Chapter IX: The Government of National Defence (2)

At this moment I think the French have recovered their hope of
making a successful resistance to the Dismemberment of the country.
I am not very sanguine after all that has occurred, but I do think
the military prospects less gloomy than they have been since Sèdan,
or at all events, since Metz. You will, I conclude, soon have a
really trustworthy account of things in Paris from Claremont.

The Conference, I suppose, must end in Russia carrying her main
point practically, and therefore it only remains to make it as much
as possible an antidote to the scheme of raising her prestige in
Turkey, by the form she adopted, of setting the other parties to the
Treaty at defiance. I am afraid not much can be done towards this. I
should suggest a very careful consideration of the meaning of the
restoration to the Sultan of the right to open the Dardanelles and
the Bosphorus at pleasure, and a very cautious wording of the
article establishing it. Otherwise, considering the weakness of the
Porte, I am afraid the new right might become a snare and a danger
rather than a safeguard. It was so much easier for the Porte to say:
'I cannot' in answer to inconvenient importunity, than it will in
future be to say: 'I will not.' Even under the Treaty prohibition
the Turks had not the firmness they might have had in resisting
demands for vessels to pass. I can conceive circumstances under
which it might suit them to let a Russian fleet through into the
Mediterranean, if only to be rid of it for the time in the Black Sea.

In Busch's 'Bismarck' there are many references to Jules Favre's emotional disposition. At the first interview which took place, a French peasant was told to keep watch outside the house where the Chancellor and Favre were negotiating, and the latter was unable to resist the temptation of making a speech to his fellow-countryman. 'Favre, who had gone into the house with the Chancellor, came out and addressed his countryman in a speech full of pathos and noble sentiments. Disorderly attacks had been made, which, he said, must be stopped. He, Favre, was not a spy, but, on the contrary, a member of the new Government, which had undertaken to defend the interests of the country, and which represented its dignity. In the name of International Law and of the honour of France, he called upon him to keep watch, and to see that the place was held sacred. That was imperatively demanded by his, the statesman's, honour, as well as by that of the peasant, and so forth. The honest rustic looked particularly silly as he listened open-mouthed to all this high falutin, which he evidently understood as little as if it were so much Greek.' Bismarck entertained a well-founded contempt for rhetoric, and Jules Favre's eloquent verbosity was to him only an instance of the way in which Frenchmen could be successfully duped. 'You can give a Frenchman twenty-five lashes, and if you only make a fine speech to him about the freedom and dignity of man of which those lashes are the expression, and at the same time strike a fitting attitude, he will persuade himself that he is not being thrashed.' It is probable too that Jules Favre's inability to appreciate Bismarck's undisguised cynicism contributed to the disfavour with which he was regarded as compared with the other negotiator, Thiers. When during one stage of the negotiations, Jules Favre complained that his position in Paris was very critical, Bismarck proposed to him that he should organize a rising so as to be able to suppress it whilst he still had an army at his disposal: 'he looked at me quite terror-stricken, as if he wished to say, "How bloodthirsty you are!" I explained to him, however, that that was the only right way to manage the mob.'

Whatever the merits or demerits of Jules Favre, a disagreeable surprise was inflicted upon both the British Government and the Government of National Defence by a refusal on the part of Bismarck to give him a safe conduct through the German lines. At first, difficulties were raised in connection with alleged violations of flags of truce; but upon the issue of a proclamation by Jules Favre, Bismarck took advantage of the opportunity in order to prevent his departure for London on the ground that it would imply an official recognition of the Government of National Defence.

At all events, he made such stipulations about the way in which the safe conduct should be applied for, that Jules Favre with his strong sentimental character found it impossible to comply with them, and he was also honourably reluctant to leave Paris just before the bombardment was about to begin. Bismarck, it is clear, was determined that he should not go to London if he could prevent it. The meeting of the Conference was postponed and by the time the final arrangements in connection with it had been made, negotiations for peace had begun and it became necessary for Favre to remain in Paris.

At the close of 1870, the bombardment of Paris had not yet begun: the French hopes of military success were based upon Generals Chanzy and Bourbaki; the German terms of peace were still unknown, and there was every sign that the extreme Republicans were disposed to break with Favre and Trochu and to perpetuate their power by war _à outrance_ and a _loi des suspects_, or reign of terror. The most surprising feature in the situation was that Russia, who had been in fact an active ally of Prussia, by undertaking to watch Austria, and had obtained nothing whatever for France, was in much higher favour than the other blameless neutrals, it being fondly imagined that the Emperor Alexander's influence would be successful in obtaining favourable peace terms; and so adroitly did the Russians play their cards, that they persuaded Moltke that the 'malevolent neutrality' of England was the sole cause of the continuance of the war. Such at least was the purport of a communication which the latter made to Mr. Odo Russell at Versailles.

* * * * *

Bordeaux, Jan. 7, 1871.

