Chapter I: YESTERDAY, sir, gave notice that I should ask leave to introduce (5)

‘Entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation
to the bank of the United States, _as at present organized_,’
(noncommittal once more: and what _that_ means, Mr. President,
nobody better knows than _you_ and I,) ‘I felt it my duty, in
my former messages, _frankly to disclose them_.’

_Frank_ disclosures! Now, sir, I recollect perfectly well the impressions made on my mind, and on those of other senators with whom I conversed, immediately after the message was read. We thought and said to each other, the president has left a door open to pass out. It is not the bank; it is not _any_ bank of the United States to which he is opposed, but it is to the particular organization of the existing bank. And we all concluded that, if amendments could be made to the charter satisfactory to the president, he would approve a bill for its renewal.

We come now to the famous message of July, 1832, negativing the bill to recharter the bank. Here, it may be expected, we shall certainly find clear opinions, unequivocally expressed. The president cannot elude the question. He must now be perfectly _frank_. We shall presently see. He says:

‘A bank of the United States is, in _many_ respects, convenient
to the government, and useful to the people. Entertaining this
_opinion_, and deeply impressed with the belief that _some_ of
the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank, are
unauthorized by the constitution.’ and so forth. * * * ‘I felt
it my duty, at an early period of my administration, to call the
attention of congress to the practicability of _organizing an
institution_, combining all its advantages, and obviating these
objections. I sincerely regret, that in the act before me I can
perceive none of _those modifications_,’ and so forth. * * *
‘That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties
which may be required by the government, might be so organized
as not to infringe on our own delegated powers, or the reserved
rights of the states, I do not entertain _a doubt_. Had the
executive been called on to furnish _the project of such an
institution_, the duty would have been cheerfully performed.’

The message is principally employed in discussing the objections which the president entertained to the particular provisions of the charter, and not to the bank itself; such as the right of foreigners to hold stock in it; its exemption from state taxation; its capacity to hold real estate, and so forth, and so forth. Does the president, even in this message, array himself in opposition to any bank of the United States? Does he even oppose himself to the existing bank under every organization of which it is susceptible? On the contrary, does he not declare that he does not entertain _a doubt_ that a bank may be constitutionally organized? Does he not even rebuke congress for not calling on him to furnish a project of a bank, which he would have cheerfully supplied? Is it not fairly deducible, from the message, that the charter of the present bank might have been so amended as to have secured the president’s approbation to the institution? So far was the message from being decisive against all banks of the United States, or against the existing bank, under any modification, that the president expressly declares that the question was adjourned. He says:

‘A general discussion will now take place, eliciting new
light, and settling important principles; and a _new_ congress,
elected in the midst of such discussion, and furnishing an equal
representation of the people, according to the last census, will
bear to the _capitol_ the verdict of public opinion, and I doubt
not bring this important question to a satisfactory result.’

This review of the various messages of the president, conclusively evinces that they were far from expressing, frankly and decisively, any opinions of the chief magistrate, except that he was opposed to the amendments of the charter contained in the bill submitted to him for its renewal, and that he required further amendments. It demonstrates that he entertained no doubt that it was practicable and desirable to establish a bank of the United States; it justified the hope that he might be ultimately reconciled to the continuation of the present bank, with _suitable_ modifications; and it expressly proclaimed that the whole subject was adjourned to the new congress, to be assembled under the last census. If the parts of the messages which I have cited, or other expressions, in the same document, be doubtful, or susceptible of a different interpretation, the review is sufficient for my purpose; which is, to refute the argument, so confidently advanced, that the president’s opinion, in opposition to the present or any other bank of the United States, was frankly and fairly stated to the people, prior to the late election, was fully understood, and finally decided by them.

Accordingly, in the canvass which ensued, it was boldly asserted by the partisans of the president, that he was not opposed to a bank of the United States, nor to the existing bank with proper amendments. They maintained, at least, wherever those friendly to a national bank were in the majority, that the reëlection would be followed by a recharter of the bank, with proper amendments. They dwelt, it is true, with great earnestness, upon his objections to the pernicious influence of foreigners in holding stock in it; but they nevertheless contended that these objections would be cured, if he was reëlected, and the bank sustained. I appeal to the whole senate, to my colleagues, to the people of Kentucky, and especially to the citizens of the city of Louisville, for the correctness of this statement.

