Chapter I: HAVE been desirous, Mr. President, before the passage of this bill, (6)

The first item that I shall notice, with which, I think, he improperly debits the public lands, is a charge of eighty odd millions of dollars for the expense of conducting our Indian relations. Now, if this single item can be satisfactorily expunged, no more need be done to turn a large balance in favor of the public lands. I ask, then, with what color of propriety can the public lands be charged with the entire expense incident to our Indian relations? If the government did not own an acre of public lands, this expense would have been incurred. The aborigines are here; our fathers found them in possession of this land, these woods, and these waters. The preservation of peace with them; the fulfilment of the duties of humanity towards them; their civilization, education, conversion to christianity, friendly and commercial intercourse; these are the causes of the chief expenditure on their account, and they are quite distinct from the fact of our possessing the public domain. When every acre of that domain has gone from you, the Indian tribes, if not in the mean time extinct, may yet remain, imploring you, for charity’s sake, to assist them, and to share with them those blessings, of which, by the weakness of their nature, or the cruelty of your policy, they have been stripped. Why, especially, should the public lands be chargeable with that large portion of the eighty odd millions of dollars, arising from the removal of the Indians from the east to the west side of the Mississippi? They protested against it. They entreated you to allow them to remain at the homes and by the sides of the graves of their ancestors; but your stern and rigorous policy would not allow you to listen to their supplication. The public domain, instead of being justly chargeable with the expense of their removal, is entitled to a large credit for the vast territorial districts beyond the Mississippi, which it furnished for the settlement of the emigrant Indians.

I feel that I have not strength to go through all the items of the senator’s account, nor need I. The deduction of this single item will leave a net balance in favor of the public lands of between sixty and seventy millions of dollars.

What, after all, is the senator’s mode of stating the account with the public lands? Has he taken any other than a mere counting-house view of them? Has he exhibited any thing more than any sub-accountant or clerk might make out in any of the departments, as probably it was prepared, cut and dry, to the senator’s hands? Are there no higher or more statesman-like views to be taken of the public lands, and of the acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida, than the account of dollars and cents which the senator has presented? I have said that the senator, by the double process of erroneous insertion, and unjust suppression of items, has shaped an account to suit his argument, which presents any thing but a full and fair statement of the case. And is it not so? Louisiana cost fifteen millions of dollars. And if you had the power of selling, how many hundred millions of dollars would you now ask for the states of Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas――people, land, and all? Is the sovereignty which you acquired of the two provinces of Louisiana and Florida nothing? Are the public buildings, and works, the fortifications, cannon, and other arms, independent of the public lands, nothing? Is the navigation of the great father of waters, which you secured from the head to the mouth, on both sides of the river, by the purchase of Louisiana, to the total exclusion of all foreign powers, not worthy of being taken into the senator’s estimate of the advantages of the acquisition? Who, at all acquainted with the history and geography of this continent, does not know that the Mississippi could not have remained in the hands, and its navigation continued subject to the control, of a foreign power, without imminent danger to the stability of the union? Is the cost of the public domain undeserving of any credit on account of the vast sums which, during the greater part of this century, you have been receiving into the public treasury from the custom-houses of New Orleans and Mobile? Or on account of the augmentation of the revenue of the government, from the consumption of dutiable articles by the population within the boundaries of the two former provinces? The national benefits and advantages accruing from their possession have been so various and immense, that it would be impossible to make any mere pecuniary estimate of them. In any aspect of the subject, the senator’s petty items of Indian annuities must appear contemptible in comparison with these splendid national acquisitions.

But the public lands are redeemed. They have long been redeemed. President Jackson announced, more than eight years ago, an incontestable truth, when he stated, that they might be considered as relieved from the pledge which had been made of them, the object having been accomplished for which they were ceded, and that it was in the discretion of congress to dispose of them in such way as best to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general interest of the American people. That which congress has the power to do, by an express grant of authority in the constitution, it is, in my humble opinion, imperatively bound to do by the terms of the deed of cession. Distribution, and only distribution, of the proceeds of the public lands, among the states, upon the principles proposed, will conform to the spirit, and execute the trust, created in the deeds of cession. Each state, upon grounds of strict justice, as well as equity, has a right to demand its distributive share of those proceeds. It is a debt which this government owes to every state――a debt, payment of which might be enforced by process of law, if there were any forum, before which the United States could be brought.

