Chapter XCII: Act 8: Parliament 1. repeated in Act 99. Parliament 7 (18)

"Murat was disappointed of the crown of Spain, on which he had
fixed his hopes. It had been refused with surprise and
indignation by Napoleon's brother Louis, who wore reluctantly
even that of Holland, but was unwilling to exchange it for a
still deeper royal servitude. Joseph Bonaparte, however,
consented to abandon his more tranquil throne of Naples for
the dangers and discontents which surrounded that of Spain.
Napoleon, who had nominated him to it June 6th, was desirous
of procuring at least the apparent consent of the Spanish
nation. The Council of Castile, the chief political body of
Spain, when informed of the Treaties of Bayonne, was at last
induced to give a cold and reluctant assent to the accession
of Joseph. Its example was followed by the Supreme Junta and
the municipality of Madrid. There was, indeed, no alternative
but war. Ferdinand displayed on the occasion all the baseness
of his soul in its true colours. He not only wrote to Napoleon
to express his satisfaction at the elevation of Joseph, he
even addressed a letter of congratulation to the man who had
usurped his crown! thus testifying under his own hand his
utter unworthiness to wear it. A Junta of 150 Spanish
notables, which had been summoned to Bayonne, accepted a
constitution proposed by Napoleon, July 7th, and a day or two
after Joseph left Bayonne for Madrid. He had signed on the 5th
a treaty with his brother Napoleon, by which he renounced the
crown of Naples, made, as King of Spain, a perpetual offensive
alliance with France, fixed the number of troops and ships to
be provided by each nation, and agreed to the establishment of
a commercial system. By an act called Constitutional Statute,
July 15th, the vacant throne of Naples was bestowed upon
Joachim Murat. Ferdinand had found means to despatch from
Bayonne a proclamation addressed to the Asturians, and dated
May 8th, in which he called upon them to assert their
independence and never to submit to the perfidious enemy who
had deprived him of his rights. This letter naturally made a
great impression on a proud and sensitive people; nor was its
effect diminished by another proclamation which Ferdinand and
his brothers were compelled to sign at Bordeaux, May 12th,
calling upon the Spaniards not to oppose 'the beneficent
views' of Napoleon. At this last address, evidently extorted
from a prisoner, a general cry of indignation arose in Spain;
the people everywhere flew to arms, except where prevented by
the presence of French troops. The city of Valencia renounced
its obedience to the Government of Madrid, May 23rd; Seville
followed its example; and on the 27th, Joseph Palafox
organised at Saragossa the insurrection of Aragon. As these
insurrections were accompanied with frightful massacres,
principally of persons who had held high civil or military
posts under Charles IV., the better classes, to put an end to
these horrible scenes, established central Juntas in the
principal towns. … They proposed not to meet the enemy in
pitched battles in the open field, but to harass, wear out,
and overcome him by 'guerilla,' or the discursive and
incessant attacks of separate small bands. The Supreme Junta
issued instructions for conducting this mode of warfare.
Andalusia was better fitted for organising the revolt, if such
it can be called, than any other province of Spain. Its
population formed one-fifth of the whole nation, it possessed
the sole cannon-foundry in the kingdom, it contained half the
disposable Spanish army, and it could receive assistance from
the English both by means of Gibraltar and of Collingwood's
fleet that was cruising on the coast. One of the first feats
of arms of the Spaniards was to compel the surrender of five
French ships of the line and a frigate, which had remained in
the port of Cadiz ever since the battle of Trafalgar (June
14th). Marshal Moncey was repulsed towards the end of June in
an advance upon Valencia, and compelled to retreat upon Madrid
with a loss of one-third of his men. In the north-west the
Spaniards were less fortunate. Cuesta, with a corps of 25,000
men, was defeated by Marshal Bessières, July 14th, at Medina
del Rio Seco. The consequence of this victory was the
temporary submission of Leon, Palencia, Valladolid, Zamora,
and Salamanca to the French. But this misfortune was more than
counterbalanced by the victory of General Castaños over the
French in Andalusia, a few days after. Generals Dupont and
Vedel had advanced into that province as far as Cordova, but
they were defeated by Castaños with the army of Andalusia at
Baylen, July 20th. On this occasion, the commencement of the
French reverses in Spain, 18,000 French soldiers laid down
their arms. Joseph Bonaparte found it prudent to leave Madrid
August 1st, which he had only entered on the day of the
battle, and fly to Burgos. This important victory not only
inspired the Spaniards with confidence, but also caused them
to be regarded in Europe as a substantive Power. On the day
after the battle Castaños issued a proclamation which does him
great honour. He invoked the Spaniards to show humanity
towards the French prisoners of war, and threatened to shoot
those who should maltreat them. Such, however, was the
exasperation of the people against their invaders, that
numbers of the French were massacred on their route to Cadiz
for embarkation, and the remainder were treated with barbarous
inhumanity. These cruelties had, however, been provoked by the
atrocities of the French at the capture and sack of Cordova.
The campaign in Aragon was still more glorious for the
Spaniards.
{3002}
Palafox, whether or not he was the poltroon described by
Napier, had at all events the merit of organising, out of
almost nothing, the means by which the French were repulsed in
several desperate assaults upon Saragossa, and at length
compelled to retreat after a siege of some weeks (August
14th). The patriot cause was soon after strengthened by the
arrival at Corunna of General La Romana, with 7,000 of his men
from Denmark (September 20th). Keats, the English admiral in
the Baltic, had in·formed him of the rising of his countrymen
and provided him the means to transport his troops from
Nyborg. The English Government, soon after the breaking out of
the insurrection, had proclaimed a peace with the Spanish
nation (July 4th 1808), and had prepared to assist them in
their heroic struggle. The example of Spain had also
encouraged the Portuguese to throw off the insufferable yoke
of the French. A Junta was established at Oporto, June 6th,
and an insurrection was organised in all parts of the kingdom
where the French forces were not predominant. Sir Arthur
Wellesley, with about 10,000 British troops, landed at Mondego
Bay, July 31st."

