Chapter IV: The Struggle for the Hudson (2)

Burgoyne's formidable invading force of 7,863 men, with 42 pieces of artillery, which reached Crown Point June 27th, advanced thence, July 1st, in battle array: the right wing of British troops under General Phillips, upon Fort Ticonderoga on the west bank of the lake; the left wing of Germans under General Riedesel, upon Fort Independence on the east bank; and the floating batteries in line across the lake. Burgoyne had announced in orders: "This army must not retreat."

General Schuyler had recently visited Forts Ticonderoga and Independence, where, instead of a garrison of 5,000 men, he found only 2,546 half-armed and poorly provided Continental troops and 900 raw militia, "many of them mere boys, and one third of the whole force unfit for duty." He noted, with serious forebodings, the unfitness of the works to resist attack, a state to which lack of workmen and the neglect of Gates had brought them. The reduction of this stronghold was indispensable to Burgoyne's progress, not only as insuring his communications with Canada, but because of the danger of leaving such a force in his rear.

In an endeavor to strengthen these fortifications, of which General St. Clair had recently taken command, the works had been too much extended, and the key-points—Mount Hope, commanding Fort Ticonderoga, and Mount Defiance, a supposed inaccessible eminence at the confluence of the waters of Lakes George and Champlain—had not been occupied; consequently, they were seized by the British and artillery was planted upon them.

St. Clair, no favorite of fortune, finding himself nearly invested on the 5th, and exposed to a plunging fire from these heights, which he could not return, wisely determined to evacuate all his works that night, under pretence of making a sortie. As soon as it was dark enough, the women and wounded, together with some ammunition and stores, were placed upon 200 bateaux, which were to be escorted to Skenesborough by five armed galleys and a guard of 600 men, all under the command of Colonel Long. In thus abandoning Ticonderoga, St. Clair justified himself, saying that "we had lost a post, but saved a province."

St. Clair, leaving his heavy artillery and many supplies behind, with the garrison of Fort Ticonderoga passed undisturbed, at midnight, over the floating bridge across the lake. On the southern side the troops from Fort Independence joined him, and all were safely escaping, when, without orders, General De Fermois's headquarters were fired, the blaze of which disclosed the retreat to the enemy. The alarm was at once given, and the deserted forts were seized by the British. General Fraser was in pursuit at daylight of the 6th, followed soon after by General Riedesel with the German grenadiers.

From a photograph of a miniature furnished by Mr. F. D. Stone. It was painted near the close of the war. Daniel Goodwin, Jr., _Provincial Pictures_, p. 72, says there is another miniature on ivory, owned by Miss Mary R. Sheets, of Indianapolis.

A likeness by C. W. Peale hangs in Independence Hall in Philadelphia. It was drawn by J. B. Longacre, and engraved by E. Wellmore. It represents him at the time he was governor of the Northwest Territory. Cf. _St. Clair Papers_; Goodwin's _Provincial Pictures_, p.72. There is also a pencil sketch by John Trumbull given in the _St. Clair Papers_, and in the illustrated edition of Irving's _Washington_. Cf. 2 _Penna. Archives_, vol. x.; Lossing's _Field-Book_, i. 132. A view of his home is given in Egle's _Pennsylvania_, p. 1156.—ED.]

Meanwhile, Burgoyne and Phillips, in the fleet, broke through the boom and bridge across the lake, in chase of Colonel Long and the American flotilla, which, on the afternoon of the 7th, was overtaken and attacked at the wharves of Skenesborough. Two of the covering galleys struck their colors, and the others were blown up by their crews. The bateaux, mills, and stockade there were promptly burned, and then the detachment fled to Fort Anne, eleven miles below. Early the next morning Long sallied out and had a sharp encounter with his pursuers under Colonel Hill; but when victory was almost within his grasp, the enemy was reinforced by a number of savages sent forward by Burgoyne, who had remained at Skenesborough. Colonel Long, after burning Fort Anne, retreated sixteen miles to Fort Edward, where he met Schuyler on his way to Ticonderoga with a small reinforcement.

St. Clair, with the main body, was even less fortunate. He retreated through the wilderness to Castleton, his rear-guard of 1,200 men, under Colonel Warner, stopping over night at Hubbardton, where on the morning of the 8th it was attacked by Fraser with an inferior force. After a spirited engagement Hale's militia regiment abandoned the field, and the enemy was reinforced by the arrival of Riedesel's Brunswickers, which latter turned the American right flank and compelled their retreat to Rutland, the rendezvous appointed by St. Clair in the event of disaster. From here the remnant of St. Clair's forces, by a circuitous march of more than a hundred miles, on the 12th reached Fort Edward, where Schuyler, on the 20th, could muster only 4,467 men fit for duty. This little army was deficient in almost every requisite for battle, while Burgoyne, flushed with victory, lay within a day's forced march with his veteran army of nearly double the American force.

Schuyler was charged by Congress with "neglect of duty" in not ordering a timely retreat of the garrison from Ticonderoga, if untenable; and, if to be defended, not to have been present at the attack upon it. The court-martial, of thirteen distinguished officers, unanimously acquitted him "with the highest honor."[727]

These reverses, which closed the first act of the drama of varied events in this checkered campaign, seemed to open the way to Burgoyne's triumph, and they spread universal alarm among the patriots, who had considered Ticonderoga the closed gate to northern invasion. These disasters, however, were blessings in disguise, despite the desertion of the militia. Washington predicted ultimate success, and Schuyler was roused to great efforts to oppose the enemy's advance. Wood Creek was at once obstructed with logs and huge stones; all roads were broken up and their bridges destroyed; dry land was converted into morass, trees were felled in every direction, and the whole of this wild and savage country was stripped of cattle and supplies, for which the enemy had consequently to depend upon Canada and remoter England.

