Chapter I: HAVE been desirous, Mr. President, before the passage of this bill, (8)

I have heard that, on his arrival at the seat of the general government, to enter upon the duties of the office of vice-president, in March last, when interrogated how far he meant to conform, in his new station, to certain peculiar opinions which were held in Virginia, he made this patriotic and noble reply: ‘I am vice-president of the United States, and not of the state of Virginia; and I shall be governed by the wishes and opinions of my constituents.’ When I heard of this encouraging and satisfactory reply, believing, as I most religiously do, that a large majority of the people of the United States are in favor of a national bank, (and gentlemen may shut their eyes to the fact, deny or dispute, or reason it away as they please, but it is my conscientious conviction that two-thirds, if not more, of the people of the United States desire such an institution,) I thought I beheld a sure and certain guarantee for the fulfilment of the wishes of the people of the United States. I thought it impossible, that the wants and wishes of a great people, who had bestowed such unbounded and generous confidence, and conferred on him, such exalted honors, should be disregarded and disappointed. It did not enter into my imagination to conceive, that one, who had shown so much deference and respect to the presumed sentiments of a single state, should display less towards the sentiments of the whole nation.

I hope, Mr. President, that, in performing the painful duty which had devolved on me, I have not transcended the limits of legitimate debate. I repeat, in all truth and sincerity, the assurance to the senate and to the country, that nothing but a stern, reluctant, and indispensable sense of honor and of duty could have forced from me the response which I have made to the president’s objections. But, instead of yielding without restraint to the feelings of disappointment and mortification excited by the perusal of his message, I have anxiously endeavored to temper the notice of it, which I have been compelled to take, by the respect due to the office of chief magistrate, and by the personal regard and esteem which I have ever entertained for its present incumbent.

ON A GENERAL BANKRUPT LAW.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 17, 1842.

[THE subject of a general bankrupt law, after the repeal of
the law of 1800, which took place in 1805, had been frequently
agitated in congress. Bills were at different periods introduced
and discussed, some of which passed the senate, but were
lost in the house of representatives. In 1837, president Van
Buren recommended to congress the passage of a bankrupt law,
exclusively applicable to banks, and other corporations; but
the proposition met with very little favor at the time. The
pecuniary distress prevailing throughout the country, during
the administration of that president, caused many memorials
to be presented to congress, praying for a general bankrupt
law for the relief of the people, and, on the twenty-third
of March, 1840, on presenting a memorial from a large number
of the citizens of New York, asking the passage of a uniform
bankrupt law, Mr. Clay took occasion to say, that he had been
at all times favorable to such a measure, and was then ready
to support such a bill, when found suitable in its details,
for the exigencies required. In April, three different bills
were introduced in the senate, one of which was taken up
and discussed. On motion of a senator from Alabama, (an
administration man,) sustained by Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, among
others, the clause subjecting banks to the operation of the bill
was stricken out, by a vote of twenty-eight to sixteen; Mr. Clay,
on a subsequent occasion, (February twenty-sixth, 1841,) denying
the constitutionality, as well as the expediency, of including
corporations in such a law. In June, 1840, Mr. Clay moved to
strike out the compulsory provisions in the bill, which was
negatived, (seventeen to twenty-five.) He had previously said,
(April twenty-second,) ‘that it was not to be denied that the
voluntary class of bankruptcies would comprehend a vast majority
of all the cases, and hence the bill of the majority of the
judiciary committee, would be likely to afford the largest share
of relief, in the present embarrassed and deranged state of
business.’

The compulsory clause being thus retained, the bill was
ordered to be engrossed, on the twenty-fourth of June, by a vote
of twenty-four to twenty-three, Mr. Clay in the affirmative.
It finally passed the senate on the twenty-fifth, twenty-one
to nineteen; but was laid on the table in the house of
representatives, on the seventh of July, by a vote of one
hundred and one to eighty-nine.

At the extra session of congress in 1841, after the election
of president Harrison, the whigs having a majority in both
branches, a bankrupt hill was introduced, and after considerable
debate, passed the senate July twenty-fourth, 1841, by a vote of
twenty-six to twenty-three, and the house of representatives on
the eighteenth of August, one hundred and ten to one hundred and
six. Mr. Clay supported this bill, declaring that ‘he considered
it as part of a system of relief for the country.’

Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, a Van Buren senator, said: ‘the
refusal of the late administration to act upon the subject, had
done more than any thing else to cause their defeat.’

During the next session of the same congress, the most strenuous
efforts were made to repeal the bankrupt law, before the time in
which it was to go into operation, which was fixed for the first
of February, 1842; and the repeal was carried in the house of
representatives, one hundred and twenty-six to ninety-four, on
the seventeenth of January, but defeated in the senate on the
twenty-eighth, by a vote of twenty-two to twenty-three. While
the question was pending, numerous petitions from the people,
remonstrating against the repeal of the law, were presented to
congress. Mr. Clay, on presenting some of these petitions, on
the seventeenth of January, made the following remarks on the
subject.]

