Chapter LXIX (2)

At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary, except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,[49] a century before; most of them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against the Great King.[50]

[49] See Herodot. v. 49.

[50] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 1.

Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias, etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or less in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship,—yet his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required them,—but preferred service under other commanders, when they could obtain it.[51] Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed, Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the cattle who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward, and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular assembly, and to essay persuasion.

[51] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.

On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping; a remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At length he addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics, which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness. But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him. Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say; but I shall stand by you, and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies; while you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand me well; I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune.”[52]

[52] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I
translate the sense rather than the words.

This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two thousand of them left their commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the encampment of Klearchus.

Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered, sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He, however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent, in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He then again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest.”

Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be impatient for immediate departure. “If Klearchus does not choose to conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.” Klearchus here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for a guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible. The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their resolution accordingly.

To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’ march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again consult what step was fit to be taken.

The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.[53]

[53] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 16-21.

This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood, against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.

As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five days’ march,—crossing the rivers Sarus[54] and Pyramus. At Issus, a flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called, Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the Spartan Ephors.[55] He also received a farther reinforcement of four hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army fourteen thousand, from which are to be deducted the one hundred soldiers of Menon’s division, slain in Kilikia.

[54] The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon
at three hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of
modern travellers (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 34).

Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir’s Journey
through Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris,
ii, p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten
Thousand, p. 54.

Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus
is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then
flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and
Mr. Ainsworth, however, differ as to the route which they suppose
Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus.

Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which
afterwards appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in
Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The various data of ancient history and
geography about this region are by no means easy to reconcile;
see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius, iii, 17, 7.
An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney’s
or Kiepert’s, clears up some of these better than any verbal
description. We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates
into two branches, one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on
its western, the other on its eastern side. There are thus two
different passes, each called Pylæ Amanides or Amanian Gates; one
having reference to the Western Amanus, the other to the Eastern.
The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by Darius, before
the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct
in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates;
though both did not pass the same gates.

[55] Diodor. xiv. 21.

The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning amidst the king’s army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement, that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior; abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The Gates of Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.[56]

[56] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽
ἐπεὶ ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, αναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ
βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν, etc.

Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one day’s march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended.[57] And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them; whereas, on the king’s side, all the numerous means and opportunities of defence are successively abandoned; the Persians have no confidence, except in vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in treachery.

[57] Diodor. xiv.

Five parasangs, or one day’s march from this pass, Cyrus reached the Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce, with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days, his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging a merchant vessel to carry them away with their property. They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathized. The general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives. But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone, added,—“I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantmen if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing. No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as hostages, at Tralles;[58] but even these shall be given up to them, in consideration of their good behavior down to the present day. Let them go if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I towards them.” This behavior, alike judicious and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement, in the unknown march upon which they were entering.[59]

[58] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of
generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have
been not unfrequent with Persian kings. On the other hand, it
was remarked as a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian
Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent of his countrymen
serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered to
bring up his son to the king as a hostage, without being demanded
(Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wichers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).

[59] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.

At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his fleet,[60] and striking with his land-force eastward into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross mount Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have defended it, if he had chosen.[61] Four days’ march brought the army to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred by the neighboring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys; three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude about 35° 40′ N.[62] The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.

[60] Diodor. xiv, 21.

[61] See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of
the Ten Thousand, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the
difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Mützel’s valuable
notes on Quintus Curtius, iii, 20, 13, p. 101.

[62] Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the
road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the
Euphrates, can be satisfactorily made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn
Tausend, p. 36, 37).

Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by
Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even
in the map annexed to Col. Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, and
by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde,
part x, B. iii; West Asien, p. 14-17, with the elaborate
discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of
Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is
correctly placed in Colonel Chesney’s last work (Euphr. and Tigr.
p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though
I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of
Beilan and Thapsakus.

Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and
best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration
of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a
noted point, to which observations and calculations might be
conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers
(see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire
became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the
river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude)
became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.

