Chapter I: FEEL myself called on, by the sentiment just expressed, to return my (1)

thanks, in behalf of my colleagues and myself. I do not, and am quite sure they do not, feel, that, in the service alluded to, they are at all entitled to the compliment which has been paid them. We could not do otherwise than reject the demand made by the other party; and if our labors finally terminated in an honorable peace, it was owing to causes on this side of the Atlantic, and not to any exertion of ours. Whatever diversity of opinion may have existed as to the declaration of the war, there are some points on which all may look back with proud satisfaction. The first relates to the time of the conclusion of the peace. Had it been made immediately after the treaty of Paris, we should have retired humiliated from the contest, believing that we had escaped the severe chastisement with which we were threatened, and that we owed to the generosity and magnanimity of the enemy, what we were incapable of commanding by our arms. That magnanimity would have been the theme of every tongue, and of every press, abroad and at home. We should have retired, unconscious of our own strength, and unconscious of the utter inability of the enemy, with his whole undivided force, to make any serious impression upon us. Our military character, then in the lowest state of degradation, would have been unretrieved. Fortunately for us, Great Britain chose to try the issue of the last campaign. And the issue of the last campaign has demonstrated, in the repulse before Baltimore, the retreat from Plattsburgh, the hard-fought action on the Niagara frontier, and in that most glorious day, the eighth of January, that we have always possessed the finest elements of military composition, and that a proper use of them, only, was necessary, to insure for the army and militia a fame as imperishable as that which the navy had previously acquired.

Another point which appears to me to afford the highest consolation is, that we fought the most powerful nation, perhaps, in existence, single-handed and alone, without any sort of alliance. More than thirty years has Great Britain been maturing her physical means, which she had rendered as efficacious as possible, by skill, by discipline, and by actual service. Proudly boasting of the conquest of Europe, she vainly flattered herself with the easy conquest of America also. Her veterans were put to flight or defeated, while all Europe――I mean the governments of Europe――was gazing with cold indifference, or sentiments of positive hatred of us, upon the arduous contest. Hereafter no monarch can assert claims of gratitude upon us, for assistance rendered in the hour of danger.

There is another view of which the subject of the war is fairly susceptible. From the moment that Great Britain came forward at Ghent with her extravagant demands, the war totally changed its character. It became, as it were, a new war. It was no longer an American war, prosecuted for redress of British aggressions upon American rights, but became a British war, prosecuted for objects of British ambition, to be accompanied by American sacrifices. And what were those demands? Here, in the immediate neighborhood of a sister state and territories, which were to be made in part the victims, they must have been felt, and their enormity justly appreciated. They consisted of the erection of a barrier between Canada and the United States, to be formed by cutting off from Ohio and some of the territories a country more extensive than Great Britain, containing thousands of freemen, who were to be abandoned to their fate, and creating a new power, totally unknown upon the continent of America; of the dismantling of our fortresses, and naval power on the lakes, with the surrender of the military occupation of those waters to the enemy, and of an _arrondissement_ for two British provinces. These demands, boldly asserted, and one of them declared to be a _sine qua non_, were finally relinquished. Taking this view of the subject, if there be loss of reputation by either party, in the terms of peace, who has sustained it?

The effects of the war are highly satisfactory. Abroad, our character, which at the time of its declaration was in the lowest state of degradation, is raised to the highest point of elevation. It is impossible for any American to visit Europe, without being sensible of this agreeable change, in the personal attentions which he receives, in the praises which are bestowed on our past exertions, and the predictions which are made as to our future prospects. At home, a government, which, at its formation, was apprehended by its best friends, and pronounced by its enemies to be incapable of standing the shock, is found to answer all the purposes of its institution. In spite of the errors which have been committed (and errors have undoubtedly been committed), aided by the spirit and patriotism of the people, it is demonstrated to be as competent to the objects of effective war, as it has been before proved to be to the concerns of a season of peace. Government has thus acquired strength and confidence. Our prospects for the future, are of the brightest kind. With every reason to count on the permanence of peace, it remains only for the government to determine upon military and naval establishments adapted to the growth and extension of our country and its rising importance, keeping in view a gradual but not burdensome increase of the navy; to provide for the payment of the interest, and the redemption of the public debt, and for the current expenses of government. For all these objects, the existing sources of the revenue promise not only to be abundantly sufficient, but will probably leave ample scope to the exercise of the judgment of congress, in selecting for repeal, modification, or abolition, those which may be found most oppressive, inconvenient, or unproductive.

[The eighteenth and last toast was, ‘our guest, HENRY CLAY. We
welcome his return to that country, whose rights and interests
he has so ably maintained, at home and abroad.’]

