Chapter LXXI (3)

The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is
marked by the strength of Xenophon’s language; extreme celerity
is enjoined three several times.

While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians, chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were,—and sold them all into slavery.[268] Apprised of the movements of Xenophon with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit into Asia; laying an embargo on the transports in the harbor, and presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit the soldiers from crossing. When Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct them,—Aristarchus replied, “Anaxibius is no longer in functions as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you at sea, I will sink you.” On the next day, he sent to invite the generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in, Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation of sacrificing. The behavior of Aristarchus,—who, when he saw the others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they would all come again in the afternoon,—confirmed the justice of his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been preserved by this accidental warning.[269] It need hardly be added that Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the first; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards sent, was disregarded by all.

[268] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῷ μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ
ἐπιστέλλει ὁπόσους ἂν εὕροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κύρου στρατιωτῶν
ὑπολελειμμένους, ἀποδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ Κλέανδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐθεράπευεν οἰκτείρων, καὶ ἀναγκάζων
οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι. Ἀρίσταρχος δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἦλθε τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους
τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.

[269] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 14-16.

Ἥδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει, ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι, εἰ
εἴσεισι, συλληφθήσεται· καὶ ἢ αὐτοῦ τι πείσεται, ἢ καὶ Φαρναβάζῳ,
παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προπέμπεται, αὐτὸς
δ᾽ εἶπεν, ὅτι θῦσαί τι βούλοιτο.... Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ
λοχαγοὶ ἥκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν
ἀπιέναι σφᾶς κελεύει, τῆς δείλης δὲ ἥκειν· ἔνθα καὶ δήλη μᾶλλον
ἐδόκει [εἶναι] ἡ ἐπιβουλή. Compare vii, 3, 2.

We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had practised on the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his colleagues,—and that too against a Greek, and an officer of the highest station and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from pillage, and was now actually in execution of orders received from the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been withheld, Xenophon would assuredly have fallen into this snare, nor could we reasonably have charged him with imprudence,—so fully was he entitled to count upon straightforward conduct under the circumstances. But the same cannot be said of Klearchus, who undoubtedly manifested lamentable credulity, nefarious as was the fraud to which he fell a victim.

At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, while he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to force their way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy mountain, and thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) they should receive pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight hundred hoplites who adhered to his separate command, advocated this plan as the best. To be set against it, however, there was the proposition of Seuthes to take the army into pay; which Xenophon was inclined to prefer, uneasy at the thoughts of being cooped up in the narrow peninsula of the Chersonese, under the absolute command of the Lacedæmonian harmost, with great uncertainty both as to pay and as to provisions.[270] Moreover it was imperiously necessary for these disappointed troops to make some immediate movement; for they had been brought to the gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing immediately on shipboard; it was mid-winter,—they were encamped in the open field, under the severe cold of Thrace,—they had neither assured supplies, nor even money to purchase, if a market had been near.[271] Xenophon, who had brought them to the neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again responsible for extricating them from this untenable situation, and began to offer sacrifices, according to his wont, to ascertain whether the gods would encourage him to recommend a covenant with Seuthes. The sacrifices were so favorable, that he himself, together with a confidential officer from each of the generals, went by night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for the purpose of understanding distinctly his offers and purposes.

[270] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 15; vii, 3, 3; vii, 6, 13.

[271] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 24. μέσος δὲ χείμων ἦν, etc. Probably
the month of December.

Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians; so formidable in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine commotions had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian tribes; which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by the aid of the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater of Kyzikus (about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that which they originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as much to each lochage or captain,—four times as much to each of the generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement and fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, over and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, with a lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to Xenophon in particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, his best point on the coast. “I will also (he added, addressing Xenophon) give you my daughter in marriage; and if you have any daughter, I will buy her from you in marriage according to the custom of Thrace.”[272] Seuthes farther engaged never on any occasion to lead them more than seven days’ journey from the sea, at farthest.

[272] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 17-38.

These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect; and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him) as a valuable refuge in case of need.[273] But even if the promise had been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative; for they had not even present supplies,—still less any means of subsistence throughout the winter; while departure by sea was rendered impossible by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes was introduced by Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who accepted his offers and concluded the bargain.

[273] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 34.

They remained for two months in his service, engaged in warfare against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to conquer and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in possession of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and a considerable tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from cold were extreme, during these two months of full winter and amidst the snowy mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled by their expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful subsistence; which they could hardly have done in any other manner. But the pay which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, in requital of their two months of service, they received pay only for twenty days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from obtaining fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had made to him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as one of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy; since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.

Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon, both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes,—interesting as it is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It seems to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute personal disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies against himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace in it a tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the soldiers were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the army, under the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes while they had not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent sentiments and falsehoods against him.[274] Until such suspicions were refuted, it is no wonder that the army were alienated; but they were perfectly willing to hear both sides,—and Xenophon triumphantly disproved the accusation. That in the end, their feelings towards him were those of esteem and favor, stands confessed in his own words,[275] proving that the ingratitude of which he complains was the feeling of some indeed, but not of all.

[274] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 9, 10.

[275] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 55-57.

It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in two months all that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off without pay,—had they not been extricated by a change of interest and policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had just declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,—sending Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited,—and to take them into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, Charmînus and Polynîkus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer to the army the same pay as had been promised, though not paid, by Seuthes; and as had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes and Herakleides, eager to hasten the departure of the soldiers, endeavored to take credit with the Lacedæmonians for assisting their views.[276] Joyfully did the army accept this offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud practised upon them by Seuthes; which Charmînus, at the instance of Xenophon, vainly pressed the Thracian prince to redress.[277] He even sent Xenophon to demand the arrear of pay in the name of the Lacedæmonians, which afforded to the Athenian an opportunity of administering a severe lecture to Seuthes.[278] But the latter was found less accessible to the workings of eloquence than the Cyreian assembled soldiers; nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a miserable dividend upon the sum due;—together with civil expressions towards himself personally,—an invitation to remain in his service with one thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the army,—and renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a fort and grant of lands.

[276] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 1-7.

[277] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 15.

[278] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 21-47.

The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the
person to whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to
have been spoken.

When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six thousand men,[279] was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon was desirous of going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain with them until the junction with Thimbron. He was at this time so poor, having scarcely enough to pay for his journey home, that he was obliged to sell his horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic town where the army landed. Here he found Eukleides, a Phliasian prophet with whom he had been wont to hold intercourse and offer sacrifice at Athens. This man, having asked Xenophon how much he had acquired in the expedition, could not believe him when he affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to offer sacrifice together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes as a present to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the entrails of the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited the statement. “I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on its way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios (the Gracious)[280] is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed to him, with entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at Athens?” “Never (replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march.” “Do so now, then (said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage.” The next day, on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; sacrificing little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom at Athens during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very same day he felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton and another envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay to the army, and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they bought back for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus for fifty darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one year’s pay in hand (the pay which he would have received as general being four darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a time when he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore would not stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now made up with immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any man in the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the present, by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to him a favorite horse.

[279] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 23.

[280] It appears that the epithet _Meilichios_ (the Gracious)
is here applied to Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the
denomination _Eumenides_ to the avenging goddesses. Zeus
is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being in a
disposition to inflict, evil; the sacrifice to him under this
surname represents a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement,
expiation or purification, destined to avert his displeasure; but
the surname itself is to be interpreted _proleptice_, to use the
word of the critics—it designates, not the actual disposition of
Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which the sacrifice
is intended to bring about in him.

See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstl.
Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De Græcorum Diebus
Festis, p. 5 (Utrecht, 1849).

Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious respond to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, had been admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon was more than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself throughout all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by the interior aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming events,—but also, according as it is rendered to the right god and at the right season, determines his will, and therefore the course of events, for dispensations favorable or unfavorable.

But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia, through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town overhanging the river and plain of Käikus. This district was occupied by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant, another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden night-march, with three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler dividend to each partner.

Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment of three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison. It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around, like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak, yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood; numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little farther off seaward.[281]

[281] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 10-19.

Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid plans for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in bringing Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, horses, and all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above all things for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the “previous sacrifices (those which had promised favorably before the first unsuccessful attempt) now came true.”[282] The persons of this family were doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for a large ransom;[283] which, together with the booty brought in, made up a prodigious total to be divided.

[282] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 22. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα
συμπεριτυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ
γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα· ~καὶ οὕτω
τὰ πρότερα ἱερὰ ἀπέβη~.

[283] Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy and admiration was paid to Xenophon, to which all the army,—generals, captains, and soldiers,—and the Lacedæmonians besides,—unanimously concurred. Like Agamemnon at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the picked lots of horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty; insomuch that he became possessor of a share valuable enough to enrich him at once, in addition to the fifty darics which he had before received. “Here then Xenophon (to use his own language[284]) had no reason to complain of the god” (Zeus Meilichios). We may add,—what he ought to have added, considering the accusations which he had before put forth,—that neither had he any reason to complain of the ingratitude of the army.

