Chapter IV: The Struggle for the Hudson (1)

BY GEORGE W. CULLUM,

_Major-General United States Army._

WHEN, in March, 1776, the British evacuated Boston, Washington felt assured that New York, already threatened, would be their objective point, not only on account of its commercial and strategical importance, but because it was the great arsenal of America. He therefore, as soon as practicable, concentrated in and about it his whole disposable force, and pushed forward the defences of the city and of its vicinity, already planned and partly executed by General Lee. Until the arrival of Washington, April 13, 1776, General Putnam commanded at New York, and General Greene, with a considerable body of troops, took charge of the incomplete intrenchments of Brooklyn, extending from the Wallabout (the present Navy Yard) to Gowanus Cove on New York Bay. These were now strengthened by four redoubts armed with twenty pieces of artillery, and by a strong interior keep mounting seven guns. These Brooklyn Heights, from their proximity and command of New York, were considered the key of the defence of this valuable city.

Fort George, with several redoubts and batteries, guarded the southern end of Manhattan Island, while the fortified hills overlooking Kingsbridge protected its northern extremity. On Red and Paulus Hooks, and at various points along the shores of the East and Hudson rivers, were erected earthworks, and a strong redoubt was built upon Governor's Island. Between the latter and the "Battery", hulks were sunk to obstruct the main channel. Notwithstanding all these defences, Manhattan Island, as events proved, was assailable at many points.

To defend these works, scattered over more than twenty miles, Washington had an army of only 17,225 men, of whom 6,711 were sick, on furlough, or detached, leaving but 10,514 present for duty. Most of these were militia, badly clothed, imperfectly armed, without discipline or military experience, and their artillery was old and of various patterns and calibres.

There had been dispatched from England a powerful fleet under Lord Howe, convoying a large body of troops to reinforce those already in America. The army of General William Howe (brother of the Admiral) on Staten Island in August (including some 8,600 German hirelings) numbered, as stated by General Clinton, 31,625 rank and file, of whom 24,464 were well-appointed, disciplined soldiers, fit for duty and equal to any in Europe.

The struggle for the Hudson, by the coöperation of the army of Canada with Howe, was now about to begin; but Washington was at his wits' end to foresee the particular point upon which the blow would fall. Hence he was obliged to retain the greater part of his troops in New York to defend the city, holding them ready, however, to support any point in the vicinity whether assailed by the enemy's large fleet or by their powerful army.

From a plate in the _New York Magazine_, June, 1790, when the house, then owned by Mrs. Jephson, was occupied by John Adams, as Vice-President of the United States. It was at one time the home of Aaron Burr. See Parton's _Burr_, i. 81.

Washington's first headquarters in New York were probably at a house, 180 Pearl St., opposite Cedar St., sometimes called the house of Gov. Geo. Clinton, of which a view is given in Valentine's _Manual_, 1854, p. 446, and in Lossing's _Mary and Martha Washington_ (N. Y., 1886), p. 153. He is also supposed by some to have occupied for a short interval the Kennedy mansion, No. 1 Broadway, known to have been used certainly by Col. Knox as artillery headquarters, of which a view is given in Irving's _Washington_, illus. ed. ii. 211, and in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 495. (Cf. Drake's _Knox_; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 594; Johnston's _Campaign of 1776_, p. 86.) In June, if not earlier, he removed to the Mortier House on Richmond Hill, and remained there till September, when he transferred his headquarters first to the Apthorp House (view in _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, 1885, p. 227), still standing at the corner of Ninth Avenue and Ninety-first Street, and next to the Morris House at Harlem.—ED.]

On the morning of August 22, 1776, General Howe, under cover of the guns of the British ships, without mishap, delay, or opposition, debarked, as stated by Admiral Howe, about 15,000 men, with artillery, baggage, and stores, on Long Island, in the vicinity of the Narrows; and on the 25th, General de Heister's German division was landed at Gravesend Cove. This invading force of "upwards of 20,000 rank and file", well armed and with forty cannon, promptly occupied a line extending from the Narrows, through Gravesend, to Flatlands, and made ready for an immediate advance through the passes of the long range of densely wooded hills running eastwardly from the Narrows to Jamaica, about two and a half miles in front of Brooklyn. To oppose this large force of regular troops, the Americans had not quite 8,000 men, most of whom were raw militia, and of these about one half were outside of the defences of Brooklyn, ready to participate in the impending battle.

From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, Lond., 1785, vol. ii.—ED.]

The most direct route from the British landing-place to the Brooklyn intrenchments was by the road running nearly parallel to the bay, and passing through a gorge just back of the Red Lion Tavern, where Martense Lane joins the usual thoroughfare at the edge of Greenwood Cemetery. A second road led from Flatbush directly through the pass defended by General Sullivan's intrenchments. The third was by the road from Flatbush to Bedford. Finally, the fourth, extending to Flushing, intersected the Bedford and Jamaica road at the pass between the present Evergreen and Cypress Cemeteries, about three miles east of Bedford, or about ten miles from the Narrows.

From the upper part of an engraving of full length in _An Impartial Hist. of the War in America_, Lond., 1780, p. 204. Smith in his _Brit. Mez. Portraits_ records a print, standing posture, sash and star, right elbow on block, left hand on hip, marked "Corbutt delin't et fecit. Lond. 10 Nov. 1777."—ED.]