And are there not, sir, existing at this moment the most urgent and powerful motives for this dispensation of justice to the states at the hands of the general government? A stranger listening to the argument of the senator from New York, would conclude that we were not one united people, but that there were two separate and distinct nations; one acted upon by the general government, and the other by the state governments. But is that a fair representation of the case? Are we not one and the same people, acted upon, it is true, by two systems of government, two sets of public agents; the one established for general, and the other for local purposes? The constituency is identical, although it is doubly governed. It is the bounden duty of those who are charged with the administration of each system, so to administer it as to do as much good and as little harm as possible, within the scope of their respective powers. They should also each take into view the defects in the powers, or defects in the administration of the powers, of the other, and endeavor to supply them, as far as its legitimate authority extends, and the wants or necessities of the people require. For, if distress, adversity, and ruin come upon our constituents from any quarter, should they not have our active exertions to relieve them, as well as all our sympathies and our deepest regrets? It would be but a poor consolation to the general government, if such were the fact, that this unhappy state of things was produced by the measures and operation of the state governments, and not by its own. And if the general government, by a seasonable and legitimate exercise of its authority, could relieve the people, and would not relieve them, the reproaches due to it would be quite as great as if that government itself, and not the state governments, had brought these distresses upon the people.

The powers of taxation possessed by the general government are unlimited. The most fruitful and the least burdensome modes of taxation are confided to this government exclusive of the states. The power of laying duties on foreign imports is entirely monopolized by the federal government. The states have only the power of direct or internal taxation. They have none to impose duties on imports, not even luxuries; we have. And what is their condition at this moment? Some of them are greatly in debt, at a loss even to raise means to pay the interest upon their bonds. These debts were contracted under the joint encouragement of the recommendation of this government and prosperous times, in the prosecution of the laudable object of internal improvements. They may have pushed, in some instances, their schemes too far; but it was in a good cause, and it is easy to make reproaches when things turn out ill.

And here let me say, that, looking to the patriotic object of these state debts, and the circumstances under which they were contracted, I saw with astonished and indignant feelings a resolution submitted to the senate, at the last session, declaring that the general government would not assume the payment of them. A more wicked, malignant, Danton-like proposition was never offered to the consideration of any deliberative assembly. It was a _negative_ proposition, not a negative of any affirmative resolution presented to the senate; for no such affirmative resolution was offered by any one, nor do I believe was ever thought or dreamed of by any one. When, where, by whom, was the extravagant idea ever entertained, of an assumption of the state debts by the general government? There was not a solitary voice raised in favor of such a measure in this senate. Would it not have been time enough to have denounced assumption when it was seriously proposed? Yet, at a moment when the states were greatly embarrassed, when their credit was sinking, at this critical moment, was a measure brought forward, unnecessarily, wantonly, and gratuitously, made the subject of an elaborate report, and exciting a protracted debate, the inevitable effect of all which must have been to create abroad distrust in the ability and good faith of the debtor states. Can it be doubted, that a serious injury was inflicted upon them by this unprecedented proceeding? Nothing is more delicate than credit or character. Their credit cannot fail to have suffered in the only place where capital could be obtained, and where at that very time some of the agents of the states were negotiating with foreign bankers. About that period, one of the senators of this body had in person gone abroad for the purpose of obtaining advances of money on Illinois stock.

The senator from New York said, that the European capitalists had fixed the value of the state bonds of this country at fifty per centum; and therefore it was a matter of no consequence what might be said about the credit of the states here. But the senator is mistaken, or I have been entirely misinformed. I understand that some bankers have limited their advances upon the amount of state bonds, prior to their actual sale, to fifty per centum, in like manner as commission merchants will advance on the goods consigned to them, prior to their sale. But in such an operation it is manifestly for the interest of the states, as well as the bankers, that the bonds should command in the market as much as possible above the fifty per centum; and any proceeding which impairs the value of the bonds must be injurious to both. In any event, the loss would fall upon the states; and that this loss was aggravated by what occurred here, on the resolution to which I have referred, no one, at all acquainted with the sensitiveness of credit and of capitalists, can hesitate to believe. My friends and I made the most strenuous opposition to the resolution, but it was all unavailing, and a majority of the senate adopted the report of the committee, to which the resolution had been referred. We urged the impolicy and injustice of the proceeding; that no man in his senses would ever propose the assumption of the state debts; that no such proposal had, in fact, been made; that the debts of the states were unequal in amount, contracted by states of unequal population, and that some states were not in debt at all. How, then, was it possible to think of a general assumption of state debts? Who could conceive of such a proposal? But there is a vast difference between our paying _their_ debts _for_ them, and paying _our own_ debts _to_ them, in conformity with the trusts arising out of the public domain, which the general government is bound to execute.

