Chapter I: HAVE been desirous, Mr. President, before the passage of this bill, (5)

There is no novelty in this idea of cession to the new states. The form of it is somewhat varied, by the proposal of the senator to divide the proceeds between the new states and the United States, but it is still substantially the same thing; a present cession of thirty-five per centum, and an ultimate cession of the whole! When the subject of the public lands was before the committee on manufactures, it considered the scheme of cession among the other various projects then afloat. The report made in April, 1832, presents the views entertained by the committee on that topic; and, although I am not in the habit of quoting from my own productions, I trust the senate will excuse me on this occasion for availing myself of what was then said, as it will at least enable me to economize my breath and strength. I ask some friend to read the following passages: [which were accordingly read by another senator.]

‘Whether the question of a transfer of the public lands be
considered in a limited or more extensive view of it which has
been stated, it is one of the highest importance, and demanding
the most deliberate consideration. From the statements founded
on official reports, made in the preceding part of this report,
it has been seen, that the quantity of unsold and unappropriated
lands lying within the limits of the new states and territories,
is three hundred and forty million eight hundred and seventy-one
thousand seven hundred and fifty-three acres, and the quantity
beyond those limits, is seven hundred and fifty millions,
presenting an aggregate of one billion ninety million eight
hundred and seventy-one thousand seven hundred and fifty-three
acres. It is difficult to conceive a question of greater
magnitude than that of relinquishing this immense amount of
national property. Estimating its value according to the minimum
price, it presents the enormous sum of one billion three hundred
and sixty-three million five hundred and eighty-nine thousand
six hundred and ninety-one dollars. If it be said, that a
large portion of it will never command that price, it is to be
observed, on the other hand, that, as fresh lands are brought
into market and exposed to sale at public auction, many of them
sell at prices exceeding one dollar and a quarter per acre.
Supposing the public lands to be worth, on the average, one
half of the minimum price, they would still present the immense
sum of six hundred and eighty-one million seven hundred and
ninety-four thousand eight hundred and forty-five dollars. The
least favorable view which can be taken of them is, that of
considering them a capital, yielding, at present, an income
of three millions of dollars annually. Assuming the ordinary
rate of six per centum interest per annum as the standard, to
ascertain the amount of that capital, it would be fifty millions
of dollars. But this income has been progressively increasing.
The average increase during the six last years has been at
the rate of twenty-three per centum per annum. Supposing it to
continue in the same ratio, at the end of a little more than
four years the income would be double, and make the capital
one hundred millions of dollars. Whilst the population of the
United States increases only three per centum per annum, the
increase of the demand for the public lands is at the rate of
twenty-three per centum, furnishing another evidence that the
progress of emigration and the activity of sales have not been
checked by the price demanded by government.

‘In whatever light, therefore, this great subject is viewed,
the transfer of the public lands from the whole people of
the United States, for whose benefit they are now held, to
the people inhabiting the new states, must be regarded as the
most momentous measure ever presented to the consideration
of congress. If such a measure could find any justification,
it must arise out of some radical and incurable defect in the
construction of the general government properly to administer
the public domain. But the existence of any such defect is
contradicted by the most successful experience. No branch of
the public service has evinced more system, uniformity, and
wisdom, or given more general satisfaction, than that of the
administration of the public lands.

‘If the proposed cession to the new states were to be made at
a fair price, such as the general government could obtain from
individual purchasers under the present system, there would be
no motive for it, unless the new states are more competent to
dispose of the public lands than the common government. They
are now sold under one uniform plan, regulated and controlled by
a single legislative authority, and the practical operation is
perfectly understood. If they were transferred to the new states,
the subsequent disposition would be according to laws emanating
from various legislative sources. Competition would probably
arise between the new states, in the terms which they would
offer to purchasers. Each state would be desirous of inviting
the greatest number of emigrants, not only for the laudable
purpose of populating rapidly its own territories, but with
the view to the acquisition of funds to enable it to fulfil its
engagements with the general government. Collisions between the
states would probably arise, and their injurious consequences
may be imagined. A spirit of hazardous speculation would be
engendered. Various schemes in the new states would be put
afloat to sell or divide the public lands. Companies and
combinations would be formed in this country, if not in foreign
countries, presenting gigantic and tempting but delusive
projects; and the history of legislation, in some of the states
of the union, admonishes us that a too ready ear is sometimes
given by a majority, in a legislative assembly, to such projects.

