Chapter III: Outbreak of CIVIL War--The 'trent' Case (2)

If the effect on the people and Government of this country were the
only thing to be considered, it would be a case for an extreme
measure one way or the other. If the capture be unjustifiable we
should ask for the immediate release of the prisoners, promptly,
imperatively, with a determination to act at once, if the demand
were refused. If, on the other hand, the capture be justifiable,
we should at once say so and declare that we have no complaint to
make on the subject. Even so, we should not escape the evil of
encouraging the Americans in the belief that we shall bear anything
from them. For they have made up their minds that they have insulted
us, although the fear of the consequences prevents their giving vent
to their exultation. They would not however consider it so manifest
a proof of yielding on our part if we at once declared that we had
nothing to complain of, as if we did complain without obtaining full
reparation. Of course, however, I am well aware that public opinion
in this country is not the only thing to be thought of in this
question. While maintaining entire reserve on the question itself, I
have avoided any demonstration of ill-humour. My object has been, on
the one hand, not to prevent the Government being led by its present
apprehensions to take some conciliatory step, and on the other hand
not to put H.M. Government or myself in an awkward position, if it
should after all appear that we should not be right to make the
affair a serious ground of complaint.

Congress will meet on December 2nd, which will not diminish the
difficulty of managing matters here. It is supposed that General
McClellan will be obliged to attempt some forward movement, in
order that he and the Government may be able to meet the fiery
legislators. They hoped the Beaufort affair would have been
sufficient, but like all they do, the effect is so much weakened,
first by the preposterous boastings beforehand, and secondly by the
fabulous accounts of the success first given, that something new
must if possible be provided.

The Finances are kept in an apparently prosperous condition, by
postponing all but the most pressing payments. In this manner the
New York Banks are not pressed to pay up the sums they have taken of
the Loan. The people are so enamoured of their last brilliant
discovery in political economy that it was seriously intended to
raise the Morrill Tariff, in order that no money might go out of the
country and nothing be imported but 'gold and silver to carry on the
war with.' The Cabinet has now however, I understand, determined to
recommend that the Morrill Tariff be not touched. One cannot help
hoping that some one may be reasonable enough to suggest the idea of
a Revenue Tariff.

General McClellan's own plan is said to be to gain a great victory,
and then, with or without the sanction of Congress and the
President, to propose the most favourable terms to the South if it
will only come back. It is a curious sign of the confusion into
which things are falling, that such a plan is coolly discussed. I
mean that part of it which consists in the General's acting without
the consent of the President and Congress.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Nov. 25, 1861.

The people here are extremely frightened about the capture on board
the _Trent_. The New York money market gives signs of this. Another
indication is the moderation of the newspapers, which is for them
wonderful. They have put in more correct accounts of my language (or
rather silence). I rather suspect that this must have been done on a
hint from Mr. Seward. As a general rule I abstain from noticing
anything the newspapers say about me. On this occasion in particular
contradiction from me would have been almost as dangerous as
affirmation, so I left the assertions to take their chance.

The Consuls in the South do not behave well about forwarding private
letters. There is a fresh case which I report to-day. Mr. Seward
has, I think, behaved properly about it. I am afraid I shall be
obliged to ask you to support me by some severe act, if my last
instruction is not obeyed.

I write, as indeed I act, as if our relations with this Government
were to be unchanged. Let the affair of the capture on board the
_Trent_ turn out how it may, I am not confident that I shall long
be able to do so.

Writing on the same date to Admiral Milne, he repeats that nothing whatever has passed between him and the U.S. Government on the subject of the _Trent_, and adds: 'I suppose I am the only man in America who has expressed no opinion whatever either on the International Law question, or on the course which our Government will take.' Such reticence appears almost superhuman.

The attitude, however, of an important section of the American public was anything but reticent. Captain Wilkes sprang at once into the position of a national hero. Congress passed a vote of thanks to him; he was banqueted, toasted, serenaded, and shortly became an admiral. A member of the Government, Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, noted for his hostility to England, distinguished himself by officially congratulating Captain Wilkes upon his heroic action; intimating at the same time that the 'generous forbearance' he had shown in not capturing the _Trent_ could not be treated as a precedent in subsequent cases of the infraction of neutral obligations. The Governor of Boston also distinguished himself by the following statement at a public banquet: 'That there may be nothing left to crown this exaltation, Commodore Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the British lion at its head,' while many other prominent citizens followed his example.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Nov. 29, 1861.