MR. CLAY said, that he was charged with the presentation of a great many memorials, all remonstrating against any repeal or postponement of the bankrupt law. He would not trouble the senate with having them read. There were a great many from the state of New York; two from the state of Maryland; one from Pennsylvania; one from Newark, New Jersey; one from Boston, signed by hundreds of persons; a city which, from its mercantile character, must be supposed to have knowledge on the subject, in which were mingled the names of those both able and unable to pay their debts; also, three from his own state, (Kentucky,) one from the capital of the state, in which were the proceedings of a meeting, strongly remonstrating against interference with the law, going into arguments to show why it should not be repealed or postponed. To this there were four hundred signatures, all of which, the secretaries informed him, were voluntarily made.

Mr. Clay referred to an opinion, which had been thrown out under the sanction of some high commercial authority in New York, that the bankrupt bill, if it should become a law, would operate to throw one hundred millions worth of property into the market to be sacrificed. Such a remark, coming from that source, might be likely to have some weight. But it must be remembered that the estimate of one hundred millions, was mere assumption and random conjecture, for no man could tell, with any thing like accuracy, what the amount would be; it might just as well have been set down at two hundred millions, as at one. But be the amount what it might, in estimating the weight of the statement, as an argument against the bill, it should be inquired, on the other hand, what would be done with this property, should the bill not go into effect? Would it be kept _out_ of the market? Not at all. On the contrary, it would be thrown into the market, to be sold under the hammer, by sheriffs and other officers executing the process of the courts, and that without competition to raise the price. For when the property of a debtor was seized by one of his creditors, what motive could his other creditors have to enhance its avails, by competition at the sale? None in the world. On the contrary, should the law remain undisturbed, what would be the course of action under it? According to his understanding of the act, it would produce a distribution of the goods of the debtor among all his creditors, _pro rata_; of course, when his property should be set up to sale, it would be the interest of them all to make as much out of it as possible. They would bid it up, instead of suffering it to be sacrificed for a song. He considered, that whatever might be the exact form of legal proceedings in carrying out the law, the result in practice would be, that, under the benignant operation of the act, there would be a distribution of the debtor’s effects, not only among all his creditors, but at the highest price they could be made to command.

Mr. Clay went on to say that it was not his purpose to go, at this time, into a discussion of the subject generally. He had thought of the bankrupt act as a measure, which came recommended to congress, not only by all considerations of justice, of humanity, and benevolence, but recommended no less by the appalling condition of the country. If, among all the other distresses, discontents, and disorders, which every where prevailed to so alarming an extent, this legislature should now slam the door in the faces of those unfortunate men, who had at length hoped to be liberated from irretrievable embarrassment, by the beneficent operations of this law, it would produce such a state of excitement, distress, disorder, and despair, from one end of the land to the other, that no man could foresee, or even conjecture, the consequences.

But he could not terminate the brief remarks with which he had deemed it proper to accompany the presentation of these petitions and memorials, without adverting, for a moment, to a circumstance which had a personal relation to himself. The senate would do him the justice to admit, that he rarely introduced any thing of that description on their notice; never, indeed, unless under a sense of unavoidable necessity. An intimation had recently appeared in some of the public prints of the day, that the movement now in progress in the other wing of the capitol, towards a repeal of the bankrupt law, had originated with him, (Mr. Clay.) He disdained to enter upon any thing like a defence, against a charge so base and dishonorable, and one so entirely contrary to the entire tenor of his whole public life. It might, with equal probability, or evidence, have been asserted that he was the author or prompter of the proposal of a gentleman near him, to repeal the distribution law. He held the insinuation in profound contempt and scorn.

A single remark he must be permitted, in reference to the delegation in the other house, from his own state. At the last session, every member of that delegation, with one solitary exception, had voted against the passage of the bankrupt bill; and even that single advocate of the bill, on his return to his own district, found so great and general a dissatisfaction with the provisions of the bill, that he had, on the present occasion, felt it his duty to give such a vote, as he presumed it would appear that he had this day given in that body, on the question of repeal. But it seemed, notwithstanding these known facts, that Mr. Clay was to be held responsible for the votes of all the representatives in the other house, from his state, on that question. But those who imagined that Kentuckians were made of so supple, servile stuff, as to take their public course in legislation, from the dictation of any man, had yet to learn their true character. Those gentlemen had as good a right to dictate Mr. Clay’s course, as he had to dictate theirs. The representatives from Kentucky, in either house of congress, had enough of manly independence, to judge and to act for themselves, and to vote as their own individual views of duty should prompt them. But this accusation, base and despicable as it was in itself, had, notwithstanding, assumed such a shape as to render it Mr. Clay’s duty to bring it to the notice of the senate; and he felt very sure that it was only necessary for him to bring it home to the bosom of every senator, to have it promptly, instantaneously rejected and repelled, as utterly groundless. For whatever might have been their difference of sentiment――and no man regretted more than he did, that it should have been his misfortune to differ in opinion from any portion of the gentlemen of that chamber――he was satisfied that all, both friends and foes, would, with one voice, do him the justice to say, that, whatever might have been the errors of his head, he had, at least, sought to live, as he hoped to die, an HONEST MAN――honest in his public, as in his private life.

ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION RESPECTING THE VETO POWER.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 24, 1842.

[THE frequent use of the veto power, by presidents Jackson and
Tyler, by which very important bills passed by congress had
been defeated, to the detriment of the public interests, induced
Mr. Clay, before resigning his seat in the senate, to propose
an amendment of the constitution, limiting the power of the
president in this respect, on which subject he addressed
the senate as follows. There were also two other resolutions
submitted by Mr. Clay, having in view the same object――namely,
the reduction of executive power within proper limits; first,
that no senator or representative should be appointed to any
office under the United States during the term for which he was
elected; second, the secretary of the treasury to be chosen by
congress.]

WHATEVER, said Mr. Clay, might be the ultimate fate of the amendment which had just been read, or of the two other kindred amendments which he had the honor of offering at the same time with it, he should at least enjoy the consciousness of having discharged his duty in their presentation. He must regret, indeed, that the duty of presenting and of advocating their adoption by the senate, had not devolved upon abler and more skilful hands; still, however, he considered the measure as one he was bound in conscience to present in his place, for the action of this body.

Nor had the performance of this duty been prompted, as some might suppose, and as had been suggested in certain quarters, by any recent exercise of the power to which the resolution has reference; yet, he was free to confess, that although the subject was one which had long been in his mind, and on which he had thought much and deeply for years past, the course of recent events had certainly not tended to weaken, if it had not added much to the strength of his impressions on the general subject. As far back as seven years ago, a worthy and lamented friend of his, from Maryland, now no more, had, in concert with himself, presented a proposition the object of which had been to modify, and further to restrain the exercise by the executive, of this veto power. The drafting of the resolution, its presentation, and even the observations with which it was to be accompanied, all had been subjects of joint consultation and consideration between himself and that gentleman. He adverted to this fact for no other purpose than to repel the idea, if it were entertained in the mind of any who now heard him, that the amendment now under consideration, and the others which accompanied it, had been suggested by recent occurrences. As far back as June, 1840, on one of the most solemn occasions in which he had ever been called to address a popular assembly――he alluded to the time when he enjoyed the opportunity of addressing the friends of his youth, and the people of his native county of Hanover, on the subject of the duties to be looked for at the hands of the new whig administration, which was expected to come into power, in consequence of the glorious and universal triumph of the whig party at the then approaching election――he had placed emphatically, and in front of them all, that which formed the subject of the present resolution. After speaking of the veto power generally, and more particularly of it’s exercise by a late president of the United States, the speech proceeded to say:

‘The first, and, in my opinion, the most important object which
should engage the serious attention of a new administration, is
that of circumscribing the executive power, and throwing around
it such limitations and safeguards as will render it no longer
dangerous to the public liberties.

‘Whatever is the work of man, necessarily partakes of his
imperfections; and it was not to be expected, that, with all
the acknowledged wisdom and virtues of the framers of our
constitution, they could have sent forth a plan of government
so free from all defect, and so full of guarantees, that it
should not, in the conflict of embittered parties, and of excited
passions, be perverted and misinterpreted. Misconceptions,
or erroneous constructions of the powers granted in the
constitution, would probably have occurred, after the lapse of
many years, in seasons of entire calm, and with a regular and
temperate administration of the government; but, during the last
twelve years, the machine, driven by a reckless charioteer, with
frightful impetuosity, has been greatly jarred and jolted, and
it needs careful examination, and thorough repair.

‘With this view, therefore, to the fundamental character of the
government itself, and especially of the executive branch, it
seems to me that, either by amendments of the constitution, when
they are necessary, or by remedial legislation, when the object
falls within the scope of the powers of congress, there should
be,

‘First, a provision to render a person ineligible to the office
of president of the United States after a service of one term.
Much observation and deliberate reflection have satisfied me,
that too much of the time, the thoughts, and the exertions of
the incumbent are occupied, during his first term, in securing
his reëlection. The public business, consequently, suffers;
and measures are proposed or executed with less regard to the
general prosperity, than to their influence upon the approaching
election. If the limitation to one term existed, the president
would be exclusively devoted to the discharge of his public
duties; and he would endeavor to signalize his administration by
the beneficence and wisdom of its measures.

