Chapter LXXIII (1)

AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA.—THE CORINTHIAN WAR.

The close of the Peloponnesian war, with the victorious organization of the Lacedæmonian empire by Lysander, has already been described as a period carrying with it increased sufferings to those towns which had formerly belonged to the Athenian empire, as compared with what they had endured under Athens,—and harder dependence, unaccompanied by any species of advantage, even to those Peloponnesians and inland cities which had always been dependent allies of Sparta. To complete the melancholy picture of the Grecian world during these years, we may add (what will be hereafter more fully detailed) that calamities of a still more deplorable character overtook the Sicilian Greeks; first, from the invasion of the Carthaginians, who sacked Himera, Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina,—next from the overruling despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.

Sparta alone had been the gainer; and that to a prodigious extent, both in revenue and power. It is from this time, and from the proceedings of Lysander, that various ancient authors dated the commencement of her degeneracy, which they ascribe mainly to her departure from the institutions of Lykurgus by admitting gold and silver money. These metals had before been strictly prohibited; no money being tolerated except heavy pieces of iron, not portable except to a very trifling amount. That such was the ancient institution of Sparta, under which any Spartan having in his possession gold and silver money, was liable, if detected, to punishment, appears certain. How far the regulation may have been in practice evaded, we have no means of determining. Some of the ephors strenuously opposed the admission of the large sum brought home by Lysander as remnant of what he had received from Cyrus towards the prosecution of the war. They contended that the admission of so much gold and silver into the public treasury was a flagrant transgression of the Lykurgean ordinances. But their resistance was unavailing and the new acquisitions were received; though it still continued to be a penal offence (and was even made a capital offence, if we may trust Plutarch) for any individual to be found with gold and silver in his possession.[403] To enforce such a prohibition, however, even if practicable before, ceased to be practicable so soon as these metals were recognized and tolerated in the possession, and for the purposes of the government.

[403] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17. Compare Xen. Rep. Laced. vii, 6.

Both Ephorus and Theopompus recounted the opposition to the
introduction of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the
name of one of the ephors as taking the lead in it.

There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too
among high-minded and intelligent men, which regarded gold and
silver as a cause of mischief and corruption, and of which the
stanza of Horace (Od. iii, 3) is an echo:—

Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm
Cum terra celat, spernere fortior
Quam cogere humanos in usus,
Omne sacrum rapiente dextrâ.

There can be no doubt that the introduction of a large sum of coined gold and silver into Sparta was in itself a striking and important phenomenon, when viewed in conjunction with the peculiar customs and discipline of the state. It was likely to raise strong antipathies in the bosom of an old fashioned Spartan, and probably king Archidamus, had he been alive, would have taken part with the opposing ephors. But Plutarch and others have criticised it too much as a phenomenon by itself; whereas, it was really one characteristic mark and portion of a new assemblage of circumstances, into which Sparta had been gradually arriving during the last years of the war, and which were brought into the most effective action by the decisive success at Ægospotami. The institutions of Lykurgus, though excluding all Spartan citizens, by an unremitting drill and public mess, from trade and industry, from ostentation, and from luxury,—did not by any means extinguish in their bosoms the love of money;[404] while it had a positive tendency to exaggerate, rather than to abate, the love of power. The Spartan kings, Leotychides and Pleistoanax, had both been guilty of receiving bribes; Tissaphernes had found means (during the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war) to corrupt not merely the Spartan admiral Astyochus, but also nearly all the captains of the Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan Hermokrates; Gylippus, as well as his father Kleandrides, had degraded himself by the like fraud; and Anaxibius at Byzantium was not at all purer. Lysander, enslaved only by his appetite for dominion, and himself a remarkable instance of superiority to pecuniary corruption, was thus not the first to engraft that vice on the minds of his countrymen. But though he found it already diffused among them, he did much to impart to it a still more decided predominance, by the immense increase of opportunities, and enlarged booty for peculation, which his newly-organized Spartan empire furnished. Not merely did he bring home a large residue in gold and silver, but there was a much larger annual tribute imposed by him on the dependent cities, combined with numerous appointments of harmosts to govern these cities. Such appointments presented abundant illicit profits, easy to acquire, and even difficult to avoid, since the decemvirs in each city were eager thus to purchase forbearance or connivance for their own misdeeds. So many new sources of corruption were sufficient to operate most unfavorably on the Spartan character, if not by implanting any fresh vices, at least by stimulating all its inherent bad tendencies.

[404] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 23.

Ἀποβέβηκε δὲ τοὐνάντιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ
πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