When the British landed on the 22d, Colonel Hand's regiment was deployed to oppose them, but the enemy proving to be in too great force, Hand fell back to Prospect Hill and thence to Flatbush, burning property which would be of immediate use to the foe; but he did not at once apprise the commanding general of the real character of the British movement. So soon, however, as Washington heard of the landing, he dispatched six regiments to reinforce the garrison of Brooklyn Heights, and ordered additional forces to be in readiness to cross the East River from Manhattan Island, if Howe's movement did not prove to be a feint to cover a real attack upon New York. General Greene, unfortunately, was too sick to retain the active command on Long Island, every point of which, between Hell Gate and the Narrows, he had carefully studied. He was succeeded, August 20th, by General Sullivan, a far inferior officer. As Washington said of him, he was "active, spirited, and zealously attached to the cause", but was tinctured with "vanity, which now and then led him into embarrassments;" besides which he lacked "experience to move on a large scale", as he had just shown in Canada. On the 24th of August, Washington placed Putnam in command over Sullivan. Putnam was a brave soldier, but wholly ignorant of the science of war, besides being advanced in years. He was entirely unacquainted with the arrangements which had been made for the defence of his position, and he never went beyond the Brooklyn Heights intrenchments on the day of the battle. The truth is, no one exercised a general command in that conflict.

De Heister's division, constituting the enemy's centre, occupied Flatbush August 26th, threatening the pass in front, which Sullivan held with a large force under cover of intrenchments. During the evening, Cornwallis withdrew from Flatbush to Flatlands, there becoming the reserve of the British right, which was composed of choice regiments under General Clinton, aided by Lord Percy and accompanied by the commander-in-chief.

The British plan of attack would have been very hazardous in the presence of an enterprising enemy; but against undisciplined troops, small in numbers and without skilful leadership, it proved a brilliant success. The right, under Clinton, by a night march was to seize the Cypress Hill pass, and then move down the Jamaica road towards Bedford to get in the rear of Sullivan's left. To divert the attention of the Americans from this stealthy march, General Grant was to menace their right, towards Gravesend, before daybreak, and De Heister at the same time was to cannonade the American centre under Colonel Hand. These attacks were not, however, to be pressed till General Clinton's guns were heard in the rear of Sullivan, when the Americans were to be assailed with the utmost vigor from all quarters. Besides these land operations a squadron of five ships, under Sir Peter Parker, was to menace New York and keep up a cannonade against Governor's Island and the right flank of the American defences.

Sir Henry Clinton, the principal actor in this contest, with his heavy column and its artillery, guided by a Tory farmer, at nine in the evening of the 26th, moved silently forward from Flatlands through New Lots (now East New York), having successfully crossed Shoemaker's narrow causeway over a long marsh. At three on the morning of the 27th, Clinton arrived within half a mile of the pass he was to force, being followed and joined before daybreak by the main body under Lord Percy. Soon after daylight a small American patrol was captured and the unguarded pass occupied. Thus the whole right wing of the enemy, after partaking of refreshments, was marching unopposed directly to Brooklyn Heights. The battle, by this bold and lucky manœuvre, was in this way virtually gained before any real struggle had begun.

General Grant, on the enemy's left, with two brigades and a regiment, two companies of Tories and ten pieces of artillery, in the mean time advanced along the bay road against the flying Americans, and, at daybreak of the 27th, got through the pass in the hills and was marching on the Brooklyn lines. General Parsons, in command of the American outpost on the right, succeeded in rallying some of the fugitives and posting them advantageously on a hill until the arrival of Lord Stirling, who, with 1,500 choice Continental troops, had been sent by Putnam on learning the condition of affairs. For some hours Grant amused Stirling by slight skirmishes about Battle Hill (now in Greenwood Cemetery), till Clinton had reached his destined goal, when Grant, with quadruple forces, pushed forward to grapple in a death-struggle with his gallant foe. At the same time De Heister, who had slept upon his arms during the night at Flatbush, as soon as he heard Clinton's signal guns, sent Count Donop to storm the redoubt which protected Sullivan and defended the pass through the hills, while he himself pressed forward with the main body of the Hessians. Sullivan, hemmed in on all sides, ordered a retreat to the Brooklyn lines, but it was too late, as he was already ensnared in the prepared net, and before long all was a scene of confusion, consternation, and slaughter. Some of the Americans, after fighting desperately, broke through the enemy's line, but a large number were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Washington, from Brooklyn, witnessed this sad catastrophe, but was powerless to prevent it.

Stirling in like manner, met by the force under Cornwallis, which had been detached from Clinton's column, was nearly surrounded, having no chance for escape except across Gowanus Creek, in which the tide was fast rising. After a terrible conflict of twenty minutes, the mass of Stirling's command succeeded in passing the muddy stream, but the general and some of his bravest companions were compelled to surrender to superior numbers. Washington wrung his hands in agony at the sight of such disaster. "Good God", he cried, "what brave fellows I must this day lose!"

After a photograph of a portrait in a family brooch, attested by H. S. Watts, Oct. 8, 1879 (in Harvard College library, given by Professor C. E. Norton). There is a picture, taken at a later day, engraved in Duer's _Life of Stirling._—ED.]

