Chapter I: HAVE been desirous, Mr. President, before the passage of this bill, (9)

Then, to enable a nation of freemen to carry out their will, to set congress free to speak that will, to redress the wrongs, and to supply the wants, of those that sent them, Mr. Clay again declared, that the veto power must be modified and restrained. If not, the question which congress would have to decide would be, not what is the proper remedy for the existing grievances of the country, not what will restore the national prosperity――no; but what measure will be sanctioned by the chief magistrate?

Mr. Clay said, that, as he had not the bodily strength to dwell more at large on the general subject, he would now proceed to examine the objections which were urged against any further restrictions on this executive power.

There had gotten up a notion, of late years, that some curb was necessary upon the power of majorities, and that without this the safety of the country must be in danger. Now, on what grounds had the principle been founded, that in a free government the majority must govern? On two grounds. The first was of an intellectual and moral character. It was right, that in a great public, political partnership, the greater number should be satisfied with what was done, and that there was a greater chance of wisdom in complying with the will of the greater number. On the score of chances, some must govern, and who should it be? The minority? Why? Because they possessed more wisdom? Why were they likely to possess more wisdom? The second ground was physical in its aspect. It held, that the majority should be allowed to govern, because they would govern, having the physical force which would enable them to carry out their will. Now this doctrine, that minorities must govern, whether with or without the veto, was advanced by gentlemen who professed and called themselves members of the Jeffersonian school. But what was the doctrine of Mr. Jefferson himself, in regard to majorities, and so declared by him forty years ago? (Here Mr. Clay read an extract from Jefferson’s works, in which it was broadly laid down, that an absolute acquiescence in the will of majorities, was necessary in a free republican government.)

But there were some particular interests, and one especially, in regard to which the south felt great solicitude, which it was supposed would be more safe under the continuance of the veto power, than without it. Now, in the first place, Mr. Clay saw no difference, in respect to safety, between that particular interest, and other interests of the country. If it was true, that any one interest would be more secure under the veto power than without it, then all interests would be more secure; but if no security was produced by the veto, then that particular interest would not be more secure by the veto. Just as well might gentlemen from the north rise up and say, that the navigating interest, (in regard to which they were, perhaps, more interested,) would be more secure under the veto power, or the friends of any interest, northern, southern, or western, might fancy that it would be more secure. But the question came at last to this; is the veto a necessary power, or is it not? If it is necessary, it is necessary to all; if not, it is necessary to none.

What was the security which the south would possess in this veto power? Sooner or later, the president would be in a majority himself. But if a majority of congress should put itself in opposition to the interest of the south, neither presidents, nor vetoes, would avail to protect it. Its own resolution, its own valor, its own indomitable determination to maintain its rights against all men, these, and these alone, could in that case uphold southern interests.

Meanwhile the people of the south had all requisite guarantees. First, they had the sacred provisions of the constitution; and then they had the character of our government as a confederacy, the existence of these interests long before the adoption of the constitution, and the rights and duties of the government in regard to them, recognised and laid down by that sacred instrument. That was the security of the south. As one who himself lived where that peculiar interest existed, he possessed no security from the existence of the veto power; none, none whatever. He felt himself secure in that mutual harmony, which it was alike the interest of all to cultivate in the constitutional securities, and in the certainty of the disruption of the union, as the inevitable result, the moment that interest should be assailed; in the capacity and determination of the south to defend herself at all hazards, and against all forms of attack, whether from abroad or at home. There, there, was the security, and not in this miserable despotic veto power of the president of the United States.

Mr. Clay went on to say, that the amendment which he had the honor of proposing to the senate, was encountered by arguments which were directly opposed to each other. He was told by one, that this power was a sacred thing, not lightly to be touched, but to be held in honor and veneration, as the choicest legacy left by our ancestors. He was told, on the other hand, by an honorable friend in his eye, that the amendment was vain, because it was a thing impossible ever to get the constitution amended. He admitted it was a thing extremely difficult, requiring as it did the concurrence of eighteen states. But now, in reply to the first argument, those who regarded the constitution as so worthy of preservation, should be satisfied that no light and trivial amendment to it ever could be carried into effect; but if they were convinced that any amendment would be for the good of the country, it was their duty to put it forth, and submit it to public will. As to the second argument, he admitted, as he said, its full force. It was, indeed, extremely doubtful, whether any gentleman here present would ever live to see the constitution amended; but still it was the duty of every friend of his country to use proper efforts to have it improved. One attempt only had succeeded since those alterations were adopted, which took place immediately after the adoption of the constitution itself. But this subject had been a good deal considered in the country, and if Mr. Clay had been successful in any degree in demonstrating its expediency, neither class of objectors ought to persevere in opposing it.

