Chapter LXXV (2)

Peiræum was occupied by so numerous a guard, comprising Iphikrates and his peltasts, that Agesilaus, instead of directly attacking it, resorted to the stratagem of making a sudden retrograde march directly towards Corinth. Probably, many of the citizens were at that moment absent for the second celebration of the festival; so that those remaining within, on hearing of the approach of Agesilaus, apprehended a plot to betray the city to him, and sent in haste to Peiræum to summon back Iphikrates with his peltasts. Having learned that these troops had passed by in the night, Agesilaus forthwith again turned his course and marched back to Peiræum, which he himself approached by the ordinary road, coasting round along the bay of Lechæum, near the Therma, or warm springs, which are still discernible;[652] while he sent a mora or division of troops to get round the place by a mountain-road more in the interior, ascending some woody heights commanding the town, and crowned by a temple of Poseidon.[653] The movement was quite effectual. The garrison and inhabitants of Peiræum, seeing that the place had become indefensible, abandoned it the next day with all their cattle and property, to take refuge in the Heræum, or sacred ground of Hêrê Akræa near the western cape of the peninsula. While Agesilaus marched thither towards the coast in pursuit of them, the troops descending from the heights attacked and captured Œnoê,[654]—the Corinthian town of that name situated near the Alkyonian bay over against Kreusis in Bœotia. A large booty here fell into their hands, which was still farther augmented by the speedy surrender of all in the Heræum to Agesilaus, without conditions. Called upon to determine the fate of the prisoners, among whom were included men, women, and children,—freemen and slaves,—with cattle and other property,—Agesilaus ordered that all those who had taken part in the massacre at Corinth, in the market-place, should be handed over to the vengeance of the exiles; and that all the rest should be sold as slaves.[655] Though he did not here inflict any harder measure than was usual in Grecian warfare, the reader who reflects that this sentence, pronounced by one on the whole more generous than most contemporary commanders, condemned numbers of free Corinthian men and women to a life of degradation, if not of misery,—will understand by contrast the encomiums with which in my last volume I set forth the magnanimity of Kallikratidas after the capture of Methymna; when he refused, in spite of the importunity of his allies, to sell either the Methymnæan or the Athenian captives,—and when he proclaimed the exalted principle, that no free Greek should be sold into slavery by any permission of his.[656]

[652] See Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, chap.
i, p. 3. The modern village and port of Lutráki derives its name
from these warm springs, which are quite close to it and close to
the sea, at the foot of the mountain of Perachora or Peiræum; on
the side of the bay opposite to Lechæum, but near the point where
the level ground constituting the Isthmus (properly so-called),
ends,—and where the rocky or mountainous region, forming the
westernmost portion of Geraneia (or the peninsula of Peiræum),
begins. The language of Xenophon, therefore, when he comes to
describe the back-march of Agesilaus is perfectly accurate,—ἤδη
δ᾽ ἐκπεπερακότος αὐτοῦ τὰ θερμὰ ἐς τὸ πλατὺ τοῦ Λεχαίου, etc.
(iv, 5, 8).

[653] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 4.

Xenophon here recounts how Agesilaus sent up ten men with fire
in pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm
themselves; the night being very cold and rainy, the situation
very high, and the troops not having come out with blankets or
warm covering to protect them. They kindled large fires, and the
neighboring temple of Poseidon was accidentally burnt.

[654] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5.

This Œnoê must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that
name, which lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Bœotia.

So also the town of Peiræum here noticed must not be confounded
with another Peiræum, which was also in the Corinthian territory,
but on the Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus
(Thucyd. viii, 10).

[655] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5-8.

[656] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 14. See Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 165 of
this History.

The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the
encomiums of his biographers (Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornel. Nep.
Agesil. c. 5).

As the Lacedæmonians had been before masters of Lechæum, Krommyon, and Sidus, this last success shut up Corinth on its other side, and cut off its communication with Bœotia. The city not being in condition to hold out much longer, the exiles already began to lay their plans for surprising it by aid of friends within.[657] So triumphant was the position of Agesilaus, that his enemies were all in alarm, and the Thebans, as well as others, sent fresh envoys to him to solicit peace. His antipathy towards the Thebans was so vehement, that it was a great personal satisfaction to him to see them thus humiliated. He even treated their envoys with marked contempt, affecting not to notice them when they stood close by, though Pharax, the proxenus of Thebes at Sparta, was preparing to introduce them.

[657] Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Ages. c. 5.

The story of Polyænus (iii, 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this
point of time. But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or
those of the other Tactic writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to
find proper places for the sixty-three different stratagems which
Polyænus ascribes to Iphikrates.

Absorbed in this overweening pride and exultation over conquered enemies, Agesilaus was sitting in a round pavilion, on the banks of the lake adjoining the Heræum,[658]—with his eyes fixed on the long train of captives brought out under the guard of armed Lacedæmonian hoplites, themselves the object of admiration to a crowd of spectators,[659]—when news arrived, as if under the special intervention of retributive Nemesis, which changed unexpectedly the prospect of affairs.[660] A horseman was seen galloping up, his horse foaming with sweat. To the many inquiries addressed, he returned no answer, nor did he stop until he sprang from his horse at the feet of Agesilaus; to whom, with sorrowful tone and features, he made his communication. Immediately Agesilaus started up, seized his spear, and desired the herald to summon his principal officers. On their coming near, he directed them, together with the guards around, to accompany him without a moment’s delay; leaving orders with the general body of the troops to follow as soon as they should have snatched some rapid refreshment. He then immediately put himself in march; but he had not gone far when three fresh horsemen met and informed him, that the task which he was hastening to perform had already been accomplished. Upon this he ordered a halt and returned to the Heræum; where on the ensuing day, to countervail the bad news, he sold all his captives by auction.[661]

[658] This Lake is now called Lake Vuliasmeni. Considerable
ruins were noticed by M. Dutroyat, in the recent French survey,
near its western extremity; on which side it adjoins the temple
of Hêrê Akræa, or the Heræum. See M. Boblaye, Recherches
Géographiques sur les Ruines de la Morée, p. 36; and Colonel
Leake’s Peloponnesiaca, p. 399.