Having provided this barrier against the enemy, Schuyler, who had been joined by Arnold, fell back to Fort Miller with his artillery (brought from Fort George), where he tarried till he had ruined the road over which he passed, and thence proceeded to Stillwater to await reinforcements, making that his fortified headquarters, while his little army occupied a camp, which was intrenched on Van Schaick's Island, near the mouth of the Mohawk.

Burgoyne was so elated by his successes that he dispatched his aide-de-camp Captain Gardner to England, "with news so important to the king's service, and so honorable to the troops under his command." But while the British colors were flying over Ticonderoga, he little dreamed of the difficulties and reverses which were awaiting him. To provide garrisons for these works in his rear, to which he had sent all his surplus artillery and baggage, he was compelled "to drain the life-blood of his army", since Carleton had declined to supply the necessary troops for their defence, on the ground that his jurisdiction as governor did not extend beyond the bounds of Canada.

Burgoyne availed himself of the water transportation of Lake George for most of his artillery and stores; but, for the march of his army from Skenesborough, a trackless wilderness confronted him, through which he had to remove countless obstacles, cut a new pathway, and build no less than forty bridges, one of which, over a swamp, was two miles long. Wood Creek had also to be opened for his bateaux. In these laborious undertakings his army was exhausted with overwork, and suffered terribly with midsummer heat and innumerable insects. Consequently, with his utmost efforts, he did not reach Fort Edward till July 30th, or twenty-four days after leaving Lake Champlain, a distance of only twenty-six miles. Burgoyne remained at Fort Edward till August 15th, awaiting the transportation across the portage from Lake George of the necessary artillery, ammunition, provisions, and bateaux for his descent of the Hudson.

During this enforced delay important events were occurring elsewhere, on the Mohawk and near Bennington. General Lincoln at the same time was recruiting troops in New England, with which to attempt the recapture of Ticonderoga and cut off the British retreat to Canada.

Fort Stanwix, or Fort Schuyler as it was subsequently called, on the head-waters of the Mohawk, near the present Rome, N. Y., was built in 1758, and in April, 1777, was put under command of Colonel Gansevoort, who, with Colonel Marinus Willet, placed it in a better condition of defence. The garrison of the work was 750 Continental troops, before which St. Leger, accompanied by the loyalist Sir John Johnson, and Joseph Brant the great Mohawk chief, appeared, August 2, and the next day summoned it to surrender. Gansevoort paying no attention to this, the British colonel prepared for a regular siege, and sent out detachments to cut off all succor.

The inhabitants of Tryon County were panic-stricken, but the aged General Herkimer by great efforts collected 800 militia and marched to Oriskany, within eight miles of the fort, to which he sent a messenger with a request that upon the messenger's arrival three guns should be fired and a sortie made to facilitate the advance of the succoring party through the besiegers. The signal was delayed, and, unfortunately, Herkimer's better judgment was overruled by his younger officers, who were impatient of delay. This led to his moving forward and to his being ambushed in a valley, the head of which was held by loyalists, while Indian allies under Brant occupied the sides. Here a desperate hand-to-hand fight of five hours ensued, early in which the brave Herkimer was mortally wounded; but seated upon his saddle, and propped against a tree, he calmly continued to give his orders and animate his men with his own heroism till the end of the battle.

At length the long-expected signal guns were heard, when Colonel Willet with 250 men made a sudden dash upon a weak part of the besiegers' camp. Though he failed to reach Herkimer, he destroyed two sections of the enemy's intrenchments, and captured the British camp equipage, Sir John Johnson's papers, five flags, and some prisoners.

The Indians, who had lost many of their braves at Oriskany, hearing the sound of Willet's musketry in their rear, quickly retreated, and were soon followed by the loyalists, leaving Herkimer in possession of the field. St. Leger still continued the siege of the fort, where now floated for the first time the American flag, just adopted by Congress, made of alternate stripes of a soldier's white shirt and a camp-woman's red petticoat, the field being cut out of an old blue overcoat. Beneath this were hung the five captured British standards.

St. Leger on the 7th again demanded the surrender of the fort, threatening Indian vengeance, and falsely stating that Burgoyne was in possession of Albany. Gansevoort returned an indignant refusal to this disgraceful threat. Soon came rumors of the approach of the intrepid Arnold to raise the siege. Statements sent forward of his numbers, purposely exaggerated, caused the flight of the panic-stricken Indians, and St. Leger, August 22, abandoned his trenches, some artillery and camp equipage, and fled to Canada. The right wing of the invaders being thus paralyzed, Arnold returned in triumph to join Schuyler.

Burgoyne's difficulties increased. His Indian allies were insubordinate, and the patriots swelled the American ranks. Finding that his scanty supplies had to be replenished from his distant base in Canada, or rather from England, he decided to make a raid upon Bennington, to secure horses, cattle, and provisions from the depot there. He hoped also that this move would strike terror among the unfriendly inhabitants of the New Hampshire Grants, who hung "like a gathering storm upon his left", and also would elevate the flagging spirits of his army, by a victory which he supposed would be easy. Accordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel Baum was dispatched with a select corps of 550 British, German, and loyalist troops and 150 Indians. Colonel Breyman, with 642 heavy dismounted Brunswick chasseurs, was sent on the 15th as a support. To oppose this expedition, General John Stark hastily collected 1,400 trained militia.