As to another amendment, which had reference to the appointment of the secretary of the treasury and the treasurer of the United States, Mr. Clay admitted, that if his friend from Virginia, (Mr. Archer,) could succeed in establishing what Mr. Clay had attempted years ago to demonstrate――that congress did possess the constitutional power to define the tenure of office, and to defend it against the power of dismission――there would, to be sure, be less necessity for making a special provision in regard to these two officers. But still, for greater security, Mr. Clay should prefer to have the appointment of the treasurer and the secretary explicitly placed in the hands of congress.

Mr. Clay observed, that if there was any sentiment in relation to public affairs, on which the people of this country had made up their minds, it was in regard to the necessity of limiting executive power. Its present overgrown character had long been viewed by them with apprehension. The power was not personal, it was mainly official. You might take a mechanic from the avenue and make him president, and he would instantly be surrounded with power and influence, the power and the influence of his office. It was very true, that the personal popularity of an incumbent might add much to his power, but the power itself was official, not personal, and its danger arose from its tendency and ability to accumulate. This was demonstrated by all past history, and was witnessed by all we saw around us. All these considerations called upon senators in the language of patriotism deeply to reflect on the consequences which might ensue, should not a power so great in itself, and so prone to increase, be subjected to some salutary limitation.

Let not gentlemen deceive themselves by names. The unpretending name, president of the United States, was no security against the extent or the abuse of power. The power assigned to a public individual did not depend on the title he might bear. The danger arose not from his name, but from the quantum of power at his command. Whether he were called emperor, dictator, king, liberator, protector, sultan, or president of the United States, was of no consequence at all. Look at his power; that was what we had to guard against. The most tremendous power known to antiquity was the shortest in duration. It was not, then, in duration, any more than in title, that the danger lay, but in the magnitude of the power. This called for every safeguard. The dictatorship of Rome continued but for a brief period; yet, while it lasted, the whole state was in his hands. He did whatever he pleased, whether with life, liberty, or property. We had, then, no security against the power of the president of the United States in the shortness of the term for which he was chosen.

We often found very pathetic reflections in the writings of scholars, on the sad condition of kings; on the isolation of their thrones; on the effect of their station in removing them from the body of society, where no voice could reach them but the voice of flatterers, and where they were perpetually surrounded by the incense of adulation; and the chief ground of sympathy seemed to be, the impossibility that truth should reach their ears. It might be said, that this was true of kings, but did not apply on this side of the water; but let Mr. Clay tell those who thought so, that the actual condition of a president of the United States did not very widely differ from that of the monarchs of the old world. Here, too, the chief magistrate occupied an isolated station, where the voice of his country and the cries of its distress could not reach his ear. He, too, was surrounded by a cordon of favorites, flatterers, and fawns. Isolated in this district, with no embarrassments himself, the echoes of the public distress, if they reached his ear at all, reached it with a faint and feeble sound, being obstructed by those who surrounded his person, and approached him only to flatter. Facts were boldly denied, and all complaints attributed to a factious spirit. Now, he would ask, was a man thus separated, and thus surrounded, more likely to know the real sufferings, wants, and wishes of his countrymen, than the two hundred and forty-two men in the other house, or the fifty-two men in this house, who came up here directly from their bosom, who shared in all their sufferings, who felt their wants, participated in their wishes, and sympathized with all their sorrows? That was the true question of the veto power. Now he thought if these things were duly considered, (and he spoke not of this or of that incumbent of the office, but of the circumstances of every one who filled it,) it must be admitted, by every candid mind, that the responsibility was great of a man who should undertake, on his own private opinion, to resist and suppress the will of the nation, constitutionally expressed. It was a power not merely to annul the national will, as lawfully uttered by its own chosen representatives; but the power to initiate legislation itself, and to substitute for the will of the nation an alien will, neither of the nation, nor of its representatives.

But, he was physically unable to go further into this subject. The question was the old question, whether we should have, in this country, a power tyrannical, despotic, absolute, the exercise of which must, sooner or later, produce an absolute despotism, or a free representative government, with powers clearly defined and carefully separated? That was the true question to be decided.

There were other amendments accompanying this one, on which he wished to say a few words, but was to-day unable to do so. (Several offers had been made by gentlemen near him to move an adjournment, but he had persevered in declining them.)

That in relation to securing to congress the appointment of the secretary and treasurer, was one of those reforms to which he considered the whig party solemnly pledged, as one of the measures proper to be pursued in the process of limiting executive power, but he could not now dwell upon it.

The other, relating to the appointment of members of congress to office, only went, in effect, to carry out the principles already sanctioned by that article of the constitution, which declares, that no member should be appointed to an office which had been created, or the emoluments of which had been increased with his concurrence. This went one step further, and declared, that no member should be appointed to an office which had been created with or without his concurrence, before or after he was a member. Whenever a man accepted an office which he was reasonably expected to hold, for a definite term, he should continue to hold it for that entire period, unless some very strong reason existed to the contrary, and which had not existed prior to his appointment.