The French claim a success at Bapaume, but prudent people are
already speculating on what the consequences of the fall of Paris
will be. It is very generally thought that Gambetta will place
himself at the head of the ultra-Republicans, throw himself into
Lyons, or some other southern town, and proclaim war and democracy
_à outrance_. But what will Bismarck do at Paris? Will he try to
obtain a government with whom he may make a reasonable peace, or
will he promote war and anarchy with a view to ruin France utterly,
and induce her to accept a monarch from his hand? In the former case
he will perhaps either summon the old Legislative Body, or get
together some meeting of Notables, who might appoint a provisional
government to sanction a National Constituent Assembly as soon as
possible, and in the meantime to treat upon the preliminaries of
peace. The Moderates and chiefs of the old parties (except the
ultra-Republican) might be not unwilling either to attend a summons
of the old Corps Législatif, or to some other temporary body; for
they are excessively dissatisfied with their present position, and
think they see symptoms of the approach of the reign of terror and
of a violent socialistic government.

As for Bismarck's notion of bringing back the Emperor at the head of
the captive army, it is, I suppose, very doubtful whether the
Emperor would give in to it, still more doubtful whether the
released army would, and quite certain that the country would loathe
a sovereign thus imposed upon it. If however Bismarck is bent upon
it, it must be supposed that he intends to make some concessions to
the Emperor to make his return to France palatable to the nation. If
so, Belgium will be in danger, and Holland also, and Bismarck may
return to one of his former projects of coming to an understanding
with France, through the Emperor, and dealing with the small states
just as he pleases. I suppose Russia will look after Denmark as well
as she can. These dangers may seem visionary but I don't think they
are so visionary as to make it superfluous to consider how
they may be guarded against. Hateful as it would be to the towns and
the educated classes, to have a sovereign imposed upon them by
Prussia, it must not be forgotten that the peasants are still
Bonapartists, and that a plébiscite in favour of the Empire might be
managed.

I think I have made them feel here that you have been very friendly
and considerate about Jules Favre.

At the opening of the year 1871, the hope of relieving Paris depended upon the three armies which the energy of Gambetta and the Government of National Defence had created in the North, Centre, and West, and on paper the prospects of the French were far from hopeless, for their forces in numbers far exceeded those of the Germans. In Paris alone there were supposed to be something like half a million fighting men, and the three armies above mentioned amounted to between four and five hundred thousand men. The Germans had 220,000 men in position round Paris, their forces in the provinces were numerically inferior to the French armies opposed to them, and the strain upon them must undoubtedly have been severe. The quality of Gambetta's levies, however, was unequal to the task, and as each of the French armies succumbed in turn, the fall of Paris became inevitable. The bombardment, which had been postponed as long as possible, in the hope that internal disorders would precipitate the capitulation, began in January.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, January 12, 1871.

If the telegraphic intelligence which is published as having come by
this balloon is to be depended upon, the Prussians have begun the
actual bombardment of the town of Paris itself, without giving
Diplomatists, Neutrals, or any other non-combatants a chance of
withdrawing. To say nothing of other feelings, this makes me very
uneasy about the English left in the place. Most of them have
perhaps only themselves to blame for staying in despite of warning
but there must be many who had valid reasons, or were without the
means to come away.

People are very much alarmed as to what may happen inside the town
for the last two or three days, if a surrender become inevitable.
There are two or three hundred thousand people (workmen and their
families) who have a positive interest in the continuance of the
siege, during which they are supported by the Government without
being called upon to expose themselves, or at all events without in
fact exposing themselves to much danger.

The intention of not listening to terms of peace, including any
cession of territory, whether Paris be taken or not, is as loudly
and as positively proclaimed here as ever. I am afraid Bismarck, who
certainly does not at all understand the French character, and who
does not appear to have a very delicate consideration for anybody's
feelings, may add to the difficulties of peace by the manner in
which his conditions are propounded, as well as by the substance of
them.

The Diplomatists here are beginning to talk hypothetically of what
they should do if one or more Governments should be set up in France
on the fall of Paris. I do not think much good comes of giving
opinions beforehand on supposed cases. It is of course clear that
the Diplomatic Body cannot go wandering about France in the suite of
any set of men, who are not beyond dispute the _de facto_ Government
of the country. And I suppose, _caeteris paribus_, if there be a
Government in the Capital that must be taken to be the Government
for the time being. It is so impossible to foresee what will happen,
that I do not ask you for instructions.

Chaudordy on the other hand, continues to press for the immediate
recognition of the Government of National Defence by England--saying
that they do not want any fresh letters of credence to be presented,
but would be quite satisfied with a simple note declaring that Her
Majesty's Government entered into official relations with the
existing Government in France. I conclude that Gambetta urges him to
do this, with a view to strengthen the position of the National
Defence Government or of what remains of it, if Paris falls; and on
the other hand Chaudordy himself would be very glad to have obtained
some decided result during his Administration of the _extra muros_
foreign Department. He has certainly on the whole acted with skill
in a very difficult position, and France and the Government ought to
congratulate themselves on having him to act for them. I don't think
that Jules Favre or any member of the Government would have done
anything like as well. But in France more even than in other
countries a little éclat is more appreciated than years of useful
unobtrusive labour.

