Chapter XVIII: Preface (16)
Let us inquire into the actual participation of this bank in the collection of the revenue. Prior to the passage of the act of 1800, requiring the collectors of those ports of entry, at which the principal bank, or any of its offices, are situated, to deposit with them the custom-house bonds, it had not the smallest agency in the collection of the duties. During almost one moiety of the period to which the existence of this institution was limited, it was nowise instrumental in the collection of that revenue, to which it is now become indispensable! The collection, previous to 1800, was made entirely by the collectors; and even at present, where there is one port of entry, at which this bank is employed, there are eight or ten at which the collection is made as it was before 1800. And, sir, what _does_ this bank or its branches, where resort is had to it? It does not adjust with the merchant the amount of duty, nor take his bond; nor, if the bond is not paid, coerce the payment by distress or otherwise. In fact, it has no active agency whatever in the collection. Its operation is merely passive; that is, if the obligor, after his bond is placed in the bank, discharges it, all is very well. Such is the mighty aid afforded by this tax-gatherer, without which the government cannot get along! Again, it is not pretended that the very limited assistance which this institution does in truth render, extends to any other than a single species of tax, that is, duties. In the collection of the excise, the direct and other internal taxes, no aid was derived from any bank. It is true, in the collection of those taxes, the former did not obtain the same indulgence which the merchant receives in paying duties. But what obliges congress to give credit at all? Could it not demand prompt payment of the duties? And, in fact, does it not so demand in many instances? Whether credit is given or not is a matter merely of discretion. If it be a facility to mercantile operations (as I presume it is) it ought to be granted. But I deny the right to engraft upon it a bank, which you would not otherwise have the power to erect. You cannot _create the necessity_ of a bank, and then plead _that necessity_ for its establishment. In the administration of the finances, the bank acts simply as a payer and receiver. The secretary of the treasury has money in New York, and wants it in Charleston; the bank will furnish him with a check, or bill, to make the remittance, which any merchant would do just as well.
I will now proceed to show by fact, actual experience, not theoretic reasoning, but by the records of the treasury themselves, that the operations of that department may be as well conducted without as with this bank. The delusion has consisted in the use of certain high-sounding phrases, dexterously used on the occasion; ‘the collection of the revenue,’ ‘the administration of the finance,’ ‘the conducting of the fiscal affairs of the government,’ the usual language of the advocates of the bank, extort express assent, or awe into acquiescence, without inquiry or examination into its necessity. About the commencement of this year there appears, by the report of the secretary of the treasury, of the seventh of January, to have been a little upwards of two million and four hundred thousand dollars in the treasury of the United States; and more than one third of this whole sum was in the vaults of local banks. In several instances, where opportunities existed of selecting the bank, a preference has been given to the state bank, or at least a portion of the deposits has been made with it. In New York, for example, there were deposited with the Manhattan bank one hundred and eighty-eight thousand and six hundred and seventy dollars, although a branch bank is in that city. In this district, one hundred and fifteen thousand and eighty dollars were deposited with the bank of Columbia, although here also is a branch bank, and yet the state banks are utterly unsafe to be trusted! If the money, after the bonds are collected, is thus placed with these banks, I presume there can be no difficulty in placing the bonds themselves there, if they must be deposited with some bank for collection, which I deny.
Again, one of the most important and complicated branches of the treasury department, is the management of our landed system. The sales have, in some years, amounted to upwards of half a million of dollars, and are generally made upon credit, and yet no bank whatever is made use of to facilitate the collection. After it is made, the amount, in some instances, has been deposited with banks, and, according to the secretary’s report, which I have before adverted to, the amount so deposited, was, in January, upwards of three hundred thousand dollars, not one cent of which was in the vaults of the bank of the United States, or in any of its branches, but in the bank of Pennsylvania, its branch at Pittsburgh, the Marietta bank, and the Kentucky bank. Upon the point of responsibility, I cannot subscribe to the opinion of the secretary of the treasury, if it is meant that the ability to pay the amount of any deposits which the government may make, under any exigency, is greater than that of the state banks; that the _accountability_ of a ramified institution, whose affairs are managed by a single head, responsible for all its members, is more simple than that of a number of independent and unconnected establishments, I shall not deny; but, with regard to safety, I am strongly inclined to think it is on the side of the local banks. The corruption or misconduct of the parent, or any of its branches, may bankrupt or destroy the whole system, and the loss of the government in that event, will be of the deposits made with each; whereas, in the failure of one state bank, the loss will be confined to the deposit in the vault of that bank. It is said to have been a part of Burr’s plan to seize on the branch bank, at New Orleans. At that period large sums, imported from La Vera Cruz, are alleged to have been deposited with it, and if the traitor had accomplished the design, the bank of the United States, if not actually bankrupt, might have been constrained to stop payment.
