Chapter LXXI (1)

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.

We now commence a third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus,—then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization, we shall now track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose, was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra, farther westward; each of them receiving an harmost or governor from the mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians, even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not more than a long day’s journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium, was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of the Mariandyni.

The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibarêni, Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to inland produce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also subject, in the same manner, to the Trapezuntines;[197] and Sinôpê doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery attached to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighborhood, which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and copper in the neighboring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house furniture, and native slaves.[198] The case was similar with the three colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward,—Kotyôra, Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, left to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent,—since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling Cyrus[199]—and now on terms of established alliance with Sinôpê, though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to execute, against that city.[200] The other native tribes to the eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.

[197] Strabo, xii, p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 24.

[198] Strabo. xii, p. 545, 546.

[199] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 8.

[200] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 23.

Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment of Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,[201] and had expelled from thence the despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor any of their neighbors appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian war, either for or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.

[201] Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.

Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat, the Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus,[202] eight thousand six hundred hoplites, with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers, etc., making a total of above ten thousand military persons. Such a force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the Cyreians, even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor receive orders from any established government. They were like those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal with the established communities on the shores of the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinôpê,—or if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating war against that city,—here were formidable auxiliaries to second their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and families.[203] We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had never before been endangered.

[202] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3; v, 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian
force, when mustered at Issus after the junction of those three
hundred men who deserted from Abrokomas, was thirteen thousand
nine hundred men. At the review in Babylonia, three days before
the battle of Kunaxa, there were mustered, however, only twelve
thousand nine hundred (Anab. i, 7, 10).

[203] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 8.

Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ὁι πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες
ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες,
οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα,
καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ
καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες
πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ
πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες ἐπόθουν εἶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι.

This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers
is more authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of
Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegyr. s. 170).

In another oration, composed about fifty years after the
Cyreian expedition, Isokrates notices the large premiums which
it had been formerly necessary to give to those who brought
together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the
soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as
contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries
during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 _seq._)

An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled achievement could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assembly to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian soldier, named Antileon, exclaimed,—“Comrades, I am already tired of packing up, marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch, and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus.” This pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly responded to by all,—Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he could obtain from his friend the Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius, sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly accepted; and he departed to execute the project.

Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains. Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships which they saw; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by;[204] so that they would thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of transports.

[204] Xen. Anab. v, 1, 3-13.

Ὁρῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ πλοῖα πολλάκις παραπλέοντα, etc. This is a forcible
proof how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and
region of Phasis, at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.

All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army, except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.[205]

[205] Xen. Anab v. 1, 15.

The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Periœkus, named Dexippus, for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports. It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary for the camp; while the Trapezuntines,—tired of the protracted stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the natives in their own immediate neighborhood,—conducted the detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access. It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself, attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ,—the most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the Euxine; well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous defeat,—they returned in the end completely successful, and with a plentiful booty.[206]

[206] Xen. Anab. v. 2.

At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under the command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining; besides targeteers and various light troops.[207]

[207] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3. Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p.
327) and many other authors, have naturally presumed from the
analogy of name that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38°
40′) corresponds to the Kerasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in
his Periplus conceives to be identical with what was afterwards
called Pharnakia.

But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (Asia Minor, vol. i, p.
281) and by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv, p. 250),
that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon
having marched with the army from the one place to the other in
three days; or even in less than ten days, in the judgment of Mr.
Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus
of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond (about long. 39° 20′, as it
stands in Kiepert’s map of Asia Minor,) near a river now called
the Kerasoun Dere Sú.

During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately with the booty in one of the vessels; but his attack was repelled, and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders, as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from the numbers concerned in it.

Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now) any regular road.[208] This march cost the Cyreian army not less than ten days, by an inland track departing from the sea-shore, and through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynœki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki refused to grant a friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was proxenus of the Mosynœki, and understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description, which I have not space to copy.[209] The territory of the Tibarêni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at first declined the presents,—preferring to treat them as enemies and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.[210]

[208] It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir
obtained horses to travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land.
The aga of the place told him that it was madness to think of
travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for him; but was at
last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems, indeed, to
have been no regular or trodden road at all; the hills approach
close to the sea, and Mr. Kinneir “travelled the whole of the way
along the shore alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded
bank. The hills at intervals jutting out into the sea, form capes
and numerous little bays along the coast; but the nature of the
country was still the same, that is to say, studded with fine
timber, flowers, and groves of cherry trees” (Travels in Asia
Minor, p. 324).

Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the
origin of its name.

Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days’ march given by
Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than
consists with the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where
Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he
supposes that the Greeks must have halted somewhere (Zug der Zehn
Tausend. p. 115. 116).