[659] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6.

Τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων σὺν τοῖς δόρασι παρηκολούθουν
φύλακες τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, μάλα ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων θεωρούμενοι· οἱ γὰρ
εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ κρατοῦντες ἀεί πως ἀξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
Ἔτι δὲ καθημένου τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐοικότος ἀγαλλομένῳ τοῖς
πεπραγμένοις, ἱππεύς τις προσήλαυνε, καὶ μάλα ἰσχυρῶς ἱδρῶντι τῷ
ἵππῳ· ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὅ,τι ἀγγέλλοι, οὐδενὶ ἀπεκρίνατο,
etc.

It is interesting to mark in Xenophon the mixture of
Philo-Laconian complacency,—of philosophical reflection,—and
of that care in bringing out the contrast of good fortune, with
sudden reverse instantly following upon it, which forms so
constant a point of effect with Grecian poets and historians.

[660] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 22. ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητὸν, etc.

[661] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 7-9.

This bad news,—the arrival of which has been so graphically described by Xenophon, himself probably among the bystanders and companions of Agesilaus,—was nothing less than the defeat and destruction of a Lacedæmonian _mora_ or military division by the light troops under Iphikrates. As it was an understood privilege of the Amyklæan hoplites in the Lacedæmonian army always to go home, even when on actual service, to the festival of the Hyakinthia, Agesilaus had left all of them at Lechæum. The festival day being now at hand, they set off to return. But the road from Lechæum to Sikyon lay immediately under the walls of Corinth, so that their march was not safe without an escort. Accordingly the polemarch commanding at Lechæum, leaving that place for the time under watch by the Peloponnesian allies, put himself at the head of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ which formed the habitual garrison, consisting of six hundred hoplites, and of a _mora_ of cavalry (number unknown)—to protect the Amyklæans until they were out of danger from the enemy at Corinth. Having passed by Corinth, and reached a point within about three miles of the friendly town of Sikyon, he thought the danger over, and turned back with his _mora_ of hoplites to Lechæum; still, however, leaving the officer of cavalry with orders to accompany the Amyklæans as much farther as they might choose, and afterwards to follow him on the return march.[662]

[662] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 11, 12.

Though the Amyklæans (probably not very numerous) were presumed to be in danger of attack from Corinth in their march, and though the force in that town was known to be considerable, it never occurred to the Lacedæmonian polemarch that there was any similar danger for his own _mora_ of six hundred hoplites; so contemptuous was his estimate of the peltasts, and so strong was the apprehension which these peltasts were known to entertain of the Lacedæmonians. But Iphikrates, who had let the whole body march by undisturbed, when he now saw from the walls of Corinth the six hundred hoplites returning separately, without either cavalry or light troops, conceived the idea,—perhaps, in the existing state of men’s minds, no one else would have conceived it,—of attacking them with his peltasts as they repassed near the town. Kallias, the general of the Athenian hoplites in Corinth, warmly seconding the project, marched out his troops, and arrayed them in battle order not far from the gates; while Iphikrates with his peltasts began his attack upon the Lacedæmonian _mora_ in flanks and rear. Approaching within missile distance, he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows, which killed or wounded several, especially on the unshielded side. Upon this the polemarch ordered a halt, directed the youngest soldiers to drive off the assailants, and confided the wounded to the care of attendants to be carried forward to Lechæum.[663] But even the youngest soldiers, encumbered by their heavy shields, could not reach their nimbler enemies, who were trained to recede before them. And when, after an unavailing pursuit, they sought to resume their places in the ranks, the attack was renewed, so that nine or ten of them were slain before they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders to march forward; again the peltasts renewed their attack, forcing him to halt; again he ordered the younger soldiers (this time, all those between eighteen and thirty-three years of age, whereas on the former occasion, it had been those between eighteen and twenty-eight) to rush out and drive them off.[664] But the result was just the same: the pursuers accomplished nothing, and only suffered increased loss of their bravest and most forward soldiers, when they tried to rejoin the main body. Whenever the Lacedæmonians attempted to make progress, these circumstances were again repeated, to their great loss and discouragement; while the peltasts became every moment more confident and vigorous.

[663] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 14. Τούτους μὲν ἐκέλευον τοὺς
ὑπασπιστὰς ἀραμένους ἀποφέρειν ἐς Λέχαιον· ~οὗτοι καὶ μόνοι τῆς
μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν~.

We have here a remarkable expression of Xenophon,—“These were
the only men in the mora who were _really and truly saved_.” He
means, I presume, that they were the only men who were saved
without the smallest loss of honor; being carried off wounded
from the field of battle, and not having fled or deserted their
posts. The others who survived, preserved themselves by flight;
and we know that the treatment of those Lacedæmonians who ran
away from the field (οἱ τρέσαντες), on their return to Sparta,
was insupportably humiliating. See Xenoph. Rep. Laced. ix, 4;
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of
Xenophon, that a distinction was really made at Sparta between
the treatment of these wounded men here carried off, and that of
the other survivors of the beaten mora.