‘A decisive objection to such a transfer, for a fair equivalent,
is, that it would establish a new and dangerous relation between
the general government and the new states. In abolishing the
credit which had been allowed to purchasers of the public lands
prior to the year 1820, congress was principally governed by
the consideration of the expediency and hazard of accumulating
a large amount of debt in the new states all bordering on each
other. Such an accumulation was deemed unwise and unsafe. It
presented a new bond of interest, of sympathy, and of union,
partially operating to the possible prejudice of the common
bond of the whole union. But that debt was a debt due from
individuals, and it was attended with this encouraging security,
that purchasers, as they successively completed the payments for
their lands, would naturally be disposed to aid the government
in enforcing payment from delinquents. The project which the
committee are now considering, is, to sell to the states, in
their sovereign character, and consequently, to render them
public debtors to the general government to an immense amount.
This would inevitably create between the debtor states a common
feeling and a common interest, distinct from the rest of the
union. These states are all in the western and southwestern
quarter of the union, remotest from the centre of federal
power. The debt would be felt as a load from which they would
constantly be desirous to relieve themselves; and it would
operate as a strong temptation, weakening, if not dangerous, to
the existing confederacy. The committee have the most animating
hopes and the greatest confidence in the strength, and power,
and durability of our happy union; and the attachment and warm
affection of every member of the confederacy cannot be doubted;
but we have authority, higher than human, for the instruction,
that it is wise to avoid all temptation.

‘In the state of Illinois, with a population at the last
census of one hundred and fifty-seven thousand four hundred
and forty-five, there are thirty-one million three hundred and
ninety-five thousand six hundred and sixty-nine acres of public
land, including that part on which the Indian title remains to be
extinguished. If we suppose it to be worth only half the minimum
price, it would amount to nineteen million six hundred and
twenty-two thousand four hundred and eighty dollars. How would
that state be able to pay such an enormous debt? How could it
pay even the annual interest upon it?

‘Supposing the debtor states to fail to comply with their
engagements, in what mode could they be enforced by the general
government? In treaties between independent nations, the
ultimate remedy is well known. The apprehension of an appeal to
that remedy, seconding the sense of justice and the regard for
character, which prevail among christian and civilized nations,
constitutes, generally, adequate security for the performance
of national compacts. But this last remedy would be totally
inadmissible in case of a delinquency on the part of the
debtor states. The relations between the general government
and the members of the confederacy are happily those of peace,
friendship, and fraternity, and exclude all idea of force and
war. Could the judiciary coerce the debtor states? On what
could their process operate? Could the property of innocent
citizens, residing within the limits of those states, be justly
seized by the general government, and held responsible for
debts contracted by the states themselves in their sovereign
character? If a mortgage upon the lands ceded, were retained,
that mortgage would prevent or retard subsequent sales by the
states; and if individuals bought, subject to the incumbrance, a
parental government could never resort to the painful measure of
disturbing them in their possessions.

‘Delinquency, on the part of the debtor states, would be
inevitable, and there would be no effectual remedy for the
delinquency. They would come again and again to congress,
soliciting time and indulgence, until, finding the weight of the
debt intolerable, congress, wearied by reiterated applications
for relief, would finally resolve to spunge the debt; or, if
congress attempted to enforce its payment, another and a worse
alternative would be embraced.

‘If the proposed cession be made for a price merely nominal,
it would be contrary to the express conditions of the original
cessions from primitive states to congress, and contrary to the
obligations which the general government stands under to the
whole people of these United States, arising out of the fact,
that the acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida, and from Georgia,
were obtained at a great expense, borne from the common treasure,
and incurred for the common benefit. Such a gratuitous cession
could not be made without a positive violation of a solemn
trust, and without manifest injustice to the old states. And
its inequality among the new states would be as marked as its
injustice to the old would be indefensible. Thus Missouri, with
a population of one hundred and forty thousand four hundred and
fifty-five, would acquire thirty-eight million two hundred and
ninety-two thousand one hundred and fifty-one acres; and the
state of Ohio, with a population of nine hundred and thirty-five
thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, would obtain only five
million five hundred and eighty-six thousand eight hundred and
thirty-four acres. Supposing a division of the land among the
citizens of those two states respectively; the citizen of Ohio
would obtain less than six acres for his share, and the citizen
of Missouri upwards of two hundred and seventy-two acres as his
proportion.

‘Upon full and thorough consideration, the committee have come
to the conclusion, that it is inexpedient either to reduce the
price of the public lands, or to cede them to the new states.
They believe, on the contrary, that sound policy coincides with
the duty which has devolved on the general government to the
whole of the states, and the whole of the people of the union,
and enjoins the preservation of the existing system, as having
been tried and approved, after a long and triumphant experience.
But, in consequence of the extraordinary financial prosperity
which the United States enjoys, the question merits examination,
whether, whilst the general government steadily retains the
control of this great national resource in its own hands, after
the payment of the public debt, the proceeds of the sales of the
public lands, no longer needed to meet the ordinary expenses of
government, may not be beneficially appropriated to some other
objects for a limited time.’