_T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 7, chapter 14 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN:
_T. Hamilton,
Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns,
volume 1, chapters 4-10._

_Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 12 (volume 2)._

_General Foy,
History of the War in the Peninsula,
volume 2, part 1._

_Count Miot de Melito,
Memoirs,
chapters 23-28._

SPAIN: A. D. 1808 (September-December).
Napoleon's overwhelming campaign against the Spanish armies.
Joseph reinstated at Madrid.

The French disasters in the Peninsula shook the belief in
Napoleon's invincibility which had prevailed throughout the
Continent, and the Emperor saw that he must crush the
Spaniards at once, before the English could advance from the
fortified base they had acquired on the flank of the Spanish
plains. To secure his power on the side of Germany, he had a
prolonged interview with the Czar at Erfurt. … On the 14th
October the two Emperors parted; and at the end of the month
Napoleon set out from Paris for Bayonne, and continued his
journey to Vitoria. In September the French had evacuated
Tudela and Burgos, and had been driven from Bilbao by General
Joachim Blake [a Spanish officer of Irish descent]. But such
vast reinforcements had been poured across the Pyrenees, that
the French armies in Spain now numbered 250,000 men, and of
these 180,000 were drawn up behind the Ebro. On the last day
of October Lefevre re-took Bilbao; and Blake, after a defeat
at Tornosa, fell back upon Espinosa, where Napoleon, upon his
arrival, directed Marshal Victor … and Lefevre to assail him
with 40,000 men. The Spaniards, though numbering only 25,000,
held their ground till the morning of the second day's
fighting (11th November). With one part of the fugitives Blake
made a stand at Reynosa on the 13th against Marshal Soult, who
had achieved a victory over Belvedere at Burgos on the 10th;
but they were again broken, and fled to the mountains of the
Cantabrian chain. With the other part of the fugitives, about
10,000, the Marquis of La Romana made his way into Leon.
Castaños and Palafox had a united force of 43,000 men and 40
guns; but they were wrangling over their plans when Marshal
Lannes, the intrepid Duke of Montebello, … appeared with
35,000 men, and broke their centre at Tudela. But on the
Spanish left, the troops who had conquered at Baylen not only
maintained their ground with obstinacy, but drove back the
French. At length they were outnumbered, and Castaños fell
back in admirable order upon Madrid through Calatayud. The
right, under Palafox, retired in disorder to Saragossa; and
now the road to Madrid was blocked only by General San Juan
with 12,000 men, who had entrenched the Somo Sierra Pass. But
this post also was carried on the 30th November by the Polish
lancers of the Imperial Guard, who rode up and speared the
artillerymen at their guns. Aranjuez was at once abandoned by
the central Junta, and on the 2nd December the French vanguard
appeared on the heights north of Madrid. The capital became at
once a scene of tumult and confusion: barricades were erected,
and the bells sounded the alarm, but no discipline was visible
in the assembling bands; and when the heights of the Retiro,
overlooking the city, were carried by the French on the
morning of the 3rd December, the authorities sent out to
arrange a surrender. On the following morning … the French
entered the city, Joseph was again installed in the palace,
where deputations waited upon him to congratulate him and
renew their professions of devoted attachment, and the city
settled down once more to tranquil submission to the
foreigner."

_H. R. Clinton,
The War in the Peninsula,
chapter 3._

ALSO IN:
_General Vane (Marquis of Londonderry),
Story of the Peninsular War,
chapter 8._

SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (August-January).
Wellington's first campaign.
Convention of Cintra.
Evacuation of Portugal by the French.
Napoleon in the field.
Sir John Moore's advance into Spain.
His retreat.
His repulse of Soult at Corunna.
His death.