It is urged by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd), that as this nation advances in commerce, wealth, and population, new energies will be unfolded, new wants and exigences will arise, and hence he infers that powers must be implied from the constitution. But, sir, the question is, shall we stretch the instrument to embrace cases not fairly within its scope, or shall we resort to that remedy, by amendment, which the constitution prescribes?
Gentlemen contend, that the construction which they give to the constitution has been acquiesced in by all parties and under all administrations; and they rely particularly on an act which passed in 1804, for extending a branch to New Orleans; and another act of 1807, for punishing those who should forge or utter forged paper of the bank. With regard to the first law, passed, no doubt, upon the recommendation of the treasury department, I would remark, that it was the extension of a branch to a territory over which congress possesses the power of legislation almost uncontrolled, and where, without any constitutional impediment, charters of incorporation may be granted. As to the other act, it was passed no less for the benefit of the community than the bank; to protect the ignorant and unwary from counterfeit paper, purporting to have been emitted by the bank. When gentlemen are claiming the advantage supposed to be deducible from acquiescence, let me inquire, what they would have had those to do, who believed the establishment of a bank an encroachment upon state rights. Were they to have resisted, and how? By force? Upon the change of parties in 1800, it must be well recollected, that the greatest calamities were predicted as a consequence of that event. Intentions were ascribed to the new occupants of power, of violating the public faith, and prostrating national credit. Under such circumstances, that they should act with great circumspection was quite natural. They saw in full operation a bank, chartered by a congress who had as much right to judge of their constitutional powers as their successors. Had they revoked the law which gave it existence, the institution would, in all probability, have continued to transact business notwithstanding. The judiciary would have been appealed to, and, from the known opinions and predilections of the judges then composing it, they would have pronounced the act of incorporation, as in the nature of a contract, beyond the repealing power of any succeeding legislature. And, sir, what a scene of confusion would such a state of things have presented; an act of congress, which was law in the statute book, and a nullity on the judicial records! was it not the wisest to wait the natural dissolution of the corporation rather than accelerate that event by a repealing law involving so many delicate considerations?
When gentlemen attempt to carry this measure upon the ground of acquiescence or precedent, do they forget that we are not in Westminster Hall? In courts of justice, the utility of uniform decision exacts of the judge a conformity to the adjudication of his predecessor. In the interpretation and administration of the law, this practice is wise and proper, and without it, every thing depending upon the caprice of the judge, we should have no security for our dearest rights. It is far otherwise when applied to the source of legislation. Here no rule exists but the constitution, and to legislate upon the ground, merely, that our predecessors thought themselves authorized, under similar circumstances, to legislate, is to sanctify error and perpetuate usurpation. But if we are to be subjected to the trammels of precedent, I claim, on the other hand, the benefit of the restrictions under which the intelligent judge cautiously receives them. It is an established rule, that to give to a previous adjudication any effect, the mind of the judge who pronounced it must have been awakened to the subject, and it must have been a deliberate opinion formed after full argument. In technical language, it must not have been _sub silentio_. Now the acts of 1804 and 1807, relied upon as pledges for the rechartering of this company, passed not only without any discussions whatever of the constitutional power of congress to establish a bank, but, I venture to say, without a single member having had his attention drawn to this question. I had the honor of a seat in the senate when the latter law passed, probably voted for it, and I declare, with the utmost sincerity, that I never once thought of that point, and I appeal confidently to every honorable member who was then present, to say if that was not his situation.
This doctrine of precedents, applied to the legislature, appears to me to be fraught with the most mischievous consequences. The great advantage of our system of government over all others, is, that we have a _written_ constitution defining its limits, and prescribing its authorities; and that however for a time faction may convulse the nation, and passion and party prejudice sway its functionaries, the season of reflection will recur, when, calmly retracing their deeds, all aberration’s from fundamental principle will be corrected. But once substitute _practice_ for principle; the exposition of the constitution for the text of the constitution, and in vain shall we look for the instrument in the instrument itself! It will be as diffused and intangible as the pretended constitution of England; and must be sought for in the statute book, in the fugitive journals of congress, and in the reports of the secretary of the treasury! What would be our condition, if we were to take the interpretations given to that sacred book, which is, or ought to be, the criterion of our faith, for the book itself? We should find the holy bible buried beneath the interpretations, glosses, and comments of councils, synods, and learned divines, which have produced swarms of intolerant and furious sects, partaking less of the mildness and meekness of their origin, than of a vindictive spirit of hostility towards each other! They ought to afford us a solemn warning to make that constitution, which we have sworn to support, our invariable guide.
I conceive, then, sir, that we were not empowered by the constitution, nor bound by any practice under it, to renew the charter of this bank, and I might here rest the argument. But as there are strong objections to the renewal on the score of expediency, and as the distresses which will attend the dissolution of the bank have been greatly exaggerated, I will ask for your indulgence for a few moments longer. That some temporary inconvenience will arise, I shall not deny; but most groundlessly have the recent failures in New York been attributed to the discontinuance of this bank. As well might you ascribe to that cause the failures of Amsterdam and Hamburg, of London and Liverpool. The embarrassments of commerce, the sequestrations in France, the Danish captures; in fine, the belligerent edicts are the obvious sources of these failures. Their immediate cause is the return of bills upon London, drawn upon the faith of unproductive or unprofitable shipments. Yes, sir, the protests of the notaries of London, not those of New York, have occasioned these bankruptcies.