The senator from New York has adverted, for another purpose, to the twenty-eight millions of surplus divided a few years ago among the states. He has said, truly, that it arose from the public lands. Was not that, in effect, distribution? Was it not so understood at the time? Was it not voted for, by senators, as practical distribution? The senator from North Carolina, (Mr. Mangum,) has stated that he did. I did. Other senators did; and no one, not the boldest, will have the temerity to rise here and propose to require or compel the states to refund that money. If, in form, it was a deposit with the states, in fact, and in truth, it was distribution. So it was then regarded. So it will ever remain.

Let us now see, Mr. President, how this plan of cession will operate among the new states themselves. And I appeal more especially to the senators from Ohio. That state has about a million and a half of inhabitants. The United States have (as will probably be shown when the returns are published of the late census[25]) a population of about fifteen millions. Ohio, then, has within her limits one tenth part of the population of the United States. Now, let us see what sort of a bargain the proposed cession makes for Ohio.

[Mr. Allen here interposed, to explain, that the vote he gave
for Mr. Calhoun’s plan of cession to the new states, was on
the ground of substituting that in preference to the plan of
distribution among all the states.]

Oh! ho!――ah! is that the ground of the senator’s vote?

[Mr. Allen said, he had had a choice between two evils; the
amendment of the senator from South Carolina, and the amendment
of the senator from Kentucky; and it was well known on this side
of the house, that he took the first only as a less evil than
the last.]

Well; all I will say is, that the side of the house kept the secret remarkably well. [Loud laughter.] And no one better than the senator himself. There were seventeen votes given in favor of the plan of the senator from South Carolina, to my utter astonishment at the time. I had not expected any other vote for it but that of the senator from South Carolina himself, and the senator from Michigan, (Mr. Norvell.) No other did, or I suppose would rise and vote to cede away, without any just or certain equivalent, more than a billion of acres of public land of the people of the United States. If the vote of the other fifteen senators was also misunderstood, in the same way as the senator’s from Ohio, I shall be very glad of it.

But I was going to show what sort of a bargain for Ohio her two senators, by their votes, appeared to be assenting to. There are eight hundred thousand acres of public land remaining in Ohio, after being culled for near half a century, thirty-five per centum of the proceeds of which are to be assigned to that state, by the plan of cession. For this trifling consideration, she is to surrender her interest in one hundred and sixty millions of acres; in other words, she is to give sixteen millions, (that being her tenth,) for the small interest secured to her in the eight hundred thousand acres. If, as I believe and have contended, the principle of cession, being once established, would be finally extended to the whole public domain, then Ohio would give one hundred millions of acres of land, (that being her tenth part of the whole of the public lands,) for the comparatively contemptible consideration that she would acquire in the eight hundred thousand acres. A capital bargain this, to which I supposed the two senators had assented, by which, in behalf of their state, they exchanged one hundred millions of acres of land against eight hundred thousand! [A laugh.]

I do not think that the senator’s explanation mends the matter much. According to that, he did not vote for cession because he liked cession. No! that is very bad; but, bad as it may be, it is not so great an evil as distribution, and he preferred it to distribution. Let us see what Ohio would get by distribution. Assuming that the public lands will yield only five millions of dollars annually, her proportion, being one tenth, would be half a million of dollars. But I entertain no doubt that, under proper management, in a few years the public lands will produce a much larger sum, perhaps ten or fifteen millions of dollars; so that the honorable senator prefers giving away for a song the interests of his state, presently, in one hundred and sixty millions of acres, and eventually in a billion, to receiving annually, in perpetuity, half a million of dollars, with an encouraging prospect of a large augmentation of that sum. That is the notion which the two senators from Ohio entertain of her interest! Go home, Messieurs Senators from Ohio, and tell your constituents of your votes. Tell them of your preference of a cession of all their interest in the public lands, with the exception of that inconsiderable portion remaining in Ohio, to the reception of Ohio’s fair distributive share of the proceeds of all the public lands of the United States, now and hereafter. I do not seek to interfere in the delicate relation between senators and their constituents; but I think I know something of the feelings and views of my neighbors, the people of Ohio. I have recently read an exposition of her true interests and views, in the message of her enlightened governor, directly contrary to those which appear to be entertained by her two senators; and I am greatly deceived if a large majority of the people of that state do not coincide with their governor.

