Chapter LXXV (1)

FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.

The presence of Pharnabazus and Konon with their commanding force in the Saronic Gulf, and the liberality with which the former furnished pecuniary aid to the latter for rebuilding the full fortifications of Athens, as well as to the Corinthians for the prosecution of the war,—seem to have given preponderance to the confederates over Sparta for that year. The plans of Konon[622] were extensive. He was the first to organize for the defence of Corinth, a mercenary force which was afterwards improved and conducted with greater efficiency by Iphikrates; and after he had finished the fortifications of Peiræus with the Long Walls, he employed himself in showing his force among the islands, for the purpose of laying the foundations of renewed maritime power for Athens. We even hear that he caused an Athenian envoy to be despatched to Dionysius at Syracuse, with the view of detaching that despot from Sparta, and bringing him into connection with Athens. Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, the steady friend of Konon, was a party to this proposition, which he sought to strengthen by offering to Dionysius his sister in marriage.[623] There was a basis of sympathy between them arising from the fact that Evagoras was at variance with the Phœnicians both in Phœnicia and Cyprus, while Dionysius was in active hostilities with the Carthaginians (their kinsmen and Colonists) in Sicily. Nevertheless, the proposition met with little or no success. We find Dionysius afterwards still continuing to act as an ally of Sparta.

[622] Harpokration, v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ. Philochorus, Fragm.
150, ed. Didot.

[623] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 21.

Profiting by the aid received from Pharnabazus, the Corinthians strengthened their fleet at Lechæum (their harbor in the Corinthian Gulf) so considerably, as to become masters of the Gulf, and to occupy Rhium, one of the two opposite capes which bound its narrow entrance. To oppose them, the Lacedæmonians on their side were driven to greater maritime effort. More than one naval action seems to have taken place, in those waters where the prowess and skill of the Athenian admiral Phormion had been so signally displayed at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At length the Lacedæmonian admiral Herippidas, who succeeded to the command of the fleet after his predecessor Polemarchus had been slain in battle, compelled the Corinthians to abandon Rhium, and gradually recovered his ascendency in the Corinthian Gulf; which his successor Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, still farther completed.[624]

[624] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 11.

While these transactions were going on (seemingly during the last half of 393 B.C. and the full year of 392 B.C.), so as to put an end to the temporary naval preponderance of the Corinthians,—the latter were at the same time bearing the brunt of a desultory, but continued, land-warfare against the garrison of Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians established at Sikyon. Both Corinth and Lechæum were partly defended by the presence of confederate troops, Bœotians, Argeians, Athenians, or mercenaries paid by Athens. But this did not protect the Corinthians against suffering great damage, in their lands and outlying properties, from the incursions of the enemy.

The plain between Corinth and Sikyon,—fertile and extensive (speaking by comparison with Peloponnesus generally), and constituting a large part of the landed property of both cities, was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.C.; so that the Corinthian proprietors were obliged to withdraw their servants and cattle to Peiræum[625] (a portion of the Corinthian territory without the Isthmus properly so called, north-east of the Akrokorinthus, in a line between that eminence and the Megarian harbor of Pegæ). Here the Sikyonian assailants could not reach them, because of the Long Walls of Corinth, which connected that city by a continuous fortification of twelve stadia (somewhat less than a mile and a half) with its harbor of Lechæum. Nevertheless, the loss to the proprietors of the deserted plain was still so great, that two successive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion to the war;[626] the more so, as the damage fell exclusively upon them—their allies in Bœotia, Athens, and Argos, having as yet suffered nothing. Constant military service for defence, with the conversion of the city into a sort of besieged post, aggravated their discomfort. There was another circumstance also, doubtless not without influence. The consequences of the battle of Knidus had been, first, to put down the maritime empire of Sparta, and thus to diminish the fear which she inspired to the Corinthians; next, to rebuild the fortifications, and renovate the shipping, commercial as well as warlike, of Athens;—a revival well calculated to bring back a portion of that anti-Athenian jealousy and apprehension which the Corinthians had felt so strongly a few years before. Perhaps some of the trade at Corinth may have been actually driven away by the disturbance of the war, to the renewed fortifications and greater security of Peiræus.

[625] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 1; iv, 5, 1.

[626] I dissent from Mr. Fynes Clinton as well as from M.
Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc., c. 4, who in the main agrees
with Dodwell’s Annales Xenophontei) in their chronological
arrangement of these events.

They place the battle fought by Praxitas within the Long Walls
of Corinth in 393 B.C., and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian
_mora_ or division by Iphikrates (the monthly date of which is
marked by its having immediately succeeded the Isthmian games),
in 392 B.C. I place the former event in 392 B.C.; the latter in
390 B.C., immediately after the Isthmian games of 390 B.C.

If we study the narrative of Xenophon, we shall find, that after
describing (iv, 3) the battle of Korôneia (August 394 B.C.) with
its immediate consequences, and the return of Agesilaus home,—he
goes on in the next chapter to narrate the land-war about or near
Corinth, which he carries down without interruption (through
Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 B.C.

But in Chapter 8 of Book iv, he leaves the land-war, and takes up
the naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug.
394 B.C.). He recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the
Ægean with a powerful fleet in the spring of 393 B.C., and how
after various proceedings, they brought the fleet to the Saronic
Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where they must have arrived at
or near midsummer 393 B.C.

Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of
Pharnabazus with the fleet, recounted in the eighth chapter,
come, in point of date, _before_ the seditious movements and
the _coup d’état_ at Corinth, which are recounted in the fourth
chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in midsummer
393 B.C., the narrative of Xenophon (iv, 8, 8-10) leads us to
believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously,
and without discontent: the money and encouragement which
Pharnabazus gave them was calculated to strengthen such ardor. It
was by aid of this money that the Corinthians fitted out their
fleet under Agathinus, and acquired for a time the maritime
command of the Gulf.