To understand the material change thus wrought in it, we have only to contrast the speeches of king Archidamus and of the Corinthians, made in 432 B.C. at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, with the state of facts at the end of the war,—during the eleven years between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus (405-394 B.C.). At the former of the two epochs, Sparta had no tributary subjects, nor any funds in her treasury, while her citizens were very reluctant to pay imposts.[405] About 334 B.C., thirty-seven years after her defeat at Leuktra and her loss of Messenia, Aristotle remarks the like fact, which had then again become true;[406] but during the continuance of her empire between 405 and 394 B.C., she possessed a large public revenue, derived from the tribute of the dependent cities. In 432 B.C., Sparta is not merely cautious but backward; especially averse to any action at a distance from home.[407] In 404 B.C., after the close of the war, she becomes aggressive, intermeddling, and ready for dealing with enemies, or making acquisitions remote as well as near.[408] In 432 B.C., her unsocial and exclusive manners, against the rest of Greece, with her constant expulsion of other Greeks from her own city, stand prominent among her attributes;[409] while at the end of the war, her foreign relations had acquired such great development as to become the principal matter of attention for her leading citizens as well as for her magistrates; so that the influx of strangers into Sparta, and the efflux of Spartans into other parts of Greece became constant and inevitable. Hence the strictness of the Lykurgean discipline gave way on many points, and the principal Spartans especially struggled by various shifts to evade its obligations. It was to these leading men that the great prizes fell, enabling them to enrich themselves at the expense either of foreign subjects or of the public treasury, and tending more and more to aggravate that inequality of wealth among the Spartans which Aristotle so emphatically notices in his time;[410] since the smaller citizens had no similar opportunities opened to them, nor any industry of their own, to guard their properties against gradual subdivision and absorption, and to keep them in a permanent state of ability to furnish that contribution to the mess-table, for themselves and their sons, which formed the groundwork of Spartan political franchise. Moreover, the spectacle of such newly-opened lucrative prizes,—accessible only to that particular section of influential Spartan families who gradually became known apart from the rest under the title of the Equals or Peers,—embittered the discontent of the energetic citizens beneath that privileged position, in such a manner as to menace the tranquillity of the state,—as will presently be seen. That sameness of life, habits, attainments, aptitudes, enjoyments, fatigues, and restraints, which the Lykurgean regulations had so long enforced, and still continued to prescribe,—divesting wealth of its principal advantages, and thus keeping up the sentiment of personal equality among the poorer citizens,—became more and more eluded by the richer, through the venality as well as the example of ephors and senators;[411] while for those who had no means of corruption, it continued unrelaxed, except in so far as many of them fell into a still more degraded condition by the loss of their citizenship.

[405] Thucyd. i, 80. ἀλλὰ πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον τούτου (χρημάτων)
ἐλλείπομεν, καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν, οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων
φέρομεν.

[406] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 23. Φαύλως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ
κοινὰ κρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεώς
ἐστιν οὐδὲν, πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους φέρειν· εἰσφέρουσί
τε κακῶς, etc.

Contrast what Plato says in his dialogue of Alkibiades, i, c.
39, p. 122 E. about the great quantity of gold and silver then
at Sparta. The dialogue must bear date at some period between
400-371 B.C.

[407] See the speeches of the Corinthian envoys and of King
Archidamus at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 70-84; compare also viii, 24-96).

[408] See the criticisms upon Sparta, about 395 B.C. and 372 B.C.
(Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 11-15; vi, 3, 8-11).

[409] Thucyd. i, 77. Ἄμικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, etc. About the ξενηλασίαι of the Spartans—see
the speech of Perikles in Thucyd. i, 138.

[410] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 10.

[411] Aristot. Politic. ii, 6, 16-18; ii, 7, 3.

It is not merely Isokrates,[412] who attests the corruption wrought in the character of the Spartans by the possession of that foreign empire which followed the victory of Ægospotami,—but also their earnest panegyrist Xenophon. After having warmly extolled the laws of Lykurgus or the Spartan institutions, he is constrained to admit that his eulogies, though merited by the past, have become lamentably inapplicable to that present which he himself witnessed. “Formerly (says he,[413]) the Lacedæmonians used to prefer their own society and moderate way of life at home, to appointments as harmosts in foreign towns, with all the flattery and all the corruption attending them. Formerly, they were afraid to be seen with gold in their possession; now, there are some who make even an ostentatious display of it. Formerly, they enforced their (Xenêlasy or) expulsion of strangers, and forbade foreign travel, in order that their citizens might not be filled with relaxed habits of life from contact with foreigners; but now, those who stand first in point of influence among them, study above all things to be in perpetual employment as harmosts abroad. There was a time when they took pains to be worthy of headship; but now they strive much rather to get and keep the command, than to be properly qualified for it. Accordingly, the Greeks used in former days to come and solicit, that the Spartans would act as their leaders against wrong-doers; but now they are exhorting each other to concert measures for shutting out Sparta from renewed empire. Nor can we wonder that the Spartans have fallen into this discredit, when they have manifestly renounced obedience both to the Delphian god, and to the institutions of Lykurgus!”

[412] Isokrates, de Pace, s. 118-127.

[413] Xen. de Republ. Laced. c. 14.

Οἶδα γὰρ πρότερον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους αἱρουμένους, οἴκοι τὰ
μέτρια ἔχοντας ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἁρμόζοντας ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσι καὶ κολακευομένους διαφθείρεσθαι. Καὶ πρόσθεν μὲν οἶδα
αὐτοὺς φοβουμένους, χρύσιον ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι· νῦν δ᾽ ἔστιν οὓς
καὶ καλλωπιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι. Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν
τούτου ἕνεκα ξενηλασίας γιγνομένας, καὶ ἀποδημεῖν οὐκ ἐξόν, ὅπως
μὴ ῥᾳδιουργίας οἱ πολῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐμπίμπλαιντο· νῦν δ᾽
ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρώτους εἶναι ἐσπουδακότας ὡς μηδεπότε
παύωνται ἁρμόζοντες ἐπὶ ξένης. Καὶ ἦν μὲν, ὅτε ἐπεμελοῦντο, ὅπως
ἄξιοι εἶεν ἡγεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον πραγματεύονται, ὅπως
ἄρξουσιν, ἢ ὅπως ἄξιοι τούτου ἔσονται. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες
πρότερον μὲν ἰόντες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ἡγεῖσθαι ἐπὶ
τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἀδικεῖν· νῦν δὲ πολλοὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ~ἐπὶ
τὸ διακωλύειν ἄρξαι πάλιν αὐτούς~. Οὐδὲν μέντοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν
τούτων τῶν ἐπιψόγων αὐτοῖς γιγνομένων, ἐπειδὴ φανεροί εἰσιν οὔτε
τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενοι οὔτε τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις.