After a silhouette given in Rev. Albert Tyler's _Bennington, the battle, 1777; Centennial Celebration, 1877_ (Worcester, 1878). This book is of some interest for its account of the ground and its landmarks, and relics of the battle. A view of Stark's monument is given in Potter's _Manchester_, N. H., p. 584; and an account of his homestead is in the _Granite Monthly_, v. 84. The usual portrait of Stark is that given in Caleb Stark's _Memoir of Gen. John Stark_ (Concord, 1860), and in the illustrated ed. of Irving's _Washington_, ii. 437. Cf. _N. E. Hist. Geneal. Reg._, July, 1853, and the original ed. of the Stark _Memoirs_, for another likeness.—ED.]

Though constant skirmishing took place on the 15th, a pouring rain prevented a general engagement till the next day, when the determined Yankee leader declared he would beat the invader or "before night Molly Stark would be a widow." To fulfil his pledge he seized the initiative, attacked the enemy on three sides, stormed their intrenchments on the Walloomscoick River and captured their guns, dispersed the Indians and loyalists, and went in hot pursuit of the Germans and British, when his exhausted forces were checked by Breyman's supporting detachment. Colonel Warner's excellent regiment, at once fresh and eager, arrived that afternoon and renewed the action, which was continued till dark, when Breyman, under the cover of night, made good his retreat. Baum was mortally wounded, 207 men were killed, 700 were captured, including the wounded; and 1,000 stand of small arms, all the enemy's artillery and most of their baggage fell into the hands of the Americans. Had there been another hour of daylight, none would have escaped. Stark's losses were 40 killed and 42 wounded.

This victory and the success in the Mohawk valley were as inspiriting to the American as depressing to the Anglo-German army. Burgoyne was now beset with danger on every side. Formidable obstacles accumulated in his path, famine stared him in the face; all his English flour and beef had been consumed, and the whole surrounding country was sending enthusiastic volunteers to bar his progress.

Nearly a month before, Washington had predicted that Burgoyne's successes "would precipitate his ruin", and that his "acting in detachments was the course of all others most favorable to the American cause", as cutting off any of them "would inspirit the people and do away with much of their present anxiety." The beginning of the end had already come.

The first stage in this eventful campaign was for Burgoyne a great success; the second was an equally great failure; and now the last was coming, in which the most decisive results and the highest plaudits were to be won or lost. Schuyler unquestionably would have been the hero of this final development had he not most inopportunely been replaced by Gates, a mediocre soldier. Fortunately, the latter's deficiencies were compensated by officers inferior in rank but superior in ability,—the dashing Arnold, the daring Morgan, not to name others.

From _An Impartial Hist. of the War in Amer._, London, 1780, p. 494. The engraving in the Boston edition, 1781, vol. ii., is by J. Norman. Smith (_Brit. Mez. Portraits_) records an engraving published in London, Jan. 2, 1778, which represents him holding a similar scroll, but "with right hand on hip."—ED.]

Congress, in the exercise of its prerogative, made and displaced generals at its will, and too often was influenced by sectional interests and rivalries. The command of the Northern Department was especially the prize of party favorites. Wooster, Thomas, Sullivan, Schuyler, and Gates had in rapid succession followed each other, and now Schuyler, after all he had done to baffle the enemy and organize victory, was to be the victim of prejudice—of New England against New York—which dated back to colonial days. Schuyler placed little reliance upon New England troops, and their representatives in Congress had as little confidence in Schuyler's generalship.

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, vol. ii. There is a portrait by Stuart, published in 1798 as engraved by Tiebout, given in steel (bust only) by H. B. Hall in Jones's _Campaign for the Conquest of Canada_ (p. 140), and in photogravure (whole picture) in Mason's Stuart (p. 183). The expression in this last is wholly different from the steel engraving. There is also a picture in the _Heads of Illustrious Americans_, London, 1783. There are other likenesses,—cf. Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 586; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 669.

Gates after the war lived for a while on his estate in the Shenandoah valley (view of his house in _Appleton's Journal_, July 19, 1873, p. 69, and Mrs. Lamb's _Homes of America_), but finally removed to New York, and lived near what is now Second Avenue and Twenty-third Street. A view of the house occupied by him as headquarters at Saratoga is in Lossing's _Hudson River_, p. 94.—ED.]

Each misjudged the other; but the outcome of this feeling between Dutch and Puritan blood was unfortunate in superseding the soldierly Schuyler by the intriguing Gates. And it was a cruel reverse to the former, just as his skilful plans were culminating in the utter discomfiture of the enemy, and his successes at Stanwix and Bennington were bringing reinforcements from every quarter to his standard with which to take the offensive, that he should be shorn of the laurels which were about to crown him as the brilliant leader in this most important campaign of the Revolution. If Schuyler had been left in command, probably all the after-complications connected with Burgoyne's surrender would have been avoided.

The resolution of Congress superseding Schuyler reached him on the 10th of August. The noble patriot responded to this ungenerous censure by renewed efforts for his army till Gates's arrival on the 19th, and then he extended to his unworthy successor the courtesy of a true gentleman, for with him the country's welfare was paramount to all personal wrongs.

Gates, clothed with plenary powers and granted by Congress almost everything denied to Schuyler, moved, after a delay of three weeks, with his army, 6,000 strong, from the mouth of the Mohawk to Bemis's Heights, a commanding position on the west bank of the Hudson, which was selected by Arnold and fortified by the engineer Kosciusko. The principal hill was occupied on three sides by extensive intrenchments and redoubts with an abatis. A line of breastworks on the east extended from the hill to the Hudson, to guard a floating bridge across the river and to sweep the plain in front; and on the west was a lower hill which was only partially fortified. The whole position was covered by a ravine in front, through which flowed a branch of Mill Creek.

Gates took personal command of the right wing of the army, occupying the intrenchments between the Hudson and the heights to the west; Learned held the centre; while Arnold had charge of the left wing, comprising Morgan's riflemen, some Continental troops, and a body of militia.

