Chapter I: FEEL myself called on, by the sentiment just expressed, to return my (2)

The public debt exists. However contracted, the faith of the nation is pledged for its redemption. It can only be paid by providing an excess of revenue beyond expenditure, or by retrenchment. Did gentlemen contend that the results of the report were inaccurate――that the proceeds of the revenue would be greater, or the public expenses less, than the estimate? On these subjects, he believed it would be presumption in him, when the defence of the report was in such able hands (Mr. Lowndes’s), to attempt its vindication. Leaving the task to that gentleman, he should assume, for the present, its accuracy. He would lay down a general rule, from which there ought never to be a departure, without absolute necessity――that the expenses of the year ought to be met by the revenue of the year. If in time of war it were impossible to observe this rule, we ought, in time of peace, to provide for as speedy a discharge of the debt contracted in the preceding war as possible. This can only be done by an effective sinking fund, based upon an excess of revenue beyond expenditure, and a protraction of the period of peace. If in England the sinking fund had not fulfilled what was promised, it was because of a failure to provide such a revenue, and because the interests of peace in that country had been too few and too short. From the revolution to 1812, a period of one hundred and twenty-four years, there had been sixty-three years of war, and only sixty-one of peace; and there had been contracted £638,129,577 of debt, and discharged only £39,594,305. The national debt at the peace of Utrecht amounted to £52,681,076, and during the peace which followed, being twenty-seven years, from 1714 to 1740, there was discharged only £7,231,503. When the operations of our sinking fund were contrasted with those of Great Britain, they would be found to present the most gratifying results. Our public debt, existing on the first day of January, 1802, amounted to $78,754,568 70; and on the first of January, 1815, we had extinguished $33,873,463 98. Thus in thirteen years, one half the period of peace that followed the treaty of Utrecht, we had discharged more public debt than Great Britain did during that period. In twenty-six years she did not pay much more than a seventh of her debt. In thirteen years we paid more than a third of ours. If, then, a public debt, contracted in a manner, he trusted, satisfactory to the country, imposed upon us a duty to provide for its payment; if we were encouraged, by past experience, to persevere in the application of an effective sinking fund, he would again repeat, that the only alternatives were the adoption of a system of taxation producing the revenue estimated by the committee of ways and means, or by great retrenchment of the public expenses.

In what respect can a reduction of the public expenses be effected? Gentlemen who assailed the report on this ground have, by the indefinite nature of the attack, great advantage on their side. Instead of contenting themselves with crying out retrenchment! retrenchment! a theme always plausible, an object always proper, when the public interest will admit of it, let them point the attention of the house to some specified subject. If they really think a reduction of the army and navy, or either of them, be proper, let them lay a resolution upon the table to that effect. They had generally, it was true, singled out, in discussing this report, (and he had no objection to meet them in this way, though he thought the other the fairest course,) the military establishment. He was glad that the navy had fought itself into favor, and that no one appeared disposed to move its reduction or to oppose its gradual augmentation. But the ‘standing army’ is the great object of gentlemen’s apprehensions. And those who can bravely set at defiance hobgoblins, the creatures of their own fertile imaginations, are trembling for the liberties of the people, endangered by a standing army of ten thousand men. Those who can courageously vote against taxes, are alarmed for the safety of the constitution and the country, at such a force scattered over our extensive territory! This could not have been expected, at least in the honorable gentleman (Mr. Ross), who, if he had been storming a fort, could not have displayed more cool, collected courage than he did, when he declared, that he would show to Pennsylvania, that she had one faithful representative, bold and independent enough to vote against a tax!

He had happened, very incidentally, the other day, and in a manner which he had supposed could not attract particular attention, to state, that the general condition of the world admonished us to shape our measures with a view to the possible conflicts into which we might be drawn; and he said, he did not know when he should cease to witness the attacks made upon him in consequence of that general remark; when he should cease to hear the cry of ‘standing army,’ ‘national glory,’ &c. &c. From the tenor of gentlemen’s observations, it would seem as if, for the first time in the history of this government, it was now proposed, that a certain regular force should constitute a portion of the public defence. But from the administration of general Washington, down to this time, a regular force, a standing army (if gentlemen please), had existed, and the only question about it, at any time, had been, what should be the amount. Gentlemen themselves, who most loudly decry this establishment, did not propose an entire disbandment of it; and the question, ever with them, is, not whether a regular force be necessary, but whether a regular force of this or that amount be called for by the actual state of our affairs.