My friends, I must again thank you for your kind and affectionate attention. My reception has been more like that of a brother, than a common friend or acquaintance, and I am utterly incapable of finding words to express my gratitude. My situation is like that of a Swedish gentleman, at a dinner given in England, by the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress. A toast having been given complimentary to his country, it was expected, as is usual on such occasions, that he would rise and address the company. The gentleman, not understanding the English language, rose under great embarrassment, and said, ‘sir, I wish you to consider me _A Foreigner in Distress_.’ I wish you, gentlemen, to consider me a _Friend_ in distress.

ON THE UNITED STATES BANK QUESTION.

ADDRESS TO HIS CONSTITUENTS AT LEXINGTON, JUNE 3, 1816

[MR. CLAY here explains to the electors of the congressional
district of Kentucky which he represented, the grounds of his
change of opinion on the subject of a national bank. We have
seen, by his speech delivered in the senate of the United States,
in 1811, that he had opposed the renewal of the charter of
the first bank of the United States, and now, in 1816, he had
advocated the bill brought in by Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina,
for incorporating a similar institution, which bill passed both
houses of congress, and received the signature of president
Madison.[7] A perusal of the following address will, it is
believed, satisfy all candid persons of the sincerity and
patriotism of Mr. Clay, on both occasions. As one of his
biographers remarks, ‘there is no other instance, in the whole
history of his life, where he has changed his opinions, on an
important subject. His ingenuousness is evinced by his having
changed _once_, but his firmness by his having done so _but_
once. And what was it that wrought this single revolution in his
sentiments? A mighty event, whose consequences could be learned
only from experience――the occurrence of a war with Great Britain,
which changed, not only his views of the policy of a bank, but
those of almost every other leading politician in the country.’]

ON one subject, that of the bank of the United States, to which at the late session of congress he gave his humble support, Mr. Clay felt particularly anxious to explain the grounds on which he had acted. This explanation, if not due to his own character, the state, and the district to which he belonged, had a right to demand. It would have been unnecessary, if his observations, addressed to the house of representatives, pending the measure, had been published; but they were not published, and why they were not published he was unadvised.

When he was a member of the senate of the United States, he was induced to oppose the renewal of the charter to the old bank of the United States by three general considerations. The first was, that he was instructed to oppose it by the legislature of the state. What were the reasons that operated with the legislature, in giving the instruction, he did not know. He has understood from members of that body, at the time it was given, that a clause, declaring that congress had no power to grant the charter, was stricken out; from which it might be inferred, either that the legislature did not believe a bank to be unconstitutional, or that it had formed no opinion on that point. This inference derives additional strength from the fact, that, although the two late senators from this state, as well as the present senators, voted for a national bank, the legislature, which must have been well apprized that such a measure was in contemplation, did not again interpose, either to protest against the measure itself, or to censure the conduct of those senators. From this silence on the part of a body which has ever fixed a watchful eye upon the proceedings of the general government, he had a right to believe, that the legislature of Kentucky saw, without dissatisfaction, the proposal to establish a national bank; and that its opposition to the former one was upon grounds of expediency, applicable to that corporation alone, or no longer existing. But when, at the last session, the question came up as to the establishment of a national bank, being a member of the house of representatives, the point of inquiry with him, was, not so much what was the opinion of the legislature, although undoubtedly the opinion of a body so respectable would have great weight with him under any circumstances, as, what were the sentiments of his immediate constituents. These he believed to be in favor of such an institution, from the following circumstances. In the first place, his predecessor (Mr. Hawkins) voted for a national bank, without the slightest murmur of discontent. Secondly, during the last fall, when he was in his district, he conversed freely with many of his constituents upon that subject, then the most common topic of conversation, and all, without a single exception, as far as he recollected, agreed that it was a desirable if not the only efficient remedy for the alarming evils in the currency of the country. And, lastly, during the session, he received many letters from his constituents, prior to the passage of the bill, all of which concurred, he believed without a solitary exception, in advising the measure. So far then from being instructed by his district to oppose the bank, he had what was perhaps tantamount to an instruction to support it――the acquiescence of his constituents in the vote of their former representative, and the communications, oral and written, of the opinions of many of them in favor of a bank.

The next consideration which induced him to oppose the renewal of the old charter, was, that he believed the corporation had, during a portion of the period of its existence, abused its powers, and had sought to subserve the views of a political party. Instances of its oppression, for that purpose, were asserted to have occurred at Philadelphia and at Charleston; and, although denied in congress by the friends of the institution, during the discussions on the application for the renewal of the charter, they were, in his judgment, satisfactorily made out. This oppression, indeed, was admitted in the house of representatives, in the debate on the present bank, by a distinguished member of that party which had so warmly espoused the renewal of the old charter. It may be said, what security is there, that the new bank will not imitate this example of oppression? He answered, the fate of the old bank, warning all similar institutions to shun politics, with which they ought not to have any concern; the existence of abundant competition, arising from the great multiplication of banks; and the precautions which are to be found in the details of the present bill.