Language has been held in this chamber, which would lead any one who heard it to believe, that some gentlemen would take delight in seeing states dishonored, and unable to pay their bonds. If such a feeling does really exist, I trust it will find no sympathy with the people of this country, as it can have none in the breast of any honest man. When the honorable senator from Massachusetts, (Mr. Webster,) the other day uttered, in such thrilling language, the sentiment, that honor and probity bound the states to the faithful payment of all their debts, and that they would do it, I felt my bosom swelling with patriotic pride; pride, on account of the just and manly sentiment itself; and pride, on account of the beautiful and eloquent language, in which that noble sentiment was clothed. Dishonor American credit! Dishonor the American name! Dishonor the whole country! Why, sir, what is national character, national credit, national honor, national glory, but the aggregate of the character, the credit, the honor, the glory, of the parts of the nation? Can the parts be dishonored, and the whole remain unsullied? Or can the whole be blemished, and the parts stand pure and untainted? Can a younger sister be disgraced, without bringing blushes and shame upon the whole family? Can our young sister, Illinois, (I mention her only for illustration, but with all feelings and sentiments of fraternal regard,) can she degrade her character as a state, without bringing reproach and obloquy upon all of us? What has made England, our country’s glorious parent――although she has taught us the duty of eternal watchfulness, to repel aggression, and maintain our rights against even her――what has made England the wonder of the world? What has raised her to such preëminence in wealth, power, empire, and greatness, at once the awe and the admiration of nations? Undoubtedly, among the prominent causes, have been the preservation of her credit, the maintenance of her honor, and the scrupulous fidelity with which she has fulfilled her pecuniary engagements, foreign as well as domestic. An opposite example of a disregard of national faith and character presents itself in the pages of ancient history. Every schoolboy is familiar with the phrase, ‘Punic faith,’ which at Rome became a by-word and a reproach against Carthage, in consequence of her notorious violations of her public engagements. The stigma has been transmitted down to the present time, and will remain for ever uneffaced. Who would not lament that a similar stigma should be affixed to any member of our confederacy? If there be anyone so thoroughly imbued with party spirit, so destitute of honor and morality, so regardless of just feelings of national dignity and character, as to desire to see any of the states of this glorious union dishonored, by violating their engagements to foreigners, and refusing to pay their just debts, I repel and repudiate him and his sentiments as unworthy of the American name, as sentiments dishonest in themselves, and neither entertained nor approved by the people of the United States.

Let us not be misunderstood, or our feelings and opinions be perverted. What is it that we ask? That this government shall assume the debts of the states? Oh! no, no. The debts of Pennsylvania, for example? (which is, I believe, the most indebted of all the states.) No, no; far from it. But, seeing that this government has the power, and, as I think, is under a duty, to distribute the proceeds of the public lands; and that it has the power, which the states have not, to lay duties on foreign luxuries; we propose to make that distribution, pay _our_ debt to the states, and save the states, to that extent at least, from the necessity of resorting to direct taxation, the most onerous of all modes of levying money upon the people. We propose to supply the deficiency produced from the withdrawal of the land fund by duties on luxuries, which the wealthy only will pay, and so far save the states from the necessity of burdening the poor. We propose, that, by a just exercise of incontestable powers possessed by this government, we shall go to the succor of all the states, and, by a fair distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among them, avert, as far as that may avert, the ruin and dishonor with which some of them are menaced. We propose, in short, such an administration of the powers of this government as shall protect and relieve our common constituents from the embarrassments to which they may be exposed from the defects in the powers or in the administration of the state governments.

Let us look a little more minutely at consequences. The distributive share of the state of Illinois in the land proceeds would be, according to the present receipts from the public lands, about one hundred thousand dollars. We make distribution, and she receives it. To that extent it would, then, relieve her from direct taxation, to meet the debt which she has contracted, or it would form the basis of new loans to an amount equal to about two millions. We refuse to make distribution. She must levy the hundred thousand dollars upon her population, in the form of direct taxation. And, if I am rightly informed, her chief source of revenue is a land tax, the most burdensome of all taxes. If I am misinformed, the senators from Illinois can correct me.

[Here Messrs. Robinson and Young explained, stating that there
was an additional source in a tax on the stock in the state bank.]

Still the land tax is, as I had understood, the principal source of the revenue of Illinois.

We make distribution, and, if necessary, we supply the deficiency which it produces by an imposition of duties on luxuries, which Illinois cannot tax. We refuse it, and, having no power herself to lay a duty on any foreign imports, she is compelled to resort to the most inconvenient and oppressive of all the modes of taxation. Every vote, therefore, which is given against distribution, is a vote, in effect, given to lay a land tax on the people of Illinois. Worse than that, it is a vote, in effect, refusing to tax the luxuries of the rich, and rendering inevitable the taxation of the poor――that poor in whose behalf we hear, from the other side of the chamber, professions of such deep sympathy, interest, and devotion! In what attitude do gentlemen place themselves who oppose this measure――gentlemen who taunt us as the aristocracy, as the friends of the banks, and so forth――gentlemen who claim to be the peculiar guardians of the democracy? How do they treat the poor? We have seen, at former sessions, a measure warmly espoused, and finally carried by them, which they represented would reduce the wages of labor. At this session, a tax, which would be borne exclusively by the rich, encounters their opposition. And now we have proposed another mode of benefiting the poor, by distribution of the land proceeds, to prevent their being borne down and oppressed by direct taxation; and this, too, is opposed from the same quarter! These gentlemen will not consent to lay a tax on the luxuries of the affluent, and, by their votes, insist upon leaving the states under the necessity of imposing direct taxes on the farmer, the laboring man, the poor, and all the while set up to be the exclusive friends of the poor! [A general laugh.] Really, sir, the best friends appear to be the worst enemies of the poor, and their greatest enemies their best friends.