The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra
to Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the
Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern
Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the
Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc.

The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) “is
celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On
the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved
causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on
the opposite side.”

Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto, in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother,—which to themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon; as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minæ per head (about £19 5_s._), equal to more than a year’s pay, at the rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.

But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before the others had given any answer. “By acting thus (said he) you will confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward. If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you could for him.” Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however, completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents to Menon separately.[63] He passed with his whole army immediately afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.

[63] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.

What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been never before fordable,—always passed by means of boats; insomuch that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; “the river made way for him to come and take the sceptre.” When we find that Abrokomas came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.[64]

[64] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17)
analogous expressions of flattery—from the historians of
Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially
made way for him—from the inhabitants on the banks of the
Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and
the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor
Tiberius (Tacitus, Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier
(Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24).

The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have
been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period
of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this
part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May; the
period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November
(see Colonel Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell
erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September
(Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a
sort of mean height, when Cyrus passed.

Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water
in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the
steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though
the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without
difficulty in the month of May.

After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded, for nine days’ march,[65] southward along its left bank, until he came to its affluent, the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated, he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to enter, following the banks of the Euphrates still further southward. It was now that he entered on what may be called the Desert,—an endless breadth or succession of undulations, “like the sea,” without any cultivation or even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various aromatic shrubs.[66] Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days’ march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by its inhabitants,—probably, however, leaving the provision dealers behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;[67] since the army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures; efforts in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire.[68] After these thirteen days of hardship, they reached Pylæ; near the entrance of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest and refresh.[69] There was on the opposite side of the river, at or near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of the soldiers crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.[70]

[65] Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty
parasangs (Anab. i, 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance
is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which
latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some
confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any
given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, Zug der
Zehn Tausend, p. 38).

[66] See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal
observation, to the accuracy of Xenophon’s description of the
country, even at the present day.

[67] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 24.

[68] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 4-8.

[69] I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from
the story afterwards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the
prophet of the army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his
brother would not fight for ten days (i, 7, 16). This sacrifice
must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt—not during
the distressing march which preceded. The ten days named by
Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.

It is in reference to this portion of the course of the
Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the
ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from
its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35½° and
34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the
Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:—

“The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly
heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent
recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating
aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art and durability are
attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as
is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers,
and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks,
and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly
inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application
of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest
utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more
or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for
use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of
stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty
inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried
various distances towards the interior, from two hundred to one
thousand two hundred yards.

“But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the
existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just
above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the
former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably,
between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the
stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left
in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these
subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the
water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as
a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those
times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the
opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with
a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from
four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a
bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always
affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons.”

The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous
population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this
part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when
contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xenophon; who mentions
that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by
cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending
them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the
population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens,
either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to
construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than
Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid
kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road along the
Euphrates began then to acquire great importance as the means
of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the
Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus
Nikator and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia
Minor—Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc.
This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad
to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsakus. It can hardly be
doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected
during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100,
speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when
that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the
Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian’s invasion,
however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the
Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well
cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, (Ammian. Marc.
xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon’s Anabasis, there was nothing
to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of
Babylonia.

Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the
Euphrates, before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same
condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched
through it,—“full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting
many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator
was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on
this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the
Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across
these inhospitable regions; so that he can speak feelingly of the
difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter.” (Travels in the
Track, etc. p. 81.)

[70] I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly
opposite Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107)
and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place
as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known
town with which we can identify it.

It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division, subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged. The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through the encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude against Menon’s division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand. “Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be the hour of my destruction,—and of your own also, shortly after me. For if _your_ force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around, will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the King.” On hearing this (says Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses, and the troops dispersed without any encounter.[71]

[71] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17.

After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The hills flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.[72] Traces were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of a hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as of Klearchus with a guard of three thousand hoplites. Orontes was examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.[73]

[72] The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand
by Pylæ a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert
country north of Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and
its steep banks along the river—was exchanged for the flat and
fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia proper. Perhaps there was
a town near the pass, and named after it.