There was one concluding remark on the amendment at present before the senate, with which he would close what he had now to say. Although he admitted, that the principles he had laid down would, if carried fairly out, lead to the abolition of the veto altogether, as inconsistent with the fundamental axiom of free government, yet he was of opinion, that this, like other reforms, should be introduced slowly, and with circumspection, without suddenly rushing from one extreme to another. Before the power should be utterly abolished, he deemed it prudent, that an experiment should be made in a modified form; and instead of requiring a majority of two thirds of both houses to supersede the veto of the president, he thought it sufficient to require the concurrence of a majority of the whole number of members elected to each house of Congress.

He asked, whether this would not afford a sufficient security against the dangers of hasty legislation; and, in confirmation of its sufficiency, he would appeal to what had been the experience of all the states, where such a provision had been adopted. If a bill, after having undergone a full investigation and discussion, should pass both houses, and be transmitted to the president for his signature, and he should return it with his veto, and the reasons for that veto, and it should then be again considered and fully discussed, in view of the objections urged against it by the executive, (to say nothing of the whole influence derived from his office, and all that pertained to it,) and still there should be found a clear majority, not of a quorum present, but of the total number of members chosen by the people, was not the presumption irresistible, that the bill ought to become a law? Surely, surely, this was a sufficient evidence of the will of the people, and an abundant safeguard against the hazardous consequences of hasty and ill-advised legislation.

ON THE COMPROMISE TARIFF.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 18, 1842.

[MR. CLAY, in presenting a memorial from citizens of
Pennsylvania, in relation to the tariff, and in opposition to
the tariff act, took occasion, as requested by the memorialists,
to express his views in regard to the subject, briefly, as
follows.]

TWO motives had operated on my mind, and I believe on the minds of others, to induce them to concur in the passage of the law, (of 1833.) The first was, to avert the calamity of civil war, the fire of which having been lighted up in South Carolina, threatened to extend its flames over the whole union; the second was, to preserve from utter destruction the system of protection which Pennsylvania favored, when the law was passed; and I will repeat here, although it will not be long before I shall have an opportunity to go into an examination of the whole subject, that if the compromise act had not been adopted, the whole system of protection would have been swept by the board, by the preponderating influence of the illustrious man then at the head of the government, (general Jackson,) at the very next session after its enactment. With regard to the operation of this act, it is a great mistake to say, that any portion of the embarrassments of the country has resulted from it. Other causes have contributed to this result, and it is to be attributed to the experiments which have been made upon the currency. The embarrassments are also to be attributed to the action of the states, which, by plunging into schemes of internal improvement, have contracted debts abroad, and thereby given a false and fictitious appearance to the prosperity of the country; and when their bonds depreciated, the evils under which they now suffer, as a consequence, ensued. As to the compromise, I have already said, that it is my purpose, as long as I shall remain in the senate, to maintain, that the original principles of the act should be carried out faithfully and honestly; and if, in providing for an adequate revenue for an economical administration of the government, they can at the same time afford incidental protection, I shall be happy if both of these objects can be accomplished; but if it should be necessary, for the interests of Pennsylvania, to go beyond a revenue tariff, for the purpose of obtaining protection, then I hope that every senator and representative from that state, and those of other states, and other interests, who think it necessary to transcend the revenue, will take up this subject of protection, and carry it to the point which their local interests demand.

In reply to Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Clay combated the idea of that senator, that the tariff had created the embarrassments which had existed for a long time in the country. He referred the senator to the discussions upon the tariff acts, for the purpose of showing that the reverse was true. If the senator would look to the tariff acts of 1824, ’28, ’32, and the compromise act of 1833, he would find that the revenues of the country had never been more from these acts, than the expenditures of government. The whole surplus revenue, about which so much had been heard, and which was attributed to the protective policy, originated exclusively in the extensive land sales, which had swelled in one year to the enormous amount of twenty-six millions of dollars. These excessive sales alone, had exceeded the amount of the surplus revenue which had ever been brought into the treasury.

Hereafter, I shall be able to show, that it will be impossible to stand by the twenty per centum, even by withdrawing the whole of the land fund from its appropriated purpose of distribution, and placing it in the treasury.

THE TARIFF, AND OTHER MEASURES OF PUBLIC POLICY.

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 1, 1842.

[HAVING previously announced his determination to retire from
public life, by resigning his seat in the senate, Mr. Clay
submitted for the consideration of that body a series of
resolutions; which, being taken up at this date, he supported
in the following speech, in the course of which, the resolutions
are recapitulated and explained. They relate to the tariff, and
other measures of public policy, which, in his view, should be
adopted, to restore the prosperity of the nation. Although these
views, and the prospects of the whig party which supported them,
have been but partially carried out under the administration
of president Tyler, owing to the adverse position in which
the president placed himself towards the party which elevated
him to power; yet, it is interesting to observe the line of
policy marked out by a statesman, of the enlarged views and
great experience of Mr. Clay――a line of policy worthy of being
transmitted to posterity, as a guide and landmark for the future
legislators of the republic.]

