Chapter LXX: Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (1)

The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Proklês and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining; that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.[100]

[100] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7.

Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the service of the Persian king.[101] Phalinus, an officer of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. “If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them.” “The king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable subjects.”—“Our arms and our valor are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure.”[102] But though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgment, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. “If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance of safety for you against the king’s consent, I recommend you to look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself.” Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question, Klearchus rejoined,—“That is _your_ opinion; now report our answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we are to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his enemies,—with our arms, than without them.” Phalinus, in retiring, said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in their present position,—but war, if they moved, either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he intended to do.[103]

[101] We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias
distinctly asserted himself to have been present at this
interview, and I see no reason why we should not believe him.
Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as false, affirming that
Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had he been there;
but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it
necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῶν Φαλῖνος
~εἶς Ἕλλην~, (ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence
of one or two other Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he
was the spokesman of the party—a military man.

[102] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἴου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα
ὑμῖν παραδώσειν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν
μαχούμεθα.

[103] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat
copious in his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he
certainly followed other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it
be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past
heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus.

Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason, from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king, at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly horse, partly foot.

The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus, with his chief companions, a spear.[104] The latter, besides the promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith, down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was, however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days’ marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get out of the reach of the king’s forces, who would hardly be able to overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.

[104] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good
reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in
Babylonia, for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).

They had now come ninety-three days’ march[105] from Ephesus, or ninety from Sardis.[106] The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is, according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles. There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed at various places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been one hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more than half a year;[107] but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not specified in number of days.

[105] Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab.
ii, 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which
we should obtain by adding together the separate days’ march
specified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis
to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was three days’ journey
(Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really only to
the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556;
Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.

[106] Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208)
calculates twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from
Sardis to Kunaxa or the Mounds of Mohammed.

[107] For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ,
or opposite to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the
preceding chapter) for believing that it cannot have been less
than five days. The army must have been in the utmost need of
repose, as well as of provisions.

How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field, indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious apprehensions.[108] In spite of this great extent, population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending the long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were of a very different character. How were they to find their way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle would be most formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing, in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads or distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any one to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing. Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his heart, seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of the king.[109] The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30′—will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his course.

[108] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.

[109] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.

In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed, yet better supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they did;[110] yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and by evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had been pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms; and desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded with a talent of silver.[111]

[110] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ~ἐπορεύοντο
ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον~, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι
εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν.

Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter,
(Erdkunde, part. x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the
Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219),
understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from
which I dissent. “When it was day, the army proceeded onward on
their march, having the sun on their right hand,”—these words
they understand as meaning that the army marched _northward_;
whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched
_eastward_. _To have the sun on the right hand_, does not so
much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise
instant when, the sun rises,—but to his diurnal path through the
heavens, and to the general direction of the day’s march. This
may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus,
iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa,
from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of
Gibraltar, by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These
Phœnicians said, “that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea)
they had the sun on their right hand”—ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλώοντες
~τὸν ἠέλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ~. Herodotus rejects this statement as
incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude
beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in
sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their
right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits
of Gibraltar must, in his judgment, have the sun on the _left_
hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude
of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See Vol. III. of this
History, ch. xviii, p. 282.

In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the
Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates
(the place where they had passed the last night but one before
the battle of Kunaxa) and marching _northward_, could not expect
to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the
Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so,
if they marched _eastward_, towards the Tigris. Nor would they
have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact
have been something near to a return upon their own previous
steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended
Trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to
the Euphrates.

[111] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing
military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic.
See the references in Krüger and Schneider’s notes.

What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot ascertain;[112] since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy,—and even the clamor and shouting of the camp during the night—so intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message, and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at leisure; then, having put his troops into the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had come from the king with instructions to propose a truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus replied abruptly,—“Well then,—go and tell the king, that our first business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing dinner for them.” With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned very speedily; thus making it plain that the king, or the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the king thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be concluded.

[112] Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide
them towards Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.