A third consideration upon which he acted in 1811, was, that as the power to create a corporation, such as was proposed to be continued, was not specifically granted in the constitution, and did not then appear to him to be necessary to carry into effect any of the powers which were specifically granted, congress was not authorized to continue the bank. The constitution, he said, contained powers delegated and prohibitory, powers expressed and constructive. It vests in congress all powers _necessary_ to give effect to the enumerated powers――all that may be necessary to put into motion and activity the machine of government which it constructs. The powers that may be so necessary are deducible by construction. They are not defined in the constitution. They are, from their nature, indefinable. When the question is in relation to one of these powers, the point of inquiry should be, is its exertion necessary to carry into effect any of the enumerated powers and objects of the general government? With regard to the _degree_ of necessity, various rules have been, at different times, laid down; but, perhaps, at last, there is no other than a sound and honest judgment exercised, under the checks and control which belong to the constitution and to the people.

The constructive powers being auxiliary to the specifically granted powers, and depending for their sanction and existence upon a necessity to give effect to the latter, which necessity is to be sought for and ascertained by a sound and honest discretion, it is manifest that this necessity may not be perceived, at one time, under one state of things, when it is perceived at another time, under a different state of things. The constitution, it is true, never changes; it is always the same; but the force of circumstances and the lights of experience may evolve to the fallible persons charged with its administration, the fitness and necessity of a particular exercise of constructive power to-day, which they did not see at a former period.

Mr. Clay proceeded to remark, that when the application was made to renew the old charter of the bank of the United States, such an institution did not appear to him to be so necessary to the fulfilment of any of the objects specifically enumerated in the constitution, as to justify congress in assuming, by construction, a power to establish it. It was supported mainly upon the ground that it was indispensable to the treasury operations. But the local institutions in the several states were at that time in prosperous existence, confided in by the community, having a confidence in each other, and maintaining an intercourse and connection the most intimate. Many of them were actually employed by the treasury to aid that department, in a part of its fiscal arrangements; and they appeared to him to be fully capable of affording to it all the facility that it ought to desire in all of them. They superseded, in his judgment, the necessity of a national institution. But how stood the case in 1816, when he was called upon again to examine the power of the general government to incorporate a national bank? A total change of circumstances was presented; events of the utmost magnitude had intervened.

A general suspension of specie payments had taken place, and this had led to a train of consequences of the most alarming nature. He beheld, dispersed over the immense extent of the United States, about three hundred banking institutions, enjoying in different degrees the confidence of the public, shaken as to them all, under no direct control of the general government, and subject to no actual responsibility to the state authorities. These institutions were emitting the actual currency of the United States; a currency consisting of a paper, on which they neither paid interest nor principal, whilst it was exchanged for the paper of the community, on which both were paid. He saw these institutions in fact exercising what had been considered, at all times and in all countries, one of the highest attributes of sovereignty, the regulation of the current medium of the country. They were no longer competent to assist the treasury in either of the great operations of collection, deposit, or distribution, of the public revenues. In fact, the paper which they emitted, and which the treasury, from the force of events, found itself constrained to receive, was constantly obstructing the operations of that department. For it would accumulate where it was not wanted, and could not be used where it was wanted for the purposes of government, without a ruinous and arbitrary brokerage. Every man who paid or received from the government, paid or received as much less than he ought to have done as was the difference between the medium in which the payment was effected and specie. Taxes were no longer uniform. In New England, where specie payments have not been suspended, the people were called upon to pay larger contributions than where they were suspended. In Kentucky as much more was paid by the people in their taxes than was paid, for example, in the state of Ohio, as Kentucky paper was worth more than Ohio paper.

It appeared to Mr. Clay, that, in this condition of things, the general government could depend no longer upon these local institutions, multiplied and multiplying daily; coming into existence by the breath of eighteen state sovereignties, some of which by a single act of volition had created twenty or thirty at a time. Even if the resumption of specie payments could have been anticipated, the general government remaining passive, it did not seem to him that the general government ought longer to depend upon these local institutions exclusively for aid in its operations. But he did not believe it could be justly so anticipated. It was not the interest of all of them that the renewal of specie payments should take place, and yet, without concert between all or most of them it could not be effected. With regard to those disposed to return to a regular state of things, great difficulties might arise, as to the time of its commencement.

