Chapter I: AM charged with the pleasing duty of presenting to the senate the (2)

The correspondence was further continued; and, finally, the commissioners on the part of Great Britain proposed an article to which the American commissioners assented, the basis of which is, a declaration of what is the state of the law between the Indian tribes and the people of the United States. They then proposed a further article, which declared that the United States should endeavor to restore peace to the Indians who had acted on the side of Great Britain, together with all the rights, possessions, privileges, and immunities which they possessed prior to the year 1811, that is, antecedently to the war between England and the United States; in consideration that Great Britain would terminate the war, so far as respected the Indians who had been allies of the United States, and restore to them all the rights, privileges, possessions, and immunities which these also had enjoyed previously to the same period. Mr. President, I here state my solemn belief, that if the American commissioners had not declared the laws between the Indians and the people of this country, and the rights of the Indians, to be such as they are stated to be in the extracts I have read to the senate; if they had then stated that any one state of this union who happened to have Indians residing within its limits, possessed the right of extending over them the laws of such state, and of taking their lands, when and how it pleased, that the effect would have been a prolongation of the war. I again declare my most solemn belief that Great Britain, who assented with great reluctance to this mutual stipulation with respect to the Indians, never would have done it at all, but under a conviction of the correspondence of those principles of Indian international law, (if I may use such a phrase,) with those which the United States government had respected ever since the period of our independence.

Sir, if I am right in this, let me ask whether in adopting the new code which now prevails, and by which the rights of the Indians have been trampled on, and the most solemn obligations of treaties have been disregarded, we are not chargeable with having induced that power to conclude a peace with us by suggestions utterly unfounded and erroneous?

Most of the treaties between the Cherokee nation of Indians and the United States have been submitted to the senate for ratification, and the senate have acted upon them in conformity with their constitutional power. Besides the action of the senate, as a legislative body, in the enactment of laws in conformity with their stipulations, regulating the intercourse of our citizens with that nation, it has acted in its separate character, and confirmed the treaties themselves by the constitutional majority of two thirds of its members. Thus have those treaties been sanctioned by the government of the United States, and by every branch of that government; by the senate, the executive, and the supreme court; both at home and abroad. But not only have the rights of the Cherokees received all these recognitions; they have been, by implication, recognised by the state of Georgia itself, in the act of 1802, in which she stipulated that the government of the United States, and not the state of Georgia, should extinguish the Indian title to land within her limits; and the general government has been, from time to time, urged by Georgia to comply with its engagement from that period until the adoption of the late new policy upon this subject.

Having thus, Mr. President, stated, as I hope with clearness, the RIGHTS of the Indian tribes, as recognised by the most solemn acts that can be entered into by any government, let me, in the next place, inquire into the nature of the INJURIES which have been inflicted upon them; in other words, into the present condition of these Cherokees, to whom protection had been assured as well by solemn treaties as by the laws and guarantees of the United States government.

And here let me be permitted to say, that I go into this subject with feelings which no language at my command will enable me adequately to express. I assure the senate, and in an especial manner do I assure the honorable senators from Georgia, that my wish and purpose is any other than to excite the slightest possible irritation on the part of any human being. Far from it. I am actuated only by feelings of grief, feelings of sorrow, and of profound regret, irresistibly called forth by a contemplation of the miserable condition to which these unfortunate people have been reduced by acts of legislation proceeding from one of the states of this confederacy. I again assure the honorable senators from Georgia, that, if it has become my painful duty to comment upon some of these acts, I do it not with any desire to place them, or the state they represent, in an invidious position; but because Georgia was, I believe, the first in the career, the object of which seems to be the utter annihilation of every Indian right, and because she has certainly, in the promotion of it, far outstripped every other state in the union.

I have not before me the various acts of the state in reference to the Indians within her bounds; and it is possible I may be under some mistake in reference to them; and if I am, no one will correct the error more readily, or with greater pleasure.

If, however, I had all those laws in my hands, I should not now attempt to read them. Instead of this, it will be sufficient for me to state the effects which have been produced by them upon the condition of the Cherokee Indians residing in that state. And here follows a list of what has been done by her legislature. Her first act was to abolish the government of these Cherokees. No human community can exist without a government of some kind; and the Cherokees, imitating our example, and having learned from us something of the principles of a free constitution, established for themselves a government somewhat resembling our own. It is quite immaterial to us what its form was. They always had had some government among them; and we guarantied to them the right of living under their own laws and customs, unmolested by any one; insomuch that our own citizens were outlawed should they presume to interfere with them. What particular regulations they adopted, in the management of their humble and limited concerns, is a matter with which we have no concern. However; the very first act of the Georgia legislature was, to abolish all government of every sort among these people, and to extend the laws and government of the state of Georgia over them. The next step was to divide their territory into counties; the next, to survey the Cherokee lands; and the last, to distribute this land among the citizens of Georgia by lottery, giving to every head of a family one ticket, and the prize in land that should be drawn against it. To be sure there were many reservations for the heads of Indian families; and of how much did gentlemen suppose? of _one hundred and sixty acres only_, and this to include their improvements. But even to this limited possession the poor Indian was to have no fee simple title; he was to hold as a mere occupant, at the will of the state of Georgia, for just as long or as short a time as she might think proper. The laws at the same time gave him no one political right, whatever. He could not become a member of the state legislature, nor could he hold any office under state authority, nor could he vote as an elector. He possessed not one single right of a freeman; no; not even the poor privilege of testifying to his wrongs in the character of a witness in the courts of Georgia, or in any matter of controversy, whatsoever.