The Consuls in the South are crying out for ships again. This is the
solution for every difficulty in the Consular mind, as my experience
in the Mediterranean taught me long ago; though what the ships were
to do, except fire a salute in honour of the Consul, I could never
discover. I had some trouble, as you may perhaps recollect, in
checking the Consular ardour to send ships up the Potomac to my own
relief last spring. Sir A. Milne objects strongly to sending ships
to the Southern Ports, unless with a specific object and definite
instructions, and I think he is quite right. It is quite true that a
town _may_ be bombarded some day by the United States forces: that
British subjects may have their throats cut by the negroes in a
servile insurrection, or be tarred and feathered by a Vigilance
Committee. But we cannot keep a squadron at every point to protect
them, and I do not know what points are particularly threatened.

I shall do all in my power to keep things smooth until I receive
your orders about the _Trent_ affair. This can in any event do no
harm. There is a story here that, in a recent hypothetical case, the
Law Officers of the Crown decided in favour of the right of the
United States to take Mason and Slidell out of a British ship or
postal packet. I do not know whether Mr. Adams has written this to
Mr. Seward, but I am inclined to think that the Government believe
it to be true.

The uncertainty as to the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown rendered it all the more necessary to keep quiet and wait for orders, and the situation was rendered a little easier on account of there being no mention of the _Trent_ in the Presidential Message. Mr. Galt, the Canadian Finance Minister, happened to be in Washington at the beginning of December, and had an interesting conversation with President Lincoln, who disclaimed for himself and the Cabinet all thought of aggression against Canada. The President also stated that he himself had been opposed to Mr. Seward's circular putting the coasts into a state of defence, but had been overruled. On being asked what the recommendation to make fortifications and depôts of arms on the Great Lakes meant, he only said, 'We must say something to satisfy the people.' About the Mason and Slidell case, he remarked, 'Oh, that'll be got along with!' He further volunteered the observation that if he could not within a reasonable period get hold of Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, and keep Maryland, he should tell the American people to give up the contest, for it would be 'too big' for them.

The impression produced upon Mr. Galt was that President Lincoln himself was honest and sincere in what he said, but that he was very far from being master of his Cabinet. Mr. Galt returned to Canada, bearing a letter to Lord Monck, the new Governor-General, urging the necessity of preparing for defence, and also an ingenious arrangement for warning the Canadian Government in case of emergency, without having recourse to cypher telegrams, which might arouse the suspicions of the Americans.

On December 13, intelligence was received in America of the arrival in England of the first news of the capture of Mason and Slidell, the submarine cable, of course, not being at that time in operation. A great fall in all securities immediately took place.

At midnight on the 18th, the Queen's messenger bearing the fateful despatches from Lord Russell arrived at the British Legation at Washington.

The principal despatch, dated November 30, 1861, had been drawn up after consideration by the Cabinet, and the purport of it was that the United States Government were informed that International Law and the rights of Great Britain had been violated, that H.M. Government trusted that the act would be disavowed, the prisoners set free and restored to British protection. Should this demand be refused, Lord Lyons was instructed to leave Washington.

The draft of this despatch was submitted to the Queen, and, in the opinion of the Prince Consort, the wording was of somewhat too peremptory a character. The suggestions of the Prince Consort were embodied in a memorandum quoted by Sir Theodore Martin in his book, and the object of them was to remove any expressions in the despatch which might unduly affront a sensitive nation, and at the same time enable it to retreat from a false position without loss of credit or dignity. The Prince was suffering from a mortal illness at the time, and was dead within a fortnight; it was the last occasion upon which he took any part in public affairs, but never, probably, did he render a greater service to the country of his adoption than when he persuaded the Cabinet to modify the wording of this momentous despatch. As amended in accordance with the Prince Consort's suggestions, the crucial passages ran as follows:--

Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations
which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United
States, are willing to believe that the United States's naval
officer who committed this aggression was not acting in compliance
with any authority from his Government, or that if he conceived
himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the
instructions which he had received.

