Chapter LXIX (3)

On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,[81] just when they were about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden intimation that the king’s army was approaching in order of battle on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback, to arm himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on their side halted and formed their line with all possible speed.[82] They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river Euphrates; Ariæus with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of six hundred well-armed Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river; Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left. All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets, short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head. Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished by having an upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white cloud,—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until the armor began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left, opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with white cuirasses; on his right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground while arrows were shot from behind them; next, the Egyptian infantry with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front of all was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels, destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.[83]

[81] Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to
us from Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five
hundred stadia (about fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while
Xenophon was informed that the field of battle was distant from
Babylon only three hundred and sixty stadia. Now, according to
Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 57), Hillah
(Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one
and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the
distance given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we
should place Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah.
This seems the most probable supposition.

Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and
Assyria, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the
latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the
Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after
the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my
next chapter, in reference to that Wall.

[82] The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field
of Kunaxa would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles
beyond the trench, to the first night-station; next, a full day’s
march, say twelve miles; thirdly, a half day’s march, to the time
of the mid-day halt, say seven miles.

The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at
thirty-two miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be
about fifty-four miles.

Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah
Castle (two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line,
and seventy-seven miles, if following the line of the river.
Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall
then have between Pylæ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of
forty-four miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained
in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not
exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from
Pylæ to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to
Kunaxa.

[83] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.

As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front, and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks upon the centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in person would be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, that his centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right,—and merely replied to Cyrus, that he would manage everything for the best. I have before remarked[84] how often the fear of being attacked on the unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution, was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.[85] The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of Proxenus, rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that the sacrifices were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword? and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was “Zeus the Preserver, and Victory.”—“I accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be the word;” and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the Asiatics.

[84] Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.

[85] Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon
Klearchus; and it seems quite just.

The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without noise, were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to move forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.[86] This might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other than Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge. They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass. The left division of the king’s army was thus routed without a blow, and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way of one of the chariots.[87] Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the body of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left, close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal flight. He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who stood opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts, commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of the Greeks, who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying Persians before them.[88]

[86] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.

[87] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.

[88] Xen. Anab i, 10, 4-8.

Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field. Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of the Cyreians.[89] Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed; and received from every one around him salutations, as if he were already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to rush forward as if the victory was already gained,[90] but remained unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around him, watching the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous was the attack of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke and dispersed this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His own six hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few, called his “Table-Companions,” around him. It was under these circumstances that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person had been exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,[91] that he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, “I see the man,”—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host behind him. Cyrus made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass; though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias) could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his defence. Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew himself, or was slain by order of the king.[92]

[89] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9, 31.

[90] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21.

Κῦρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ
διώκοντας, ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν, ~οὐδ᾽ ὣς ἐξήχθη διώκειν~, etc.

The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other
stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal
antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of
Cyrus.

[91] Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized
the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Pheræ
in the opposite army; which led to the same fatal consequences
(Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See
also the reflections of Xenophon on the conduct of Teleutas
before Olynthus.—Hellenic. v. 3, 7.

[92] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of
the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from
the brief abstract in Photius—Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed.
Bähr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions
the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xenophon) who hurled the
javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and
put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death
of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who by
order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was
destroyed by her in the same way.

Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the
conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many
points, partly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon.

Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the
battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have
derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially
from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of
Justin, v, 11.

Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of
the king’s army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks
under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the
loss of Cyrus’s Asiatic army at three thousand men. But as the
Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many
in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great
number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have overtaken the
flying Persians.

The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, who, together with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when the king and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes got into the camp and began to plunder it without resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian women,—of free condition, good family, and education,—one from Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him, by force, from their parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto, distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence, was made prisoner and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes; the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though without her upper garments,[93] and sought shelter among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, of a supply.[94]

[93] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations
of this Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was
held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been
exaggerated into a romantic story, in which we cannot tell
what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian, V. H. xii, 1;
Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch
and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes
and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter
against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy
was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But
as that transaction certainly happened at the close of the long
life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six years—and
as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we may
fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have
been something different.

Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and
Monimê of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during
the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).

[94] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been
made during the recent halt at Pylæ.

While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time, there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or three and a half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division; so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king’s troops had been victorious on the left and centre, and were masters of the camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of Cyrus,—Klearchus marched back his troops, and met the enemy’s forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position, Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack him, but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores; so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper, while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at which the battle had commenced.[95] It was only on the next morning that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.[96]

[95] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.

[96] Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.

Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and long-sighted combination,—a power of foreseeing difficulties, and providing means beforehand for overcoming them,—a dexterity in meeting variable exigencies, and dealing with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers,—a conviction of the necessity, not merely of purchasing men’s service by lavish presents, but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and systematic good faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description of the Persian satraps by Isokrates.[97] That many persons deserted from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus to Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxes with the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus, and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman, against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence, an act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother, and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in regal families,[98] blinded him, for the moment, to all rational calculation.

[97] Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175-182; a striking
passage, as describing the way in which political institutions
work themselves into the individual character and habits.

[98] Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile
brothers, Eteokles and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare
Tacitus, Annal. iv, 60. “Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem
potentiæ, et _solita fratribus odia_, accendebatur invidia, quod
mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat,” etc.; and Justin, xlii, 4.

Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in
his life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the
name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in
personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of
Transtamare.

At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, “Don Pèdre,
qui, pendant le combat, s’était jété au plus fort de la mêlée,
s’acharna long temps à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait
galoper dans la plaine, monté sur un cheval noir, sa bannière
armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frère partout où
l’on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage—‘Où
est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?’” (Histoire de Don
Pèdre, p. 504.)

Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the
castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into
the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by
the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle,
in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been
partially aided by a bystander.

This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is
graphically described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).

We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as recorded by Xenophon[99]) have thought him a better friend to them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands,—and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.

[99] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα
Πρόξενος) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ~ὃν αὐτός ἔφη κρείττω
ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος~.