These, Mr. President, are the acts of the legislature of the state of Georgia, in relation to the Indians. They were not all passed at one session; they were enacted, time after time, as the state advanced further and further in her steps to the acquisition of the Indian country, and the destruction and annihilation of all Indian rights; until, by a recent act of the same body, the courts of the state itself are occluded against the Indian sufferer, and he is actually denied an appeal even to foreign tribunals, in the erection and in the laws of which he had no voice, there to complain of his wrongs. If he enters the hall of Georgia’s justice, it is upon a surrender at the threshold of all his rights. The history of this last law, to which I have alluded, is this; when the previous law of the state dividing the Indian lands by lottery was passed, some Indians made an appeal to one of the judges of the state, and applied for an injunction against the proceeding; and such was the undeniable justice of their plea, that the judge found himself unable to refuse it, and he granted the injunction sought. It was that injunction which led to the passage of this act; to some of the provisions of which I now invite the attention of the senate. And first to the _title_ of the act; ‘a bill to amend an act entitled an act more effectually to provide for the government and protection of the Cherokee Indians residing within the limits of Georgia, and to prescribe the bounds of their occupant claims; and also to authorize grants to issue for lots drawn in the late land and gold lotteries’――ah, sir, it was the pursuit of _gold_ which led the Spanish invader to desolate the fair fields of Mexico and Peru――‘and to provide for the appointment of an agent to carry certain parts thereof into execution; and to fix the salary of such agent, and to punish those persons who may deter Indians from enrolling for emigration, passed the twentieth of December, 1833.’ Well, sir, this bill goes on to provide, ‘that it shall be the duty of the agent or agents appointed by his excellency the governor, under the authority of this or the act of which it is amendatory, to report to him the number, district, and section of all lots of land subject to be granted by the provisions of said act, which he may be required to do by the drawer, or his agent, or the person claiming the same; and it shall be the duty of his excellency the governor, upon the application of the drawer of any of the aforesaid lots, his or her special agents, or the person to whom the drawer may have _bonâ fide_ conveyed the same, his agent or assigns, to issue a grant therefor; and it shall be the duty of the said agent or agents, upon the production of the grant so issued as aforesaid by the grantor, his or her agent, or the person, or his or her agent to whom said land so granted as aforesaid may have been _bonâ fide_ conveyed, to deliver possession of said granted lot to the said grantee, or person entitled to the possession of the same under the provisions of this act, or the act of which this is amendatory, and his excellency the governor is hereby authorized, upon satisfactory evidence that the said agent is impeded or resisted in delivering such possession, by a force which he cannot overcome, to order out a sufficient force to carry the power of said agent or agents fully into effect, and to pay the expenses of the same out of the contingent fund; _provided_ nothing in this act shall be so construed as to require the interference of the said agent between two or more individuals claiming possession, by virtue of titles derived from a grant from the state to any lot.’

Thus, after the state of Georgia had distributed the lands of the Indians by lottery, and the drawers of prizes were authorized to receive grants of the land drawn, and with these grants in their hand were authorized to demand of the agent of the state, appointed for the purpose, to be put in possession of the soil thus obtained; and if any resistance to their entry should be made, and who was to make it but a poor Indian? the governor is empowered to turn out the military force of the state, and enable the agent to take possession by force, without trial, without judgment, and without investigation.

But, should there be two claimants of the prize, should two of the ticket-holders dispute their claim to the same lot, then no military force was to be used. It was only when the resistance was by an Indian――it was only when Indian rights should come into collision with the alleged rights of the state of Georgia――that the strong hand of military power was instantly to interpose.

The next section of the act is in these words: ‘and be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if any person dispossessed of a lot of land under this act, or the act of which it is amendatory, shall go before a justice of the peace or of the inferior court, and make affidavit that he or she was not liable to be dispossessed under or by any of the provisions of this or the aforesaid act, and file said affidavit in the clerk’s office of the superior court of the county in which said land shall lie, such person upon giving bond and security in the clerk’s office for the costs to accrue on the trial, shall be permitted within ten days from such dispossessing to enter an appeal to said superior court and at said court, the judge shall cause an issue to be made up between the appellant and the person to whom possession of said land was delivered by either of said agents, which said issue shall be in the following form.’

[Mr. Cuthbert, of Georgia, here interposed; and having obtained
Mr. Clay’s consent to explain, stated that he had unfortunately
not been in the senate when the honorable senator commenced his
speech; but had learned that it was in support of a memorial
from certain Cherokee Indians in the state of Georgia, who
desired to emigrate. He must be permitted to say, that the
current of the honorable senator’s remarks did not suit
remarkably well the subject of such a memorial. A memorial of
a different kind had been presented, and which the committee
on Indian affairs had before it, to which the senator’s remarks
would better apply. The present discussion was wholly unexpected,
and it seemed to him not in consistency with the object of the
memorial he had presented.]

Mr. Clay replied, that he was truly sorry the honorable gentleman had been absent when he commenced speaking. He had delayed presenting the memorial, because he observed that neither of the senators from Georgia was in his seat, until the hour when they might be expected to be present, and when one of them, (Mr. King,) had actually taken his seat. If the honorable senator had been present he would have heard Mr. Clay say that he thought the presentation of the memorial a fit occasion to express his sentiments, not only touching the rights of these individual petitioners, but on the rights of all the Indian tribes, and their relations to this government. And if he would have but a little patience he would find that it was Mr. Clay’s intention to present propositions which went to embrace both resolutions.

Mr. Clay now resumed the course of his speech. And here, Mr. President, let me pause, and invite the attention of the senate to the provision in the act of Georgia which I was reading, (the substance of which Mr. Clay here repeated,) that is, that he may have the privilege of an appeal to a tribunal of justice by forms and by a bond with the nature and force of which he is unacquainted; and that then he may have――what beside? I invoke the attention of the senate to this part of the law. What, I ask, does it secure to the Indian? His rights? the rights recognised by treaties? the rights guarantied to him by the most solemn acts which human governments can perform? No. It allows him to come into the courts of the state, and there to enjoy the benefit of the summary proceeding called in the act ‘an appeal,’ but which can never be continued beyond a second term; and when he comes there, what then? He shall be permitted to come into court and enter an appeal, which shall be in the following form.

“A. B., who was dispossessed of a lot of land by an agent of
the state of Georgia, comes into court, and, admitting the right
of the state of Georgia to pass the law under which agent acted,
avers that he was not liable to be dispossessed of said land,
by or under any one of the provisions of the act of the general
assembly of Georgia, passed the twentieth of December, 1833,
‘more effectually to provide for the protection of the Cherokee
Indians residing within the limits of Georgia, and to prescribe
the bounds of their occupant claims, and also to authorize
grants to issue for lots drawn in the land and gold lotteries in
certain cases, and to provide for the appointment of an agent to
carry certain parts thereof into execution, and fix the salary
of such agent, and to punish those persons who may deter Indians
from enrolling for emigration,’ or the act amendatory thereof,
passed at the session of the legislature of 1834: ‘in which
issue the person to whom possession of said land was delivered
shall join; and which issue shall constitute the entire
pleadings between the parties; nor shall the court allow any
matter other than is contained in said issue to be placed upon
the record or files of said court; and said cause shall be tried
at the first term of the court, unless good cause shall be shown
for a continuance, and the same party shall not be permitted
to continue said cause more than once, except for unavoidable
providential cause; nor shall said court at the instance of
either party pass any order or grant any injunction to stay
said cause, nor permit to be engrafted on said cause any other
proceedings, whatever.’”

At the same time, we find, by another enactment, the judges of the courts of Georgia are restrained from granting injunctions, so that the only form in which the Indian can come before them, is in the form of an appeal; and in this, the very first step is an absolute renunciation of the rights he holds by treaty, and the unqualified admission of the rights of his antagonist, as conferred by the laws of Georgia; and the court is expressly prohibited from putting any thing else upon the record. Why? do we not all know the reason? If the poor Indian was allowed to put in a plea stating his rights, and the court should then decide against him, the cause would go upon an appeal to the supreme court; the decision could be reëxamined, could be annulled, and the authority of treaties vindicated. But, to prevent this, to make it impossible, he is compelled, on entering the court, to renounce his Indian rights, and the court is forbidden to put any thing on record which can bring up a decision upon them.

Mr. President, I have already stated that, in the observations I have made, I am actuated by no other feelings than such as ought to be in the breast of every honest man, the feelings of common justice. I would say nothing, I would whisper nothing, I would insinuate nothing, I would think nothing, which can, in the remotest degree, cause irritation in the mind of any one, of any senator here, of any state in this union; I have too much respect for every member of the confederacy. I feel nothing but grief for the wretched condition of these most unfortunate people, and every emotion of my bosom dissuades me from the use of epithets that might raise emotions which should draw the attention of the senate from the justice of their claims. I forbear to apply to this law any epithet of any kind. Sir, no epithet is needed. The features of the law itself; its warrant for the interposition of military power, when no trial and no judgment has been allowed; its denial of any appeal, unless the unhappy Indian shall first renounce his own rights, and admit the rights of his opponent; features such as these are enough to show what the true character of the act is, and supersede the necessity of all epithets, were I even capable of applying any.

The senate will thus perceive that the whole power of the state of Georgia, military as well as civil, has been made to bear upon these Indians, without their having any voice in forming, judging upon, or executing the laws under which he is placed, and without even the poor privilege of establishing the injury he may have suffered, by Indian evidence; nay, worse still, not even by the evidence of a white man! Because the renunciation of his rights precludes all evidence, white or black, civilized or savage. There then he lies, with his property, his rights, and every privilege which makes human existence desirable, at the mere mercy of the state of Georgia; a state, in whose government or laws he has no voice. Sir, it is impossible for the most active imagination to conceive a condition of human society more perfectly wretched. Shall I be told that the condition of the African slave is worse? No, sir; no, sir. It is not worse. The interest of the master makes it at once his duty and his inclination, to provide for the comfort and the health of his slave; for without these, he would be unprofitable. Both pride and interest render the master prompt in vindicating the rights of his slave, and protecting him from the oppression of others; and the laws secure to him the amplest means to do so. But who, what human being, stands in the relation of master or any other relation, which makes him interested in the preservation and protection of the poor Indian thus degraded and miserable? Thrust out from human society, without the sympathies of any, and placed without the pale of common justice, who is there to protect him, or to defend his rights?

Such, Mr. President, is the present condition of these Cherokee memorialists, whose case it is my duty to submit to the consideration of the senate. There remains but one more inquiry before I conclude. Is there any REMEDY within the scope of the powers of the federal government, as given by the constitution? If we are without power, if we have no constitutional authority, then we are also without responsibility. Our regrets may be excited, our sympathies may be moved, our humanity may be shocked, our hearts may be grieved, but if our hands are tied, we can only unite with all the good, the christian, the benevolent portion of the human family, in deploring what we cannot prevent.

But, sir, we are not thus powerless. I stated to the senate when I began, that there are two classes of the Cherokees; one of these classes desires to emigrate, and it was their petition I presented this morning; and with respect to these, our powers are ample to afford them the most liberal and effectual relief. They wish to go beyond the Mississippi, and to be guarantied in the possession of the country which may be there assigned to them. As the congress of the United States have full powers over the territories, we may give them all the guarantee which congress can express, for the undisturbed possession of their lands. With respect to their case, there can be no question as to our powers.

And, then, as to those who desire to remain on this side the river, I ask, again, are we powerless? Can we afford them no redress? Must we sit still, and see the injury they suffer, and extend no hand to relieve them? It were strange, indeed, were such the case. Why have we guarantied to them the enjoyment of their own laws? Why have we pledged to them protection? Why have we assigned them limits of territory? Why have we declared that they shall enjoy their homes in peace, without molestation from any? If the United States government has contracted these serious obligations, it ought, before the Indians were reduced by our assurances to rely upon our engagement, to have explained to them its want of authority to make the contract. Before we pretend to Great Britain, to Europe, to the civilized world, that such were the rights we would secure to the Indians, we ought to have examined the extent and the grounds of our own rights to do so. But is such, indeed, our situation? No, sir. Georgia has shut her courts against these Indians. What is the remedy? _To open ours._ Have we not the right? What says the constitution? ‘The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.’

But here was a case of conflict between the rights of the proprietors and the local laws; and here was the very case which the constitution contemplated, when it declared that the power of the federal judiciary should extend to all cases under the authority of the United States. Therefore, it was fully within the competence of congress, under the provisions of the constitution, to provide the manner in which the Cherokees might have their rights decided, because a grant of the means was included in the grant of jurisdiction. It was competent, then, for congress to decide, whether the Cherokee had a right to come into a court of justice and to make an appeal to the highest authority, to sustain the solemn treaties under which their rights had been guarantied, and in the sacred character of which they had reposed their confidence. And if congress possessed the power to extend relief to the Indians, were they not bound, by the most sacred of human considerations, the obligations of treaties, the protection assured them, by every christian tie, every benevolent feeling, every humane impulse of the human heart, to extend it? If they were to fail to do this, and there was, as reason and revelation declared there was, a tribunal of eternal justice, to which all human power was amenable, how could they, if they refused to perform their duties to this injured and oppressed, though civilized race, expect to escape the visitations of that divine vengeance which none would be permitted to avoid, who had committed wrong, or done injustice to others?

At this moment, when the United States were urging on the government of France the fulfilment of the obligations of the treaty concluded with that country, to the execution of which, it was contended that France had plighted her sacred faith, what strength, what an irresistible force would be given to our plea, if we could say to France, that, in all instances, we had completely fulfilled all our engagements, and that we had adhered faithfully to every obligation which we had contracted, no matter whether it was entered into with a powerful or a weak people; if we could say to her, that we had complied with all our engagements to others, that we now came before her, always acting right as we had done, to induce her also to fulfil her obligations to us. How should we stand in the eyes of France, and of the civilized world, if we, in spite of the most solemn treaties, which had existed for half a century, and had been recognised in every form, and by every branch of the government; how would they be justified, if they, suffered these treaties to be trampled under foot, and the rights which they were given to secure, trodden into the dust? How would Great Britain, after the solemn understanding entered into with her at Ghent, feel, after such a breach of faith? And how could he, as a commissioner on the negotiation of that treaty, hold up his head before Great Britain, after having been thus made an instrument of fraud and deception, as he assuredly would have been, if the rights of the Indians are to be thus violated, and the treaties by which they were secured, violated? How could he hold up his head, after such a violation of rights, and say that he was proud of his country, of which they all must wish to be proud?

For himself, he rejoiced that he had been spared, and allowed a suitable opportunity to present his views and opinions, on this great national subject, so interesting to the national character of the country for justice and equity. He rejoiced that the voice which, without charge of presumption or arrogance, he might say, was ever raised in defence of the oppressed of the human species, had been heard in defence of this most oppressed of all. To him, in that awful hour of death, to which all must come, and which, with respect to himself, could not be very far distant, it would be a source of the highest consolation, that an opportunity had been found by him, on the floor of the senate, in the discharge of his official duty, to pronounce his views on a course of policy marked by such wrongs as were calculated to arrest the attention of every one, and that he had raised his humble voice, and pronounced his solemn protest, against such wrongs.

He would no longer detain the senate, but would submit the following propositions.

_Resolved_, that the committee on the judiciary be directed to
inquire into the expediency of making further provision, by law,
to enable Indian nations or tribes, to whose use and occupancy
lands are secured by treaties concluded between them and the
United States, to defend and maintain their rights to such
lands, in the courts of the United States, in conformity with
the constitution of the United States.

_Resolved_, that the committee on Indian affairs be directed to
inquire into the expediency of making further provisions, by law,
for setting apart a district of country west of the Mississippi
river, for such of the Cherokee nation as may be disposed to
emigrate and to occupy the same, and for securing, in perpetuity,
the peaceful and undisturbed enjoyment thereof, to the emigrants
and their descendants.

Mr. Clay moved that the memorial and resolutions adopted by the council of the Running Waters, be referred to the committee on Indian affairs, and printed.

As to his resolutions, he knew, that in the regular order of business, they could not be taken up until to-morrow, but, if it met with the approbation of the senate, he would be as well disposed to act on them to-day as to-morrow.

In reply to Mr. Cuthbert, of Georgia, and Mr. White, of Tennessee, Mr. Clay said he could assure the honorable senator from Georgia, that nothing was further from his purpose, than to make any display on this occasion. That he always left to others, and by the judgment of the senate he was willing to abide, whether the honorable senator himself had not been guilty of that which he imputed to others. For, after addressing the senate, himself, some time, he had said that he did not intend arguing the question, that Georgia would not appear before the senate or any other tribunal. Now, Georgia might be content to do that, but could congress, could honorable senators, reconcile it with their duty, with their responsibility, to coldly contemplate the violation of numerous treaties, to witness the destruction of a people under the protection of the United States, and to let that injustice which had been inflicted on these unfortunate Cherokees, be perpetuated without the slightest notice on their part?

The gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. White,) had remarked, that they were all unconstitutional treaties; that they had no binding force as treaties; that general Washington was mistaken; that every succeeding administration was mistaken; that general Jackson himself was mistaken, in 1817, in regard to these treaties. Now, if they gave the argument of the honorable senator from Tennessee its full force, what was the consequence? What did he, (Mr. Clay,) offer? He said, merely to open the question to the court. If they had no validity, if the question which was sent to the judiciary did not rest upon treaties, they could vindicate no rights under them. Why had Georgia, if she believed there were no treaties, made provisions in her late act to which he had referred? Why shut out the rights of the Indians under the treaty? Why, if she was convinced of the unconstitutionality of the treaties, did she not allow them to be submitted to the federal judiciary, which was bound to declare that they were not obligatory and binding, if unconstitutional? Why has she studiously precluded the possibility of a review, in the supreme court, of the decisions of the local tribunals? But the gentleman had told the senate, that the treaty of ’91 was the first that guarantied to the Cherokees their lands, and that president Washington doubted whether it was necessary to submit it to the senate. It might be true, at the commencement of the government, when every thing was new and unfixed, that there were doubts; but general Washington decided that it was a treaty, and laid it, with his doubts, before the senate, who decided them, and the treaty was ratified by and with the consent of the senate. And from that day those doubts have remained dispelled. He was indebted to the honorable senator for the historical fact which he, (Mr. Clay,) had not before pressed, that this very guaranty which secured to the Indians the undisturbed possession of their lands in the treaty of ’91, was inserted by the express direction of the father of his country. And the senate was called upon now, not merely to violate the solemn obligations which the whole nation had contracted, but to violate the provision which had been inserted at the instance of the venerated father of his country!

The honorable senator had told this body, that the treaty of ’91 was the first in which there was any guarantee. If the gentleman meant to say it was the first in which there was any _express_ guarantee, he, (Mr. Clay,) would admit it. But, in the treaty of ’85, if it was not expressed, was it not implied? What was that clause, marking the boundaries of their territory? That, in the same treaty, which places the Indians under the protection of the United States, and excludes them from the authority of any other sovereign? And that, which outlaws citizens of the United States who intrude in their territory? What was the meaning of those clauses, if they did not, by implication at least, guaranty their rights, their property, and the peace of their country? But, the gentleman says, that in inserting the guaranty of ’91, there was a mistake; it was supposed that it was without the limits of North Carolina, and other states; a mistake which ran through all the treaties from that time down to 1817, which renewed and enforced the preëxisting treaties. So that general Jackson himself had been acting under a mistake when he signed the treaty of 1817. Is it possible, that, if a mistake were committed as early as 1791, it would not have been corrected in some of the various treaties negotiated as late as 1817?

The senator had said also, that the states had a right to extend their laws over all the territories and people within their limits, as defined by the treaty of ’83. Why, that was the very question under consideration, the identical question to be submitted to the judiciary. He, (Mr. Clay,) contended that the states had no right to extend their laws over that portion of the territory assigned to the Indians, or over the Indians dwelling upon it. And that is the exact question which his resolution proposes to be submitted to the determination of the judiciary, and which the late act of Georgia carefully shuns.

But the senator from Tennessee had asked, ‘what will the poor Indian, with his six hundred and forty acres of land, do, contending for his rights in a court of justice?’ Why, he, (Mr. Clay,) would admit that his condition would be miserable enough; but it was all they could do for him, and they were bound to do all they could, under the constitutional power they possessed, to maintain his rights. But, he would ask, what was to prevent these Indians, in their corporate, or collective character, from bringing their grievances before the courts? Nothing. And, that they were competent to this, we had only to look at the state papers which had emanated from them, and which did them immortal credit, to be convinced. The senator from Tennessee asked, ‘what the states would do? Would they array the federal power against the power of the state governments, and thus produce that condition of things which must result in the Indians’ being stricken from the face of the earth?’ Did not the honorable senator remember the period when a state of this union was actually arrayed and marshalled to defend its interpretation of the constitution? He was hearty in the support of the force bill; he did not stop to look at the possible consequences of a civil war. He, (Mr. Clay,) gave it his reluctant and most painful support. He would gladly have turned the bitter cup from his lips, but he felt it to be his duty to sustain the authority of the general government; and, after giving to the subject the most solemn and serious consideration, he felt himself constrained to sustain that measure. And he went along with the senator from Tennessee upon the principle, now denied by him, that the federal authority must maintain its dignity. He went upon the ground, now abandoned by the senator from Tennessee, that no state ought to array itself against the constitutional powers of this government.

How was the fact up to the period of 1829? The gentleman from Tennessee tells us the true policy of this government is to send these poor creatures beyond the Mississippi, and that there is no impediment in the obligations of subsisting treaties. Never, until the new light burst upon us, that hundreds of Indian treaties, made during a period of half a century, under almost every administration of the government, concluded and ratified with all the solemn forms of the constitution, and containing the most explicit guarantees and obligations of protection to the Indians, and of security to their possessions, were mere nullities, was it supposed competent to effect a compulsory removal of the Indians beyond the Mississippi. It is true, that the policy of removing them has been long entertained; was contemplated by Mr. Jefferson; but it was a free, voluntary, and unconstrained emigration. No one, until of late, ever dreamed of a forcible removal, against their consent, accomplished either by the direct application of military power, or by cruel and intolerable local legislation. He wished that they would voluntarily remove. He believed that absorption or extinction was the only alternative of their remaining in the bosom of the whites. But they were a part of the human race, as capable as we are of pleasure and pain, and invested with as indisputable a right as we have, to judge of and pursue their own happiness.