For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that
the British Government could not allow such an affront to the
national honour to pass without full reparation, and Her Majesty's
Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate
intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to
force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so
grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation
would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter
shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of
the United States, that Government will, of its own accord, offer to
the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the
British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen, and
their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again be
placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the
aggression which has been committed.

Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose
them to him.

It will be observed that in the above there is nothing of an aggressive or minatory nature, but in a further despatch of the same date, Lord Lyons was instructed to allow Mr. Seward a delay of seven days, if the latter asked for it. If at the end of seven days no answer was returned, or any answer which was not a compliance with the demands of Her Majesty's Government, then the British Minister was directed to leave Washington with all the members of his staff and the archives, and to repair forthwith to London.

Accompanying the despatches was a private letter from Lord Russell to Lord Lyons.

* * * * *

Pembroke Lodge, Dec. 1, 1861.

The despatches which were agreed to at the Cabinet yesterday and
which I have signed this morning impose upon you a disagreeable
task.

My wish would be that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you
should not take my despatch with you, but should prepare him for it,
and ask him to settle with the President and his Cabinet what course
they would propose.

The next time you should bring my despatch and read it to him fully.

If he asks you what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance
I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President
quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain
from anything like menace. I think the disposition of the Cabinet is
to accept the liberation of the captive commissioners and to be
rather easy about the apology: that is to say if the Commissioners
are delivered to you and allowed to embark in a packet for England,
and an apology or explanation is sent through Mr. Adams that might
be taken as a substantial compliance. But if the Commissioners are
not liberated, no apology will suffice.

M. Thouvenel promises to send off a despatch on Thursday next giving
our cause moral support, so that you may as well keep the despatch
itself a day or two before you produce it, provided you ask at once
for an interview with Seward.

The feeling here is very quiet but very decided. There is no party
about it: all are unanimous.

The best thing would be if Seward could be turned out, and a
rational man put in his place. I hear it said that the Americans
will not fight, but we must not count upon that.

I have every reliance that you will discharge your task in the
temper of firmness and calmness which befits a British
representative.

Mr. Hammond, the permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, whose judgment was in after years shown to be far from infallible, expressed the opinion that Messrs. Mason and Slidell would be immediately executed, so that there might be an answer ready whenever their release was demanded. A warship was ordered to proceed from Halifax to New York to receive the members of the Legation in case an unfavourable reply should be received from the American Government.

On December 7, Lord Russell wrote again privately to Lord Lyons.

* * * * *

Foreign Office, Dec. 7, 1861.

I have been going over in my mind the possible evasive answers of
Mr. Seward, falling short of substantial compliance with our
demands, in order to give you some contingent instructions.

But the result is that I fear I should embarrass you more by such a
course, than by leaving you to the exercise of your own excellent
judgment.

What we want is a plain Yes, or a plain No to our very simple
demands, and we want that plain Yes or No within seven days of the
communication of the despatch.

The devices for avoiding the plain course are endless, and the
ingenuity of American lawyers will seek perhaps to entangle you in
endless arguments on Vattel, Wheaton and Scott.

Here are two plain answers. If the _Trent_ had been brought into
Boston harbour, the Prize Court must have condemned the captors to
pay costs for illegal detention. This, at least, is our opinion.

But Captain Wilkes superseded the authority of the Courts instituted
and recognized by the Law of Nations. Seeing that there was no
chance that any Court of Justice, or any law could justify the
capture of the four Americans, Captain Wilkes has set aside all
Courts of Justice and all law, and has taken into his own hands, by
virtue of his cannons and cutlasses, the solution of a question
which demanded if raised at all, a regular, a solemn and a legal
decision.

These are the grounds therefore upon which our demands are based and
upon which they should be urged.

P.S.--I have just received your letter of the 22nd. If you receive
the Confederate prisoners under the protection of the British flag,
we shall be satisfied. But if that is not to be obtained, you will
only have to obey your instructions and withdraw.