By two o'clock in the afternoon, this battle, or rather this series of skirmishes between forces very unequal in numbers, quality, and skill, was terminated by the retreat of the remnant of Americans which had escaped capture. Howe stated his loss at 367 killed, wounded, and missing; and he estimated that of the Americans at 3,300, though probably it did not exceed one half of that number, of whom 1,076, including Generals Stirling, Sullivan, and Woodhull (captured at Jamaica on the next day), were made prisoners.

Fortunately the victor, instead of pressing his advantage and at once assaulting the Brooklyn intrenchments, which covered the demoralized troops, waited till the next day, when he broke ground as for a regular siege, and began cannonading the American works. "By such ill-timed caution", says Lord Mahon, "arising probably from an overestimate of the insurgents' force, the English general flung away the fairest opportunity of utterly destroying or capturing the flower of the American army;" yet such was the joy of the British government over this cheap success that General Howe was knighted for a victory over inexperienced troops one fifth his own numbers.

Washington, promptly profiting by the over-caution of his antagonist, strengthened his position, and conceived the masterly measures for his retreat from Long Island. Without the knowledge of Howe, availing himself of a dense fog and rain, and favored by a fair wind, he safely crossed the East River with all his troops, stores, and artillery, except a few heavy pieces which the mud prevented him from moving. The army reached New York on the morning of the 30th, Washington leaving in the last boat after having been forty-eight hours almost continuously in the saddle without once closing his eyes. "Whoever", says Botta, "will attend to all the details of this retreat will easily believe that no military operation was ever conducted by great captains with more ability and prudence, or under more unfavorable auspices."

Though the British general had gained a decided success, he was as far as ever from the object of his campaign—the capture of New York. The victors and the vanquished now confronted each other from opposite sides of a stream half a mile broad, each making ready for a decisive effort. Howe possessed a large, veteran, and disciplined European army, while Washington's troops, for the most part, were a demoralized assemblage of heterogeneous organizations, not much superior to an armed mob.

"Our situation", writes Washington to the President of Congress, "is truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in order to repair our losses, are discouraged, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off: in some instances almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time. This circumstance of itself, independently of others, when fronted by a well-appointed enemy superior in numbers to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when their example has infected another part of the army, when their want of discipline and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government have produced a like conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well-doing of an army, and which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit of, our condition becomes more alarming; and, with the deepest concern, I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops.

"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia, or other troops, than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean, one to exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every emergency far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which, when effected, are not attended with any good consequences. Men who have been free and subject to no control cannot be reduced to order in an instant; and the privileges and exemptions, which they claim and will have, influence the conduct of others; and the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity, and confusion they occasion."

Three weeks later, he again writes: "It becomes evident to me, then, that, as this contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have good officers, there are no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage; and till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise, you have little to expect from them.... But while the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raise men, while these men consider and treat him as an equal, and in the character of an officer regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no order nor discipline can prevail; nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination. To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff.... To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year; and unhappily for us and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been laboring to establish in the army under my immediate command is in a manner done away with by having such a mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months....

"The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one are remote, and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter."

The defeat of the American army on Long Island, a heavy blow to the patriot cause, suggested a desperate remedy to the mind of Washington,—no less a measure than the deliberate destruction of the great commercial city of New York. "Till of late", he writes to the President of Congress, "I had no doubt in my own mind of defending this place; nor should I have yet if the men would do their duty, but this I despair of.... If we should be obliged to abandon the town, ought it to stand as winter-quarters for the enemy? They would derive great conveniences from it on the one hand, and much property would be destroyed on the other.... At present I dare say the enemy mean to preserve it if they can. If Congress, therefore, should resolve upon the destruction of it, the resolution should be a profound secret, as the knowledge of it will make a capital change in their plans." General Greene, John Jay, and many others of note were of the same opinion. Congress decided otherwise, and Howe forbore to bombard it from Brooklyn Heights and Governor's Island, both belligerents deeming its possession of far greater service to either than its destruction.

As New York was not to be destroyed, it became a serious question how a city swarming with Tories was to be defended with less than twenty thousand militia against a powerful army. Washington, Greene, Putnam, and others were opposed to the attempt, but were overruled by a council of war. The question was finally left by Congress to the commander-in-chief, who, deeming the city untenable, made preparations, September 10th, for its speedy evacuation, which was concurred in, two days later, by a new council of war. This determination was timely, as the Americans were about to be driven out.

Howe, anticipating Washington's design, determined to prevent the execution of it by the same manœuvre he had tried so successfully on Long Island,—that was to threaten the city's front and right flank by the fleet, while his army, assembled about the present site of Astoria, should cross the East River, turn Washington's left flank, cut off his communications with the mainland, oblige him to fight on the enemy's terms, and force him to surrender at discretion, or by a brilliant stroke break the American army in pieces, and secure their arms and stores.