Considering, then, that the state of the currency was such that no thinking man could contemplate it without the most serious alarm; that it threatened general distress, if it did not ultimately lead to convulsion and subversion of the government; it appeared to him to be the duty of congress to apply a remedy, if a remedy could be devised. A national bank, with other auxiliary measures, was proposed as that remedy. Mr. Clay said, he determined to examine the question with as little prejudice as possible arising from his former opinion. He knew that the safest course to him, if he pursued a cold, calculating prudence, was to adhere to that opinion, right or wrong. He was perfectly aware, that if he changed, or seemed to change it, he should expose himself to some censure. But, looking at the subject with the light shed upon it by events happening since the commencement of the war, he could no longer doubt. A bank appeared to him not only necessary, but indispensably necessary, in connection with another measure, to remedy the evils of which all were but too sensible. He preferred to the suggestions of the pride of consistency, the evident interests of the community, and determined to throw himself upon their candor and justice. That which appeared to him in 1811, under the state of things then existing, not to be necessary to the general government, seemed now to be necessary, under the present state of things. Had he then foreseen what now exists, and no objection had lain against the renewal of the charter other than that derived from the constitution, he should have voted for the renewal.

Other provisions of the constitution, but little noticed, if noticed at all, on the discussions in congress in 1811, would seem to urge that body to exert all its powers to restore to a sound state the money of the country. That instrument confers upon congress the power to coin money, and to regulate the value of foreign coins; and the states are prohibited to coin money, to emit bills of credit, or to make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. The plain inference is, that the subject of the general currency was intended to be submitted exclusively to the general government. In point of fact, however, the regulation of the general currency is in the hands of the state governments, or, which is the same thing, of the banks created by them. Their paper has every quality of money, except that of being made a tender, and even this is imparted to it by some states, in the law by which a creditor must receive it, or submit to a ruinous suspension of the payment of his debt. It was incumbent upon congress to recover the control which it had lost over the general currency. The remedy called for, was one of caution and moderation, but of firmness. Whether a remedy directly acting upon the banks and their paper thrown into circulation, was in the power of the general government or not, neither congress nor the community were prepared for the application of such a remedy. An indirect remedy, of a milder character, seemed to be furnished by a national bank. Going into operation, with the powerful aid of the treasury of the United States, he believed it would be highly instrumental in the renewal of specie payments. Coupled with the other measure adopted by congress for that object, he believed the remedy effectual. The local banks must follow the example which the national bank would set them, of redeeming their notes by the payment of specie, or their notes will be discredited and put down.

If the constitution, then, warranted the establishment of a bank, other considerations, besides those already mentioned, strongly urged it. The want of a general medium is every where felt. Exchange varies continually, not only between different parts of the union, but between different parts of the same city. If the paper of a national bank were not redeemed in specie, it would be much better than the current paper, since, although its value in comparison with specie might fluctuate, it would afford an uniform standard.

If political power be incidental to banking corporations, there ought, perhaps, to be in the general government some counterpoise to that which is exerted by the states. Such a counterpoise might not indeed be so necessary, if the states exercised the power to incorporate banks equally, or in proportion to their respective populations. But that is not the case. A single state has a banking capital equivalent, or nearly so, to one-fifth of the whole banking capital of the United States. Four states combined, have the major part of the banking capital of the United States. In the event of any convulsion, in which the distribution of banking institutions might be important, it may be urged, that the mischief would not be alleviated by the creation of a national bank, since its location must be within one of the states. But in this respect the location of the bank is extremely favorable, being in one of the middle states, not likely from its position, as well as its loyalty, to concur in any scheme for subverting the government. And a sufficient security against such contingency is to be found in the distribution of branches in different states, acting and reacting upon the parent institution, and upon each other.

ON THE DIRECT TAX,

AND THE STATE OF THE NATION AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE WAR
WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY, 1816.

[IN this speech, which was made in committee of the whole, on
a proposition to lay a direct tax for the purpose of providing
for the interest on the public debt, and for other objects, as
expressed in the report of the committee of ways and means, Mr.
Clay enters into a general view of the state of public affairs,
as they existed at the conclusion of the war with Great Britain.
His defence of the policy of the war, and of the treaty of peace
concluded by himself and the other commissioners at Ghent, will
be found interesting and valuable, as a portion of our national
history. On the present occasion, it will be observed, Mr. Clay
first boldly avows his sympathies for the cause of the patriots
of South America; thus shadowing forth, at this early period,
the feelings which prompted him, in 1818, to propose, in a
definite form, the recognition of their independence. This
speech concludes with a masterly, although rapid, sketch of
the true policy of the country, in which are seen the outlines
of the _American system_, a subject always prominent in the
thoughts of this statesman.]