Mr. Hammond, a very unfortunate prophet, predicted that 'the Americans will never give way. The humiliation will be too great, and after all their boastings against Europe, they will scarcely be satisfied to yield to the common reprobation with which the act has been received. We hear, too, that the President himself is most determined against concession, having rejected peremptorily General McClellan's conciliatory advice.' It must be admitted, however, that if Mr. Hammond was wrong, plenty of other people shared his views on both sides of the Atlantic.

Lord Russell's despatch having arrived at Washington late at night on December 18, Lord Lyons called upon Mr. Seward on the 19th, and acquainted him with its general tenour. Mr. Seward received the communication seriously and with dignity, nor did he manifest any dissatisfaction. At the conclusion of the interview, he asked to be given the following day for consideration, and also for communication with the President. He thought that on the 21st he would be able to express an opinion upon the communication, and in the meanwhile expressed his gratification at the friendly and conciliatory manner in which it had been made by the British Representative.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Dec. 19, 1861.

Before I left Mr. Seward he said that there was one question which
he would put to me 'informally,' but which it was most important
that I should answer. Was any time fixed by my instructions within
which the U.S. Government must reply? I told him that I did not like
to answer the question; that what of all things I wished to avoid
was the slightest appearance of a menace. He said I need not fear
that; he only wished me to tell him privately and confidentially. I
said that on that understanding, I would tell him that the term was
seven days. He then said that much time would be lost if I did not
let him have a copy of your despatch 'unofficially and informally';
that so much depended upon the wording of it, that it was impossible
to come to a decision without reading it. I told him that the only
difficulty I had about giving it to him at once officially was that
the seven days would at once begin to run. He said that was very
true, but I might let him have it on the understanding that no one
but himself and the President should know that I had done so. I was
very glad to let him have it on these terms. It will give time for
the Packet (which is indeed already due) to arrive with M.
Thouvenel's Despatch to M. Mercier, and in the meantime give Mr.
Seward who is now on the peace side of the Cabinet time to work with
the President before the affair comes before the Cabinet itself. I
sent the Despatch to him in an envelope marked 'Private and
Confidential.' Almost immediately afterwards he came here. He told
me he was pleased to find that the Despatch was courteous and
friendly, and not dictatorial or menacing. There was however one
question more which he must ask me, without an answer to which he
could not act, but at the same time he must have the answer only in
strict confidence between himself and me. I had told him in
confidence that I was to wait seven days for an answer on the
subject of the redress we required. Supposing he was within the
seven days to send me a refusal, or a proposal to discuss the
question? I told him that my instructions were positive and left me
no discretion. If the answer was not satisfactory, and particularly
if it did not include the immediate surrender of the Prisoners, I
could not accept it.

I was not sorry to tell him this in the way I did. I avoided all
menace which could be an obstacle to the U.S. yielding, while I did
the only thing which will make them yield if they ever do, let them
know that we were really in earnest.

I don't think it likely they will give in, but I do not think it
impossible they may do so, particularly if the next news from
England brings note of warlike preparations, and determination on
the part of the Government and people.

Mr. Seward has taken up all my time, which is my excuse for this
scrawl. I shall be able to write to you to-morrow.

The second interview took place on the 21st, and the following letter explains the reasons for allowing Mr. Seward an additional two days--a happy expedient, which probably contributed in great measure to the ultimate solution of the difficulty--and also graphically depicts the general uncertainty and alarm which prevailed.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Dec. 23, 1861.

I have followed, I think to the letter, in my communications with
Mr. Seward on the _Trent_ affair, the plan laid down in your private
letter of the 1st. The packet is unfortunately so late that M.
Mercier will not receive the promised instruction from M. Thouvenel
until to-morrow, but I could not have again put off communicating
your despatch to Mr. Seward without an appearance of vacillation
which would have been fatal. No time was practically lost by my
consenting to the delay from Saturday to Monday, for whether the
seven days expired on Saturday next or Monday next, I should have
been equally unable to announce the result to you sooner than by the
packet which will sail from New York on Wednesday, the 1st January.