MR. PRESIDENT,

The resolutions which have just been read, and which are to form the subject of the present discussion, are of the greatest importance, involving interests of the highest character, and a system of policy which, in my opinion, lies at the bottom of any restoration of the prosperity of the country. In discussing them, I would address myself to you in the language of plainness, of soberness, and truth. I did not come here as if I were entering a garden full of flowers, and of the richest shrubbery, to cull the tea-roses, the japonicas, the jasmines, and woodbines, and weave them into a garland of the gayest colors, that, by the beauty of their assortment, and by their fragrance, I may gratify fair ladies. Nor is it my wish――it is far, far from my wish――to revive any subjects of a party character, or which might be calculated to renew the animosities which unhappily have hitherto prevailed between the two great political parties in the country. My course is far different from this; it is to speak to you of the sad condition of our country; to point out not the remote and original, but the proximate, the immediate causes which have produced, and are likely to continue our distresses, and to suggest a remedy. If any one, in or out of the senate, has imagined it to be my intention, on this occasion, to indulge in any ambitious display of language, to attempt any rhetorical flights, or to deal in any other figures than figures of arithmetic, he will find himself greatly disappointed. The farmer, if he is a judicious man, does not begin to plough till he has first laid off his land, and marked it off at proper distances, by planting stakes, by which his ploughmen are to be guided in their movements; and the ploughman, accordingly, fixes his eye upon the stake opposite to the end of the destined furrow, and then endeavors to reach it by a straight and direct furrow. These resolutions are my stakes.

But, before I proceed to examine them, let me first meet and obviate certain objections, which, as I understand, have been or may be urged against them generally. I learn that it is said of these resolutions, that they present only general propositions, and that, instead of this, I should at once have introduced separate bills, and entered into detail, and shown in what manner I propose to accomplish the objects which the resolutions propose. Let me here say, in reply, that the ancient principles and mode of legislation which has ever prevailed from the foundation of this government, has been to fix first upon the general principles which are to guide us, and then to carry out these principles by detailed legislation. Such has ever been the course pursued, not only in the country from which we derive our legislative institutions, but in our own. The memorable resolution offered in the British house of commons, by the celebrated Mr. Dunning, is no doubt familiar to the mind of every one――that ‘the power of the crown (and it is equally true of our own chief magistrate) had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished.’ When I was a member of another legislative body, which meets in the opposite extremity of this capitol, it was the course, in reference to the great questions of internal improvement, and other leading measures of public policy, to propose specific resolutions, going to mark out the principles of action which ought to be adopted, and then to carry out these principles by subsequent enactments. Another objection is urged, as I understand, against one of these resolutions, which is this: that, by the constitution, no bill for raising revenue can originate any where but in the house of representatives. It is true, that we cannot originate such a bill; but, undoubtedly, in contemplating the condition of the public affairs, and in the right consideration of all questions touching the amount of the revenue, and the mode in which it shall be raised, and involving the great questions of expenditure and retrenchment, and how far the expenses of the government may safely and properly be diminished, it is perfectly legitimate for us to deliberate and to act as duty may demand. There can be no question but that, during the present session of congress, a bill of revenue will be sent to us from the other house; and if, when it comes, we shall first have gone through with a consideration of the general subject, fixing the principles of policy proper to be pursued in relation to it, it will greatly economize the time of the senate, and proportionably save a large amount of the public money.

Perhaps no better mode can be pursued of discussing the resolutions I have had the honor to present, than to take them up in the order of their arrangement, as I presented them to the senate, after much deliberate consideration.

The first resolution declares,

‘That it is the duty of the general government, for conducting
its administration, to provide an adequate revenue within the
year, to meet the current expenses of the year; and that any
expedient, either by loan or treasury notes, to supply, in time
of peace, a deficiency of revenue, especially during successive
years, is unwise, and must lead to pernicious consequences.’

I have heard it asserted, that this resolution is but a truism. If so, I regret to say, that it is one from which governments too often depart, and from which this government especially has departed during the last five years. Has an adequate revenue been provided within each of those years, to meet the necessary expenses of those same years? No; far otherwise.

In 1837, at the called session, instead of imposing the requisite amount of taxes on the free articles, according to the provisions of the compromise act, what was the resort of the administration? To treasury notes. And the same expedient of treasury notes was ever since adopted, from year to year, to supply the deficit accruing. And, of necessity, this policy cast upon the administration succeeding, an unascertained, unliquidated debt, inducing a temporary necessity on that administration, to have resort to the same means of supply.

