Chapter VIII: The Franco-German War (2)

The last paragraph of your letter of this morning frightens me not a
little. You say the Prussians complain of a flag of truce being
fired upon and of field hospitals being shot at; and you add: 'You
will probably hear from us about these matters, if Bernstorff makes
a formal representation.' I hope this does not imply that you mean
to adopt all Prussian complaints as British, and make me the channel
of communicating them to the French Government. Please do not forget
that the United States Legation, not this Embassy, represents
Prussian interests in France, and that if you impose upon me such
works of supererogation as making unpleasant communications from
Prussia, you will expose me to well-merited snubs, and damage my
position so much that I shall be able to effect very little in a
real emergency. The particular things which you mention ought not to
be made the subject of diplomatic representation at all: they ought
to be discussed by Flag of Truce between the two Generals.

Why H.M. Government should have taken the inexplicable course of gratuitously offending the French Government is not explained, but at all events the practice was abandoned.

When, towards the end of August, it was announced that the Crown Prince was advancing upon Paris, the Empress, the members of the Government, and the Chambers, proclaimed their determination to stay in the town. The Empress probably feared that if she once left, she might never return; but the decision to attempt to govern a country from a besieged town was so obviously unpractical that it can hardly have been taken seriously, for it was plain that each party in turn would discover that it was essential to be in communication with the outside world. The Empress herself seems to have preserved her fortitude during this unhappy period. 'I saw the Empress yesterday,' wrote Lord Lyons, on September 1, 'for the first time since the war. She was calm and natural, well aware, I think, of the real state of things, but courageous without boasting or affectation. She let me know by La Tour d'Auvergne that she would like to see me. She did not invite, nor did I offer any advice or any assurances or conjectures as to what England or any other Power was likely to do.'

Within three or four days of this interview the Empress herself was a fugitive, the Empire had collapsed without a hand being raised to defend it, and the mob, breaking into the Chamber, had called the Third Republic into existence. The delight of changing one form of government was so great that the French almost forgot for the moment that the enemy was practically at the gates of Paris, but M. Jules Favre, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Provisional Government, lost no time in communicating with Lord Lyons and sounding him with regard to mediation.

According to Jules Favre, the new Government had two courses of action in view. The first was to proclaim loudly that France would fight to the death rather than make any undue concessions to Prussia. This was the course intended for public consumption. The second and practical course was to accept cordially the intervention of Foreign Powers with the object of restricting French sacrifices within endurable limits. In other words, he thought that France ought to submit to paying the expenses of the war, provided her territorial integrity remained intact. As for agreeing to a cession of territory, no man in France would venture even to speak of such a thing, and the Government and the people were equally determined to perish rather than give way upon it. The public, and in particular, the inhabitants of Paris were greatly averse from any pecuniary sacrifice, but he (obviously considering himself to be an exceptionally far-seeing statesman) felt so strongly that a pecuniary sacrifice was necessary, that unless the principle was acceded to, he should feel bound to leave the Government. If, therefore, foreign Governments would offer mediation upon the basis of keeping French territory intact, their intervention would be extremely useful and ought to be admitted gratefully by France. If, however, Foreign Powers could only mediate on the basis of a cession of territory, their interference would be ineffectual and offensive, rather than agreeable to France.

It is rather surprising, in view of this artless opinion, to learn that Jules Favre seemed to be pretty well acquainted with the feeling in Germany; and, at all events, he realized that the one neutral Power who was likely to influence Prussia was Russia. It is also rather surprising to learn that he considered the immediate proclamation of a Republic to be a mistake, due to the impetuosity of the Paris population, and calculated to alienate the French provinces as well as foreign Governments, and he was forced to admit that the new Government was completely under the control of the mob.

On September 6, a surreptitious interview took place between Lord Lyons and M. Thiers, who was not a member of the Government of National Defence.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Sept, 6, 1870.

I have had conversations to-day, both with Thiers and with Jules
Favre. They think they can bring public opinion to accept a peace
with a large pecuniary indemnity to Prussia, but they are afraid of
being thought by the populace to be begging the aid of England at
this moment: so much so, that Thiers was afraid either of coming
here or of my going to his house, and asked me to meet him at
Alphonse de Rothschild's.

I put to him the extreme difficulty of inducing Prussia to accept
mediation without securing some cession of territory, and asked him
whether he would still be in favour of its being offered, even if
Prussia were almost certain to reject it. He considered the Pros and
Cons. On the one hand, he saw danger to France and to Europe, if the
neutral Powers should look quietly on, while France was being
destroyed, without any sort of mark of feeling, or of protest
against her dismemberment. On the other hand, he did not conceal
from himself that it might lower the authority of the other Powers,
and in some sort put a seal upon the predominance of Prussia, if
they spoke in vain and took no steps to give effect to their
language. After some consideration, however, he said he inclined
to the opinion that the offer should at all events be made.