"Sir Arthur Wellesley's division comprised 9,000 men. Another
corps, under Sir John Moore, which had just arrived from the
Baltic, numbered 11,000 men. These two detachments were to
co-operate. But their united efforts were to be directed by
Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, two generals whose
exploits were better known in the private records of the Horse
Guards than in the annals of their country. … Sir Arthur
Wellesley landed his troops at Figuiera, a difficult task on
an iron coast. On the 7th of August, major-general Spencer's
corps joined the army. With 10,000 British and 5,000
Portuguese, Sir Arthur Wellesley then prepared to march
towards Lisbon. On the 17th he defeated at Roliça the French
under Laborde. On the 20th he was at Vimiero, having been
joined by General Anstruther and General Acland with their
corps. He had now an army of 17,000 men. Junot had joined
Laborde and Loison at Torres Vedras, and their united force
was about 14,000 men, of whom 1,600 were cavalry. Early in the
morning of the 21st, the French attacked the British in their
position. Sir Harry Burrard had arrived on the night of the
20th, but did not land. The principal attack on the British
was on the centre and left; the sea being in their rear. The
attack was repulsed. Kellermann then attacked with the French
reserve, and he also was driven back. Junot's left wing and
centre were discomfited. The road of Torres Vedras, the
shortest road to Lisbon, was uncovered. When the action was
nearly over, Sir Harry Burrard had landed. In a private
letter, Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote, 'The French got a terrible
beating on the 21st.
{3003}
They did not lose less, I believe, than 4,000 men, and they
would have been entirely destroyed, if Sir H. Burrard had not
prevented me from pursuing them. Indeed, since the arrival of
the great generals, we appear to have been palsied, and
everything has gone on wrong.' Sir John Moore arrived with his
corps on the 21st, and his troops were nearly all landed when
hostilities were suspended by the Convention of Cintra for the
evacuation of Portugal by the French. Sir Arthur writes to
Lord Castlereagh, 'Although my name is affixed to this
instrument, I beg that you will not believe that I negotiated
it, that I approve of it, or that I had any hand in wording
it.' On the 5th of September, he writes, 'It is quite
impossible for me to continue any longer with this army; and I
wish, therefore, that you would allow me to return home and
resume the duties of my office.' Dalrymple, Burrard, and
Wellesley were all recalled home. Sir John Moore remained at
Lisbon, having been appointed to command the army. A Court of
Inquiry was ordered on the subject of 'the late transactions
in Portugal.' Wellesley had to bear much before the publicity
of those proceedings was to set him right in public opinion.
The Inquiry ended in a formal disapprobation of the armistice
and convention on the part of the king being communicated to
Sir How Dalrymple. Neither of the two 'great generals' was
again employed. One advantage was gained by the Convention.
The Russian fleet in the Tagus was delivered up to the
British. Sir John Moore, late in October, began his march into
Spain, 'to co-operate,' as his instructions set forth, 'with
the Spanish armies in the expulsion of the French.' He was to
lead the British forces in Portugal; and to be joined by Sir
David Baird, with 10,000 men to be landed at Corunna. Instead
of finding Spanish armies to co-operate with, he learned that
the French had routed and dispersed them. Napoleon had himself
come to command his troops; and had arrived at Bayonne on the
3rd of November. Moore was separated from Baird by a wide
tract of country. He had been led by false information to
divide his own army. He remained for some time at Salamanca,
inactive and uncertain. Madrid was soon in the hands of the
French. Moore made a forward movement against the advanced
corps of Soult; and then, learning that the French armies were
gathering all around him, he determined to retreat. Sir David
Baird had previously joined him. Moore had abandoned all hopes
of defending Portugal, and had directed his march towards
Corunna. He commenced his retreat from Sahagun on the evening
of the 24th of December. During this retreat, the retiring
army constantly turned upon the pursuers, always defeating
them, and on one occasion capturing General Lefebvre. The
winter had set in with terrible severity; the sufferings of
the troops were excessive; disorganization, the common
consequence of a retreat, added to their danger. Moore saved
his army from destruction by an overwhelming force when he
carried it across the Esla, effectually destroying the bridge
by which they passed the swollen stream. But Moore could not
save his men from their own excesses, which made enemies of
the inhabitants of every place through which they passed. At
Lugo, on the 7th of January, 1809, the British general halted
his exhausted troops, determined to give battle to Soult, to
whom Napoleon had given up the pursuit of the English army,
having received despatches which indicated that war with
Austria was close at hand. Soult declined the conflict; and on
the British marched to Corunna. On the 11th, when they had
ascended the heights from which Corunna was visible, there
were no transports in the bay. The troops met with a kind
reception in the town; and their general applied himself to
make his position as strong as possible, to resist the enemy
that was approaching. On the evening of the 14th the
transports arrived. The sick and wounded were got on board;
and a great part of the artillery. Fourteen thousand British
remained to fight, if their embarkation were molested. The
battle of Corunna began at two o'clock on the 16th of January.
Soult had 20,000 veterans, with numerous field-guns; and he
had planted a formidable battery on the rocks, commanding the
valley and the lower ridge of hills. Columns of French
infantry descended from the higher ridge; and there was soon a
close trial of strength between the combatants. From the lower
ridge Moore beheld the 42nd and 50th driving the enemy before
them through the village of Elvina. He sent a battalion of the
guards to support them; but through a misconception the 42nd
retired. Moore immediately dashed into the fight; exclaimed
'Forty-second, remember Egypt,' and sent them back to the
village. The British held their ground or drove off their
assailants; and victory was certain under the skilful
direction of the heroic commander, when he was dashed to the
earth by a shot from the rock battery. Sir David Baird, the
second in command, had also fallen. Moore was carried into
Corunna; and endured several hours of extreme torture before
he yielded up his great spirit. The command had devolved upon
General Hope, who thought that his first duty was now to
embark the troops. … When the sufferers in Moore's campaign
came home the hospitals were filled with wounded and sick; and
some of the troops brought back a pestilential fever."

_C. Knight,
Crown History of England,
chapter 57
(abridgment of chapter 28, volume 7,
of Popular History of England)._

ALSO IN:
_General Sir W. F. P. Napier,
History of the War in the Peninsula,
books 2-4 (volume 1)._

_J. M. Wilson,
Memoirs of the Duke of Wellington,
volume 1, chapters 13-16._

_Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington,
volume 4._

_G. R. Gleig,
General Sir John Moore
(Eminent British Military Commanders, volume 3)._

_Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 13 (volume 2)._

_Duke de Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 2, part 2, chapters 2-3._

_General Foy,
History of the War in the Peninsula,
volume 2, part 2._

SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (December-March).
The siege of Saragossa.