The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse. Perhaps, at last, all power is resolvable into that of the purse, for with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie circulation of the United States is estimated by some calculators at ten millions of dollars, and if it be no more, one moiety is in the vaults of this bank. May not the time arrive, when the concentration of such a vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the hands of any corporation, will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom is this immense power wielded? By a body, that, in derogation of the great principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people, is amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners. Suppose an attempt to subvert this government; would not the traitor first aim, by force or corruption, to acquire the treasure of this company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven tenths of its capital are in the hands of foreigners, and these foreigners chiefly English subjects. We are possibly on the eve of a rupture with that nation. Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English premier would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of this institution? Republics, above all other governments, ought most seriously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves, that the internal dissensions excited by foreign intrigue have produced the downfall of almost every free government that has hitherto existed; and yet, gentlemen contend that we are benefited by the possession of this foreign capital! If we could have its use, without its attending abuse, I should be gratified also. But it is in vain to expect the one without the other. Wealth is power, and, under whatsoever form it exists, its proprietor, whether he lives on this or the other side of the Atlantic, will have a proportionate influence. It is argued, that our possession of this English capital gives us a great influence over the British government. If this reasoning be sound, we had better revoke the interdiction as to aliens holding land, and invite foreigners to engross the whole property, real and personal, of the country. We had better, at once, exchange the condition of independent proprietors for that of stewards. We should then be able to govern foreign nations, according to the reasoning of the gentlemen on the other side. But let us put aside this theory and appeal to the decisions of experience. Go to the other side of the Atlantic and see what has been achieved for us there, by Englishmen holding seven tenths of the capital of this bank. Has it released from galling and ignominious bondage one solitary American seaman, bleeding under British oppression? Did it prevent the unmanly attack upon the Chesapeake? Did it arrest the promulgation, or has it abrogated the orders in council――those orders which have given birth to a new era in commerce? In spite of all its boasted effect, are not the two nations brought to the very brink of war? Are we quite sure, that, on this side of the water, it has had no effect favorable to British interests? It has often been stated, and although I do not know that it is susceptible of strict proof, I believe it to be a fact, that this bank exercised its influence in support of Jay’s treaty; and may it not have contributed to blunt the public sentiment, or paralyse the efforts of this nation against British aggression?
The duke of Northumberland is said to be the most considerable stockholder in the bank of the United States. A late lord chancellor of England, besides other noblemen, was a large stockholder. Suppose the prince of Essling, the duke of Cadore, and other French dignitaries, owned seven eighths of the capital of this bank, should we witness the same exertions (I allude not to any made in the senate) to recharter it? So far from it, would not the danger of French influence be resounded throughout the nation?
I shall, therefore, give my most hearty assent to the motion for striking out the first section of the bill.
ON THE AUGMENTATION OF MILITARY FORCE.
IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 31, 1811.
[IN our biographical sketch, we have mentioned, that Mr. Clay,
having left the senate of the United States in 1811, was the
same year elected to the house of representatives, where he took
his seat, and was chosen speaker of that body on the opening
of the session. This took place at an eventful period in our
national history. The numerous and aggravated wrongs which the
nation had sustained and endured for years, both from France and
England, but more especially from the latter, had aroused the
attention of the whole country. The celebrated orders in council,
the impressment of our seamen, and the right of searching our
vessels, claimed and exercised by Great Britain, had prepared
the people to expect that some decisive steps would be taken
by their representatives in congress. In accordance with public
sentiment, president Madison transmitted, November fourth, 1811,
a message to congress, recommending appropriate measures for
the vindication of our national honor, and the redress of our
violated rights. The political parties, however, into which
the people were divided, differed widely as to the course to
be pursued in our foreign relations. The opposition to the
administration numbered many eminent men, among whom the most
talented and troublesome was John Randolph, of Virginia; his
intellectual powers at this juncture being in full force and
vigor. The committee on foreign relations proposed an immediate
increase of the military force, and accordingly a bill passed,
to raise thirteen additional regiments for the public service.
It was the consideration of this measure, which induced Mr. Clay
to address the house, when in committee of the whole, as follows.]
Mr. Clay (the speaker) said, that when the subject of this bill was before the house in the abstract form of a resolution, proposed by the committee of foreign relations, it was the pleasure of the house to discuss it whilst he was in the chair. He did not complain of this course of proceeding; for he did not at any time wish the house, from considerations personal to him, to depart from that mode of transacting the public business which they thought best. He merely adverted to the circumstance as an apology for the trouble he was about to give the committee. He was at all times disposed to take his share of responsibility, and under this impression, he felt that he owed it to his constituents and to himself, before the committee rose, to submit to their attention a few observations.