‘Secondly, that the veto power should be more precisely defined,
and be subjected to further limitations and qualifications.’

Thus, it would be perceived by the senate, that whatever truth or soundness there might be in the opinion which he had embodied in the resolution now submitted to the senate, it was an opinion long since deliberately formed and expressed, and one which had often since been considered and reviewed, unprompted by any of those recent occurrences to which it might otherwise have been supposed to owe its origin.

The particular amendment now before the senate, for its consideration, and to which he should speak before he more briefly adverted to the others which accompanied it, was that which related to the veto power. And while on this subject of redeeming the pledge which was, in some sort, given by him as one of the humblest members of that party which had not long since so signally triumphed, he hoped the senate would allow him, in all truth and sincerity, to say, that he desired to see a party, when it came into power, redeem the pledges and fulfil the promises it made when out of power, and not exhibit that disgraceful spectacle so often witnessed in the political history of other nations, of professing one set of principles, and employing them as a means towards getting into power, and then, when successful in obtaining their wishes, turn round, forget all they had said and promised, and go on to administer the government just as their predecessors had done. He could assure gentlemen, that, on the questions of restraining and limiting executive power, on the necessity of an economical administration of the government, on regulating the dismissing power of the president, on securing a fair and just responsibility in all the departments; in a word, on every great question of national policy to which the party to which he considered himself as belonging were pledged to the people, and to the world; they would find him, on all occasions during the short time in which he expected to remain a member of the body, heartily ready to coöperate in carrying out into practice all they had avowed in principle.

It was his purpose to go but very briefly into the history and origin of the veto power. It was known to all to have originated in the institution of the tribunitian power, in ancient Rome; that it was seized upon, and perverted to purposes of ambition, when the empire was established under Augustus; and that it had not been finally abolished until the reign of Constantine. There could be no doubt that it had been introduced from the practice under the empire, into the monarchies of Europe, in most of which, in some form, and under some modification or other, it was now to be found. But, although it existed in the national codes, the power had not, in the case of Great Britain, been exercised for a century and a half past; and, if he was correctly informed on the subject, it had, in the French monarchy, never been exercised at all. During the memorable period of the French revolution, when a new constitution was under consideration, this subject of the veto power had been largely discussed, and had agitated the whole country. Every one must recollect how it had been turned against the unfortunate Louis XIV, who had been held up to the ridicule of the populace, under the title of ‘Monsieur Veto,’ as his wife, the queen, had been called ‘Madame Veto;’ and, although after much difficulty, the power had finally found a place in the constitution, not a solitary instance had occurred of its actual exercise. Under the colonial state of this country, the power was transplanted, from the experience which had been had of it in Europe, to the laws relating to the colonies, and that in a double form; for there was a veto of the colonial governor, and also a veto of the crown. But what was thought of this power by the inhabitants of these states, when rising to assert their freedom, might be seen in the words of the instrument in which they asserted their independence. At the head of all the grievances stated in that paper, as reasons for our separation from Great Britain, was placed the exercise of this very power of the royal veto. Speaking of the king, the declaration of independence employed this language.

‘He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and
necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his governors to
pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended
in their operations, till his assent should be obtained; and,
when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.’

No doubt, the idea of ingrafting this power upon our own constitution, was adopted by the convention, from having always found it as a power recognised in European governments, just as it had been before derived by them from the practice and history of Rome. At all events, the power was inserted as one feature, not only in the general constitution of the federal government, but also in the constitutions of a portion of the states. Fifty years had now elapsed since the federal constitution was formed, and it was no derogation to the wisdom and patriotism of the venerable men who framed it, now to say, that the work of their hands, though as perfect as ever had proceeded from human hands, was, nevertheless, not absolutely so; because that was what nothing that sprung from man had ever been. But now, after the lapse of half a century, it was interesting to pause, to look back, to review the history of that period, and to compare the predictions of those who then looked into the future, with the actual results of subsequent experience. Any one at all acquainted with the contemporaneous history of the constitution, must know, that one great radical error, which possessed the minds of the wise men who drew up that instrument, was, an apprehension that the executive department of the then proposed government would be too feeble to contend successfully in a struggle with the power of the legislature; hence, it was found that various expedients had been proposed in the convention, with the avowed purpose of strengthening the executive arm; one of which went so far as to propose that the president should be chief magistrate for life. All these proposals had their origin in the one prevailing idea――that of the weakness of the executive, and its incompetence to defend itself against the encroachments of legislative domination and dictation.