Thiers has told me in the strictest confidence that when he was at
Versailles Bismarck offered to make peace on the basis of a
pecuniary indemnity, the retention of Strasburg and Alsace, and the
restoration to France of Metz and Lorraine. They seem to have
brought the matter sufficiently into shape to be submitted to the
Government at Paris. Thiers wanted Trochu, Picard and Jules Favre to
come to him to the outposts, but, as you may recollect, only Favre
came. Thiers offered to take upon himself the responsibility and
odium of signing a treaty on this basis, if the Government would
make him its plenipotentiary, but Favre declared that it would be
impossible even to mention any cession of territory even to the
people of Paris.

The most astonishing thing to me perhaps is the buoyancy of the
French finances. I understand that the Government have by strong
persuasion obtained from the Banque de France a new loan (it is said
of upwards of twenty millions sterling) and this will keep them
going for the present. There is already however, some difficulty in
circulating the 'bons du Trésor' even at a discount.

I had observed the advertisements in the second columns of the
_Times_ and thought of trying to get the paper occasionally into
Paris. In fact however the advertisers have exactly the same means
of sending letters and telegrams to Paris that I have. I will
nevertheless try. No special help can be expected from the
Government. It is only by using the thinnest paper and reducing the
despatches by means of photography that they can bring them within
the weight which pigeons or secret messengers are able to carry.

There is no reason for doubting the correctness of this important statement made by Thiers, and it only shows how much more competent he was to conduct the negotiations than Jules Favre, and what a much better judge he was of the real situation than Gambetta. It would indeed be one of the ironies of history if the failure of Picard and Trochu to meet him at the outposts on that eventful day in November was the cause of the loss of a province to France, and of a vast addition to the war indemnity.

It was not long before a succession of hideous disasters demonstrated the hopelessness of the French situation. General Chanzy, in command of the army of the West, although in superior force, was completely defeated at Le Mans on January 12th. On the 19th, the Northern army under Faidherbe was defeated at St. Quentin and ceased practically to take any further part in the war. On the same date a sortie from Paris on a large scale was repulsed with heavy loss, and produced amongst other results the resignation of Trochu, a sanguinary riot in the town, and the liberation from prison of Flourens and other revolutionaries. The crowning misfortune was the memorable _débâcle_ of Bourbaki, one of the most tragic episodes in modern warfare. It was evident that further resistance was useless, and the fictions which had so long sustained the spirits of the defenders of Paris were finally destroyed. On January 23, the unfortunate Jules Favre presented himself at Versailles and as there was no further question of 'pas une pierre de nos forteresses etc.,' an armistice was finally agreed to on the 28th. Under the provisions of the armistice it was arranged that elections should be held as soon as possible for a National Assembly in order that the question of the continuance of the war, and upon what conditions peace should be made, might be decided. Jules Favre, unlucky to the last, stipulated that the National Guards should be permitted to retain their arms, a concession which he had cause bitterly to regret before long.

The news of the armistice was received at Bordeaux with rather less indignation than had been expected, but Jules Favre was loudly denounced for not having included in it Bourbaki's army, the fact being that Bismarck, who was well aware of the ruin which threatened the force, had expressly refused to do so. Gambetta, while not actually repudiating the armistice, issued violent proclamations, loudly denouncing its authors, declaring that his policy as Minister of War remained unchanged, and urging that the period of the armistice should be employed in organizing the forces which were destined to free France from the invaders. These proclamations were followed by a decree in which the liberty-loving democrat enacted that no person should be eligible for the new Assembly who was connected with the royal families which had hitherto reigned in France, or any one who had served in any capacity as an official under the Empire. This outrageous proceeding produced a protest from Bismarck on the ground that it was a violation of the freedom of election stipulated in the armistice, and as Gambetta continued recalcitrant, the Paris section of the Government of National Defence, which included, amongst others, Favre, Trochu, and Jules Ferry, issued another decree on February 4, annulling that of Gambetta. Representatives of the National Defence Government from Paris arrived at Bordeaux on February 6, and upon that day Gambetta resigned the office of Minister of War, and Emmanuel Arago was appointed in his place. As Paris was now again in communication with the outside world, the opportunity was taken, not only of cancelling Gambetta's decrees, but of getting rid of the Delegation Government, of which he had been the virtual dictator.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, Feb. 7, 1871.

So far as we can judge here (and we have not very good means of
judging) the moderate Conservative 'Ticket' is likely to be carried
in most of the Elections. The result would be an assembly composed
of men who in their own hearts will wish for peace, and whose
Constituents will heartily wish for it. But there is always fear of
each individually thinking it necessary to express for himself in
public heroic sentiments, and of no one being willing to bell the
cat and sign or even vote for ratifying the Treaty. Much of course
will depend upon the terms. The cession of Alsace might possibly be
submitted to, if it were distinctly apparent that it was the only
means of saving Lorraine. The terms of the Armistice would make one
hope that Bismarck is at least willing to avoid propounding
conditions unnecessarily irritating.