The discontents against the war (recounted in chap. 4 _seq._)
could not have commenced until a considerable time after the
departure of Pharnabazus. They arose out of causes which only
took effect after a long continuance,—the hardships of the
land-war, the losses of property and slaves, the jealousy towards
Attica and Bœotia as being undisturbed, etc. The Lacedæmonian
and Peloponnesian aggressive force at Sikyon cannot possibly
have been established before the autumn of 394 B.C., and was
most probably placed there early in the spring of 393 B.C.
Its effects were brought about, not by one great blow, but
by repetition of ravages and destructive annoyance; and all
the effects which it produced previous to midsummer 393 B.C.
would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts,
and the encouragement of Pharnabazus with his powerful fleet.
Moreover, after his departure, too, the Corinthians were at first
successful at sea, and acquired the command of the Gulf, which,
however, they did not retain for more than a year, if so much.
Hence, it is not likely that any strong discontent against the
war began before the early part of 392 B.C.

Considering all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to
believe that the _coup d’état_ and massacre at Corinth took place
(not in 393 B.C., as Mr. Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but)
in 392 B.C.; and the battle within the Long Walls rather later
in the same year.

Next, the opinion of the same two authors, as well as of
Dodwell,—that the destruction of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ by
Iphicrates took place in the spring of 392 B.C.,—is also, in my
view, erroneous. If this were true, it would be necessary to pack
all the events mentioned in Xenophon, iv, 4, into the year 393
B.C.; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction of the
mora did not occur in the spring of 393 B.C., we know that it
could not have occurred until the spring of 390 B.C.; that is,
the next ensuing Isthmian games, two years afterwards. And this
last will be found to be its true date; thus leaving full time,
but not too much time, for the antecedent occurrences.

Fostered by this pressure of circumstances, the discontented philo-Laconian or peace-party which had always existed at Corinth, presently acquired sufficient strength, and manifested itself with sufficient publicity to give much alarm to the government. The Corinthian government had always been, and still was, oligarchical. In what manner the administrators or the council were renovated, or how long individuals continued in office, indeed, we do not know. But of democracy, with its legal, popular assemblies, open discussions and authoritative resolves, there was nothing.[627] Now the oligarchical persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian, consisting of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and contracted alliance with Persia, besides compromising themselves irrevocably (like Timolaus) by the most bitter manifestations of hostile sentiment towards Sparta. These men found themselves menaced by a powerful opposition party, which had no constitutional means for making its sentiments predominant, and for accomplishing peaceably either a change of administrators or a change of public policy. It was only by an appeal to arms and violence that such a consummation could be brought about; a fact notorious to both parties,—so that the oligarchical administrators, informed of the meetings and conversations going on, knew well that they had to expect nothing less than the breaking out of a conspiracy. That such anticipations were well-founded, we gather even from the partial recital of Xenophon; who states that Pasimêlus, the philo-Laconian leader, was on his guard and in preparation,[628]—and counts it to him as a virtue that shortly afterwards he opened the gates to the Lacedæmonians.

[627] Plutarch, Dion. c. 53.

[628] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 2. Γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ
καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κορινθίων οἵ τε τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων
μετεσχηκότες, καὶ οἱ τοῦ πολέμου αἰτιώτατοι γεγενημένοι, ὡς,
εἰ μὴ ἐκποδὼν ποιήσαιντο τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τετραμμένους,
κινδυνεύσει πάλιν ἡ πόλις λακωνίσαι—οὕτω δὴ καὶ σφαγὰς
ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖσθαι.

iv, 4, 4. Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι, ὑποπτεύσαντος Πασιμήλου τὸ μέλλον
ἔσεσθαι, ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον ἐν τῷ Κρανίῳ· ὡς δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἤσθοντο,
καὶ φεύγοντές τινες ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφίκοντο πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐκ
τούτου ἀναδραμόντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, προσβαλόντας μὲν
Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπεκρούσαντο, etc.

Anticipating such conspiracy, the government resolved to prevent it by a _coup d’état_. They threw themselves upon the assistance of their allies, invited in a body of Argeians, and made their blow the more sure by striking it on the last day of the festival called Eukleia, when it was least expected. Their proceeding, though dictated by precaution, was executed with the extreme of brutal ferocity aggravated by sacrilege; in a manner very different from the deep-laid artifices recently practised by the Spartan ephors when they were in like manner afraid of the conspiracy of Kinadon,—and more like the oligarchical conspirators at Korkyra (in the third year of the Peloponnesian war) when they broke into the assembled Senate, and massacred Peithias, with sixty others in the senate-house.[629] While the choice performers at Corinth were contending for the prize in the theatre, with judges formally named to decide,—and while the market-place around was crowded with festive spectators,—a number of armed men were introduced, probably Argeians, with leaders designating the victims whom they were to strike. Some of these select victims were massacred in the market-place, others in the theatre, and one even while sitting as a judge in the theatre. Others again fled in terror to embrace the altars or statues in the market-place,—which sanctuary, nevertheless, did not save their lives. Nor was such sacrilege arrested,—repugnant as it was to the feelings of the assembled spectators and to Grecian feelings generally,—until one hundred and twenty persons had perished.[630] But the persons slain were chiefly elderly men; for the younger portion of the philo-Laconian party, suspecting some mischief, had declined attending the festival, and kept themselves separately assembled under their leader Pasimêlus in the gymnasium and cyprus-grove called Kranium, just without the city-gates. We find, too, that they were not only assembled, but actually in arms. For the moment that they heard the clamor in the market-place, and learned from some fugitives what was going on, they rushed up at once to the Akrokorinthus (or eminence and acropolis overhanging the city) and got possession of the citadel,—which they maintained with such force and courage that the Argeians and the Corinthians, who took part with the government, were repulsed in the attempt to dislodge them. This circumstance, indirectly revealed in the one-sided narrative of Xenophon, lets us into the real state of the city, and affords good ground for believing that Pasimêlus and his friends were prepared beforehand for an armed outbreak, but waited to execute it, until the festival was over,—a scruple which the government, in their eagerness to forestall the plot, disregarded,—employing the hands and weapons of Argeians who were comparatively unimpressed by solemnities peculiar to Corinth.[631]