After all this, was it anticipated by the people of the United States, that, in the reëlection of the president, they were deciding against an institution of such vital importance? Could they have imagined, that, after an express adjournment of the whole matter to a new congress, by the president himself, he would have prejudged the action of this new congress, and pronounced that a question, expressly by himself referred to its authority, was previously settled by the people? He claimed no such result in his message, immediately after the reëlection; although in it he denounced the bank as an unsafe depository of the public money, and invited congress to investigate its condition. The president, then, and the secretary of the treasury, are without all color of justification for their assertions, that the question of bank or no bank was fully and fairly submitted to the people, and a decision pronounced against it by them.

Sir, I am surprised and alarmed at the new source of executive power, which is found in the result of a presidential election. I had supposed that the constitution and the laws were the sole source of executive authority; that the constitution could only be amended in the mode which it has itself prescribed; that the issue of a presidential election, was merely to place the chief magistrate in the post assigned to him; and that he had neither more nor less power, in consequence of the election, than the constitution defines and delegates. But it seems that if, prior to an election, certain opinions, no matter how ambiguously put forth by a candidate, are known to the people, these loose opinions, in virtue of the election, incorporate themselves with the constitution, and afterwards are to be regarded and expounded as parts of the instrument.

Third. The public money ought not, the secretary thinks, to remain in the bank until the last moment of the existence of the charter. But that was not the question which he had to decide on the twenty-sixth of September last. The real question then was, could he not wait sixty days for the meeting of congress? There were many _last_ moments, nearly two years and a half, between the twenty-sixth of September and the day of the expiration of the charter. But why not let the public money remain in the bank until the last day of the charter? It is a part of the charter, that it shall so remain; and congress having so ordered it, the secretary ought to have acquiesced in the will of congress, unless the exigency had arisen on which alone it was supposed his power over the deposits would be exercised. The secretary is greatly mistaken, in believing that the bank will be less secure in the last hours of its existence than previously. It will then be collecting its resources, with a view to the immediate payment of its notes, and the ultimate division among the stockholders of their capital; and at no period of its existence will it be so strong and able to pay all demands upon it. As to the depreciation in the value of its notes in the interior, at that time, why, sir, is the secretary possessed of the least knowledge of the course of the trade of the interior, and especially of the western states? If he had any, he could not have made such a suggestion. When the bank itself is not drawing, its notes form the best medium of remittance from the interior to the Atlantic capitals. They are sought after by merchants and traders with avidity, are never below par, and in the absence of bank drafts may command a premium. This will continue to be the case as long as the charter endures, and especially during the last moments of its existence, when its ability will be unquestionable, Philadelphia being the place of the redemption; whilst the notes themselves will be received in all the large cities in payment of duties.

Fourth. The secretary asserts, that ‘it is _well understood_ that the superior credit heretofore enjoyed by the notes of the bank of the United States, was not founded on any particular confidence in its management or solidity. It was occasioned _altogether_ by the agreement on behalf of the public, in the act of incorporation, to receive them in all payments to the United States.’ I have rarely seen any state paper characterized by so little gravity, dignity, and circumspection, as the report displays. The secretary is perfectly reckless in his assertions of matters of fact, and culpably loose in his reasoning. Can he believe the assertion which he has made? Can he believe, for example, that if the notes of the bank of the Metropolis were made receivable in all payments to the government, they would ever acquire, at home and abroad, the credit and confidence which are attached to those of the bank of the United States? If he had stated that the faculty mentioned, was one of the elements of the great credit of those notes, the statement would have been true; but who can agree with him, that it is the _sole_ cause? The credit of the bank of the United States results from the large amount of its capital; from the great ability and integrity with which it has been administered; from the participation of the government in its affairs; from its advantageous location; from its being the place of deposit of the public moneys, and its notes being receivable in all payments to the government; and from its being emphatically _the bank of the United States_. This latter circumstance arranges it with the bank of England, France, Amsterdam, Genoa, and so forth.