Probably the most prudent thing for France to do would be to accept
anything like reasonable terms of peace at once--for every day's
delay in the departure of the German troops from the country,
retards most seriously the beginning of the recovery from the
misfortunes military, political, and financial, which are exhausting
the springs of life. It is nevertheless very probable that the
Assembly, or the Government it appoints, will make a solemn official
appeal to Europe for its mediation. They may also ground a special
appeal to Europe on the plea that the people of the Provinces to be
ceded, ought to have a voice in the matter. In fact they have much
to say to Europe, to which it will be difficult to make an answer.
Bismarck, however, seems to be ready to snap his fingers at Europe.

Chaudordy naturally declines as far as possible the responsibility
of talking or taking any measures, as he is now the servant of a
Government, whose existence will probably end in a few days.
Privately he urges strongly, with a view to public opinion in
France, that England should be very prompt in recognizing officially
the Government appointed by the Assembly. In this I think he is
right.

Prudent men (Thiers included) appear to think that at all events as
a temporary measure, a moderate republic, as the form of Government
least likely to produce dissension should be adopted. Indeed, of the
various pretenders, no one I suppose would wish to be in any way
responsible for such a peace as must be concluded. Some people
indeed apprehend that the Assembly may be too conservative, or as it
is called, reactionary, but I don't think this need give any one but
the Rouges the least uneasiness.

The appearance now is that Gambetta will not go beyond legal
opposition, and that he will content himself with putting himself at
the head of the ultra-democratic and '_guerre-à-outrance_' party in
the Assembly. In fact there is no symptom that an attempt to set
himself up, by the aid of the mob in the great towns, in opposition
to the Assembly would have any success. He is not himself by
character inclined to such courses, but he has people about him who
are.

Jules Favre is fiercely attacked first for having concluded an
armistice which did not comprehend the Army of the East, and
secondly for not having mentioned this exception when he announced
the armistice to the Delegation here. This last proceeding (which I
attribute to his want of business-like habits), is of course utterly
indefensible. It may however have been rather convenient than
otherwise to Gambetta, as it enables him to attribute to this cause
the flight into Switzerland, which I suppose, the Army of the East
must at all events have been driven to. The attack against him for
not surrendering Paris at discretion, and stipulating nothing for
the Provinces, seems to me to be more unfair--for what would the
Provinces have said if he had let loose upon them the forces, which
after the occupation of the forts might have been spared from the
German Army round Paris.

Barring accidents, there seems reason to hope that we shall tide
over the time to the meeting of the Assembly next week, pretty
quietly.

At all events the suspension of the bloodshed and other horrors is a
relief which I feel every moment. Four Prussian shells fell into the
small convent near the Val de Grace at Paris in which I have a
niece--but providentially neither she nor any of her fellow nuns
were hurt.

The elections to the new National Assembly took place on February 8, all political groups participating, and resulted more or less in accordance with general expectation. In Paris, where there were many abstentions, extreme men like Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo, Gambetta and Rochefort were returned, and the example of Paris was to some extent followed by the big towns, but the general tone of the Assembly proved to be conservative, and almost reactionary, the sole question submitted to the candidates having been that of Peace or War. In effect, the feeling apparently predominant in the minds of the majority of the electors was aversion from the Government of National Defence, a feeling naturally accentuated by the recent crushing disasters, and the result was to throw discredit upon the Republican system of Government with which the Ministers were identified. But although the Assembly was in reality anti-Republican it was not the opinion of experienced politicians that it would be advisable to proclaim a monarchy; still less, that any one of the rival dynasties should be called immediately to the throne. On the contrary, they considered that a republic, moderate in its principles, and perhaps tacitly understood to be only temporary, would best promote union for the present, and that under such a form of Government it might be easier to obtain a ratification of such a peace as appeared to be possible, and to carry the painful measures necessary to give effect to it. It was also thought that if a monarchy were to be established it would have a better chance of enduring if the dynasty postponed its accession until the wounds from which the country was suffering should begin to heal, and that the all-important choice of a sovereign should be postponed to a calmer period. So far as could be judged, if a dynasty were decided upon at all, the chances appeared to be in favour of the House of Orleans, but there were nevertheless, amongst the members returned, between one hundred and fifty to two hundred Legitimist supporters of the Comte de Chambord, and not a few Bonapartists.

As for the all-important question of peace or war which the Assembly was to be called upon to decide, it was evident that the majority of the electors, in voting against the existing Government, intended to vote at the same time for peace, and therefore the majority of the members entered it with pacific intentions; but they were not prepared to vote for peace at any price, and although conditions which would have been scouted two months earlier were now considered to be worthy of discussion, the exaction of immoderate and humiliating demands might again arouse the spirit of desperate resistance, especially when argued under the excitement produced by heated parliamentary debates.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, Feb. 10, 1871.

Thiers, Dufaure, and Grévy are likely, so far as one can judge,
without knowing the result of the Paris elections, to take the lead
in the National Assembly. Grévy is avowedly a moderate Republican,
and the two others are for a moderate Republic, as a transitional
government to prepare the way for a Constitutional Monarchy. Such,
at least, are certainly Thiers's views, but I am speaking rather
without book about Dufaure.