The question is not, on any side of the house, as to the nature, but the quantum of the force. He maintained the position, that, if there was the most profound peace that ever existed; if we had no fears from any quarter whatever; if all the world was in a state of the most profound and absolute repose; a regular force of ten thousand men was not too great for the purposes of this government. We knew too much, he said, of the vicissitudes of human affairs, and the uncertainty of all our calculations, not to know, that, even in the most profound tranquillity, some tempest may suddenly arise, and bring us into a state requiring the exertion of military force, which cannot be created in a moment, but requires time for its collection, organization, and discipline. When gentlemen talked of the force which was deemed sufficient some twenty years ago, what did they mean? That this force was not to be progressive? That the full grown man ought to wear the clothes and habits of his infancy? That the establishment maintained by this government, when its population amounted to four or five millions only, should be the standard by which our measures should be regulated, in all subsequent states of the country? If gentlemen meant this, as it seemed to him they did, he and they should not agree. He contended, that establishments ought to be commensurate with the actual state of the country, should grow with its growth, and keep pace with its progress. Look at that map (said he, pointing to the large map of the United States, which hangs in the hall of representatives)――at the vast extent of that country which stretches from the Lake of the Woods, in the northwest, to the Bay of Fundy, in the east. Look at the vast extent of our maritime coast; recollect we have Indians and powerful nations conterminous on the whole frontier; and that we know not at what moment the savage enemy, or Great Britain herself, may seek to make war with us. Ought the force of the country to be graduated by the scale of our exposure, or are we to be uninfluenced by the increase of our liability to war? Have we forgotten that the power of France, as a counterpoise to that of Great Britain, is annihilated――gone, never to rise again, I believe, under the weak, unhappy, and imbecile race who now sway her destinies? Any individual must, I think, come to the same conclusion with myself, who takes these considerations into view, and reflects on our growth, the state of our defence, the situation of the nations of the world, and above all, of that nation with whom we are most likely to come into collision――for it is in vain to conceal it; this country must have many a hard and desperate tug with Great Britain, let the two governments be administered how and by whom they may. That man must be blind to the indications of the future, who cannot see that we are destined to have war after war with Great Britain, until, if one of the two nations be not crushed, all grounds of collision shall have ceased between us. I repeat, if the condition of France were that of perfect repose, instead of that of a volcano, ready to burst out again with a desolating eruption; if with Spain our differences were settled; if the dreadful war raging in South America were terminated; if the marines of all the powers of Europe were resuscitated as they stood prior to the revolution of France; if there was universal repose, and profound tranquillity among all the nations of the earth; considering the actual growth of our country, in my judgment, the force of ten thousand men would not be too great for its exigences. Do gentlemen ask, if I rely on the regular force entirely for the defence of the country? I answer, it is for garrisoning and keeping in order our fortifications, for the preservation of the national arms, for something like a safe depository of military science and skill, to which we may recur in time of danger, that I desire to maintain an adequate regular force. I know, that in the hour of peril, our great reliance must be on the whole physical force of the country, and that no detachment of it can be exclusively depended on. History proves that no nation, not destitute of the military art, whose people were united in its defence, ever was conquered. It is true, that in countries where standing armies have been entirely relied on, the armies have been subdued, and the subjugation of the nation has been the consequence of it; but no example is to be found of a united people being conquered, who possessed an adequate degree of military knowledge. Look at the Grecian republics, struggling successfully against the overwhelming force of Persia; look more recently at Spain. I have great confidence in the militia, and I would go with my honorable colleague (Mr. M’Kee), whose views I know are honest, hand in hand, in arming, disciplining, and rendering effective, the militia; I am for providing the nation with every possible means of resistance. I ask my honorable colleague, after I have gone thus far with him, to go a step further with me, and let us retain the force we now have for the purposes I have already described. I ask gentlemen who propose to reduce the army, if they have examined in detail the number and extent of the posts and garrisons on our maritime and interior frontier? If they have not gone through this process of reasoning, how shall we arrive at the result that we can reduce the army with safety? There is not one of our forts adequately garrisoned at this moment; and there is nearly one fourth of them that have not one solitary man. I said the other day, that I would rather vote for the augmentation than the reduction of the army. When returning to my country from its foreign service, and looking at this question, it appeared to me that the maximum was twenty thousand, the minimum ten thousand of the force we ought to retain. And I again say, that rather than reduce I would vote to increase the present force.