Fifth. The expansion and contraction of the accommodations of the bank to its individual customers, are held up by the secretary, in bold relief, as evidences of misconduct, which justified his withdrawal of the deposits. He represents the bank as endeavoring to operate on the public, by alternate bribery and oppression, with the same object in both cases, of influencing the election, or the administration of the president. Why this perpetual reference of all the operations of the institution to the executive? Why does the executive think of nothing but itself? It is I! It is I! It is I, that is meant! appears to be the constant exclamation. Christianity and charity enjoin us never to ascribe a bad motive if we can suppose a good one. The bank is a moneyed corporation, whose profits result from its business; if that be extensive, it makes better; if limited, less profit. Its interest is to make the greatest amount of dividends which it can safely. And all its actions may be more certainly ascribed to that than any other principle. The administration must have a poor opinion of the virtue and intelligence of the people of the United States, if it supposes that their judgments are to be warped, and their opinions controlled by any scale of graduated bank accommodations. The bank must have a still poorer conception of its duty to the stockholder, if it were to regulate its issues by the uncertain and speculative standard of political effect, rather than a positive arithmetical rule for the computation of interest.

As to the alleged extension of the business of the bank, it has been again and again satisfactorily accounted for by the payment of the public debt, and the withdrawal from Europe of considerable sums, which threw into its vaults a large amount of funds, which, to be productive, must be employed; and, as the commercial wants proceeding from extraordinary activity of business, created great demands about the same period for bank accommodations, the institution naturally enlarged its transactions. It would have been treacherous to the best interests of its constituents if it had not done so. The recent contraction of its business is the result of an obvious cause. Notwithstanding the confidence in it, manifested by one of the last acts of the last house of representatives, congress had scarcely left the district before measures were put in operation to circumvent its authority. Denunciations and threats were put forth against it. Rumors, stamped with but too much authority, were circulated, of the intention of the executive to disregard the admonition of the house of representatives. An agent was sent out――_and then such an agent_――to sound the local institutions as to the terms on which they would receive the deposits. Was the bank, who could not be ignorant of all this, to sit carelessly by, without taking any precautionary measures? The prudent mariner, when he sees the coming storm, furls his sails, and prepares for all its rage. The bank knew that the executive was in open hostility to it, and that it had nothing to expect from its forbearance. It had numerous points to defend, the strength or weakness of all of which was well known from its weekly returns to the secretary, and it could not possibly know at which the first mortal stroke would be aimed. If, on the twentieth of September last, instead of the manifesto of the president against the bank, he had officially announced, that he did not mean to make war upon the bank, and intended to allow the public deposits to remain until the pleasure of congress was expressed, public confidence would have been assured and unshaken, the business of the country continued in quiet and prosperity, and the numerous bankruptcies in our commercial cities averted. The wisdom of human actions is better known in their results than at their inception. That of the bank is manifest from all that has happened, and especially from its actual condition of perfect security.

Sixth. The secretary complains of misconduct of the bank in delegating to the committee of exchange the transaction of important business, and in that committee’s being appointed by the president and not the board, by which the government directors have been excluded. The directors who compose the board meet only periodically. Deriving no compensation from their places, which the charter, indeed, prohibits them from receiving, it cannot be expected that they should be constantly in session. They must, necessarily, therefore, devolve a great part of the business of the bank in its details, upon the officers and servants of the corporation. It is sufficient, if the board controls, governs, and directs the whole machine. The most important operation of a bank, is that of paying out its cash, and that the cashier or teller and not the board performs. As to committees of exchange, the board not being always in session, it is evident that the convenience of the public requires that there should be some authority at the bank daily, to pass daily upon bills, either in the sale or purchase, as the wants of the community require. Every bank, I believe, that does business to any extent, has a committee of exchange, similar to that of the bank of the United States. In regard to the mode of appointment by the president of the board, it is in conformity with the invariable usage of the house of representatives, with the practice of the senate for several years, and, until altered at the commencement of this session, with the usage, in a great variety, if not all of the state legislatures, and with that which prevails in our popular assemblies. The president, speaker, chairman, moderator, almost uniformly appoints committees. That none of the government directors have been on the committee of exchange, has proceeded, it is to be presumed, from their not being entitled, from their skill and experience, and standing in society, to be put there. The government directors stand upon the same equal footing with those appointed by the stockholders. When appointed, they are thrown into the mass, and must take their fair chances with their colleagues. If the president of the United States will nominate men of high character and credit, of known experience and knowledge in business, they will, no doubt, be placed in corresponding stations. If he appoints different men, he cannot expect it. Banks are exactly the places where currency and value are well understood, and duly estimated. A piece of coin, having even the stamp of the government, will not pass, unless the metal is pure.