The gentlemen opposed to us have frightened themselves, and have sought to alarm others, by imaginary dangers to spring from this measure of distribution. Corruption, it seems, is to be the order of the day! If I did not misunderstand the senator from South Carolina, he apprised us of the precise sum――one million of dollars――which was adequate to the corruption of his own state. He knows best about that; but I should be sorry to think that fifty millions of dollars could corrupt my state. What may be the condition of South Carolina at this time I know not; there is so much fog enveloping the dominant party, that it is difficult to discern her present latitude and longitude. What she was in her better days――in the days of her Rutledges, Pinckneys, Sumpters, Lowndeses, Cheveses――we all well know, and I will not inflict pain on the senator by dwelling on it. It is not for me to vindicate her from a charge so degrading and humiliating. She has another senator here, far more able and eloquent than I am to defend her. Certainly I do not believe, and should be most unwilling to think, that her senator had made a correct estimate of her moral power.

It has been, indeed, said, that our whole country is corrupt; that the results of recent elections were brought about by fraudulent means; and that a foreign influence has produced the great political revolution which has just taken place. I pronounce that charge a gross, atrocious, treasonable libel on the people of this country, on the institutions of this country, and on liberty itself. I do not attribute this calumny to any member of this body. I hope there is none who would give it the slightest countenance. But I do charge it upon some of the newspapers in the support of the other party. And it is remarkable, that the very press which originates and propagates this foul calumny of foreign influence has indicated the right of unnaturalized foreigners to mingle, at the polls, in our elections; and maintained the expediency of their owning portions of the soil of our country, before they have renounced their allegiance to foreign sovereigns.

I will not consume the time of the senate in dwelling long upon the idle and ridiculous story about the correspondence between the London bankers and some Missouri bankers――a correspondence which was kept safely until after the presidential election, in the custody of the directors of what is vaunted as a genuine locofoco bank in that state, when it was dragged out by a resolution of the legislature, authorizing the sending for persons and papers. It was then blazed forth as conclusive and damning evidence of the existence of a foreign influence in our presidential election. And what did it all amount to? These British bankers are really strange fellows. They are foolish enough to look to the safety of their money advanced to foreigners! If they see a man going to ruin, they will not lend him; and if they see a nation pursuing the same road, they are so unreasonable as to decline vesting their funds in its bonds. If they find war threatened, they will speculate on the consequences; and they will indulge in conjectures about the future condition of a country in given contingencies! Very strange! They have seen――all the world is too familiar with――these embarrassments and distresses brought upon the people of the United States, by the measures of Mr. Van Buren and his illustrious predecessor. They conclude, that, if he be reëlected, there will be no change of those measures, and no better times in the United States. On the contrary, if general Harrison be elected, they argue that a sound currency may be restored, confidence return, and business once more be active and prosperous. They therefore tell their Missouri banking correspondents, that American bonds and stocks will continue to depreciate if Mr. Van Buren be reëlected; but that, if his competitor should succeed, they will rise in value, and sell more readily in the market. And these opinions and speculations of the English bankers, carefully concealed from the vulgar gaze of the people, and locked up in the vaults of a locofoco bank, (what wonders they may have wrought there, have not been disclosed,) are dragged out and paraded, as full proof of the corrupt exercise of a foreign influence in the election of general Harrison, as president of the United States. Why, sir, the amount of the whole of it is, that the gentlemen, calling themselves, most erroneously, the democratic party, have administered the government so badly, that they have lost all credit and confidence at home and abroad, and because the people of the United States have refused to trust them any longer, and foreign bankers will not trust them either, they utter a whining cry that their recent signal defeat has been the work of foreign influence! [Loud laughter in the galleries.]

Democratic party! They have not the slightest pretension to this denomination. In the school of 1798, in which I was taught, and to which I have ever faithfully adhered, we were instructed to be watchful and jealous of executive power, enjoined to practice economy in the public disbursements, and urged to rally around the people, and not attach ourselves to the presidential car. This was Jefferson’s democracy. But the modern democrats, who have assumed the name, have reversed all these wholesome maxims, and have given to democracy a totally different version. They have run it down, as they have run down, or at least endangered, state rights, the right of instruction――admirable in their proper sphere――and all other rights, by perversion and extravagance. But, thank God, true democracy and true democrats have not been run down. Thousands of those who have been deceived and deluded by false colors, will now eagerly return to their ancient faith, and unite, under Harrison’s banner, with their old and genuine friends and principles, as they were held at the epoch of 1798. We shall, I trust, be all once more united as a fraternal band, ready to defend liberty against all dangers that may threaten it at home, and the country against all that shall menace it from abroad.

But to return from this digression to the patriotic apprehension, entertained by senators, of corruption, if the proceeds of the public lands should be distributed among the states. If, in the hands of the general government, the land fund does not lead to corruption, why should it in the hands of the state governments? Is there less danger from the fund if it remain undivided and concentrated, than if it be distributed? Are the stale governments more prone to corruption than the federal government? Are they more wasteful and extravagant in the expenditure of the money of the people? I think that if we are to consult purity and economy, we shall find fresh motives for distribution.