The unequal operation of the plan of cession among the nine new states, has been, perhaps, sufficiently exposed by others. The states with the smallest population get the most land. Thus Arkansas, with only about one fifteenth part of the population of Ohio, will receive upwards of twenty-eight times as much land as Ohio. The scheme proceeds upon the idea of reversing the maxim of the greatest good to the greatest number, and of substituting the greatest good to the smallest number.

There can be every species of partial distribution of public land or its proceeds, but an honest, impartial, straight-forward distribution among all the states. Can the senator from New York, with his profound knowledge of the constitution, tell me on what constitutional authority it is that lands are granted to the Indians beyond the Mississippi?

[Mr. Wright said, that there was no property acquired, and
therefore no constitutional obligation applied.]

And that is the amount of the senator’s information of our Indian relations! Why, sir, we send them across the Mississippi, and put them upon our lands, from which all Indian title had been removed. We promise them even the fee simple; but, if we did not, they are at least to retain the possession and enjoy the use of the lands, until they choose to sell them; and the whole amount of our right would be a preëmption privilege of purchase, to the exclusion of all private persons or public authorities, foreign or domestic. This is the doctrine coeval with the colonization of this continent, proclaimed by the king of Great Britain, in his proclamation of 1763, asserted in the conferences at Ghent, and sustained by the supreme court of the United States. Now, such an allotment of public lands to the Indians, whether they acquire the fee or a right of possession, indefinite as to time, is equivalent to any distribution.

Thus, sir, we perceive, that all kinds of distribution of the public lands or their proceeds may be made――to particular states, to preëmptioners, to charities, to objects of education or internal improvement, to foreigners, to Indians, to black, red, white, and gray, to every body, but among all the states of the union. There is an old adage, according to which, charity should begin at home; but, according to the doctrines of the opponents of distribution, it neither begins nor ends at home.

[Here Mr. Clay gave way to an adjournment.]

It is not my intention to inflict upon the senate even a recapitulation of the heads of argument which I had the honor to address to it yesterday. On one collateral point I desire to supply an omission, as to the trade between this country and France. I stated the fact that, according to the returns of imports and exports, there existed an unfavorable balance against the United States, amounting, exclusively of what is reëxported, to seventeen millions of dollars; but I omitted another important fact, namely, that, by the laws of France, there is imposed on the raw material imported into that kingdom a duty of twenty francs on every hundred kilogrammes, equal to about two cents per pound on American cotton, at the present market price. Now what is the fact as to the comparative rate of duties in the two countries? France imposes on the raw product, (which is the mere commencement of value in articles which, when wrought and finally touched, will be worth two or three hundred fold,) a duty of nearly twenty-five per centum; while we admit, free of duty, or with nominal duties, costly luxuries, the product of French industry and taste, wholly unsusceptible of any additional value by any exertion of American skill or industry. In any thing I have said on this occasion, nothing is further from my intention than to utter one word unfriendly to France. On the contrary, it has been always my desire to see our trade with France increased and extended upon terms of reciprocal benefit. With that view, I was in favor of an arrangement in the tariff of 1832, by which silks imported into the United States from beyond the cape of Good Hope, were charged with a duty of ten per centum higher than those brought from France, and countries this side the cape, especially to encourage the commerce with France.

While speaking of France, allow me to make an observation, although it has no immediate or legitimate connexion with any thing before the senate. It is to embrace the opportunity of expressing my deep regret at a sentiment attributed by the public journals, to a highly distinguished and estimable countryman of ours, in another part of the capitol, which implied a doubt as to the validity of the title of Louis Philippe to the throne of France, inasmuch as it was neither acquired by conquest nor descent, and raising a question as to his being the lawful monarch of the French people. It appears to me, that, after the memorable revolution of July, in which our illustrious and lamented friend, Lafayette, bore a part so eminent and effectual, and the subsequent hearty acquiescence of all France, in the establishment of the Orleans branch of the house of Bourbon upon the throne, the present king has as good a title to his crown as any of the other sovereigns of Europe have to theirs, and quite as good as any which force, or the mere circumstance of birth, could confer. And if an individual so humble and at such a distance as I am, might be allowed to express an opinion on the public concerns of another country and another hemisphere, I would add, that no chief magistrate of any nation, amidst difficulties, public and personal, the most complicated and appalling, could have governed with more ability, wisdom, and firmness, than have been displayed by Louis Philippe. All christendom owes him an acknowledgment for his recent successful efforts to prevent a war which would have been disgraceful to christian Europe――a war arising from the inordinate pretensions of an upstart Mahometan pacha, a rebel against his lawful sovereign, and a usurper of his rights――a war which, if once lighted up must have involved all Europe, and have led to consequences which it is impossible to foresee.

I return to the subject immediately before us.

