all important that he should not be a partisan or dependent in any degree upon party favours. The majority for the second reading of the Bill was 33, and no fewer than 108 peers were absent from the division unpaired. Yet because the whip (probably a person of very mediocre intelligence) said that he wanted every vote that could be obtained, the Ambassador was sent for, made to figure as a party hack, and forced to give a vote on a question of which he had admittedly no knowledge, and upon which his opinion was valueless. It will be seen later that similar attempts to force him to vote were subsequently made by people who ought to have known better, but fortunately without much success.

Towards the close of April, 1869, the French Legislative Session came to an end, and with it expired the Chamber elected in 1863. The General Election took place in May, and, as an insignificant number of opposition deputies were returned, owing to the unscrupulous intervention of the Executive, the results were received with much satisfaction in Government circles. It was generally felt, however, that even the huge Government majority would be more independent than in the late Chamber, and that a very real control would be exercised over the Ministers. It was even expected by some that the Emperor would formally announce the acceptance of the principle of the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, May 25, 1869.

I understand that the result of the elections gives pleasure at the
Tuileries. The Imperialists generally seem very well satisfied.
They consider the result to be a complete defeat of the Orleanists,
a defeat of the Legitimists and a defeat of the moderate
Republicans; the Chamber being thus divided into supporters of the
dynasty and Ultra-Republicans. They think the prominence of the
_Spectre Rouge_ will frighten and unite the people at large, and
cause them to rally round the dynasty. I cannot help being afraid
that there are more _rouges_ elected than is very safe, and the
election of such a sanguinary socialist as Baucel both at Paris and
Lyons is an uncomfortable symptom. The opposition will not be
inconveniently numerous, and its violence will be in all probability
simply a source of weakness.

I could not get Rouher to listen to any hint to propose to Prussia
that a French vessel should be sent to Jahde,[14] though he seemed
willing enough to send one if invited. You have, however, I think,
entirely prevented them having any suspicion of our having been
coquetting with Prussia, or having been willing to curry favour with
her at the expense of France.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, May 29, 1869.

It is very generally believed that Rouher will be made the scapegoat
and placed in the honourable retreat of the Presidency of the
Senate. Since the great rally of the Moderates to the dynasty it has
become the fashion to throw upon Rouher personally the blame of all
the measures which he has had to defend. I don't know who can be
found to take his place as Government orator.

Speculation is occupied in divining how the Emperor will take the
elections. Some think that, finding himself in front of an
opposition of _Rouges_, he will again take the part of the Saviour
of Society and begin a new epoch of Cæsarism. Others, looking to the
comparatively large number of independent members, whose elections
the Government did not oppose, and to the liberal professions made
even by the official candidates, expect a formal announcement of the
responsibility of Ministers to the Chamber, and Parliamentary
Government in form and in fact. An opinion not the least probable is
that His Majesty will make no change, but appoint Ministers and
direct his policy more or less in deference to the Chamber,
according to circumstances.

I hope Beust's meddling in the Belgian question has been merely an
awkward attempt to curry favour with the Emperor, but it may have
had the mischievous effect of encouraging fresh pretensions on the
part of France. Jealousy of Prussia will for a long time to come
ensure sympathy between France and Austria.

The complacent feelings with which the election results were at first received at the Tuileries soon gave place to very different emotions. M. de La Valette was under no illusion as to the unimportance of a victory over the Orleanists, and had frequently assured the Emperor that they had no real backing in the country, and that His Majesty's extreme susceptibility with regard to the attention shown to the Princes of that House by the Court and by society in England was totally unnecessary. The more the elections were considered the less they were liked. It began to dawn upon the Emperor that it had been a mistake to help the Reds with a view to crushing the Orleanists or Moderate Liberals. A majority in the Chamber was indeed secured to the official candidates, but the moral weight of the votes given for them was small, for the influence of the Government had been unsparingly and unscrupulously used to secure their return, and even the official candidates had, with few exceptions, been forced to issue very Liberal addresses. Fear of the extreme men might bring the officials and the independent members together in the Chamber, but it was generally realized that the Government would have to go at least halfway to meet the Liberals. In short, it was difficult to conceal the fact that the elections had not resulted in a manifestation of confidence in the Imperial Government, and that they had shown that the party bent upon revolution at any price was dangerously large. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the French Government showed itself alarmed and irritable, and although the country appeared to have declared against war there were not wanting Imperialists who would have been ready to look upon a provocation from abroad as a godsend.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, June 8, 1869.

The elections of yesterday in Paris seem to me satisfactory, for I
certainly prefer Orleanists and Moderate Republicans to Reds, and it
is a great thing to be rid of all the questions Rochefort's return
would have produced. In the Provinces the official candidates seem
to have had the worst of it.