The ὑπασπισταὶ, or shield-bearers, were, probably, a certain
number of attendants, who habitually carried the shields of the
officers (compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39; Anab. iv, 2, 20),
persons of importance, and rich hoplites. It seems hardly to
be presumed that every hoplite had an ὑπασπιστὴς, in spite of
what we read about the attendant Helots at the battle of Platæa
(Herod. ix, 10-29) and in other places.

[664] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5,15, 16. τὰ δέκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης—τὰ
πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης.

Some relief was now afforded to the distressed _mora_ by the coming up of their cavalry, which had finished the escort of the Amyklæans. Had this cavalry been with them at the beginning, the result might have been different; but it was now insufficient to repress the animated assaults of the peltasts. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian horsemen were at no time very good, nor did they on this occasion venture to push their pursuit to a greater range than the younger hoplites could keep up with them. At length, after much loss in killed and wounded, and great distress to all, the polemarch contrived to get his detachment as far as an eminence about a quarter of a mile from the sea and about two miles from Lechæum. Here, while Iphikrates still continued to harass them with his peltasts, Kallias also was marching up with his hoplites to charge them hand to hand,—when the Lacedæmonians, enfeebled in numbers, exhausted in strength, and too much dispirited for close fight with a new enemy, broke and fled in all directions. Some took the road to Lechæum, which place a few of them reached, along with the cavalry; the rest ran towards the sea at the nearest point, and observing that some of their friends were rowing in boats from Lechæum along the shore to rescue them, threw themselves into the sea, to wade or swim towards this new succor. But the active peltasts, irresistible in the pursuit of broken hoplites, put the last hand to the destruction of the unfortunate _mora_. Out of its full muster of six hundred, a very small proportion survived to reënter Lechæum.[665]

[665] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 17.

Xenophon affirms the number of slain to have been about two
hundred and fifty—ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς μάχαις καὶ τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέθανον
περὶ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους. But he had before distinctly
stated that the whole _mora_ marching back to Lechæum under the
polemarch, was six hundred in number—ὁ μὲν πολέμαρχος σὺν τοῖς
ὁπλίταις, οὖσιν ὡς ἑξακοσίοις, ἀπῄει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ Λέχαιον (iv, 5,
12). And it is plain, from several different expressions, that
all of them were slain, excepting a very few survivors.

I think it certain, therefore, that one or other of these two
numbers is erroneous; either the original aggregate of six
hundred is _above_ the truth,—or the total of slain, two hundred
and fifty, is _below_ the truth. Now the latter supposition
appears to me by far the more probable of the two. The
Lacedæmonians, habitually secret and misleading in their returns
of their own numbers (see Thucyd. v, 74), probably did not choose
to admit publicly a greater total of slain than two hundred and
fifty. Xenophon has inserted this in his history, forgetting that
his own details of the battle refuted the numerical statement.
The total of six hundred is more probable, than any smaller
number, for the entire mora; and it is impossible to assign any
reasons why Xenophon should overstate it.

The horseman who first communicated the disaster to Agesilaus, had started off express immediately from Lechæum, even before the bodies of the slain had been picked up for burial. The hurried movement of Agesilaus had been dictated by the desire of reaching the field in time to contend for the possession of the bodies, and to escape the shame of soliciting the burial-truce. But the three horsemen who met him afterwards, arrested his course by informing him that the bodies had already been buried, under truce asked and obtained; which authorized Iphikrates to erect his well-earned trophy on the spot where he had first made the attack.[666]

[666] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 8-10.

Such a destruction of an entire division of Lacedæmonian hoplites, by light troops who stood in awe of them and whom they despised, was an incident, not indeed of great political importance, but striking in respect of military effect and impression upon the Grecian mind. Nothing at all like it had occurred since the memorable capture of Sphakteria, thirty-five years before; a disaster less considerable in one respect, that the number of hoplites beaten was inferior by one-third,—but far more important in another respect, that half the division had surrendered as prisoners; whereas in the battle near Corinth, though the whole mora (except a few fugitives) perished, it does not seem that a single prisoner was taken. Upon the Corinthians, Bœotians, and other enemies of Sparta, the event operated as a joyous encouragement, reviving them out of all their previous despondency. Even by the allies of Sparta, jealous of her superiority and bound to her by fear more than by attachment, it was welcomed with ill-suppressed satisfaction. But upon the army of Agesilaus (and doubtless upon the Lacedæmonians at home) it fell like a sudden thunderbolt, causing the strongest manifestations of sorrow and sympathy. To these manifestations there was only one exception,—the fathers, brothers, or sons of the slain warriors; who not only showed no sorrow, but strutted about publicly with cheerful and triumphant countenances, like victorious athletes.[667] We shall find the like phenomenon at Sparta a few years subsequently, after the far more terrible defeat at Leuktra; the relatives of the slain were joyous and elate,—those of the survivors, downcast and mortified;[668] a fact strikingly characteristic both of the intense mental effect of the Spartan training, and of the peculiar associations which it generated. We may understand how terrible was the contempt which awaited a Spartan who survived defeat, when we find fathers positively rejoicing that their sons had escaped such treatment by death.