After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the guides would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they could not be crossed without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, or expressly cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the left hand, his stick in the right; employing the latter to chastise any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.[113] As it was not the usual season of irrigation for crops, he suspected that the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians that these difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily surmount.

[113] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.

At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory, which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece, was disregarded and left for the slaves,—wine and vinegar, both also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon himself and others.[114]

[114] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.

After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter, he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks, and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate situation; that he had solicited the king’s permission to save them, as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus, after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied, that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march, without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the King’s permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it was unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had assailed him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to take them where you can find them.” Well were the Greeks content to enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on the other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home; going himself to his own satrapy.[115]

[115] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.

The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly and not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed to her of the battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all those, who though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus—and that she showed favorable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.[116] It seems probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible; especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.[117] And Klearchus might say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards preparing to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted away from Syracuse[118]—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because there seems to have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the interior of Babylonia.

[116] Ktesiæ Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the
remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius
Phalêreus: see also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.

[117] Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.

[118] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.

Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements, until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus replied,—“I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides; Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”[119]

[119] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.

Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his own complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.

That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king’s daughter whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust, sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days’ march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of Media, and passed through it,[120] prosecuting their march onward through the country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and twenty feet broad; it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs (or about seventy miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia), and to be not far distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as eight parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad, and deep enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil; and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather, perhaps, they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.

[120] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 12. Διελθόντες δὲ ~τρεῖς σταθμοὺς~,
ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος, καὶ ~παρῆλθον αὐτοῦ
εἴσω~. It appears to me that these three days’ march or σταθμοὶ
can hardly be computed from the moment when they commenced
their march under the conduct of Tissaphernes. On the other
hand, if we begin from the moment when the Greeks started under
conduct of Ariæus, we can plainly trace three distinct _resting
places_ (σταθμοὺς) before they reached the Wall of Media.
First, at the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii,
13-21). Secondly, at the villages of abundant supply, where
they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes, and waited twenty
days for his return (ii, 3, 14; ii, 4, 9). Thirdly, one night’s
halt under the conduct of Tissaphernes, before they reached the
Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting
places, between the station (the first station after passing
the undefended trench) from whence they started to begin their
retreat under the conduct of Ariæus,—and the point where they
traversed the Wall of Media.

As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking them during the night,—and also to send and occupy the bridge over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the informant contradicted each other; for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten,—while, if the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger replied, that it was a great extent of country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot where they were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris,—on the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and the Tigris.[121] Such an island was a defensible position, having a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the king’s enemies. Tissaphernes calculated that the message now delivered would induce the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position and to cross the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding; an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek troops into a position sufficiently tempting for them to hold,—and since he knew that his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers, were animated only by the wish of reaching home. They trusted, though not without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them; and never for a moment thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did not, however, neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail. On the next morning they passed over it in a body, in cautious and mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern bank of the Tigris,—not only without attack, but even without sight of a single Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and a few others watching their motions.

[121] I reserve for this place the consideration of that which
Xenophon states, in two or three passages, about the Wall
of Media and about different canals in connection with the
Tigris,—the result of which, as far as I can make it out, stands
in my text.

I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the
march of the day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa,
the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for defence across
their line of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty
feet broad close by the Euphrates; through which gut the whole
army passed. Xenophon says, “This trench had been carried upwards
across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed,
the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four
canals, one hundred feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so
that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the
Euphrates, they are distant each from the other by one parasang,
and there are bridges over them—Παρετέτατο δ᾽ ἡ τάφρος ἄνω διὰ
τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παράσαγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους,
ἔνθα δὴ (the books print a full stop between τείχους and ἔνθα,
which appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without
interruption) εἰσιν αἱ διωρύχες, ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ
ῥέουσαι· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εὖρος πλεθριαῖαι, βαθεῖαι
δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγά· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ
εἰς τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπουσι δ᾽ ἑκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ᾽
ἔπεισιν. The present tense—εἰσιν αἱ διώρυχες—seems to mark the
local reference of ἔνθα to the Wall of Media, and not to the
actual march of the army.

Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp.
79-87, etc.), Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn
Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track
of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider Xenophon to state that
the Cyreian army on this day’s march (the day but one before
the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four
distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They
all, indeed, contest the accuracy of this latter statement;
Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigris, in this part
of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates; and that
it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to
each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed
through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa.

It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the
words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either
the Wall of Media, or these four canals _before_ the battle of
Kunaxa, but who says (as Krüger, De Authentiâ Anabaseos, p. 12,
prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis, rightly explains him),
that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near,
the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until
long _after_ the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them
towards the Tigris, two days’ march before they reached Sittakê
(Anab. ii, 4, 12).

It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the
direction of the Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins
still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see
journal of the Geographical Society, vol. ix. pp. 447-473, with
Captain Lynch’s map annexed) discovered a line of embankment
which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the
western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3′, and stretches
towards the Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W.
“It is a solitary straight single mound, twenty-five long paces
thick, with a bastion on its western face at every fifty-five
paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch, twenty-seven
paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of the
country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from
thirty-five to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line
as far as the eye can trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes
in the same straight line to two mounds called Ramelah on the
Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that it is, in places far
inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a level
with the desert.” (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446).

Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now
called Sidd Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall
of Media reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best
recent maps, especially that of Colonel Chesney; and accepted as
such by recent inquirers.

Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by
Colonel Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted
the views of Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall
of Media, in the line here assigned to it, has no evidence to
rest upon. Captain Jones, commander of the steamer at Bagdad,
undertook, at the request of Colonel Rawlinson a minute
examination of the locality, and ascertained that what had been
laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds;
no wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or
eight miles from the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter
torrents and drain off the rain water of the desert into a large
reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive valley between
the rivers.

From this important communication it results, that there is as
yet no evidence now remaining for determining what was the line
or position of the Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be
a datum positively established, serving as premises from whence
to deduce other positions mentioned by Xenophon. As our knowledge
now stands, there is not a single point mentioned by Xenophon
in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except Babylon
itself,—and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot
where Babylonia proper commences.

The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very
plain and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually
saw it, passed through it, and correctly describes it in height
as well as breadth. Its entire length he of course only gives
from what he was told. His statement appears to me good evidence
that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the Tigris to
the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates,
though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality
and direction of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in
the expedition of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on
the left bank of the Euphrates, the ruins of a wall, “which in
ancient times had stretched to a great distance for the defence
of Assyria against foreign invasion.” It is fair to presume that
this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta cannot
be assigned.

It is important, however, to remember,—what I have already
stated in this note,—that Xenophon did not see, and did not
cross either the Wall of Media, or the two canals here mentioned,
until many days after the battle of Kunaxa.

We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was
intersected by canals, and that there was one canal greater
than the rest and navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to
the Tigris, in a direction to the south of east. This coincides
pretty well with the direction assigned in Colonel Chesney’s map
to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into which the four great
canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris to the
Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be
said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as
it were a branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust
itself, when the space between them was covered with a network of
canals great and small, and when a vast quantity of the water of
both was exhausted in fertilizing the earth, is difficult to say.

The _island_ wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near
Sittakê, before crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram
formed by the Tigris, the Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel
canals joining them. It might well be called a large island,
containing many cities and villages, with a large population.

After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons, the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to be twenty parasangs.[122] The Physkus was one hundred feet wide, with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching. An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as a reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see the Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array, and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared greater than the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian spectators was very imposing.[123] Here Assyria ended and Media began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain of queen Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an exception to the desert character of the remaining march, were situated on the Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages, which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence,—yet without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy,[124] through Parysatis, thus proved a sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days’ march, called twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw on the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kænæ, from whence they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the inhabitants upon rafts supported by inflated skins.[125]

[122] There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the
Tigris, above Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and
less winding, than it does now. The situation of Opis cannot be
verified. The ruins of a large city were seen by Captain Lynch
near the confluence of the river Adhem with the Tigris, which he
supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.