To coöperate in checking the advance of the enemy, General Lincoln with 2,000 militia was sent to threaten Burgoyne's communications. Colonel Brown with 500 of Lincoln's force, on September 18th, surprised the outposts and key-points of Ticonderoga, destroyed over two hundred bateaux and gunboats, captured 293 prisoners and 5 cannon, released 100 Americans, and brought away the Continental standard left flying over the fort when abandoned by St. Clair.

Burgoyne was greatly perplexed. To retreat was to acknowledge his weakness, and to advance was possibly to sacrifice his army and lose his coveted peerage. Under these circumstances he stood still, hoping his recent defeats would soon be forgotten, and he should be strengthened for the future.

Having finally received from Lake George his artillery, military stores, and thirty days' provisions, Burgoyne crossed to the west bank of the Hudson; September 13th-14th, he moved with his army to Saratoga; on the 15th-16th he tarried at Dovegot (near Coveville) to reconnoitre, repair bridges, and open roads over this rugged country; on the 17th he marched to Sword's Farm; on the 18th he advanced to Wilbur's Basin, within two miles of the American position, having constantly to skirmish with Arnold; and on the morning of the 19th he was engaged in reconnoitring and making preparations to attack Gates, if deemed expedient.

A table-land, intersected with ravines through which flowed Mill Creek and its branches, separated the two armies. Except a narrow cultivated strip, adjoining the Hudson, the ground was covered in great part by a dense forest. The river formed its eastern boundary, and on the north, west, and south sides were wooded heights, separated from each other by valleys.

While the Americans occupied the south heights, the Anglo-German army made ready to take possession of those on the north, and then to turn the western hills, thus to get in rear of the American left by a flank movement of their right, while their centre attacked in front and was supported by their left.

About eleven o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Burgoyne's army advanced in three columns. He, in person, in command of the centre column, moved towards Freeman's Farm, opposite to the American left; Riedesel and Phillips with a large train of artillery, forming the left column, followed the river road, and, after the attack had begun, turned westward to support and prolong the line of battle of the deployed centre; while, by a circuitous march, Fraser, with Breyman's German riflemen, having his flanks covered by Canadians, loyalists, and Indians, moved with the right column, taking post westward of the centre, thus greatly overlapping the American left, which it was designed to turn and rout.

Gates, called by Burgoyne "an old midwife", impassively looked on, giving no orders and evincing no desire to fight, while the impatient Arnold, foreseeing the enemy's movement to turn his left, sent Morgan's riflemen and some of Dearborn's light infantry to check it. They rushed upon the enemy, and dispersed the Canadians and Indians; but following up their success too eagerly, they soon encountered the British line of battle, and were overpowered by superior numbers. This being reported to Gates, the Continental troops were sent to support Morgan, but the entire force proved insufficient to cope with and counteract Fraser's movement. Arnold, undismayed, then changed his direction, and fell suddenly upon the enemy's centre with a view of separating Burgoyne from Fraser. The battle was waged with great fury by both antagonists, and as each received reinforcements the conflict deepened, and, with varying success, became more and more stubborn. Burgoyne finally escaped defeat by the timely coming up of Riedesel with Pausch's artillery. After this death-struggle of four hours' duration, darkness terminated the contest. The Americans fell back in good order to their intrenchments, while the Anglo-German army, lying on their arms, retained the barren field of their foiled efforts to advance. Though both sides claimed the victory, neither had triumphed at "Freeman's Farm." It was in reality a drawn battle. The forces engaged in the conflict were nearly equal, the Americans having about 3,000 and the enemy nearly 3,500 of their best troops. The loss of the former was 65 killed, 218 wounded, and 38 missing; while that of the latter, according to their own authorities, was about 600 killed and wounded. British bayonets and abundant artillery were fully matched by American rifles, without a single piece of ordnance. Had Arnold been properly reinforced by Gates, he might have broken the enemy's line and have gained a complete victory.

Gates's army was confident and jubilant as to the issue of the campaign, Burgoyne's anxious and despondent; while both generals strengthened their positions, and their camps resounded with "dreadful note of preparation" for a coming conflict.

From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. iii. There is also a likeness in Murray's _Impartial Hist._ Cf. _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ October, 1883, p. 326.—ED.]

The quarrel which had been brewing between Gates and Arnold, growing out of former jealousy and the supersedure of Schuyler, ripened into open hostility. The crisis of the feud came when Gates failed in his official report to make any mention of Arnold's personal participation in the battle of Freeman's Farm. Thereupon a violent altercation ensued, resulting in Arnold being relieved of his command and excluded from headquarters.

Though unemployed, he continued with the army, the officers of his division begging him not to leave them, as another battle was impending.

The two armies confronted each other within cannon-shot, and scarcely a night passed without some contest between pickets or foraging parties. Burgoyne, anxiously awaiting news of Sir Henry Clinton's coöperation from New York, tenaciously held his ground, though living upon half rations. Gates in the mean time supinely rested in his camp, awaiting the day when the ripened fruit of Schuyler's skill, in retarding the enemy's march and cutting off his detachments, should fall at his feet, and Burgoyne be compelled to starve or pass under the Caudine Forks.

* * * * *

Sir Henry Clinton, having been reinforced from England, left New York, October 3, with a large fleet and 3,000 troops, to effect the long-expected junction with Burgoyne. On the 5th he reached Verplanck's Point, on the Hudson River, from which he made a feint upon Peekskill. Having by this ruse deceived the aged Putnam, in command of the Hudson Highlands, Clinton crossed with his main body on the 6th to King's Ferry, and, by following a circuitous route around the Dunderberg Mountain, the British general in the afternoon carried by assault the feebly garrisoned but bravely defended Forts Montgomery and Clinton. The enemy's fleet then destroyed the boom and chain across the river, forced the Americans to burn two frigates, which could not escape, and ended their excursion up the Hudson at Esopus (now Kingston) by laying it in ashes and returning to New York, it being too late to save Burgoyne.