A standing army had been deemed necessary, from the commencement of the government to the present time. The question was only as to the quantum of force; and not whether it should exist. No man who regards his political reputation, would place himself before the people, on a proposition for its absolute disbandment. He admitted a question as to quantum might be carried so far as to rise into a question of principle. If we were to propose to retain an army of thirty, or forty, or fifty thousand men, then truly the question would present itself, whether our rights were not in some danger from such a standing army; whether reliance was to be placed altogether on a standing army, or on that natural safe defence which, according to the habits of the country and the principles of our government, is considered the bulwark of our liberties. But, between five and ten thousand men, or any number under ten thousand, it could not be a question of principle; for, unless gentlemen were afraid of spectres, it was utterly impossible that any danger could be apprehended from ten thousand men, dispersed on a frontier of many thousand miles; here twenty or thirty, there an hundred; and the largest amount, at Detroit, not exceeding a thin regiment. And yet, brave gentlemen――gentlemen who are not alarmed at hobgoblins――who can intrepidly vote _even against taxes_――are alarmed by a force of this extent! What, he asked, was the amount of the army in the time of Mr. Jefferson――a time, the orthodoxy of which had been so ostentatiously proclaimed? It was true, when that gentleman came into power, it was with a determination to retrench, as far as practicable. Under the full influence of these notions, in 1802, the bold step of wholly disbanding the army, never was thought of. The military peace establishment was then fixed at about four thousand men. But, before Mr. Jefferson went out of power, what was done――that is, in April, 1808? In addition to the then existing peace establishment, eight regiments, amounting to between five and six thousand men, were authorized, making a total force precisely equal to the present peace establishment. It was true, that all this force had never been actually enlisted and embodied; that the recruiting service had been suspended; and that at the commencement of the war we had far from this number; and we have not now actually ten thousand men――being at least two thousand deficient of that number. He adverted to what had been said, on this and other occasions, of Mr. Jefferson’s not having seized the favorable moment for war, which was afforded by the attack on the Chesapeake. He had always entertained the opinion, he said, that Mr. Jefferson on that occasion took the correct, manly, and frank course, in saying to the British government, your officers have done this; it is an enormous aggression; do you approve the act; do you make it your cause, or not? That government did not sanction the act; it disclaimed it, and promptly too; and although they for a long time withheld the due redress, it was ultimately tendered. If Mr. Jefferson had used his power to carry the country into a war at that period, it might have been supported by public opinion, during the moment of fever, but it would soon abate, and the people would begin to ask, why this war had been made without understanding whether the British government avowed the conduct of its officers, and so forth. If the threatening aspect of our relations with England had entered into the consideration which had caused the increase of the army at that time, there were considerations equally strong at this time, with our augmented population, for retaining our present force. If, however, there were no threatenings from any quarter; if the relative force of European nations, and the general balance of power existing before the French revolution were restored; if South America had not made the attempt, in which he trusted in God she would succeed, to achieve her independence; if our affairs with Spain were settled, he would repeat, that ten thousand men would not be too great a force for the necessities of the country, and with a view to future emergences.

He had taken the liberty, the other day, to make some observations which he might now repeat as furnishing auxiliary considerations for adopting a course of prudence and precaution. He had then said, that our affairs with Spain were not settled; that the Spanish minister was reported to have made some inadmissible demands of our government. The fact turned out as he had presented it. It appeared that what was then rumor, was now fact; and Spain had taken the ground, not only that there must be a discussion of our title to that part of Louisiana, formerly called West Florida, (which it might be doubted whether it ought to take place,) but had required that we must surrender the territory first, and discuss the right to it afterwards. Besides this unsettled state of our relations with Spain, he said, there were other rumors, and he wished to God we had the same means of ascertaining their correctness, as we had found of ascertaining the truth of the rumor just noticed; it was rumored that the Spanish province of Florida had been ceded, with all her pretensions, to Great Britain. Would gentlemen tell him, then, that this was a time when any statesman would pursue the hazardous policy of disarming entirely, of quietly smoking our pipes by our firesides, regardless of impending danger? It might be a palatable doctrine to some, but he was persuaded was condemned by the rules of conduct in private life, by those maxims of sound precaution by which individuals would regulate their private affairs. He did not here mean to take up the question in relation to South America. Still, it was impossible not to see, that, in the progress of things, we might be called on to decide the question, whether we would or would not lend them our aid. This opinion he boldly declared, and he entertained it, not in any pursuit of vain glory, but from a deliberate conviction of its being conformable to the best interests of the country; that, having a proper understanding with foreign powers――that understanding which prudence and a just precaution recommended――it would undoubtedly be good policy to take part with the patriots of South America. He believed it could be shown, that, on the strictest principles of public law, we have a right to take part with them, that it is our interest to take part with them, and that our interposition in their favor would be effectual. But he confessed, with infinite regret, that he saw a supineness on this interesting subject, throughout our country, which left him almost without hope, that what he believed the correct policy of the country would be pursued. He considered the release of any part of America from the dominions of the old world, as adding to the general security of the new. He could not contemplate the exertions of the people of South America, without wishing that they might triumph, and nobly triumph. He believed the cause of humanity would be promoted by the interposition of any foreign power which should terminate the contest between the friends and enemies of independence in that quarter, for a more bloody and cruel war never had been carried on since the days of Adam, than that which is now raging in South America; in which not the least regard is paid to the laws of war, to the rights of capitulation, to the rights of prisoners, nor even to the rights of kindred. I do not offer these views, expecting to influence the opinions of others; they are opinions, of my own. But, on the question of general policy, whether or not we shall interfere in the war in South America, it may turn out that, whether we will or will not choose to interfere in their behalf, we shall be drawn into the contest in the course of its progress. Among other demands by the minister of Spain, is the exclusion of the flag of Buenos Ayres, and other parts of South America, from our ports. Our government has taken a ground on this subject, of which I think no gentleman can disapprove――that all parties shall be admitted and hospitably treated in our ports, provided they conform to our laws whilst among us. What course Spain may take on this subject, it was impossible now to say. Although I would not urge this as an argument for increasing our force, I would place it among those considerations which ought to have weight with every enlightened mind, in determining upon the propriety of its reduction. It is asserted that Great Britain has strengthened, and is strengthening herself in the provinces adjoining us. Is this a moment when in prudence we ought to disarm? No, sir. Preserve your existing force. It would be extreme indiscretion to lessen it.