[667] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10. Ἅτε δὲ ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
γεγενημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς, πολὺ πένθος ἦν κατὰ τὸ
Λακωνικὸν στράτευμα, πλὴν ὅσων ἐτέθνασαν ἐν χώρᾳ ἢ υἱοὶ ἢ πατέρες
ἢ ἀδελφοί· ~οὗτοι δὲ, ὥσπερ νικηφόροι, λαμπροὶ καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι τῷ
οἰκείῳ πάθει περιῄεσαν~.

If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the text
I request him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon.

[668] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16.

Sorely was Agesilaus requited for his supercilious insult towards the Theban envoys. When he at last consented to see them, after the news of the battle, their tone was completely altered. They said not a word about peace, but merely asked permission to pass through and communicate with their countrymen in Corinth. “I understand your purpose (said Agesilaus, smiling),—you want to witness the triumph of your friends, and see what it is worth. Come along with me, and I will teach you.” Accordingly, on the next day, he caused them to accompany him while he marched his army up to the very gates of Corinth,—defying those within to come out and fight. The lands had been so ravaged, that there remained little to destroy. But wherever there were any fruit-trees yet standing, the Lacedæmonians now cut them down. Iphikrates was too prudent to compromise his recent advantage by hazarding a second battle; so that Agesilaus had only the satisfaction of showing that he was master of the field, and then retired to encamp at Lechæum; from whence he sent back the Theban envoys by sea to Kreusis. Having then left a fresh mora or division at Lechæum, in place of that which had been defeated, he marched back to Sparta. But the circumstances of the march betrayed his real feelings, thinly disguised by the recent bravado of marching up to the gates of Corinth. He feared to expose his Lacedæmonian troops even to the view of those allies through whose territory he was to pass; so well was he aware that the latter (especially the Mantineians) would manifest their satisfaction at the recent defeat. Accordingly, he commenced his day’s march before dawn, and did not halt for the night till after dark; at Mantineia, he not only did not halt at all, but passed by, outside of the walls, before day had broken.[669] There cannot be a more convincing proof of the real dispositions of the allies towards Sparta, and of the sentiment of compulsion which dictated their continued adherence; a fact which we shall see abundantly illustrated as we advance in the stream of the history.

[669] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 16.

The retirement of Agesilaus was the signal for renewed enterprise on the part of Iphikrates; who retook Sidus and Krommyon, which had been garrisoned by Praxitas,—as well as Peiræum and Œnoê, which had been left under occupation by Agesilaus. Corinth was thus cleared of enemies on its eastern and north-eastern sides. And though the Lacedæmonians still carried on a desultory warfare from Lechæum, yet such was the terror impressed by the late destruction of their mora, that the Corinthian exiles at Sikyon did not venture to march by land from that place to Lechæum, under the walls of Corinth,—but communicated with Lechæum only by sea.[670] In truth, we hear of no farther serious military operations undertaken by Sparta against Corinth, before the peace of Antalkidas. And the place became so secure, that the Corinthian leaders and their Argeian allies were glad to dispense with the presence of Iphikrates. That officer had gained so much glory by his recent successes, which the Athenian orators[671] even in the next generation never ceased to extol, that his temper, naturally haughty, became domineering; and he tried to procure, either for Athens or for himself, the mastery of Corinth,—putting to death some of the philo-Argeian leaders. We know these circumstances only by brief and meagre allusion; but they caused the Athenians to recall Iphikrates with a large portion of his peltasts, and to send Chabrias to Corinth in his place.[672]

[670] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 19.

[671] Demosthenes—περὶ Συντάξεως—c. 8, p. 172.

[672] Diodor. xiv, 92; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 34.

Aristeides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were
masters of the Acro-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as
their own, but that they generously refused to do so.

It was either in the ensuing summer,—or perhaps immediately afterwards during the same summer,—390 B.C., that Agesilaus undertook an expedition into Akarnania; at the instance of the Achæans, who threatened, if this were not done, to forsake the Lacedæmonian alliance. They had acquired possession of the Ætolian district of Kalydon, had brought the neighboring villagers into a city residence, and garrisoned it as a dependence of the Achæan confederacy. But the Akarnanians,—allies of Athens as well as Thebes, and aided by an Athenian squadron at Œniadæ,—attacked them there, probably at the invitation of a portion of the inhabitants, and pressed them so hard, that they employed the most urgent instances to obtain aid from Sparta. Agesilaus crossed the Gulf at Rhium with a considerable force of Spartans and allies, and the full muster of the Achæans. On his arrival the Akarnanians all took refuge in their cities, sending their cattle up into the interior highlands, to the borders of a remote lake. Agesilaus, having sent to Stratus to require them not merely to forbear hostilities against the Achæans, but to relinquish their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and to become allies of Sparta,—found his demands resisted, and began to lay waste the country. Two or three days of operations designedly slack, were employed to lull the Akarnanians into security; after which, by a rapid forced march, Agesilaus suddenly surprised the remote spot in which their cattle and slaves had been deposited for safety. He spent a day here to sell this booty; merchants, probably, accompanying his army. But he had considerable difficulty in his return march, from the narrow paths and high mountains through which he had to thread his way. By a series of brave and well-combined hill-movements,—which, probably, reminded Xenophon of his own operations against the Karduchians in the retreat of the Ten-Thousand,—he defeated and dispersed the Akarnanians, though not without suffering considerably from the excellence of their light troops. Yet he was not successful in his attack upon any one of their cities, nor would he consent to prolong the war until seed-time, notwithstanding earnest solicitation from the Achæans, whom he pacified by engaging to return the next spring. He was, indeed, in a difficult and dangerous country, had not his retreat been facilitated by the compliance of the Ætolians; who calculated (though vainly) on obtaining from him the recovery of Naupaktus, then held (as well as Kalydon) by the Achæans.[673] Partial as the success of this expedition had been, however, it inflicted sufficient damage on the Akarnanians to accomplish its purpose. On learning that it was about to be repeated in the ensuing spring, they sent envoys to Sparta to solicit peace; consenting to abstain from hostilities against the Achæans, and to enrol themselves as members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.[674]

[673] Diodor. xv, 73.

[674] Xen. Hellen. iv, 6, 1-14; iv, 7, 1.

It was in this same year that the Spartan authorities resolved on an expedition against Argos, of which Agesipolis, the other king, took the command. Having found the border sacrifices favorable, and crossed the frontier, he sent forward his army to Phlius, where the Peloponnesian allies were ordered to assemble; but he himself first turned aside to Olympia, to consult the oracle of Zeus.

It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on more than one previous occasion,[675] when an invading Lacedæmonian army was approaching their territory, to meet them by a solemn message, intimating that it was the time of some festival (the Karneian, or other) held sacred by both parties, and warning them not to violate the frontier during the holy truce. This was in point of fact nothing better than a fraud; for the notice was sent, not at the moment when the Karneian festival (or other, as the case might be) ought to come on according to the due course of seasons, but at any time when it might serve the purpose of arresting a Lacedæmonian invasion. But though the duplicity of the Argeians was thus manifest, so strong were the pious scruples of the Spartan king, that he could hardly make up his mind to disregard the warning. Moreover, in the existing confusion of the calendar, there was always room for some uncertainty as to the question, which was the true Karneian moon; no Dorian state having any right to fix it imperatively for the others, as the Eleians fixed the Olympic truce, and the Corinthians the Isthmian. It was with a view to satisfy his conscience on this subject that Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and put the question to the oracle of Zeus,—whether he might with a safe religious conscience refuse to accept the holy truce, if the Argeians should now tender it. The oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a specific question with a general reply, informed him, that he might with a safe conscience decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for underhand purposes.[676] This was accepted by Agesipolis as a satisfactory affirmative. Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly sure, he went directly forward to Delphi, to put the same question to Apollo. As it would have been truly embarrassing, however, if the two holy replies had turned out such as to contradict each other, he availed himself of the _præjudicium_ which he had already received at Olympia, and submitted the question to Apollo at Delphi in this form: “Is thine opinion on the question of the holy truce, the same as that of thy father (Zeus)?” “Most decidedly the same,” replied the god. Such double warranty, though the appeal was so drawn up as scarcely to leave to Apollo freedom of speech,[677] enabled Agesipolis to return with full confidence to Phlius, where his army was already mustered; and to march immediately into the Argeian territory by the road of Nemea. Being met on the frontier by two heralds with wreaths and in solemn attire, who warned him that it was a season of holy truce, he informed them that the gods authorized his disobedience to their summons, and marched on into the Argeian plain.

[675] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 3. Οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ
δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ~ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν~, ἐστεφανωμένους
δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς.

[676] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2. Ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίπολις—ἐλθὼν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν
καὶ χρηστηριαζόμενος, ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ὁσίως ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῷ,
μὴ δεχομένῳ τὰς σπονδὰς τῶν Ἀργείων· ~ὅτι οὐχ ὁπότε καθήκοι
ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε
ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας~. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἐπεσήμαινεν αὐτῷ, ὅσιον εἶναι μὴ
δεχομένῳ σπονδὰς ἀδίκως ἐπιφερομένας. Ἐκεῖθεν δ᾽ εὐθὺς πορευθεὶς
εἰς Δελφοὺς, ἐπήρετο αὖ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, εἰ κἀκείνῳ δοκοίῃ περὶ τῶν
σπονδῶν, καθάπερ τῷ πατρί. Ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο, ~καὶ μάλα κατὰ ταὐτά~.

I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of
the words ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας,—upon which Schneider has a
long and not very instructive note, adopting an untenable
hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians on this occasion
appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce; which is not
countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged to
the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural
τοὺς μῆνας indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that
the Argeians sometimes put forward the name of one festival,
sometimes of another. We may be pretty sure that the Karneian
festival was one of them; but what the others were, we cannot
tell. It is very probable that there were several festivals
of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between
Sparta and Argos—πατρῴους τινας σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας
τοῖς Δωριεῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,—to use the language of Pausanias
(iii, 5, 6). The language of Xenophon implies that the demand
made by the Argeians, for observance of the Holy Truce, was in
itself rightful, or rather, that it would have been rightful at
a different season; but that they put themselves in the wrong by
making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political
purpose.

For some remarks on other fraudulent manœuvres of the Argeians,
respecting the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of
this History, Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb ~ὑποφέρειν~
τοὺς μῆνας seems to imply the _underhand purpose_ with which
the Argeians preferred their demand of the truce. What were the
previous occasions on which they had preferred a similar demand,
we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus had invaded
and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without
success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud.

It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or.
iii, De Pace, s. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though
strenuous in insisting that Athens should help them to carry on
the war for the possession of Corinth against the Lacedæmonians,
had nevertheless made a separate peace with the latter, covering
their own Argeian territory from invasion—αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ εἰρήνην
ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Of this obscure
passage I can give no better explanation.

[677] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 23. Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα
τὸν θεόν, κεχρημένος πρότερον Ὀλυμπιᾶσιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ,
ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, ~ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν~.

A similar story about the manner of putting the question to
Apollo at Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at
Dodona, is told about Agesilaus on another occasion (Plutarch,
Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.).

It happened that on the first evening after he had crossed the border, the supper and the consequent libation having been just concluded, an earthquake occurred; or, to translate the Greek phrase, “the god (Poseidon) shook.” To all Greeks, and to Lacedæmonians especially, this was a solemn event, and the personal companions of Agesipolis immediately began to sing the pæan in honor of Poseidon; the general impression among the soldiers being, that he would give orders for quitting the territory immediately, as Agis had acted in the invasion of Elis a few years before. Perhaps Agesipolis would have done the same here, construing the earthquake as a warning that he had done wrong, in neglecting the summons of the heralds,—had he not been fortified by the recent oracles. He now replied, that if the earthquake had occurred before he crossed the frontier, he should have considered it as a prohibition; but as it came after his crossing, he looked upon it as an encouragement to go forward.

So fully had the Argeians counted on the success of their warning transmitted by the heralds, that they had made little preparation for defence. Their dismay and confusion were very great; their property was still outlying, not yet removed into secure places, so that Agesipolis found much both to destroy and to appropriate. He carried his ravages even to the gates of the city, piquing himself on advancing a little farther than Agesilaus had gone in his invasion two years before. He was at last driven to retreat by the terror of a flash of lightning in his camp, which killed several persons. And a project which he had formed, of erecting a permanent fort on the Argeian frontier, was abandoned in consequence of unfavorable sacrifices.[678]

[678] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 7; Pausan. iii, 5, 6.

It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they
look upon the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced
to depart, as marks of some displeasure of the gods against his
expedition.

Besides these transactions in and near the isthmus of Corinth, the war between Sparta and her enemies was prosecuted during the same years both in the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor; though our information is so imperfect that we can scarcely trace the thread of events. The defeat near Knidus (394 B.C.),—the triumphant maritime force of Pharnabazus and Konon at the Isthmus of Corinth in the ensuing year (393 B.C.),—the restoration of the Athenian Long Walls and fortified port,—and the activity of Konon with the fleet among the islands,[679]—so alarmed the Spartans with the idea of a second Athenian maritime empire, that they made every effort to detach the Persian force from the side of their enemies.

[679] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12. Compare Isokrates, Or. vii,
(Areopag.) s. 13. ἁπάσης γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν
ὑποπεσούσης καὶ μετὰ τὴν Κόνωνος ναυμαχίαν καὶ μετὰ τὴν Τιμοθέου
στρατηγίαν, etc. This oration, however, was composed a long while
after the events (about B.C. 353—see Mr. Clinton’s Fast. H.,
in that year); and Isokrates exaggerates; mistaking the break-up
of the Lacedæmonian empire for a resumption of the Athenian.
Demosthenes also (cont. Leptin. c. 16, p. 477) confounds the
same two ideas, and even the Athenian vote of thanks to Konon,
perpetuated on a commemorative column, countenanced the same
impression,—ἐπειδὴ Κόνων ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους, etc.

The Spartan Antalkidas, a dexterous, winning and artful man,[680] not unlike Lysander, was sent as envoy to Tiribazus (392 B.C.); whom we now find as satrap of Ionia in the room of Tithraustes, after having been satrap of Armenia during the retreat of the Ten Thousand. As Tiribazus was newly arrived in Asia Minor, he had not acquired that personal enmity against the Spartans, which the active hostilities of Derkyllidas and Agesilaus had inspired to Pharnabazus and other Persians. Moreover, jealousy between neighboring satraps was an ordinary feeling, which Antalkidas now hoped to turn to the advantage of Sparta. To counteract his projects, envoys were also sent to Tiribazus, by the confederate enemies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos; and Konon, as the envoy of Athens, was incautiously despatched among the number. On the part of Sparta, Antalkidas offered, first, to abandon to the king of Persia all the Greeks on the continent of Asia; next, as to all the other Greeks, insular as well as continental, he required nothing more than absolute autonomy for each separate city, great and small.[681] The Persian king (he said) could neither desire anything more for himself, nor have any motive for continuing the war against Sparta, when he should once be placed in possession of all the towns on the Asiatic coast, and when he should find both Sparta and Athens rendered incapable of annoying him, through the autonomy and disunion of the Hellenic world. But to neither of the two propositions of Antalkidas would Athens, Thebes, or Argos, accede. As to the first, they repudiated the disgrace of thus formally abandoning the Asiatic Greeks;[682] as to the second proposition, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct city of Greece, they would admit it only under special reserves, which it did not suit the purpose of Antalkidas to grant. In truth the proposition went to break up (and was framed with that view) both the Bœotian confederacy under the presidency of Thebes, and the union between Argos and Corinth; while it also deprived Athens of the chance of recovering Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros,[683]—islands which had been possessed and recognized by her since the first commencement of the confederacy of Delos; indeed the two former, even from the time of Miltiades the conqueror of Marathon.

[680] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

[681] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12-14.