On the evening of September 14th Howe began his crossing of the East River by taking possession of Montressor (Randall's) Island, and the next morning he sent three ships up the Hudson as high as Bloomingdale, which stopped any further evacuation of the city by water. Soon after, under the fire of ten vessels-of-war, the main British force, under Sir Henry Clinton, embarked upon flatboats, barges, and galleys, at the mouth of Newtown Creek, and by the favoring tide was carried to Kip's Bay (34th Street), where they disembarked and quickly put to rout the panic-stricken American militia, and pursued the fugitives in disorderly flight over the fields to Murray Hill.

So soon as Washington heard the enemy's cannonade he rode with all speed to the front, and used every exertion to rally the runaways; but his efforts, though seconded by the officers in immediate command, were utterly futile. Mortified and in despair at such poltroonery, the commander-in-chief almost lost control of himself, and, says General Greene, "sought death rather than life" at the hands of the enemy.

Unopposed, the British marched to the Incleberg on Murray Hill and encamped, while the Americans retreated to Harlem Heights. Putnam, at the sacrifice of baggage and stores, and of most of his heavy artillery, by taking the river road, barely escaped with the troops remaining in the city. Howe was in close pursuit of this rear-guard of about four thousand men, but unexpectedly stopped for nearly two hours at the residence of Mrs. Murray[721] to enjoy her old Madeira, so that, in the language of the times, "Mrs. Murray saved the American army."

This was the house of Col. Roger Morris, and at a later day the residence of Madam Jumel. It follows a drawing in Valentine's _N. Y. City Manual_, 1854, p. 362. Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 816; Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 505; and for a view of the hall, _Harper's Magazine_, lii. 640. Its position was east of Tenth Avenue, near One Hundred and Sixtieth Street.—ED.]

The British, on September 15, 1776, took possession of New York with a large detachment under General Robertson; while Howe with the main body of the army encamped on the outskirts of the city. The northern line of their camp extended from Horen's Hook on the East River to Bloomingdale on the Hudson, which line was fortified with field-works and protected on the flanks by vessels-of-war. Behind this line lay their disciplined army of twenty-five thousand British and Germans.

Washington took position in their front, and for the protection of his army of about fourteen thousand fit for duty he fortified Harlem Heights with a triple line of intrenchments extending across Manhattan Island. Immediately after securing his position, Washington, to arouse some military ardor in his discomfited militia, formed the design of cutting off some of the enemy's light troops, who, encouraged by their recent successes, had advanced to the extremity of the high ground opposite to the American camp. To effect this object, Colonel Knowlton, of Bunker Hill fame, and Major Leitch were detached with parties of rangers and riflemen to get in their rear, while Washington diverted their attention by a feigned direct attack. By some mistake, the fire was begun on the front instead of upon their flank and rear, by which the enemy, though defeated, secured their escape to their main body. This successful skirmish, called the battle of Harlem Plains, was purchased by the loss of the brave Knowlton and Leitch, both of whom were mortally wounded.

The British rejoicings upon the occupation of their snug winter-quarters in New York were suddenly interrupted, early on the morning of September 21st, by the breaking out of flames from a low groggery near Whitehall Slip, which, for want of proper fire apparatus to check them, spread rapidly over one fourth of the city, consuming five hundred buildings, including the Lutheran and Trinity churches. Whether this was the work of incendiaries is not positively known. Congress and the city's inhabitants had strenuously opposed such an act, though it was strongly recommended as a military necessity by Washington and by others of high rank and position.

While Howe "continued at gaze" awaiting coming events, Washington continued to strengthen his position on Harlem Heights, and established alarm posts on the east side of Harlem River as far as Throg's Neck on the Sound, to insure surveillance of the whole field of operations.

The Harlem lines being too strong for a front attack, Howe, after leaving a sufficient force under Lord Percy to watch them and guard the city, embarked, October 12th, his main army on ninety flatboats, to execute by his favorite manœuvre the turning of these obstacles and of Washington's left flank. His object was to cut off Washington's retreat and shut him up on Manhattan Island, the only exit from which was by Kingsbridge. Adverse winds so delayed the British general that he only passed Hell Gate on the afternoon of the 14th, and the fleet did not reach Throg's Neck till nightfall. Here Howe had previously landed his advance-guard, but Washington had anticipated him by occupying, on the 12th, the passes leading to the mainland.

The enemy's design being now fully developed, it was decided in a council of war, held in the American camp on the 16th, to leave Harlem Heights, no longer tenable, and to evacuate the whole of Manhattan Island except Fort Washington, which General Greene deemed impregnable and of great value for future operations. Accordingly, the American army formed a series of intrenched camps on the hills skirting the right bank of the swollen Bronx, and extending thirteen miles, from Fordham Heights to White Plains, and protected from the enemy by the river in front.

After waiting five days for supplies, Howe, on the 18th, left Throg's Neck, debarked again on Pell's Point, and on the march northward encountered Glover's brigade well posted behind stone fences. After a hot skirmish Glover slowly fell back, while the enemy advanced to the heights of New Rochelle. Here the British encamped till the 22d, when they were joined by the second division of Hessians under General Knyphausen. This delay gave Washington ample time to strengthen himself at White Plains, where he held a strong and important strategic position commanding the roads leading up the Hudson and to New England.

On the morning of the 28th of October the opposing armies, each about thirteen thousand strong, confronted each other. Washington's intrenchments, partly a double line, occupied the hilly ground within the village of White Plains, the left resting upon a mill-pond and the right on a bend of the Bronx, which protected its flank and rear. Across the Bronx rose Chatterton's Hill, presenting a steep rocky front to the enemy, but it was not fortified.