* * * * *

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, i. p. 526.—ED.]

The American army, after the battle of Freeman's Farm, was daily growing stronger in men and fortifications, while the Anglo-German force was constantly becoming weaker and worn out by watching and incessant alarms. Burgoyne's situation was critical, for he could neither advance nor retreat with safety, and to stand still was to starve. Already the loyalists and Canadians were deserting in numbers, and his Indians, having little opportunity for plundering and scalping, were abandoning him altogether.

Receiving no tidings from Sir Henry Clinton, Burgoyne determined to make an armed reconnoissance of the American left on the 7th of October, and attack the next day, should there be a reasonable prospect of success; if not, to fall back on the 11th behind the Batten-Kill.

Accordingly, leaving proper guards for his camp, Burgoyne in person, at ten A. M. of the 7th, with 1,500 choice troops and ten pieces of artillery, moved out for the contemplated reconnoissance, which was at the same time to cover a foraging party to gather wheat for the pressing necessities of his army. His troops were formed in three columns, and when within three quarters of a mile of the American left were deployed in line of battle upon open ground behind a screen of dense forest. Fraser, with 500 picked men, formed the right, ready to fall upon Gates's left; Riedesel, with his Brunswickers, held the centre; Phillips was in charge of the British left; while the Indians, rangers, and provincials were to work their way through the woods to gain the left and rear of the American camp, in which Lincoln then commanded the right, and Gates had taken Arnold's place on the left.

So soon as the enemy moved and the foragers were at work, Gates ordered out Morgan. Divining Burgoyne's intention, Morgan was to seize the high ground on the enemy's right by making a wide sweep; Learned was to hold the German centre in check; and Poor, with his brigade of Continentals and some militia, concealed by the woods, was to assail the British left. Poor, supported by Learned, opened the battle at half past two with great fury against Major Acland's grenadiers, and extended his blows to Riedesel's centre; Morgan and Dearborn almost simultaneously fell like a thunderbolt upon the enemy's right.

Reproduced from Delaplaine's _Repository of the lives and portraits of Distinguished Americans_ (Philad.). It was painted by Ames. It is engraved on steel in Allen C. Beach's _Centennial Celebrations of the State of New York_ (Albany, 1879), and by J. B. Forrest in Irving's _Washington_, ii. 209. A profile likeness by St. Memin is engraved in the _Doc. Hist. N. Y._, vol. iv. A portrait in uniform at an earlier age was etched by H. B. Hall, in 1866, and appears in the _Mag. of American History_, December, 1881. An engraving of a bust by Ceracchi (owned by the N. Y. Hist. Soc.) accompanies a memoir of Clinton by W. L. Stone in _Ibid._, iii. 336.—ED.]

Burgoyne, seeing the danger of Fraser's right being turned, ordered him to fall back to a new position, in doing which Fraser was mortally wounded by one of Morgan's sharpshooters. In the mean time, Poor was playing wild havoc with Acland's grenadiers, captured Phillips's artillery after killing nearly all of its gunners, and then turned their own pieces upon the British, putting the entire left of their army to flight.

The Germans still firmly held their ground in the centre, when Arnold, maddened by his wrongs, dashed wildly into the thickest of the fight, without authority assumed command of his old division, with audacity and judgment led regiment after regiment to the attack at different points, roused his troops to the highest enthusiasm, and forced back by his impetuous assaults the already shattered British line, which Burgoyne then courageously led in person. But all of the British commander's determination was of little avail, his entire forces being driven back into their intrenched camp. Here the wreck of the Anglo-German army made a firm stand; but Arnold still sought new dangers. With desperation he and his fearless followers mounted embankments and abatis to assail Balcarras, then dashed upon the strong works of the German camp, and ceased not his furious onsets till the whole of the enemy's fortified position lay open, when night closed the scene.

The American army in this decisive battle lost 50 killed and 150 wounded, including among the latter the dauntless Arnold. The enemy, besides nine guns, a large supply of ammunition, and much baggage, lost 176 killed, about 250 wounded, and some 200 prisoners. Among those who lost their lives were the gallant Fraser and the sturdy Breyman, and included in the wounded were several British officers of high rank.

Burgoyne, signally defeated and exposed to a new attack by double his fighting force, prudently retreated, on the stormy night of the 8th, to Saratoga, leaving behind his sick, wounded, and everything he could possibly spare. General Fraser was buried, as he had requested, in a large redoubt near the Hudson, the guns fired over his grave being the American artillery aimed at the group of distinguished mourners before knowing the occasion of their assembling.

Gates, who had not been personally engaged in either battle of his army, remained two days with his main body in the abandoned camp of the enemy at Wilbur's Basin, he judiciously having sent detachments to take advantageous positions to hem in Burgoyne. On the 11th, Gates ordered his main body to cross the Fishkill, supposing Burgoyne had further retreated; but his advanced guard of 1,500 men under Nixon quickly withdrew, having discovered the enemy intrenched and in battle array on the other side of the stream.