Mr. President, two plans of disposing of the vast public domain belonging to the United States, have been, from time to time, submitted to the consideration of congress and the public. According to one of them, it should not be regarded as a source of revenue, either to the general or to the state government. That, I have, I think, clearly demonstrated, although the supporters of that plan do press the argument of revenue whenever the rival plan is brought forward. They contend that the general government, being unfit, or less competent than the state governments, to manage the public lands, it ought to hasten to get rid of them, either by reduction of the price, by donation, by preëmptions, or by cessions to certain states, or by all these methods together.

Now, sir, it is manifest that the public lands cannot be all settled in a century or centuries to come. The progress of their settlement is indicated by the growth of the population of the United States. There have not been, on an average, five millions of acres per annum sold, daring the last half century. Larger quantities will be probably hereafter, although not immediately, annually sold. Now, when we recollect that we have at least a billion of acres to dispose of, some idea may be entertained, judging from the past, of the probable length of time before the whole is sold. Prior to their sale and settlement, the unoccupied portion of the public domain must remain either in the hands of the general government, or in the hands of the state governments, or pass into the hands of speculators. In the hands of the general government, if that government shall perform its duty, we know that the public lands will be distributed on liberal, equal, and moderate terms. The worst fate that can befall them, would be for them to be acquired by speculators. The emigrant and settler would always prefer purchasing from government, at fixed and known rates, rather than from the speculator, at unknown rates, fixed by his cupidity or caprice. But, if they are transferred from the general government, the best of them will be engrossed by speculators. That is the inevitable tendency of reduction of the price by graduation, and of cession to the states within which they lie.

The rival plan is, for the general government to retain the public domain, and make distribution of the proceeds, in time of peace, among the several states, upon equal and just principles, according to the rule of federal numbers, and, in time of war, to resume the proceeds for its vigorous prosecution. We think that the administration of the public lands had better remain with the common government, to be regulated by uniform principles, than confided to the states, to be administered according to various, and, perhaps, conflicting views. As to that important part of them which was ceded by certain states to the United States, for the common benefit of all the states, a trust was thereby created, which has been voluntarily accepted by the United States, and which they are not at liberty now to decline or transfer. The history of public lands held in the United States, demonstrates that they have been wasted or thrown away by most of the states that owned any, and that the general government has displayed more judgment and wisdom in the administration of them than any of the states. Whilst it is readily admitted that revenue should not be regarded as the sole or exclusive object, the pecuniary advantages which may be derived from this great national property, to both the states and the union, ought not to be altogether overlooked.

The measure which I have had the honor to propose, settles this great and agitating question for ever. It is founded upon no partial and unequal basis, aggrandizing a few of the states to the prejudice of the rest. It stands on a just, broad, and liberal foundation. It is a measure applicable not only to the states now in being, but to the territories, as states shall hereafter be formed out of them, and to all new states, as they shall rise, tier behind tier, to the Pacific ocean. It is a system operating upon a space almost boundless, and adapted to all future time. It was a noble spirit of harmony and union that prompted the revolutionary states originally to cede to the United States. How admirably does this measure conform to that spirit, and tend to the perpetuity of our glorious union! The imagination can hardly conceive one fraught with more harmony and union among the states. If to the other ties that bind us together as one people be superadded the powerful interest springing out of a just administration of our exhaustless public domain, by which, for a long succession of ages, in seasons of peace, the states will enjoy the benefit of the great and growing revenue which it produces, and in periods of war that revenue will be applied to the prosecution of the war, we shall be for ever linked together with the strength of adamantine chains. No section, no state, would ever be mad enough to break off from the union, and deprive itself of the inestimable advantages which it secures. Although thirty or forty more new states should be admitted into this union, this measure would cement them all fast together. The honorable senator from Missouri, near me, (Mr. Linn,) is very anxious to have a settlement formed at the mouth of the Oregon, and he will probably be gratified at no very distant day. Then will be seen members of congress from the Pacific states scaling the Rocky mountains, passing through the country of the grizzly bear, descending the turbid Missouri, entering the father of rivers, ascending the beautiful Ohio, and coming to this capitol, to take their seats in its spacious and magnificent halls. Proud of the commission they bear, and happy to find themselves here in council with friends, and brothers, and countrymen, enjoying the incalculable benefits of this great confederacy, and, among them, their annual distributive share of the issues of a nation’s inheritance, would even they, the remote people of the Pacific, ever desire to separate themselves from such a high and glorious destiny? The fund which is to be dedicated to these great and salutary purposes, does not proceed from a few thousand acres of land, soon to be disposed of; but of more than ten hundred millions of acres; and age after age may roll away, state after state arise, generation succeed generation, and still the fund will remain not only unexhausted, but improved and increasing, for the benefit of our children’s children, to the remotest posterity. The measure is not one pregnant with jealousy, discord, or division, but it is a far-reaching, comprehensive, healing measure of compromise and composure, having for its patriotic object the harmony, the stability, and the prosperity of the states and of the union.

IN DEFENCE OF MR. WEBSTER.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 1, 1841.

[AT the session of congress, the term of which expired with the
administration of Mr. Van Buren, the honorable Daniel Webster
resigned his seat in the senate, preparatory to taking office
under president Harrison, as secretary of state, which had
been offered to him by the president elect. Mr. Bates, of
Massachusetts, having presented to the senate the credentials of
the honorable Rufus Choate, who had been elected senator in the
place of Mr. Webster, the latter took his seat this day, (first
of March,) when Mr. Cuthbert, of Georgia, made some remarks
reflecting on the political character of Mr. Webster, in
connection with Mr. Clay, as his associate in the senate, which
called out Mr. Clay in reply, and occasioned the following
debate.]

MR. CUTHBERT said, that on the resignation of the late senator from Massachusetts, (Mr. Webster,) he had charged upon that senator certain opinions on the subject of southern institutions. This had led to a discussion, in the course of which he, (Mr. Cuthbert,) had pledged himself to prove certain points. The most important point was, that Mr. Webster had avowed the doctrine, that congress had full power to prohibit the slave-trade between the states. The next point was, that the legislature of Massachusetts had maintained the same doctrines, and quoted the opinions of that senator, (Mr. Webster,) to sustain them. He had pledged himself to produce the document to support and justify the charge.

After some discussion as to the point of order, and Mr. Cuthbert being permitted to proceed, he then desired the clerk to read an extract from a paper which he sent to the desk. It purported to be a memorial drawn up by a committee, of which Mr. Webster was a member, expressing the opinion, that congress had the power to prohibit the slave-trade between the states.

Mr. Cuthbert then animadverted upon the remark made by Mr. Clay, on the twenty-second of February, complimentary to Mr. Webster, and spoke of three great crises in the history of the two gentlemen when they differed in opinion――namely, on the late war with Great Britain; on the compromise tariff; and on the subject of abolition petitions.

Mr. Clay regretted extremely that he had been called out in this way. The discussion of the other day had, he ventured to say, satisfied every member of that body, with the exception of the senator from Georgia. He agreed with the senator from Vermont, (Mr. Phelps,) that it was all out of order. There was no necessity to create an occasion for the discussion. The distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts was soon to be nominated to that body, and then would be the proper time to bring out all the opposition to him. But the senator from Georgia had appealed to the courtesy of gentlemen, and he, (Mr. Clay,) was not willing to refuse the request.

No error could be greater than to judge of human character by a single act, a single sentiment or opinion. We were not to expect perfect coincidence in every thing abstract and practical.

[Mr. Cuthbert here addressed the chair.]

Mr. Clay said, I cannot be interrupted, Mr. President. I will not permit an interruption. The practice is much too common, and especially at the other end of the capitol. The senator from Georgia will have ample opportunity to reply when I have concluded. What was the question; what the subject of difference in the discussion? The senator from Georgia alleges that the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts has expressed an opinion, in Faneuil hall, it was believed, that congress had the power to regulate the trade in slaves between the states. On this subject great diversity of opinion exists. The power to regulate did not imply the power to prohibit. Congress possesses the power to regulate foreign commerce, but it has no right to prohibit it.

But the senator from Georgia has adverted to the fact, that I and my distinguished friend (Mr. Webster) have agreed on some questions, and disagreed on others. Is there any thing unusual or singular in this? The senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) and the senator from Georgia, are now on the same side; have they always agreed? Was the gentleman from Georgia ever a nullifier? [Mr. Cuthbert said, no.] No. I presume there are many points of policy on which those gentlemen differ. The only correct method of judging, is, to take human nature in the _tout ensemble_, and not undertake to determine by a single instance.

The senator from Georgia has referred to three subjects in which I have differed with the gentleman from Massachusetts. The first was, the late war with Great Britain. Mr. Webster had regarded that war as unnecessary, and in that I think he was wrong. But there was another war; a domestic war; a war waged by general Jackson against the prosperity of the country; and where stood the senator from Georgia in that war? The gallant Webster contended for the people through this long war, with persevering ability, but the senator from Georgia was on the other side.

In regard to the compromise act, the gentleman from Massachusetts had been opposed to that healing measure. But how was it with other senators, with whom the gentleman from Georgia was now coöperating? The senator from Missouri, (Mr. Benton,) and the senator from New York, (Mr. Wright,) both voted against the compromise; but the gentleman finds no difficulty in acting with those gentlemen because they disagreed with him on that measure.