Howe, believing he was now to fight the decisive battle of the war, moved up in two heavy columns, Clinton commanding the one on the right and De Heister that on the left. They seemed at first as if intending to attack in front; but they soon filed off to the left, extending their line to the front of Chatterton's Hill. Here the main body halted, while a column four thousand strong proceeded to cross the Bronx and storm the hill under cover of the fire of twenty pieces of artillery. General McDougall with fifteen hundred Continentals and militia, and Captain Alexander Hamilton with two pieces of artillery, immediately arrayed themselves on the rocky brow of the hill for its defence. As the main British body, under General Leslie, clambered up the steep acclivity it was met by a withering fire from the infantry and artillery, from which it recoiled and sought shelter. A second assault up the slope met with an equally determined resistance, and for some time the enemy was held in check. Rahl, with two regiments that had forded the Bronx a quarter of a mile below, now appeared on the American right, and drove the militia from their post. This break compelled McDougall, exposed to a heavy fire in front and flank, to retreat across the Bronx to White Plains, though with his six hundred Continentals he maintained an obstinate conflict for an hour, and carried off all his wounded and artillery. The American loss in the engagement was 30 prisoners and 130 killed and wounded, while their opponents' losses were 231.

Howe contemplated an assault, the next morning, upon the American camp, but was deterred by the apparent strength of the lines. These had been built hastily, as General Heath says, of _corn-stalks_, the tops being turned inwards, and the roots with the adhering earth outwards. The British army, strongly reinforced by the arrival of Lord Percy on the 30th, designed attacking the American works on the following day, but a storm delayed their operations, and gave Washington time to withdraw his forces to the heights of New Castle, where he erected strong defences. In the meanwhile Knyphausen had been ordered to move from New Rochelle to Kingsbridge, where he encamped on November 2d, the Americans retiring to Fort Washington on his approach. Howe in person suddenly left White Plains on the night of the 5th for Dobbs's Ferry, to which his army was already moving. "The design of this manœuvre", wrote Washington on the 6th to the President of Congress, "is a matter of much conjecture and speculation, and cannot be accounted for with any degree of certainty." A council of war which met that day evidently inferred that it threatened a movement across or up the Hudson, for it was unanimously agreed immediately to throw a body of troops into New Jersey, and station three thousand at Peekskill to guard the Highlands. Howe really contemplated a far different move—the capture of Fort Washington.

Why Sir William did not again attack Washington, and why he changed his whole plan, is now well understood to be due to the treason of William Demont, the adjutant of Colonel Magaw, in command of Fort Washington. This man, on the 2d of November, undiscovered, passed into the British camp, and placed in the hands of Lord Percy complete plans of the defences of Mount Washington and a statement of their armament and garrisons. This detailed information was immediately sent, with its author, to Howe, and must have reached him a day or two before his sudden departure from White Plains. The conclusive evidence of this treason is furnished by the culprit himself in his letter,[722] dated London, January 16, 1792, to the Rev. Dr. Peters, of the Church of England, which was first published by Mr. E. F. DeLancey, in the _Magazine of American History_ (Feb., 1877).

Fort Washington, built by Colonel Rufus Putnam soon after the evacuation of Boston, occupied the highest ground at the northern end of Manhattan Island. It was a pentagonal bastioned earthwork without a keep, having a feeble profile and scarcely any ditch. In its vicinity were batteries, redoubts, and intrenched lines. These various field fortifications, of which Fort Washington may be considered the citadel, extended north and south over two and a half miles, and had a circuit of six miles. The three intrenched lines of Harlem Heights, crossing the island, were to the south; Laurel Hill, with Fort George at its northern extremity, lay to the east; upon the River Ridge, near Tubby Hook, was Fort Tryon, and close to Spuyten Duyvel Creek were some slight works known as "Cork Hill Fort;" and across the creek, on Tetard's Hill, was Fort Independence. The main communication with these various works was the old Albany road, crossing Harlem River at Kingsbridge. This road was obstructed by three lines of abatis, extending from Laurel Hill to the River Ridge.

Fort Washington mounted not more than eighteen guns _en barbette_, of various calibres, from nines to thirty-twos. The garrison of all the various works was less than 3,000 men, mostly Pennsylvanians, who were commanded by Colonel Magaw, an officer of but little military experience. The ground about the fort was well suited for defence, and the works not only protected the upper part of Manhattan Island, but in conjunction with Fort Lee, on the palisades opposite, commanded the Hudson. However, from their too elevated positions and distance from each other, these two works, on the opposite sides of the river, with their feeble armament, proved insufficient, even with a partially constructed barrier of sunken hulks, to prevent the passage of the British vessels-of-war.

As these forts did not close the river, Washington did not deem it expedient to weaken his force, which was necessary to him for field operations, by leaving a large garrison on an island essentially in the hands of the enemy. To the opinion of General Greene, in general command of these works, and in deference to the expressed wishes of Congress to hold them at any cost, Washington yielded his better judgment. His modesty and sense of imperfect knowledge of the science and practice of war led him, as it did on several occasions, to defer too much to others, and though he did not think it "prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington", he left it discretionary with Greene to give the necessary orders for its evacuation.