Burgoyne, now finding himself exposed to the concentric fire of the Americans, who nearly surrounded him, and having no opening through which to retreat to Lake George or to Lake Champlain, called a council of war to deliberate upon his desperate situation. "By their unanimous concurrence and advice", says he, "I was induced to open a treaty with Major-General Gates." At ten A. M. of the 14th, a flag of truce was sent by Burgoyne, asking for a parley, during which Gates demanded an unconditional surrender of the enemy's troops as prisoners of war. This proposition Burgoyne peremptorily refused to entertain. Hostilities in the mean time were suspended, and modified proposals were made. After two days' delay, Gates, hearing of Sir Henry Clinton's advance up the Hudson, and fearing that he might reach Albany, agreed upon the terms, dictated by Burgoyne, as follows:—

The Anglo-German troops to march out of their camp with all the honors of war, and their artillery to be moved to the bank of the Hudson River, and there left, together with the soldiers' arms, which were to be piled at the word of command from their own officers. It was further agreed that a free passage to Great Britain should be granted to the troops on condition of their not serving again in the present contest; that all officers should retain their baggage and side-arms, and not be separated from their men; and that all, of whatever country they might be, following the camp, should be included in the terms of capitulation. Before signing the treaty, Burgoyne demurred to designate it as a _capitulation_, whereupon Gates readily consented to its being called a TREATY OF CONVENTION, and as such it was signed October 16, 1777.

Somewhat reduced, after the fac-simile in Wilkinson's _Memoirs_, i. 282.—ED.]

Burgoyne in a rich uniform, accompanied by his brilliant staff and general officers, rode, on October 17, to the headquarters of General Gates, who was simply attired in a plain blue coat. Reining up their horses, Burgoyne gracefully raising his cocked hat, said, "The fortune of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner;" to which the victor, gracefully returning the salute, replied, "I shall always be ready to bear testimony that it has not been through any fault of your excellency."

From _Bickerstaff's Boston Almanac_. This is from the title of the number for 1778, and shows the kind of effigies popularly current in such publications.—ED.]

On the site of old Fort Hardy the Anglo-German army, October 17, grounded their arms at the command of their own officers, none of the American troops being present to witness this humiliation of the enemy. In the afternoon the captured troops crossed the Hudson, and, escorted by a company of light dragoons, were marched between the parallel lines of American soldiers, preceded by two officers, unfurling "the stars and stripes" just adopted by Congress. While this ceremony took place in the presence of Burgoyne and Gates, the former drew his sword and presented it to the latter, which being received was courteously returned, when both generals retired into Gates's tent.[728]

While the prisoners, under guard of General Heath, were marching to Boston, Gates hurried to Albany to oppose any movement of Sir Henry Clinton; and Major Wilkinson was sent to Congress to communicate the joyful tidings of Burgoyne's surrender. Rejoicings were heard throughout the United States, and the successful general was so elated and his vanity so stimulated that he aspired to supplant Washington, as he had Schuyler.

* * * * *

A few criticisms upon the plan of the campaign of 1777, and the mode of conducting it, may be permitted. The British cabinet wisely decided upon the seizure of the Hudson as the most efficient way of breaking the power of the revolted colonies; but, in carrying out its design, it violated a fundamental maxim of war. No principle of strategy is better established than the superiority of _interior_ as against _exterior_ lines of operation of armies, as was so admirably illustrated in the "Seven Years' War." Frederic the Great, without any frontier barriers and open to attack on all sides, from his central position kept at bay France, Austria, Russia, Saxony, Sweden, and the Germanic body, whose united population was over twenty times as great as that of Prussia, including Silesia, a recently conquered province. In like manner, the Americans, in July, 1777, were within a great circle,—Schuyler on the upper Hudson, Putnam at the Highlands, and Washington in New Jersey, within supporting distance of each other; while the British armies were widely separated upon its vast circumference,—St. Leger moving to the upper Mohawk, Burgoyne from Canada, Clinton at New York, and Howe sailing to the Chesapeake.

In the struggle for the Hudson, the two independent British armies—one in Canada and the other in New York—were expected to coöperate in order to attain a common object, while Burgoyne with the one was tied down by fixed orders, and Clinton with the other had no instructions as to the part he was expected to perform. Besides, their bases were separated by about four hundred miles of wild, hostile, and thinly populated country, rendering intercommunication so difficult that, of ten messengers sent out by different routes to Howe, not one returned to Burgoyne.

No precaution was taken to provide for the losses of Burgoyne's army, nor to supply the necessary drafts upon it to garrison the posts in his rear, guarding his communications with Canada. When he gained possession of Ticonderoga, he called upon Sir Guy Carleton to furnish the necessary force to hold the place; but Carleton did not feel justified, under his precise orders, to send troops beyond his jurisdiction. Consequently, Burgoyne "drained the life-blood of his force" in the field to provide for the defence of this and other works left behind.

Burgoyne's _logistics_, or means of supplying and moving his army, were very defective. Not till June 7, 1777, a month after his arrival in Canada, did he make provision for the transportation of either stores or artillery, and then his arrangements were so entirely inadequate that they seemed based upon the assumption that his adversary was his inferior in all military qualities. Hence, he decided "to trust to the resources of the expedition for the rest", while for his own personal baggage he used no less than "_thirty carts_." Most of his provisions had to be brought from England, a distance of 3,600 miles; some from Canada; and for the rest he relied upon the meagre resources of the hostile country he was to traverse. Consequently his army was often on reduced rations, sometimes nearly starving, and finally, to secure its existence, he undertook his disastrous raid upon Bennington.