MR. CLAY (speaker) said, the course had been pursued, ever since he had had the honor of a seat on this floor, to select some subject during the early part of the session, on which, by a general understanding, gentlemen were allowed to indulge themselves in remarks on the existing state of public affairs. The practice was a very good one, he said, and there could be no occasion more proper than that of a proposition to lay a direct tax.

Those who have for fifteen years past administered the affairs of this government, have conducted this nation to an honorable point of elevation, at which they may justly pause, challenge a retrospect, and invite attention to the bright field of prosperity which lies before us.

The great objects of the committee of finance, in the report under consideration, are, in the first place, to provide for the payment of the public debts, and in the second, to provide for the support of the government, and the payment of such expenses as should be authorized by congress. The greater part of the debt, Mr. Clay admitted, had grown out of the late war; yet a considerable portion of it consisted of that contracted in the former war for independence, and a portion of it, perhaps, of that which arose out of the wars with Tripoli and Algiers. Gentlemen had, on this occasion, therefore, fairly a right to examine into the course of administration heretofore, to demonstrate the impolicy of those wars, and the injudiciousness of the public expenditures generally. In the cursory view which he should take of this subject, he must be allowed to say, he should pay no particular attention to what had passed before, in debate. An honorable colleague (Mr. Hardin) who spoke the other day, like another gentleman who preceded him in debate, had taken occasion to refer to his (Mr. Clay’s) late absence from this country on public business; but, Mr. Clay said, he trusted, among the fruits of that absence were a greater respect for the institutions which distinguish this happy country, a greater confidence in them, and an increased disposition to cling to them. Yes, sir; I was in the neighborhood of the battle of Waterloo, and some lessons I did derive from it; but they were lessons which satisfied me, that national independence was only to be maintained by national resistance against foreign encroachments; by cherishing the interests of the people, and giving to the whole physical power of the country an interest in the preservation of the nation. I have been taught that lesson; that we should never lose sight of the possibility, that a combination of despots, of men unfriendly to liberty, propagating what in their opinion constitutes the principle of legitimacy, might reach our happy land, and subject us to that tyranny and degradation which seems to be one of their objects in another country. The result of my reflections is, the determination to aid with my vote in providing my country with all the means to protect its liberties, and guard them even from serious menace. Motives of delicacy, which the committee would be able to understand and appreciate, prevented him from noticing some of his colleague’s (Mr. Hardin’s) remarks; but he would take the occasion to give him one admonition――that, when he next favored the house with an exhibition of his talent for wit――with a display of those elegant implements, for his possession of which, the gentleman from Virginia had so handsomely complimented him――that he would recollect that it is _bought_, and not _borrowed_ wit, which the adage recommends as best. With regard to the late war with Great Britain, history, in deciding upon the justice and policy of that war, will determine the question according to the state of things which existed when that war was declared. I gave a vote for the declaration of war. I exerted all the little influence and talents I could command to make the war. The war was made; it is terminated; and I declare with perfect sincerity, if it had been permitted me to lift the veil of futurity, and to have foreseen the precise series of events which has occurred, my vote would have been unchanged. The policy of the war, as it regarded our state of preparation, must be determined with reference to the state of things at the time that war was declared. He need not take up the time of the house, in demonstrating that we had cause sufficient for war. We had been insulted and outraged, and spoilated upon by almost all Europe――by Great Britain, by France, Spain, Denmark, Naples, and, to cap the climax, by the little, contemptible power of Algiers. We had submitted too long and too much. We had become the scorn of foreign powers, and the contempt of our own citizens. The question of the policy of declaring war at the particular time when it was commenced, is best determined by applying to the enemy himself; and what said _he!_――that of all the circumstances attending its declaration, none was so aggravating as that we should have selected the moment which of all others was most inconvenient to him; when he was struggling for self-existence in a last effort against the gigantic power of France. The question of the state of preparation for war at any time is a relative question――relative to our own means, the condition of the other power, and the state of the world at the time of declaring it. We could not expect, for instance, that a war against Algiers would require the same means or extent of preparation, as a war against Great Britain; and if it was to be waged against one of the primary powers of Europe, at peace with all the rest of the world, and therefore all her force at command, it could not be commenced with so little preparation, as if her whole force were employed in another quarter. It is not necessary again to repel the stale, ridiculous, false story of French influence, originating in Great Britain, and echoed here. I now contend, as I have always done, that we had a right to take advantage of the condition of the world, at the time war was declared. If Great Britain were engaged in war, we had a right to act on the knowledge of the fact, that her means of annoyance, as to us, were diminished; and we had a right to obtain all the collateral aid we could, from the operations of other powers against her, without entering into those connections which are forbidden by the genius of our government. But it was rather like disturbing the ashes of the dead, now to discuss the questions of the justice or expediency of the war. They were questions long since settled, and on which the public opinion was decisively made up, in favor of the administration.