Howe, November 15th, demanded the surrender of Fort Washington, stating that, if he were compelled to take it by assault, the garrison would be put to the sword. Magaw replied that to propose such an alternative was unworthy of a British officer, and that, for himself, he should defend the fort to the last extremity.

On the 15th Washington started across the river from Fort Lee, to which he had come, to determine the condition of the garrison at Fort Washington. He says, "I had partly crossed the North River when I met General Putnam and General Greene, who were just returning from thence, and they informed me that the troops were in high spirits and would make a good defence, and, it being late at night, I returned."

Magaw, awaiting the enemy's attack, made a judicious disposition of his forces to defend Fort Washington and the various intrenchments in its vicinity. Colonel Rawlings took command of Fort Tryon and the northern end of the River Ridge, with an outpost at Cork Hill Fort; Colonel Baxter held Fort George and the summit of Laurel Hill; Colonel Cadwallader occupied the Harlem Lines; while Magaw, at his central position of Fort Washington, directed the whole.

Howe's attack upon Fort Washington was skilfully planned and admirably executed. A vessel-of-war, the "Pearl", took up a position in the Hudson to protect the contemplated movement of the Hessian troops and enfilade the northern outworks of Fort Washington; while thirty flatboats were in the Harlem River for ferrying troops,—these boats having eluded the vigilance of the American sentries on the night of the 14th, when passing up the Hudson and through Spuyten Duyvel Creek.

On the morning of the 16th, under a furious cannonade from the heights on the east bank of the Harlem, three distinct assaults were ordered to be made upon the American defences, besides a fourth movement, which, though designed as a feint, became a real attack at the critical moment. The _first_ British column, under General Knyphausen, moved down from Kingsbridge, and with him were Rahl's Germans marching close to the Hudson; the _second_, under General Matthews, supported by Lord Cornwallis, crossed the Harlem and moved upon Fort George and the northern end of Laurel Hill; the _third_, or feint, under Lieut.-Col. Stirling, floated down the Harlem to threaten the southerly part of Laurel Hill; while the _fourth_, of British and Hessians, led by Earl Percy and accompanied by Howe, moved from Harlem Plain upon the triple lines of Harlem Heights.

The latter column, advancing from the south, began the attack upon the outer or southernmost American line, where Cadwallader, unable to check Lord Percy's superior forces, fell back to his stronger middle line. Howe then ordered Stirling to land from the Harlem and clamber up the steep slope of Laurel Hill to threaten the rear of Cadwallader. The latter sent a detachment, as did also Colonel Magaw, to oppose Stirling's landing, without avail. Matthews at the same time debarked his column and attacked the Americans on Laurel Hill, where Baxter was killed. The united forces of Matthews and Stirling overcame all opposition and took 170 prisoners. Baxter's force was compelled, as was also Cadwallader, when pressed by Percy, to seek refuge in Fort Washington. About noon the Hessian column from the north was in motion. Rahl soon scattered the small guard in Cork Hill Fort and advanced upon Fort Tryon, crowding Rawlings by superior force nearly back to Fort Washington, when, being joined by Knyphausen, who had made his way over wooded and difficult ground and across abatis, the reunited German columns bore down all opposition. The Americans at this point also, after a spirited resistance, were compelled to take refuge in Fort Washington, which, now overcrowded and exposed to the deadly concentric fire of the enemy, left Magaw no alternative but surrender. He asked for a parley of four hours, but he was allowed only half an hour. In the end he capitulated, upon honorable terms, to General Knyphausen, to whom the glory of the day belonged. Magaw had received a promise from Washington to attempt to bring off the troops if he would hold out till night, which Magaw deemed impossible, with troops huddled together and exposed to destruction from the enemy's near circle of fire. This capture cost the enemy nearly 500 men in killed and wounded. The American loss was 150 killed and wounded, 2,634 taken prisoners (including many of their best troops), 43 pieces of artillery of from three to thirty-two pounds calibre, a large number of small arms, and much ammunition and stores. The whole of Manhattan Island thus passed into British hands.

Immediately after the capture of Fort Washington, Sir William Howe crossed with his army into New Jersey, it being too late for any coöperation with the Northern army under General Carleton, who had already retreated from Crown Point into Canada.[723]

* * * * *

This New York campaign had been most disastrous to the American cause; yet it was far from a brilliant success for the Anglo-Hessian arms. Washington, with troops inferior in numbers, arms, organization, discipline, and experience, had outgeneralled Howe, with a superior veteran army, whenever he acted upon his own good judgment and did not yield his convictions to his subordinates, to whom most of the errors of the campaign were due.

It is doubtful whether there was any necessity whatever for the British to fight the battle of Long Island, as their fleet might have occupied the East River, as it subsequently did, and thus have caged the part of Washington's army which was on Long Island. It is true that the American batteries on Brooklyn Heights and Governor's Island might have done the fleet much damage; but if it was too dangerous to run the gauntlet of the Buttermilk Channel, four fathoms deep, it would have been an easy matter to sail around the eastern end of Long Island, and safely enter the East River from that direction.