After the pursuit of St. Clair, Burgoyne should have returned with his army to Ticonderoga, and taken the water route by Lake George, instead of forcing his way through an obstructed wilderness to Fort Edward, which he did not reach till July 30th, nor leave till August 14th. Had Schuyler directed Burgoyne's operations he could not have planned measures more conducive to his own advantage. On the Lake George route were only two small armed schooners to oppose any resistance, and from the head of the lake was a direct road to Albany, which had been followed by Abercrombie and Amherst. As it was, Burgoyne was compelled to send his supplies and artillery by the lake, and then carry them over the portage to Fort Edward, which consumed more time than would have been necessary to move in light marching order direct to Albany. General De Peyster, a careful student of this campaign, says: "Burgoyne could have been reassembled at 'Old Ty' by the 10th July; could have been transported to Fort George by the 12th; and, having left his heavy guns and all but his light artillery and indispensable materials there or at Ty, in depot, with a sufficient guard, could have reached Fort Edward on the evening of the 13th July. From this point to Albany is about fifty miles. With six or ten days' rations and an extra supply of ammunition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and, allowing one day's delay for a fight, could have occupied Albany on the 16th July." But the British commander had proclaimed, "This army must not retreat." Though he subsequently tried to palliate his mistake, all his correspondence shows that pride in carrying out his declaration, not military principles, made him persevere in the false movement which lost him the campaign, and secured in the end American independence.

Burgoyne, after his brilliant success at the opening of the campaign, suddenly relapsed into the sluggishness of his German allies. Instead of rapidly pursuing his demoralized foe, he tarried at Skenesborough till his pathway was thoroughly obstructed and the fugitives had recovered from their panic. After he had lost his prestige and the Americans had gained confidence by success at Stanwix and Bennington, he attempted with diminished forces to cope with the growing strength of his opponent. Thus, by delay, he lost in September what he might have achieved in July. From his arrival at Skenesborough till he had reached his southernmost point at Freeman's Farm, he moved only _fifty miles in seventy-four days_.

Slow in all his movements, Burgoyne's tardiness was increased by his large and superfluous train of artillery which accompanied all his toilsome marches. Even when he required the greatest celerity, he chose for his raid upon Bennington, not the nimble-footed light infantry under the dashing Fraser, but cumbrous dismounted German dragoons moving only a mile and a third an hour.

Burgoyne was not only slow, but he was irresolute. After his disastrous defeat at Bemis's Heights he lost five precious days in fatal indecision while retreat was possible. On October 12th his last chance had passed, he then being completely invested by the Americans, and nothing was left to him but surrender. According to Madame Riedesel, he had given in this crisis of his fate more attention to his mistress than to his army. Aspasia had triumphed over Mars.

While Burgoyne committed many blunders, his opponents had their shortcomings also. The fortifications of Ticonderoga, after falling into the hands of the Americans, were too much extended for their defence by a moderate garrison; but the most fatal error was the failure to occupy Mount Defiance, which completely commanded all the American works, and, when seized by the British, left St. Clair no alternative but hasty retreat and the abandonment of much artillery and considerable supplies. The fugitives then counted largely on the delay of their pursuers, who followed them with celerity, severely punishing them at Skenesborough and Hubbardton.

Congress committed the most criminal error, outweighing all others, in substituting, at the most critical moment of the campaign, a military charlatan for an accomplished soldier,—in supplanting Schuyler, who was the organizer of the victories, by Gates, who "had no fitness for command and wanted personal courage." To say nothing of the difference in merit of the two commanders, the time for making the change was most inopportune.

Putnam, a brave officer but no general, managed things so badly in the Highlands that Forts Montgomery and Clinton were lost, and the Hudson was opened to the enemy whenever he chose to advance.[729]

CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

THE titles alone of the numerous works which have been consulted in the preparation of the foregoing narratives would fill many of these pages. Therefore, to avoid repetition, as most of them are common to all the chapters of this History of the American Revolution, reference will be made only to those authorities which have a bearing upon disputed points, or to newly discovered facts respecting the "Struggle for the Hudson."

Of the many authors who have written of the New York campaign of 1776, nearly all have followed the narrations given in Sparks's _Washington_ and in the official despatches of the various officers engaged. For topographical details we have relied upon Des Barres' _Atlantic Neptune_ (1780-81), with its plans of battles, sieges, etc., and maps of the seat of war, and upon the recent Coast Survey charts. Local historians have supplied many minor particulars, which need not be enumerated, except, perhaps, the one relating to the treason of William Demont, already referred to in the text. Much new light has been thrown upon the Burgoyne campaign by works published within the last few years.[730]

One of the most earnestly disputed points of Burgoyne's campaign is whether Arnold was personally engaged with the enemy at the battle of Freeman's Farm, on Sept. 19, 1777. Some authorities, notably Bancroft, while admitting that Arnold's troops were in the thickest of the fray, deny that the general himself was on the battlefield; while Stedman, Irving, Stone, and many others, equally competent to weigh the facts, maintain that Arnold was the conquering hero of the fight, and that, but for him, Burgoyne would have marched straight on to Albany.

Just after Gates had superseded Schuyler in the command of the Northern army, Arnold had returned from the Mohawk valley flushed with success and impatient to win new laurels. He was incessantly engaged in skirmishing with the enemy and adding to his reputation as a brilliant, dashing officer. Gates was envious of Arnold's growing fame, and resentful of his partiality for Schuyler. Hence arose a coolness towards Arnold, which rapidly ripened into bitter hostility. That the action of Freeman's Farm, a five hours' battle, full of skilful movements, was purely a series of chance operations without a guiding spirit, is utterly preposterous. As Gates was not engaged, whose was the directing mind but Arnold's, the second in command?

It seems impossible that one devoid of fear, brave even to rashness, who even courted danger at the risk of death, and one too who was filled with ambition and love of military glory, could possibly have allowed his command to go into action without leading its movements and sharing its perils. His subsequent heroism amid the carnage of battle at Bemis's Heights would seem a sufficient refutation of the charge that he who was always in the thickest of the fight was only a looker-on while the conflict of September 19th was raging around Freeman's Farm.