What I am most afraid of is that Bismarck's conditions may be so
hard as to turn the really pacific Assembly into a war _à outrance_
one. The war could not in all probability go on long, but it might
give us three months more of bloodshed, destruction and misery, and
add to the difficulty of establishing eventually a good government
here. An Assembly elected two months ago would have been very
different from the present one, supposing one could have been
elected at all; but, two months ago, Gambetta would have been strong
enough to reject the armistice and refuse to convoke the Assembly.
His entourage had even now prepared warrants for arrest of his
colleagues, with a view to his assuming the Dictatorship and going
on with the war without an Assembly, but he is wiser and less wicked
than they. He will probably make a vigorous leader of the violent
Republican opposition in the Assembly.

Of course under present circumstances I have nothing to do but to
stay here, as it will be for the present the seat of government. It
will be a comfort to have a whole real government, and not half a
one, to deal with.

Chaudordy has at last come round to the opinion that a
plenipotentiary should be named to the Conference, simply to speak
for France on the Black Sea question, without any _arrière pensée_
about bringing in other matters. He said he would telegraph as well
as he could _en clair_ to let Jules Favre know this. Bismarck will
not let telegrams in cypher through, and there are no more pigeons.

What the French are craving for is some open, patent sympathy and
support from us. They would give us comparatively little thanks for
taking unostentatious steps in their favour with the Germans, though
such steps were much better calculated to obtain something for them.

The extreme desirability of showing some evident sign of sympathy with France was impressed upon Her Majesty's Government who were urged to lose no time in doing so, with a view to the future relations between the two countries. The French, who certainty are not less prone than other nations in seeking to attribute a large share of their misfortunes to the shortcomings of other people, were inclined to put the blame of their calamities and disasters as much as possible, upon the Neutral Powers, who had not interfered actively in their defence; and England, who had certainly exerted herself more than any other Power in seeking practical means for making peace attainable, was very unjustly singled out for peculiar obloquy. This feeling had arisen partly because the long alliance between the two countries had made the French expect more from England than from others; partly because other Powers had ingeniously represented that their own inertness had been caused by the unwillingness of England to come forward, and had also, on various occasions, put England forward as the leading Power among the Neutrals, in order to give her the greatest share of the unpopularity which accompanies neutrality. French feeling was, therefore, at the time highly irritable on the subject of England, and it was suggested that a good impression would be created if Her Majesty's Government would be very prompt in recognizing whatever Government were adopted by the new Assembly, even if it did not assume a permanent character. Another suggestion was, that if the terms offered by the Germans appeared unendurably hard, the French might make an appeal to the rest of Europe; that appeal would probably take the form of a request for the mediation of the Great Neutral Powers, or for the assembling of an European Congress, and an immediate compliance on the part of England with either of these requests would go far towards re-establishing good feeling. Even if Germany rejected all intervention, this would not affect the impression made by the action of England in responding to the appeal of France, and although more could probably be obtained by the exercise of quiet and unostentatious influence upon Germany, yet nothing that might be obtained in that way would have anything like the same value in the eyes of France as an open declaration of sympathy with her and an avowed advocacy of her cause, even if no practical result followed. In short, what was required, at that particular moment, was a policy of sympathetic gush.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, Feb. 16, 1870.

Your telegrams announcing that you have adjourned the Conference,
and that I may recognize the new Government immediately have been a
great satisfaction to me. I hope we shall bring French feeling round
to its old cordial state, if we can give them a little patent
sympathy in their misfortunes. The Commercial Treaty will be a
trouble hereafter, but it was in great danger even before the fall
of the Empire, and I hope will be let remain quiet until the time
approaches for giving the notice next February.

I had a confidential conversation with Thiers last night. He seems
to have taken already _de facto_ the direction of affairs, and will
probably be given it _de jure_ by the Assembly to-morrow. He is very
anxious to keep the three fractions of the Chamber who are for order
at home and for a reasonable policy about peace together, in order
to resist the Reds. He means therefore to take moderate Republicans,
Legitimists and Orleanists into his Ministry. Jules Favre is to be
his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and there will of course be
moderate Orleanists and Legitimists. If Thiers can succeed in
getting the united support of Orleanists, Legitimists, and moderate
Republicans, he expects to have a working majority of nearly
three-quarters of the Assembly. I suppose his difficulty will arise
from the impatience of the Orleanists, who are believed to have
nearly half the seats in the Assembly, and who are impatient and
hungry after their long deprivation of the sweets of power.

Thiers told me that he should take great pains to select men of
station and ability for his diplomatic appointments. In furtherance
of his policy of conciliating all parties, he supports M. Grévy, a
moderate Republican, for the Presidency of the Assembly.

I like Jules Favre and have a good opinion of his character, but I
don't think that he has hitherto shown himself to be skilful as a
diplomatist or a negotiator. Thiers says however that he now gets on
extremely well with Bismarck. There is however a very general
opinion that Thiers means to go himself to Versailles to negotiate
the Peace. He did not give me to understand that he intended to do
so, and there are serious inconveniences in the head of the
Government's being away from the Assembly and the centre of affairs,
to say nothing of the ordinary objections to the chief of a
Government conducting negotiations in his own person.