I feel little or no doubt that I shall have an answer of some kind
before the seven days are over. What it will be depends very much
upon the news which will be brought by the packet to-morrow. If it
convinces the people here that it is surrender or war, without any
hope of a diversion in their favour by France, our terms will
perhaps be complied with. If there is any hope left that there will
be only a rupture of Diplomatic Relations, or that we shall accept
the mediation of France, no concession will be made. There is no
doubt that both government and people are very much frightened, but
still I do not think anything but the first shot will convince the
bulk of the population that England will really go to war.

M. Mercier went of his own accord to Mr. Seward the day before
yesterday and expressed strongly his own conviction that the choice
lay only between a compliance with the demands of England and war.
He begged Mr. Seward to dismiss all idea of assistance from France,
and not to be led away by the vulgar notion that the Emperor would
gladly see England embroiled with the United States in order to
pursue his own plans in Europe without opposition. He said that if
he could be of use, by making these sentiments known to Senators and
other influential people, he was quite ready to do so. Mr. Seward
asked him whether he had received special instructions from his
Government on the subject. M. Mercier said no, but that he expected
some immediately, and that he had no doubt whatever what they would
be. Mr. Seward did not accept his offer to prepare influential men
here for giving way, but merely said, 'Let us wait and see what your
instructions really turn out to be.'

It is announced that General Scott is more than halfway across the
Atlantic on his way here, I suppose in the hope of appearing again
on the stage as the Grand Pacificator. If he gives the sanction of
his name to a compliance with our terms he will certainly render the
compliance easier to the Government and less unpalatable to the
people. But I cannot foresee any circumstances, under which I should
be justified in departing from your instructions. Unless I receive
an announcement that the prisoners will be surrendered to _us_, and
at least not a refusal to make an apology before noon on this day
week, no other course will be open to me than to demand my passports
and those of all the members of the Legation and go away at once. In
case of a non-compliance, or of the time elapsing without any
answer, it will probably be desirable for me to take myself, the
Secretary of Legation, and the greater part of the Attachés off at
once, leaving, if necessary, one or two of the junior attachés to
pack up the archives and follow as quickly as possible. It is a case
in which, above all others, delay will be dangerous. I am so
convinced that unless we give our friends here a good lesson this
time, we shall have the same trouble with them again very soon,
under less advantageous circumstances, that even my regard for them
leads me to think it all important that they should receive the
lesson. Surrender or war will have a very good effect upon them, but
anything less will make them more self-confident than ever, and lead
them on to their ruin.

I do not think there is any danger of the Government's deliberately
taking any step to precipitate hostilities upon my departure. On the
contrary, if they let me go, it will be in the hope that the
interruption of diplomatic relations will be all they have to fear
from us. But they have so little control over their officers, that I
think we must be prepared for acts of violence from subordinates, if
they have the chance of performing them, in cases where no immediate
danger is incurred. I shall suggest to the Governors and Naval
Officers to take reasonable precautions against such acts. A
filibustering expedition of the Irish on the frontiers of Canada, to
damage the canals, or something of that sort, may also be on the
cards.

It is generally believed that the Government will insist on an
immediate advance of the Grand Army of the Potomac, in the hope of
covering a surrender to England with (to use President Lincoln's
phraseology) a 'sugar coating' of glory, in another quarter if
possible.

You will perhaps be surprised to find Mr. Seward on the side of
peace. He does not like the look of the spirit he has called up. Ten
months of office have dispelled many of his illusions. I presume
that he no longer believes in the existence of a Union Party in the
South, in the return of the South to the arms of the North in case
of a foreign war; in his power to frighten the nations of Europe by
great words; in the ease with which the U.S. could crush rebellion
with one hand and chastise Europe with the other; in the notion that
the relations with England in particular are safe playthings to be
used for the amusement of the American people. He sees himself in a
very painful dilemma. But he knows his countrymen well enough to
believe that if he can convince them that there is a real danger
of war, they may forgive him for the humiliation of yielding to
England, while it would be fatal to him to be the author of a
disastrous foreign war. How he will act eventually, I cannot say.
It will be hard for him to face present unpopularity, and if the
President and Cabinet throw the whole burden on his shoulders, he
may refuse to bear it. I hope that without embarrassing him with
official threats, I have made him aware himself of the extreme
danger of refusing our terms.