The expression, “taking measures to hinder the Lacedæmonians
from again exercising empire,”—marks this treatise as probably
composed some time between their naval defeat at Knidus, and
their land-defeat at Leuktra. The former put an end to their
maritime empire,—the latter excluded them from all possibility
of recovering it; but during the interval between the two, such
recovery was by no means impossible.

This criticism (written at some period between 394-371 B.C.) from the strenuous eulogist of Sparta is highly instructive. We know from other evidences how badly the Spartan empire worked for the subject cities; we here learn how badly it worked for the character of the Spartans themselves, and for those internal institutions which even an enemy of Sparta, who detested her foreign policy, still felt constrained to admire.[414] All the vices, here insisted upon by Xenophon, arise from various incidents connected with her empire. The moderate, home-keeping, old-fashioned, backward disposition,—of which the Corinthians complain,[415] but for which king Archidamus takes credit, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,—is found exchanged, at the close of the war, for a spirit of aggression and conquest, for ambition public as well as private, and for emancipation of the great men from the subduing[416] equality of the discipline enacted by Lykurgus.

[414] The Athenian envoy at Melos says,—Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς
μὲν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα, πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται·
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀλλους—ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ
νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια (Thucyd. v. 105). A judgment
almost exactly the same, is pronounced by Polybius (vi, 48).

[415] Thucyd. i, 69, 70, 71, 84. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ
ἐπιτηδεύματα—ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς
ἐνδημοτάτους: also viii, 24.

[416] Σπάρτην δαμασίμβροτον (Simonides ap. Plutarch. Agesilaum,
c. 1).

Agis the son of Archidamus (426-399 B.C.), and Pausanias son of Pleistoanax (408-394 B.C.), were the two kings of Sparta at the end of the war. But Lysander, the admiral or commander of the fleet, was for the time[417] greater than either of the two kings, who had the right of commanding only the troops on land. I have already mentioned how his overweening dictation and insolence offended not only Pausanias, but also several of the ephors and leading men at Sparta, as well as Pharnabazus the Persian satrap; thus indirectly bringing about the emancipation of Athens from the Thirty, the partial discouragement of the dekarchies throughout Greece, and the recall of Lysander himself from his command. It was not without reluctance that the conqueror of Athens submitted to descend again to a private station. Amidst the crowd of flatterers who heaped incense on him at the moment of his omnipotence, there were not wanting those who suggested that he was much more worthy to reign than either Agis or Pausanias; that the kings ought to be taken, not from the first-born of the lineage of Eurysthenês and Proklês, but by selection out of all the Herakleids, of whom Lysander himself was one;[418] and that the person elected ought to be not merely a descendant of Hêraklês, but a worthy parallel of Hêraklês himself, while pæans were sung to the honor of Lysander at Samos,[419]—while Chœrilus and Antilochus composed poems in his praise,—while Antimachus (a poet highly esteemed by Plato) entered into a formal competition of recited epic verses called _Lysandria_, and was surpassed by Nikêratus, there was another warm admirer, a rhetor or sophist of Halikarnassus, named Kleon,[420] who wrote a discourse proving that Lysander had well earned the regal dignity,—that personal excellence ought to prevail over legitimate descent, and that the crown ought to be laid open to election from the most worthy among the Herakleids. Considering that rhetoric was neither employed nor esteemed at Sparta, we cannot reasonably believe that Lysander really ordered the composition of this discourse as an instrument of execution for projects preconceived by himself, in the same manner as an Athenian prosecutor or defendant before the dikastery used to arm himself with a speech from Lysias or Demosthenes. Kleon would make his court professionally through such a prose composition, whether the project were first recommended by himself, or currently discussed among a circle of admirers; while Lysander would probably requite the compliment by a reward not less munificent than that which he gave to the indifferent poet Antilochus.[421] And the composition would be put into the form of an harangue from the admiral to his countrymen, without any definite purpose that it should be ever so delivered. Such hypothesis of a speaker and an audience was frequent with the rhetors in their writings, as we may see in Isokrates,—especially in his sixth discourse, called Archidamus.

[417] See an expression of Aristotle (Polit. ii, 6, 22) about
the function of admiral among the Lacedæmonians,—ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς
βασιλεῦσιν, οὖσι στρατηγοῖς ἀϊδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδόν ἑτέρα
βασιλεία καθέστηκε.

This reflection,—which Aristotle intimates that he has borrowed
from some one else, though without saying from whom,—must in
all probability have been founded upon the case of Lysander;
for never after Lysander, was there any Lacedæmonian admiral
enjoying a power which could by possibility be termed exorbitant
or dangerous. We know that during the later years of the
Peloponnesian war, much censure was cast upon the Lacedæmonian
practice of annually changing the admiral (Xen. Hellen. i, 6, 4).

The Lacedæmonians seem to have been impressed with these
criticisms, for in the year 395 B.C. (the year before the battle
of Knidus) they conferred upon King Agesilaus, who was then
commanding the land army in Asia Minor, the command of the fleet
also—in order to secure unity of operations. This had never been
done before (Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28).

[418] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 24. Perhaps he may have been simply
a member of the tribe called Hylleis, who, probably, called
themselves Herakleids. Some affirmed that Lysander wished to
cause the kings to be elected out of all the Spartans, not simply
out of the Herakleids. This is less probable.

[419] Duris ap. Athenæum, xv, p. 696.

[420] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 20.

[421] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17.