[284] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 23.

Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ᾐτιάσατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γὰρ καὶ οἱ
Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται,
ὥστε ἐξαίρετα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν
εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη εὖ ποιεῖν.

As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and the Cyreians became a part of his army, Xenophon took his leave of them. Having deposited in the temple at Ephesus that portion which had been confided to him as general, of the tithe set apart by the army at Kerasus for the Ephesian Artemis,[285] he seems to have executed his intention of returning to Athens.[286] He must have arrived there, after an absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks, at farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates, whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume. That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence from Athens;[287] but whether it had come to his knowledge before he reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and indignation it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of memoranda respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by the name of Memorabilia, and probably put together shortly after his arrival.

[285] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must
have been first made on the present occasion.

[286] Compare Anabasis, vii, 7, 57; vii, 8, 2.

[287] Xenoph. Memorab. iv, 8, 4—as well as the opening sentence
of the work.

That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia,—became again their commander,—and served for two years under the Spartan general Derkyllidas before the arrival of Agesilaus. Such military service would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence at Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful to him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted during the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the death of Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would be disposed to enter again upon the war against his old enemy Tissaphernes; and his service went on when Agesilaus arrived to take the command.[288]

[288] See Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 7—a passage which Morus
refers, I think with much probability, to Xenophon himself.

The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1,
11-28) about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in
the Troad, seem also to indicate that he was serving there in
person.

But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a party to the war against Sparta, and entered into conjunction with the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans and others; while Xenophon, continuing his service as commander of the Cyreians, and accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into Greece, became engaged against the Athenian troops and their Bœotian allies at the bloody battle of Korôneia. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that the Athenians passed sentence of banishment against him; not because he had originally taken part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes,—nor because his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has been sometimes erroneously affirmed,—but because he was now openly in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his own country.[289] Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed by the Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillus, one of the villages of Triphylia, near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently emancipated from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic festivals, Megabyzus, the superintendent of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, came over as a spectator; bringing with him the money which Xenophon had dedicated therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This money Xenophon invested in the purchase of lands at Skillus, to be consecrated in permanence to the goddess; having previously consulted her by sacrifice to ascertain her approval of the site contemplated, which site was recommended to him by its resemblance in certain points to that of the Ephesian temple. Thus, there was near each of them a river called by the same name Selinus, having in it fish and a shelly bottom. Xenophon constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue of the goddess made of cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced scale, of the temple and golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them was inscribed with the following words,—“This spot is sacred to Artemis. Whoever possesses the property and gathers its fruits, must sacrifice to her the tithe every year, and keep the chapel in repair out of the remainder. Should any one omit this duty the goddess herself will take the omission in hand.”[290]

[289] That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed
by the Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears
plainly from Anabasis, v. 3, 7. This battle took place in August
394 B.C.

Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as
to the time of the banishment. Ἐδιώχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων,
ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν, ~σφίσιν εὔνουν ὄντα~, στρατείας
μετασχὼν Κύρῳ πολεμιωτάτῳ τοῦ δήμου (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not
until 396 or 395 B.C., that the Persian king began to manifest
the least symptoms of good-will towards Athens; and not until the
battle of Knidus (a little before the battle of Korôneia in the
same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous and
effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians
to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of
the king of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have
taken place before 395 B.C., and is not likely to have taken
place until after 394 B.C.; which is the intimation of Xenophon
himself as above.

Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to
be the main truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed
against Xenophon by the Athenians on the ground of his attachment
to the Lacedæmonians—ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ.

Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished
because he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter
enemy of Athens. It is true that Sokrates, when first consulted,
was apprehensive beforehand that this might bring upon him the
displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5). But it is to be
remembered that _at this time_, the king of Persia was just as
much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact
had made war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king.
Artaxerxes and Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of
Athens, it was of little consequence to the Athenians whether
Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. But when Artaxerxes,
six years afterwards, became their friend, their feelings towards
his enemies were altered.

The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as
asserting the main cause of Xenophon’s banishment, is in my
judgment inaccurate. Xenophon was banished _for Laconism_, or
attachment to Sparta against his country; the fact of his having
served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes counted at best only as a
secondary motive.

[290] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 13. Καὶ στήλη ἔστηκε παρὰ τὸν ναὸν,
γράμματα ἔχουσα—Ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Αρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ
καρπούμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθύειν ἑκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
περίττου τόν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ θεῷ
μελήσει.

Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description of fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range of meadow, woodland, and mountain,—with the still loftier mountain called Pholoê adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture for horses, oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for deer and other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision at Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to him by the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as steward for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her name for protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed with a jealous eye the Lacedæmonian[291] settlers at Skillus, and protested against the peace and convention promoted by Athens after the battle of Leuktra, because it recognized that place, along with the townships of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he made a splendid sacrifice, from the tithe of all the fruits of the property; to which solemnity not only all the Skilluntines, but also all the neighboring villages, were invited. Booths were erected for the visitors, to whom the goddess furnished (this is the language of Xenophon) an ample dinner of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, game, and sweetmeats;[292] the game being provided by a general hunt, which the sons of Xenophon conducted, and in which all the neighbors took part if they chose. The produce of the estate, saving this tithe and subject to the obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, was enjoyed by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both hunting and horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as we know, who ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses and dogs, the subject of rational study and description.

[291] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

[292] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9. Παρεῖχε δ᾽ ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν ἄλφιτα
ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, etc.

Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted by the army at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe, voted at the same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the treasure-chamber of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his own name and that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance of twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to enjoy society with every variety of Greeks,—and to obtain copious information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant in his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition of his various works. The interesting description which he himself gives of his residence at Skillus, implies a state of things not present and continuing,[293] but past and gone; other testimonies too, though confused and contradictory, seem to show that the Lacedæmonian settlement at Skillus lasted no longer than the power of Lacedæmon was adequate to maintain it. During the misfortunes which befel that city after the battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), Xenophon, with his family and his fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians, and is then said to have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens soon came to be not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with Sparta,—the sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so that the latter part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment of his birthright as an Athenian citizen and Knight.[294] Two of his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen at the cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantineia, where the former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject of a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the orator Deinarchus.[295]

[293] Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9.

[294] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v, 6, 4) attests
the reconquest of Skillus by the Eleians, but adds (on the
authority of the Eleian ἐξηγηταὶ or show guides) that they
permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination before the
Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point
I apprehend to be incorrect.

The latter works of Xenophon (De Vectigalibus, De Officio
Magistri Equitum, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been
restored to citizenship, and had come again to take cognizance of
politics at Athens.

[295] Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. De Dinarcho, p. 664,
ed. Reiska. Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of
Ἀποστασίου ἀπολογία Αἰσχύλου πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα. And Diogenes also
alludes to it—ὥς φησι Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου.

Schneider in his Epimetrum (ad calcem Anabaseos, p. 573),
respecting the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against
whom the oration of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon
himself, the Cyreian commander and author. But this, I think, is
chronologically all but impossible; for Deinarchus was not born
till 361 B.C., and composed his first oration in 336 B.C.

Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly
mentioned several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which
implies that the latter was a relative of the person against
whom the oration was directed. I venture to set him down as
grandson, on that evidence, combined with the identity of name
and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be the son
of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantineia in
362 B.C.

Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration
against Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and
character of Xenophon the grandfather; see for analogy, the
oration of Isokrates, de Bigis; among others.

On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, I have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future, in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile (in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted, afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence of the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit for any systematic operations, even under the greatest possible advantages, against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen.[296] Against such perfect weakness and disorganization, nothing prevented the success of the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm of fraternal antipathy.[297] And we shall perceive hereafter the military and political leaders of Greece,—Agesilaus, Jason of Pheræ,[298] and others down to Philip and Alexander[299]—firmly persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian force, combined with exemption from Grecian enemies, they could succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian empire. This conviction, so important in the subsequent history of Greece, takes its date from the retreat of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find Persia exercising an important influence, for two generations to come,—and at the peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than ever,—over the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise from the treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who abandons the Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and the force of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion to herself. Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic strength against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet to one side of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming artificially strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis betrays her real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at the same time exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power of self-action and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from speech and discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of citizens with the mechanical regularity of soldiers,—which confer such immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance of this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been devoted to it in this History.

[296] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 20; and
Isokrates, Panegyr. Or. iv, s. 168, 169 _seq._

The last chapter of the Cyropædia of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21-26)
expresses strenuously the like conviction, of the military
feebleness and disorganization of the Persian empire, not
defensible without Grecian aid.

[297] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 104-106. ἤδη δ᾽
ἐγκρατεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι (_i. e._ the Greeks under Klearchus)
διὰ τὴν Κύρου ~προπέτειαν~ ἀτυχῆσαι, etc.

[298] Isokrates. Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 141: Xen. Hellen. vi, 1,
12.

[299] See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the
adventures of the Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his
soldiers before the battle of Issus (Arrian, E. A. ii, 7, 8).