[629] Thucyd. iii, 70.

[630] Diodorus (xiv, 86) gives this number, which seems very
credible. Xenophon (iv, 4, 4) only says πολλοί.

[631] In recounting this alternation of violence projected,
violence perpetrated, recourse on the one side to a foreign
ally, treason on the other by admitting an avowed enemy,—which
formed the _modus operandi_ of opposing parties in the
oligarchical Corinth,—I invite the reader to contrast it with
the democratical Athens.

At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were
precisely the same causes at work, and precisely the same marked
antithesis of parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth.
There was first, a considerable Athenian minority who opposed
the war with Sparta from the first; next, when the war began,
the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined, and were
compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and
cattle, so that they obtained no returns. The intense discontent,
the angry complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which
these circumstances raised among the Athenian citizens,—not to
mention the aggravation of all these symptoms by the terrible
epidemic,—are marked out in Thucydides, and have been recorded
in the fifth volume of this history. Not only the positive loss
and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a
higher pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian
war, than at Corinth in 392 B.C.

Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority
resort to a conspiracy,—or the majority to a _coup d’état_—or
either of them to invitation of foreign aid against the other?
Nothing of the kind. The minority had always open to them the
road of pacific opposition, and the chance of obtaining a
majority in the Senate or in the public assembly, which was
practically identical with the totality of the citizens. Their
opposition, though pacific as to acts, was sufficiently animated
and violent in words and propositions, to serve as a real
discharge for imprisoned angry passion. If they could not carry
the adoption of their general policy, they had the opportunity
of gaining partial victories which took off the edge of a fierce
discontent; witness the fine imposed upon Perikles (Thucyd.
ii, 65) in the year before his death, which both gratified and
mollified the antipathy against him, and brought about shortly
afterwards a strong reaction in his favor. The majority, on the
other hand, knew that the predominance of its policy depended
upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public assembly,
against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain
forms and rules prescribed by the constitution; attachment to
the latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in
both parties. It was this system which excluded on both sides the
thought of armed violence. It produced among the democratical
citizens of Athens that characteristic insisted upon by Kleon
in Thucydides,—“constant and fearless security and absence of
treacherous hostility among one another” (διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν
ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ
αὐτὸ ἔχετε—Thuc. iii, 37), the entire absence of which stands
so prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the
oligarchical Corinth. Pasimêlus and his Corinthian minority had
no assemblies, dikasteries, annual Senate, or constant habit of
free debate and accusation, to appeal to; their only available
weapon was armed violence, or treacherous correspondence with a
foreign enemy. On the part of the Corinthian government, superior
or more skilfully used force, or superior alliance abroad, was
the only weapon of defence, in like manner.

I shall return to this subject in a future chapter, where I enter
more at large into the character of the Athenians.

Though Pasimêlus and his friends were masters of the citadel, and had repulsed the assault of their enemies, yet the _coup d’état_ had been completely successful in overawing their party in the city, and depriving them of all means of communicating with the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. Feeling unable to maintain themselves, they were besides frightened by menacing omens, when they came to offer sacrifice, in order that they might learn whether the gods encouraged them to fight or not. The victims were found so alarming, as to drive them to evacuate the post and prepare for voluntary exile. Many of them (according to Diodorus five hundred)[632] actually went into exile; while others, and among them Pasimêlus himself, were restrained by the entreaties of their friends and relatives, combined with solemn assurances of peace and security from the government; who now, probably, felt themselves victorious, and were anxious to mitigate the antipathies which their recent violence had inspired. These pacific assurances were faithfully kept, and no farther mischief was done to any citizen.

[632] Diodor. xiv, 86; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 5.

But the political condition of Corinth was materially altered, by an extreme intimacy of alliance and communion now formed with Argos; perhaps combined with reciprocal rights of intermarriage, and of purchase and sale. The boundary pillars or hedges which separated the two territories, were pulled up, and the city was entitled _Argos_ instead of _Corinth_ (says Xenophon); such was probably the invidious phrase in which the opposition party described the very close political union now formed between the two cities; upheld by a strong Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, and some Bœotians as a garrison in the port of Lechæum. Most probably the government remained still Corinthian, and still oligarchical, as before. But it now rested upon Argeian aid, and was therefore dependent chiefly upon Argos, though partly also upon the other two allies.