Seventh. The French bill forms another topic of great complaint with the secretary. The state of the case is, that the government sold to the bank a bill on that of France for nine hundred thousand dollars, which the bank sold in London, whence it was sent by the purchaser to Paris to receive the amount. When the bank purchased the bill, it paid the amount to the government, or, which is the same thing, passed it to the credit of the treasury, to be used on demand. The bill was protested in Paris, and the agents of the bank, to avoid its being liable to damages, took up the bill on account of the bank. The bill being dishonored, the bank comes back on the drawer, and demands the customary damages due according to the course of all such transactions. The complaint of the secretary is, that the bank took up the bill to save its own credit, and that it did not do it on account of the government; in other words, that the bank did not advance at Paris nine hundred thousand dollars to the government on account of a bill which it had already paid, every dollar, at Philadelphia. Why, sir, has the secretary read the charter? If he has, he must have known that the bank could not have _advanced_ the nine hundred thousand dollars for the government at Paris, without subjecting itself to a penalty of three times the amount, (two million and seven hundred thousand dollars.) The thirteenth section of the charter is express and positive:

‘That if the said corporation shall _advance_ or lend any sum
of money for _the use or on account_ of the government of the
United States, to an amount exceeding five hundred thousand
dollars, all persons concerned in making such unlawful advances
or loan, shall forfeit treble the amount, one fifth to the
informer,’ and so forth.

Eighth. The last reason which I shall notice of the secretary is, that this ambitious corporation aspires to possess political power. Those in the actual possession of power, especially when they have grossly abused it, are perpetually dreading its loss. The miser does not cling to his treasure with a more death-like grasp. Their suspicions are always active and on the alert. In every form they behold a rival, and every breeze comes charged with alarm and dread. A thousand spectres glide before their affrighted imaginations, and they see, in every attempt to enlighten those who have placed them in office, a sinister design to snatch from them their authority. On what other principles can we account for the extravagant charges brought forward by the secretary against the bank? More groundless and reckless assertions than those which he has allowed himself to embody in his report, never were presented to a deceived, insulted, and outraged people. Suffer me, sir, to group some of them. He asserts, ‘that there is _sufficient evidence to prove_ that the bank has used its means to obtain political power;’ that, in the presidential election, ‘the bank took an open and direct interest, demonstrating that it was using its money for the purpose of obtaining a hold upon the people of this country;’ that it ‘entered the political arena;’ that it circulated publications containing ‘attacks on the officers of government;’ that ‘it is now openly in the field as a political partisan;’ that there are ‘_positive proofs_’ of the efforts of the bank to obtain power. And, finally, he concludes, as a demonstrated proposition:

‘Fourthly, that there is sufficient evidence to show that the
bank has been and still is seeking to obtain political power,
and has used its money for the purpose of influencing the
election of the public servants.’

After all this, who can doubt that this ambitious corporation is a candidate for the next presidency? Or, if it can moderate its lofty pretensions, that it means at least to go for the office of secretary of the treasury, upon the next removal? But, sir, where are the proofs of these political designs? Can any thing be more reckless than these confident assertions of the secretary? Let us have the proofs; I call for the proofs. The bank has been the constant object for years of vituperation and calumny. It has been assailed in every form of bitterness and malignity. Its operations have been misrepresented; attempts have been made to destroy its credit, and the public confidence in its integrity and solidity; and the character of its officers has been assailed. Under these circumstances, it has dared to defend itself. It has circulated public documents, speeches of members of congress, reports made by chairmen of committees, friends of the administration, and other papers. And, as it was necessary to make the defence commensurate with the duration and the extensive theatre of the attack, it has been compelled to incur a heavy expense to save itself from threatened destruction. It has openly avowed, and yet avows, its right and purpose to defend itself. All this was known to the last congress. Not a solitary material fact has been since disclosed. And when before, in a country where the press is free, was it deemed criminal for any body to defend itself? Who invested the secretary of the treasury with power to interpose himself between the people, and light and intelligence? Who gave him the right to dictate what information should be communicated to the people and by whom? Whence does he derive his jurisdiction? Who made him censor of the public press? From what new sedition law does he deduce his authority? Is the superintendence of the American press a part of the financial duty of a secretary of the treasury? Why did he not lay the whole case before congress, and invite the revival of the old sedition law? Why anticipate the arrival of their session? Why usurp the authority of the only department of government competent to apply a remedy, if there be any power to abridge the freedom of the press? If the secretary wishes to purify the press, he has a most Herculean duty before him. And when he sallies out on his quixotic expedition, he had better begin with the Augean stable, the press nearest to him, his organ, as most needing purification.

I have done with the secretary’s reasons. They have been weighed and found wanting. There was not only no financial motive for his acting――the sole motive which he could officially entertain――but every financial consideration forbade him to act. I proceed now, in the third and last place, to examine the manner in which he has exercised his power over the deposits.

Thirdly. The whole people of the United States derive an interest from the public deposits in the bank of the United States, as a stockholder, in that institution. The bank is enabled, through its branches, to throw capital into those parts of the union where it is most needed. Thus it distributes and equalizes the advantages accruing from the collection of a large public revenue, and the consequent public deposits. Thus it neutralizes the injustice which would otherwise flow from the people of the west and the interior’s paying their full proportion of the public burdens, without deriving any corresponding benefit from the circulation and deposits of the public revenue. The use of the capital of the bank has been signally beneficial to the west. We there want capital, domestic, foreign――any capital that we can honestly get. We want it to stimulate enterprise, to give activity to business, and to develope the vast resources which the bounty of Nature has concentrated in that region. But, by the secretary’s financial arrangements, the twenty-five or thirty millions of the public revenue collected from all the people of the United States, (including those of the west,) will be retained in a few Atlantic ports. Each port will engross the public moneys there collected. And, as that of New York collects about one half of the public revenue, all the people of the United States will be laid under contribution, not for the sake of the people of the city of New York, but of two or three banks in that city, in which the people of the United States, collectively, have not a particle of interest; banks, the stock in which is or may be held by foreigners.

Three months have elapsed, and the secretary has not yet found places of deposit for the public moneys, as substitutes for the bank of the United States. He tells us, in his report of yesterday, that the bank at Charleston, to which he applied for their reception, declined the custody, and that he has yet found no other bank willing to assume it. But he states that the public interest does not in consequence suffer. No! What is done with the public moneys constantly receiving in the important port of Charleston, the largest port, (New Orleans excepted,) from the Potomac to the Gulf of Mexico? What with the revenue bonds? It appears that he has not yet received the charters from all the banks selected as places of deposit. Can any thing be more improvident than that the secretary should undertake to contract with banks, without knowing their power and capacity to contract by their charters? That he should venture to deposit the people’s money in banks, without a full knowledge of every thing respecting their actual condition? But he has found some banks willing to receive the public deposits, and he has entered into contracts with them. And the very first step he has taken has been in direct violation of an express and positive statute of the United States. By the act of the first of May, 1820, section sixth, it is enacted:

‘That no contract shall hereafter be made by the secretary of
state, or of _the treasury_, or of the department of war, or of
the navy, except under a law authorizing the same, or under an
appropriation adequate to its fulfilment; and excepting, also,
contracts for the subsistence and clothing of the army or navy,
and contracts by the quarter-master’s department, which may be
made by the secretaries of those departments.’

Now, sir, what law authorized these contracts with the local banks, made by the secretary _of the treasury_? The argument, if I understand the argument intended to be employed on the other side, is this; that, by the bank charter, the secretary, is authorized to remove the public deposits, and that includes the power in question? But the act establishing the treasury department confides, expressly, the safe-keeping of the public moneys of the United States to the treasurer of the United States, and not to the secretary; and the treasurer, not the secretary, gives a bond for the fidelity with which he shall keep them. The moment, therefore, that they are withdrawn from the bank of the United States, they are placed, by law, under the charge and responsibility of the treasurer and his bond, and not of the secretary, who has given no bond. But let us trace this argument a little further. The power to remove the deposits, says the secretary, _from_ a given place, implies the power to designate the place _to_ which they shall be removed. And this _implied_ power to designate the place to which they shall be removed, _implies_ the power to the secretary of the treasury to contract with the new banks of deposit. And, on this third link, in the chain of implications, a fourth is constructed, to dispense with the express duties of the treasurer of the United States, defined in a positive statute; and _yet a fifth_, to repeal a positive statute of congress, passed four years after the passage of the law containing the present source of this most extraordinary chain of implications. The exceptions in the act of 1820, prove the inflexibility of the rule which it prescribes. Annual appropriations are made for the clothing and subsistence of the army and navy. These appropriations might have been supposed to be included in a power to contract for those articles, notwithstanding the prohibitory clause in that act. But congress thought otherwise, and therefore expressly provided for the exceptions. It must be admitted that our clerk, (as the late governor Robinson, of Louisiana, one of the purest republicans I have ever known, used to call a secretary of the treasury,) tramples with very little ceremony upon the duties of the treasurer, and the acts of the congress of the United States, when they come in his way.

These contracts, therefore, between the secretary of the treasury and the local banks are mere nullities, and absolutely void, enforceable in no court of justice whatever, for two causes; first, because they are made in violation of the act of the first of May, 1820; and, secondly, because the treasurer, and not the secretary of the treasury, alone had, if any federal officer possessed the power to contract with the local banks. And here, again, we perceive the necessity there was for avoiding the precipitancy with which the executive acted, and for awaiting the meeting of congress. Congress could have deliberately reviewed the previous legislation, decided upon the expediency of a transfer of the public deposits, and, if deemed proper, could have passed the new laws adapted to the new condition of the treasury. It could have decided whether the local banks should pay any bonus, or pay any interest, or diffuse the public deposits throughout the United States, so as to secure among all their parts, equality of benefits as well as of burdens, and provided for ample guarantees for the safety of the public moneys in their new depositories.

But let us now inquire, whether the secretary of the treasury has exercised his usurped authority, in the formation of these contracts, with prudence and discretion. Having substituted himself to congress and to the treasurer of the United States, he ought at least to show that, in the stipulations of the contracts themselves, he has guarded the public moneys and provided for the public interests. I will examine the contract with the Girard bank of Philadelphia, which is presented as a specimen of the contracts with the Atlantic banks. The first stipulation limits the duty of the local banks to receive in deposit, on account of the United States, only the notes of banks convertible into coin, ‘in its _immediate_ vicinity,’ or which it is, ‘for the time being, in the habit of receiving.’ Under this stipulation, the Girard bank, for example, will not be bound to receive the notes of the Louisville bank, although that also be one of the deposit banks, nor the notes of any other bank, not in its immediate vicinity. As to the provision that it will receive the notes of banks which, for the time being, it is in the habit of receiving, it is absurd to put such a stipulation in a contract, because by the power retained to change the habit, for the time being, it is an absolute nullity. Now, sir, how does this compare with the charter and bank of the United States? The bank receives every where, and credits the government with the notes, whether issued by the branches or the principal bank. The amount of all these notes is every where available to the government. But the government may be overflowing in distant bank notes when they are not wanted, and a bankrupt, at the places of expenditure, under this singular arrangement.

With respect to the transfer of moneys from place to place, the local banks require in this contract, that it shall not take place but upon _reasonable_ notice. And what reasonable is, has been left totally undefined, and of course open to future contest. When hereafter a transfer is ordered, and the bank is unable to make it, there is nothing to do but to allege the unreasonableness of the notice. The local bank agrees to render to the government all the services now performed by the bank of the United States, subject, however, to the restriction that they are required ‘in the vicinity’ of the local bank. But the bank of the United States is under no such restrictions; its services are coextensive with the United States and their territories.

The local banks agree to submit their books and accounts to the secretary of the treasury, or to any agent to be appointed by him, but to be paid by the local banks pro rata, as far as such examination _is admissible without a violation of their respective charters_; and how far that may be, the secretary cannot tell, because he has not yet seen all the charters. He is, however, to appoint the agents of examination, and to fix the salaries which the local banks are to pay. And where does the secretary find the authority to create officers and fix their salaries, without the authority of congress?

But the most improvident, unprecedented, and extraordinary provision in the contract, is that which relates to the security. When, and not until the deposits in the local bank shall exceed one half of the capital stock annually paid in, collateral security, satisfactory to the secretary of the treasury, is to be given for the safety of the deposits. Why, sir, a freshman, a schoolboy, would not have thus dealt with his father’s guardian’s money. Instead of the security _preceding_, it is to _follow_ the deposit of the people’s money! That is, the local bank gets an amount of their money, equal to one half its capital, and then it condescends to give security! Does not the secretary know, that when he goes for the security, the money may be gone, and that he may be entirely unable to get the one or the other! We have a law, if I mistake not, which forbids the advance of any public money, even to a disbursing agent of the government, without previous security. Yet, in violation of the spirit of that law, or, at least, of all common sense and common prudence, the secretary disperses upwards of twenty-five millions of public revenue among a countless number of unknown banks, and stipulates that, when the amount of the deposit exceeds one half of their respective capitals, security is to be given!

The best stipulation in the whole contract, is the last, which reserves to the secretary of the treasury the power of discharging these local banks from the service of the United States whenever he pleases; and the sooner he exercises it, and restores the public deposits to the place of acknowledged safety, from which they have been rashly taken, the better for all parties concerned.

Let us look into the condition of one of these local banks, the nearest to us, and that with respect to which we have the best information. The banks of this district (and among them that of the Metropolis) are required to make annual reports of their condition on the first day of January. The latest official return from the Metropolis bank is of the first of January, 1832. Why it did not make one on the first of last January, along with the other banks, I know not. In point of fact, I am informed, it made none. Here is its account of January, 1832, and I think you will agree that it is a Flemish one. On the debit side stand capital paid in, five hundred thousand dollars. Due to the banks, twenty thousand nine hundred and eleven dollars and ten cents; individuals on deposit, seventy-four thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven dollars and forty-two cents; dividend and expenses, seventeen thousand five hundred and ninety-one dollars and seventy-seven cents; and surplus, eight thousand one hundred and thirty-one dollars and two cents; making an aggregate of six hundred and eighty-four thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars and thirty-one cents. On the credit side, there are bills and notes discounted, and stock (what sort?) bearing interest, six hundred and twenty-six thousand and eleven dollars and ninety cents; real estate, eighteen thousand four hundred and four dollars and eighty-six cents; notes of other banks on hand, and checks on the same, twenty-three thousand two hundred and thirteen dollars and eighty cents; specie――now, Mr. President, how much do you imagine? Recollect, that this is the bank selected at the seat of government, where there is necessarily concentrated a vast amount of public money, employed in the expenditure of government. Recollect that, by another executive edict, all public officers, charged with the disbursement of the public money here, are required to make their deposits with this Metropolis; and how much specie do you suppose it had at the date of its last official return? ten thousand nine hundred and seventy-four dollars and seventy-six cents; due from other banks, five thousand eight hundred and ninety dollars and ninety-nine cents; making in the aggregate on the credit side, six hundred and eighty-four thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars and thirty-one cents. Upon looking into the items, and casting them up, you will find that this Metropolis bank, on the first day of January, 1832, was liable to an immediate call for one hundred and seventy-six thousand three hundred and thirty-five dollars and twenty-nine cents, and that the amount which it had on hand, ready to meet that call, was forty thousand and seventy-nine dollars and fifty-five cents. And _this_ is one of the banks selected at the seat of the general government, for the deposit of the public moneys of the United States. A bank with a capital of thirty millions of dollars, and upwards of ten millions of specie on hand has been put aside, and a bank with a capital of half a million, and a little more than ten thousand dollars in specie on hand, has been substituted in its place! How that half million has been raised, whether in part or in the whole, by the neutralizing operation of giving stock notes in exchange for certificates of stock, does not appear.

The design of the whole scheme of this treasury arrangement seems to have been, to have united in one common league a number of local banks, dispersed throughout the union, and subject to one central will, with a right of scrutiny instituted by the agents of that will. It is a bad imitation of the New York project of a safety-fund. This confederation of banks will probably be combined in sympathy as well as interest, and will be always ready to fly to the succor of the source of their nourishment. As to their supplying a common currency, in place of that of the bank of the United States, the plan is totally destitute of the essential requisite. They are not required to credit each other’s paper, unless it be issued in the ‘_immediate vicinity_.’

We have seen what _is_ in this contract. Now let us see what is _not_ there. It contains no stipulation for the preservation of the public morals; none for the freedom of elections; none for the purity of the press. All these great interests, after all that has been said against the bank of the United States, are left to shift and take care of themselves as they can. We have already seen the president of a bank in a neighboring city, rushing impetuously to the defence of the secretary of the treasury against an editorial article in a newspaper, although the ‘venom of the shaft was quite equal to the vigor of the bow.’ Was he rebuked by the secretary of the treasury? Was the bank _discharged_ from the public service? Or, are morals, the press, and elections, in no danger of contamination, when a host of banks become literary champions on the side of power and the officers of government? Is the patriotism of the secretary only alarmed when the infallibility of high authority is questioned? Will the states silently acquiesce, and see the federal authority insinuating itself into banks of their creation, and subject to their exclusive control?