Either from his own ambition, or from the suggestions of others, Lysander came now to conceive the idea of breaking the succession of the two regal families, and opening for himself a door to reach the crown. His projects have been characterized as revolutionary; but there seems nothing in them which fairly merits the appellation, in the sense which that word now bears, if we consider accurately what the Spartan kings were in the year 400 B.C. In this view the associations connected with the title of king, are to a modern reader misleading. The Spartan kings were not kings at all, in any modern sense of the term; not only they were not absolute, but they were not even constitutional kings. They were not sovereigns, nor was any Spartan their subject; every Spartan was the member of a free Grecian community. The Spartan king did not govern; nor did he reign, in the sense of having government carried on in his name and by his delegates. The government of Sparta was carried on by the ephors, with frequent consultation of the senate, and occasional, though rare appeals, to the public assembly of citizens. The Spartan king was not legally inviolable. He might be, and occasionally was, arrested, tried, and punished for misbehavior in the discharge of his functions. He was a self-acting person, a great officer of state; enjoying certain definite privileges, and exercising certain military and judicial functions, which passed as an _universitas_ by hereditary transmission in his family; but subject to the control of the ephors as to the way in which he performed these duties.[422] Thus, for example, it was his privilege to command the army when sent on foreign service; yet a law was made, requiring him to take deputies along with him, as a council of war, without whom nothing was to be done. The ephors recalled Agesilaus when they thought fit; and they brought Pausanias to trial and punishment, for alleged misconduct in his command.[423] The only way in which the Spartan kings formed part of the sovereign power in the state, or shared in the exercise of government properly so called, was that they had votes _ex officio_ in the Senate, and could vote there by proxy when they were not present. In ancient times, very imperfectly known, the Spartan kings seem really to have been sovereigns; the government having then been really carried on by them, or by their orders. But in the year 400 B.C., Agis and Pausanias had become nothing more than great and dignified hereditary officers of state, still bearing the old title of their ancestors. To throw open these hereditary functions to all the members of the Herakleid Gens, by election from their number, might be a change better or worse; it was a startling novelty (just as it would have been to propose, that any of the various priesthoods, which were hereditary in particular families, should be made elective), because of the extreme attachment of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs; but it cannot properly be styled revolutionary. The ephors, the senate, and the public assembly, might have made such a change in full legal form, without any appeal to violence; the kings might vote against it, but they would have been outvoted. And if the change had been made, the Spartan government would have remained, in form as well as in principle, just what it was before; although the Eurystheneid and Prokleid families would have lost their privileges. It is not meant here to deny that the Spartan kings were men of great importance in the state, especially when (like Agesilaus) they combined with their official station a marked personal energy. But it is not the less true, that the associations, connected with the title of _king_ in the modern mind, do not properly apply to them.

[422] Aristotle (Polit. v, 1, 5) represents justly the schemes
of Lysander as going πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας·
οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν. The Spartan kingship is
here regarded as ἀρχή τις—one office of state, among others.
But Aristotle regards Lysander as having intended to destroy the
kingship—καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν—which does not appear to have
been the fact. The plan of Lysander was to retain the kingship,
but to render it elective instead of hereditary. He wished to
place the Spartan kingship substantially on the same footing, as
that on which the office of the kings or suffetes of Carthage
stood; who were not hereditary, nor confined to members of the
same family or Gens, but chosen out of the principal families or
Gentes. Aristotle, while comparing the βασιλεῖς at Sparta with
those at Carthage, as being generally analogous, pronounces in
favor of the Carthaginian election as better than the Spartan
hereditary transmission. (Arist. Polit. ii, 8, 2.)

[423] Thucyd. v, 63; Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25; iv, 2, 1.

To carry his point at Sparta, Lysander was well aware that agencies of an unusual character must be employed. Quitting Sparta soon after his recall, he visited the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Zeus Ammon in Libya,[424] in order to procure, by persuasion or corruption, injunctions to the Spartans, countenancing his projects. So great was the general effect of oracular injunctions on the Spartan mind, that Kleomenes had thus obtained the deposition of king Demaratus, and the exiled Pleistoanax, his own return;[425] bribery having been in both cases the moving impulse. But Lysander was not equally fortunate. None of these oracles could be induced, by any offers, to venture upon so grave a sentence as that of repealing the established law of succession to the Spartan throne. It is even said that the priests of Ammon, not content with refusing his offers, came over to Sparta to denounce his proceeding; upon which accusation Lysander was put on his trial, but acquitted. The statement that he was thus tried and acquitted, I think untrue. But his schemes so far miscarried,—and he was compelled to resort to another stratagem, yet still appealing to the religious susceptibilities of his countrymen. There had been born some time before, in one of the cities of the Euxine, a youth named Silenus, whose mother affirmed that he was the son of Apollo; an assertion which found extensive credence, notwithstanding various difficulties raised by the sceptics. While making at Sparta this new birth of a son to the god, the partisans of Lysander also spread abroad the news that there existed sacred manuscripts and inspired records, of great antiquity, hidden and yet unread, in the custody of the Delphian priests; not to be touched or consulted until some genuine son of Apollo should come forward to claim them. With the connivance of some among the priests, certain oracles were fabricated agreeable to the views of Lysander. The plan was concerted that Silenus should present himself at Delphi, tender the proofs of his divine parentage, and then claim the inspection of these hidden records; which the priests, after an apparently rigid scrutiny, were prepared to grant. Silenus would then read them aloud in the presence of all the spectators; and one would be found among them, recommending to the Spartans to choose their kings out of all the best citizens.[426]

[424] Diodor. xiv, 13; Cicero, de Divinat. i, 43, 96; Cornel.
Nepos, Lysand. c. 3.