As it regards abolition, so far as I know the opinions of Mr. Webster, he is just as much averse to it as the senator from Georgia himself. That there is danger impending, no one will deny. The danger is in ultraism. The ultraism of a portion of the south on the one hand, and from abolition on the other. It is to be averted by a moderate but firm course; not being led off into extremes on the one side, or frightened on the other. Mr. Webster and myself have differed on some subjects, have coincided on others; and the senator from Georgia might have referred to an instance in which he himself had voted with Mr. Webster, and in opposition to me. I allude to the tariff of 1824. The substance of the charge is, that Mr. Webster and myself have agreed on certain matters, and disagreed on others; and if the senator from Georgia should undertake to compute the several agreements and disagreements, he would have to work out a more difficult problem than a friend of mine in the other house, who had tried to ascertain whether Vermont or Kentucky was the banner state.

ON THE VETO OF THE FISCAL BANK BILL BY PRESIDENT TYLER.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, AUGUST 19, 1841.

[A FEW days after the inauguration of general Harrison as
president of the United States――on the seventeenth of March,
1841――he issued a proclamation convening an extra session of
congress on the thirty-first of May, on which day both houses
assembled, and formed a quorum. President Harrison having died
on the fourth of April, was succeeded by the vice-president
Tyler, who, in his message to congress, recommended, among
other matters, the adoption of measures to create a fiscal agent
for the convenience of government, and the regulation of the
currency. A bill to establish a fiscal bank of the United States
was reported, and, after discussion, passed the senate by a vote
of twenty-six to twenty-three, and the house, by one hundred
and twenty-eight to ninety-one. On the sixteenth of August,
president Tyler, much to the surprise and regret of those to
whom he owed his election, returned the bill to the senate, with
his objections, and on the nineteenth, the executive message
being under consideration, Mr. Clay addressed the senate as
follows; to which Mr. Rives replied, and the same day Mr. Clay
made his rejoinder to Mr. Rives, in the remarks following this
speech.]

MR. PRESIDENT, the bill which forms the present subject of our deliberations, had passed both houses of congress by decisive majorities, and, in conformity with the requirement of the constitution, was presented to the president of the United States for his consideration. He has returned it to the senate, in which it originated, according to the direction of the constitution, with a message announcing his veto of the bill, and containing his objections to its passage. And the question now to be decided is, shall the bill pass, by the required constitutional majority of two thirds, the president’s objections notwithstanding?

Knowing, sir, but too well that no such majority can be obtained, and that the bill must fall, I would have been rejoiced to have found myself at liberty to abstain from saying one word on this painful occasion. But the president has not allowed me to give a silent vote. I think, with all respect and deference to him, he has not reciprocated the friendly spirit of concession and compromise which animated congress in the provisions of this bill, and especially in the modification of the sixteenth fundamental condition of the bank. He has commented, I think, with undeserved severity, on that part of the bill; he has used, I am sure unintentionally, harsh if not reproachful language; and he has made the very concession, which was prompted as a peace-offering, and from friendly considerations, the cause of stronger and more decided disapprobation of the bill. Standing in the relation to that bill which I do, and especially to the exceptionable clause, the duty which I owe to the senate and to the country, and self-respect, impose upon me the obligation of at least attempting the vindication of a measure which has met with a fate so unmerited, and so unexpected.

On the fourth of April last, the lamented Harrison, the president of the United States, paid the debt of nature. President Tyler, who, as vice-president, succeeded to the duties of that office, arrived in the city of Washington, on the sixth of that month. He found the whole metropolis wrapped in gloom, every heart filled with sorrow and sadness, every eye streaming with tears, and the surrounding hills yet flinging back the echo of the bells which were tolled on that melancholy occasion. On entering the presidential mansion, he contemplated the pale body of his predecessor stretched before him, and clothed in the black habiliments of death. At that solemn moment, I have no doubt that the heart of president Tyler was overflowing with mingled emotions of grief, of patriotism, and of gratitude――above all, of gratitude to that country, by a majority of whose suffrages, bestowed at the preceding November, he then stood the most distinguished, the most elevated, the most honored of all living whigs of the United States.

It was under these circumstances, and in this probable state of mind, that president Tyler, on the tenth day of the same month of April, voluntarily promulgated an address to the people of the United States. That address was in the nature of a coronation oath, which the chief of the state in other countries, and under other forms, takes, upon ascending the throne. It referred to the solemn obligations, and the profound sense of duty, under which the new president entered upon the high trust which had devolved upon him, by the joint acts of the people and of Providence, and it stated the principles, and delineated the policy, by which he would be governed in his exalted station. It was emphatically a whig address, from beginning to end――every inch of it was whig, and was patriotic.

In that address the president, in respect to the subject matter embraced in the present bill, held the following conclusive and emphatic language.

‘I shall _promptly_ give my sanction to any constitutional
measure, which, _originating in congress_, shall have for
its object the restoration of a sound circulating medium,
_so essentially necessary_ to give confidence in all the
transactions of life, to secure _to industry its just and
adequate rewards, and to reëstablish the public prosperity_.
In deciding upon the adaptation of any such measure to the end
proposed, _as well as its conformity to the constitution_, I
shall resort to the _fathers of the great republican school_
for advice and instruction, to be drawn from their sage views of
our system of government, and the light of their ever _glorious
example_.’