It is said, that annihilation is the destiny of the Indian race. Perhaps it is, judging from the past. But shall we therefore hasten it? Death is the irreversible decree pronounced against the human race. Shall we accelerate its approach, because it is inevitable? No, sir. Let us treat with the utmost kindness, and the most perfect justice, the aborigines whom Providence has committed to our guardianship. Let us confer upon them, if we can, the inestimable blessings of christianity and civilization, and then, if they must sink beneath the progressive wave of civilized population, we are free from all reproach, and stand acquitted in the sight of God and man.

The senator from Tennessee has left the senate under the impression, no doubt unintentionally, that three other states had advanced as far as Georgia in the exercise of a jurisdiction over the Indians and their property. But if he, (Mr. Clay,) were rightly informed, this was far from correct. North Carolina had exercised no such jurisdiction. She had not touched a hair upon the head of any Indian. Tennessee had extended her laws to the Indian country, for the sole purpose of protecting the Indians, and punishing the white intruders. Her upright judges and tribunals concurred, unanimously, if he were rightly informed, in supporting the Indian rights. No state, he believed, but Georgia, had seized upon the Indian lands, and distributed them among the whites. From the commencement of our independence down to this time, there was not another instance of such seizure, and appropriation, by any other member of the confederacy.

Mr. Clay assured the senator from Georgia, that he had not sought for the position in which he was placed. It was sought of him. He was applied to by the unfortunate Cherokees, to present their case to the senate. And he should have been false and faithless to his own heart, and unworthy of human nature, if he had declined to be their organ, however inadequate he feared he had proved himself to be.

On the whole, then, said Mr. Clay, the resolutions proposed an inquiry into the suitableness of making further provision for the Cherokees who choose to emigrate beyond the Mississippi. And in regard to those of them who will not go, but who prefer to cling to the graves of their forefathers, and to the spot which gave them birth, in spite of any destiny impending over them, the resolution proposes, that, since Georgia has shut her courts against them, we should inquire whether we should not open those of the federal government to them, and ascertain whether, according to the constitution, treaties, and laws, we are capable of fulfilling the obligations which we have solemnly contracted.

The memorial of the Cherokees was then referred to the committee
on Indian affairs, and Mr. Clay’s resolutions laid on the table
for one day.

ON THE CUMBERLAND ROAD BILL.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 11, 1835.

[THE Cumberland road is a national work, constructed under the
authority of congress, commencing at Cumberland on the Potomac
river in the state of Maryland, and extending west to the Ohio
river at Wheeling; from whence it is to be continued, under the
name of the national road, through Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and
Missouri, to Jefferson, the capital of the latter state. At the
time when the compact with the state of Ohio was made by the
United States, this road had become absolutely necessary for
the purpose of securing an intercourse between the west and the
east side of the Alleghany mountains. The first step to effect
this, was taken in 1802, when Mr. Jefferson was president. Its
completion to the Ohio river, was in a great measure owing to
the exertions of Mr. Clay in the cause of internal improvement,
at various periods during his congressional career. After the
road had been made to Columbus, in the state of Ohio, the Ohio
section had been given to and accepted by that state. At the
session of congress in 1834, an appropriation of three hundred
thousand dollars had been made for repairing the road, and on
the present occasion a further sum of three hundred and forty
thousand dollars was proposed for the purpose of putting the
work in good condition, previously to its being surrendered
to the states through which it passes. The bill to effect this
object passed the senate by a vote of thirty-two to nine, after
considerable discussion; Mr. Clay giving his views as follows.]

MR. CLAY remarked, that he would not have said a word then, but for the introduction in this discussion of collateral matters, not immediately connected with it. He meant to vote for the appropriation contained in the bill, and he should do so with pleasure, because, under all the circumstances of the case, he felt himself called upon by a sense of imperative necessity to yield his assent to the appropriation. The road would be abandoned, and all the expenditures which had heretofore been made upon it would have been entirely thrown away, unless they now succeeded in obtaining an appropriation to put the road in a state of repair. Now, he did not concur with the gentleman, (Mr. Ewing,) that Ohio could, as a matter of strict right, demand of the government to keep this road in repair. And why so? Because, by the terms of the compact, under the operation of which the road was made, there was a restricted and defined fund, set apart in order to accomplish that object. And that fund measured the obligation of the government. It had been, however, long since exhausted. There was no obligation, then, on the part of the government, to keep the road in repair. But he was free to admit, that considerations of policy would prompt it to adopt that course, in order that an opportunity should be presented to the states to take it into their own hands.