He saw with regret a diversity of opinion amongst those who had the happiness generally to act together, in relation to the quantum of force proposed to be raised. For his part, he thought it was too great for peace, and he feared too small for war. He had been in favor of the number recommended by the senate, and he would ask gentlemen, who had preferred fifteen thousand, to take a candid and dispassionate view of the subject. It was admitted, on all hands, that it was a force to be raised for the purposes of war, and to be kept up and used only in the event of war. It was further conceded, that its principal destination would be the provinces of our enemy. By the bill which had been passed, to complete the peace establishment, we had authorized the collection of a force of about six thousand men, exclusive of those now in service, which, with the twenty-five thousand provided for by this bill, will give an aggregate of new troops of thirty-one thousand men. Experience in military affairs, has shown, that when any given number of men is authorized to be raised, you must, in counting upon the effective men which it will produce, deduct one fourth or one third for desertion, sickness, and other incidents to which raw troops are peculiarly exposed. In measures relating to war, it is wisest, if you err at all, to err on the side of the largest force, and you will consequently put down your thirty-one thousand men at not more than an effective force in the field of about twenty-one thousand. This, with the four thousand now in service, will amount to twenty-five thousand effective men. The secretary of war has stated, in his report, that, for the single purpose of manning your forts and garrisons on the sea-board, twelve thousand and six hundred men are necessary. Although the whole of that number will not be taken from the twenty-five thousand, a portion of it, probably, will be. We are told, that in Canada, there are between seven and eight thousand regular troops. If it is invaded, the whole of that force will be concentrated in Quebec, and would you attempt that almost impregnable fortress, with less than double the force of the besieged? Gentlemen who calculate upon volunteers as a substitute for regulars, ought not to deceive themselves. No man appreciated higher than he did the spirit of the country. But, although volunteers were admirably adapted to the first operations of the war, to the making of a first impression, he doubted their fitness for a regular siege, or for the manning and garrisoning of forts. He understood it was a rule in military affairs, never to leave in the rear a place of any strength undefended. Canada is invaded; the upper part falls, and you proceed to Quebec. It is true there would be no European army behind to be apprehended; but the people of the country might rise; and he warned gentlemen who imagined that the affections of the Canadians were with us, against trusting too confidently on such a calculation, the basis of which was treason. He concluded, therefore, that a portion of the invading army would be distributed in the upper country, after its conquest, amongst the places susceptible of military strength and defence. The army, considerably reduced, sets itself down before Quebec. Suppose it falls. Here again will be required a number of men to hold and defend it. And if the war be prosecuted still further, and the lower country and Halifax be assailed, he conceived it obvious, that the whole force of twenty-five thousand men would not be too great.
The difference between those who were for fifteen thousand, and those who were for twenty-five thousand men, appeared to him to resolve itself into the question, merely, of a short or protracted war; a war of vigor, or a war of languor and imbecility. If a competent force be raised in the first instance, the war on the continent will be speedily terminated. He was aware that it might still rage on the ocean. But where the nation could act with unquestionable success, he was in favor of the display of an energy correspondent to the feelings and spirit of the country. Suppose one third of the force he had mentioned (twenty-five thousand men) could reduce the country, say in three years, and that the whole could accomplish the same object in one year; taking into view the greater hazard of the repulsion and defeat of the small force, and every other consideration, do not wisdom and true economy equally decide in favor of the larger force, and thus prevent failure in consequence of inadequate means? He begged gentlemen to recollect the immense extent of the United States; our vast maritime frontier, vulnerable in almost all its parts to predatory incursions, and he was persuaded, they would see that a regular force, of twenty-five thousand men, was not much too great during a period of war, if all designs of invading the provinces of the enemy were abandoned.