I do not advert to these facts with any purpose of crimination or recrimination. Far from it. For we have reached that state of the public affairs when the country lies bleeding at every pore, and when, as I earnestly hope and trust, we shall, by common consent, dispense with our party prejudices, and agree to look at any measure proposed for the public relief as patriots and statesmen. I say, then, that during the four years of the administration of Mr. Van Buren, there was an excess of expenditure over the income of the government, to the amount of between seven and eight millions of dollars; and I say that it was the duty of that administration, the moment they found this deficit to exist in the revenue, to have resorted to the adequate remedy by laying the requisite amount of taxes on the free articles to meet and to supply the deficiency.

I shall say nothing more on the first resolution, because I do hope that, whatever the previous practice of this government may have been, there is no senator here who will hesitate to concur in the truth of the general propositions it contains.

The next three resolutions all relate to the same general subjects――subjects which I consider much the most important of any here set forth; and I shall, for that reason, consider them together.

The second resolution asserts,

‘That such an adequate revenue cannot be obtained by duties
on foreign imports, without adopting a higher rate than twenty
per centum, as provided for in the compromise act, which, at
the time of its passage, was supposed and assumed as a rate
that would supply a sufficient revenue for an economical
administration of the government.’

The third resolution concludes,

‘That the rate of duties on foreign imports ought to be
augmented beyond the rate of twenty per centum, so as to produce
a net revenue of twenty-six millions of dollars――twenty-two
for the ordinary expenses of government, two for the payment
of the existing debt, and two millions as a reserved fund for
contingencies.’

The fourth resolution asserts,

‘That, in the adjustment of a tariff to raise an amount of
twenty-six millions of revenue, the principles of the compromise
act generally should be adhered to; and that especially a
maximum rate of ad valorem duties should be established, from
which there ought to be as little departure as possible.’

The first question which these resolutions suggest, is this: what should be the amount of the annual expenditures of this government? Now, on this point, I shall not attempt, what is impossible, to be exact and precise in stating what that may be. We can only make an approximation. No man, in his private affairs, can say, or pretends to say, at the beginning of the year, precisely what shall be the amount of his expenses during the year; that must depend on many unforeseen contingencies, which cannot, with any precision, be calculated beforehand; all that can be done is to make an approximation to what ought to be or what may be the amount. Before I consider that question, allow me to correct, here, an assertion made first by the senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) and subsequently by the senator from Missouri near me, (Mr. Linn,) and I believe by one or two other gentlemen, namely, that the whig party, when out of power, asserted that, if trusted with the helm, they would administer this government at an amount of expenditure not exceeding thirteen millions of dollars. I hope, if such an assertion was actually made by either or all of these gentlemen, that it will never be repeated again, without resorting to proof to sustain it. I know of no such position ever taken by the whig party, or by any prominent member of the whig party. Sure I am that the party generally pledged itself to no such reduction of the public expenses――none.

And I again say that I trust, before such an assertion is repeated, the proofs will be adduced. For in this case, as in others, that which is asserted and reiterated, comes at last to be believed. The whig party did promise economy and retrenchment, and I trust will perform their promise. I deny (in no offensive sense) that the whig party ever promised to reduce the expenditures of this government to thirteen millions of dollars. No; but this was what they said: during the four years of the administration of Mr. Adams, the average amount of the public expenditure was but thirteen millions, and you charged that administration with outrageous extravagance, and came yourselves into power on promises to reduce the annual expenditure; but, having obtained power, instead of reducing the public expenses, you carried them up to the astonishing amount of near forty millions. But, while the whigs never asserted that they would administer the government with thirteen millions, our opponents, our respected opponents, after having been three years in power, instead of bringing the expenses below the standard of Mr. Adams’s administration, declared that fifteen millions was the amount at which the expenditures should be fixed. This was the ground taken by Mr. McLane, when he was at the head of the treasury. I have his report before me; but as the fact, I presume, will not be denied, I forbear to read from it. He suggests, as the fit amount to be raised by the tariff he had proposed, the sum of fifteen millions of dollars as sufficient to meet the wants of the government.

I hope now I have shown that the whig party, before they obtained power, never were pledged to bring down the public expenses, either to thirteen or to fifteen millions. They were pledged, I admit, to retrench unnecessary expenditures, and to make a reasonable deduction, whenever it could properly be made, consistently with the public service; that process, as I understand, is now going on in both houses, and I trust the fruits will be seen before the end of the present session.

Unpledged, therefore, as the whig party was, as to any specific amount, the question recurs, at what sum can the expenses of the government be now fixed?

I repeat that the exact amount is difficult to be ascertained. I have stated it in the resolution I now offer, at _twenty-two millions_; and I shall soon show how I have arrived at the amount. But, before I do that, allow me to call the attention of the senate to the expenditures of the preceding administration; for, in attempting to fix a sum for the future, I know of no course but to look back upon the experience of the past, and then to endeavor to deduce from it the probable amount of future expenditure. What, then, were the expenditures of the four years of the past administration?