The lessons to be drawn from the general election are not pleasant,
for it is impossible to find anywhere a symptom of approval of
personal government. It is not that the French desire a
Parliamentary government _à l'Anglaise_, but they are tired of the
uncertainty and disquiet in which they are kept by the fact that
peace and war, and indeed everything, depend upon the inscrutable
will of one man whom they do believe capable of giving them
surprises, and whom they no longer believe to be infallible. I don't
like the look of things. I dare say we shall be quiet for some time,
but like the French public, I live in dread of a surprise.

It is true that Fleury is likely to go as Minister to Florence,
though it is a secret. He would keep his office of Grand Ecuyer, but
he would go because he felt that he had lost his influence with
the Emperor and would not choose to stay here only to look after
horses and carriages. I don't think his departure a good sign. He
has lately been rather liberal in politics, and he is one of the few
men who would be certainly true to the Emperor and brave and
resolute if it came to actual fighting in the streets. The object of
his mission to Florence would be to manage the withdrawal of the
French troops from Rome. I have no doubt the Emperor wants to
withdraw them, but he wants also to be sure that the Pope will be
safe without them. I dare say, too, that His Majesty is angry about
the conduct of the clergy in the elections. They voted according to
their own predilections, and certainly did not make the support of
the Government a primary object.

General Fleury, a man of charming personality, and a prominent figure in French society, was the author of the celebrated rejoinder, _Pourtant, nous nous sommes diablement bien amusés_, upon an occasion when the Second Empire was severely criticized some years later. Lord Clarendon was another of those who felt misgivings over the elections. 'I feel precisely as you do,' he wrote to Lord Lyons, 'about the elections and the danger of a surprise that they create. Cæsar thinks only of his dynasty, and I expect he foresees greater danger to it from responsible Government than from war. It is not surprising that the French should be exasperated at always living on a volcano and never knowing when it may burst out and what mischief it may do them. The Bourgeoisie and the _actionnaires_ must fear revolution, but they must be beginning to weigh its evils against those which they are now suffering from. Fleury was a friend of peace and of England, and I am very sorry that he should so much have lost his influence as to make him accept a foreign mission.'

The elections were followed by a certain amount of rioting in Paris, and some hundreds of persons were arrested, but the only effect of these disorders was to strengthen the hands of those who advised the Emperor to hold fast to absolute and personal government. The latter was quite willing to sacrifice individuals to the Chamber, and was aware of the necessity of making some concessions in a Liberal sense, but he continued to resist any extension of the power of the Legislative Body. The latter might have obtained what was desired by calm and patience, for no minister would have been strong enough to successfully withstand the demand, but it is not in the nature of Frenchmen to achieve practical successes without noise and ostentation, and it was plain that troublous times were ahead. Had Napoleon III. been wise he would have taken the bull by the horns and announced something that would have satisfied the Chamber and the country. Unfortunately, the one thing he refused to give up was the one thing which his opponents were determined to wrest from him--personal government.

In July the Constitutional agitation was advanced a stage by an important interpellation of the Government demanding that the country should be given a greater share in the direction of affairs and asking for a ministry responsible to the Chamber. This demand was very numerously signed, and much to the general surprise amongst the signatures were many names belonging to the Government majority. It was evident that the country and the Chamber were determined to put some check on personal government.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._

Paris, July 7, 1869.

We are going on here _à toute vitesse_, whither, it is not very
pleasant to think. A new form has been agreed upon for the famous
interpellation.

More than a hundred Deputies have signed the demand, and among the
signatories are to be found even some of the regular courtiers, such
as Prince Joachim Murat and the Duc de Mouchy. It is entirely
illegal for the Corps Legislatif to discuss the Constitution, but
things seem to have gone much too far for such scruples to have any
weight. It would be amusing, if it were not rather alarming, to see
the eagerness among men of all parties to be forward in the race
towards Liberalism. Rouher preaches patience and moderation, but the
Oracle from St. Cloud gives no certain response to the many votaries
who try to extract a declaration of its views. This it is, which has
been one of the main causes of the falling away of the Imperial
Deputies. To keep the majority together, it would have been
necessary that a distinct _mot d'ordre_ should have been given them,
the moment the Chamber met. No one is willing to take the unpopular
side without some assurance that he will not be thrown over by the
Prince he wishes to serve; and what is worse, the want of decision
shown has very much diminished confidence in the resolution and
ability of the Sovereign, and consequently the willingness of
politicians to throw their lot in with his. When one looks at the
position in which things stood, I will not say before the election,
but between the election and the meeting of the Chamber, one is
astonished at the rapid descent of the personal power and the
reputation. Whether concessions will come in time to enable him to
stop before he is dragged to the bottom of the hill, is even
beginning to be questioned.