Now, let any man look at the actual working of the machine they constructed, and see whether the anticipations which haunted their minds on this subject had been realized or falsified by the subsequent political history of this government. Let him see, whether the executive department was the weak spot in the system. Much had been said about the encroachments of the federal government on the governments of the states, from which complaints, had arisen what was called the states-rights party, and its opposite; but an examination of the facts of the case would demonstrate, that no solitary instance had yet occurred of any such encroachment by the general government; but, on the contrary, Mr. Clay could demonstrate, were this the proper time or occasion for doing so, that there had been an abandonment by that government of the exercise of its own just powers, in relation to the states, and this to such an extent, that the existing state of the country presented very much the aspect that the old confederation had once done, with all its weakness and imbecility.

But while there had been no such thing in practice as an encroachment by the federal upon the state governments, there had been, within the federal government itself, a constant encroachment by the executive upon the legislative department.

First, it attacked the treaty-making power. None could now read the language of the constitution, without at once coming to the conclusion, that the intention of the authors of that instrument was, that the senate should be consulted by the president, not merely in the ratification, but in the inception, of all treaties; that, in the commencement of the negotiations, the instructions of the ministers appointed to treat, the character and provisions of the treaty, the senate should be consulted, and should first yield its assent. And such had, in fact, been the interpretation put upon the treaty-making power, in the first and purest years of our government. Every one must recollect the early history of the exercise of the power, and the high sanction for such a usage. The first president had been wont to come to the senate, there to propose a foreign mission, and to consult with his constitutional advisers, the members of the senate, on the instructions to be given to the minister who should be sent. But this practice had since been abandoned. The president now, without a word of consultation with the senate, on his own mere personal sense of propriety, concluded a treaty, and promised to the foreign power its ratification; and then after all this had been done, and the terms of the treaty agreed upon, he, for the first time, submitted it to the senate for ratification. Now, every one must see, that there was a great difference between rejecting what had been already actually done, and refusing to do that thing if asked beforehand. All must feel, that they often gave their official assent to what they never would have sanctioned, but for the consideration that the treaty was already concluded, and that the faith of the nation was in some sort pledged for its ratification. Another consequence of this executive encroachment, was one from which foreign powers often experienced great inconvenience; he meant the amendments of treaties by the senate, after they were at length submitted. So great had the inconvenience from this source been, that, in more recent treaties, it had come to be the practice to insert, in the body of the treaty itself, a provision against all alteration; so that it must be ratified in its existing form, or not ratified at all.

The next executive encroachment he should notice, was that which occurred in the dismissal from office of persons appointed by and with the consent of the senate. The effect of this practice was virtually to destroy all agency and coöperation of the senate, in such appointments. Of what avail was it that the senate should to-day solemnly ratify and confirm the appointment of an individual to an office under the government, when the president could to-morrow reverse the effect of their act by his mere breath? Every one knew that the power of removal had been grossly perverted. In the early days of the constitution, it had been maintained, that that power could be exercised only in case of malfeasance or misfeasance in office; and that the president who should dare to employ it for any other end, would subject himself to impeachment. But our history and experience has gone to show, that this liability to impeachment was a mere scarecrow, and that it could never have any practical effect in a popular government, constituted as ours was, and in a country politically divided as ours was ever like to be. By the free exercise of this power of removal, the senate had lost its practical influence on the whole subject of appointment to office. Instance after instance had occurred, where an individual had been dismissed by the executive, whom the senate would gladly have replaced in office, but whom they were unable to retain there, and were therefore compelled to sanction the nomination of a successor. The actual result of such a state of things was, he repeated it, that the coöperation of the senate with the president, in the matter of appointments, had been almost completely nullified for years past. Indeed, so perfectly was this understood, that when the senate were deliberating with closed doors, on executive nominations, Mr. Clay frequently walked out of the chamber. Deliberation, in such a case, was one of the idlest things in the world, because every one knew that all resistance must be unavailing. And, even should the objections against the nominee be so gross and undeniable that resistance to his appointment should succeed, they might generally calculate on another nomination, not more to the taste of the senate; and when at length the office was filled, the tenure of the incumbent was not on the joint will of the president and senate acting together, but upon the single will, upon the mere arbitrary breath of one man.

Mr. Clay said, it was not his purpose to go into all the details of these encroachments by the executive, upon the constitutional powers and prerogatives of a single legislative branch of the government. He would now pass to its attacks on the powers of the congress of the United States.

And the first instance of this to which he should refer, was the creation of officers and the designation of their salaries, without the consent of congress, or any consultation with it. Another, and a more formidable instance, was to be found in the assumption within the last few years, of the purse of the nation. He alluded, as every body must understand, to the seizure made by a late executive, of the public deposits placed by law in the bank of the United States――a removal which had been effected under the avowed claim of power to employ the prerogative of removal as a means to compel subordinate executive officers to comply with the will of the president, on the principle that the executive was a unit, and that a single will must control the entire executive department. This seizure of the public deposits had yet been unprovided against; the congressional power to control them had been unresumed, and thus a state of things was permitted to continue, by which the nation was virtually placed at the feet of the executive.