He proceeded to examine the conditions of the peace and the fruits of the war――questions of more recent date, and more immediately applicable to the present discussion. The terms of the peace must be determined by the same rule that was applicable to the declaration of war――that rule which was furnished by the state of the world at the time the peace was made; and, even if it were true, that all the sanguine expectations which might have been formed at the time of the declaration of war, were not realized by the terms of the subsequent peace, it did not follow that the war was improperly declared, or the peace dishonorable, unless the condition of the parties, in relation to other powers, remained substantially the same, throughout the struggle, and at the time of the termination of the war, as it was at the commencement of it. At the termination of the war, France was annihilated――blotted out of the map of Europe; the vast power wielded by Bonaparte existed no longer. Let it be admitted, that statesmen, in laying their course, are to look at probable events; that their conduct is to be examined, with reference to the course of events, which in all human probability might have been anticipated; and is there a man in this house, in existence, who can say, that on the eighteenth day of June, 1812, when the war was declared, it would have been anticipated, that Great Britain, by the circumstance of a general peace, resulting from the overthrow of a power whose basements were supposed to be deeper laid, more ramified, and more extended, than those of any power ever were before, would be placed in the attitude in which she stood in December, 1814? Would any one say, that this government could have anticipated such a state of things, and ought to have been governed in its conduct accordingly? Great Britain, Russia, Germany, did not expect――not a power in Europe believed――as late even as January, 1814, that, in the ensuing March, Bonaparte would abdicate, and the restoration of the Bourbons would follow. What, then, was the actual condition of Europe, when peace was concluded? A perfect tranquillity reigned throughout; for, as late as the first of March, the idea of Napoleon’s reappearing in France, was as little entertained as that of a man’s coming from the moon to take upon himself the government of the country. In December, 1814, a profound and apparently a permanent peace existed; Great Britain was left to dispose of the vast force, the accumulation of twenty-five years, the work of an immense system of finance and protracted war; she was at liberty to employ that undivided force against this country. Under such circumstances, it did not follow, according to the rules laid down, either that the war ought not to have been made, or that peace on such terms ought not to have been concluded.

What, then, were the terms of the peace? The regular opposition in this country, the gentlemen on the other side of the house, had not come out to challenge an investigation of the terms of the peace, although they had several times given a sidewipe at the treaty, on occasions with which it had no necessary connection. It had been sometimes said, that we had gained nothing by the war, that the fisheries were lost, &c. How, he asked, did this question of the fisheries really stand? By the first part of the third article of the treaty of 1783, the right was recognized in the people of the United States to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the gulf of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea, where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time to fish. This right was a necessary incident to our sovereignty, although it is denied to some of the powers of Europe. It was not contested at Ghent; it has never been drawn in question by Great Britain. But by the same third article it was further stipulated, that the inhabitants of the United States shall have ‘liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island), and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks, of all other of his Britannic majesty’s dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen islands, and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.’ The British commissioners, assuming that these liberties had expired by the war between the two countries, at an early period of the negotiation, declared that they would not be revived without an equivalent. Whether the treaty of 1783 does not form an exception to the general rule, according to which treaties are vacated by a war breaking out between the parties, is a question on which he did not mean to express an opinion. The first article of that treaty, by which the king of Great Britain acknowledges the sovereignty of the United States, certainly was not abrogated by the war; that all the other parts of the same instrument, which define the limits, privileges, and liberties attaching to that sovereignty, were equally unaffected by the war, might be contended for with at least much plausibility. If we determined to offer them the equivalent required, the question was, what should it be? When the British commissioners demanded, in their _projet_, a renewal to Great Britain of the right to the navigation of the Mississippi, secured by the treaty of 1783, a bare majority of the American commissioners offered to renew it, upon the condition that the liberties in question were renewed to us. He was not one of that majority. He would not trouble the committee with his reasons for being opposed to the offer. A majority of his colleagues, actuated he believed by the best motives, made, however, the offer, and it was refused by the British commissioners.

If the British interpretation of the treaty of 1783 be correct, we have lost the liberties in question. What the value of them really is, he had not been able to meet with any two gentlemen who agreed. The great value of the whole mass of our fishery interests, as connected with our navigation and trade, was sufficiently demonstrated by the tonnage employed; but of what was the relative importance of these liberties, there was great contrariety of statements. They were liberties to be exercised within a foreign jurisdiction, and some of them were liable to be destroyed by the contingency of settlement. He did not believe, that much importance attached to such liberties. And, supposing them to be lost, we are, perhaps, sufficiently indemnified by the redemption of the British mortgage upon the navigation of the Mississippi. This great stream, on that supposition, is placed where it ought to be, in the same independent condition with the Hudson, or any other river in the United States.