The feeling in the Assembly yesterday when Alsace and Lorraine were
mentioned was strong and universal, and gives reason to doubt
whether they will even now be brought to vote a cession of
territory. In that case I suppose the only remedy would be a
plébiscite, if a cession of territory is absolutely insisted upon.
The Assembly might refer the question to the people, and I suppose
that, in their present mood, the great majority of the population
voting secretly, would vote Peace and not War, and that the vote
might be taken in a very short time. I don't know however what the
Germans would say to the notion, and I don't think such a plan of
throwing off the responsibility worthy of the Assembly, or a happy
precedent for Parliamentary Government.

Of what Thiers means to do respecting the definitive government of
the country, he gave me no hint. His present policy is to try and
get France out of her present straits by the united help of all the
reasonable parties, and not to give any indication as to the future
which might have the effect of alienating any of them.

As had been expected, Thiers proceeded himself to Versailles to negotiate the Peace preliminaries. He was obviously the person best fitted to do so, for he was at once the most moderate and capable amongst Frenchmen, the least unwilling to make terms in conformity with the exigencies of the situation, and the only man in a position to carry his way in the Assembly.

On February 26, the preliminaries of Peace were signed and contained even harsher conditions than had been anticipated, but the military position of France was so absolutely hopeless that resistance to them was impracticable. The war indemnity was reduced from six milliards to five, but this constituted the sole success of the French negotiators, unless the formal entry of the German troops into Paris might be taken as a somewhat barren substitute for the restoration of Belfort; certain matters of detail, chiefly connected with finance, were postponed for future consideration at Frankfort.

In view of what has already been written respecting the secret negotiations which took place during the campaign, it is impossible not to be struck with the heroic folly displayed by the French in the latter stages of the war. If it is true that their gallant struggle under the stimulus of Gambetta and the Government of National Defence inspired the admiration of the world, it is equally obvious that human life and treasure were ruthlessly wasted in a hopeless cause. Bismarck, it is well known, was strongly opposed to any accession of territory, beyond what was absolutely necessary, and would have much preferred a pecuniary compensation. If, instead of following the lead of Gambetta, the counsels of Thiers had been adopted, peace would have been made long before the fall of Paris became imminent; millions of money would have been saved, thousands of lives would not have been uselessly sacrificed, and Lorraine would have remained French instead of becoming the chief contributory cause towards undying hatred of the German people.

Thiers returned to Bordeaux upon the accomplishment of his melancholy mission, and a debate took place in the Assembly on the question of the ratification of the Peace preliminaries. The discussion gave opportunity for much recrimination and for much display of emotion, especially on the part of Victor Hugo, but Thiers's success was a foregone conclusion and the Peace preliminaries were accepted by 546 votes to 107.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, March 2, 1871.

I suppose we may say peace at last. I hear that the discoveries made
by the Committees on the Military Forces and on the Finances were so
overwhelming, as to convince every member that defence was
absolutely impossible. This reduced the debate yesterday to mere
idle vapouring on the part of the Opposition. One speech was simply
absurd--that of Victor Hugo. The rest were perhaps fair speeches,
but there was no eloquence worthy of the occasion, and there was an
evident unreality about the Opposition. The majority had determined
not to speak. Thiers's few words were very telling; no one but
Thiers could have got so many to vote; the fear was that a great
number would abstain from voting, and so the Ratification would
either not be carried at all, or be carried by too small a majority
to pledge the country.

Chaudordy did not vote, he hankered to the last after an appeal to
the Neutral Powers. Even supposing the Germans would have given time
by prolonging the Armistice, which they certainly would not, I don't
think France would have gained anything by the appeal. Either
Bismarck would have peremptorily refused to let the Neutrals have
anything to say; or, if, _par impossible_, he had made some
concessions, he would in return of course have required them to
acquiesce explicitly in his other terms; and this, I think, would
have been as bad for France, and worse for the dignity of the
Neutrals themselves, than the present state of things. At least we
are free from any sort of sign of approval of the monstrous
conditions Prussia has imposed by sheer force.

How France is to be governed, and how the milliards are to be paid,
are hard questions. The majority of the Assembly, which is decidedly
anti-republican, hardly expects to establish a Government to its
taste, without some actual fighting with the Reds in Paris and other
large towns. It therefore does not at all like the idea of moving
the Assembly to Paris. Thiers, I think, wishes to go to Paris, or at
least to move the Assembly to some place near enough to enable the
Executive Government to be carried on in Paris. The inconveniences
of the present roving system are manifold; and I cannot help
thinking that the sooner the Government settles in the Capital, and
has its fight (if fight there really must be) with the Mob over, the
better.

As to what the New Government is to be, there would, with the
present Assembly in its present mood, be, one would think, little
difficulty in getting a large majority for a Monarchy, if the fusion
between the Legitimists and the Orleanists were once decidedly and
irrevocably made, and I suppose the Moderate Republicans would not
hold aloof from such a Government, provided it was _bonâ fide_
parliamentary. Thiers, I believe, still thinks that for the present
a Moderate Republic is the best compromise between all opinions, and
the form of Government which least disunites Frenchmen. He has now
immense influence, but the claimants of the throne and their
supporters in the Assembly seem to be already impatient; and Thiers
will have nothing but painful measures to bring forward, and will be
accused of desiring to perpetuate his own power.