[425] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25, from Ephorus. Compare Herodot. vi,
66; Thucyd. v, 12.

[426] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 26.

So nearly did this project approach to consummation, that Silenus actually presented himself at Delphi, and put in his claim. But one of the confederates either failed in his courage, or broke down, at the critical moment; so that the hidden records still remained hidden. Yet though Lysander was thus compelled to abandon his plan, nothing was made public about it until after his death. It might probably have succeeded, had he found temple-confederates of proper courage and cunning,—when we consider the profound and habitual deference of the Spartans to Delphi; upon the sanction of which oracle the Lykurgean institutions themselves were mainly understood to rest. And an occasion presently arose, on which the proposed change might have been tried with unusual facility and pertinence; though Lysander himself, having once miscarried, renounced his enterprise, and employed his influence, which continued unabated, in giving the sceptre to another instead of acquiring it for himself,[427]—like Mucian in reference to the emperor Vespasian.

[427] Tacit. Histor. i, 10. “Cui expeditius fuerit tradere
imperium, quam obtinere.”

The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for
himself a way to the throne, appears to rest on very sufficient
testimony,—that of Ephorus; to whom perhaps the words φασί τινες
in Aristotle may allude, where he mentions this conspiracy as
having been narrated (Polit. v, 1, 5). But Plutarch, as well as
K. O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, iv, 9, 5) and others, erroneously
represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to
after Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia;
which is certainly impossible, since Lysander accompanied
Agesilaus out, in the spring of 396 B.C.—did not return to
Greece until the spring of 395 B.C.—and was then employed,
with an interval not greater than four or five months, on that
expedition against Bœotia wherein he was slain.

The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have
taken place prior to the death of Agis,—at some time between 403
B.C. and 399 B.C. The humiliation which he received in 396 B.C.
from Agesilaus might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind
the renewal of his former plans; but he can have had no time to
do anything towards them. Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2) alludes
to the humiliation of Lysander by the kings as an example of
incidents _tending_ to raise disturbance in an aristocratical
government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner
in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 B.C.—which
proceeding is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to
their jealousy of Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21)—not to
the treatment of Lysander by Agesilaus in 396 B.C. The mission of
Lysander to the despot Dionysius at Syracuse (Plutarch, Lysand.
c. 2) must also have taken place prior to the death of Agis in
399 B.C.; whether before or after the failure of the stratagem at
Delphi, is uncertain; perhaps after it.

It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that king Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heræa in Arcadia, and carried back to Sparta, where he shortly afterwards expired. His wife Mimæa had given birth to a son named Leotychides, now a youth about fifteen years of age.[428] But the legitimacy of this youth had always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, when the birth of the child was first made known to him, that it could not be his. He had been frightened out of his wife’s bed by the shock of an earthquake, which was construed as a warning from Poseidon, and was held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time; during which interval Leotychides was born. This was one story; another was, that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it was alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully recognized him; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during his last illness.[429] As in the case of Demaratus about a century earlier,[430]—advantage was taken of these doubts by Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by Lysander, to exclude Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself.

[428] The age of Leotychides is approximately marked by the
date of the presence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414-413 B.C. The
mere rumor, true or false, that this young man was the son of
Alkibiades, may be held sufficient as chronological evidence to
certify his age.

[429] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Pausanias, iii, 8, 4; Plutarch,
Agesilaus, c. 3.

[430] Herodot. v, 66.

Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, not by Lampito the mother of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. He was now at the mature age of forty,[431] and having been brought up without any prospect of becoming king,—at least until very recent times,—had passed through the unmitigated rigor of Spartan drill and training. He was distinguished for all Spartan virtues; exemplary obedience to authority, in the performance of his trying exercises, military as well as civil,—intense emulation, in trying to surpass every competitor,—extraordinary courage, unremitting energy, as well as facility in enduring hardship,—perfect simplicity and frugality in all his personal habits,—extreme sensibility to the opinion of his fellow-citizens. Towards his personal friends or adherents, he was remarkable for fervor of attachment, even for unscrupulous partisanship, with a readiness to use all his influence in screening their injustices or short-comings; while he was comparatively placable and generous in dealing with rivals at home, notwithstanding his eagerness to be first in every sort of competition.[432] His manners were cheerful and popular, and his physiognomy pleasing; though in stature he was not only small but mean, and though he labored under the additional defect of lameness on one leg,[433] which accounts for his constant refusal to suffer his statue to be taken.[434] He was indifferent to money, and exempt from excess of selfish feeling, except in his passion for superiority and power.

[431] I confess I do not understand how Xenophon can say, in
his Agesilaus, i, 6, Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε
τῆς βασιλείας. For he himself says (ii, 28), and it seems
well established, that Agesilaus died at the age of above 80
(Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40); and his death must have been about 360
B.C.

[432] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2-5; Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 3;
Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 212 D.

[433] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2; Xenoph. Agesil. viii, 1.

It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman,
and that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on
that especial ground, for marrying her.

[434] Xenoph. Agesil. xi, 7; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never yet been tried in any military command, though he had probably served in the army either at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his character, therefore, lay as yet undisclosed. And his popularity may perhaps have been the greater at the moment when the throne became vacant, inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to excite jealousy, he stood distinguished only for accomplishments, efforts, endurances, and punctual obedience, wherein even the poorest citizens were his competitors on equal terms. Nay, so complete was the self-constraint, and the habit of smothering emotions, generated by a Spartan training, that even the cunning Lysander himself did not at this time know him. He and Agesilaus had been early and intimate friends,[435] both having been placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the purposes of discipline; a strong illustration of the equalizing character of this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of poor parents and condition.[436] He made the mistake of supposing Agesilaus to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable; and this was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the latter to the throne, after the decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned, if by his means Agesilaus became king, on a great increase of his own influence, and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as ostensible general, at least as real chief under the tutelar headship of the new king.