Mr. Clay here made some observations, to show that a reduction of the army to from four to five thousand men, as had been suggested, would not occasion such a diminution of expense as to authorize the rejection of the report, or any essential alteration in the amount of revenue, which the system proposes to raise from internal taxes, and his colleague (Mr. M’Kee) appeared equally hostile to all of them. Having, however, shown that we cannot in safety reduce the army, he would leave the details of the report in the abler hands of the honorable chairman (Mr. Lowndes), who, he had no doubt, could demonstrate, that with all the retrenchments which had been recommended, the government would be bankrupt in less than three years, if most of these taxes were not continued. He would now hasten to that conclusion, at which the committee could not regret more than he did, that he had not long since arrived.

As to the attitude in which this country should be placed, the duty of congress could not be mistaken. My policy is to preserve the present force, naval and military; to provide for the augmentation of the navy; and, if the danger of war should increase, to increase the army also. Arm the militia, and give it the most effective character of which it is susceptible. Provide in the most ample manner, and place in proper depots, all the munitions and instruments of war. Fortify and strengthen the weak and vulnerable points indicated by experience. Construct military roads and canals, particularly from the Miami of the Ohio to the Miami of Erie; from the Sciota to the bay of Sandusky; from the Hudson to Ontario; that the facilities of transportation may exist, of the men and means of the country, to points where they may be wanted. I would employ on this subject a part of the army, which should also be employed on our line of frontier, territorial and maritime, in strengthening the works of defence. I would provide steam batteries for the Mississippi, for Borgne and Ponchartrain, and for the Chesapeake, and for any part of the north or east, where they might be beneficially employed. In short, I would act seriously, effectively act, on the principle, that in peace we ought to prepare for war; for I repeat, again and again, that, in spite of all the prudence exerted by the government, and the forbearance of others, the hour of trial will come. These halcyon days of peace, this calm will yield to the storm of war, and when that comes, I am for being prepared to breast it. Has not the government been reproached for the want of preparation at the commencement of the late war? And yet the same gentlemen who utter these reproaches, instead of taking counsel from experience, would leave the country in an unprepared condition.

He would as earnestly commence the great work, too long delayed, of internal improvement. He desired to see a chain of turnpike roads and canals, from Passamaquoddy to New Orleans; and other similar roads intersecting the mountains, to facilitate intercourse between all parts of the country, and to bind and connect us together. He would also effectually protect our manufactories. We had given, at least, an implied pledge to do so, by the course of administration. He would afford them protection, not so much for the sake of the manufacturers themselves, as for the general interest. We should thus have our wants supplied, when foreign resources are cut off, and we should also lay the basis of a system of taxation, to be resorted to when the revenue from imports is stopped by war. Such, Mr. Chairman, is a rapid sketch of the policy which it seems to me it becomes us to pursue. It is for you now to decide, whether we shall draw wisdom from the past, or, neglecting the lessons of recent experience, we shall go on headlong without foresight, meriting and receiving the reproaches of the community. I trust, sir, notwithstanding the unpromising appearances sometimes presenting themselves, during the present session, we shall yet do our duty. I appeal to the friends around me, with whom I have been associated for years in public life; who nobly, manfully vindicated the national character by a war, waged by a young people, unskilled in arms, single-handed, against a veteran power――a war which the nation has emerged from, covered with laurels; let us now do something to ameliorate the internal condition of the country; let us show that objects of domestic, no less than those of foreign policy, receive our attention; let us fulfil the just expectations of the public, whose eyes are anxiously directed towards this session of congress; let us, by a liberal and enlightened policy, entitle ourselves, upon our return home, to that best of all rewards, the grateful exclamation, ‘well done, thou good and faithful servant.’

ON THE BILL FOR ENFORCING NEUTRALITY.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 24, 1817.