In 1837 the amount was $37,265,037.15
In 1838 it was 39,455,438.35
In 1839 it was 37,614,936.15
In 1840 it was 28,226,533.81
―――――――――――――――
Making an aggregate of $142,561,945.46

Which gives us an average per year of thirty-five million, six hundred and forty thousand, four hundred and eighty-six dollars, and thirty-eight cents.

The sum I have proposed is only twenty-two millions, which deducted from thirty-five, as above, leaves a reduction of thirteen million, six hundred and forty thousand dollars――being a sum greater than the whole average expenditure of the extravagant and profligate administration of Mr. Adams, which they told us was so enormous that it must be reduced by a great ‘retrenchment and reform.’

I am not here going to inquire into the items which composed the large expenditures of the four years of Mr. Van Buren’s administration. I know what has been said, and will again be said, on that subject――that there were many items of extra expenditure, which may never occur again. Be it so; but do we not know that every administration has its extras, and that these may be expected to arise, and will and must arise, under every administration beneath the sun? But take this also into view in looking at the expenses of that administration: that less was expended on the national defence, less in the construction or repair of fortifications, less for the navy, and less for other means of repelling a foreign attack, than, perhaps, ought to have been expended. At present we are all animated with a common zeal and determination on the subject of defence; all feel the necessity of some adequate plan of defence, as well upon the ocean as the land, and especially of putting our navy and our fortifications in a better state to defend the honor and protect the rights of the nation. We feel this necessity, although we all trust that the calamity of a war may be averted. This calls for a greater amount of money for these purposes than was appropriated under Mr. Van Buren’s administration; beside which, in the progress of affairs, unforeseen exigencies may arise, and do constantly occur, calling for other appropriations needed, which no man can anticipate. Every ministry in every government, every administration of our own government, has its extraordinaries and its contingencies; and it is no apology for Mr. Van Buren’s administration to say, that the circumstances which occasioned its expenditures were extraordinary and peculiar. Making all the allowances which its warmest friends can ask for the expenses of the inglorious war in Florida――a contest which has profusely wasted not only the resources of the treasury, but the best blood of the nation――making the amplest allowance for this and for all other extras whatever, the sum expended by the last administration still remains to be far, far beyond what is proposed in these resolutions, as sufficient for the present, and for years to come. It must, in candor, be conceded that this is a very great diminution of the national expenditure; and such, if nothing else were done, would redeem the pledge of the whig party.

But let us now consider the subject in another light. Thirteen millions was the average annual amount of expenditure under Mr. Adams’s administration, which terminated thirteen years ago. I should be authorized, therefore, to take the commencement of his administration, in 1825, being a period of seventeen years, in making a comparison of the progressive increase of the national expenditures; or, at all events, adding one half of Mr. Adams’s term, to take the period as running fifteen years back; but I shall not avail myself of this perfectly fair calculation; and I will therefore say, that at the end of thirteen years, from the time when the expenditures were thirteen millions, I propose that they be raised to twenty-two millions. And is this an extraordinary increase for such a period, in a country of such rapid increase and development as this is? What has occurred during this lapse of time? The army has been doubled, or nearly so; it has increased from a little over six thousand men to twelve thousand. We have built six, eight, or ten ships of the line; (I do not recollect the precise number;) two or three new states have been added to the union; and two periodical enumerations have been made to the national population; besides which, there have been, and yet are to be, vast expenditures, on works of fortification and national defence. Now, when we look at the increase in the number of members in both houses of congress, and consider the necessary and inevitable progress and growth of the nation, is it, I ask, an extraordinary thing, that, at the end of a period of thirteen years, our expenditures should increase from thirteen to twenty-two millions? If we take the period at seventeen years, (as we fairly may,) or at but fifteen years, the increase of expenses will be found not to go beyond the proportional increase of our population within the same period. That increase is found to be about four per centum annually; and the increase of government expenditures, at the rate above stated, will not exceed that. This is independent of any augmentation of the army or navy, of the addition of new states and territories, or the enlargement of the numbers in congress. Taking the addition, at the end of thirteen years, to be nine millions of dollars, it will give an annual average increase of about seven hundred thousand dollars. And I think that the government of no people, young, free, and growing, as is this nation, can, under circumstances like ours, be justly charged with rashness, recklessness, or extravagance, if its expenses increase but at the rate of seven hundred thousand dollars per annum. If our posterity, after their numbers shall have swelled to one hundred millions, shall find that their expenses have augmented in no greater ratio than this, they will have no cause of complaint of the profuseness or extravagance of their government.