To Pasimêlus and his friends such a state of things was intolerable. Though personally they had no ill-usage to complain of, yet the complete predominance of their political enemies was quite sufficient to excite their most vehement antipathies. They entered into secret correspondence with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander at Sikyon, engaging to betray to him one of the gates in the western Long Wall between Corinth and Lechæum. The scheme being concerted, Pasimêlus and his partisans got themselves placed,[633] partly by contrivance and partly by accident, on the night-watch at this gate; an imprudence, which shows that the government not only did not maltreat them, but even admitted them to trust. At the moment fixed, Praxitas,—presenting himself with a Lacedæmonian _mora_ or regiment, a Sikyonian force, and the Corinthian exiles,—found the treacherous sentinels prepared to open the gates. Having first sent in a trusty soldier to satisfy him that there was no deceit,[634] he then conducted all his force within the gates, into the mid-space between the two Long Walls. So broad was this space, and so inadequate did his numbers appear to maintain it, that he took the precaution of digging a cross-ditch with a palisade to defend himself on the side towards the city; which he was enabled to do undisturbed, since the enemy (we are not told why) did not attack him all the next day. On the ensuing day, however, Argeians, Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, all came down from the city in full force; the latter stood on the right of the line, along the eastern wall, opposed to the Corinthian exiles on the Lacedæmonian left; while the Lacedæmonians themselves were on their own right, opposed to the Corinthians from the city; and the Argeians, opposed to the Sikyonians, in the centre.

[633] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν,
etc.

[634] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. Nothing can show more forcibly the
Laconian bias of Xenophon, than the credit which he gives to
Pasimêlus for his good faith towards the Lacedæmonians whom he
was letting in; overlooking or approving his treacherous betrayal
towards his own countrymen, in thus opening a gate which he
had been trusted to watch. τὼ δ᾽ εἰσηγαγέτην, καὶ ~οὕτως ἁπλῶς
ἀπεδειξάτην~, ὥστε ὁ εἰσελθὼν ἐξήγγειλε, πάντα εἶναι ἀδόλως,
οἷάπερ ἐλεγέτην.

It was here that the battle began; the Argeians, bold from superior numbers, attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the palisade, and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughter;[635] upon which Pasimachus the Lacedæmonian commander of cavalry, coming to their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then armed them with shields taken from the Sikyonians, inscribed on the outside with the letter Sigma (Σ). With these he approached on foot to attack the Argeians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed to the charge with alacrity; upon which Pasimachus exclaimed,—“By the two gods, Argeians, these Sigmas which you see here will deceive you;” he then closed with them resolutely, but his number was so inferior that he was soon overpowered and slain. Meanwhile, the Corinthian exiles on the left had driven back Iphikrates with his mercenaries (doubtless chiefly light troops) and pursued them even to the city gates; while the Lacedæmonians, easily repelling the Corinthians opposed to them, came out of their palisade, and planted themselves with their faces towards the eastern wall, but at a little distance from it, to intercept the Argeians on their return. The latter were forced to run back as they could, huddling close along the eastern wall, with their right or unshielded side exposed, as they passed, to the spears of the Lacedæmonians. Before they could get to the walls of Corinth, they were met and roughly handled by the victorious Corinthian exiles. And even when they came to the walls, those within, unwilling to throw open the gates for fear of admitting the enemy, contented themselves with handing down ladders, over which the defeated Argeians clambered with distress and difficulty. Altogether, their loss in this disastrous retreat was frightful. Their dead (says Xenophon) lay piled up like heaps of stones or wood.[636]

[635] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4. 10. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Σικυωνίους ἐκράτησαν
καὶ διασπάσαντες τὸ σταύρωμα ἐδίωκον ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκεῖ
πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν.

It would appear from hence that there must have been an open
portion of Lechæum, or a space apart from (but adjoining to) the
wall which encircled Lechæum, yet still within the Long Walls.
Otherwise the fugitive Sikyonians could hardly have got down to
the sea.

[636] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 12. Οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον, ὥστε
εἰθισμένοι ὁρᾷν οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς σίτου, ξύλων, λίθου, τότε
ἐθεάσαντο σωροὺς νεκρῶν.

A singular form of speech.

This victory of Praxitas and the Lacedæmonians, though it did not yet make them masters of Lechæum,[637] was, nevertheless, of considerable importance. Shortly afterwards they received reinforcements which enabled them to turn it to still better account. The first measure of Praxitas was to pull down a considerable breadth of the two walls, leaving a breach which opened a free passage for any Lacedæmonian army from Sikyon to reach and pass the isthmus. He then marched his troops through the breach, forward on the road to Megara, capturing the two Corinthian dependencies of Krommyon and Sidus on the Saronic gulf, in which he placed garrisons. Returning back by the road south of Corinth, he occupied Epieikia on the frontier of Epidaurus, as a protection to the territory of the latter against incursions from Corinth,—and then disbanded his army.

[637] Diodorus (xiv, 87) represents that the Lacedæmonians on
this occasion surprised and held Lechæum, defeating the general
body of the confederates who came out from Corinth to retake it.
But his narrative of all these circumstances differs materially
from that of Xenophon; whom I here follow in preference, making
allowance for great partiality, and for much confusion and
obscurity.

Xenophon gives us plainly to understand, that Lechæum was <i>not</i>
captured by the Lacedæmonians until the following year, by
Agesilaus and Teleutias.

It is to be recollected that Xenophon had particular means of
knowing what was done by Agesilaus, and therefore deserves credit
on that head,—always allowing for partiality. Diodorus does not
mention Agesilaus in connection with the proceedings at Lechæum.