[PRESIDENT MADISON, in a message dated December 26, 1816, had
apprized congress, that the existing laws did not enable him
to preserve the peace of the United States with foreign powers.
The subject having been referred to the committee on foreign
relations, that committee, through their chairman, Mr. Forsyth,
of Georgia, reported a bill for enforcing neutrality. This bill
was debated in committee of the whole, on the 24th of January,
1817, by Messrs. Forsyth, Smith, of Maryland, Grosvenor, of New
York, Randolph, of Virginia, Sharp, of Kentucky, Sheffey, of
Virginia, Hopkinson, of Pennsylvania, and Clay (speaker). In
the brief remarks of Mr. Clay it will be observed, that he
renews the expression of his sympathies with the people of South
America in their struggle for independence; and, considering
the bill under discussion as intended to discountenance that
revolution, he avowed his opposition to it.]

MR. CLAY (speaker). As long as the government abstained from taking any part in the contest now carrying on in the southern part of this continent, it was unquestionably its duty to maintain a strict neutrality. On that point there was and could be no difference of opinion. It ought not, however, to be overlooked, that the two parties stood with this government on unequal ground. One of them had an accredited minister here, to watch over its interests, and to remonstrate against any acts of which it might complain; whilst the other, being wholly unrepresented, had no organ through which to communicate its grievances. This inequality of condition in the contending parties, imposed upon us the duty of great circumspection and prudence in what we might do.

Whenever a war exists, whether between two independent states or between parts of a common empire, he knew of but two relations in which other powers could stand towards the belligerents; the one was that of neutrality, and the other that of a belligerent.

Being then in a state of neutrality respecting the contest, and bound to maintain it, the question was, whether the provisions of the bill were necessary to the performance of that duty? It will be recollected that we have an existing law, directed against armaments, such as are described in the bill. That law was passed in 1794. It was intended to preserve our neutrality in the contest between France and her enemies. The circumstances under which it was passed, must be yet fresh in our recollection. The French revolution had excited a universal enthusiasm in the cause of liberty. The flame reached this country, and spread with electric rapidity throughout the continent. There was not a state, county, city, or village, exempted from it. An ardent disposition to enter into the conflict, on the side of France, was every where felt. General Washington thought it the interest of this country to remain neutral, and the law of 1794 was enacted, to restrain our citizens from taking part in the contest. If that law had been effectual to preserve the neutrality of this country, during the stormy period of the French revolution, we ought to pause before we assent to the adoption of new penalties and provisions. If the law did not reach the case (which he understood to be doubtful from some judicial decisions), he was willing to legislate so far as to make it comprehend it. Further than that, as at present advised, he was not willing to go.

But the present bill not only went further, but, in his judgment, contained provisions not demanded of us by our neutral duties. It contained two principles not embraced by the law of 1794. The first was, the requisition of a bond from the owners of armed vessels, that persons, to whom they might sell these vessels, should not use them in the contest. The second was, the power vested in the collectors to seize and detain, under certain circumstances, any such vessels. Now, with regard to the first provision, it is not denied that an armed vessel may be lawfully sold by an American citizen to a foreign subject, other than a subject of Spain. But on what ground is it possible, then, to maintain, that it is the duty of the American citizen to become responsible for the subsequent use which may be made of such vessel by the foreign subject? We are bound to take care that our own citizens do not violate our neutrality, but we are under no such obligation as it respects the subjects of foreign powers. It is the business of those foreign powers to guard the conduct of their own subjects. If it be true, as he had heard it asserted, that Fell’s Point exhibits an activity in hostile preparation, not surpassed during the late war, we had enough to do with our own citizens. It was not incumbent upon us, as a neutral power, to provide, after a legal sale had been made of an armed vessel to a foreign subject, against any illegal use of the vessel.

Gentlemen have contended, that this bill ought to be considered as intended merely to enforce our own laws; as a municipal regulation, having no relation to the war now existing. It was impossible to deceive ourselves, as to the true character of the measure. Bestow on it what denomination you please, disguise it as you may, it is a law, and will be understood by the whole world as a law, to discountenance any aid being given to the South American colonies in a state of revolution against the parent country. With respect to the nature of that struggle, he had not now, for the first time, to express his opinion and his wishes. An honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Sheffey) had said, the people of South America were incapable, from the ignorance and superstition which prevail among them, of achieving independence or enjoying liberty. And to what cause is that ignorance and superstition owing? Was it not to the vices of their government? to the tyranny and oppression, hierarchical and political, under which they groaned? If Spain succeeded in riveting their chains upon them, would not that ignorance and superstition be perpetuated? In the event of that success, he feared the time would never arrive, when the good wishes of the honorable gentleman from Virginia would be conciliated in behalf of that oppressed and suffering people. For his part, he wished their independence. It was the first step towards improving their condition. Let them have free government, if they be capable of enjoying it; but let them have, at all events, independence. Yes, from the inmost recesses of my soul, I wish them independence. I may be accused of an imprudent utterance of my feelings, on this occasion. I care not; when the independence, the happiness, the liberty of a whole people is at stake, and that people our neighbors, our brethren, occupying a portion of the same continent, imitating our example, and participating of the same sympathies with ourselves, I will boldly avow my feelings and my wishes in their behalf, even at the hazard of such an imputation.