[435] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

[436] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2.

Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which always marked the funeral of a king of Sparta were terminated,[437] and the day arrived for installation of a new king, Agesilaus, under the promptings of Lysander, stood forward to contest the legitimacy and the title of Leotychides, and to claim the sceptre for himself,—a true Herakleid, brother of the late king Agis. In the debate, which probably took place not merely before the ephors and the senate but before the assembled citizens besides, Lysander warmly seconded his pretensions. Of this debate unfortunately we are not permitted to know much. We cannot doubt that the mature age and excellent reputation of Agesilaus would count as a great recommendation, when set against an untried youth; and this was probably the real point (since the relationship of both was so near) upon which decision turned;[438] for the legitimacy of Leotychides was positively asseverated by his mother Timæa,[439] and we do not find that the question of paternity was referred to the Delphian oracle, as in the case of Demaratus.

[437] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 1.

[438] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3;
Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Xen. Agesil. 1, 5—κρίνασα ἡ πόλις
ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ, etc.

[439] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2. This statement contradicts the talk
imputed to Timæa by Duris (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch,
Alkibiad. c. 23).

There was, however, one circumstance which stood much in the way of Agesilaus,—his personal deformity. A lame king of Sparta had never yet been known. And if we turn back more than a century to the occurrence of a similar deformity in one of the Battiad princes at Kyrênê,[440] we see the Kyrenians taking it so deeply to heart, that they sent to ask advice from Delphi, and invited over the Mantineian reformer Demônax. Over and above this sentiment of repugnance, too, the gods had specially forewarned Sparta to beware of “a lame reign.” Deiopeithes, a prophet and religious adviser of high reputation, advocated the cause of Leotychides. He produced an ancient oracle, telling Sparta, that “with all her pride she must not suffer a lame reign to impair her stable footing;[441] for if she did so, unexampled suffering and ruinous wars would long beset her.” This prophecy had already been once invoked, about eighty years earlier,[442] but with a very different interpretation. To Grecian leaders, like Themistokles or Lysander, it was an accomplishment of no small value to be able to elude inconvenient texts or intractable religious feelings, by expository ingenuity. And Lysander here raised his voice (as Themistokles had done on the momentous occasion before the battle of Salamis),[443] to combat the professional expositors; contending that by “a lame reign,” the god meant, not a bodily defect in the king,—which might not even be congenital, but might arise from some positive hurt,[444]—but the reign of any king who was not a genuine descendant of Hêraklês.

[440] Herodot. iv, 161. Διεδέξατο δὲ τὴν βασιληΐην τοῦ
Ἀρκεσίλεω ὁ παῖς Βάττος, χωλός τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἀρτίπους. Οἱ δὲ
Κυρηναῖοι ~πρὸς τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν συμφορὴν~ ἔπεμπον ἐς Δελφοὺς,
ἐπειρησομένους ὅντινα τρόπον καταστησάμενοι κάλλιστα ἂν οἰκέοιεν.

[441] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Pausanias,
iii, 8, 5.

[442] Diodor. xi, 50.

[443] Herodot. vii, 143.

[444] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 3. ὡς οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο
κελεύειν φυλάξασθαι, ~μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσῃ~, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον,
μὴ οὐκ ὢν τοῦ γένους βασιλεύσῃ.

Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine
displeasure, and therefore a disqualification from the throne,
as in the case of Battus of Kyrênê above noticed. But the
words χωλὴ βασίλεια were general enough to cover both the
cases,—superinduced as well as congenital lameness. It is upon
this that Lysander founds his inference—that the god did not
mean to allude to bodily lameness at all.

The influence of Lysander,[445] combined doubtless with a preponderance of sentiment already tending towards Agesilaus, caused this effort of interpretative subtlety to be welcomed as convincing, and led to the nomination of the lame candidate as king. There was, however, a considerable minority, to whom this decision appeared a sin against the gods and a mockery of the oracle. And though the murmurs of such dissentients were kept down by the ability and success of Agesilaus during the first years of his reign; yet when, in his ten last years, calamity and humiliation were poured thickly upon this proud city, the public sentiment came decidedly round to their view. Many a pious Spartan then exclaimed, with feelings of bitter repentance, that the divine word never failed to come true at last,[446] and that Sparta was justly punished for having wilfully shut her eyes to the distinct and merciful warning vouchsafed to her, about the mischiefs of a “lame reign.”[447]

[445] Pausanias, iii, 8, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch,
Lysand. c. 22; Justin, vi, 2.

[446]

Ἴδ᾽ οἷον, ὦ παῖδες, προσέμιξεν ἄφαρ
Τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον ἡμῖν
Τῆς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,
Ὅ τ᾽ ἔλακεν, etc.

This is a splendid chorus of the Trachiniæ of Sophokles (822)
proclaiming their sentiments on the awful death of Hêraklês, in
the tunic of Nessus, which has just been announced as about to
happen.

[447] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Compar. Agesil. and
Pomp. c. 1. Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔδοξε λαβεῖν, οὔτε τὰ
πρὸς θεοὺς ἄμεμπτος, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, κρίνας νοθείας
Λεωτυχίδην, ὃν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ ἀδελφὸς γνήσιον, τὸν δὲ
χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσάμενος τὸν περὶ τῆς χωλότητος. Again, ib. c.
2. δι᾽ Ἀγησίλαον ἐπεσκότησε τῷ χρησμῷ Λύσανδρος.