A desultory warfare was carried on during the ensuing winter and spring between the opposite garrisons in Corinth and Sikyon. It was now that the Athenian Iphikrates, in the former place, began to distinguish himself at the head of his mercenary peltasts whom, after their first organization by Konon, he had trained to effective tactics under the strictest discipline, and whose movements he conducted with consummate skill. His genius introduced improvements both in their armor and in their clothing. He lengthened by one half both the light javelin and the short sword, which the Thracian peltasts habitually carried; he devised a species of leggings, known afterwards by the name of Iphikratides; and he thus combined, better than had ever been done before, rapid motion,—power of acting in difficult ground and open order,—effective attack, either by missiles or hand to hand, and dexterous retreat in case of need.[638] As yet, he was but a young officer, in the beginning of his military career.[639] We must therefore presume that these improvements were chiefly of later date, the suggestions of his personal experience; but even now, the successes of his light troops were remarkable. Attacking Phlius, he entrapped the Phliasians into an ambuscade, and inflicted on them a defeat so destructive that they were obliged to invoke the aid of a Lacedæmonian garrison for the protection of their city. He gained a victory near Sikyon, and carried his incursions over all Arcadia, to the very gates of the cities; damaging the Arcadian hoplites so severely, that they became afraid to meet him in the field. His own peltasts, however, though full of confidence against these Peloponnesian hoplites, still retained their awe and their reluctance to fight against Lacedæmonians;[640] who, on their side, despised them, but despised their own allies still more. “Our friends fear these peltasts, as children fear hobgoblins,”—said the Lacedæmonians, sarcastically, endeavoring to set the example of courage by ostentatious demonstrations of their own around the walls of Corinth.[641]

[638] Diodor. xv, 44; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Iphicrat. c.
2; Polyæn. iii, 9, 10. Compare Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis,
Chabriæ, et Timothei, c. 2, 7 (Berlin, 1845)—a very useful and
instructive publication.

In describing the improvements made by Iphikrates in the armature
of his peltasts, I have not exactly copied either Nepos or
Diodorus, who both appear to me confused in their statements.
You would imagine, in reading their account (and so it has been
stated by Weber, Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. xxxv.),
that there were no peltasts in Greece prior to Iphikrates;
that he was the first to transform heavy-armed hoplites into
light-armed peltasts, and to introduce from Thrace the light
shield or _pelta_, not only smaller in size than the round ἀσπὶς
carried by the hoplite, but also without the ἴτυς (or surrounding
metallic rim of the ἀσπὶς) seemingly connected by outside bars
or spokes of metal with the exterior central knob or projection
(_umbo_) which the hoplite pushed before him in close combat. The
_pelta_, smaller and lighter than the ἀσπὶς, was seemingly square
or oblong and not round; though it had no ἴτυς, it often had thin
plates of brass, as we may see by Xenophon, Anab. v, 2, 29, so
that the explanation of it given in the Scholia ad Platon. Legg.
vii, p. 813 must be taken with reserve.

But Grecian peltasts existed before the time of Iphikrates (Xen.
Hellen. i, 2, 1 and elsewhere); he did not first introduce them;
he found them already there, and improved their armature. Both
Diodorus and Nepos affirm that he lengthened the _spears_ of
the peltasts to a measure half as long again as those of the
hoplites (or twice as long, if we believe Nepos), and the swords
in proportion—“ηὔξησε μὲν τὰ δόρατα ἡμιολίῳ μεγέθει—hastæ
modum duplicavit.” Now this I apprehend to be not exact; nor is
it true (as Nepos asserts) that the Grecian hoplites carried
“short spears”—“brevibus hastis.” The spear of the Grecian
hoplite was long (though not so long as that of the heavy and
compact Macedonian phalanx afterwards became), and it appears
to me incredible that Iphikrates should have given to his light
and active peltast a spear twice as long, or half as long again,
as that of the hoplite. Both Diodorus and Nepos have mistaken
by making their comparison with the arms _of the hoplite_, to
which the changes of Iphikrates had no reference. The peltast
both before and after Iphikrates did not carry a _spear_, but
a _javelin_, which he employed as a missile, to hurl, not to
thrust; he was essentially an ἀκοντιστὴς or javelin-shooter (See
Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 14; vi, 1, 9). Of course the javelin
might, in case of need, serve to thrust, but this was not its
appropriate employment; _e converso_, the spear might be hurled
(under advantageous circumstances, from the higher ground against
an enemy below—Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 15; v, 4, 52), but its proper
employment was, to be held and thrust forward.

What Iphikrates really did, was, to lengthen both the two
offensive weapons which the peltast carried, before his
time,—the javelin, and the sword. He made the javelin a longer
and heavier weapon, requiring a more practised hand to throw—but
also competent to inflict more serious wounds, and capable
of being used with more deadly effect if the peltasts saw an
opportunity of coming to close fight on advantageous terms.
Possibly Iphikrates not only lengthened the weapon, but also
improved its point and efficacy in other ways; making it more
analogous to the formidable Roman _pilum_. Whether he made any
alteration in the _pelta_ itself, we do not know.

The name _Iphikratides_, given to these new-fashioned leggings or
boots, proves to us that Wellington and Blucher are not the first
eminent generals who have lent an honorable denomination to boots
and shoes.

[639] Justin, vi, 5.

[640] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 16; Diodor. xiv, 91.

Τοὺς μέντοι Λακεδαιμονίους οὕτως αὖ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐδέδισαν, ὡς
ἐντὸς ἀκοντίσματος οὐ προσῄεσαν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, etc.

Compare the sentiment of the light troops in the attack of
Sphakteria, when they were awe-struck and afraid at first to
approach the Lacedæmonian hoplites—τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ
Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. (Thucyd. iv, 34).

[641] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 17. ὥστε οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ
ἐπισκώπτειν ἐτόλμων, ὡς οἱ σύμμαχοι φοβοῖντο τοὺς πελταστὰς,
ὥσπερ μορμῶνας παιδάρια, etc.

This is a camp-jest of the time, which we have to thank Xenophon
for preserving.