But, notwithstanding the feelings which he cherished on this subject, Mr. Clay admitted that it became us not to exhibit the spectacle of a people at war and a government at peace. We ought to perform our neutral duties, whilst we are neutral, without regard to the unredressed injuries inflicted upon us by old Spain, on the one hand, or to the glorious object of the struggle of the South American patriots on the other. We ought to render strict justice, and no more. If the bill on the table was limited to that object, he would vote for it. But he thought it went further; that it assumed obligations which we were not bound to incur, and, thinking so, he could not, in its present shape, give to it his assent.

ON COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIONS WITH FOREIGN NATIONS.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 30, 1817.

[ON the fifth of February, 1816, Mr. Cyrus King, of
Massachusetts, presented for consideration a resolution,
instructing the committee on foreign relations to inquire
into the expediency of excluding from the ports of the United
States all foreign vessels, owned in, coming from, bound to,
or touching at any of his Britannic majesty’s possessions in
the West Indies, and in the continent of North America, from
which the vessels of the United States are excluded; and of
prohibiting or increasing the duties on the importation in
foreign vessels, of any articles, the growth, produce, or
manufacture of such possessions. This resolution underwent
much discussion, but was finally laid upon the table, and the
subject not again introduced during the same session. But on the
twenty-seventh of January, 1817, there was introduced ‘a bill
to prohibit all commercial intercourse with ports or places,
into or with which, the vessels of the United States are not
ordinarily permitted to enter or trade.’ On the thirtieth of
January, this bill was called up and debated in committee of
the whole. Among the speakers on the subject, were Messrs. Cyrus
King, of Massachusetts, Smith, of Maryland, Wilde, of Georgia,
Randolph, of Virginia, Lowndes, of South Carolina, Hopkinson, of
Pennsylvania, and Clay (speaker).

The whole subject was finally again laid on the table. The
following are Mr. Clay’s remarks in this debate.]

MR. CLAY (speaker) said, that in one sentiment expressed by the gentleman from Georgia he most heartily concurred; that the measure contemplated by the bill, or by the proposed substitute, was the most important, as respected at least our foreign relations, that had come before congress at this session, or would probably be brought before it for some years; a measure, which, whatever fate attended it, ought to attract the attention of honorable members of this house, and to which, he hoped, before the final question on it, they would give the most mature consideration.

The importance of the question by no means depended simply on the value of the trade between this country and the colonies of Great Britain. But considering the question as it related merely to that trade, when the fact was stated, that it consisted of six millions of dollars imports, and of course a like amount of exports, it must be admitted, the question was one of deep import, compared to any which at present presented itself to the attention of congress. But, as was stated in the president’s message, it was not solely important on account of the effect of the colonial system on that trade, but the fact was, that the exclusion from a participation in that navigation, essentially affected the trade between this country and the British European possessions, and, by the operation of the system, deprived us, in a great measure, of the benefits of the convention of commerce with Great Britain, which provided for the establishment of a perfect reciprocity of commerce between the United States and the British European possessions. Even if gentlemen were not disposed to do something to obtain for the navigation of this country a participation in the colonial trade, they ought to go so far as to place them on an equal footing as regarded the European trade. Some measure ought to be devised, by which the navigation of Great Britain should be prevented from enjoying peculiar advantages over us, in a trade wherein reciprocity had been solemnly promised by the convention, to which he had alluded.

Let us, then, inquire into the character of the evil proposed to be remedied, and of the remedy that is offered. What is the evil? Great Britain says, that the whole commerce between her colonies and the United States shall be carried on in British ships, absolutely excluding American ships from any participation in it. The most natural course of the exchange of commodities between nations might be thus defined; that each nation should carry its own products to market; that we should carry of our produce what we do not want, but they do, to British ports; and that they should bring what they do not want, but we do, to our ports. With this course, however, Great Britain was not satisfied. The next and perhaps the most equal and best mode of providing for the free and fair interchange of commodities, was, to open the trade equally and reciprocally to both parties, to let each carry the commodities of both countries, in a fair competition. Great Britain was not, however, disposed to do this. She not only prohibited the carriage of her colonial commodities in our vessels; not only entirely engrossed the export trade from her colonies, but refused to allow us any participation, by conventional regulation or otherwise, in the trade to the colonies. The effect was, to deprive us of the advantages, in the augmentation of our commerce and increase of our seamen, which would result from the carriage of our own produce, to the amount of six millions of dollars annually.

With regard to the importance of encouraging our navigation, he said, he need not resort to argument. The question of the importance of a navy, to maintain and defend our rights, which had been some years ago a question of a theoretical nature, was no longer so; it was now a question of practical experience. All felt its importance, and all acknowledged the expediency of cherishing, by all means in our power, that important branch of national defence.