Since I have been writing this letter, M. Mercier has come in and
related to me more in detail the conversation he had with Mr. Seward
the day before yesterday. In addition to what I have already
mentioned, he says that he told Mr. Seward that it would be
impossible for France to blame England for precisely the same course
that she would herself have pursued in similar circumstances: that
of course he could not pretend to give advice on a question
concerning national honour without being asked to do so, but that it
might be of advantage to the U.S. Government for him to dispel
illusions which might exercise a baneful influence on its
determination.

M. Mercier reports the conversation to-day to his Government. I
think it as well, at all events for the present, not to put it into
an official despatch, but it might perhaps be well that Lord Cowley
should know that I am disposed to speak in very high terms of the
moral support given to my demands by M. Mercier.

I am told that the Senate is still more angry about the combined
expedition against Mexico than about the _Trent_ affair. They will
hardly be so absurd as to manifest their displeasure in such a way
as to add France and Spain to their adversaries.

P.S.--I have kept M. Mercier _au courant_ of all my communications,
confidential as well as official, with Mr. Seward, but I have given
no information as to either to any one else.

There was now nothing to be done but to sit and wait for the American reply. It arrived on December 27, in the shape of a note from Mr. Seward of the most portentous length abounding in exuberant dialectics, but the gist of which was contained in the two following short paragraphs:--

'The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated.

'Your lordship will please indicate a time and place for receiving them.'

The question of peace or war had hung in the balance for weeks, but the victory was complete, and British diplomacy achieved a success which was not equalled until Fashoda supplied a somewhat similar case in 1897.

So far from being intoxicated with his remarkable triumph, as would have been the case with some diplomatists, Lord Lyons communicated the news to Lord Russell in matter-of-fact terms which were typical of his calm and practical nature.

* * * * *

Washington, Dec. 27, 1861.

It is of course impossible for me to give an opinion upon the
argumentation in Mr. Seward's voluminous note. Time barely admits of
its being read and copied before the messenger goes. But as the four
prisoners are given up, immediately and unconditionally, it is quite
clear to my mind that you will not wish me to decide the question
of peace or war without reference to you. A rupture of diplomatic
relations, not followed by war, would be worse than war itself, for
after that, nothing but actual hostilities would ever convince the
Americans that there was any limit to our forbearance.

I hope, however, that the Note will, on further examination, be
deemed sufficient. In that case it might not be unadvisable to give
credit to Mr. Seward, in speaking to Mr. Adams, and the more so
perhaps because Mr. Adams is, or at all events was, devoted to Mr.
Seward and his policy. I cannot say that my general opinion of Mr.
Seward has undergone any change; but without inquiring into his
motives, I must allow him the merit of having worked very hard and
exposed his popularity to very great danger.

I shall not be able to give you any information to-day as to the
effect produced upon the public. Mr. Seward has begged me to keep
the answer a secret until to-morrow. He intends to publish it in the
newspapers here to-morrow, and has sent a copy to New York to be
published simultaneously there. In the latter case it will be
conveyed to the public in Europe, as well as to you, by the same
packet which takes this letter. Mr. Seward told me he 'had been
through the fires of Tophet' in order to get the prisoners
surrendered.

I have seen with very great satisfaction that you have informed Mr.
Adams, in answer to the remonstrances about Mr. Bunch, that H.M.
Government must and will hold communication with the Confederate
Government. I am also extremely glad that the instructions to the
Consuls on the subject have been sent to the Admiral to forward, not
to me. In fact, if we are able to maintain peace with the U.S. it
will be very desirable to separate the Consuls in the South as much
as possible from this Legation. It will hardly be possible for me to
keep well with the Government here, if I am supposed to have the
direction of communication with the enemy's Government.

I think it very important, with a view to the preservation of peace,
that advantage should be taken of the opportunity to put Canada into
a state of defence; and indeed (as I said in a despatch which I
wrote in May last) to provide for the security of all our
possessions on both sides of this Continent. While Canada, in
particular, is apparently defenceless, the Americans will never
believe that we contemplate the possibility of war. And it must
never be forgotten that when they make peace with the South, they
may have a large army to provide with employment, and an immense
amount of popular dissatisfaction and humiliation to find a safety
valve for.