[682] Diodor. xiv, 110. He affirms that these cities strongly
objected to this concession, five years afterwards, when the
peace of Antalkidas was actually concluded; but that they were
forced to give up their scruples and accept the peace including
the concession, because they had not force to resist Persia and
Sparta acting in hearty alliance.

Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to
it during the earlier discussions, when it was first broached
by Antalkidas; and that their objections to it were in part the
cause why the discussions reported in the text broke off without
result.

It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the
last years of the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this
concession, and even to greater, without doing herself any good
(Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was not now placed in circumstances
so imperious as to force her to be equally yielding.

Plato, in the Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the
allies of Athens—Bœotians, Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were
willing to surrender the Asiatic Greeks at the requisition of
Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone resolutely stood out,
and were in consequence left without any allies. The latter
part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her
allies, is certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies
took essentially different views from Athens on the point.
The Menexenus, eloquent and complimentary to Athens, must be
followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato goes the length
of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of
Antalkidas. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 172) says that they were
forced to subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them.

[683] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 15.

Here commences a new era in the policy of Sparta. That she should abnegate all pretension to maritime empire, is noway difficult to understand—seeing that it had already been irrevocably overthrown by the defeat of Knidus. Nor can we wonder that she should abandon the Greeks on the Asiatic continent to Persian sway; since this was nothing more than she had already consented to do in her conventions with Tissaphernes and Cyrus during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war,[684]—and consented, let us add, not under any of that stringent necessity which at the same time pressed upon Athens, but simply with a view to the maximum of victory over an enemy already enfeebled. The events which followed the close of that war (recounted in a former chapter) had indeed induced her to alter her determination, and again to espouse their cause. But the real novelty now first exhibited in her policy, is, the full development of what had before existed in manifest tendency,—hostility against all the partial land-confederacies of Greece, disguised under the plausible demand of universal autonomy for every town, great or small. How this autonomy was construed and carried into act, we shall see hereafter; at present, we have only to note the first proclamation of it by Antalkidas in the name of Sparta.

[684] See a striking passage in the Or. xii, (Panathen.) of
Isokrates, s. 110.

On this occasion, indeed, his mission came to nothing, from the peremptory opposition of Athens and the others. But he was fortunate enough to gain the approbation and confidence of Tiribazus; who saw so clearly how much both propositions tended to promote the interests and power of Persia, that he resolved to go up in person to court, and prevail on Artaxerxes to act in concert with Sparta. Though not daring to support Antalkidas openly, Tiribazus secretly gave him money to reinforce the Spartan fleet. He at the same time rendered to Sparta the more signal service of arresting and detaining Konon, pretending that the latter was acting contrary to the interests of the king.[685] This arrest was a gross act of perfidy, since Konon not only commanded respect in his character of envoy,—but had been acting with the full confidence, and almost under the orders, of Pharnabazus. But the removal of an officer of so much ability,—the only man who possessed the confidence of Pharnabazus,—was the most fatal of all impediments to the naval renovation of Athens. It was fortunate that Konon had had time to rebuild the Long Walls, before his means of action were thus abruptly intercepted. Respecting his subsequent fate, there exist contradictory stories. According to one, he was put to death by the Persians in prison; according to another, he found means to escape and again took refuge with Evagoras in Cyprus, in which island he afterwards died of sickness.[686] The latter story appears undoubtedly to be the true one. But it is certain that he never afterwards had the means of performing any public service, and that his career was cut short by this treacherous detention, just at the moment when its promise was the most splendid for his country.

[685] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16; Diodor. xiv, 85.

[686] Lysias, Or. xix, (De Bon. Aristoph.) s. 41, 42, 44;
Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 5; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s.
180.

Tiribazus, on going up to the Persian court, teems to have been detained there for the purpose of concerting measures against Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, whose revolt from Persia was now on the point of breaking out. But the Persian court could not yet be prevailed upon to show any countenance to the propositions of Sparta or of Antalkidas. On the contrary, Struthas, who was sent down to Ionia as temporary substitute for Tiribazus, full of anxiety to avenge the ravages of Agesilaus, acted with vigorous hostility against the Lacedæmonians, and manifested friendly dispositions towards Athens.

Thimbron (of whom we have before heard as first taking the command of the Cyreian army in Asia Minor, after their return from Thrace) received orders again to act as head of the Lacedæmonian forces in Asia against Struthas. The new commander, with an army estimated by Diodorus at eight thousand men,[687] marched from Ephesus into the interior, and began his devastation of the territory dependent on Persia. But his previous command, though he was personally amiable,[688] had been irregular and disorderly, and it was soon observed that the same defects were now yet more prominent, aggravated by too liberal indulgence in convivial pleasures. Aware of his rash, contemptuous, and improvident mode of attack, Struthas laid a snare for him by sending a detachment of cavalry to menace the camp, just when Thimbron had concluded his morning meal in company with the flute-player Thersander,—the latter not merely an excellent musician, but possessed of a full measure of Spartan courage. Starting from his tent at the news, Thimbron, with Thersander, waited only to collect the few troops immediately at hand, without even leaving any orders for the remainder, and hastened to repel the assailants; who gave way easily, and seduced him into a pursuit. Presently Struthas himself, appearing with a numerous and well-arrayed body of cavalry, charged with vigor the disorderly detachment of Thimbron. Both that general and Thersander, bravely fighting, fell among the first; while the army, deprived of their commander as well as ill-prepared for a battle, made but an ineffective resistance. They were broken, warmly pursued, and the greater number slain. A few who contrived to escape the active Persian cavalry, found shelter in the neighboring cities.[689]

[687] Diodor. xiv. 99.