I told Jules Favre that Thiers had hesitated about this. He answered
at once: 'I do not hesitate for a moment. I decidedly wish the
mediation, on the basis of the integrity of our territory, to be
made, whether Prussia accepts it or not.'

Jules Favre was very decided about the armistice. He thought France
could not herself ask for one, in her present position, but it was
plain enough (which is certainly not at all surprising) that he
would be very grateful to any neutral Power who would try to bring
one about.

Time presses, for the Prussians may be said to be almost literally
at the gates.

Thiers pointed out with all his clearness and eloquence the danger
to the different nations of Europe, of the predominance of Prussia,
and dwelt also a good deal upon the risk of a Red Republic, with a
foreign propaganda, etc., etc., if the present Government were
overthrown in consequence of further military reverses, or of a
disgraceful peace. He pointed out that, with the exception of
Rochefort, all the Provisional Government were Moderate Republicans
and honest men. Rochefort was, he said, very manageable and less
dangerous in the Government than out of it. He was in hopes order
would be maintained, but he did not shut his eyes to the fact that
the Government was without the means of resisting the mob of Paris,
if the mob should become excited or enraged by defeats.

There seems to me to be a great deal of depression in Paris. People
seem to feel that an obstinate defence of the town might only lead
to its destruction and leave France more at the mercy of Prussia
than ever. They have also a great dread, that while the respectable
citizens are on the ramparts, the Reds may pillage the town.

How all this may turn out, I do not pretend to guess. The first
days of a Revolution are generally those on which the mob behaves
the best. Hitherto everybody has behaved extremely well, and only a
few people have suffered from the unfortunate epidemic which
prevails and makes every one who cannot speak French well be taken
for a Prussian spy.

Jules Favre has not yet announced his appointment as Minister for
Foreign Affairs, nor, I think, seen any of the Foreign Diplomatists
except me. The circular which he has prepared for Foreign Powers
is very fierce in its language, but it mentions peace, and even
pronounces the word '_traiter_' and he seems to consider it rather a
bold step towards accustoming the people of Paris to the idea of
treating while the Prussians are still on French soil.

Lord Granville, as his letters show, was at first by no means anxious to mediate, but altered his mind, because he was under the impression that the change of government in Paris had made the Prussians more anxious to treat. The French were not to be informed of this altered attitude on the part of their adversary but were to be encouraged to put forward 'elastic' proposals, Bismarck having graciously intimated that he had no objection to England becoming the channel of communication. The objections to mediation were sufficiently obvious. If the basis of a cession of territory were to be adopted, then it would be clearly undesirable for any neutral country to attempt to exercise any pressure upon France, and there would not be anything to be gained by such action, for France could always obtain peace on these terms from Prussia without foreign aid. If, on the other hand, mediation was adopted on the basis of the integrity of French territory, there appeared to be little or no chance of success.

In spite of the unpromising prospects various attempts were made to sound the views of the Prussian Government with regard to an eventual peace on the basis of integrity of territory. The Russians were requested by the French to make known the terms on which the latter were prepared to treat. Communications at Berlin were made by the Italian Government, and the meddling Beust caused it to be announced to the Prussian Government that France would accept an armistice on the condition of territorial integrity. As he was a _persona ingratissima_ to Bismarck, his efforts were not likely to meet with much success, and it was intimated to him and to the others that Bismarck reserved to himself all discussions concerning the conditions of peace, and that the Prussian officials at Berlin had no authority to enter upon such matters.

Before anything definite was decided upon as to how the Prussian Government was to be approached, Thiers started upon his historic mission to the Courts of the various Great Powers with the object of enlisting their practical sympathy on behalf of France.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Sept. 12, 1870.

The provisional Government, though the most moderate and regular I
ever heard of, is sometimes a little sudden in its movements; and
accordingly Thiers's mission was announced in the _Journal Official_
before Jules Favre mentioned it to me, though I must do him the
justice to say that he came at an early hour for the purpose. It is
patriotic of Thiers to undertake it at his age, and with a prospect
at best of assisting to make a bitter peace just supportable. I am
glad you should hear from him the real state of things as to the
internal condition and prospects of society and Government in
France. He will also, I suppose, bring you the last word of the
Provisional Government on peace. My impression is that they will
give up almost anything to save territory; but they are, or at all
events believe themselves, capable of a great _coup de désespoir_
rather than yield that. The Reds within are more likely to give
permanent trouble than the Prussians without.