[209] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 3.

[210] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 18-25.

Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost or governor, did not permit them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls. But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress, but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.

These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent among them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra and Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their hands, in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the Greeks.[211] Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinopian harmost in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick, and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his auxiliaries.[212]

[211] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 7-12.

[212] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 13-22.

This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much, that they went the length of protesting against what he had said, and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.

Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê was an unspeakable advantage to the army,—indeed, an essential condition to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation that they could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversation with the Sinopian envoys, the generals convoked the army in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologizing for the menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy. Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would be unable to pass,—the Thermodon and the Iris, each three hundred feet in breadth,—the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth,—the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra to Sinôpê, and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit from the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across Thrace, yet easier.[213]

[213] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 4-11.

Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there were not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body, and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinôpê to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly sent,—Ariston, an Athenian, Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achæan; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian senate or assembly.[214]

[214] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.

During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued near Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with traders from Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighboring frontier of Paphlagonia.[215] But they were receiving no pay; every man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when they left home.[216] Moreover, the army was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the Grecian world.

[215] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.

[216] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8; vi, 2, 4.

It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population, possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had contracted no special convention with the inhabitants,—though he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to any innocent Hellenic community.[217] He contemplated the employment of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city; after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers, might do so without emperiling those who stayed, and probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighborhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs,—perhaps even the recognized Œkist, like Agnon at Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and important,—was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover, the sequel will prove, how correctly Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain employment.

[217] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 15-30; vi, 2, 6; vii, 1, 25, 29.

Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they
ascribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyôra.

It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master Sokrates,[218] in grave and doubtful cases, where the most careful reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; for which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would not fight for ten days,—and the prophecy came to pass; which made such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded him with the prodigious present of three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining in the Euxine, and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were favorable;[219] Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself began to realize, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their own concurrence.[220]

[218] Xen. Memorab. i, 1, 8, 9. Ἔφη δὲ (Sokrates) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν
μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι·
τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν.

Compare passages in his Cyropædia, i, 6, 3; De Officio Magistr.
Equit. ix, 9.

“The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us
wisdom to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary
comforts of life; in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are
enabled to inform ourselves by looking at the blaze of the fire,
or by consulting prophets who understand the livers of sacrificial
victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so
excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be
discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of
self-conceit, will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume
itself to be wiser, than the gods.”

Ἃ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἄσημα, κοὐ σαφῆ, γιγνώσκομεν
Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων πτύχας
Μάντεις προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνῶν τ᾽ ἄπο.
Ἆρ᾽ οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευὴν βίου
Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;
Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μεῖζον σθένειν
Ζητεῖ· τὸ γαῦρον δ᾽ ἐν χεροῖν κεκτημένοι
Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι (Supplices, 211).

It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special
revelations, through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of
these Sokratic thinkers) an essential part of the divine
government; indispensable to satisfy their ideas of the
benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific
prediction was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the
phenomena of the future.

[219] Xen. Anab. v. 6, 29.

[220] Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential
preliminary to any action of dubious result, and placed great
faith in the indications which the victims offered, as signs of
the future purposes of the gods,—he nevertheless had very little
confidence in the professional prophets. He thought them quite
capable of gross deceit (See Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 2, 3; compare
Sophokles, Antigone, 1035, 1060; and Œdip. Tyrann. 387).

Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of Xenophon. Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine, and would employ the transports when they arrived, not for the homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition This news spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that large offers of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these officers, convening an assembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on the faith of the assurances from Herakleia and Sinôpê, future pay on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of Dardanus on the Hellespont, from whence they could make incursions on the rich neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus.[221]

[221] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19-26.

It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more than one quarter,—until the Achæans Philesius and Lykon had loudly accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into remaining against their will,—that the latter rose to repel the imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult the gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the gods, as conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus himself, proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless, (he remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by his own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be visible in the victims. “If (added Xenophon) you had continued as destitute and unprovided as you were just now,—I should still have looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or runs off, be condemned as a wrong-doer.”[222]

[222] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 30-33.

Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted with the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against the injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment. But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece with the three thousand darics.[223]

[223] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 34; vi, 4, 13.

If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his partners gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians and the Herakleots felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; for, having positively engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.[224] Xenophon replied, that they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery obtained information of the manœuvre, much to their discontent and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon; alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his original project, and that he intended as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project, once his own,—and something so improbable in the fact that the other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up his,—that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence which Neon’s calumny found among the army. Their exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of Kerasus.

[224] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 36.

I may here note that this _Phasis_ in the Euxine means the town
of that name, not the river.

Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal assemblages, and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate defence,[225]—Xenophon immediately sent round the herald to summon the army into the regular agora, with customary method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then addressed them,—refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become one of life and death between him and those other officers.

[225] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 1-3.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾐσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν
αὐτῶν ἀγορὰν, καὶ μὴ ἐᾶσαι συλλεγῆναι αὐτομάτους· καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν
κήρυκα συλλέξαι ἀγοράν.

The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is
incontestable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers
from getting together, and exciting one another to action,
without any formal summons.

The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens
(described in Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p.
133 of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesian
war, and the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians;
when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight of the walls of
Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of the most
violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest
impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call
an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution
of going out. And what was much more remarkable—the people
even in that state of excitement though all united within the
walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any
resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would
certainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular
assembly.

The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the
extraordinary empire exercised by constitutional forms over the
minds of the Athenian citizens.

“Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece, he must go westward,—if to the barbaric territories, he must go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade you that the sun rises on _this_ side, and sets on _that_? Can any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your own consent,—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more? Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not in Greece; and what fate can I then expect,—a detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No,—these stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence with you; jealous, too, without reason,—for I neither hinder _them_ from outstripping me in your favor, if they can render you greater service,—nor _you_ from electing them commanders, if you think fit. Enough of this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid to my charge.”[226]

[226] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 7-11.

Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such that, if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus,—the unauthorized and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighboring village which was in friendly commerce with the army,—the murder of the three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such wrong,—the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves to ignominy.[227] “If such are to be our proceedings, (continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body,[228] will no longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against any point which he may choose. And even if men should come to you as envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i. e. darts or stones), may put to death, without trial, either officer or soldier, as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial. Those who stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such a pass, that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial; though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury the bodies for us.”[229]

[227] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-26.

[228] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 26-27. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται,
θεάσασθε οἵα ἡ κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ
πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι, οὔτ᾽ ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε,
οὔτε καταλῦσαι· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει στράτευμα ἐφ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν
ἐθέλῃ. Κἄν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ
ἄλλου τινός, κατακαίνοντες τούτους οἱ βουλόμενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς
τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰόντων. Ἔπειτα δὲ, οὓς μὲν ἂν
ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἔλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ᾽
ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἕληται στρατηγὸν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος
ἔσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακαίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ
ἄκριτον—ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πεισόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.

[229] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 27-30.

Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They passed a vote that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be punished; that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future, he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the prophets, to purify the army.[230]

[230] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 34, 35.

This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected, as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority; the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling. No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards, though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion. And what is not less important to notice,—the influence of Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to have been sensibly augmented,—certainly no way diminished.

The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of Xenophon himself[231] that the generals themselves should be tried before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains, in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters; agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklês were fined twenty minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty by burying the dying man alive.[232] This interesting debate (given in the Anabasis at length) ended by full approbation, on the part of the army, of Xenophon’s conduct, accompanied with regret that he had not handled the man yet more severely.

[231] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 35.

Παραινοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος, καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε
καὶ καθᾶραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς
στρατηγοὺς δίκην ὑποσχεῖν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου.

In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter
the eighth is made to begin at the second ἔδοξε, which seems to
me not convenient for comprehending the full sense. I think that
the second ἔδοξε, as well as the first, is connected with the
words παραινοῦντος Ξενοφῶντος, and ought to be included not only
in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sentence,
without an intervening full stop.

[232] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 3-12.

The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and well-tempered officer. “I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) to have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were content to owe their preservation to your orderly march and constant fighting, while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to a man. Sometimes, too, I struck men who were lagging behind with cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others from getting forward; I struck them with my fist,[233] in order to save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by, and saw me; you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not from any insolence of disposition; for it was a time when we were all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now live comparatively well, drink more wine, and pass easy days,—and yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most in those times of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders in the army. There is Boïskus,[234] the Thessalian pugilist, who pretended sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen of carrying his shield,—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped several citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are now brought in evidence,—I call upon those among you also, to whom I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my favor.”[235]

[233] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 16. ἔπαισα πὺξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν
πολεμίων παίοιτο.

[234] The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in
battle, is as old among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled
pugilist of the Homeric Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own
inferiority as a soldier (Iliad, xxiii 667).

Ἆσσον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφικύπελλον·
Ἡμίονον δ᾽ οὔ φημί τιν᾽ ἄξεμεν ἄλλον Ἀχαιῶν,
Πυγμῇ νικήσαντ᾽· ἐπεὶ εὔχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.
~Ἦ οὐχ ἅλις, ὅ,ττι μάχης ἐπιδεύομαι~; οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν
Ἐν πάντεσσ᾽ ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.

[235] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 13-25.