The breach made in the Long Walls of Corinth by Praxitas had laid open the road for a Peloponnesian army to march either into Attica or Bœotia.[642] Fortunately for the Athenians, they had already completed the rebuilding of their own Long Walls; but they were so much alarmed by the new danger, that they marched with their full force, and with masons and carpenters accompanying,[643] to Corinth. Here, with that celerity of work for which they were distinguished,[644] they in a few days reëstablished completely the western wall; the more important of the two, since it formed the barrier against the incursions of the Lacedæmonians from Sikyon. They had then a secure position, and could finish the eastern wall at their leisure; which they accordingly did, and then retired, leaving it to the confederate troops in Corinth to defend.

[642] Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 17. ἀναπετάσας τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὰς
πύλας, etc.

Respecting the Long Walls of Corinth, as part of a line
of defence which barred ingress to, or egress from,
Peloponnesus,—Colonel Leake remarks,—“The narrative of Xenophon
shows the great importance of the Corinthian Long Walls in time
of war. They completed a line of fortification from the summit
of the Acro-Corinthus to the sea, and thus intercepted the most
direct and easy communication from the Isthmus into Peloponnesus.
For the rugged mountain, which borders the southern side of the
Isthmian plain, has only two passes,—one, by the opening on the
eastern side of Acro-Corinthus, which obliged an enemy to pass
under the eastern side of Corinth, and was, moreover, defended
by a particular kind of fortification, as some remains of walls
still testify,—the other, along the shore at Cenchreiæ, which
was also a fortified place in the hands of the Corinthians.
Hence the importance of the pass of Cenchreiæ, in all operations
between the Peloponnesians, and an enemy without the Isthmus.”
(Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxviii, p. 254).

Compare Plutarch, Aratus, c. 16; and the operations of
Epaminondas as described by Diodorus, xv, 68.

[643] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 18. ἐλθόντες ~πανδημεὶ~ μετὰ λιθολόγων
καὶ τεκτόνων, etc. The word πανδημεὶ shows how much they were
alarmed.

[644] Thucyd. vi, 98.

This advantage, however,—a very material one,—was again overthrown by the expedition of the Lacedæmonian king, Agesilaus, during the same summer. At the head of a full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force, he first marched into the territory of Argos, and there spent some time in ravaging all the cultivated plain. From hence he passed over the mountain-road, by Tenea,[645] into the plain of Corinth, to the foot of the newly-repaired Long Walls. Here his brother Teleutias, who had recently superseded Herippidas as admiral in the Corinthian Gulf, came to coöperate with him in a joint attack, by sea and land, on the new walls and on Lechæum.[646] The presence of this naval force rendered the Long Walls difficult to maintain, since troops could be disembarked in the interval between them, where the Sikyonians in the previous battle had been beaten and pursued down to the sea. Agesilaus and Teleutias were strong enough to defeat the joint force of the four confederated armies, and to master not only the Long Walls, but also the port of Lechæum,[647] with its docks, and the ships within them; thus breaking up the naval power of Corinth in the Krissæan Gulf. Lechæum now became a permanent post of hostility against Corinth, occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and occasionally by the Corinthian exiles, while any second rebuilding of the Corinthian Long Walls by the Athenians became impossible. After this important success, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. Neither he nor his Lacedæmonian hoplites, especially the Amyklæans, were ever willingly absent from the festival of the Hyakinthia; nor did he now disdain to take his station in the chorus,[648] under the orders of the choric conductor, for the pæan in honor of Apollo.

[645] The words stand in the text of Xenophon,—εὐθὺς ἐκεῖθεν
ὑπερβαλὼν κατὰ ~Τεγέαν~ εἰς Κόρινθον. A straight march from the
Argeian territory to Corinth could not possibly carry Agesilaus
by _Tegea_; Kœppen proposes ~Τενέαν~, which I accept, as
geographically suitable. I am not certain, however, that it is
right; the _Agesilaus_ of Xenophon has the words κατὰ τὰ στενά.

About the probable situation of Tenea, see Colonel Leake, Travels
in Morea, vol. iii, p. 321; also his Peloponnesiaca, p. 400.

[646] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19—iv, 8, 10, 11.

It was rather late in the autumn of 393 B.C. that the
Lacedæmonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf began,
against the fleet recently equipped by the Corinthians out of the
funds lent by Pharnabazus. First, the Lacedæmonian Polemarchus
was named admiral; he was slain,—and his secretary Pollis, who
succeeded to his command, retired afterwards wounded. Next came
Herippidas to the command, who was succeeded by Teleutias. Now if
we allow to Herippidas a year of command (the ordinary duration
of a Lacedæmonian admiral’s appointment), and to the other two
something less than a year, since their time was brought to
an end by accidents,—we shall find that the appointment of
Teleutias will fall in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C.,
the year of this expedition of Agesilaus.

[647] Andokides de Pace, s. 18; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19.
Παρεγένετο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ἀγησιλάῳ) καὶ ὁ ἁδελφὸς Τελευτίας κατὰ
θάλασσαν, ἔχων τριήρεις περὶ δώδεκα· ὥστε μακαρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν
μητέρα, ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧν ~ἔτεκεν ὁ μὲν κατὰ γῆν τὰ τείχη τῶν
πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ νεώρια ᾕρηκε~.

This last passage indicates decidedly that Lechæum was not
taken until this joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias. And
the authority of Xenophon on the point is superior, in my
judgment, to that of Diodorus (xiv, 86), who represents Lechæum
to have been taken in the year before, on the occasion when the
Lacedæmonians were first admitted by treachery within the Long
Walls.