If, on the contrary, the opposite construction of the treaty of 1783 be the true one, these liberties remain to us, and the right to the navigation of the Mississippi, as secured to Great Britain by that instrument, continues with her.

But he was surprised to hear a gentleman from the western country (Mr. Hardin) exclaim, that we had gained nothing by the war. Great Britain acquired, by the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, the right to trade with the Indians within our territories. It was a right upon which she placed great value, and from the pursuit of which she did not desist without great reluctance. It had been exercised by her agents in a manner to excite the greatest sensibility in the western country. This right was clearly lost by the war; for, whatever may be the true opinion as to the treaty of 1783, there can be no doubt that the stipulations of that of 1794 no longer exist.

It had been said, that the great object, in the continuation of the war, had been to secure our mariners against impressment, and that peace was made without accomplishing it. With regard to the opposition, he presumed that they would not urge any such argument. For, if their opinion was to be inferred (though he hoped in this case it was not) from that of an influential and distinguished member of the opposition, we had reason to believe that they did not think the British doctrines wrong on this subject. He alluded to a letter said to be written by a gentleman of great consideration, residing in an adjoining state, to a member of this house, in which the writer states, that he conceives the British claim to be right, and expresses his hope that the president, however he might kick at it, would be compelled to swallow the bitter pill. If the peace had really given up the American doctrine, it would have been, according to that opinion, merely yielding to the force of the British right. In that view of the subject, the error of the administration would have been in contending for too much in behalf of this country; for he presumed there was no doubt, that, whether right or wrong, it would be an important principle gained to secure our seamen against British impressment. And he trusted in God that all future administrations would rather err on the side of contending for too much than too little for America.

But he was willing to admit, that the conduct of the administration ought to be tried by their own opinions, and not those of the opposition. One of the great causes of the war, and of its continuance, was the practice of impressment exercised by Great Britain, and if this claim has been admitted, by necessary implication or express stipulation, the administration has abandoned the rights of our seamen. It was with utter astonishment that he heard, that it had been contended in this country, that because our right of exemption from the practice had not been expressly secured in the treaty, it was therefore given up! It was impossible that such an argument could be advanced on the floor. No member who regarded his reputation would have dared advance such an argument here.

Had the war terminated, the practice continuing, he admitted that such might be a fair inference; and on some former occasion he had laid down the principle, which he thought correct, that if the United States did not make peace with Great Britain, the war in Europe continuing, and therefore she continuing the exercise of the practice, without any stipulation to secure us against its effects, the plain inference would be, that we had surrendered the right. But what is the fact? At the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace, Great Britain had ceased the practice of impressment; she was not only at peace with all the powers of Europe, but there was every prospect of a permanent and durable peace. The treaty being silent on the subject of impressment, the only plain rational result was, that neither party had conceded its rights, but they were left totally unaffected by it. He recollected to have heard, in the British house of commons, whilst he was in Europe, the very reverse of the doctrine advanced here on this subject. The British ministry were charged by a member of the opposition with having surrendered their right of impressment, and the same course of reasoning was employed to prove it, as he understood was employed in this country to prove our acquiescence in that practice. The argument was this: the war was made on the professed ground of resistance of the practice of impressment; the peace having been made without a recognition of the right of America, the treaty being silent on the subject, the inference was, that the British authorities had surrendered the right――that they had failed to secure it, and, having done so, had in effect yielded it. The member of the opposition in England was just as wrong as any member of the house would be, who should contend that the right of impressment is surrendered to the British government. The fact, was, neither party had surrendered its rights; things remain as though the war had never been made――both parties are in possession of all the rights they had anterior to the war. Lest it might be deduced that his sentiments on the subject of impressment had undergone a change, he took the opportunity to say, that, although he desired to preserve peace between Great Britain and the United States, and to maintain between them that good understanding calculated to promote the interest of each, yet, whenever Great Britain should give satisfactory evidence of her design to apply her doctrine of impressment as heretofore, he was, for one, ready to take up arms again to oppose her. The fact was, that the two nations had been placed in a state of hostility as to a practice growing out of the war in Europe. The war ceasing between Great Britain and the rest of Europe, left England and America engaged in a contest on an aggression which had also practically ceased. The question had then presented itself, whether the United States should be kept in war, to gain an abandonment of what had become a mere abstract principle; or, looking at the results, and relying on the good sense and sound discretion of both countries, we should not recommend the termination of the war. When no practical evil could result from the suspension of hostilities, and there was no more than a possibility of the removal of the practice of impressment, I, as one of the mission, consented with sincere pleasure to the peace, satisfied that we gave up no right, sacrificed no honor, compromited no important principle. He said, then, applying the rule of the actual state of things, as that by which to judge of the peace, there was nothing in the conditions or terms of the peace that was dishonorable, nothing for reproach, nothing for regret.