Now it appears from Col. Chesney’s survey that this alteration
in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit.
He observes—(Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—“Three miles
below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings
become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through
a tract of country almost level.” Thereabouts it is that I am
inclined to place Pylæ.

Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit.
Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still.
Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as seventy geographical miles
lower than Hit (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81);
compare Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.

[73] The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks
through the communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is
extremely interesting (Anab. i, 6). I omit it from regard to
space.

After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand, and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians; but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand five hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, one hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses, and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas, Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however, that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.

In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause. Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on other occasions.

“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff you will find in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men, and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my service to your own homes.”

“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when danger is over.... As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in satrapies among my brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious, will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present a wreath of gold.”

Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—“Do you really think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?... Yes, by Zeus, (was the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle.” All the Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own person, but to take post in the rear of their body.[74] We shall see presently how this advice was followed.

[74] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.

The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the Persæ, nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences respecting the Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also their fidelity and sense of obligation which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery of the latter;[75] connecting these superior qualities with the political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendor of his own position,—was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus[76] in Herodotus. To Xerxes, the conception of free citizenship,—and of orderly, self-sufficing courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as well as equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible. He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that in rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for themselves.[77] Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political freedom by the hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once high-toned communities.

[75] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 16.

[76] See Herodot. vii, 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of
the Persian Achæmenês, c. 236.

[77] Herod. vii, 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the
Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι·
ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ
οἱ σοὶ σέ.

Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their
extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the
despotism of Hippias (v. 78)—Δηλοῖ δ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ
πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι
τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ
πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι
ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακεέον, ὡς
δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ
προθυμέετο ἐργάζεσθαι.

Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm.
Græc. vol. iv. p. 268—

Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἑνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμῳ·
Δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.

Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen, however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were evident. The day’s march, (called three parasangs) having been concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time; upon which Cyrus had told him,—“If your prophecy comes true, I will give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at all, if he does not fight within ten days.”[78]

[78] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.

In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last day’s march, he came to a broad and deep trench (thirty feet broad and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphrates as to leave an interval of only twenty feet for passage. This trench had been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain, for a length said to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other extremity what was called the walls of Media.[79] It had been dug as a special measure of defence against the approaching invaders. Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it; so that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance through the narrow breadth of twenty feet. This is the first notice of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion,—except the precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a blow. And now Artaxerxes, after having cut a prodigious extent of trench at the cost of so much labor,—provided a valuable means of resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed soldiers,—and occupied it seemingly until the very last moment,—throws it up from some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that Artaxerxes would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the midnight review, insomuch that he himself proceeded in his chariot instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.[80]

[79] From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three
entire days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in
the fourth day’s march.

Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all.
This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not
seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them
can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with
visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which
circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontes, who
asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking
the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter
to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his
division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered
the treason.

Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must
have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore
must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of
Orontes must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated
to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time.
And the very trial of Orontes appears to have been conducted
under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army.

Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks
to have got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in
the three entire days of march. The fourth day they must have
got over very little ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus
was in momentary expectation of the King’s main army, and of
a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the great delay
necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than one
hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass
through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench
and the Euphrates. He can hardly have made more than five miles
in this whole day’s march, getting at night so far as to encamp
two or three miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon
the distance marched over between Pylæ and the trench as about
thirty-two miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the
encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the
river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so
that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the
straight line and the full windings of the river.

I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much
wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney’s map; so that the
triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the
river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume,
why the trench was cut, was, to defend that portion of the
well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay
outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see
hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very
considerable.

[80] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this
long line of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then
left useless and undefended, differs from the narrative of
Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be borrowed from Ephorus.
Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench to be dug, and
lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage;
and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with
his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This
is a statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this
point of view, that it makes out the king to have acted upon a
rational scheme; whereas in Xenophon he appears at first to have
adopted a plan of defence, and then to have renounced it, after
immense labor and cost, without any reason, so far as we can see.
Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is the true one.
The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both facts of
the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.