Mr. Clay proceeded next to examine the nature of the force contemplated by the bill. It was a regular army, enlisted for a limited time, raised for the sole purpose of war, and to be disbanded on the return of peace. Against this army, all our republican jealousies and apprehensions are attempted to be excited. He was not the advocate of standing armies; but the standing armies which excite most his fears, are those which are kept up in time of peace. He confessed, he did not perceive any real source of danger in a military force of twenty-five thousand men in the United States, provided only for a state of war, even supposing it to be corrupted, and its arms turned, by the ambition of its leaders, against the freedom of the country. He saw abundant security against the success of any such treasonable attempt. The diffusion of political information amongst the great body of the people, constituted a powerful safeguard. The American character has been much abused by Europeans, whose tourists, whether on horse or foot, in verse and prose, have united in depreciating it. It is true, that we do not exhibit as many signal instances of scientific acquirement in this country as are furnished in the old world; but he believed it undeniable, that the great mass of the people possessed more intelligence than any other people on the globe. Such a people, consisting of upwards of seven millions, affording a physical power of about a million of men, capable of bearing arms, and ardently devoted to liberty, could not be subdued by an army of twenty-five thousand men. The wide extent of country over which we are spread, was another security. In other countries, France and England, for example, the fall of Paris or London, is the fall of the nation. Here are no such dangerous aggregations of people. New York, and Philadelphia, and Boston, and every city on the Atlantic, might be subdued by an usurper, and he would have made but a small advance in the accomplishment of his purpose. He would add a still more improbable supposition, that the country east of the Allegany, was to submit to the ambition of some daring chief, and he insisted that the liberty of the union would be still unconquered. It would find successful support from the west. We are not only in the situation just described, but a great portion of the militia――nearly the whole, he understood, of that of Massachusetts――have arms in their hands; and he trusted in God, that that great object would be persevered in, until every man in the nation could proudly shoulder the musket, which was to defend his country and himself. A people having, besides the benefit of one general government, other local governments in full operation, capable of exerting and commanding great portions of the physical power, all of which must be prostrated before our constitution is subverted. Such a people have nothing to fear from a petty contemptible force of twenty-five thousand regulars.
Mr. Clay proceeded, more particularly, to inquire into the object of the force. That object he understood distinctly to be war, and war with Great Britain. It had been supposed, by some gentlemen, improper to discuss publicly so delicate a question. He did not feel the impropriety. It was a subject in its nature incapable of concealment. Even in countries where the powers of government were conducted by a single ruler, it was almost impossible for that ruler to conceal his intentions when he meditates war. The assembling of armies, the strengthening of posts; all the movements preparatory to war, and which it is impossible to disguise, unfolded the intentions of the sovereign. Does Russia or France intend war, the intention is almost invariably known before the war is commenced. If congress were to pass a law, with closed doors, for raising an army for the purpose of war, its enlistment and organization, which could not be done in secret, would indicate the use to which it was to be applied; and we cannot suppose England would be so blind, as not to see that she was aimed at. Nor could she, did she apprehend, injure us more by thus knowing our purposes, than if she were kept in ignorance of them. She may, indeed, anticipate us, and commence the war. But that is what she is in fact doing, and she can add but little to the injury which she is inflicting. If she choose to declare war in form, let her do so, the responsibility will be with her.
What are we to gain by the war? has been emphatically asked. In reply, he would ask, what are we not to lose by peace? Commerce, character, a nation’s best treasure, honor! If pecuniary considerations alone are to govern, there is sufficient motive for the war. Our revenue is reduced, by the operation of the belligerent edicts, to about six millions of dollars, according to the secretary of the treasury’s report. The year preceding the embargo it was sixteen. Take away the orders in council, it will again mount up to sixteen millions. By continuing, therefore, in peace, (if the mongrel state in which we are deserve that denomination,) we lose annually in revenue alone ten millions of dollars. Gentlemen will say, repeal the law of non-importation. He contended, that, if the United States were capable of that perfidy, the revenue would not be restored to its former state, the orders in council continuing. Without an export trade, which those orders prevent, inevitable ruin would ensue, if we imported as freely as we did prior to the embargo. A nation that carries on an import trade, without an export trade to support it, must, in the end, be as certainly bankrupt, as the individual would be, who incurred an annual expenditure without an income.
He had no disposition to magnify or dwell upon the catalogue of injuries we had received from England. He could not, however, overlook the impressment of our seamen――an aggression upon which he never reflected, without feelings of indignation, which would not allow him appropriate language to describe its enormity. Not content with seizing upon all our property which falls within her rapacious grasp, the personal rights of our countrymen――rights which forever ought to be sacred――are trampled upon and violated. The orders in council were pretended to have been reluctantly adopted, as a measure of retaliation. The French decrees, their alleged basis, are revoked. England resorts to the expedient of denying the fact of the revocation, and Sir William Scott, in the celebrated case of Fox and others, suspends judgment that proof may be adduced to it. At the same moment, when the British ministry, through that judge, is thus affecting to controvert that fact, and to place the release of our property upon its establishment, instructions are prepared for Mr. Foster, to meet at Washington the very revocation which they were contesting. And how does he meet it? By fulfilling the engagement solemnly made to rescind the orders? No, sir; but by demanding that we shall secure the introduction, into the continent, of British manufactures!