Gentlemen alarmed themselves by the apprehension, that the other party would view as inimical any regulations countervailing her colonial policy, and that the issue of this conflict of commercial regulations would be war. He believed in no such result. If an exclusion of the navigation and shipping of Great Britain from our ports be a measure of a hostile character, said Mr. Clay, Great Britain has set us the example; for she excludes our navigation and shipping from an extensive range of her ports. He considered this rather as a diplomatic than a hostile measure; but, if it were otherwise, she had set the example, which she could not complain if we followed.

But, said he, let us look to the fact. What would be the light in which Great Britain would view any such regulations as are proposed by the bill? The convention of London contains an express stipulation on the subject; and I will observe to gentlemen, that the clause which exempts the colonial trade from the second article of the convention, was introduced with the express view of retaining in our hands the right to countervail the British regulations in this respect. It was so understood by the framers of that convention. But we have later evidence than that which is furnished by the terms of the convention. The president, in his message at the opening of the session, says, that it is ascertained, ‘that the British government declines all negotiation on this subject; _with a disavowal_, however, of any disposition to view in an unfriendly light, whatever _countervailing regulations_ the United States may oppose to the regulations of which they complain.’ Thus, then, we have evidence, both from the nature of the case, and from the express declarations of the British government, that it will not, because it cannot, view in an unfriendly light any regulations which this government may find it expedient to adopt, to countervail their policy. Mr. Clay said, he did not think that the adoption of this policy on the part of Great Britain, ought to excite any hostile feeling towards her. She was not singular in this respect. Every country that has colonies in the West Indies, and which is not too weak to defend them, endeavored, he said, to appropriate to itself all the advantages of the trade with those colonies; and it would be found that the relaxation of the rigor of that system by one nation or another, was precisely graduated by the degree of ability to maintain their colonies in peace, and defend them in war. There was nothing in the regulations of Great Britain, which could be offensive, or possibly lead to war. They might be complained of as selfish or unfriendly, they certainly were the former. But Great Britain had a perfect right to set the example before us; and the question was, whether the total exclusion of our ships from the colonial ports of Britain, was such a measure as we ought to fold our arms and submit to, without an effort to obtain some part of the trade which she had attempted to appropriate exclusively to herself?

Gentlemen had properly said, that this was a question which ought to be well weighed before decided. Whatever we do, it ought to be with a determination to adhere firmly to it. For, depend upon it, Great Britain will never lightly relax her policy.

The policy of Great Britain was deeply laid in selfish considerations; a policy which she had never relaxed, except in periods of war, when it became her interest to do so, from the commencement of her colonies to this time. The measure which we address to her interest, to induce her to relax from the rigor of her colonial policy, should be a measure framed with ample deliberation, which, when we adopt with resolution, we will maintain with fortitude. For, the first conclusion of the British government would undoubtedly be, that the American government would be incapable of maintaining its regulations for any length of time; and that government, in the expectation of a retraction of the measure, would persevere in its policy as long as it could.

The question which presents itself, then, is, whether we will adopt measures to induce a relaxation so desirable to our interest?

What ought to be done, if any thing is? There were two propositions before the house, and the question now was, on substituting high duties for the prohibitory system. He preferred the prohibition; and if any gentleman would candidly compare the merits of the two proposed remedies, he would find that the whole value of the remedy, by the imposition of duties, was derived from its approximation to prohibition.

Suppose the measure of prohibition be adopted, what would be its effect? In the opinion of Mr. Clay, a mere change in the direction of the trade. St. Domingo would be opened to us, St. Thomas, Vera Cruz, and possibly St. Bartholomews, and other islands and ports. But, if not one port should be open, the necessity Great Britain would be under, to obtain supplies for her colonies, would dictate the expediency of opening some port at which an interchange of commodities could take place. If this operation took place, all that is proposed to be effected by the bill is accomplished, by the participation of our navigation in the transportation of the articles thus exchanged. Our ships will have obtained an employment, in carrying our products to that entrepot, and bringing return cargoes, of the same amount they would have now, if American, instead of British ships, wholly engrossed the trade. There might, in the case supposed, be some little increase in the cost of the articles, but so inconsiderable, as not to amount to any offset to the great advantages accruing to this country, from the employment of its tonnage.

The present moment Mr. Clay considered as particularly propitious to the adoption of this regulation; because, as regarded the great direct trade between the United States and British ports in Europe, that was regulated and unalterable for nearly three years. It stood on the footing of convention; and we should not, by any regulation adopted in regard to the colonial trade, put to hazard the advantages in the other, at least until that convention expired.