Gates, in his official report of the battle of Freeman's Farm, makes no mention of Arnold being engaged; and his adjutant-general, Wilkinson, in his _Memoirs_, written long after Arnold's good name had been blasted by his treason, says: "Not a single general officer was on the field of battle on the 19th of September, until evening, when General Learned was ordered out."

Under ordinary circumstances, the testimony of the commander-in-chief and his adjutant-general would be considered conclusive; but it must be borne in mind that both of these officers were inimical to Arnold, that neither was personally engaged in the battle, and that the wooded character of the ground precluded either from following any one's movements through the conflict.

On the other side, we have the contemporary testimony of officers present on the battlefield, newspaper accounts of the time, and Arnold's own division order of the day after the battle, in which he speaks of the zeal and spirit of the company officers engaged, in a manner which none but a close observer could notice. Besides, we have the direct evidence of two of Arnold's staff officers—Colonels Livingston and Varick—that their chief was the hero of the battle of Freeman's Farm; the former warmly lauding "his conduct during the late action", and declaring that "to him alone is due the honor of our late victory." Even the enemy's chief, Burgoyne, said in the British House of Commons: "Mr. Gates had determined to receive the attack in his lines. Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, foreseeing the danger of being turned, advanced without consultation with his general, and gave instead of receiving battle."

Another much-disputed point is whether to Schuyler or Gates is chiefly due the triumph of our arms in the Burgoyne campaign. Bancroft, in his _History of the United States_ (vol. ix. ch. 21, orig. ed.), states that Schuyler lacked military talents, failed to harry the advance of Burgoyne, wanted personal courage, and had no influence with the people. All these charges have been triumphantly refuted by his grandson and by his biographer.[731]

General Schuyler's zeal, energy, ability, and sterling virtues have been so fully set forth in the preceding narrative of the Burgoyne campaign that any amplification here is needless; but it may be proper to add the testimony of some of our most distinguished countrymen as to the merits of this true gentleman, noble soldier, and patriotic Fabian hero. Chief Justice Marshall says: "In this gloomy state of things no officer could have exerted more diligence and skill than Schuyler." Chancellor Kent writes: "In acuteness of intellect, profound thought, indefatigable activity, exhaustless energy, pure patriotism, and persevering and intrepid public efforts, Schuyler had no superior." Daniel Webster said: "I consider Schuyler as second only to Washington in the services he rendered to the country in the war of the Revolution. His zeal and devotion to the cause under difficulties which would have paralyzed the efforts of most men, and his fortitude and courage when assailed by malicious attacks upon his public and private character, _every one of which was proved to be false_, have impressed me with a strong desire to express publicly my sense of his great qualities."

Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Jefferson, and most of the great men of the Revolution had unbounded confidence in Schuyler; and modern historians, such as Irving, Sparks, Lossing, and others, bear like testimony to his virtues and services. Even Congress, which had so unjustly removed Schuyler from his command, when convinced of its error, would not consent to his resignation from the army till he persistently demanded it. Though Schuyler's military career did not sparkle with "feats of broil and battle", he exhibited those great qualities which are as conducive to the success of war as "the magnificently stern array" of arms in the heady fight. He was ready in expedients to foil the enemy, skilful and persevering in executing them, and resolute and untiring till his end was obtained. Never discouraged by disaster, and stimulated to higher effort as fortune frowned, he continued sanguine of success in the darkest hour of adversity. Every assault upon his reputation fell harmless before his invulnerable patriotism; no injustice could swerve him from the path of honor; and to him, as to all true men, the meaning of life was concentrated in the single word DUTY.

NOTE BY GENERAL CULLUM.

DISPOSAL OF THE CONVENTION TROOPS.[732]—In accordance with Article IV. of the convention, the captured army was marched, under guard of General Glover, to the neighborhood of Boston, where it arrived about Nov. 6th. The British troops were barracked on Prospect Hill and the German troops on Winter Hill, the officers being quartered in Cambridge and the neighboring towns. Much complaint was made of the character and insufficiency of their accommodations, but considering the limited supply of houses at the disposal of General Heath, commanding the Eastern department, he did the best in his power, without the aid of the State of Massachusetts, to whose Council he appealed for the use of "at least one of the colleges" for their comfort. At the worst, however, these captives fared far better than our own troops at Valley Forge during that winter.[733]

Under Article V. supplies were to be furnished to Burgoyne's army "at the same rates." This was interpreted by Congress, Dec. 19th, to mean "that the accounts of all provisions and other necessaries which already have been or which hereafter may be supplied by the public to prisoners in the power of these States shall be discharged by either receiving from the British Commissary of Prisoners, or any of his agents, provisions or other necessaries, equal in quality and kind to what had been supplied, or the amount thereof in gold or silver."

Exacting provisions _in kind_, though inconvenient to the British commissary, was not unreasonable, considering their scarcity; but the condition that expenditures made in depreciated Continental money should be liquidated, dollar for dollar, in gold and silver, was a hard one. As a justification for this latter requirement, it was stated by Congress "that General Howe had required that provisions should be sent in for the subsistence of the American prisoners in his possession, and that for the purchase of such necessaries he had forbidden the circulation of the currency of the States within such parts as are subject to his power."

By Article II. General Howe was authorized to send transports to Boston to receive the troops for their conveyance to England. For its failure to carry out the obligation imposed upon it by its own general, the American government, through Congress, justified itself by claiming that Burgoyne had already evaded the provisions of Article I. of the convention. Bancroft, in his _History of the United States_, contends that it had been broken by Burgoyne at the time of the surrender, by the concealment of the military chest and other public property, of which the United States were thus defrauded.[734] He therefore sustains Congress in its subsequent demand for the descriptive lists "of all persons comprehended in the surrender", and the postponing of the embarkation of Burgoyne's army "until his capitulation should be expressly confirmed by Great Britain."