My intention is to propose to Mr. Seward that I shall send a
man-of-war or a British mail packet to Boston to receive the
prisoners. I should propose that they should go in the first
instance to Halifax. But I should suggest to the Captain to consult
their wishes as far as possible, but certainly _not_ to take them to
a Confederate port. Neither of the ships of war at New York would, I
suppose, be large enough to take them across the Atlantic, but I do
not think I ought to refuse to provide them with a passage to
Europe, if they ask for one. This seems due to them, inasmuch as it
was the failure of the British flag to afford them protection which
lost them their passage on board the _Trent_. Of course if they go
in a mail packet, I shall take precautions against any risk of an
'heroic' Captain applying the doctrines maintained here and bringing
the packet before an American Prize Court for adjudication. In any
case I shall give a caution to the Commander of the ship which takes
them, that they are not to be received with honours or treated
otherwise than as distinguished _private_ gentlemen.

Those who have not seen the Americans near, will probably be much
more surprised than I am at the surrender of the prisoners. I was
sure from the first that they would give in, if it were possible to
convince them that war was really the only alternative. My
difficulty has been to make them aware that it was surrender or war,
without making such threats as would render the humiliation too
great to be borne. This was the object of my confidential
communications with Mr. Seward before I gave him your despatch.

The main point having been gained, it remained to settle how the surrender of the prisoners could best be carried out without causing unnecessary ill-feeling and arousing a popular agitation which might drive the United States Government into committing some high-handed action in order to maintain itself. It was finally decided that, in order to avoid the trouble which Mr. Seward feared from the inhabitants of Boston, they should embark at Provincetown. They were accordingly conveyed in an American ship from Fort Warren to Provincetown, and there embarked on a British warship for Halifax, it having been expressly stipulated that the transfer should not take place at night. From Halifax they proceeded subsequently to Europe.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._

Washington, Dec. 31, 1861.

The Americans are putting the best face they can upon the surrender
of Slidell and Mason, and as far as has depended upon me I have done
everything to make the pill as easy to swallow as possible. But I
cannot disguise from myself that the real cause of the yielding was
nothing more nor less than the military preparations made in
England. They are horribly out of humour and looking out for some
mode of annoying us without danger to themselves. There is a talk of
discriminative duties on British goods, of a non-intercourse Act,
and other absurdities. What is more serious is a proposal, which it
is said will be introduced into Congress next week, to repeal the
Act for carrying into effect the Reciprocity Treaty. This would be a
direct breach of the treaty, and would of course be an indisputable
_casus belli_. It has often been suggested before, in the old belief
that we should bear anything rather than go to war with the U.S. I
hope they have had a lesson which will make them wiser.

I cannot help fearing that it is as necessary as ever, nay more than
ever necessary, to be prepared to give a warm reception whether to
regular invaders or to filibusters from the U.S. who may make an
attempt upon Canada. In fact I am not reassured respecting the
maintenance of peace. For the present we have some security in Mr.
Seward. For he must do his best to maintain peace or he will have
made the sacrifice in the case of Mason and Slidell in vain. As in
that case, so in others, he sees now that besides the utter ruin of
the country, a war with us would give the ascendancy to the ultra
party who are opposed to him in the Cabinet and in Congress. He
fears too, and with great reason, that it would throw the country
into a state of anarchy, in which chiefs of a totally different
frame of mind from him would have the upper hand. But he may be
swept away, or, if he find it impossible to hold his position or his
own principles, turn round and play a desperate game with the
ultras. I have given him the opportunity of offering amends
spontaneously in three rather awkward matters, and, as you will see
by my despatches, he has been prompt in seizing it.

On reading his enormous note at leisure, I find that it is much more
of an apology than I thought from the hurried perusal which was all
I had time to give to it before I sent it off to you. But with your
letters before me, I should have taken much less _ad referendum_;
for the surrender of the prisoners is after all the main question.
On the other hand, I should not have gone out of my way to declare,
on my own responsibility, that the note was perfectly satisfactory,
unless it had contained a formal apology in plain words.