[123] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 26.

[124] Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.

[125] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 26-28.

Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators,
identify this town of Καιναὶ or Kænæ with the modern town Senn;
which latter place Mannert (Geogr. der Röm. v. p. 333) and
Rennell (Illustrations p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser
Zab instead of the Greater Zab.

To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to
Καιναὶ, does not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is
there much real similarity of name between the two; although our
erroneous way of pronouncing the Latin name _Caenae_, creates a
delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth shows that some
modern writers have been misled in the same manner by identifying
the modern town of Sert with Tigrano-_certa_.

It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon’s
work, that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he
must have crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on
the fact that though distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v,
52). Perhaps in drawing up his narrative after the expedition,
Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as to fancy that two
synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoranda, were
only one.

On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days,—days of serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of mistrust, ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they had followed throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the rear of his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During their halt on the Zab, so many various manifestations occurred to aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities seemed on the point of breaking out between the two camps. To obviate this danger Klearchus demanded an interview with Tissaphernes, represented to him the threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the necessity of coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap that, over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the Greeks on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel with him; that they had everything to hope from his friendship, and everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance of safe return, from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could gain nothing by destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the best and most faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement and for conquering the Mysians and the Pisidians,—as Cyrus had experienced while he was alive. Klearchus concluded his protest by requesting to be informed, what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of Tissaphernes with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.[126]

[126] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 2-15.

“Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove to you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the king or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be easier. We have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are wide plains in which you would be starved,—besides mountains and rivers which you would be unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the means of destroying you in our hands, and having nevertheless bound ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall not be fools and knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw upon ourselves the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection for my neighbors, the Greeks,—and my wish to attach to my own person, by ties of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus,—which have made me eager to conduct you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are in my service, though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara erect _upon his head_, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon _my heart_, in full pride and confidence.”[127]

[127] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 17-23. This last comparison is curious,
and in all probability the genuine words of the satrap—τὴν μὲν
γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ τιάραν βασιλεῖ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν, τὴν δ᾽
ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἴσως ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων καὶ ἕτερος εὐπετῶς ἔχοι.

So powerful was the impression made upon Klearchus by these assurances, that he exclaimed,—“Surely those informers deserve the severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such good friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so.” “Yes (replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I will tell you who the calumniators are.” “To-be-sure I will (rejoined Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at the same time, who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against you.” The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential manner.

On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed to the Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order to reëstablish that confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did he pledge himself for the good faith and philhellenic dispositions of the satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the soldiers; who, still continuing to entertain their former suspicions, remonstrated especially against the extreme imprudence of putting all the generals at once into the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency of Klearchus prevailed. Himself with four other generals,—Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and Sokrates,—and twenty lochages or captains,—went to visit the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers going along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the Persian camp-market.[128]

[128] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 30.

On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes,—distant nearly three miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit,—the five generals were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent, betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior were detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the Persian court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Sokrates were beheaded after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from affection to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Klearchus in the prison, by the hands of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all her influence with her son Artaxerxes to save his life; though her efforts were counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior influence of queen Stateira, his wife. The rivalry between these two royal women, doubtless arising out of many other circumstances besides the death of Klearchus, became soon afterwards so furious, that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.[129]

[129] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 1. Ktesiæ Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr;
Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv, 27.

Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He appears to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason of entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But his life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and torture,—probably by the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had always power enough to perpetrate cruelties, though not always to avert them.[130] She had already brought to a miserable end every one, even faithful defenders of Artaxerxes, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.

[130] Tacit. Histor. i, 45. “Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad
_prohibendum_ scelus; _jubere_ jam poterat. Ita, simulatione
iræ, vinciri jussum (Marium Celsum) et majores pœnas daturum,
affirmans, præsenti exitio subtraxit.”