The honorable senator from Pennsylvania felicitated himself on having, at a very early epoch, discovered the unconstitutionality of the general government’s erecting toll-gates upon this road, and he voted against the first measure to carry that object into execution. He (Mr. Clay) must say, that, for himself, he thought the general government had a right to adopt that course which it deemed necessary for the preservation of a road which was made under its own authority. And as a legitimate consequence from the power of making a road, was derived the power of making an improvement on it. That was established; and, on that point he was sure the honorable gentleman did not differ from those who were in favor of establishing toll-gates at the period to which he had alluded. He would repeat, that, if the power to make a road were conceded, it followed, as a legitimate consequence from that power, that the general government had a right to preserve it. And, if the right to do so, there was no mode of preservation more fitting and suitable, than that which resulted from a moderate toll for keeping up the road, and thus continuing it for all time to come.

The opinion held by the honorable senator, at the period to which he had adverted, was not the general opinion. He would well remember that the power which he, (Mr. Clay,) contended, did exist, was sustained in the other branch of the legislature by large majorities. And, in that senate, if he was not mistaken, there were but nine dissentients from the existence of it. If his recollection deceived him not, he had the pleasure of concurring with the distinguished individual who now presided over the deliberations of that body. He thought that he, (the vice-president,) in common with the majority of the senate and house of representatives, coincided in the belief, that a road, constructed under the orders of the general government, ought to be preserved by the authority which brought it into being. Now, that was his, (Mr. Clay’s,) opinion still. He was not one of those who, on this or any other great national subject, had changed his opinion in consequence of being wrought upon by various conflicting circumstances.

With regard to the general power of making internal improvements, as far as it existed in the opinions he had frequently expressed in both houses, his opinion was unaltered. But with respect to the expediency of exercising that power, at any period, it must depend upon the circumstances of the times. And, in his opinion, the power was to be found in the constitution. This belief he had always entertained, and it remained unshaken. He could not coincide in the opinion expressed by the honorable senator from Pennsylvania and the honorable senator from Massachusetts, in regard to the disposition that was to be made of this road.

What, he would ask, had been stated on all hands? That the Cumberland road was a great national object, in which all the people of the United States were interested and concerned; that we are interested in our corporate capacity, on account of the stake we possessed in the public domain, and that we were consequently benefited by that road; that the people of the west were interested in it, as a common thoroughfare to all places from one side of the country to the other. Now, what was the principle of the arrangement that had been entered into? It was this common object, this national object, this object in which the people of this country were interested; its care, its preservation, was to be confided to different states, having no special motive or interest in its preservation; and, therefore, not responsible for the consequences that might result. The people of Kentucky and Indiana, and of the states west of those states, as well as the people living on the eastern side of the mountains, were all interested in the use and occupation of this road, which, instead of being retained and kept under the control of that common government in which all had a share, their interest in it was to be confided to the local jurisdictions through which the road passed; and thus the states, generally, were to depend upon the manner in which they should perform their duties; upon those having no sympathy with them, having no regard for their interest, but left to do as they chose in regard to the preservation of this road.

He would say that the principle was fundamentally wrong. He protested against it; had done from the first, and did so again now. It was a great national object, and they might as well give the care of the mint to Pennsylvania, the protection of the breakwater, or of the public vessels in New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, to the respective legislatures of the states in which that property was situated, as give the care of a great national road, in which the whole people of the United States were concerned, to the care of a few states which were acknowledged to have no particular interest in it――states having so little interest in that great work, that they would not repair it when offered to their hands.

But, he said, he would vote for this appropriation; he was compelled to vote for it by the force of circumstances over which he had no control. He had seen, in reference to internal improvements, and other measures of a national character, not individuals, merely, but whole masses, entire communities, prostrating their own settled opinions, to which they had conformed for half a century, wheel to the right or the left, march this way or that, according as they saw high authority for it. And he saw that there was no way of preserving this great object, which afforded such vast facilities to the western states, no other mode of preserving it, but by a reluctant acquiescence in a course of policy, which _all_, at least, had not contributed to produce, but which was formed to operate on the country, and from which there lay no appeal.

Mr. Clay, in conclusion, again reiterated that he should vote for the appropriation in this bill, although very reluctantly, and with the protest, that the road in question, being the common property of the whole nation, and under the guardianship of the general government, ought not to be treacherously parted from by it, and put into the hands of the local governments, who felt no interest in the matter.

ON THE APPOINTING AND REMOVING POWER.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 18, 1835.

[IN the course of a discussion on a bill relating to the power
of appointing to and removal from office, as exercised by the
president, Mr. Clay made the following speech, in which he
denies the constitutionality of the unlimited power of removal
from office, by the president, at his own will and pleasure,
without the consent of the senate. Mr. Clay’s views of the
nature and consequences of this arbitrary power claimed and
exercised by president Jackson, will be found interesting,
as well as his allusions to the pecuniary troubles and
distress, which he then predicted would follow from the acts
of Jackson’s administration――predictions painfully verified in
the subsequent succession of disasters which have befallen the
country.]