Besides the crown, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the large property left by the late king Agis; an acquisition which enabled him to display his generosity by transferring half of it at once to his maternal relatives,—for the most part poor persons.[448] The popularity acquired by this step was still farther increased by his manner of conducting himself towards the ephors and senate. Between these magistrates and the kings, there was generally a bad understanding. The kings, not having lost the tradition of the plenary power once enjoyed by their ancestors, displayed as much haughty reserve as they dared, towards an authority now become essentially superior to their own. But Agesilaus,—not less from his own preëstablished habits, than from anxiety to make up for the defects of his title,—adopted a line of conduct studiously opposite. He not only took pains to avoid collision with the ephors, but showed marked deference both to their orders and to their persons. He rose from his seat whenever they appeared; he conciliated both ephors and senators by timely presents.[449] By such judicious proceeding, as well as by his exact observance of the laws and customs,[450] he was himself the greatest gainer. Combined with that ability and energy in which he was never deficient, it ensured to him more real power than had ever fallen to the lot of any king of Sparta; power not merely over the military operations abroad which usually fell to the kings,—but also over the policy of the state at home. On the increase and maintenance of that real power, his chief thoughts were concentrated; new dispositions generated by kingship, which had never shown themselves in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money, luxury, and all the outward show of power,—he exhibited, as a king, an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation, in diet, clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander also, he delighted in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots or factions of devoted partisans, whom he rarely scrupled to uphold in all their career of injustice and oppression. Though an amiable man, with no disposition to tyranny, and still less to plunder, for his own benefit,—Agesilaus thus made himself the willing instrument of both, for the benefit of his various coadjutors and friends, whose power and consequence he identified with his own.[451]

[448] Xen. Agesil. iv, 5; Plutarch, Ages. c. 4.

[449] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 4.

[450] Xen. Agesil. vii, 2.

[451] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 100; Plutarch, Agesilaus,
c. 3, 13-23; Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconica, p. 209 F—212 D.

See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xiii, p.
609.

At the moment when Agesilaus became king, Sparta was at the maximum of her power, holding nearly all the Grecian towns as subject allies, with or without tribute. She was engaged in the task (as has already been mentioned) of protecting the Asiatic Greeks against the Persian satraps in their neighborhood. And the most interesting portion of the life of Agesilaus consists in the earnestness with which he espoused, and the vigor and ability with which he conducted, this great Pan-hellenic duty. It will be seen that success in his very promising career was intercepted[452] by his bad, factious subservience to partisans, at home and abroad,—by his unmeasured thirst for Spartan omnipotence,—and his indifference or aversion to any generous scheme of combination with the cities dependent on Sparta.

[452] Isokrates (Orat. v, _ut sup._) makes a remark in substance
the same.

His attention, however, was first called to a dangerous internal conspiracy with which Sparta was threatened. The “lame reign” was as yet less than twelve months old, when Agesilaus, being engaged in sacrificing at one of the established state solemnities, was apprised by the officiating prophet, that the victims exhibited menacing symptoms, portending a conspiracy of the most formidable character. A second sacrifice gave yet worse promise; and on the third, the terrified prophet exclaimed, “Agesilaus, the revelation before us imports that we are actually in the midst of our enemies.” They still continued to sacrifice, but victims were now offered to the averting and preserving gods, with prayers that these latter, by tutelary interposition, would keep off the impending peril. At length, after much repetition, and great difficulty, favorable victims were obtained; the meaning of which was soon made clear. Five days afterwards, an informer came before the ephors, communicating the secret, that a dangerous conspiracy was preparing, organized by a citizen named Kinadon.[453]

[453] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 4.

The conspirator thus named was a Spartan citizen, but not one of that select number called The Equals or The Peers. It has already been mentioned that inequalities had been gradually growing up among qualified citizens of Sparta, tending tacitly to set apart a certain number of them under the name of The Peers, and all the rest under the correlative name of The Inferiors. Besides this, since the qualification of every family lasted only so long as the citizen could furnish a given contribution for himself and his sons to the public mess-table, and since industry of every kind was inconsistent with the rigid personal drilling imposed upon all of them,—the natural consequence was, that in each generation a certain number of citizens became disfranchised and dropped off. But these disfranchised men did not become Periœki or Helots. They were still citizens, whose qualification, though in abeyance, might be at any time renewed by the munificence of a rich man;[454] so that they too, along with the lesser citizens, were known under the denomination of The Inferiors. It was to this class that Kinadon belonged. He was a young man of remarkable strength and courage, who had discharged with honor his duties in the Lykurgean discipline,[455] and had imbibed from it that sense of personal equality, and that contempt of privilege, which its theory as well as its practice suggested. Notwithstanding all exactness of duty performed, he found that the constitution, as practically worked, excluded him from the honors and distinctions of the state; reserving them for the select citizens known under the name of Peers. And this exclusion had become more marked and galling since the formation of the Spartan empire after the victory of Ægospotami; whereby the number of lucrative posts (harmosties and others) all monopolized by the Peers, had been so much multiplied. Debarred from the great political prizes, Kinadon was still employed by the ephors, in consequence of his high spirit and military sufficiency, in that standing force which they kept for maintaining order at home.[456] He had been the agent ordered on several of those arbitrary seizures which they never scrupled to employ towards persons whom they regarded as dangerous. But this was no satisfaction to his mind; nay, probably, by bringing him into close contact with the men in authority, it contributed to lessen his respect for them. He desired “to be inferior to no man in Sparta,”[457] and his conspiracy was undertaken to realize this object by breaking up the constitution.