Regarding this regulation in another view, he anticipated beneficial effects from it. In consequence of the weakness of some of the powers of Europe in their maritime force, they had found it convenient to open ports to us, which were formerly shut, and we could thence draw our supplies, thus effecting a mere change in the channel of supply with the advantage of the employment of our own navigation, as already stated. South America, besides, would be open to us, and we could there obtain a large portion of the commodities we import from the West Indies, except, perhaps, the article of rum. Whether that could be obtained there or not, he did not know. Sugar might be obtained, in quantity, from Louisiana, where the product of that article increased every year. Georgia, and a portion of South Carolina, too, had turned their attention to that object; and the effect of this measure would be, to encourage the cultivation of that article. With respect to the article of spirits, if its importation were totally cut off, he thought it would be a benefit. He believed, he said, that America was the only country that imported as great a quantity of spirituous liquors; every other country he was acquainted with, used more of its own manufacture.

I think that the suffering of the navigating interest, to which the attention of congress is attracted, is one which calls loudly on this body to do something to alleviate it. It is attributable greatly to the colonial system of Great Britain, though no doubt also greatly to the state of peace, and the consequent resumption of their navigation by the powers of Europe, who, during war, suspended a great proportion of it. Taking care of the interests of the nation, and guarding our commerce against the effect of foreign regulations, it becomes us to act on this subject. He should, he said, cheerfully give his assent, therefore, to the bill before the house; and should vote for it, but with reluctance, if the amendment proposed by Mr. Forsyth should succeed.

The great question was, the _modus operandi_ of this bill, to use a favorite expression of a member of another body. Operating on the sympathy as well as the direct interest of the parent country, it would induce her to relax her system. Great Britain would find a greater interest in securing the amount of six millions of trade, necessary to support and cherish her colonies, than she would gain merely on the transportation of the articles of which that trade consists. That was the question on which the British people would be called on to decide; and he believed the effect of this measure would be such as to induce them to decide in favor of admitting us, on a footing of reciprocity, into the West India trade. If the British government did not take this course, it would have to wink at the formation of entrepots, by which the object proposed by the bill would be substantially accomplished.

ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 4, 1817.

[THE house resolved itself into a committee of the whole on
the bill to set apart, and pledge, as a fund for internal
improvement, the bonus and United States share of the dividends
of the national bank. The discussion was commenced by Mr.
Calhoun of South Carolina, who advocated the constitutionality,
importance, and expediency of a system of internal improvements,
under the authority of the general government. The same views
were expressed by Mr. Clay (speaker), Mr. Gold, of New York, Mr.
Sheffey, of Virginia, and others. The bill finally passed both
houses (but was vetoed by president Madison, on constitutional
grounds, on the third of March, 1817). In the brief remarks of
Mr. Clay on this occasion, which are subjoined, he expresses
the same sentiments as will be found more at length in his
subsequent speeches on this subject.]

MR. CLAY (speaker) observed, that it was not his intention to enter into the general discussion of the subject; he wished only to say, that he had long thought that there were no two subjects which could engage the attention of the national legislature, more worthy of its deliberate consideration, than those of internal improvements and domestic manufactures.

As to the constitutional point which had been made, he had not a doubt on his mind; but it was not necessary, in his judgment, to embarrass the passage of the bill with the argument of that point at this time. It was a sufficient answer to say, that the power was not now to be exercised. It was proposed merely to designate the fund, and, from time to time, as the proceeds of it came in, to invest them in the funded debt of the United States. It would thus be accumulating; and congress could, at some future day, examine into the constitutionality of the question, and if it has the power, it would exercise it; if it has not, the constitution, there could be very little doubt, would be so amended as to confer it. It was quite obvious, however, that congress might so direct the application of the fund, as not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the several states, and thus avoid the difficulty which had been started. It might distribute it among those objects of private enterprise which called for national patronage in the form of subscriptions to the capital stock of incorporated companies, such as that of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal, and other similar institutions. Perhaps that might be the best way to employ the fund; but, he repeated this was not the time to go into this inquiry.

With regard to the general importance of the proposition; the effect of internal improvements in cementing the union; in facilitating internal trade; in augmenting the wealth and the population of the country; he would not consume the time of the committee in discussing those interesting topics, after the able manner in which they had been treated by his friend from South Carolina. In reply to those who thought that internal improvements had better be left to the several states, he would ask, he would put it to the candor of every one, if there were not various objects in which many states were interested, and which, requiring therefore their joint coöperation, would, if not taken up by the general government, be neglected, either for the want of resources, or from the difficulty of regulating their respective contributions. Such was the case with the improvement of the navigation of the Ohio at the rapids; the canal from the Hudson to the lakes; the great turnpike road, parallel with the coast from Maine to Louisiana. These, and similar objects were stamped with a national character; and they required the wisdom and the resources of the nation to accomplish them. No particular state felt an individual interest, sufficient to execute improvements of such magnitude. They must be patronised, efficaciously patronised, by the general government, or they never would be accomplished.