Let not gentlemen mock him, by talking about the impossibility of the president’s drawing money out of the treasury, except under an appropriation by congress. Let them not tell him of the responsibility of public officers; let them look at facts; let them look at what had actually occurred, on the removal of two or three secretaries of the treasury, in order to accomplish this very seizure of the public treasure; and then let them look at the dismissal of a countless host of subordinate officers, because they did not happen to hold the same political opinions that were held by the president. Of what avail were laws? The president had nothing to do but say to his secretary, issue your warrant for such a sum of money, and direct the register and comptroller to sign it, and if they should talk about a regard for their oaths, and boggle at obeying, tell them to do what I command them, and if not, I will find men who will. And he would here say, to all those who professed to be desirous of guarding against such abuses of trust, that unless it were done by an amendment of the constitution, or by a revival and resumption of the power already possessed by congress, under the constitution, they never could effect their purpose. All efforts, all devices, all guards, all guarantees, all attempts of whatever kind, to separate the purse from the sword, would prove in practice utterly vain and ineffectual. There was a third instance of this encroachment, which he was authorized by facts to state, but on which he should not at this time dwell. Not only had the purse of the nation been seized; not only did it still remain in the hands of the president, but the nation had seen armies raised, by executive mandate, not only without authority or shadow of authority of law, but, as in the case of the Florida volunteers, after a law had been asked for, and positively refused. Other instances might be cited, in which a military force had been raised, without the sanction of congress.

Without, therefore, going any further, Mr. Clay said, that he thought a careful review of the operations of this government, down to the present havoc, would fully demonstrate that, while it had made no encroachment on the states, there had been a constant encroachment by the executive on the legislative authority.

And was not this in the nature of things? The executive branch of the government was eternally in action; it was ever awake; it never slept; its action was continuous and unceasing, like the tides of some mighty river, which continued flowing and flowing on, swelling, and deepening, and widening, in its onward progress, till it swept away every impediment, and broke down and removed every frail obstacle which might be set up to impede its course. Let gentlemen look at all history, and they would find that it had ever been so. The legislative branch of government met only periodically; its power lay in its assembling and acting; the moment it adjourned, its power disappeared; it was dissipated, gone; but there stood the president at the head of the executive department, ever ready to enforce the law, and to seize upon every advantage which presented itself, for the extension and augmentation of its power.

And now he would, upon principle, examine for a few moments the motives which might be supposed to have actuated the members of the convention, in conferring upon the executive this veto power. Let us throw ourselves back to the period in which they lived and acted, and then institute a comparison between the expectations in which they had indulged, and the actual facts, as they had since occurred.

On principle, certainly, the executive ought to have no agency in the formation of laws. Laws were the will of the nation authoritatively expressed. The carrying of those laws into effect was the duty which ought to be assigned to the executive, and this ought to be his sole duty, for it was an axiom in all free governments that the three great departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, should ever be kept separate and distinct. And a government was the most perfect when most in conformity with this fundamental principle. To give, then, to the executive, any agency in the ascertainment and expression of the will of the nation, was so far a violation of this great leading principle. But it was said that the framers of our constitution had, nevertheless, been induced to place the veto upon the list of executive powers, by two considerations; the first was a desire to protect the executive against the power of the legislative branch, and the other was a prudent wish to guard the country against the injurious effects of crude and hasty legislation. But where was the necessity to protect the executive against the legislative department? were not both bound by their solemn oaths, to support the constitution? The judiciary had no veto. If the argument was a sound one, why was not the same protection extended to the judiciary also? Was there not ample security against the encroachments of the legislative power, in the absence of the veto? First, there was the solemn oath of office; then there was the authority of the judiciary; then there was the responsibility of individual members to the people, and this responsibility continually kept up by a frequent appeal to the people; and, lastly, there was the ultimate conflict of the president and the legislature before the grand tribunal of the nation itself, in case of any attempt, by the legislature, to deprive him of the rightful exercise of his authority. Besides, if a veto be necessary, as a defence against legislative power, why was there no veto against the highest description of all legislation, the fundamental legislation by a convention? There was no veto there; there was no apprehension of hasty action; no necessity was recognised for the controlling will of one man to save the nation from the heedless acts of its own representatives. But in the case of ordinary legislation, why should such apprehensions be indulged? On this subject, experience was our safest guide. Now, Mr. Clay had taken the pains to look into the provisions of twenty-six state constitutions, in relation to this matter of the veto, and the result was highly curious and interesting. The states were in this respect divided, as equally as their number would admit, into three distinct classes. Nine of them gave to the executive the veto power, unless controlled by two thirds of the legislature. Eight other states conferred the veto, but controlled it by a second veto of a majority, as was proposed in the amendment now under consideration. While the nine remaining states had not inserted the veto at all, and at the head of these stood one which had been called the mother of states――Virginia. Now some of these state constitutions were of a date anterior to that of the constitution of the United States itself. If there had been this very great danger of executive encroachment and of hasty legislation, one would suppose it would have been heard of in these nine states. Had any instance yet occurred to show that such a danger did exist? Mr. Clay had heard of none, read of none; and he put it to the advocates of this arbitrary and monarchical power, he put it especially to democrats, who, while they professed themselves, and, he doubted not, honestly and conscientiously professed themselves friends of the people, came out in the contest between monarchical prerogative on the one hand, and civil freedom on the other, as the avowed advocates of prerogative; he put it to all of them to tell, if such dangers both of encroachment and rashness as were pretended as a pretext for the veto did actually exist, how it happened that in the nine states he had named, during so long a period as had elapsed since their constitutions were formed, no instances had occurred, either of encroachment by the legislature on the powers of the executive, or of such rash and hasty legislation as called for the restraint and safeguard of a single sovereign will.

Now, before he proceeded further, he invited gentlemen to form a just estimate of this veto power; to look at it; to see what it was; to ascertain what was its value, what it amounted to in the practical operations of government. He should not pretend to go into any inquiry as to its moral value, or to estimate its influence on the individual who exercised it, or the degree and extent to which, by means of it, in connection with a vast patronage, the president could sway the minds of other men, for that was a power which admitted of no estimate. He should confine himself to what might be called a mere numerical estimate of the amount of the veto power, and he would make this estimate by taking the numbers of the two houses of congress, as those houses now stood. The senate at present consisted of fifty-two members; of that number a majority consisted of twenty-seven; two thirds amounted to thirty-six. Supposing a law to be passed by a bare majority, (and in all great and contested questions bills were wont to be passed by very small majorities,) then there would be in its favor twenty-seven votes. The bill was submitted to the president, and returned by him with his veto. The force of the presidential veto could not be overturned but by thirty-six votes. Here, then, the veto in the hands of the president was equal in its effect, upon legislation to nine senatorial votes. Mr. Clay dismissed all considerations of influence derived from his office, all the glitter and eclat of the president’s high station, and all the persuasion directed to the interests of men by his vast patronage; all this he laid out of view, and looked merely at the numerical fact, that in the senate the veto was equal to nine votes. And now in regard to the other branch. The house of representatives consisted of two hundred and forty-two members; to constitute a majority required one hundred and twenty-two; two thirds amounted to one hundred and sixty-two. By looking at this difference, it would be seen, as in the case of the senate, that the executive veto amounted in effect to forty representative votes.

Now Mr. Clay did not mean to say any thing in the least derogatory to the wisdom, or fairness, or integrity, or patriotism of any president of the United States. It was not necessary, and he was utterly unwilling, without necessity, to injure the feelings of any man. We had had six presidents who had previously been senators. They were able and eminent men; but he wished to inquire, whether any gentleman could show that their wisdom and other distinguished qualities had been so great as to be equal to the wisdom of nine other senators? Could it be shown that their patriotism, and intelligence, and integrity, were equal to those of forty members of the house of representatives? If not, how did it happen that a man who, when in that chamber, and acting with his fellow senators, had been considered upon a par with them, was no sooner transferred to the other end of the avenue, than his will became equal to that of nine senators and forty representatives? How, he asked, did this happen, and wherein was it just and right? Was it not sufficient, that this man, after his political apotheosis; should enjoy all the glitter, and distinction, and glory attached to his office? Was it not enough that he wielded so vast and formidable an amount of patronage, and thereby exerted an influence so potent and so extensive? Must there be superadded to all, a legislative force equal to nine senators and forty members of the house of representatives?

Again: let the subject be looked at in another point of view; and that was with reference to the balance of power among the states. Now, gentlemen might reason as they pleased about what a particular president would, or ought to do, but Mr. Clay would answer for it, that he would never forget, amid the splendor of his high station, the state from whence he came, the early associations, the friendly sympathies, the remembrance of honors, and all those other ties which bound every man, especially a public man, to the land and to the people among whom he had spent his youth and attained the honors of his manhood. All these considerations would operate as so many powerful motives to prefer, in the distribution of benefits, his own state before all others. Looking at this in a political view, was it right, was it just, to give to one particular state, in which the president happened to have been born, so great an advantage in the general competition as must be derived from nine senatorial and forty representative votes? Mr. Clay said, he did not mean to illustrate the remarks he had made about the influence of state partiality on the mind of a chief magistrate by reference to any particulars; his appeal was only to the general principles of human nature. The effect, to be sure, would be greater or less, as the mind of the chief magistrate might happen to be constituted. There might be some men who would be induced, by a chivalric sense of honor, even to do injustice to their own state, in the effort to avoid an unjust partiality; but there were other minds, all whose thoughts, and aims, and wishes, would be circumscribed by local interests and local attachments.

Mr. Clay had hitherto viewed the veto power simply in its numerical ♦weight, in the aggregate votes of the two houses; but there was another and far more important point of view in which it ought to be considered. He contended, that practically, and in effect, the veto, armed with such a qualification as now accompanied it in the constitution, was neither more nor less than an absolute power. It was virtually an unqualified negative on the legislation of congress. Not a solitary instance had yet occurred in which the veto once exerted had ever been overruled, nor was such a case likely to happen. In most questions where the veto could be exerted, there was always a considerable difference of opinion both in the country and in congress as to the bill which had been passed. In such circumstances, when all the personal influence, the official patronage, and the reasoning which accompanied the veto, were added to the substantial weight of the veto itself, every man acquainted with human nature would be ready to admit, that if nothing could set it aside but a vote of two thirds in both houses, it might as well have been made absolute at once.

But Mr. Clay was unable to dwell on this part of his subject, being warned by his feelings of a want of physical ability to go at large into the subject.

He now, however, approached another view of it, to which he would ask the serious and undivided attention of the senate. The veto power professed to act only while the legislature acted; then it was to terminate. Its effect was to be, to consummate legislation. The officer of government, in whose hands the constitution placed a power so formidable, was supposed in theory to remain profoundly silent as to the passage of great measures of public policy, until they were presented to him in a finished form for his approbation and sanction.

This was the theory; but Mr. Clay contended, that really and in practice this veto power drew after it the power of initiating laws, and in its effect must ultimately amount to conferring on the executive the entire legislative power of the government. With the power to initiate and the power to consummate legislation, to give vitality and vigor to every law, or to strike it dead at his pleasure, the president must ultimately become the ruler of the nation.

When members, acting in their legislative capacity, knew and remembered that it was in the power of one man to arrest them in their legislative career, what was the natural tendency of such a state of things? On the established principles of our nature, how was this likely to work? Would not legislators, with gradually less and less attention to that delicacy, reserve, and official deference, which were ever due from one department of government towards the other, come at length to consult with the executive as to what law they might pass with the hope of his approbation? Would not this be the natural result? Independently of all those obvious, and glaring considerations, which went to show that it must, Mr. Clay would point to numerous facts illustrative of the position; and if he went into them, it would be not with a view to complain, not with a desire to revive former contests, or to say a word which might rudely wound the feelings of any human being. But did not gentlemen recollect, how often, during the administration of an eminent individual, now in private life, intimations had been given beforehand, that a certain bill would be vetoed, if it were passed? And did they not remember various instances, in which the threat had been fulfilled? Take the experience of the last six mouths. Congress have passed two bills to establish a bank of the United States; bills, in all the provisions of which neither party concurred, and which would not have had the concurrence of twenty men in either house, had their minds been left uninfluenced by the expected action of the executive. Take, as a special instance, the famous sixteenth section of one of those bills. Mr. Clay was free to declare, that he did not know a solitary man among those who voted for the bill, who would have voted for that section, but as a measure of conciliation, and in the hope that, so modified, the bill would receive the sanction of the president. True, that expectation was not realized; the sacrifice was vainly made, but it had been made with a view to that end, and that alone. And so in regard to the second of those bills. That bill, as he was informed, came to congress, precisely as it had left the president’s hand. So anxious had congress been, to secure the approbation of the president, that, although almost every thing in the bill would either have been omitted, or amended by a majority, they took it as it came from the presidential hand, and passed it, letter for letter, as they received it. Without going further, did not this fact prove, that the possession of the veto power drew after it the power of initiating laws.

Take another case, in the bill now before the judiciary committee. Was there one man to be found, in either house of congress, who would ever have proposed such a measure as the exchequer board provided in that bill? Yet, what had been the feeling? Had it not been this; must we go home without doing something? Had not the feeling been, we are bound by the veto power, we cannot do what we would? Had not the feeling been, we must take what the executive offers, or get nothing? Yes. Already the idea was becoming familiarized to the minds of freemen, to men of only the second generation after the days of the revolution, of submitting to the dictation of the executive, because without his assent they could do nothing. Mr. Clay warned the nation, that if this veto power was not arrested, if it were not either abolished, or at least limited and circumscribed, in process of time, and that before another such period had elapsed as had intervened since the revolution, the whole legislation of this country would come to be prepared at the white house, or in one or other of the executive departments, and would come down to congress in the shape of bills for them to register, and pass through the forms of legislation, just as had once been done in the ancient courts of France.