England is said to be fighting for the world, and shall we, it is asked, attempt to weaken her exertions? If, indeed, the aim of the French emperor be universal dominion, (and he was willing to allow it to the argument,) how much nobler a cause is presented to British valor! But how is her philanthropic purpose to be achieved? By a scrupulous observance of the rights of others, by respecting that code of public law which she professes to vindicate, and by abstaining from self-aggrandizement. Then would she command the sympathies of the world. What are we required to do by those who would engage our feelings and wishes in her behalf? To bear the actual cuffs of her arrogance, that we may escape a chimerical French subjugation! We are invited, conjured, to drink the potion of British poison, actually presented to our lips, that we may avoid the imperial dose prepared by perturbed imaginations. We are called upon to submit to debasement, dishonor, and disgrace; to bow the neck to royal insolence, as a course of preparation for manly resistance to gallic invasion! What nation, what individual, was ever taught, in the schools of ignominious submission, these patriotic lessons of freedom and independence? Let those who contend for this humiliating doctrine, read its refutation in the history of the very man against whose insatiable thirst of dominion we are warned. The experience of desolated Spain, for the last fifteen years, is worth volumes. Did she find her repose and safety in subserviency to the will of that man? Had she boldly stood forth and repelled the first attempt to dictate to her councils, her monarch would not be now a miserable captive in Marseilles. Let us come home to our own history; it was not by submission that our fathers achieved our independence. The patriotic wisdom that placed you, Mr. Chairman, under that canopy, penetrated the designs of a corrupt ministry, and nobly fronted encroachment on its first appearance. It saw, beyond the petty taxes with which it commenced, a long train of oppressive measures, terminating in the total annihilation of liberty, and, contemptible as they were, it did not hesitate to resist them. Take the experience of the last four or five years, which he was sorry to say exhibited, in appearance, at least, a different kind of spirit. He did not wish to view the past, further than to guide us for the future. We were but yesterday contending for the indirect trade; the right to export to Europe the coffee and sugar of the West Indies. To-day we are asserting our claim to the direct trade; the right to export our cotton, tobacco, and other domestic produce, to market. Yield this point, and to-morrow intercourse between New York and New Orleans, between the planters on James river and Richmond, will be interdicted. For, sir, the career of encroachment is never arrested by submission. It will advance while there remains a single privilege on which it can operate. Gentlemen say, that this government is unfit for any war, but a war of invasion. What, is it not equivalent to invasion, if the mouths of our harbors and outlets are blocked up, and we are denied egress from our own waters? Or, when the burglar is at our door, shall we bravely sally forth and repel his felonious entrance, or meanly skulk within the cells of the castle?
He contended, that the real cause of British aggression was, not to distress an enemy, but to destroy a rival. A comparative view of our commerce with that of England and the continent, would satisfy any one of the truth of this remark. Prior to the embargo, the balance of trade between this country and England was between eleven and fifteen millions of dollars in favor of England. Our consumption of her manufactures was annually increasing, and had risen to nearly fifty millions of dollars. We exported to her what she most wanted, provisions and raw materials for her manufactures, and received in return what she was most desirous to sell. Our exports to France, Holland, Spain, and Italy, taking an average of the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, amounted to about twelve million dollars of domestic, and about eighteen million dollars of foreign produce. Our imports from the same countries, amounted to about twenty-five million dollars. The foreign produce exported, consisted chiefly of luxuries, from the West Indies. It is apparent that this trade, the balance of which was in favor, not of France, but of the United States, was not of very vital consequence to the enemy of England. Would she, therefore, for the sole purpose of depriving her adversary of this commerce, relinquish her valuable trade with this country, exhibiting the essential balance in her favor; nay, more, hazard the peace of the country? No, sir; you must look for an explanation of her conduct in the jealousies of a rival. She sickens at your prosperity, and beholds, in your growth――your sails spread on every ocean, and your numerous seamen――the foundations of a power which, at no very distant day, is to make her tremble for her naval superiority. He had omitted before to notice the loss of our seamen, if we continued in our present situation. What would become of the one hundred thousand (for he understood there was about that number) in the American service? Would they not leave us and seek employment abroad, perhaps in the very country that injures us?
It is said, that the effect of the war at home, will be a change of those who administer the government, who will be replaced by others that will make a disgraceful peace. He did not believe it. Not a man in the nation could really doubt the sincerity with which those in power have sought, by all honorable and pacific means, to protect the interests of the country. When the people saw exercised towards both belligerents the utmost impartiality; witnessed the same equal terms tendered to both; and beheld the government successively embracing an accommodation with each, in exactly the same spirit of amity, he was fully persuaded, now that war was the only alternative left to us, by the injustice of one of the powers, that the support and confidence of the people would remain undiminished. He was one, however, who was prepared (and he would not believe that he was more so than any other member of the committee) to march on in the road of his duty, at all hazards. What! shall it be said, that our _amor patriæ_ is located at these desks; that we pusillanimously cling to our seats here, rather than boldly vindicate the most inestimable rights of the country? Whilst the heroic Daviess, and his gallant associates, exposed to all the dangers of treacherous savage warfare, are sacrificing themselves for the good of their country, shall we shrink from our duty?
He concluded, by hoping that his remarks had tended to prove that the quantum of the force required was not too great, that in its nature it was free from the objections urged against it, and that the object of its application was one imperiously called for by the present peculiar crisis.
ON THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 22, 1812.