But, it should be recollected, that while I have fixed the rate of expenditure at the sum I have mentioned, namely, twenty-two millions, this does not preclude further reductions, if they shall be found practicable, after existing abuses have been explored, and all useless or unnecessary expenditures have been lopped off.

The honorable senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) has favored us, on more occasions than one, with an account of the reforms he effected, when at the head of the war department of this government; and no man, certainly, can be less disposed than I am to deprive him of a single feather which he thinks he put in his cap by that operation. But what does he tell us was his experience in this business of retrenchment? He tells us what we all know to be true――what every father, every householder, especially finds to be true in his own case――that it is much easier to plunge into extravagance than to reduce expenses; and it is preëminently true of a nation. Every nation finds it far easier to rush into an extravagant expenditure of the money entrusted to its public agents, than to bring down the public expenditures from a profuse and reckless to an economical standard. All useful and salutary reforms must be made with care and circumspection. The gentleman from South Carolina admits, that the reforms he accomplished took him four years to bring about. It was not till after four years of constant exertion that he was enabled to establish a system of just accountability, and to bring down the expenses of the army to that average per man, to which they were at length reduced. And now, with all his personal knowledge of the difficulties of such a task, was it kind in him, was it kind or fair in his associates, to taunt us, as they have done, by already asking, ‘where are the reforms you promised to accomplish when you were out of power?’

[Mr. Calhoun here rose to explain, and observed, that what he
had again and again said, on the subject of reforms, was no more
than this, that it was time the promised reforms should begin,
it was time they should _begin_; and that was all he now asked.]

Very well; if that is all he asks, the gentleman will not be disappointed. We could not begin at the extra session; it could not then reasonably be expected of us; for what is the duty of a new administration, when it first comes into the possession of power? Its immediate and pressing care is to carry on the government; to become acquainted with the machine; to look how it acts in various parts, and to take care that it shall not work injuriously to the public interest. They cannot, at once, look back at the past abuses; it is not practicable to do so; it must have time to look into the pigeon-holes of the various bureaux, to find out what has been done, and what is doing. Its first great duty is to keep the machine of government in regular motion. It could not, therefore, be expected that congress would go into a thorough process of reform at the extra session. Its peculiar object then was to adopt measures of immediate and indispensable relief to the people, and to the government. Besides which, the subsequent misfortunes of the whig party were well known. President Harrison occupied the chair of state but for a single month; and the members of his cabinet left it under circumstances which, let me here say, do them the highest honor. I do not enter upon the inquiry whether the state of things, which they supposed to exist did actually exist or not; but, believing it to exist, as they did, their resignation presents one of the most signal examples of the sacrifice of the honors and emoluments of high station, at great expense and personal inconvenience, and of noble adherence to honor and good faith, which the history of any country can show. But I may justly claim, not only on behalf of the retiring secretaries, but for the whole whig party, a stern adherence to principle, in utter disregard of the spoils doctrine, and of all those baser motives and considerations which address themselves to some men with so great a power. I say, then, that the late extra session was no time to achieve a great, and extensive, and difficult reform throughout the departments of the government; a process like that can be attempted only during a regular session of congress; and do not gentlemen know that it is now in progress, by the faithful hands to which it has here and elsewhere in congress been committed? and that an extraordinary committee has been raised in this body, insomuch that, to effect it, the senate has somewhat shot from its usual and appropriate orbit, by establishing a standing committee of retrenchment? If the honorable senator from South Carolina took four years to bring down the expenses of the war department, when under his own immediate superintendence, I may surely, with confidence, make my appeal to his sense of justice and liberality, to allow us, at least, two years, before he reproaches us with a failure in a work so much more extensive.

I will now say, that, in suggesting the propriety of fixing the annual average expenditure of this government at twenty-two millions of dollars, from this time, and for some years to come, it is not my purpose to preclude any further reductions of expense, by the dismissal of useless officers, the abolition of useless institutions, and the reduction of unnecessary or extravagant expenditures. No man is more desirous than I am of seeing this government administered at the smallest possible expense consistent with the duties intrusted to us, in the management of our public interests, both at home and abroad. None will rejoice more, if it shall be found practicable to reduce our expenses to eighteen, to fifteen, or even to thirteen millions. None, I repeat it, will rejoice in such a triumph of economy more heartily than I. None, none.

But now allow me to proceed to state by what process I have reached the sum of twenty-two millions, as proposed in the resolution I have offered.