In tracing the history of that portion of our public domain which was acquired by the war of the revolution, we should always recollect the danger to the peace and harmony among the members of the confederacy with which it was pregnant. It prevented for a long time, the ratification of the articles of confederation, by all the states, some of them refusing their assent until a just and equitable settlement was made of the question of the crown lands. The argument they urged as to these lands, in a waste and unappropriated state, was, that they had been conquered by the common valor, the common exertions, and the common sacrifices of all the states; that their ought therefore to be the common property of all the states, and that it would be manifestly wrong and unjust that the states within whose limits these crown lands happened to lie, should exclusively enjoy the benefit of them. Virginia, within whose boundaries by far the greater part of these crown lands were situated, and by whose separate and unaided exertions on the bloody theatre of Kentucky, and beyond the Ohio, under the direction of the renowned George Rogers Clarke, the conquest of most of them was achieved, was, to her immortal honor, among the first to yield to these just and patriotic views, and, by her magnificent grant to the union, powerfully contributed to restore harmony, and quiet all apprehensions among the several states.

Among the objects to be attained by the cession from the states to the confederation of these crown lands, a very important one was to provide a fund to pay the debts of the revolution. The senator from New York, (Mr. Wright,) made it the object of a large part of the argument which he addressed to the senate, to show the contrary; and so far as the mere terms of the deeds of cession are concerned, I admit the argument was sustained. No such purpose appears on the face of the deeds, as far as I have examined them.

[Mr. Wright here interposed, and said, that he had not
undertaken to argue that the cessions made by the states to the
union, were not for the purpose of extinguishing the public debt,
but that they were not exclusively for that purpose.]

It is not material whether they were made for the sole purpose of extinguishing the revolutionary debt or not. I think I shall be able to show, in the progress of my argument, that, from the moment of the adoption of the federal constitution, the proceeds of the public lands ought to have been divided among the states.

But that the payment of the revolutionary debt was one of the objects of the cession, is a matter of incontestable history. We should have an imperfect idea of the intentions of the parties, if we confined our attention to the mere language of the deeds. In order to ascertain their views, we must examine contemporaneous acts, resolutions, and proceedings. One of these resolutions, clearly manifesting the purpose I have stated, has probably escaped the notice of the senator from New York. It was a resolution of the old congress, adopted in April, 1783, preceding the final cession from Virginia, which was in March, 1784. There had been an attempt to make the cession as early as 1781, but, owing to the conditions with which it was embarrassed, and other difficulties, the cession was not consummated until March, 1784. The resolution I refer to, bears a date prior to that of the cession, and must be taken with it, as indicative of the motives which probably operated on Virginia to make, and the confederation to accept, that memorable grant. I will read it.

‘Resolved, that as a further mean, as well of hastening the
extinguishment of the debts, as of establishing the harmony
of the United States, it be recommended to the states which
have passed no acts towards complying with the resolutions of
congress of the sixth of September and tenth of October, 1780,
relative to the cession of territorial claims, to make the
liberal cessions therein recommended, and to the states which
may have passed acts complying with the said resolutions in part
only, to revise and complete such compliance.’

That was one of the great objects of the cession. Seven of the old thirteen states had waste crown lands within their limits; the other six had none. These complained that what ought to be regarded as property common to them all, would accrue exclusively to the seven states, by the operation of the articles of confederation; and, therefore, for the double purpose of extinguishing the revolutionary debt, and of establishing harmony among the states of the union, the cession of those lands to the United States was recommended by congress.

And here let us pause for a moment, and contemplate the proposition of the senator from South Carolina, and its possible consequences. We have seen that the possession by seven states of these public lands, won by the valor of the whole thirteen, was cause of so much dissatisfaction to the other six as to have occasioned a serious impediment to the formation of the confederacy; and we have seen that, to remove all jealousy and disquietude on that account, in conformity with the recommendation of congress, the seven states, Virginia taking the lead, animated by a noble spirit of justice and patriotism, ceded the waste lands to the United States, for the benefit of all the states. Now what is the measure of the senator from South Carolina? It is in effect to restore the discordant and menacing state of things, which existed in 1783, prior to any cession from the states. It is worse than that. For it proposes that seventeen states shall give up immediately or eventually all their interest in the public lands, lying in nine states, to those nine states. Now if the seven states had refused to cede at all, they could at least have asserted that they fought Great Britain for these lands, as hard as the six. They would have had, therefore, the apparent right of conquest, although it was a common conquest. But the senator’s proposition is, to cede these public lands from the states which fought for them in the revolutionary war, to states that neither fought for them nor had existence daring that war. If the apprehension of an appropriation of these lands, to the exclusive advantage of the seven states, was nigh preventing the establishment of the union, can it be supposed that its security and harmony will be unaffected by a transfer of them from seventeen to nine states? But the senator’s proposition goes yet further. It has been shown that it will establish a precedent, which must lead to a cession from the United States of all the public domain, whether won by the sword or acquired by treaties with foreign powers, to new states, as they shall be admitted into the union.

In the second volume of the laws of the United States, will be found the act, known as the funding act, which passed in the year 1790. By the last section of that act, the public lands are pledged, and pledged exclusively, to the payment of the revolutionary debt, until it should be satisfied. Thus, we find, prior to the cession, an invitation from congress, to the states, to cede the waste lands, among other objects, for the purpose of paying the public debt; and, after the cessions were made, one of the earliest acts of congress pledged them to that object. So the matter stood whilst that debt hung over us. During all that time, there was a general acquiescence in the dedication of the public lands to that just object. No one thought of disturbing the arrangement. But when the debt was discharged, or rather when, from the rapidity of the process of its extinction, it was evident that it would soon be discharged, attention was directed to a proper disposition of the public lands. No one doubted the power of congress to dispose of them according to its sound discretion. Such was the view of president Jackson, distinctly communicated to congress, in the message which I have already cited.

‘As the lands may now be considered as relieved from this pledge,
the object for which they were ceded having been accomplished,
it is in the discretion of congress to dispose of them in such
way as best to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general
interest of the American people.’

Can the power of congress, to dispose of the public domain be more broadly asserted? What was then said about revenue? That it should cease to be a source of revenue! We never hear of the revenue argument, but when the proposition is up to make an equal and just distribution of the proceeds. When the favorable, but, as I regard them, wild and squandering projects of gentlemen, are under consideration, they are profoundly silent as to that argument.

I come now to an examination of the terms on which the cession was made by the states, as contained in the deeds of cession. And I shall take that from Virginia, because it was, in some measure, the model deed, and because it conveyed by far the most important part of the public lands, acquired from the ceding states. I will first dispose of a preliminary difficulty, raised by the senator from New York. That senator imagined a case, and then combated it, with great force. The case he supposed was, that the senator from Massachusetts and I had maintained, that, under that deed, there was a reversion to the states; and much of his argument was directed to prove that there is no reversion, but that, if there were, it could only be to the ceding states. Now, neither the senator from Massachusetts, nor I, attempted to erect any such windmill, as the senator from New York has imagined; and he might have spared himself the heavy blows, which, like another famed hero, not less valorous than himself, he dealt upon it. What I really maintain, and have always maintained, is, that, according to the terms themselves, of the deed of cession, although there is conveyed a common property, to be held for the common benefit, there is, nevertheless, an assignment of a separate use. The ceded land, I admit, is to remain a common fund for all the states, to be administered by a common authority; but the proceeds, or profits, were to be appropriated to the states in severalty, according to a certain prescribed rule. I contend this is manifestly true, from the words of the deed. What are they? ‘That all the lands within the territory so ceded to the United States, and not reserved for or appropriated to any of the before-mentioned purposes, or disposed of in bounties to the officers and soldiers of the American army, shall be considered a common fund, for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall become members of the confederation, or federal alliance of the said states, Virginia inclusive, according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever.’

The territory conveyed was to be regarded as an inviolable fund, for the use and benefit of such states as were admitted, or might be admitted into the union, Virginia inclusive, according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure. It was to be faithfully and bona fide administered for that sole purpose, and for no other purpose whatever.

Where, then, is the authority for all those wild, extravagant, and unjust projects, by which, instead of administration of the ceded territory for all the states, and all the people of the union, it is to be granted to particular states, wasted in schemes of graduation and preëmption, for the benefit of the trespasser, the alien, and the speculator?

The senator from New York, pressed by the argument as to the application of the fund to the separate use of the states, deducible from the phrases in the deed, ‘Virginia inclusive,’ said, that they were necessary, because, without them, Virginia would have been entitled to no part of the ceded lands. No? Were they not ceded to the United States? was she not one of those states? and did not the grant to them include her? Why, then, were the words inserted? Can any other purpose be imagined, than that of securing to Virginia her separate or ‘respective’ proportion? The whole paragraph, cautiously and carefully composed, clearly demonstrates, that, although the fund was to be common, the title common, the administration common, the use and benefit were to be separate among the several states, in the defined proportions.

The grant was for the benefit of the states, ‘according to their usual respective proportions in the common charge and expenditure.’ Bear in mind the date of the deed; it was in 1784――before the adoption of the present constitution, and whilst the articles of confederation were in force. What, according to them, was the mode of assessing the quotas of the different states towards the common charge and expenditure? It was made upon the basis of the value of all the surveyed land, and the improvements in each state. Each state was assessed according to the aggregate value of surveyed land, and improvements within its limits. After that was ascertained, the process of assessment was this; suppose there were five millions of dollars required to be raised, for the use of the general government, and one million of that five were the proportion of Virginia; there would be an account stated on the books of the general government with the state of Virginia, in which she would be charged with that million. Then there would be an account kept for the proceeds of the sales of the public lands; and, if these amounted to five millions of dollars also, Virginia would be credited with one million, being her fair proportion; and thus the account would be balanced. It is unnecessary to pursue the process with all the other states; this is enough to show that, according to the original contemplation of the grant, the common fund was for the separate benefit of the states; and that, if there had been no change in the form of government, each would have been credited with its share of the proceeds of the public lands in its account with the general government. Is not this indisputable? But let me suppose that Virginia, or any other state, had said to the general government, ‘I choose to receive my share of the proceeds of the public lands into my separate treasury; pay it to me, and I will provide in some other mode more agreeable to me, for the payment of my assessed quota of the expenses of the general government;’ can it be doubted that such a demand would have been legitimate, and perfectly compatible with the deed of cession? Even under our present system, you will recollect, sir, that, during the last war, any state was allowed to assume the payment of its share of the direct tax, and raise it, according to its own pleasure or convenience, from its own people, instead of the general government’s collecting of it.

From the period of the adoption of the present constitution of the United States, the mode of raising revenue, for the expenses of the general government, has been changed. Instead of acting upon the states, and through them upon the people of the several states, in the form of assessed quotas or contributions, the general government now acts directly upon the people themselves, in the form of taxes, duties, or excises. Now, as the chief source of revenue raised by this government is from foreign imports, and as the consumer pays the duty, it is entirely impracticable to ascertain how much of the common charge and general expenditure is contributed by any one state to the union.

By the deed of cession, a great and a sacred trust was created. The general government was the trustee, and the states were the _cestui que_ trust. According to the trust, the measure of benefit accruing to each state from the ceded lands, was to be the measure of burden which it bore in the general charge and expenditure. But, by the substitution of a new rule of raising revenue to that which was in contemplation at the time of the execution of the deed of cession, it has become impossible to adjust the exact proportion of burden and benefit with each other. The measure of burden is lost, although the subject remains, which was to be apportioned according to that measure. Who can now ascertain, whether any one of the states has received, or is receiving a benefit from the ceded lands, proportionate to its burden in the general government? Who can know that we are not daily violating the rule of apportionment prescribed by the deed of cession? To me, it appears clear, that, either from the epoch of the establishment of the present constitution, or certainly from that of the payment of the revolutionary debt, the proceeds of the public lands being no longer applied by the general government, according to that rule, they ought to have been transferred to the states, upon some equitable principle of division, conforming as nearly as possible to the spirit of the cessions. The trustee not being able, by the change of government, to execute the trust agreeably to the terms of the trust, ought to have done, and ought yet to do, that which a chancellor would decree, if he had jurisdiction of the case――make a division of the proceeds among the states, upon some rule, approximating as nearly as practicable to that of the trust. And what rule can so well fulfil this condition, as that which was introduced in the bill which I presented to the senate, and which is contained in my colleague’s amendment? That rule is founded on federal numbers, which are made up of all the inhabitants of the United States other than the slaves, and three fifths of them. The south, surely, should be the last section to object to a distribution founded on that rule. And yet, if I rightly understood one of the dark allusions of the senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) he has attempted to excite the jealousy of the north on that very ground. Be that as it may, I can conceive of no rule more equitable than that compound one, and I think that will be the judgment of all parts of the country, the objection of that senator notwithstanding. Although slaves are, in a limited proportion, one of the elements that enter into the rule, it will be recollected that they are both consumers and the objects of taxation.

It has been argued that since the fund was to be a common one, and its administration was to be by the general government, the fund ought to be used also by that government to the exclusion of the states separately. But that is a _non sequitur_. It may be a common fund, a common title, and a common or single administration; but is there any thing, in all that, incompatible with a periodical distribution of the profits of the fund among the parties for whose benefit the trust was created? What is the ordinary case of tenants in common? There the estate is common, the title is common, the defence against all attacks is common; but the profits of the estate go to the separate use of, and are enjoyed by, each tenant. Does it therefore cease to be an estate in common?

Again. There is another view. It has been argued, from the fact that the ceded lands in the hands of the trustee were for the common benefit, that that object could be no otherwise accomplished, than to use them in the disbursements of the general government; that the general government only must expend them. Now, I do not admit that. In point of fact, the general government would continue to collect and receive the fund, and as a trustee, would pay over to each state its distributive share.

The public domain would still remain in common. Then, as to the expenditure, there may be different modes of expenditure. One is, for the general government itself to disperse it, in payments to the civil list, the army, the navy, and so forth. Another is, by distributing it among the states, to constitute them so many agencies, through which the expenditure is effected. If the general government and the state governments were in two different countries, if they had entirely distinct and distant theatres of action, and operated upon different races of men, it would be another case; but here the two systems of government, although for different purposes, are among the same people, and the constituency of both of them is the same. The expenditure, whether made by the one government directly, or through the state governments as agencies, is all for the happiness and prosperity, the honor and the glory, of one and the same people.

The subject is susceptible of other illustrations, of which I will add one or two. Here is a fountain of water held in common by several neighbors living around it. It is a perennial fountain; deep, pure, copious, and salubrious. Does it cease to be common because some equal division is made by which the members of each adjacent family dip their vessels into it, and take out as much as they want? A tract of land is held in common by the inhabitants of a neighboring village. Does it cease to be a common property because each villager uses it for his particular beasts? A river is the common highroad of navigation to conterminous powers or states. Does it cease to be common because on its bosom are borne vessels bearing the stripes and the stars, or the British cross? These, and other examples which might be given, prove that the argument, on which so much reliance has been placed, is not well founded, that, because the public domain is held for the common benefit of the states, there can be no other just application of its proceeds than through the direct expenditures of the general government.

I might have avoided most of this consumption of time by following the bad example of quoting from my own productions; and I ask the senate to excuse one or two citations from the report I made in 1834, in answer to the veto message of president Jackson, as they present a condensed view of the argument which I have been urging. Speaking of the cession from Virginia, the report says:

‘This deed created a trust in the United States which they are
not at liberty to violate. But the deed does not require that
the fund should be disbursed in the payment of the expenses of
the general government. It makes no such provision in express
terms, nor is such a duty on the part of the trustee fairly
deducible from the language of the deed. On the contrary, the
language of the deed seems to contemplate a separate use and
enjoyment of the fund by the states individually, rather than
a preservation of it for common expenditure. The fund itself
is to be a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the
United States as have become, or shall become members of the
confederation or federal alliance, Virginia inclusive. The grant
is not for the benefit of the confederation, but for that of
the several states which compose the confederation. The fund is
to be under the management of the confederation collectively,
and is so far a common fund; but it is to be managed for the
use and benefit of the states individually, and is so far a
separate fund under a joint management. Whilst there was a heavy
debt existing, created by the war of the revolution, and by a
subsequent war, there was a fitness in applying the proceeds
of a common fund to the discharge of a common debt, which
reconciled all; but the debt being now discharged, and the
general government no longer standing in need of the fund,
there is evident propriety in a division of it among those for
whose use and benefit it was originally designed, and whose
wants require it. And the committee cannot conceive how this
appropriation of it, upon principles of equality and justice
among the several states, can be regarded as contrary to either
the letter or spirit of the deed.’

The senator from New York, assuming that the whole debt of the revolution has not yet been paid by the proceeds of the public lands, insists that we should continue to retain the avails of them until a reimbursement shall have been effected of all that has been applied to that object. But the public lands were never set apart or relied upon as the exclusive resource for the payment of the revolutionary debt. To give confidence to public creditors, and credit to the government, they were pledged to that object, along with other means applicable to its discharge. The debt is paid, and the pledge of the public lands has performed its office. And who paid what the lands did not? Was it not the people of the United States?――those very people to whose use, under the guardianship of their states, it is now proposed to dedicate the proceeds of the public lands? If the money had been paid by a foreign government, the proceeds of the public lands, in honor and good faith, would have been bound to reimburse it. But our revolutionary debt, if not wholly paid by the public lands, was otherwise paid out of the pockets of the people who own the lands; and if money has been drawn from their pockets for a purpose to which these lands were destined, it creates an additional obligation upon congress to replace the amount so abstracted, by distributing the proceeds among the states for the benefit and the reimbursement of the people.

But the senator from New York has exhibited a most formidable account against the public domain, tending to show, if it be correct, that what has been heretofore regarded, at home and abroad, as a source of great national wealth, has been a constant charge upon the treasury, and a great loss to the country. The credit side, according to his statement, was, I believe, one hundred and twenty millions, but the debit side was much larger.

It is scarcely necessary to remark, that it is easy to state an account presenting a balance on the one side or the other, as may suit the taste or views of the person making it up. This may be done by making charges that have no foundation, or omitting credits that ought to be allowed, or by both. The most certain operation is the latter, and the senator, who is a pretty thoroughgoing gentleman, has adopted it.