Had the East River been occupied by the British fleet, it could, while cutting off half of our army from the defence of New York, at the same time have threatened the city front pending the transportation of the British army by water to points above the city from whence to turn either or both flanks of Manhattan Island. Washington, thus shut up, would have been compelled to fight at great disadvantage, and possibly surrender at discretion.

Even admitting that the battle of Long Island was necessary, Howe, in dividing his army into three masses, stretching over a line of more than ten miles, ran great risk of being beaten in detail had all of the American forces on the island been concentrated at a central position, ready to be thrown successively upon his isolated columns. It is true the undisciplined American forces might not have been able to cope in the open field with British and German regulars; but Howe had no right to presume their inferiority after his own experience of their good conduct at Bunker Hill and Clinton's trial at Sullivan's Island.

The American general also committed a great military blunder in leaving with raw troops the shelter of the Brooklyn intrenchments for the precarious protection of the Long Island Ridge, several important passes in which were left entirely unguarded, though Washington had ordered their careful observation.

After the retreat of the American army to New York, Howe wasted two precious weeks, during which Washington had time to organize his defence; and when the British general crossed the East River, he committed a great mistake in debarking at Kip's Bay,—a halfway measure which involved a long land march to his objective, White Plains. Washington, with great vigor, seized his advantage, and, by availing himself of his shorter interior line, arrived first at the coveted position and fortified it. Had Howe moved to this point by water immediately after the battle of Long Island, he undoubtedly would have succeeded in turning Washington's left flank, and would thus have cut off his retreat. The British general's delay of _two months_ after the battle of Long Island in moving less than thirty miles to reach White Plains was inexcusable. In a shorter period Moltke began and ended the campaign of 1866, which so humbled the great power of the Austrian empire.

When Howe decided to attack the American army at White Plains he should have thrown his entire force upon Washington's centre, and thus have won a decisive victory with his superior troops; whereas he used less than one third of his army in driving Washington's right wing from Chatterton's Hill upon his main body, which then successfully retreated before the tardy and inert British general.

Howe's good fortune in capturing Fort Washington was due more to the treason of Magaw's adjutant and to Washington's yielding to bad advice, than to any skill of the British commander.[724]

* * * * *

With the invasion of New Jersey by the Anglo-Hessian army all military operations at the mouth of the Hudson were terminated. The struggle for the control of this great river was to be transferred to its upper waters, and it was expected that the coming campaign would be so conducted as soon to force the whole power of the colonies into silence and submission.

General Gates, who was appointed the successor of Sullivan in the command of the army of Canada, was, says Horace Walpole, "the son of a housekeeper of the second Duke of Leeds." He had neither brilliant qualities nor military genius, but possessed the vanity and ambition to covet the highest position, for the attainment of which he resorted to disgraceful intrigue. When assigned to this command, in June, 1776, the army of Canada was flying to Crown Point; so, like Sancho Panza, Gates found himself a governor without a government; but, nothing abashed, he at once claimed the command of the Northern department, then under Schuyler. Congress sustained the latter, whereupon Gates took post at Ticonderoga, where the remnant of the American army had retired upon the abandonment of Crown Point, and promptly adopted vigorous measures to put the work in good condition for defence and to reinforce its garrison against any forward movement of General Carleton.

To secure control of Lake Champlain, a squadron of small vessels was ordered to be constructed at its head (Skenesborough), which, to the number of nine, mounting in all fifty-five guns, were completed by the middle of August. Arnold, in command of these and some additional galleys from Ticonderoga, moved down to the foot of the lake, and anchored his vessels across it to bar the passage of the enemy.

From _Political Magazine_ (1780), i. 743, with a memoir of Burgoyne. There are modern engravings of this likeness in Moore's _Diary of the Amer. Rev._, i. p. 513; and in Lossing's _Field Book_, i. 37.—ED.]

Carleton, as active as his adversary, had built at St. Johns a flotilla of "thirty fighting vessels." When Arnold discovered the superiority of the enemy's fleet in vessels and guns to be more than double his own, and that they were manned by picked British sailors, he fell back and formed line of battle between Valcour's Island and the western shore of the lake. In this disadvantageous position he was attacked, October 11th, by Captain Pringle, of the British navy, with thirty-eight vessels and boats, mounting 123 guns. Though the crews of Arnold's flotilla were landsmen, he maintained a desperate fight from eleven in the forenoon until dark, when, availing himself of the obscurity of a thick fog, he escaped with part of his vessels, unobserved, through the enemy's fleet; but, owing to adverse winds and his crippled condition, he was overtaken on the 13th off Split Rock, where he was again attacked. Some of his flotilla escaped and some were captured, but he himself, after fighting four hours, ran his remaining vessels ashore, set them on fire with their flags flying, and escaped with their crews through the forests to Ticonderoga. General Carleton now advanced to Crown Point, of which he took possession October 14th, and pushed a reconnoissance to within sight of Ticonderoga. When Carleton's boats appeared, Gates made an effective display of his garrison, whereupon the British general fell back to Crown Point, which he evacuated, and, it being too late for further active operations, he retired to Canada.