[688] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 22. Ἦν δὲ οὗτος ἁνὴρ (Diphridas)
~εὔχαρίς τε οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Θίμβρωνος~, μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος,
καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος, στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ
σώματος ἡδοναὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ᾧ εἴη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν.

[689] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 18, 19.

This victory of Struthas, gained by the Persian cavalry, displays a degree of vigor and ability which, fortunately for the Greeks, was rarely seen in Persian operations. Our scanty information does not enable us to trace its consequences. We find Diphridas sent out soon after by the Lacedæmonians, along with the admiral Ekdikus, as successor of Thimbron to bring together the remnant of the defeated army, and to protect those cities which had contributed to form it. Diphridas,—a man with all the popular qualities of his predecessor, but a better and more careful officer,—is said to have succeeded to some extent in this difficult mission. Being fortunate enough to take captive the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, (as Xenophon had captured Asidates,) he obtained a sufficiently large ransom to enable him to pay his troops for some time.[690] But it is evident that his achievements were not considerable, and that the Ionian Greeks on the continent are now left to make good their position, as they can, against the satrap at Sardis.

[690] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21, 22.

The forces of Sparta were much required at Rhodes; which island (as has been mentioned already) had revolted from Sparta about five years before (a few months anterior to the battle of Knidus), dispossessed the Lysandrian oligarchy, and established a democratical government. But since that period, an opposition-party in the island had gradually risen up, acquired strength, and come into correspondence with the oligarchical exiles; who on their side warmly solicited aid from Sparta, representing that Rhodes would otherwise become thoroughly dependent on Athens. Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians sent eight triremes across the Ægean under the command of Ekdikus; the first of their ships of war which had crossed since the defeat of Knidus.[691] Though the Perso-Athenian naval force in the Ægean had been either dismissed or paralyzed since the seizure of Konon, yet the Rhodian government possessed a fleet of about twenty triremes, besides considerable force of other kinds; so that Ekdikus could not even land on the island, but was compelled to halt at Knidus. Fortunately, Teleutias the Lacedæmonian was now in the Corinthian Gulf with a fleet of twelve triremes, which were no longer required there; since Agesilaus and he had captured Lechæum a few months before, and destroyed the maritime force of the Corinthians in those waters. He was now directed to sail with his squadron out of the Corinthian Gulf across to Asia, to supersede Ekdikus, and take the command of the whole fleet for operations off Rhodes. On passing by Samos, he persuaded the inhabitants to embrace the cause of Sparta, and to furnish him with a few ships; after which he went onward to Knidus, where, superseding Ekdikus, he found himself at the head of twenty-seven triremes.[692] In his way from Knidus to Rhodes, he accidentally fell in with the Athenian admiral Philokrates, conducting ten triremes to Cyprus to the aid of Evagoras in his struggle against the Persians. He was fortunate enough to carry them all as prisoners into Knidus, where he sold the whole booty, and then proceeded with his fleet, thus augmented to thirty-seven sail, to Rhodes. Here he established a fortified post, enabling the oligarchical party to carry on an active civil war. But he was defeated in a battle,—his enemies being decidedly the stronger force in the island, and masters of all the cities.[693]

[691] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

[692] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 23.

Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven
triremes, and in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos,
which island was persuaded to detach itself from Athens. But
he recounts the circumstances in a very different manner. He
represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes as having risen in
insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does not name
Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?), and
Philodikus, as commanders.

The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my
judgment. His means of information, as well as his interest,
about Teleutias (the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable.

[693] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 24-26.

Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus,
and Kameirus) had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years
before into the great city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and
celebrated,—yet they still continued to exist, and apparently as
fortified places. For Xenophon speaks of the democrats in Rhodes
as ~τάς τε πόλεις~ ἔχοντας, etc.

Whether the Philokrates here named as _Philokrates son of
Ephialtes_, is the same person as the Philokrates accused in the
Thirtieth oration of Lysias—cannot be certainly made out. It is
possible enough that there might be two contemporary Athenians
bearing this name, which would explain the circumstance that
Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes—a practice occasional
with him, but not common.

The alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, in his contention against Artaxerxes, was at this moment an unfortunate and perplexing circumstance for Athens, since she was relying upon Persian aid against Sparta, and since Sparta was bidding against her for it. But the alliance was one which she could not lightly throw off. For Evagoras had not only harbored Konon with the remnant of the Athenian fleet after the disaster of Ægospotami, but had earned a grant of citizenship and the honor of a statue at Athens, as a strenuous auxiliary in procuring that Persian aid which gained the battle of Knidus, and as a personal combatant in that battle, before the commencement of his dissension with Artaxerxes.[694] It would have been every way advantageous to Athens at this moment to decline assisting Evagoras, since (not to mention the probability of offending the Persian court) she had more than enough to employ all her maritime force nearer home and for purposes more essential to herself. Yet in spite of these very serious considerations of prudence, the paramount feelings of prior obligation and gratitude, enforced by influential citizens who had formed connections in Cyprus, determined the Athenians to identify themselves with his gallant struggles[695] (of which I shall speak more fully presently). So little was fickleness, or instability, or the easy oblivion of past feelings, a part of their real nature,—though historians have commonly denounced it as among their prominent qualities.

[694] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 67, 68, 82; Epistola
Philippi ap. Demosthen. Orat. p. 161, c. 4.

[695] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristoph.) s. 27-44.