I am afraid our Commercial Treaty is in the greatest danger. With
Thiers as head of the Government and as Minister of Finance, and the
popular feeling hostile to free trade and not in good humour with
England, it will be strange if we hold our own about the Treaty, or
a liberal tariff in France. It was indeed very doubtful whether the
Treaty could be maintained even under the Constitutional Empire.

Grant's Message has for the moment turned the wrath of the French
from the Neutrals to the Americans. It is strange that the
Americans, who are so abominably thin skinned themselves, never show
the least consideration for the national feelings of other Peoples.
The French are, of course, peculiarly sensitive at this moment, and
prone to resent anything like a demonstration of disregard for them.
I am truly thankful that you stopped Walker's entering Paris with
the Germans.

I have not been able to speak to Thiers since he came back, but I am
going to present my letters of Credence to him this evening.

The harshness of the peace conditions shocked Lord Granville, who thought them not only intolerable to France, but a dangerous menace to the sacred idol of free trade.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, March 1, 1871.

_Vae Victis_ indeed! How hard the conquerors have been, and what a
mistake in a great country like Germany to give up all direction of
its affairs to one bold unscrupulous man!

We do not believe in France being able to bear the burden which has
been put upon her.

I presume one of the results will be to put protectionist duties on
all imported articles. I do not think we should complain much. We
shall lose to a certain degree, but infinitesimally as compared with
France. You had better, in conversation with Thiers, and others, say
that you shall regret it on French account. They want money, which
is to be chiefly got in England. Here, rightly or wrongly, we
believe that protective duties are most injurious to the revenue to
which money-lenders look for their interest. If it is known that
Thiers means to go in for large armaments and for protection,
self-interest will shut up the hoards here.

Peace having now at length been assured, there arose the question of where the new Assembly was to establish itself, and as there was an only too well-founded suspicion that Paris was no place for a conservative chamber with a hankering after a monarchy, Versailles was eventually selected.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Bordeaux, March 6, 1871.

Thiers asked me yesterday whether I thought it would be advisable
for him to bring the state of affairs between France and Germany
before the Conference in London.

I did not very well see what there was to submit to the Conference,
as the preliminaries of peace were signed and could not be altered.
I thought it however better to avoid any discussion on this point,
and to say decidedly that in my opinion it would be very unadvisable
to do anything of the kind. I told him that I thought it would be a
particularly bad opportunity to take, if he wished to consult the
European Powers; that the German Plenipotentiary would say, and say
with reason, that his Government had entered into a Conference for a
specific purpose and was not to be entrapped into an extraneous
discussion, that in this view he would no doubt be strongly
supported by the Russian, and that probably none of the
Plenipotentiaries would approve of a proceeding, which would
certainly retard the business for which the Conference had met, and
might very likely break it off altogether.

I think Thiers rather asked my opinion pour 'l'acquit de sa
conscience,' than from having himself any strong desire to attempt
to bring his affairs before the Conference. At any rate he gave a
very conclusive argument against doing so himself, for he said that
it might have the effect of delaying the Prussian evacuation of the
neighbourhood of Paris.

He hopes to get the half milliard necessary to get the Prussians out
of the forts on the North side of the Seine, before the end of the
month. He speaks altogether more hopefully of the financial
prospects than any one else whom I have heard. He says Bismarck was
extremely hard about the money, and that the negociation was nearly
broken off altogether on the question of Belfort. On this question
he believes Bismarck was with him, and had a tremendous fight to
obtain leave from the Emperor and Moltke to make the concession.
Strange as it may appear Thiers seems really to have a sort of
liking for Bismarck personally, and to believe that if he had been
let have his own way by the _militaires_, he would have been much
kinder to France.

It has been generally supposed that the Assembly will adjourn to
Versailles, and St. Germain has also been mentioned; but Thiers told
me yesterday that he should himself propose Fontainebleau. He would
like himself to take it to Paris, as soon as the Prussians are out
of the forts, but the majority will not hear of putting themselves
so near the Belleville mob. I think it will be a great mistake not
to go to Paris, and I hope Thiers will pluck up a spirit, and carry
his point. He said something about being glad to have me near him at
Fontainebleau, but I do not know that it was more than a compliment.
At any rate I am myself strongly of opinion that the best thing for
me to do is to go to Paris as soon as possible, and re-establish the
Embassy there on the normal footing. If there should be (which I
doubt) any necessity for my going to Thiers or Fontainebleau or
elsewhere for more than a few hours at a time I should still propose
to have the headquarters of the Embassy in the Faubourg St. Honoré
and to treat my own occasional absence as accidental. In fact to act
as I did when invited to Compiègne in the Emperor's time. I hope to
be in Paris by the end of this week, or at latest, the beginning of
next.