Some of my colleagues are I am afraid rather cross at my not setting
them the example of going off to Tours. The notion under present
circumstances seems to me most injudicious. Either the French will
make terms as soon as the enemy approach Paris, or being unable to
do so, they will stand a siege and announce a desperate resistance.
Upon this last contingency coming to pass we had better get out of
Paris as fast as we can; but if there is negotiation we may possibly
be of use here, while we could certainly be of none at Tours, to
say nothing of the absurdity of our going off under present
circumstances to Tours, without the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The various interviews which took place between Thiers and Lord Granville have been described at length by Lord Fitzmaurice. In the main, the causes of the war, as expounded by Thiers, were in accordance with those described by Lord Lyons in the letters previously quoted, although he seems to have unjustly laid much of the responsibility upon the Empress, and to have unduly exalted his own prescience, having always been obsessed with the idea that he was a military genius. As for the form of government in France, although an Orleanist himself, he considered that Bonapartists, Bourbons, and Orleanists were all out of the question for the time being, and that a Republic was the only possible solution under existing circumstances. To put it shortly, he had started on his mission through Europe in order to obtain intervention, and had began with England in order to persuade her if possible to use her moral influence in securing peace. This application was supported by much high-sounding rhetoric on the subject of the ancient friendship between England and France, and of the necessity of the former retaining her due ascendency in the Councils of Europe, etc., etc., etc. Exhausted at the conclusion of his eloquent arguments, he went to sleep, as recorded by Lord Granville, without waiting to listen to the latter's reply, and the really practical part of the conversation seems to have been the suggestion that the way should be paved by the British Government for an interview between Jules Favre and Bismarck.

On the next day Thiers proposed that H.M. Government should at once recognize the Republic; but to this Lord Granville demurred, on the ground that it would be contrary to precedent, and that the Republic had at present no legal sanction, because no Constituent Assembly had yet decided on the future government of the country.

Upon the occasion of a third interview, Thiers's arguments seem to have been still more forcible.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, Sept. 16, 1870.

I called again on M. Thiers at his request to-day. He thanked me for
the letter which I had written to Bernstorff, although he thought it
might have been in warmer terms.

He informed me of his plan to go to Petersburg, by France, Turin and
Vienna. He said that by that way he should be within reach of
telegraphic and other news, and could be recalled, if wanted. He
should go back if his concurrence was absolutely necessary to the
conclusion of peace. He admitted that it would be most painful to
sign any peace at this time; that M. Jules Favre, on the contrary,
did not dislike the notion of it.

He spoke sanguinely of the defence of Paris: he counted the number
of armed men and the completeness of the ordnance. He gave some
credence to the report of General Bazaine's bold march. He then came
back to the subject of England's apathy: he dwelt upon the loss to
her dignity; the danger to her and to all Europe of the immense
preponderance of Germany. Austria must lose her German provinces.
What would not 60,000,000 Germans do, led by such a man as Bismarck?
I told him that I would not further discuss that matter with him,
and that his arguments went further than his demands. They were in
favour of an armed intervention. I had no doubt of what public
opinion here was on that point. He spoke of the sad task he had
undertaken, at his age, to go from Court to Court, almost as a
mendicant, for support to his country. I told him that it was most
honourable to him at his age, and after his long public life, to
undertake a task in which it was thought that he might be of use,
and that he ought not to be discontented with his mission here. He
could hardly have hoped, even with his ability, to change the
deliberate course of policy which H.M. Government had adopted, and
which they had announced to Parliament. But his second object, that
of explaining the necessity at this moment of the present Government
in France, and of the merits of M. Favre and General Trochu, and its
leading members, had had much effect upon me, and upon others with
whom he had conversed. We had also during his presence here arranged
the possibility of a meeting between M. Favre and Count Bismarck,
which if it took place (about which I was not sanguine) must, in any
case, be of some use.

We parted in a most friendly manner.

The offer to sound Bismarck on the question of receiving Jules Favre was enthusiastically received by the latter, who had a strong personal feeling on the subject. As, however, he had just concocted the celebrated proclamation that France would never consent to yield 'a stone of her fortresses or an inch of her territory,' he could hardly be said to approach the question of peace in a practical spirit, nor did he receive much assistance from his countrymen in general, for at that period no Frenchman could be found who was willing to admit openly the possibility of a cession of territory, whatever opinions may have been entertained in secret. Shrewder judges than Jules Favre, who, although able and honest, was too emotional for diplomatic work, suspected, with reason, that Bismarck was determined not to negotiate through neutrals, and not to negotiate at all except under the walls of Paris or in Paris itself.

The emissary appointed to approach Bismarck was Malet, who was selected because he was discreet, knew German well, and was already acquainted with Bismarck, but no sooner had he been despatched than the Austrian Ambassador, Metternich, announced that he had received authority from Vienna to go in company with his colleagues to the Prussian Headquarters. Efforts were made to stop Malet, but fortunately without success, and the private letter from the latter (extracts of which have already been published) recounting his interview, is a singularly graphic and interesting presentment of Bismarck's real disposition.