[THE bill making provisions for the general repair and increase
of the Navy, followed the preceding measure for augmenting
the army. During Mr. Jefferson’s administration, the Navy had
been unpopular with the democratic party, and the policy of
reducing that branch of the national force had been pursued, in
opposition to the former course, adopted by the administration
of John Adams. Many of the democratic supporters of Mr.
Madison’s administration, still adhered to the policy of Mr.
Jefferson; while Mr. Clay, Mr. Cheves, and other members of
that party, saw the importance of sustaining the navy, in
prospect of war. Among the arguments in opposition to the bill,
now introduced, it was insisted that the fitting out of naval
armaments would require a pecuniary expenditure which the
people were not prepared to meet. The bill contained a section,
providing for new frigates, leaving a blank for the number. Mr.
Cheves (of South Carolina) moved to fill the blank with _ten_.
Mr. Rhea (of Tennessee) moved to strike out this section of the
bill. In committee of the whole, a warm debate ensued. Mr. Clay,
in the following speech sustained the proposition of Mr. Cheves,
and the motion to strike out was rejected by a vote of fifty-two
to forty-seven. An appropriation was made, and the Navy fitted
out with despatch. The result is known by the naval victories,
which, in less than two years, crowned this right arm of the
nation with glory, and gave it an enduring popularity with the
people.]
MR. CLAY (the speaker) rose to present his views on the bill before the committee. He said, as he did not precisely agree in opinion with any gentleman who had spoken, he should take the liberty of detaining the committee a few moments, while he offered to their attention some observations. He was highly gratified with the temper and ability with which the discussion had hitherto been conducted. It was honorable to the house, and, he trusted, would continue to be manifested on many future occasions.
On this interesting topic a diversity of opinion has existed, almost ever since the adoption of the present government. On the one hand, there appeared to him to have been attempts made to precipitate the nation into all the evils of naval extravagance, which had been productive of so much mischief in other countries; and, on the other, strongly feeling this mischief, there has existed an unreasonable prejudice against providing such a competent naval protection, for our commercial and maritime rights, as is demanded by their importance, and as the increased resources of the country amply justify.
The attention of congress has been invited to this subject by the president, in his message, delivered at the opening of the session. Indeed, had it been wholly neglected by the chief magistrate, from the critical situation of the country, and the nature of the rights proposed to be vindicated, it must have pressed itself upon our attention. But, said Mr. Clay, the president, in his message, observes: ‘your attention will, of course, be drawn to such provisions on the subject of our naval force, as may be required for the service to which it is best adapted. I submit to congress the seasonableness, also, of an authority to augment the stock of such materials as are imperishable in their nature, or may not, at once, be attainable?’ The president, by this recommendation, clearly intimates an opinion, that the naval force of this country is capable of producing effect; and the propriety of laying up imperishable materials, was no doubt suggested for the purpose of making additions to the navy, as convenience and exigences might direct.
It appeared to Mr. Clay a little extraordinary, that so much, as it seemed to him, unreasonable jealousy, should exist against the naval establishment. If, said he, we look back to the period of the formation of the constitution, it will be found that no such jealousy was then excited. In placing the physical force of the nation at the disposal of congress, the convention manifested much greater apprehension of abuse in the power given to raise armies, than in that to provide a navy. In reference to the navy, congress is put under no restrictions; but with respect to the army, that description of force which has been so often employed to subvert the liberties of mankind, they are subjected to limitations designed to prevent the abuse of this dangerous power. But it was not his intention to detain the committee, by a discussion on the comparative utility and safety of these two kinds of force. He would, however, be indulged in saying, that he thought gentlemen had wholly failed in maintaining the position they had assumed, that the fall of maritime powers was attributable to their navies. They have told you, indeed, that Carthage, Genoa, Venice, and other nations, had navies, and, notwithstanding, were finally destroyed. But have they shown, by a train of argument, that their overthrow was, in any degree, attributable to their maritime greatness? Have they attempted, even, to show that there exists in the nature of this power a necessary tendency to destroy the nation using it? Assertion is substituted for argument; inferences not authorized by historical facts are arbitrarily drawn; things wholly unconnected with each other are associated together; a very logical mode of reasoning, it must be admitted! In the same way he could demonstrate how idle and absurd our attachments are to freedom itself. He might say, for example, that Greece and Rome had forms of free government, and that they no longer exist; and, deducing their fall from their devotion to liberty, the conclusion, in favor of despotism, would very satisfactorily follow! He demanded what there is in the nature and construction of maritime power, to excite the fears that have been indulged? Do gentlemen really apprehend, that a body of seamen will abandon their proper element, and, placing themselves under an aspiring chief, will erect a throne to his ambition? Will they deign to listen to the voice of history, and learn how chimerical are their apprehensions?