"When Moore was pursued by Napoleon, the Duke of Infantado,
who had rallied 20,000 men in New Castile after the fall of
Madrid, formed the Quixotic design of re-taking the capital.
Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno, utterly crushed his force at
Ucles on the 13th January, 1809, where 1,500 Spaniards were
slain, and 9,000 men and all the stores and artillery were
taken. The French, in retaliation for the Spaniards having
hanged some soldiers who had been captured, murdered many of
the prisoners in cold blood, and perpetrated infamous
atrocities on the inhabitants of Ucles.
{3004}
The Spaniards, however, showed their extraordinary valour
behind walls in their second defence of Saragossa, the siege
of which [abandoned the previous August, after a fierce
struggle] was renewed by 35,000 French under Marshals Moncey
and Mortier, on the 20th December, 1808. The city was defended
by Palafox, who had retired into it after his defeat at
Tudela. The second siege of this renowned city—though the
defence eventually proved unsuccessful—crowns with everlasting
glory the Spanish War of Independence. … 'The citizens gave up
their goods, their houses, and their bodies to the war, and,
mingling with the peasants and soldiers, formed one mighty
garrison suited to the vast fortress they had formed. For
doors and windows were built up, house-fronts loopholed,
internal communications opened, streets trenched and crossed
by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong
building was a separate fortification: there was no weak
point—there could be none in a city which was all fortress,
where the space covered by houses was the measure of the
ramparts' (Napier). All the trees outside the walls were cut
down, the houses destroyed, and the materials carried into the
town. … The public magazines were provisioned for six months,
and all the conventual communities and the inhabitants had
large private stores. Nearly 3,000 artillerymen and sappers,
and 30,000 men of the regular army, had taken refuge in the
city, and at least 20,000 citizens and fugitive peasants were
fit for arms. The popular leaders had recourse to all the aid
which superstition could give them: denunciations of the wrath
of Heaven were hurled on those who were suspected of wavering,
and the clergy readily recounted stories of miracles to
encourage the faithful. Saragossa was 'believed to be
invincible through the protection of Our Lady of the Pillar,
who had chosen it for the seat of her peculiar worship. … An
appearance in the sky, which at other times might have passed
unremembered, and perhaps unnoticed, had given strong
confirmation to the popular faith. About a month before the
commencement of the first siege, a white cloud appeared at
noon, and gradually assumed the form of a palm-tree; the sky
being in all other parts clear, except that a few specks of
fleecy cloud hovered about the larger one. It was first
observed over the church of N. Senora del Portillo, and moving
from thence till it seemed to be immediately above that of the
pillar, continued in the same form about half an hour, and
then dispersed. The inhabitants were in a state of such
excitement that crowds joined in the acclamation of the first
beholder, who cried out, "A miracle!"—and after the defeat of
the besiegers had confirmed the omen, a miracle it was
universally pronounced to have been, the people proclaiming
with exultation that the Virgin had by this token prefigured
the victory she had given them, and promised Zaragoza her
protection as long as the world should endure' (Southey). … At
daybreak on the 21st December, General Suchet carried the
works on the Monte Torrero; but Count Gazan de la Peyrière—a
general highly distinguished in the Swiss and Italian
campaigns—failed in his attack upon the suburbs on the left
bank of the Ebro, and the confidence of the Spaniards in their
leaders was restored. Three days later the town was completely
invested, the siege operations being directed by General La
Coste. On the 30th December, the trenches being completed, the
town was summoned to surrender, and the example of Madrid was
referred to; but Palafox replied proudly, 'If Madrid has
surrendered, Madrid has been sold: Saragossa will neither be
sold nor surrendered.' Marshal Moncey being recalled to
Madrid, Junot took command of his corps. The besieged
attempted several sallies, which were repulsed; and after a
heavy bombardment, the St. Joseph convent was carried by the
French on the 11th January, 1809. The Spanish leaders
maintained the courage of their countrymen by proclaiming a
forged despatch narrating the defeat of Napoleon. The
guerrilla bands began to gather in round the French, and their
condition was becoming perilous. But the command had now been
taken by the invincible Marshal Lannes, Duke of Montebello
(who had been detained by a long illness); the approaches were
steadily pushed on, the breaches in the walls became wider,
and on the 29th the French rushed forward and took possession
of the ramparts. 'Thus the walls of Zaragoza went to the
ground; but Zaragoza remained erect, and as the broken girdle
fell from the heroic city, the besiegers started at her naked
strength. The regular defences had crumbled, but the popular
resistance was instantly called with all its terrors into
action; and as if fortune had resolved to mark the exact
moment when the ordinary calculations of science should cease,
the chief engineers on both sides [La Coste and San Genis]
were simultaneously slain' (Napier). … The Junta was in no
degree cowed: they resolved on resistance to the last
extremity, and a row of gibbets was raised for any who should
dare to propose surrender. Additional barricades were
constructed, and alarm-bells were rung to summon the citizens
to the threatened points. As each house was in itself a fort
which had to be separately attacked, mining now was had
recourse to. In this art the skill of the French was
unquestioned, and room after room and house after house was
carried. But still the constancy of the besieged was unshaken,
and the French soldiers began to murmur at their excessive
toil. From so many of the women and children being huddled
together in the cellars of the city, for safety from the
shells and cannon-balls, a pestilence arose, and slowly spread
from the besieged to the besiegers. 'The strong and the weak,
the daring soldier and the shrinking child, fell before it
alike; and such was the predisposition to disease, that the
slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the
beginning of February the daily deaths were from four to five
hundred;—the living were unable to bury the dead; and
thousands of carcases, scattered about the streets and
courtyards, or piled in heaps at the doors of the churches,
were left to dissolve in their own corruption, or be licked up
by the flames of burning houses as the defence became
concentrated' (Napier). On the 18th February a great assault
took place, and so much of the town was carried that further
resistance was hopeless. Terms of capitulation were offered by
the besieged, but were rejected by Lannes, and on the 19th the
heavy guns opened from the batteries on the left bank of the
Ebro, to sweep the houses on the quays. On the 20th, when all
the great leaders were dead or prostrated with fever, and none
but the soldier-priest Ric remained to lead the diminished
and of heroes, Saragossa surrendered,—at discretion, according
to the French: on honourable terms, according to the
Spaniards.
{3005}
Such was the close of one of the most heroic defences in the
history of the world. If any conditions were really accepted,
they were ill observed by the victors: the churches were
plundered, and many of the clergy and monks were put to death.
… The other strongholds in Aragon, one after another,
surrendered to the French before the end of March. In
Catalonia the French, under General Gouvion St. Cyr, had met
with equal success. With 30,000 men St. Cyr had taken Rosas
after a month's siege—which was prolonged by the presence of
that brilliant naval commander, Lord Cochrane (afterwards Earl
of Dundonald), with an English frigate in the harbour—in
December, 1808, had routed Reding at Cardadeu, had relieved
Barcelona (where General Duhesme was shut up with 8,000
Frenchmen), and had again, on the 21st December, routed Reding
at Molinos del Hey, where all the Spanish stores, including
30,000 muskets from England, were taken. In the spring of 1809
Reding made another attempt to achieve the independence of the
north-east, and moved to relieve Saragossa; but on the 17th
February he was met by St. Cyr at Igualada, where Reding
himself was killed and his army was dispersed. The siege of
Gerona alone in the north-east of Spain remained to be
undertaken."

_H. R. Clinton,
The War in the Peninsula,
chapter 3._

ALSO IN:
_C. M. Yonge,
Book of Golden Deeds,
page 365._

_R. Southey,
History of the Peninsular War,
chapter 18 (volume 3)._

_Sir W. F. P. Napier,
History of the War in the Peninsula,
book 5, chapters 2-3 (volume 1)._

_Baron de Marbot,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 40._

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (February-June).
The war in Aragon.
Siege of Gerona.

"This decisive victory [of Igualada] terminated the regular
war in Catalonia; and St. Cyr, retiring to Vich, commenced
preparations for the siege of Gerona. The undertaking was for
some time delayed by the discord of St. Cyr and Verdier; but
in the beginning of May they appeared before the town, and on
the 1st of June the investment was completed. But the prowess
of the Spaniards nowhere appeared to greater advantage than in
the defence of their walled towns: it was not till 12th
August, after 37 days of open trenches, and two unsuccessful
assaults, that the French possessed themselves of the fort of
Monjuich, which commands the town: yet the gallant governor,
Alvarez, still held out, and the safe arrival of a convoy sent
by Blake reanimated the spirit of the garrison. The grand
assault of the lower town was given (September 17); but the
French were repulsed from the breach with the loss of 1,600
men; and St. Cyr, despairing of carrying the place by force,
converted the siege into a blockade. The capture of three
successive convoys, sent by Blake for their relief, reduced
the besieged at last to extremity; famine and pestilence
devastated the city; but it was not till the inhabitants were
reduced to the necessity of eating hair that the place was
yielded (December 12) to Augereau, who had superseded St. Cyr
in the command. A more memorable resistance is not on record;
but the heroic Alvarez, to the eternal disgrace of Augereau,
was immured in a dungeon at Figueras, where he soon afterwards
died. Junot, in the mean time, had been taken ill, and was
succeeded in the command in Aragon by Suchet, a young general
whose talents and success gave him a brilliant career in the
later years of the empire. His first essay, however, was
unfortunate; for the indefatigable Blake, encouraged by the
retreat of St. Cyr towards the Pyrenees, had again advanced
with 12,000 men; and an action ensued (May 23) at Alcaniz, in
which the French, seized with a panic, fled in confusion from
the field. This unwonted success emboldened Blake to approach
Saragossa; but the discipline and manœuvres of the French
asserted their wonted superiority in the plains; the Spaniards
were routed close to Saragossa (June 16), and more decisively
at Belchite the next day. The army of Blake was entirely
dispersed; and all regular resistance ceased in Aragon, as it
had done in Catalonia, after the fall of Gerona."

_Epitome of Alison's History of Europe,
sections 566-567._

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (February-July).
Wellington again in the English command.
The French advance into Portugal checked.
Passage of the Douro by the English.
Battle of Talavera.

"Napoleon, before Moore's corps had actually left Corunna,
conceived the war at an end, and, in issuing instructions to
his marshals, anticipated, with no unreasonable confidence,
the complete subjugation of the Peninsula. Excepting, indeed,
some isolated districts in the east, the only parts now in
possession of the Spaniards or their allies were Andalusia,
which had been saved by the precipitate recall of Napoleon to
the north; and Portugal, which, still in arms against the
French, was nominally occupied by a British corps of 10,000
men, left there under Sir John Cradock at the time of General
Moore's departure with the bulk of the army for Spain. The
proceedings of the French marshals for the recovery of the
entire Peninsula were speedily arranged. Lannes took the
direction of the siege of Saragossa, where the Spaniards,
fighting as usual with admirable constancy from behind stone
walls, were holding two French corps at bay. Lefebvre drove
one Spanish army into the recesses of the Sierra Morena, and
Victor chased another into the fastnesses of Murcia. Meantime
Soult, after recoiling awhile from the dying blows of Moore,
had promptly occupied Gallicia upon the departure of the
English, and was preparing to cross the Portuguese frontier on
his work of conquest. In aid of this design it was concerted
that while the last-named marshal advanced from the north,
Victor, by way of Elvas, and Lapisse by way of Almeida, should
converge together upon Portugal, and that when the English at
Lisbon had been driven to their ships the several corps should
unite for the final subjugation of the Peninsula by the
occupation of Andalusia. Accordingly, leaving Ney to maintain
the ground already won, Soult descended with 30,000 men upon
the Douro, and by the end of March was in secure possession of
Oporto. Had he continued his advance, it is not impossible
that the campaign might have had the termination he desired;
but at this point he waited for intelligence of the English in
his front and of Victor and Lapisse on his flank. His caution
saved Portugal, for, while he still hesitated on the brink of
the Douro, there again arrived in the Tagus that renowned
commander before whose genius the fortunes not only of the
marshals, but of their imperial master, were finally to fail.
England was now at the commencement of her greatest war.
{3006}
The system of small expeditions and insignificant diversions,
though not yet conclusively abandoned, was soon superseded by
the glories of a visible contest: and in a short time it was
known and felt by a great majority of the nation, that on the
field of the Peninsula England was fairly pitted against
France. … At the commencement of the year 1809, when the
prospects of Spanish independence were at their very gloomiest
point, the British Cabinet had proposed and concluded a
comprehensive treaty of alliance with the Provisional
Administration of Spain; and it was now resolved that the
contest in the Peninsula should be continued on a scale more
effectual than before, and that the principal, instead of the
secondary, part should be borne by England. … England’s
colonial requirements left her little to show against the
myriads of the continent. It was calculated at the time that
60,000 British soldiers might have been made disposable for
the Peninsular service, but at no period of the war was such a
force ever actually collected under the standards of
Wellington, while Napoleon could maintain his 300,000 warriors
in Spain, without materially disabling the arms of the Empire
on the Danube or the Rhine. We had allies, it is true, in the
troops of the country; but these at first were little better
than refractory recruits, requiring all the accessories of
discipline, equipment, and organisation; jealous of all
foreigners, even as friends, and not unreasonably suspicious
of supporters who could always find in their ships a refuge
which was denied to themselves. But above all these
difficulties was that arising from the inexperience of the
Government in continental warfare. … When, however, with these
ambiguous prospects, the Government did at length resolve on
the systematic prosecution of the Peninsular war, the eyes of
the nation were at once instinctively turned on Sir Arthur
Wellesley as the general to conduct it. … He stoutly declared
his opinion that Portugal was tenable against the French, even
if actual possessors of Spain, and that it offered ample
opportunities of influencing the great result of the war. With
these views he recommended that the Portuguese army should be
organised at its full strength; that it should be in part
taken into British pay and under the direction of British
officers, and that a force of not less than 30,000 English
troops should be despatched to keep this army together. … Such
was the prestige already attached to Wellesley’s name that his
arrival in the Tagus changed every feature of the scene. No
longer suspicious of our intentions, the Portuguese Government
gave prompt effect to the suggestions of the English
commander. … The command-in-chief of the native army was
intrusted to an English officer of great distinction, General
Beresford; and no time was lost in once more testing the
efficacy of the British arms. … Of the Spanish armies we need
only say that they had been repeatedly routed with invariable
certainty and more or less disgrace, though Cuesta still held
a nominal force together in the valley of the Tagus. There
were, therefore, two courses open to the British commander:
—either to repel the menaced advance of Soult by marching on
Oporto, or to effect a junction with Cuesta, and try the
result of a demonstration against Madrid. The latter of these
plans was wisely postponed for the moment, and, preference
having been decisively given to the former, the troops, at
once commenced their march upon the Douro. The British force
under Sir Arthur Wellesley’s command amounted at this time to
about 20,000 men, to which about 15,000 Portuguese, in a
respectable state of organisation, were added by the exertions
of Beresford. Of these about 24,000 were now led against
Soult, who, though not inferior in strength, no sooner
ascertained the advance of the English commander, than he
arranged for a retreat by detaching Loison with 6,000 men to
dislodge a Portuguese post from his left rear. Sir Arthur’s
intention was to envelope, if possible, the French corps by
pushing forward a strong force upon its left, and thus
intercepting its retreat toward Ney’s position, while the main
body assaulted Soult in his quarters at Oporto. The former of
these operations he intrusted to Beresford, the latter he
directed in person. On the 12th of May the troops reached the
southern bank of the Douro; the waters of’ which, 800 yards in
width, rolled between them and their adversaries. … Availing
himself of' a point where the river by a bend in its course
was not easily visible from the town, Sir Arthur determined on
transporting, if possible, a few troops to the northern bank,
and occupying an unfinished stone building, which he perceived
was capable of affording temporary cover. The means were soon
supplied by the activity of Colonel Waters—an officer whose
habitual audacity rendered him one of the heroes of this
memorable war. Crossing in a skiff to the opposite bank, he
returned with two or three boats, and in a few minutes a
company of the Buffs was established in the building.
Reinforcements quickly followed, but not without discovery.
The alarm was given, and presently the edifice was enveloped
by the eager battalions of the French. The British, however,
held their ground; a passage was effected at other points
during the struggle; the French, after an ineffectual
resistance, were fain to abandon the city in precipitation,
and Sir Arthur, after his unexampled feat of arms, sat down
that evening to the dinner which had been prepared for Soult.
… This brilliant operation being effected, Sir Arthur was now
at liberty to turn to the main project of the campaign—that to
which, in fact, the attack upon Soult had been subsidiary—the
defeat of Victor in Estremadura. … Cuesta would take no
advice, and insisted on the adoption of his own schemes with
such obstinacy, that Sir Arthur was compelled to frame his
plans accordingly. Instead, therefore, of circumventing Victor
as he had intended, be advanced into Spain at the beginning of
July, to effect a junction with Cuesta and feel his way
towards Madrid. The armies, when united, formed a mass of
78,000 combatants; but of these 56,000 were Spanish, and for
the brunt of war Sir Arthur could only reckon on his 22,000
British troops, Beresford’s Portuguese having been despatched
to the north of Portugal. On the other side, Victor’s force
had been strengthened by the succours which Joseph Bonaparte,
alarmed for the safety of Madrid, had hastily concentrated at
Toledo; and when the two armies at length confronted each
other at Talavera, it was found that 55,000 excellent French
troops were arrayed against Sir Arthur and his ally, while
nearly as many more were descending from the north on the line
of the British communications along the valley of the Tagus.
{3007}
On the 28th of July the British commander, after making the
best dispositions in his power, received the attack of the
French, directed by Joseph Bonaparte in person, with Victor
and Jourdan at his side, and after an engagement of great
severity, in which the Spaniards were virtually inactive, he
remained master of the field against double his numbers,
having repulsed the enemy at all points with heavy loss, and
having captured several hundred prisoners and 17 pieces of
cannon in this the first great pitched battle between the
French and English in the Peninsula. In this well fought field
of Talavera, the French had thrown, for the first time, their
whole disposable force upon the British army without success;
and Sir Arthur Wellesley inferred, with a justifiable
confidence, that the relative superiority of his troops to
those of the Emperor was practically decided. Jomini, the
French military historian, confesses almost as much; and the
opinions of Napoleon himself, as visible in his
correspondence, underwent from that moment a serious change."

_Memoir of Wellington,
from "The Times" of September 15-16, 1852. _

ALSO IN:
_R. Southey,
History of the Peninsular War,
chapters 22-24 (volumes 3-4)._

_Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 62 (volume 13)._

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (August-November).
Battles of Almonacid, Puerto de Baños, Ocana,
and Alba de Tormes.

Soon after Wellington's unfruitful victory at Talavera,
"Venegas had advanced as far as Aranjuez, and was besieging
Toledo; but the retreat of the British having set the French
armies at liberty, he was attacked and defeated after a sharp
action at Almonacid (August 11) by Dessoles and Sebastiani;
and Sir Robert Wilson, who had approached Madrid with 6,000
Spaniards and Portuguese, was encountered and driven back by
Ney (August 8) at Puerto de Banos. The British at length,
after lying a month at Deleitosa, were compelled, by the
scandalous failure of the Spanish authorities to furnish them
with supplies or provisions, to cross the mountains and fix
their headquarters at Badajos, after an angry correspondence
between Wellesley and Cuesta, who soon after was removed from
his command. A gleam of success at Tamanes, where Marchand was
routed with loss (October 24) by Romana's army under the Duke
del Parque, encouraged the Spaniards to make another effort
for the recovery of Madrid; and an army of 50,000 men,
including 7,000 horse and 60 pieces of cannon, advanced for
this purpose from the Sierra Morena, under General Areizaga.
The battle was fought (November 12) at Ocana, near Aranjuez;
but though the Spaniards behaved with considerable spirit, the
miserable incapacity of their commander counterbalanced all
their efforts, and an unparalleled rout was the result.
Pursued over the wide plains of Castile by the French cavalry,
20,000 prisoners were taken, with all the guns and stores: the
wreck was complete and irretrievable; and the defeat of the
Duke del Parque (November 25) at Alba de Tormes, dispersed the
last force which could be called a Spanish army. It was
evident from these events that Portugal was the only basis
from which the deliverance of the Peninsula could be
effected."

_Epitome of Alison's History of Europe,
section 576 (chapter 62, volume 13 of complete work)._

SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (August-December).
Wellington's difficulties.
His retreat into Portugal.

"In the course of the 29th, the army was reinforced by the
arrival of a troop of horse-artillery, and a brigade of light
troops from Lisbon, under General Crawford. Under the
circumstances of his situation, however, it was impossible for
Sir Arthur Wellesley to follow up his victory. The position he
occupied was still one of extreme peril. A powerful enemy was
advancing on his rear; and no reliance could be placed for the
supply of his army, either on the promises of the Spanish
General, or of the Junta. The army of Vanegas, which, in
obedience to the orders of the Supreme Junta, had advanced
from Madrilejos, was engaged, during the 28th and 29th, in
endeavouring to dislodge the French garrison from Toledo. His
advance pushed on during the night to the neighbourhood of
Madrid, and took prisoners some patroles of the enemy.
Vanegas, however no sooner learned from the prisoners that
Joseph and Sebastiani were approaching, than he … desisted
from any further offensive operations. The intelligence that
Vanegas had failed in executing the part allotted to him, was
speedily followed by information that Soult had with facility
driven the Spaniards from the passes leading from Salamanca to
Placentia. It was in consequence arranged between the
Generals, that the British army should immediately march to
attack Soult, and that Cuesta should remain in the position of
Talavera, to protect this movement from any operation of
Victor. The wounded likewise were to be left in charge of
Cuesta. … On the morning of the 3rd of August, the British
accordingly commenced their march on Oropesa. On his arrival
there, Sir Arthur Wellesley received intelligence that Soult
was already at Naval Moral. … Shortly after, a courier arrived
from Cuesta, announcing, that, as the enemy were stated to be
advancing on his flank, and as it was ascertained that the
corps of Ney and Mortier had been united under Soult, he had
determined on quitting his position, and joining the British
army at Oropesa. This movement was executed the same night;
and nearly the whole of the British wounded were left
unprotected in the town of Talavera. The conduct of Cuesta, in
this precipitate retreat, is altogether indefensible. … In
quitting the position of Talavera, Cuesta had abandoned the
only situation in which the advance of Victor on the British
rear could be resisted with any prospect of success. … The
whole calculations of Sir Arthur Wellesley were at once
overthrown. … Sir Arthur determined to throw his army across
the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobisbo. … Cuesta … followed the
British in their retreat to the bridge of Arzobisbo, and
leaving the Duke del Albuquerque with two divisions of
infantry and one of cavalry to defend it, he withdrew the
remainder of his army to Paraleda de Garben. The French,
however, having taken post on the opposite side of the river,
soon succeeded in discovering a ford by which they crossed,
and surprising the Spaniards, drove them at once from the
works, with the loss of 30 pieces of cannon. After this,
Cuesta with his whole force fell back on Deleytosa, while the
British moved to Xaraicejo. … Vanegas … remained with his army
in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. On the 5th of August, he
succeeded in gaining a decided advantage over an advanced
division of the enemy. …
{3008}
Harassed by inconsistent orders, Vanegas was unfortunately
induced again to advance, and give battle to the corps of
Sebastiani at Almonacid. This engagement, though many of the
Spanish troops behaved with great gallantry, terminated in the
complete defeat of the army of Vanegas. It was driven to the
Sierra Morena, with the loss of all its baggage and artillery.
With this action terminated the campaign which had been
undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the
enemy from the central provinces of Spain. The British army at
Xaraicejo, still served as a shield to the southern provinces,
and Sir Arthur Wellesley, (whom the gratitude of his country
had now ennobled,) [raising him to the peerage as Baron Duke
of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera] considered
it of importance to maintain the position he then occupied.
But the total failure of supplies rendered this impossible,
and about the 20th of August he fell back through Merida on
Badajos, in the neighbourhood of which he established his
army. At this period all operations in concert ceased between
the English and Spanish armies. The Supreme Junta complained
bitterly of the retreat of the former, which left the road to
Seville and Cadiz open to the enemy, while the Marquis
Wellesley, then ambassador in Spain, made strong
representations of the privations to which the British army
had been exposed, by the inattention and neglect of the
authorities. In the correspondence which ensued, it appeared
that the measure of retreat had been forced on Lord
Wellington, by the absolute impossibility of supporting his
army in the ground he occupied. … The year had closed in Spain
triumphantly for the French arms, as it had commenced. The
Spanish armies had sustained a series of unparalleled defeats.
The British had retired into Portugal; and the efforts of Lord
Wellington, were for the present, limited to the defence of
that kingdom."