To this clause in the address of the president, I believe but one interpretation was given throughout this whole country, by friend and foe, by whig and democrat, and by the presses of both parties. It was, by every man with whom I conversed on the subject at the time of its appearance, or of whom I have since inquired, construed to mean that the president intended to occupy the Madison ground, and to regard the question of the power to establish a national bank as immovably settled. And I think I may confidently appeal to the senate and to the country, to sustain the fact, that this was the contemporaneous and unanimous judgment of the public. Reverting back to the period of the promulgation of the address, could any other construction have been given to its language? What is it? ‘I shall _promptly_ give my sanction to any constitutional measure, which, _originating in congress_,’ shall have certain defined objects in view. He concedes the vital importance of a sound circulating medium to industry, and to the public prosperity. He concedes that its origin must be in congress. And to prevent any inference from the qualification, which he prefixes to the measure, being interpreted to mean that a United States bank was unconstitutional, he declares, that in deciding on the adaptation of the measure to the end proposed, and its _conformity_ to the constitution, he will resort to the fathers of the great republican school. And who were they? If the father of his country is to be excluded, are Madison, (the father of the constitution,) Jefferson, Monroe, Gerry, Gallatin, and the long list of republicans who acted with them, not to be regarded as among those fathers? But president Tyler declares, not only that he should appeal to them for advice and instruction, but to the light of their ever glorious EXAMPLE. What example? What other meaning could have been possibly applied to the phrase, than that he intended to refer to what had been done during the administration of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe?

Entertaining this opinion of the address, I came to Washington at the commencement of the session, with the most confident and buoyant hopes that the whigs would be able to carry all their prominent measures, and especially a bank of the United States, by far that one of the greatest immediate importance. I anticipated nothing but cordial coöperation between the two departments of government; and I reflected with pleasure, that I should find, at the head of the executive branch, a personal and political friend, whom I had long and intimately known, and highly esteemed. It will not be my fault, if our amicable relations should unhappily cease, in consequence of any difference of opinion between us on this occasion. The president has been always perfectly familiar with my opinion on this bank question.

Upon the opening of the session, but especially on the receipt of a plan of a national bank, as proposed by the secretary of the treasury, fears were excited that the president had been misunderstood in his address, and that he had not waived but adhered to his constitutional scruples. Under these circumstances, it was hoped, that, by the indulgence of a mutual spirit of compromise and concession, a bank, competent to fulfil the expectations and satisfy the wants of the people, might be established.

Under the influence of that spirit, the senate and the house agreed, first, as to the name of the proposed bank. I confess, sir, that there was something exceedingly _outré_ and revolting to my ears, in the term ‘fiscal bank;’ but I thought, ‘what is there in a name? A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.’ Looking, therefore, rather to the utility of the substantial faculties, than to the name of the contemplated institution, we consented to that which was proposed.

Secondly, as to the place of location of the bank. Although Washington had passed through my mind as among the cities in which it might be expedient to place the bank, it was believed to be the least eligible of some four or five other cities. Nevertheless, we consented to fix it here.

And, lastly, in respect to the branching power, there was not, probably, a solitary vote given in either house of congress for the bill, that did not greatly prefer the unqualified branching power, as asserted in the charters of the two former banks of the United States, to the sixteenth fundamental condition, as finally incorporated in this bill. It is perfectly manifest, therefore, that it was not in conformity with the opinion and wish of majorities in congress, but in a friendly spirit of concession towards the president and his particular friends, that the clause assumed that form. So repugnant was it to some of the best friends of a national bank in the other house, that they finally voted against the bill, because it contained that compromise of the branching power.

It is true, that in presenting the compromise to the senate, I stated, as was the fact, that I did not know whether it would be acceptable to the president or not; that, according to my opinion, each department of the government should act upon its own responsibility, independently of the other; and that I presented the modification of the branching power because it was necessary to insure the passage of the bill in the senate, having ascertained that the vote would stand twenty-six against it to twenty-five, if the form of that power which had been reported by the committee were persisted in. But I nevertheless did entertain the most confident hopes and expectations, that the bill would receive the sanction of the president; and this motive, although not the immediate one, had great weight in the introduction and adoption of the compromise clause. I knew that our friends who would not vote for the bill as reported, were actuated, as they avowed, by considerations of union and harmony, growing out of supposed views of the president, and I presumed that he would not fail to feel and appreciate their sacrifices. But I deeply regret that we were mistaken. Notwithstanding all our concessions, made in a genuine and sincere spirit of conciliation, the sanction of the president could not be obtained, and the bill has been returned by him with his objections.

And I shall now proceed to consider those objections, with as much brevity as possible, but with the most perfect respect, official and personal, towards the chief magistrate.

After stating that the power of congress to establish a national bank, to operate _per se_, has been a controverted question from the origin of the government, the president remarks: