Chapter I: YESTERDAY, sir, gave notice that I should ask leave to introduce (4)

The charter of the bank of the United States requires that the public deposits be made in its vaults. It also gives the secretary of the treasury power to remove them――and why? The secretary is at the head of the finances of the government. Weekly reports are made by the bank to him. He is to report to congress annually; and to either house whenever he should be called upon. He is the sentinel of congress――the agent of congress――the representative of congress. Congress has prescribed and has defined his duties. He is required to report to them, not to the president. He is put there by us, as our representative; he is required to remove the deposits when they shall be in danger, and we not in session; but when he does this, he is required to report to congress the fact, with his reasons for it. Now, sir, if, when an officer of government is thus specifically assigned his duty, if he is to report his official acts on his responsibility to congress; if, in a case where no power whatever is given to the president, the president may go and say to that officer, ‘go and do as I bid you, or you shall be removed from office;’ let me ask, whether the danger apprehended by that eloquent man has not already been realized?

But, sir, let me suppose that I am mistaken in my construction of the constitution; and let me suppose that the president has, as is contended, power to see every particular law carried into effect; what, then, was it his duty to do in the present case under the clause thus interpreted? The law authorized the secretary of the treasury to remove the deposits on his responsibility to congress. Now, if the president has power to see this, like other laws, faithfully executed, then, surely, the law exacted of him that he should see that the secretary was allowed to exercise his free, unbiased, uncontrolled judgment in removing or not removing them. That was the execution of the law. Congress had not said that the secretary of war, or the secretary of state, might remove the public deposits from the treasury.

The president has no right to go to the secretary of war and ask him what the secretary of the treasury ought to do. He might as well have consulted the secretary of the treasury about a contemplated movement of the army, as to ask the secretary of war about the disposition of the public moneys. It was not to the president, and all his secretaries combined, that the power was given to alter the disposition of the deposits in the bank. It was to the secretary alone, exclusive of the president, and all the other officers of government. And according to gentlemen’s own showing, by their construction of the clause, the secretary ought to have been left to his own unbiased determination, uncontrolled by the president or any body else.

I would thank the secretary of the senate to get me the sedition law. It is not very certain how soon we may be called to act upon it.

Now, sir, let us trace some of the other sources of the exercise of this power, or motives for it, or by whatever other name they are to be called. He says to Mr. Duane:

‘The president repeats, that he begs the cabinet to consider
the proposed measure as his own, in the support of which he
shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or
principle. Its responsibility has been assumed, after the most
mature deliberation and reflection, as necessary to preserve the
morals of the people, the freedom of the press, and the purity
of the elective franchise.’

The morals of the people! What part of the constitution has given to the president any power over ‘the morals of the people?’ None. It does not give such power even over religion, the presiding and genial influence over every true system of morals. No, sir, it gives him no such power.

And what is the next step? To-day he claims a power as necessary to the morals of the people; to-morrow he will claim another, as still more indispensable to our religion. And the president might in this case as well have said that he went into the office of the secretary of the treasury, and controlled his free exercise of his authority as secretary, because it was necessary to preserve ‘the religion of the people!’ I ask for the authority. Will any one of those gentlemen here, who consider themselves as the vindicators of the executive, point me to any clause of the constitution which gives to the _present_ president of the United States any power to preserve ‘the morals of the people?’

But ‘the freedom of the press,’ it seems, was another motive. Sir, I am not surprised that the present secretary of the treasury should feel a desire to revive this power over the press. He, I think, was a member of that party which passed the sedition law, under precisely the same pretext. I recollect it was said, that this bank, this monster of tyranny, was taking into its pay a countless number of papers, and by this means was destroying the fair fame of the president and his secretary, and all that sort of thing. Sir, it is sometimes useful to refer back to those old things――to the notions and the motives which induced men in former times to do certain acts which may not be altogether unlike some others in our own time.

The famous sedition act was passed, sir, in 1789; and it contained, among others, the following provision:

‘Section 2. That if any person shall write, print, utter, or
publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed,
uttered, or published, or shall, knowingly and willingly, assist
or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing, any false,
scandalous, and malicious writing or writings, against the
government of the United States, or either house of the congress
of the United States, or the president of the United States,
with intent to defame the said government, or either house of
the said congress, or the said president, or to bring them, or
either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against
them, or either of them, the hatred of the good people of the
United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States:
or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing
or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the
president of the United States, done in pursuance of any such
law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the
United States; or to resist, oppose, or defeat, any such law
or act; or to aid, encourage, or abet, any hostile designs of
any foreign nation, against the United States, their people, or
government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any
court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by
imprisonment not exceeding two years.’

We have now, sir, in the reasons for the removal of the government deposits, the same motives avowed and acted upon. The abuse of the government, bringing it into disrepute, using contemptuous language to persons high in authority, constituted the motives for passing the sedition law; and what have we now but a repetition of the same complaints of abuses, disrespect, and so forth. As it is now, so it was then; for, says the next section of the same sedition act:

‘That if any person shall be prosecuted under this act for
the writing or publishing of any libel aforesaid, it shall be
lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give
in evidence in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in
the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try
the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact,
under the direction of the court, as in other cases.’

It is only for the sake of _the truth_, said they who favored the passage of that law――for the sake of justice; as it is now said that it was necessary to remove the deposits, in order to preserve the purity of the press. That’s all, sir. But there is one part of this assumption of power by the president much more tyrannical than that act. Under that law, the offending party was to have a trial by jury; the benefit of witnesses and of counsel; and the right to have the truth of his alleged libels examined. But what is the case now under consideration? Why, sir, the president takes the whole matter in his own hands; he is at once the judge, the jury, and the executioner of the sentence, and utterly deprives the accused party of the opportunity of showing that the imputed libel is no libel at all, but founded in the clearest truth.

But ‘the purity of the elective franchise,’ also, the president has very much at heart. And here, again, I ask what part of the constitution gives him any power over that ‘franchise?’ Look, sir, at the nature of the exercise of this power! If it was really necessary that steps should be taken to preserve the purity of the press or the freedom of elections, what ought the president to have done? Taken the matter into his own hands? No, sir; it was his duty to recommend to congress the passage of laws for the purpose, under suitable sanctions; laws which the courts of the United States could execute. We could not have been worse off under such laws, (however exceptionable they might be,) than we are now. We could then, sir, have reviewed the laws, and seen whether congress or the president had properly any power over this matter; or whether the article of the constitution which forbids that the press shall be touched, and declares that religion shall be sacred from all the powers of legislation, applied in the case or not. This the president has undertaken to do of himself, without the shadow of authority, either in the constitution or the laws.

Suppose, sir, that this contumacious institution, which committed the great sin, in 1829, of not appointing a new president to a certain one of its branches――suppose that the bank should go on and vindicate itself against the calumnies poured out upon it――that it should continue to stand upon its defence; how inefficient will have been the exercise of power by the president! How inadequate to the end he had in view, of preserving the press from being made use of to defend the bank! Why, sir, if we had had the power, and the president had come to us, we could have laid Mr. Nicholas Biddle by the heels, if he should have undertaken to publish another report of general Smith or Mr. Duffie, or another speech of the eloquent gentleman near me, (Mr. Webster,) or any other such _libels_, tending to bring the president or his administration into disrepute. But the president of the United States, who thought he had the bank in his power, who thought he could stop it, who was induced to believe, by that ‘influence behind the throne, greater than itself,’ that he could break down the bank at a word, has only shown his want of power over the press, by his attempt to exercise it in the manner he has done. The bank has avowed and openly declared its purpose to defend itself on all suitable occasions. And, what is still more provoking, instead of being a bankrupt, as was expected, with its doors closed, and its vaults inaccessible, it has now, it seems, got more money than it knows what to do with; and this greatest of misers and hoarders, cruelly refuses to let out a dollar of its ten millions of specie, to relieve the sufferings of the banks to which the government deposits have been transferred.

Sir, the president of the United States had nothing to do with the morals of the community. No, sir; for the preservation of our morals we are responsible to God, and I trust that that responsibility will ever remain to Him and His mercy alone. Neither had the president any thing to do with the freedom of the press. The power over it is denied, even to congress, by the people. It was said, by one of those few able men and bright luminaries, whom Providence has yet spared to us, in answer to complaints by a foreign minister, against the freedom with which the American press treated certain French functionaries, that the press was one of those concerns which admitted of no regulation by the government; that its abuses must be tolerated, lest its freedom should be abridged. Such, sir, is the freedom of the press, as recognised by our constitution, and so it has been respected ever since the repeal of the obnoxious act which I have already quoted, until the detestable principles of that law have been reasserted by the president, in his assumption of a power, in nowise belonging to his office, of preserving the purity of the press.

Such, sir, are the powers on which the president relies to justify his seizure of the treasury of the United States. I have examined them one by one; and they all fail, utterly fail, to bear out the act. We are irresistibly brought to the conclusion, that the removal of the public money from the bank of the United States has been effected by the displacement from the head of the treasury department of one who would not remove them, and putting in his stead another person, who would; and, secondly, that the president has no color of authority in the constitution or the laws for the act which he has undertaken to perform.

Let us now, for a few moments, examine the consequences which may ensue from the exercise of this enormous power. If the president has authority, in a case in which the law has assigned a specific duty exclusively to a designated officer, to control the exercise of his discretion by that officer, he has a right to interfere in every other case, and remove every one from office who hesitates to do his bidding, against his judgment of his own duty. This, surely, is a logical deduction not to be resisted. Well, then, how stands the matter? Recapitulating the provisions of the law prescribing how money should be drawn from the treasury and the deduction above stated, what is to prevent the president from going to the comptroller, and, if he will not countersign a warrant which he has found an accommodating secretary to sign, turning him out for another; then going to the register, and doing the same; and then to the treasurer, and commanding him to pay over the money expressed in the warrant, or subject himself to expulsion.

Where is the security against such conduct on the part of the president? Where the boundary to this tremendous authority, which he has undertaken to exercise? Sir, every barrier around the treasury is broken down. From the moment that the president said, ‘I make this measure my own, I take upon myself the responsibility,’ from that moment the public treasury might as well have been at the hermitage as at this place. Sir, the measure adopted by the president is without precedent――in our day at best. There is, indeed, a precedent on record, but you must go down to the christian era for it. It will be recollected, by those who are conversant with ancient history, that after Pompey was compelled to retire to Brundusium, Cæsar, who had been anxious to give him battle, returned to Rome, ‘having reduced Italy, (says the historian,) in sixty days, (the exact period, sir, between the removal of the deposits, and the meeting of congress, without the usual allowance of three days’ grace,) without bloodshed.’ The historian goes on; ‘finding the city in a more settled condition than he expected, and many senators there, he addressed them in a mild and gracious manner, (as the president addressed his late secretary of the treasury,) and desired them to send deputies to Pompey with an offer of honorable terms of peace. As Metellus, the tribune, _opposed his_ taking money out of the public treasury, and cited some laws against it, (such, sir, I suppose, as I have endeavored to cite on this occasion,) Cæsar said, ‘arms and laws do not flourish together. If you are not pleased with what I am about, you have only to withdraw. (Leave the office, Mr. Duane!) War, indeed, will not tolerate much liberty of speech. When I say this, I am renouncing my own right; for you, and all those whom I have found exciting a spirit of faction against me, are at my disposal.’ Having said this, he approached the doors of the treasury, and as the keys were not produced, he sent for workmen to break them open. Metellus again opposed him, and gained credit with some for his firmness; but Cæsar, with an elevated voice, threatened to put him to death, if he gave any further trouble. ‘And you know very well, young man,’ said he, ‘that this is harder for me to say than to do.’ Metellus, terrified by the measure, retired, and Cæsar was afterward easily and readily supplied with every thing necessary for the war.

And where now, sir, is the public treasury? Who can tell? It is certainly without a local habitation, if it be not without a name. And where is the money of the people of the United States? Floating about in treasury drafts or checks to the amount of millions, placed in the hands of tottering banks, to enable them to pay their own debts, instead of being appropriated to the service of the people. These checks are scattered to the winds by the treasurer of the United States, who is required by law to let out money from the treasury, on warrants signed by the secretary of the treasury, countersigned, registered, and so forth, and not otherwise.

[Mr. Clay here referred to a correspondence, which he quoted,
between the treasurer and the officers of the bank, complaining
of these checks drawn without proper notice, and so forth, in
which the treasurer says they were only issued to be used in
certain contingencies, and so forth.]

Thus, sir, the people’s money is put into a bank here, and the bank there, in regard to the solvency of which we know nothing, and it is placed there to be used in the event of certain contingencies――contingencies of which neither the treasurer nor the secretary have yet deigned to furnish us any account.

Where was the oath of office of the treasurer, when he ventured thus to sport with the people’s money? Where was the constitution, which forbids money to be drawn from the treasury without appropriation by law? Where was the treasurer’s bond, when he thus cast about the people’s money? Sir, his bond is forfeited. I do not pretend to any great knowledge of the law, but give me an intelligent and unpacked jury, and I undertake to prove to him that he has forfeited the penalty of his bond.

Mr. President, the people of the United States are indebted to the president for the boldness of this movement; and as one among the humblest of them, I profess my obligations to him. He has told the senate, in his message refusing an official copy of his cabinet paper, that it has been published for the information of the people. As a part of the people, the senate, if not in their official character, have a right to its use. In that extraordinary paper, he has proclaimed, that the measure is _his_ own; and that _he has taken_ upon himself the responsibility of it. In plain English, he has proclaimed an open, palpable, and daring usurpation!

For more than fifteen years, Mr. President, I have been struggling to avoid the present state of things. I thought I perceived in some proceedings, during the conduct of the Seminole war, a spirit of defiance to the constitution and to all law. With what sincerity and truth, with what earnestness and devotion to civil liberty, I have struggled, the searcher of all human hearts best knows. With what fortune, the bleeding constitution of my country now fatally attests.

I have, nevertheless, persevered; and under every discouragement, during the short time that I expect to remain in the public councils, I will persevere. And if a bountiful Providence would allow an unworthy sinner to approach the throne of grace, I would beseech Him, as the greatest favor He could grant to me here below, to spare me until I live to behold the people rising in their majesty, with a peaceful and constitutional exercise of their power, to expel the Goths from Rome; to rescue the public treasury from pillage, to preserve the constitution of the United States; to uphold the union against the danger of the concentration and consolidation of _all_ power in the hands of the executive; and to sustain the liberties of the people of this country against the imminent perils to which they now stand exposed.

[Here Mr. Clay, who was understood to have gone through the
first part of his speech only, gave way, and Mr. Ewing of Ohio
moved that the further consideration of the subject be postponed
until Monday next; which was ordered accordingly. And then the
senate adjourned to that day. December 30, Mr. Clay resumed his
speech.]

Before I proceed to a consideration of the report of the secretary of the treasury, and the second resolution, I wish to anticipate and answer an objection, which may be made to the adoption of the first. It may be urged, that the senate, being, in a certain contingency, a court of impeachment, ought not to prejudge a question which it may be called upon to decide judicially. But by the constitution the senate has three characters, legislative, executive, and judicial. Its ordinary, and by far its most important character, is that of its being a component part of the legislative department. Only three or four cases, since the establishment of the government, (that is, during a period of nearly half a century,) have occurred, in which it was necessary that the senate should act as a judicial tribunal, the least important of all its characters. Now it would be most strange if, when its constitutional powers were assailed, it could not assert and vindicate them, because, by possibility, it might be required to act as a court of justice. The first resolution asserts only, that the president has assumed the exercise of a power over the public treasury not granted by the constitution and laws. It is silent as to motive; and without the _quo animo_――the deliberate purpose of usurpation――the president would not be liable to impeachment. But if a concurrence of all the elements be necessary to make out a charge of wilful violation of the constitution, does any one believe that the president will now be impeached? And shall we silently sit by and see ourselves stripped of one of the most essential of our legislative powers, and the exercise of it assumed by the president, to which it is not delegated, without effort to maintain it, because, against all human probability, he may be hereafter impeached?

The report of the secretary of the treasury, in the first paragraph, commences with a misstatement of the fact. He says, ‘_I have directed_’ that the deposits of the money of the United States shall not be made in the bank of the United States. If this assertion is regarded in any other than a mere formal sense, it is not true. The secretary may have been the instrument, the clerk, the automaton, in whose name the order was issued; but the measure was that of the president, by whose authority or command the order was given; and of this we have the highest and most authentic evidence. The president has told the world that the measure was his own, and that he took it upon his own responsibility. And he has exonerated his cabinet from all responsibility about it. The secretary ought to have frankly disclosed all the circumstances of the case, and told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. If he had done so, he would have informed congress, that the removal had been decided by the president on the eighteenth of September last; that it had been announced to the public on the twentieth; and that Mr. Duane remained in office until the twenty-third. He would have informed congress, that this important measure was decided before he entered into his new office, and was the cause of his appointment. Yes, sir, the present secretary stood by, a witness to the struggle in the mind of his predecessor, between his attachment to the president and his duty to the country; saw him dismissed from office, because he would not violate his conscientious obligations, and came into his place, to do what he could not, honorably, and would not perform. A son of one of the fathers of democracy, by an administration professing to be democratic, was expelled from office, and his place supplied by a gentleman, who, throughout his whole career, has been uniformly opposed to democracy!――a gentleman who, at another epoch of the republic, when it was threatened with civil war, and a dissolution of the union, voted, (although a resident of a slave state,) in the legislature of Maryland, against the admission of Missouri into the union without a restriction incompatible with her rights as a member of the confederacy![21] Mr. Duane was dismissed because the solemn convictions of his duty would not allow him to conform to the president’s will; because his logic did not bring his mind to the same conclusions with those of the logic of a venerable old gentleman, inhabiting a white house not distant from the capitol; because his watch, (here Mr. Clay held up his own,) did not keep time with that of the president. He was dismissed under that detestable system of proscription for opinion’s sake, which has finally dared to intrude itself into the halls of congress――a system under which three unoffending clerks, the husbands of wives, the fathers of families, dependent on them for support, without the slightest imputation of delinquency, have been recently unceremoniously discharged, and driven out to beggary, by a man, himself the substitute of a meritorious officer, who has not been in this city a period equal to one monthly revolution of the moon! I tell our secretary, (said Mr. Clay, raising his voice,) that, if he touch a single hair of the head of any one of the clerks of the senate, (I am sure he is not disposed to do it,) on account of his opinions, political or religious, if no other member of the senate does it, I will instantly submit a resolution for his own dismission.

The secretary ought to have communicated all these things; he ought to have stated that the cabinet was divided two and two, and one of the members equally divided with himself on the question, willing to be put into either scale. He ought to have given a full account of this, the most important act of executive authority since the origin of the government; he should have stated with what unsullied honor his predecessor retired from office, and on what degrading conditions he accepted his vacant place. When a momentous proceeding like this, varying the constitutional distribution of the powers of the legislative and executive departments, was resolved on, the ministers against whose advice it was determined, should have resigned their stations. No ministers of any monarch in Europe, under similar circumstances, would have retained the seals of office. And if, as nobody doubts, there is a cabal behind the curtain, without character and without responsibility, feeding the passions, stimulating the prejudices, and moulding the actions of the incumbent of the presidential office, it was an additional reason for their resignations. There is not a _maitre d’hotel_ in christendom, who, if the scullions were put into command in the parlor and dining-room, would not scorn to hold his place, and fling it up in disgust with indignant pride!

I shall examine the report before us, first, as to the power of the secretary over the deposits; secondly, his reasons for the exercise of it; and, thirdly, the manner of its exercise.

First. The secretary asserts that the power of removal is _exclusively_ reserved to him; that it is _absolute_ and _unconditional_, so far as the interests of the bank are concerned; that it is not restricted to any particular contingencies; that the reservation of the power to the secretary of the treasury exclusively, is a part of the compact; that he may exercise it, if the public convenience or interest would _in any degree_ be promoted; that this exclusive power, thus reserved, is so absolute, that the secretary is not restrained by the considerations that the public deposits in the bank are perfectly safe; that the bank promptly meets _all_ demands upon it; and that it faithfully performs all its duties; and that the power of congress, on the contrary, is so totally excluded, that it could not, without a breach of the compact, order the deposits to be changed, even if congress were satisfied that they were not safe, or should be convinced that the interests of the people of the United States imperiously demanded the removal.

Such is the statement which this unassuming secretary makes of his own authority. He expands his own power to the most extravagant dimensions; and he undertakes to circumscribe that of congress in the narrowest and most restricted limits! Who would have expected that, after having so confidently maintained for himself such absolute, exclusive, unqualified, and uncontrollable power, he would have let in any body else to share with him its exercise? Yet he says, ‘as the secretary of the treasury presides over one of the _executive_ departments of the government, and _his_ power over this subject forms a part of the executive duties of his office, the manner in which it is exercised must be subject to the supervision of the officer,’ (meaning the president, whose official name his modesty would not allow him to pronounce,) ‘to whom the constitution has confided the whole executive power, and has required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’ If the clause in the compact exclusively vests the power of removal in the secretary of the treasury, what has the president to do with it? What part of the charter conveys to him any power? If, as the secretary contends, the clause of removal, being part of the compact, restricts its exercise to the secretary, to the entire exclusion of congress, how does it embrace the president? especially since both the president and secretary conceive, that ‘the power over the place of deposit for the public money would seem properly to belong to the legislative department of the government?’ If the secretary be correct in asserting that the power of removal is confined to the secretary of the treasury, then Mr. Duane, while in office, possessed it; and his dismission, because he would not exercise a power which belonged to him exclusively, was itself a violation of the charter.

But by what authority does the secretary assert that the treasury department is one of the executive departments of the government? He has none in the act which creates the department; he has none in the constitution. The treasury department is placed by law on a different footing from all the other departments, which are, in the acts creating them, denominated executive, and placed under the direction of the president. The treasury department, on the contrary, is organized on totally different principles. Except the appointment of the officers, with the coöperation of the senate, and the power which is exercised of removing them, the president has neither by the constitution nor the law creating the department, any thing to do with it. The secretary’s reports and responsibility are directly to congress. The whole scheme of the department is one of checks, each officer acting as a control upon his associates. The secretary is required by the law to report, not to the president, but directly to congress. Either house may require any report from him, or command his personal attendance before it. It is not, therefore, true, that the treasury is one of the executive departments, subject to the supervision of the president. And the inference drawn from that erroneous assumption entirely fails. The secretary appears to have no precise ideas either of the constitution or duties of the department over which he presides. He says:

‘The treasury department being intrusted with the administration
of the finances of the country, it was always the duty of _the
secretary_, in the absence of any legislate provision on the
subject, to take care that the public money was deposited in
safe-keeping, in the hands of faithful agents,’ and so forth.