Gentlemen have complained, that we had lost the islands in the bay of Passamaquoddy. Have they examined into that question, and do they know the grounds on which it stands? Prior to the war we occupied Moose Island, the British Grand Menan. Each party claimed both islands; America, because they are within the limits of the United States, as defined by the treaty of 1783; and Great Britain, because, as she alleges, they were in the exception contained in the second article of that treaty as to islands within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia. All the information which he had received concurred in representing Grand Menan as the most valuable island. Does the treaty, in stipulating for an amicable and equitable mode of settling this controversy, yield one foot of the territory of the United States? If our title to Moose Island is drawn in question, that of Great Britain to Grand Menan is equally so. If we may lose the one, she may the other. The treaty, it was true, contained a provision that the party in possession, at the time of its ratification, may hold on until the question of right is decided. The committee would observe, that this stipulation, as to possession, was not limited to the moment of the signature, but looked to the period of the ratification of the treaty. The American commissioners had thought they might safely rely on the valor of Massachusetts, or the arms of the United States, to drive the invader from our soil; and had also hoped that we might obtain possession of Grand Menan. It is true, they have been disappointed in the successful application of the force of that state and of that of the union. But it is not true that we have parted with the right. It is fair to presume that Great Britain will, with good faith, coöperate in carrying the stipulations into effect; and she has, in fact, already promptly proceeded to the appointment of commissioners under the treaty.

What have we gained by the war? He had shown we had lost nothing in rights, territory, or honor; nothing for which we ought to have contended, according to the principles of the gentlemen on the other side, or according to our own. Have we gained nothing by the war? Let any man look at the degraded condition of this country before the war――the scorn of the universe, the contempt of ourselves――and tell me, if we have gained nothing by the war? What is our present situation? Respectability and character abroad; security and confidence at home. If we have not obtained, in the opinion of some, the full measure of retribution, our character and constitution are placed on a solid basis, never to be shaken. The glory acquired by our gallant tars, by our Jacksons and our Browns on the land, is that nothing? True, we have had our vicissitudes――that there were humiliating events which the patriot could not review without deep regret. But the great account, when it came to be balanced, thank God, would be found vastly in our favor. Is there a man, he asked, who would have obliterated from the proud pages of our history the brilliant achievements of Jackson, Brown, Scott, and the host of heroes on land and sea whom he would not enumerate? Is there a man who could not desire a participation in the national glory acquired by the war?――yes, national glory; which, however the expression may be condemned by some, must be cherished by every genuine patriot. What do I mean by national glory? Glory such as Hull, of the Constitution, Jackson, Lawrence, Perry, have acquired. And are gentlemen insensible to their deeds? to the value of them, in animating the country in the hour of peril hereafter? Did the battle of Thermopylæ preserve Greece but once? Whilst the Mississippi continues to bear the tributes of the Iron mountains and the Alleghany to her Delta and to the Gulf of Mexico, the eighth of January shall be remembered, and the glory of that day shall stimulate future patriots, and nerve the arms of unborn freemen, in driving the presumptuous invader from our country’s soil! Gentlemen may boast of their insensibility to feelings inspired by the contemplation of such events. But he would ask, does the recollection of Bunker’s hill, of Saratoga, of York-town, afford them no pleasure? Every act of noble sacrifice to the country――every instance of patriotic devotion to her cause――has its beneficial influence. A nation’s character is the sum of its splendid deeds. They constitute one common patrimony――the nation’s inheritance. They awe foreign powers. They arouse and animate our own people. Do gentlemen derive no pleasure from the recent transactions in the Mediterranean? Can they regard unmoved the honorable issue of a war, in support of our national rights, declared, prosecuted, and terminated by a treaty in which the enemy submitted to a carte blanche, in the short period of forty days? The days of chivalry are not gone. They have been revived in the person of commodore Decatur, who, in releasing from infidel bondage Christian captives――the subjects of a foreign power――and restoring them to their country and their friends, has placed himself beside the most renowned knights of former times. I love true glory. It is this sentiment which ought to be cherished; and in spite of cavils and sneers and attempts to put it down, it will finally conduct this nation to that height to which God and nature have destined it. Three wars, those who at present administer this government may say, and say with proud satisfaction, they have safely conducted us through. Two with powers, which, though otherwise contemptible, have laid almost all Europe under tribute――a tribute from which we are exonerated. The third, with one of the most gigantic powers that the world ever saw. These struggles have not been without their sacrifices, nor without their lessons. They have created, or rather greatly increased, the public debt. They have taught, that, to preserve the character we have established, preparation for war is necessary.