I have a better opinion of the Boston mob than Mr. Seward has, and
should have had very little fear of the prisoners being insulted, if
I had taken them from Fort Warren directly on board a British
man-of-war. I am not sorry however to spare the Bostonians (who are
among the most friendly to us of the Americans) what they might
consider a mortifying and humiliating spectacle. I have at Mr.
Seward's request not made the name of the place at which the
prisoners are to be transferred generally known. Indeed, I found
that many people were going to Boston to be present on the occasion,
and there is no advantage in having a crowd or a sensation about it.

It is sad to record that some of the American clergy showed a most unchristianlike spirit in connection with the termination of the _Trent_ case; the following remarkable prayer uttered in the Senate affording an instructive example:--

* * * * *

Thirty-Seventh Congress--Second Session.
In Senate--Monday, December 30, 1861.

[Prayer by Revd. Dr. Sunderland.]

O Thou, just Ruler of the world, in this hour of our trial, when
domestic treason stabs at the nation's heart, and foreign arrogance
is emboldened to defeat the public justice of the world, we ask help
of Thee for our rulers and our people, that we may patiently,
resolutely, and with one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a
day of darkness and reproach--a day when the high principle of human
equity, constrained by the remorseless sweep of physical and armed
force, must for the moment succumb under the plastic forms of soft
diplomacy. Yet, in the face of this, will we not be shaken in our
conviction that Thou art ever with him who, in the interest of human
liberty and the Christian faith, by all the means in his power works
righteousness and defends the truth.

O God, give to this our nation honesty, unity and courage; bring
this unnatural rebellion to a speedy end; and then prepare us to
assert upon a broader scale, and with a vaster force, the
inalienable rights and responsibilities of man: through Jesus
Christ. Amen.

Upon the whole, except for occasional manifestations of ill-humour, such as, for instance, a resolution in the House of Representatives in favour of creating a great navy to 'defend the seas from the sway of an arbitrary trident,' the surrender was taken quietly, and Mr. Seward handsomely acknowledged the great consideration which had been shown by Lord Lyons in his conduct of the negotiations.

Congratulations now began to pour in upon him, and Lord Russell wrote that nothing could have been better than his conduct, and that his patience, forbearance, and friendly discretion had gone far to secure the favourable result obtained. Another communication from Lord Russell intimated that the Queen, 'taking into consideration the judgment and conciliatory temper which you have shown in your negotiations at Washington, especially in regard to the _Trent_, has directed that you should be raised to the rank of G.C.B.

In acknowledging these congratulations, Lord Lyons disclaimed having performed any brilliant or striking service. The only merit which he attributed to himself was that of having laboured quietly and sedulously to smooth over difficulties and to carry out the instructions he received from the Foreign Office. Writing to Mr. Hammond, he explained that he had resisted the temptation 'to do something' 'which always besets one when one is anxious about a matter'; and that from the first he had been convinced that the more quiet he kept the better would be the chance of the instructions from home producing their effect. To other correspondents he expressed the view that it was the British military preparations which had turned the scale in favour of peace.

It would, of course, be an exaggeration to attribute solely to Lord Lyons the credit of having successfully prevented the calamity of a war between England and the United States. That credit is in reality due to others as well as to himself: to the Home Government for their prompt and decisive precautions, to the Prince Consort for his timely interposition, to the French Government for their loyal support at a critical moment, and to the good sense eventually displayed by the Americans themselves. But no one reading the _Trent_ correspondence can fail to realize that the issue of peace or war depended to a great extent upon the method in which the British representative at Washington carried out his task, and that the slightest error in judgment on his part would have rendered the conflict inevitable.

In after years Lord Lyons frequently expressed the opinion that if there had then been telegraphic communication across the Atlantic it would have been impossible to avert war, and it is more than likely that he was correct, although it is improbable that many people realized it at the time.

It is also evident that a judicious silence may occasionally be of inestimable value. It not unfrequently happens that taciturnity is mistaken for profundity--

'O, my Antonio, I do know of those,
That therefore only are reported wise
For saying nothing.'

and many a diplomatist and many a politician has gained a reputation for excessive sagacity by possessing sufficient good sense to conceal his ignorance by maintaining silence, but the restraint which enabled Lord Lyons to refrain from saying a single word upon a question over which the whole population of the United States was buzzing for six or seven weeks was little else than an inspiration.