The Ambassador and his staff returned to Paris on March 14, finding the Embassy quite uninjured, no traces of the siege in the neighbourhood, and the town merely looking a little duller than usual. They were enchanted to be back, and little suspected that in three or four days they would again be driven out.

Previous attempts on the part of the Red Republicans to overthrow the Government of National Defence during the siege had met with failure, but Favre's stipulation that the National Guards should be permitted to retain their arms gave the Revolutionary Party its opportunity. The new Government was obviously afraid to act, and matters came to a crisis when an ineffectual and half-hearted attempt was made to remove some guns which had been seized by National Guards. Regular troops brought up against the latter refused to fight and fraternized with their opponents; two generals were shot under circumstances of great brutality, a Revolutionary Central Committee took possession of the Hotel de Ville and proclaimed the Commune, and the Government withdrew such regular troops as remained faithful to Versailles. On March 18, the insurgents were completely masters of the right bank of the Seine, and on the following day an emissary from the French Foreign Office appeared at the Embassy with the information that the Government had been forced to retire to Versailles, and that as it was no longer able to protect the Diplomatic Body at Paris, it was hoped that the Representatives of Foreign Powers would also repair to Versailles with the least possible delay. Nearly all of these did so at once, but Lord Lyons with his pronounced sedentary tastes had had quite enough of moving about and decided to wait for instructions.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 20, 1871.

We are in a strange state indeed. How it will end, who shall say.
The Prussians may be glad of a chance to wipe away the absurdity of
their three days' occupation by a more serious entrance, and it may
suit their rulers to put down Belleville, with a view to checking
the progress of Republicanism. I should think however it would be
wiser of them with their hatred of France, to leave the Parisians to
accomplish their own ruin.

A good many National Guards have gone out towards Versailles,
whether with the view of making a serious attack on the Government
and the Assembly remains to be seen. It seems to be doubtful whether
there are _any_ troops, except perhaps the Papal Zouaves on
whom the Government can depend.

The proclamations of the Central Committee in the _Journal
Officiel_, which I send you officially, are worth reading. They seem
to me to be in form much more calm, dignified and sensible than the
proclamations of the Government of National Defence used to be. In
substance they are not specimens of political knowledge and wisdom.

It is to be hoped that the Assembly will not make matters worse by
violent and ill-considered resolutions. I suppose it will be furious
with Thiers for having brought it to Versailles, and it is on the
cards that it may be really attacked there to-day by the Parisians.
Any way, I should not be at all surprised if the Assembly
transferred itself to some dismal French provincial town.

Instructions, however, were shortly received to proceed to Versailles, and he betook himself there on the 21st, taking with him Wodehouse and Sheffield, and leaving Malet, Colonel Claremont, Lascelles,[27] and Saumarez[28] at the Embassy.

At Versailles complete ignorance appeared to prevail as to the actual situation; Jules Favre knew nothing, and either the Government had no plan or was not prepared to disclose it; but, as, at all events, during the early stage of the conflict, railway communication with Versailles was not interrupted, it was possible to come up to Paris occasionally at the risk of being seized by the Communists as a spy, and see how matters were progressing.

Thiers, in the early days of the Civil War affected to believe that the revolt would speedily be brought to a satisfactory termination, and the knowledge that he personally was largely responsible for the existing situation doubtless prompted him to minimise the danger as much as possible. By withdrawing the regular troops to Versailles, he had left the well-disposed inhabitants of Paris at the mercy of an armed revolutionary mob, and if a renewed bombardment or fresh Prussian occupation of the town was the result, the fault would have been largely his. The Assembly too found itself in a ridiculous position; it had been brought to Versailles because it had been represented that the Administration could not be carried on away from the capital, and no sooner did it arrive at Versailles than the whole Government was driven out of Paris.

The optimism with which Thiers viewed the progress of events in Paris was not shared by onlookers at Versailles. They could not help seeing that the members of the Central Committee were continually gaining ground, and had now obtained control of the whole or very nearly the whole of the city: that the slaughter of the 'Men of Order' in the Rue de la Paix on March 22, had left the Red Republicans the masters of the day, and that the communal elections on March 26, had given a semblance of regular authority to the revolutionaries. Thiers, who had taken the whole management of the affair into his own hands, and was still unwilling to use force, now endeavoured to conciliate the Communists by a proclamation conceding complete recognition of the municipal franchise, the right to elect all officers of the National Guard, including the Commander-in-Chief; a modification of the law on the maturity of bills of exchange, and a prohibition to house owners and lodging-house keepers to give their lodgers notice to quit. These concessions to blackmail were, however, considered insufficient by the implacable revolutionary leaders, and negotiations broke down when it was demanded that the Communal Council should supersede the Assembly whenever the two bodies might come into collision, and that the control of finance should be vested in the former. It was evident that civil war could no longer be avoided, and in view of the doubts which existed respecting the reliability of the army at Versailles, the gravest apprehensions were felt as to the result of the struggle. Lord Granville was convinced that the Prussians would re-enter Paris and restore the Empire, although the Emperor, while praising the Prussians in the course of a conversation with the Duke of Cambridge, had recently stated that no one could remain in France who was brought there by the enemy.