We have, Mr. President, a most wonderful financier at the head of our treasury department. He sits quietly by in the cabinet, and witnesses the contest between his colleague and the president; sees the conflict in the mind of that colleague between his personal attachment to the president on the one hand, and his solemn duty to the public on the other; beholds the triumph of conscientious obligation; contemplates the noble spectacle of an honest man, preferring to surrender an exalted office with all its honors and emoluments, rather than betray the interests of the people; witnesses the contemptuous and insulting expulsion of that colleague from office; and then coolly enters the vacated place, without the slightest sympathy or the smallest emotion. He was installed on the twenty-third of September, and by the twenty-sixth, the brief period of three days, he discovers that the government of the United States had been wrong from its origin; that every one of his predecessors from Hamilton down, including Gallatin, (who, whatever I said of him on a former occasion, and that I do not mean to retract, possessed more practical knowledge of currency, banks, and finance, than any man I have ever met in the public councils,) Dallas, and Crawford, had been mistaken about both the expediency and constitutionality of the bank; that every chief magistrate, prior to him whose patronage he enjoyed, had been wrong; that the supreme court of the United States, and the people of the United States, during the thirty-seven years that they had acquiesced in or recognised the utter utility of a bank, were all wrong. And, opposing his single opinion to their united judgments, he dismisses the bank, scatters the public money, and undertakes to regulate and purify the public morals, the public press, and popular elections!

If we examine the operations of this modern Turgot, in their financial bearing, merely, we shall find still less for approbation.

First. He withdraws the public moneys, where, by his own deliberate admission, they were perfectly safe, with a bank of thirty-five millions of capital, and ten millions of specie, and places them at great hazard with banks of comparatively small capital, and but little specie, of which the Metropolis bank is an example.

Second. He withdraws them from a bank created by, and over which the federal government had ample control, and puts them in other banks, created by different governments, and over which it has no control.

Third. He withdraws them from a bank in which the American people, as a stockholder, were drawing their fair proportion of interest accruing on loans, of which those deposits formed the basis, and puts them where the people of the United States draw no interest.

Fourth. From a bank which has paid a bonus of a million and a half, which the people of the United States may be now liable to refund, and puts them in banks which have paid to the American people no bonus.

Fifth. Depreciates the value of stock in a bank, where the general government holds seven millions, and advances that of banks in whose stock it does not hold a dollar; and whose aggregate capital does not probably much exceed that very seven millions. And, finally,

Sixth. He dismisses a bank whose paper circulates in the greatest credit throughout the union and in foreign countries, and engages in the public service banks whose paper has but a limited and local circulation in their ‘immediate vicinities.’

These are immediate and inevitable results. How much that large and long-standing item of unavailable funds, annually reported to congress, will be swelled and extended, remains to be developed by time.

And now, Mr. President, what, under all these circumstances, is it our duty to do? Is there a senator, who can hesitate to affirm, in the language of the resolution, that the president has assumed a dangerous power over the treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the constitution and the laws; and that the reasons assigned for the act, by the secretary of the treasury, are insufficient and unsatisfactory?

The eyes and the hopes of the American people are anxiously turned to congress. They feel that they have been deceived and insulted; their confidence abused; their interests betrayed; and their liberties in danger. They see a rapid and alarming concentration of all power in one man’s hands. They see that, by the exercise of the positive authority of the executive, and his negative power exerted over congress, the will of one man alone prevails, and governs the republic. The question is no longer what laws will congress pass, but what will the executive not veto? The president, and not congress, is addressed for legislative action. We have seen a corporation, charged with the execution of a great national work, dismiss an experienced, faithful, and zealous president, afterwards testify to his ability by a voluntary resolution, and reward his extraordinary services by a large gratuity, and appoint in his place an executive favorite, totally inexperienced and incompetent, to propitiate the president. We behold the usual incidents of approaching tyranny. The land is filled with spies and informers; and detraction and denunciation are the orders of the day. People, especially official incumbents in this place, no longer dare speak in the fearless tones of manly freedom, but in the cautious whispers of trembling slaves. The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us; and if congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die――ignobly die! base, mean, and abject slaves――the scorn and contempt of mankind――unpitied, unwept, unmourned!

ON THE PUBLIC DISTRESS CAUSED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 7, 1834.

[THE removal of the deposits from the bank of the United States,
by order of president Jackson, in October, 1833, caused great
pecuniary embarrassments and distress in the commercial cities
and towns of the United States, from the pernicious effect of
the measure on the banks and currency. Numerous memorials were
presented to congress, by the people, praying for relief. On
the presentation of a memorial from Philadelphia, Mr. Clay made
the brief remarks which follow, consisting principally of an
eloquent appeal to the vice-president, Mr. Van Buren, to use his
influence with general Jackson, to restore peace and prosperity
to the country.]