The secretary of the treasury has presented to us estimates for the current year, independent of permanent expenses, of a million and a half, amounting to about twenty-four and a half millions, which may be stated under the following heads, namely:

For civil list, foreign intercourse,
and miscellaneous $4,000,987.85
For the war department, including all
branches 11,717,791.27
Naval service 8,705,579.83
――――――――――――――
$24,424,358.95

And here let me say a single word in defence of the army. The department of war comes to us with estimates for the sum of eleven million, seven hundred and seventeen thousand, seven hundred and ninety-two dollars, and twenty-seven cents; and those who look only on the surface of things, may suppose that this sum is extraordinarily large; but there are many items in that sum. I have before me a statement, going to show, that, of that sum, only four millions are asked for the military service proper――a sum less than is demanded for the naval service proper, and only double the amount at which it stood when the honorable gentleman from South Carolina left the department. The sum was then about two millions of dollars; it is now not quite four millions of dollars; while, during the same period, the army has been nearly doubled, besides the raising of mounted regiments, the most expensive, for that very reason, of any in the service. I think that the gentleman from South Carolina, if he looks into the subject in detail, will find that the cost of the army is not, at this hour, greater per man, than it was when under his own personal administration. So I am informed; and that, although the pay has been raised a dollar a month, which has very largely augmented the expenditure.

The executive branch of the government has sent in estimates amounting in all to twenty-four and a half millions of dollars, for the service of the current year, which, with the million and a half of permanent expenditure, makes twenty-six millions. How much is to be added to that amount for appropriations not yet estimated, which may be made during the session by congress, to meet honest claims, and for other objects of a public nature? I remember one item proposed by my friend near me, (Mr. Mangum,) for a quarter of a million for the building of a steam-ship, an item not included in the estimates, but for which the senate has already appropriated: besides which there are various other items which have passed or will pass during the present session. When the honorable gentleman from New Hampshire was at the head of the treasury, he made, in his communications to congress, constant complaints of this very practice. He well remembers that he was ever complaining that the expenditures of government were swelled far beyond the executive estimates, by appropriations made by congress not estimated for by the departments. I have calculated that we shall add to the twenty-six millions of dollars estimated for the executive departments, or permanently required, at least one million and a half, which would raise the sum for this year to twenty-seven millions and a half.

How then do I propose to bring this down to twenty-two millions? I have, I own, some fears that we shall not be able to effect it; but I hope that we shall so far reduce the estimates and prevent unnecessary appropriations, that the total expenditures shall not exceed that amount. The mode in which I propose to reach such a result is this; I suppose we may effect a reduction of the civil list to the amount of half a million. That general head includes, among other things, the expenses of the two houses, and, as I have heard, the other house has already introduced a report which, if adopted, will cut down those expenses one hundred thousand dollars, though I think that they should be reduced much more. I estimate, then, three and a half millions for the civil list, instead of four millions; then I estimate nine millions for the war department, instead of eleven millions and seven hundred and seventeen thousand dollars. In a conversation which I have lately held with the chairman of the military committee of this body, he expressed the apprehension, that it could not be reduced below ten millions, but I hope it may be cut down to nine. As to the naval service, the estimates of the department for that branch of the service, amount to eight millions seven hundred and seven thousand and five hundred dollars; an amount I think far too high, and indeed quite extravagant. I was greatly astonished at learning the amount was so large. Still I know that the navy is the favorite of all, and justly; it is the boast of the nation, and our great resource and chief dependence in the contingency of a war; no man thinks for a moment of crippling or disabling this right arm of our defence. But I have supposed that without injury the appropriation asked for might be reduced from eight million, seven hundred and seven thousand, and five hundred, to six million and five hundred thousand dollars. This would put the reduction in the naval on a footing with that in the military appropriation, and still leave a greater appropriation than usual to that department. The reduction to six millions and a half is as large as I think will be practicable, if we are to provide for proposed experiments in the application of steam, and are, besides, to add largely to the marine corps.

How, then, will the total of our expenditures stand? We shall have,

For the civil and diplomatic expenses
of the government $3,500,000
For the military service 9,000,000
For the naval service 6,500,000
For permanent appropriations 1,500,000
For appropriations not included in
estimates 1,500,000
―――――――――――
Making an aggregate of $22,000,000

To this amount I suppose, and hope, our expenses may be reduced, until, on due investigation, it shall be discovered that still further reductions may be effected.

Well, then, having fixed the amount at twenty-two millions for the ordinary current expenses of government, I have supposed it necessary and proper to add two millions more to make provision for the payment of the existing national debt, which is, in the event of the loan’s being taken up, seventeen millions. And then I go on to add two millions more as a reserved fund, to meet contingencies; so that, should there be a temporary rise of the expenditures beyond twenty-two millions, or any sudden emergency should occur which could not be anticipated or calculated on, there may be the requisite means in the treasury to meet it. Nor has there been a single secretary at the head of the treasury since the days of Mr. Gallatin, including the respectable gentleman from New Hampshire opposite, (Mr. Woodbury,) who has not held and expressed the opinion, that a reserved fund is highly expedient and proper for contingencies. Thus I propose that twenty-two millions shall be appropriated for ordinary expenses, two millions more to provide for the public debt, and other two millions a reserved fund to meet contingencies; making in all twenty-six millions.