The passage from Aristeides the rhetor, referred to by Wesseling,
Mr. Clinton, and others, only mentions the _battle_ at
Lechæum—_not the capture_ of the port. Xenophon also mentions a
_battle_ as having taken place close to Lechæum, between the two
long walls, on the occasion when Diodorus talks of the _capture_
of Lechæum; so that Aristeides is more in harmony with Xenophon
than with Diodorus.

A few months prior to this joint attack of Agesilaus and
Teleutias, the Athenians had come with an army, and with masons
and carpenters, for the express purpose of rebuilding the Long
Walls which Praxitas had in part broken down. This step would
have been both impracticable and useless, if the Lacedæmonians
had stood then in possession of Lechæum.

There is one passage of Xenophon, indeed, which looks as if the
Lacedæmonians had been in possession of Lechæum _before_ this
expedition of the Athenians to reëstablish the Long Walls,—Αὐτοὶ
(the Lacedæmonians) ~δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι~ σὺν μόρᾳ
καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίων φυγάσι, κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Κορινθίων
ἐστρατεύοντο (iv, 4, 17). But whoever reads attentively the
sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I think) that this
affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before,
the capture of Lechæum by Agesilaus; for it has reference to the
general contempt shown by the Lacedæmonians for the peltasts
of Iphikrates, as contrasted with the terror displayed by the
Mantineians and others, of these same peltasts. Even if this
were otherwise, however, I should still say that the passages
which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly that
_he_ represents Lechæum to have been captured by Agesilaus and
Teleutias; and that the other words, ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι,
if they really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be
regarded as an inaccuracy.

I will add that the chapter of Diodorus, xiv, 86, puts into one
year events which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in
that same year.

Had Lechæum been in possession and occupation by the
Lacedæmonians in the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus
and Teleutias, Xenophon would surely have mentioned it in iv,
4, 14; for it was a more important post than Sikyon, for acting
against Corinth.

[648] Xen. Agesilaus, ii, 17.

It was thus that the Long Walls, though rebuilt by the Athenians in the preceding year, were again permanently overthrown, and the road for Lacedæmonian armies to march beyond the isthmus once more laid open. So much were the Athenians and the Bœotians alarmed at this new success, that both appear to have become desirous of peace, and to have sent envoys to Sparta. The Thebans are said to have offered to recognize Orchomenus (which was now occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison) as autonomous and disconnected from the Bœotian federation; while the Athenian envoys seem to have been favorably received at Sparta, and to have found the Lacedæmonians disposed to make peace on better terms than those which had been proposed during the late discussions with Tiribazus (hereafter to be noticed;) recognizing the newly built Athenian walls, restoring Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros to Athens, and guaranteeing autonomy to each separate city in the Grecian world. The Athenian envoys at Sparta having provisionally accepted these terms, forty days were allowed for reference to the people of Athens; to which place Lacedæmonian envoys were sent as formal bearers of the propositions. The Argeians and Corinthians, however, strenuously opposed the thoughts of peace, urging the Athenians to continue the war; besides which, it appears that many Athenian citizens thought that large restitution ought to have been made of Athenian property forfeited at the end of the late war, and that the Thracian Chersonese ought to have been given back as well as the three islands. On these and other grounds, the Athenian people refused to sanction the recommendation of their envoys; though Andokides, one of those envoys, in a discourse still extant, earnestly advised that they should accept the peace.[649]

[649] Our knowledge of the abortive negotiations adverted to in
the text, is derived, partly from the third Oration of Andokides
called de Pace,—partly from a statement contained in the
Argument of that Oration, and purporting to be borrowed from
Philochorus—Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ελθεῖν τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ
Λακεδαίμονος, καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν, μὴ πείσαντος τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου.

Whether Philochorus had any additional grounds to rest upon,
other than this very oration itself, may appear doubtful. But at
any rate, this important fragment (which I do not see noticed
among the fragments of Philochorus in M. Didot’s collection)
counts for some farther evidence as to the reality of the peace
proposed and discussed, but not concluded.

Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention of such mission to
Sparta, or discussion at Athens, as that which forms the subject
of the Andokidean oration. But on the other hand, neither of them
says anything which goes to contradict the reality of the event;
nor can we in this case found any strong negative inference
on the mere silence of Xenophon, in the case of a pacific
proposition which ultimately came to nothing.

If indeed we could be certain that the oration of Andokides was
genuine it would of itself be sufficient to establish the reality
of the mission to which it relates. It would be sufficient
evidence, not only without corroboration from Xenophon, but even
against any contradictory statement proceeding from Xenophon.
But unfortunately, the rhetor Dionysius pronounced this oration
to be spurious; which introduces a doubt and throws us upon
the investigation of collateral probabilities. I have myself a
decided opinion (already stated more than once), that another
out of the four orations ascribed to Andokides (I mean the
fourth oration, entitled against Alkibiades) is spurious; and I
was inclined to the same suspicion with respect to this present
oration De Pace; a suspicion which I expressed in a former
volume (Vol. V, Ch. xlv, p. 334). But on studying over again
with attention this oration De Pace, I find reason to retract my
suspicion, and to believe that the oration may be genuine. It has
plenty of erroneous allegations as to matter of fact, especially
in reference to times prior to the battle of Ægospotami; but not
one, so far as I can detect, which conflicts with _the situation_
to which the orator addresses himself,—nor which requires us to
pronounce it spurious.

Indeed, in considering _this situation_ (which is the most
important point to be studied when we are examining the
genuineness of an oration), we find a partial coincidence in
Xenophon, which goes to strengthen our affirmative confidence.
One point much insisted upon in the oration is, that the Bœotians
were anxious to make peace with Sparta, and were willing to
relinquish Orchomenus (s. 13-20). Now Xenophon also mentions,
three or four months afterwards, the Bœotians as being anxious
for peace, and as sending envoys to Agesilaus to ask on what
terms it would be granted to them (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6). This
coincidence is of some value in reference to the authenticity of
the oration.

Assuming the oration to be genuine, its date is pretty clearly
marked, and is rightly placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 391 B.C.
It was in the autumn or winter of that year, four years after
the commencement of the war in Bœotia which began in 395 B.C.
(s. 20). It was _after_ the capture of Lechæum, which took
place in the summer of 391 B.C.—and _before_ the destruction
of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ by Iphikrates, which took place in
the spring of 390 _B.C._ For Andokides emphatically intimates,
that at the moment when he spoke, _not one military success_
had yet been obtained against the Lacedæmonians—καίτοι ποίας
τινος ἂν ἐκεῖνοι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν εἰρήνης ἔτυχον, ~εἰ μίαν μόνον μάχην
ἡττήθησαν~; (s. 19). This could never have been said _after_ the
destruction of the Lacedæmonian _mora_, which made so profound
a sensation throughout Greece, and so greatly altered the
temper of the contending parties. And it seems to me one proof
(among others) that Mr. Fynes Clinton has not placed correctly
the events subsequent to the battle of Corinth, when I observe
that he assigns the destruction of the _mora_ to the year 392
B.C., a year _before_ the date which he rightly allots to the
Andokidean oration. I have placed (though upon other grounds)
the destruction of the _mora_ in the spring of 390 _B.C._, which
receives additional confirmation from this passage of Andokides.

Both Valckenaer and Sluiter (Lect. Andocid. c. x,) consider the
oration of Andokides de Pace as genuine; Taylor and other critics
hold the contrary opinion.

The war being thus continued, Corinth, though defended by a considerable confederate force, including Athenian hoplites under Kallias, and peltasts under Iphikrates, became much pressed by the hostile posts at Lechæum as well as at Krommyon and Sidus,—and by its own exiles as the most active of all enemies. Still, however, there remained the peninsula and the fortification of Peiræum as an undisturbed shelter for the Corinthian servants and cattle, and a source of subsistence for the city. Peiræum was an inland post north-east of Corinth, in the centre of that peninsula which separates the two innermost recesses of the Krissæan Gulf,—the bay of Lechæum on its south-west, the bay called Alkyonis, between Kreusis and Olmiæ (now Psatho Bay), on its north-east. Across this latter bay Corinth communicated easily, through Peiræum and the fortified port of Œnoê, with Kreusis the port of Thespiæ in Bœotia.[650] The Corinthian exiles now prevailed upon Agesilaus to repeat his invasion of the territory, partly in order that they might deprive the city of the benefits which it derived from Peiræum,—partly in order that they might also appropriate to themselves the honor of celebrating the Isthmian games, which were just approaching. The Spartan king accordingly marched forth, at the head of a force composed of Lacedæmonians and of the Peloponnesian allies, first to Lechæum, and thence to the Isthmus, specially so called; that is, the sacred precinct of Poseidon near Schœnus on the Saronic Gulf, at the narrowest breadth of the Isthmus, where the biennial Isthmian festival was celebrated.

[650] Xen. Agesil. ii, 18.

It was the month of April, or beginning of May, and the festival had actually begun, under the presidency of the Corinthians from the city who were in alliance with Argos; a body of Argeians being present as guards.[651] But on the approach of Agesilaus, they immediately retired to the city by the road to Kenchreæ, leaving their sacrifices half-finished. Not thinking fit to disturb their retreat, Agesilaus proceeded first to offer sacrifice himself, and then took a position close at hand, in the sacred ground of Poseidon, while the Corinthian exiles went through the solemnities in due form, and distributed the parsley wreaths to the victors. After remaining three days, Agesilaus marched away to attack Peiræum. He had no sooner departed, than the Corinthians from the city came forth, celebrated the festival and distributed the wreaths a second time.

[651] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 1; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 21.

Xenophon, who writes his history in the style and language of
a partisan, says that “_the Argeians_ celebrated the festival,
Corinth having now become Argos.” But it seems plain that the
truth was as I have stated in the text,—and that the Argeians
stood by (with others of the confederates probably also) to
protect the Corinthians of the city in the exercise of their
usual privilege; just as Agesilaus, immediately afterwards, stood
by to protect the Corinthian exiles while they were doing the
same thing.

The Isthmian games were _trietêric_, that is, celebrated in every
alternate year; in one of the spring months, about April or
perhaps the beginning of May (the Greek months being lunar, no
one of them would coincide regularly with any one of our calendar
months, year after year); and in the _second_ and _fourth_
Olympic years. From Thucydides, viii, 9, 10, we know that this
festival was celebrated in April 412 B.C.; that is, towards
the end of the _fourth_ year of Olympiad 91, about two or three
months before the festival of Olympiad 92.

Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi, 2, just cited), Corsini, (Diss.
Agonistic. iv, 3), and Schneider in his note to this passage of
Xenophon,—all state the Isthmian games to have been celebrated
in the _first_ and _third_ Olympic years; which is, in my
judgment, a mistake. Dodwell erroneously states the Isthmian
games mentioned in Thucydides, viii, 9, to have been celebrated
at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter
of the fourth year of Olympiad 91; a mistake pointed out by
Krüger (_ad loc._) as well as by Poppo and Dr. Arnold; although
the argumentation of the latter, founded upon the time of the
Lacedæmonian festival of the Hyakinthia, is extremely uncertain.
It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian
games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games
(Annal. Xenoph. ad ann. 392).