But the source of alarm is in ourselves. Gentlemen fear, that if we provide a marine, it will produce collisions with foreign nations; plunge us into war, and ultimately overturn the constitution of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid foreign collision, you had better abandon the ocean; surrender all your commerce; give up all your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of protection, that involves you in war. Commerce engenders collision, collision war, and war, the argument supposes, leads to despotism. Would the counsels of that statesman be deemed wise, who would recommend that the nation should be unarmed; that the art of war, the martial spirit, and martial exercises, should be prohibited; who should declare, in the language of Othello, that the nation must bid farewell to the neighing steed, and the shrill trump, the spirit-stirring drum, the ear-piercing fife, and all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war; and that the great body of the people should be taught, that national happiness was to be found in perpetual peace alone? No, sir. And yet, every argument in favor of a power of protection on land, applies, in some degree, to a power of protection on the sea. Undoubtedly a commerce void of naval protection is more exposed to rapacity than a guarded commerce; and if we wish to invite the continuance of the old, or the enactment of new edicts, let us refrain from all exertion upon that element where we must operate, and where, in the end, they must be resisted.
For his part (Mr. Clay said) he did not allow himself to be alarmed by those apprehensions of maritime power, which appeared to agitate other gentlemen. In the nature of our government he beheld abundant security against abuse. He would be unwilling to tax the land to support the rights of the sea, and was for drawing from the sea itself, the resources with which its violated freedom should at all times be vindicated. Whilst this principle is adhered to, there will be no danger of running into the folly and extravagance which so much alarms gentlemen; and whenever it is abandoned――whenever congress shall lay burdensome taxes, to augment the navy beyond what may be authorized by the increased wealth, and demanded by the exigences, of the country, the people will interpose, and, removing their unworthy representatives, apply the appropriate corrective. Mr. Clay, then, could not see any just ground of dread in the nature of naval power. It was, on the contrary, free from the evils attendant upon standing armies. And the genius of our institutions――the great representative principle, in the practical enjoyment of which we are so eminently distinguished――afforded the best guarantee against the ambition and wasteful extravagance of government. What maritime strength is it expedient to provide for the United States? In considering this subject, three different degrees of naval power present themselves. In the first place, such a force as would be capable of contending with that which any other nation is able to bring on the ocean――a force that, boldly scouring every sea, would challenge to combat the fleets of other powers, however great. He admitted it was impossible at this time, perhaps it never would be desirable, for this country to establish so extensive a navy. Indeed, he should consider it as madness in the extreme in this government to attempt to provide a navy able to cope with the fleets of Great Britain, wherever they might be met.
The next species of naval power to which he would advert, is that which, without adventuring into distant seas, and keeping generally in our own harbors, and on our coasts, would be competent to beat off any squadron which might be attempted to be permanently stationed in our waters. His friends from South Carolina (Messrs. Cheves and Lowndes) had satisfactorily shown, that, to effect this object, a force equivalent only to one third of that which the maintenance of such a squadron must require, would be sufficient; that if, for example, England should determine to station permanently upon our coast a squadron of twelve ships of the line, it would require for this service thirty-six ships of the line; one third in port, repairing, one third on the passage, and one third on the station. But that is a force which it has been shown that even England, with her boasted navy, could not spare for the American service, whilst she is engaged in the present contest. Mr. Clay said, that he was desirous of seeing such a force as he had described; that is, twelve ships of the line and fifteen or twenty frigates, provided for the United States; but he admitted that it was unattainable in the present situation of the finances of the country. He contended, however, that it was such as congress ought to set about providing; and he hoped, in less than ten years, to see it actually established. He was far from surveying the vast maritime power of Great Britain, with the desponding eye with which other gentlemen beheld it. He could not allow himself to be discouraged at a prospect of even her thousand ships. This country only required resolution, and a proper exertion of its immense resources, to command respect, and to vindicate every essential right. When we consider our remoteness from Europe, the expense, difficulty, and perils, to which any squadron would be exposed, while stationed off our coasts, he entertained no doubt that the force to which he referred, would insure the command of our own seas. Such a force would avail itself of our extensive sea-board and numerous harbors, every where affording asylums to which it could safely retire from a superior fleet, or from which it could issue, for the purpose of annoyance. To the opinion of his colleague (Mr. M’Kee), who appeared to think that it was in vain for us to make any struggle on the ocean, he would oppose the sentiments of his distinguished connection, the heroic Daviess, who fell in the battle of Tippecanoe. [Here Mr. Clay read certain parts of a work, written by colonel Daviess, in which the author attempts to show, that, as the aggressions upon our commerce were not committed by fleets, but by single vessels, they could, in the same manner, be best retaliated; that the force of about twenty or thirty frigates, would be capable of inflicting great injury on English commerce, by picking up stragglers, cutting off convoys, and seizing upon every moment of supineness; and that such a force, with our seaports and harbors well fortified, and aided by privateers, would be really formidable, and would annoy the British navy and commerce, just as the French army was assailed in Egypt, the Persian army in Scythia, and the Roman army in Parthia.]
Comments
Log in to leave a comment.
A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from KentuckyChapter XVIII: Preface (16)
0%37 min left in chapter