From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. iii. Fonblanque gives a likeness painted by Ramsay at Rome in 1750, and this is repeated in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 567. Reynolds painted him in 1766 (Fonblanque, p. 86). J. C. Smith (_Brit. Mez. Portraits_, ii. 710) records a picture by Pine. Cf. Jones's _Campaign for the Conquest of Canada_, p. 194, and the illus. ed. of Irving's _Washington_, iii.—ED.]

The enemy had scarcely departed when Schuyler applied himself with tireless assiduity to prepare against a new invasion during that winter or in the coming year. He continually pressed upon Congress and Washington the wants of his department in men and munitions of war. In every way he tried to conciliate the Indian tribes; and he lost no opportunity of gaining information of the enemy's designs and movements.

Burgoyne, after the battle of Bunker Hill, had suggested to Lord Rochefort, Secretary of State for the colonies, that, as there was "no probable prospect of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion with any force that Great Britain and Ireland could supply", there should be employed "a large army of such foreign troops as might be hired, to begin their operations up the Hudson River; another army, composed partly of old disciplined troops and partly of Canadians, to act from Canada; a large levy of Indians and a supply of arms for the blacks, to awe the Southern provinces, conjointly with detachments of regulars; and a numerous fleet to sweep the whole coast,—might possibly do the business in one campaign."

The importance of securing the control of the Hudson, thereby to separate the New England from the Middle and Southern States, was eminently correct; but the proposed mode of accomplishing it was, as the sequel proved, entirely wrong.

Burgoyne, like many other Englishmen, had held American prowess in contempt, and ridiculed the enrolment of provincials as "a preposterous parade of military arrangement." His later experience probably changed his views, for when he had supplanted that noble soldier Sir Guy Carleton in the command of the British army in Canada, through "family support" more than from "military merit", he took good care to secure a strong and veteran force, commanded by officers of noted skill and long experience.

Burgoyne's army, which took the field in July, 1777, had a total, rank and file, of 7,902, of which 4,135 were British, 3,116 Germans, 148 Canadian militia, and 503 Indians. The artillery corps and train were of the most serviceable character, "probably the finest and most excellently supplied as to officers and private men that had ever been allotted to second the operations of any army."

The commander-in-chief was a polished gentleman, a popular dramatist, an effective speaker, a useful member of Parliament, and a gallant officer who had won laurels in Portugal; Major-General Phillips, the second in command, was a distinguished artillerist who had earned a high reputation in Germany; Major-General Riedesel had been selected because of his long experience, especially in the Seven Years' War; Brigadier-General Fraser, who commanded the light brigade, was a knightly soldier, ambitious of glory, who had seen much service in America; Hamilton and Powel, who commanded brigades, had been twenty years on active duty; Lord Balcarras and Major Acland, commanding respectively the light infantry and grenadiers, were soldiers of high professional attainments; La Corne St. Luc, the commander of the Indians, had been an active partisan of the French in Canada wars, and "was notorious for brutal inhumanity;" and the many staff and regimental officers were already men of mark, or subsequently rose to high positions.

With such a thoroughly disciplined and well-appointed army, Burgoyne fondly anticipated making a triumphal march of two hundred miles to Albany, there to meet St. Leger descending the Mohawk, and Howe ascending the Hudson, and thus by combined movements to dismember the thirteen United States. This march of the Northern army seemed not arduous, as most of Burgoyne's way was by water through the Sorel, Lake Champlain, and the upper Hudson; but he had taken little account of the extraordinary physical difficulties he was doomed to encounter, and the hostility of the inhabitants along much of his route.

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the present War_, i. 190.—ED.]

Another embarrassment greatly marred the British plans. Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the colonies, had given Burgoyne positive orders for his march to Albany, from which he was not to deviate; while Howe was left, through a piece of criminal negligence,[725] without any imperative instructions to coöperate with the army in Canada; besides which, it was almost impossible to arrange any concerted action between forces separated by four hundred miles of hostile country.

Burgoyne, however, like a true soldier, determined to obey orders, though it might break empires. Consequently, on June 13th, at St. Johns, the standard of England was hoisted on board the "Radeau", and saluted by all the rest of the shipping and forts, thus announcing the beginning of this eventful and important campaign.

On the 20th, Burgoyne issued, with seeming royal prerogative, a bombastic proclamation, commending the justice and clemency of the king, who had directed "that Indians be employed;" denouncing the obstinacy of Americans as "wilful outcasts;" threatening the terrors of savage warfare of the "thousands of Indians" under his command, "to overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain;" and, "in consciousness of Christianity and the honor of soldiership", warned all of his opposers that "the messengers of justice and wrath await them on the field, and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must occasion."[726]

Burgoyne, after delivering himself of this pronunciamiento of loving-kindness towards his American erring brothers, and setting forth the sweet humanity of his dusky allies, who "had sharpened their affections upon their hatchets", proceeded up Lake Champlain, pioneered by these children of the forest in their birch canoes, the fleet and army following, with music and banners, as if engaged in a splendid regatta.

While Burgoyne with the main army was moving south, Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger, in conformity with instructions from the British cabinet, with a detachment of about 1,000 men (English regulars, provincials, and Indians), was rapidly advancing west to Fort Stanwix, by the St. Lawrence and Lakes Ontario and Oneida. After reducing this post and subjugating the patriots of the Mohawk valley, he was ordered to join his chief at or near Albany.