[454] See Vol. II, Ch. vi, p. 359 of this History.

[455] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5. Οὗτος (Kinadon) δ᾽ ἦν νεανίσκος καὶ
τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων.

The meaning of the term Οἱ ὅμοιοι fluctuates in Xenophon;
it sometimes, as here, is used to signify the privileged
Peers—again De Repub. Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14.
Sometimes again it is used agreeably to the Lykurgean theory;
whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged his duty in the
public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7).

There was a variance between the theory and the practice.

[456] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. Ὑπηρετήκει δὲ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἤδη ὁ
Κινάδων τοῖς Ἐφόροις τοιαῦτα. iii, 3, 7. Οἱ συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν
(Kinadon says) αὐτοὶ ὅπλα κεκτήμεθα.

[457] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 11. μηδενὸς ἥττων εἶναι τῶν ἐν
Λακεδαίμονι—was the declaration of Kinadon when seized and
questioned by the ephors concerning his purposes. Substantially
it coincides with Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2)—ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις
ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας
ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.

It has already been mentioned that amidst the general insecurity which pervaded the political society of Laconia, the ephors maintained a secret police and system of espionage which reached its height of unscrupulous efficiency under the title of the Krypteia. Such precautions were now more than ever requisite; for the changes in the practical working of Spartan politics tended to multiply the number of malcontents, and to throw the Inferiors as well as the Periœki and the Neodamodes (manumitted Helots), into one common antipathy with the Helots, against the exclusive partnership of the Peers. Informers were thus sure of encouragement and reward, and the man who now came to the ephors either was really an intimate friend of Kinadon, or had professed himself such in order to elicit the secret. “Kinadon (said he to the ephors) brought me to the extremity of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were therein. I reckoned up about forty, besides the king, the ephors and the senators. Upon my asking him why he desired me to count them, he replied,—Because these are the men, and the only men, whom you have to look upon as enemies;[458] all others in the market-place, more than four thousand in number, are friends and comrades. Kinadon also pointed out to me the one or two Spartans whom we met in the roads, or who were lords in the country districts, as our only enemies; every one else around them being friendly to our purpose.” “How many did he tell you were the accomplices actually privy to the scheme?”—asked the ephors. “Only a few (was the reply); but those thoroughly trustworthy; these confidants themselves, however, said that all around them were accomplices,—Inferiors, Periœki, Neodamodes, and Helots, all alike; for whenever any one among the classes talked about a Spartan, he could not disguise his intense antipathy,—he talked as if he could eat the Spartans raw.”[459]

[458] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5.

[459] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 6. Αὐτοὶ μέντοι πᾶσιν ἔφασαν
συνειδέναι καὶ εἵλωσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομείοσι καὶ
τοῖς περιοίκοις· ὅπου γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ
Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν ~καὶ ὠμῶν
ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν~.

The expression is Homeric—ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον, etc. (Iliad.
iv, 35). The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain
the full expression of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis
wishes, “that he may one day come to drink the blood of those who
had ill-used him” (v. 349 Gaisf.).

“But how (continued the ephors) did Kinadon reckon upon getting arms?” “His language was (replied the witness)—We of the standing force have our own arms all ready; and here are plenty of knives, swords, spits, hatchets, axes and scythes—on sale in this market-place, to suit an insurgent multitude; besides, every man who tills the earth, or cuts wood and stone, has tools by him which will serve as weapons in case of need; especially in a struggle with enemies themselves unarmed.” On being asked what was the moment fixed for execution, the witness could not tell; he had been instructed only to remain on the spot, and be ready.[460]

[460] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 7. ὅτι ἐπιδημεῖν οἱ παρηγγελμένον εἴη.

It does not appear that this man knew the name of any person concerned, except Kinadon himself. So deeply were the ephors alarmed, that they refrained from any formal convocation even of what was called the Lesser Assembly,—including the senate, of which the kings were members _ex officio_, and, perhaps, a few other principal persons besides. But the members of this assembly were privately brought together to deliberate on the emergency; Agesilaus, probably, among them. To arrest Kinadon at once in Sparta appeared imprudent; since his accomplices, of number as yet unknown, would be thus admonished either to break out in insurrection, or at least to make their escape. But an elaborate stratagem was laid for arresting him out of Sparta, without the knowledge of his accomplices. The ephors, calling him before them, professed to confide to him (as they had done occasionally before) a mission to go to Aulon (a Laconian town on the frontier towards Arcadia and Triphylia) and there to seize some parties designated by name in a formal skytalê or warrant; including some of the Aulonite Periœki,—some Helots,—and one other person by name, a woman of peculiar beauty, resident at the place, whose influence was understood to spread disaffection among all the Lacedæmonians who came thither, old as well as young.[461] When Kinadon inquired what force he was to take with him on the mission, the ephors, to obviate all suspicion that they were picking out companions with views hostile to him, desired him to go to the Hippagretês (or commander of the three hundred youthful guards called horsemen, though they were not really mounted) and ask for the first six or seven men of the guard[462] who might happen to be in the way. But they (the ephors) had already held secret communication with the Hippagretês, and had informed him both whom they wished to be sent, and what the persons sent were to do. They then despatched Kinadon on his pretended mission telling him that they should place at his disposal three carts, in order that he might more easily bring home the prisoners.

[461] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8. Ἀγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν
γυναῖκα, ἣ καλλίστη μὲν ἐλέγετο αὐτόθι εἶναι, λυμαίνεσθαι
δ᾽ ἐῴκει τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ
νεωτέρους.

[462] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9, 10.

The persons called Hippeis at Sparta, were not mounted; they were
a select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either
on home police or on foreign service.