The premises of the secretary are only partially correct, and the conclusion is directly repugnant to law. It never was the duty of the _secretary_ to take care that the public money was deposited in safe-keeping, in the hands of faithful agents, and so forth. That duty is expressly, by the act organizing the department, assigned to the treasurer of the United States, who is placed under oath, and under bond, with a large penalty, not to issue a dollar out of the public treasury, but in virtue of warrants granted in pursuance of acts of appropriation, ‘and not otherwise.’ When the secretary treats of the power of the president, he puts on corsets and prostrates himself before the executive, in the most graceful, courteous, and lady-like form; but when he treats of that of congress, and of the treasurer, he swells and expands himself, and flirts about, with all the airs of high authority.

But I cannot assent to the secretary’s interpretation of his power of removal, contained in the charter. Congress has not given up its control over the treasury, or the public deposits, to either the secretary or the executive. Congress could not have done so without a treacherous renunciation of its constitutional powers, and a faithless abandonment of its duties. And now let us see what is the true state of the matter. Congress has reserved to itself, exclusively, the right to judge of the reasons for removal of the deposits, by requiring the report of them to be made to it; and, consequently, the power to ratify or invalidate the act. The secretary of the treasury is the fiscal sentinel of congress, to whom the bank makes weekly reports, and who is presumed constantly to be well acquainted with its actual condition. He may, consequently, discover the urgent necessity of prompt action, to save the public treasure, before it is known to congress, and when it is not in session. But he is immediately to report――to whom? To the executive? No, to congress. For what purpose? That congress may sanction or disprove the act.

The power of removal is a reservation for the benefit of the people, not of the bank. It may be waived. Congress, being a legislative party to the compact, did not thereby deprive itself of ordinary powers of legislation. It cannot, without a breach of the national faith, repeal privileges or stipulations intended for the benefit of the bank. But it may repeal, modify, or waive the exercise altogether, of those parts of the charter which were intended exclusively for the public. Could not congress repeal altogether the clause of removal? Such a repeal would not injure, but add to, the security of the bank. Could not congress modify the clause, by revoking the agency of the secretary of the treasury, and substituting that of the treasurer, or any other officer of government? Could not congress, at any time during the twenty years’ duration of the charter, abolish altogether the office of secretary of the treasury, and assign all his present duties to some newly constituted department? The right and the security of the bank do not consist in the form of the agency, nor in the name of the agent, but in this: that, whatever may be its form or his denomination, the removal shall only be made upon urgent and satisfactory reasons. The power of supplemental legislation was exercised by congress both under the new and old bank. Three years after the establishment of the existing bank, an act passed, better to regulate the election of directors, and to punish any one who should attempt, by bribes, or presents in any form, to influence the operation of the institution.

The denial of the secretary, to congress, of the power to remove the deposits, under any circumstances, is most extraordinary. Why, sir, suppose a corrupt collusion between the secretary and the bank, to divide the spoils of the treasury? Suppose a total nonfulfilment of all the stipulations on the part of the bank? Is congress to remain bound and tied, whilst the bank should be free from all the obligations of the charter? The obligation of one party, to observe faithfully his stipulations, in a contract, rests upon the corresponding obligation of the other party to observe his stipulations. If one party is released, both are free. If one party fails to comply with his contract, _that_ releases the other. This is the fundamental principle of all contracts, applicable to treaties, charters, and private agreements. If it were a mere private agreement, and one party who had bound himself to deposit, from time to time, his money with the other, to be redrawn at his pleasure, saw that it was wasting and squandered away, he would have a clear right to discontinue the deposits. It is true, that a party has no right to excuse himself from the fulfilment of his contract, by imputing a breach to the other which has never been made. And it is fortunate for the peace and justice of society, that neither party to any contract, whether public or private, can decide conclusively the question of fulfilment by the other, but must always act under subjection to the ultimate decision, in case of controversy, of an impartial arbiter, provided in the judicial tribunals of civilized communities.

As to the absolute, unconditional, and exclusive power which the secretary claims to be vested in himself, it is in direct hostility with the principles of our government, and adverse to the genius of all free institutions. The secretary was made, by the charter, the mere representative or agent of congress. Its temporary substitute, acting in subordination to it, and bound, whenever he did act, to report to his principal his reasons, that they might be judged of and sanctioned, or overruled. Is it not absurd to say, that the agent can possess more power than the principal? The power of revocation is incident to all agency, unless, in express terms, by the instrument creating it, a different provision is made. The powers, whether of the principal or the agent, in relation to any contract, must be expounded by the principles which govern all contracts. It is true, that the language of the clause of removal, in the charter, is general, but it is not, therefore, to be torn from the context. It is a part only of an entire compact, and is so to be interpreted, in connection with every part and with the whole. Upon surveying the entire compact, we perceive that the bank has come under various duties to the public; has undertaken to perform important financial operations of the government; and has paid a bonus into the public treasury of a million and a half of dollars. We perceive, that, in consideration of the assumption of these heavy engagements, and the payment of that large sum of money on the part of the bank, the public has stipulated that the public deposits shall remain with the bank, during the continuation of the charter, and that its notes shall be received by the government, in payment of all debts, dues, and taxes. Except the corporate character conferred, there is none but those two stipulations of any great importance to the bank. Each of the two parties to the compact must stand bound to the performance of his engagements, whilst the other is honestly and faithfully fulfilling _his_. It is not to be conceived, in the formation of the compact, that either party could have anticipated that, whilst he was fairly and honestly executing every obligation which he had contracted, the other party might arbitrarily or capriciously exonerate himself from the discharge of his obligations. Suppose, when citizens of the United States were invited by the government to subscribe to the stock of this bank, that they had been told, that, although the bank performs all its covenants with perfect fidelity, the secretary of the treasury may, arbitrarily or capriciously, upon his speculative notions of any degree of public interest or convenience to be advanced, withdraw the public deposits; would they have ever subscribed? Would they have been guilty of the folly of binding themselves to the performance of burdensome duties, whilst the government was left at liberty to violate at pleasure that stipulation of the compact which by far was the most essential to them?