* * * * *

_Mr. Malet to Lord Lyons._

Paris, September 17, 1870.

During my two interviews with Count Bismarck on the 15th he said
some things which it may not be uninteresting to Your Lordship to
know although from the confidential familiar manner in which they
were uttered, I did not feel justified in including them in an
official report.

He stated it was the intention to hang all persons not in uniform
who were found with arms. A man in a blouse had been brought before
him who had represented that he was one of the Garde Mobile: Count
Bismarck decided that as there was nothing in his dress to support
his assertion he must be hung, and the sentence was forthwith
carried into effect. His Excellency added, 'I attach little value to
human life because I believe in another world--if we lived for three
or four hundred years it would be a different matter.' I said that
although some of the Mobile wore blouses, each regiment was dressed
in a uniform manner and that they all bore red collars and stripes
on their wristbands. His Excellency replied that that was not
enough, at a distance they looked like peasants and until they had
a dress like other soldiers those who were taken would be hung.

He said. 'When you were a little boy you wanted your mother to ask a
lady, who was not of the best position in society, to one of her
parties, your mother refused on which you threw yourself on the
ground and said you would not rise till you had got what you wanted.
In like manner we have thrown ourselves on the soil of France and
will not rise till our terms are agreed to.' In speaking of the
surrender of the Emperor he observed, 'When I approached the
carriage in which the Emperor was His Majesty took off his cap to
salute me. It is not the custom for us when in uniform to do more
than touch the cap--however I took mine off and the Emperor's eyes
followed it till it came on a level with my belt in which was a
revolver when he turned quite pale--I cannot account for it. He
could not suppose I was going to use it but the fact of his changing
colour was quite unmistakable. I was surprised that he should have
sent for me, I should have thought I was the last person that he
would wish to receive him because he has betrayed me. All that has
passed between us made me feel confident that he would not go to war
with Germany. He was bound not to do so and his doing it was an act
of personal treachery to me. The Emperor frequently asked whether
his carriages were safe out of Sedan, and a change indicating a
sense of great relief came over him when he received news of their
arrival in our lines.' M. de Bismarck talked in the most
contemptuous terms of M. de Gramont, allowing him only one merit
that of being a good shot. He touched on the publication of the
secret treaty, but his arguments in defence of it were rather too
subtle for me to seize them clearly. He said the secret should have
died with him had France had a tolerable pretext for going to war,
but that he considered her outrageous conduct in this matter
released him from all obligation.

'If,' he remarked, 'a man asks the hand of my daughter in marriage
and I refuse it I should consider it a matter of honour to keep the
proposal a secret as long as he behaved well to me, but if he
attacked me I should be no longer bound. This is quite a different
question from that of publishing a secret proposition at the same
time that you refuse it; you must be a Beust or an Austrian to do
that.'

In talking of the scheme to replace the Emperor on the throne by the
aid of Bazaine and the French Prisoners in Germany, I asked whether
His Majesty was now in a state of health to be willing to undertake
such a work. He answered that he never in his life had seen the
Emperor in the enjoyment of better health and he attributed it to
the bodily exercise and the diet which late events had forced upon
him.

Count Bismarck spoke of Italy and appeared to think that it was in
immediate danger of Republican revolution. He said 'If,' as appeared
likely at the beginning, 'Italy had sided with France such a
movement would have broken out at once; we had everything prepared,
and could have forced on a revolution within three days after a
declaration of war.'

On leaving him he asked me if I had a horse, saying, 'I would offer
you mine but the French are in the habit of firing on our
Parlementaires and as I have only one I cannot afford to lose it.'

From the French point of view there was very little encouragement to be derived from these frank and even brutal opinions, but one result of some importance was obtained, for at the close of the interview, Bismarck intimated to Malet 'as a friend' that if a member of the Government of National Defence chose to come he would be happy to receive him, and added that he need feel no anxiety as to the nature of his reception. Upon returning to Paris, Malet gave this message to Jules Favre at the British Embassy, and although the latter said nothing at the moment, he proceeded shortly afterwards to Ferrières, where the celebrated interview took place, and the opportunity of making peace on easy terms was thrown away, for 'as an old friend' Bismarck had also assured Malet that the Prussians were not going to ask for Alsace or Lorraine, but only for Strasburg and Metz, as a precaution against future attacks.

FOOTNOTES:

[17] As Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[18] French Ambassador at Berlin.

[19] 'The Life of Lord Granville.'

[20] Bavarian Minister.

[21] Prussian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[22] Foreign Minister.