_T. Hamilton,
Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns,
chapters 7 and 9._

ALSO IN:
_R. Waite,
Life of the Duke of Wellington,
chapter 6._

_Sir W. F. P. Napier,
History of the War in the Peninsula,
book 8, chapters 7-9, book 9 (volume 2). _

SPAIN: A. D. 1809-1810 (October-September).
The Lines of Torres Vedras.

"Since Austria had laid down arms by signing the peace of
Vienna, and had thus proved the inefficiency of England's last
allies—since among the sovereigns of the Continent Napoleon
boasted none but courtiers or subjects, Wellington saw that
all the resources and all the efforts of his gigantic power
would be turned against the only country which still struggled
for the liberty of Europe. What could Spain achieve with her
bands of insurgents and her defeated armies, albeit so
persevering? or the small English army effect against so
formidable an adversary, aided by the combined forces of so
many nations? But during the very time when the world looked
upon all as lost, and Napoleon's proudest enemies were growing
weak, Wellington never despaired of the cause he had embraced.
Far from allowing himself to be cast down by the magnitude or
the imminence of the danger, he derived from that very
circumstance, not only the resolution of fighting to the last
extremity, but also the energy to conceive and to execute a
project which will continue to be the admiration of the world,
and an everlasting lesson to nations oppressed by foreign
rule. He had always thought that some day, sooner or later,
the whole of Europe would rise against Napoleon's tyranny,
provided that an opportunity for such a rising were afforded
to it by a prolonged resistance in certain points. The end to
aim at therefore was, in his opinion, not so much to drive the
French out of the Peninsula, as the tacticians of the central
junta wildly fancied, but rather to keep the contest there
alive at any cost, until the moment should arrive for so
inevitable and universal a revolt. In view of the new invasion
pouring into Spain, he could not dream of undertaking any
offensive operations against the French. Even if conducted
with genius, they would have rapidly exhausted his very
limited forces. His small army … could not have lasted a month
amidst the large masses of French troops then in Spain. He
therefore resolved to entrench it in strong positions,
rendered still more formidable by every resource of defensive
warfare, where he might defy superiority in numbers and the
risk of surprise, where he could also obtain supplies by sea,
and whence if necessary he might embark in case of disaster;
where, also, he might take advantage of the distances and the
difficulties of communication which were so rapidly exhausting
our troops, by creating around us a desert in which we should
find it impossible to live. To stand out under these
restricted but vigorously conceived conditions, and to resist
with indomitable obstinacy until Europe, ashamed to let him
succumb, should come to his succour, was the only course which
afforded Wellington some chance of success in view of the
feeble means at his disposal; and such, with equal firmness
and decision, was the one he now adopted. The necessity which
suggested it to him in no wise diminishes the merit or
originality of an operation which was, one may say, without
precedent in military history. The position he was seeking for
he found in the environs of Lisbon, in the peninsula formed by
the Tagus at its entrance to the sea. Protected on almost
every side either by the ocean or the river, which at this
point is nearly as wide as an inland sea, this peninsula was
accessible only on the north where it joined the mainland.
There, however, the prolongation of the Sierra d'Estrella
presented a series of rugged heights, craggy precipices and
deep ravines filled with torrents, forming a true natural
barrier, the strength of which had already struck more than
one military observer. … Wellington was the first who
conceived and executed the project of transforming the whole
peninsula into a colossal fortress, of more than a hundred
miles in circumference. He desired that this fortress should
be composed of three concentric enclosures, defended by
cannon, and large enough to contain not only his army and the
Portuguese allies—comprising the regular troops, the militia
and Ordenanzas—but the whole available population of the
Southern provinces of Portugal, with their harvests, their
cattle and their provisions, so that the country surrounding
Lisbon should offer no resource whatever to the invaders. He
at the same time secured his retreat by means of a spacious
and fortified port, in which, should any untoward accident
occur, the English army and even the Portuguese troops might
embark in safety.
{3009}
This immense citadel extended to the north from Zizembre and
the heights of Torres Vedras, which protected its front, as
far as Alemquer; thence to the east by Sobral and Alvera it
followed the counterforts of the Estrella which overhang the
Tagus, and extended to Lisbon, where it was covered alike by
the mouth of the river and by the ocean. … From the beginning
of the month of October, 1809, with the aid of Colonel
Fletcher of the Engineers, he had employed thousands of
workmen and peasants, without intermission, in throwing up
intrenchments, constructing redoubts, and forming sluices for
inundating the plain."

_P. Lanfrey,
Life of Napoleon I.,
volume 4, chapter 4._

ALSO IN:
_W. H. Maxwell,
Life of Wellington,
volume 2, chapters 9-12._