On this part of the subject, I conclude, that congress has not parted from, but retains, its legitimate power over the deposits; that it might modify or repeal altogether the clause of removal in the charter; that a breach of material stipulations on the part of the bank would authorize congress to change the place of the deposits; that a corrupt collusion to defraud the public, between the bank and a secretary of the treasury, would be a clear justification to congress to direct a transfer of the public deposits; that the secretary of the treasury is the mere agent of congress, in respect to the deposits, acting in subordination to his principal; that it results from the nature of all agency that it may be revoked, unless otherwise expressly provided; and, finally, that the principal, and much less the agent, of one party cannot justly or lawfully violate the compact, or any of its essential provisions, whilst the other party is in the progressive and faithful performance of all his engagements.

If I am right in this view of the subject, there is an end of the argument. There was perfect equality and reciprocity between the two parties to the compact. Neither could exonerate himself from the performance of his obligations, while the other was honestly proceeding fairly to fulfil all his engagements. But the secretary of the treasury _concedes_ that the public deposits were perfectly safe in the hands of the bank; that the bank promptly met every demand upon it; and that it faithfully performed all its duties. By these concessions, he surrenders the whole argument, admits the complete obligation of the public to perform its part of the compact, and demonstrates that no reasons, however plausible or strong, can justify an open breach of a solemn national compact.

Secondly. But he has brought forward various reasons to palliate or justify his violation of the national faith; and it is now my purpose to proceed, in the second place, to examine and consider them. Before I proceed to do this, I hope to be allowed again to call the attention of the senate to the nature of the office of secretary of the treasury. It is altogether financial and administrative. His duties relate to the finances, their condition and improvement, and to them exclusively. The act creating the treasury department, and defining the duties of the secretary, demonstrates this. He has no legislative powers; and congress has delegated and could delegate none to him. His powers, wherever given, and in whatever language expressed, must be interpreted by his defined duties. Neither is the treasury department an _executive_ department. It was expressly created not to be an executive department. It is administrative, but not _executive_. His relations are positive and direct to congress, by the act of his creation, and not to the president. Whenever he is put under the direction of the president, (as he is by various subsequent acts, especially those relating to the public loans,) it is done by express provision of law, and for specified purposes.

With this key to the nature of the office, and the duties of the officer, I will now briefly examine the various reasons which he assigns for the removal of the public deposits. The first is, the near approach of the expiration of the charter. But the charter had yet to run about two and a half of the twenty years to which it was limited. During the _whole_ term the public deposits were to continue to be made with the bank. It was clearly foreseen, at the commencement of the term, as now, that it would expire, and yet congress neither then nor since has ever thought proper to provide for the withdrawal of the deposits prior to the expiration of the charter. Whence does the secretary derive an authority to do what congress had never done? Whence his power to abridge in effect the period of the charter, and to limit it to seventeen and a half years, instead of twenty? Was the urgency for the removal of the deposits so great, that he could not wait sixty days, until the assembling of congress? He admits that they were perfectly safe in the bank; that it promptly met every demand upon it; and that it faithfully performed all its duties. Why not, then, wait the arrival of congress? The last time the house of representatives had spoken, among the very last acts of the last session, that house had declared its full confidence in the safety of the deposits. Why not wait until it could review the subject, with all the new light which the secretary could throw upon it, and it again proclaims its opinion? He comes into office on the twenty-third of September, 1833, and in three days, with intuitive celerity, he comprehends the whole of the operations of the complex department of the treasury, perceives that the government, from its origin, had been in uniform error, and denounces the opinions of all his predecessors! And, hastening to rectify universal wrong, in defiance and in contempt of the resolution of the house, he signs an order for the removal of the deposits! It was of no consequence to him, whether places of safety, in substitution of the bank of the United States, could be obtained or not; without making the essential precautionary arrangements, he commands the removal almost instantly to be made.

Why, sir, if the secretary were right in contending that he alone could order the removal, even he admits that congress has power to provide for the security of the public money, in the new places to which it might be transferred. If he did not deign to consult the representatives of the people as to the propriety of the first step, did not a decent respect to their authority and judgment exact from him a delay, for the brief term of sixty days, that they might consider what was fitting to be done? The truth is, that the secretary, by law, has nothing to do with the care and safe-keeping of the public money. As has been already shown, that duty is specifically assigned by law to the treasurer of the United States. And, in assuming upon himself the authority to provide other depositories than the bank of the United States, he alike trampled upon the duties of the treasurer, and what was due to congress. Can any one doubt the motive of this precipitancy? Does anybody doubt, that it was to preclude the action of congress, or to bring it under the influence of the executive veto? Let the two houses, or either of them, perform their duty to the country, and we shall hereafter see whether, in that respect, at least, Mr. Secretary will not fail to consummate his purpose.

Second. The next reason assigned for this offensive proceeding, is the reëlection of the present chief magistrate. The secretary says:

‘I have always regarded the result of the last election of
president of the United States, as the declaration of a majority
of the people, that the charter ought not to be renewed.’ * * *
‘Its voluntary application to congress for the renewal of its
charter four years before it expired, and upon the eve of the
election of president, was _understood on all sides_ as bringing
forward that question for incidental decision at the then
approaching election. It was accordingly argued on both sides
before the tribunal of the people, and their verdict pronounced
against the bank,’ and so forth.

What has the secretary to do with elections? Do they belong to the financial concerns of his department? Why this constant reference to the result of the last presidential election? Ought not the president to be content with the triumphant issue of it? Did he want still more vetoes? The winners ought to forbear making any complaints, and be satisfied, whatever the losers may be. After an election is fairly terminated, I have always thought that the best way was to forget all the incidents of the preceding canvass, and especially the manner in which votes had been cast. If one has been successful, that ought to be sufficient for him; if defeated, regrets are unavailing. Our fellow-citizens have a right freely to exercise their elective franchise as they please, and no one, certainly no candidate, has any right to complain about it.

But the argument of the secretary is, that the question of the bank was fully submitted to the people, by the consent of all parties, fully discussed before them, and their verdict pronounced against the institution, in the reëlection of the president. His statement of the case requires that we should examine carefully the various messages of the president, to ascertain whether the bank question was fairly and frankly, (to use a favorite expression of the president,) submitted by him to the people of the United States. In his message of 1829, the president says:

‘The charter of the bank of the United States expires in 1836,
and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of
their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from
_precipitancy_ in a measure involving such important principles,
and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in
justice to _the parties_ interested, too soon present it to the
deliberate consideration of the legislature and the people.’

The charter had then upwards of six years to run. Upon this solemn invitation of the chief magistrate, two years afterwards, the bank came forward with an application for renewal. Then it was discovered that the application was premature. And the bank was denounced for accepting the very invitation which had been formally given. The president proceeds:

‘Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the bank are
well questioned _by a large portion of our fellow-citizens_.’

This message was a noncommittal. The president does not announce clearly his own opinion, but states that of _a large portion of our fellow-citizens_. Now we all know that a large and highly respectable number of the people of the United States have always entertained an opinion adverse to the bank on both grounds. The president continues:

‘_If_ such an institution is deemed essential to the fiscal
operations of the government, I submit to the wisdom of the
legislature whether _a national one_, founded upon the _credit_
of the government, and its resources, might not be devised.’

Here, again, the president, so far from expressing an explicit opinion against all national banks, makes a hypothetical admission of the utility of a bank, and distinctly intimates the practicability of devising one on the basis of the credit and resources of the government.

In his message of 1830, speaking of the bank, the president says:

‘Nothing has occurred to lessen, in any degree, the dangers
which _many of our citizens_ apprehend from that institution,
_as at present organized_. In the spirit of improvement and
compromise, which distinguishes our country and its institutions,
it becomes us to inquire whether it be not _possible_ to secure
the advantages afforded by the present bank through the agency
of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles
and structure, _as_ to obviate constitutional and other
objections.’

Here, again, the president recites the apprehensions of ‘many of our citizens,’ rather than avows his own opinion. He admits, indeed, ‘the advantages afforded by the present bank,’ but suggests an inquiry whether it be possible, (of course doubting,) to secure them by a bank differently constructed. And towards the conclusion of that part of the message, his language fully justifies the implication, that it was not to the bank itself, but to ‘its present form,’ that he objected.

The message of 1831, when treating of the bank, was very brief. The president says: