Chapter VI: The War in the Southern Department (1)

BY EDWARD CHANNING,

_Instructor in History in Harvard College_.

IN the autumn of 1778 the British commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Clinton, determined to attempt for the second time the subjugation of the Southern colonies, and Savannah was selected as the first point of attack. On November 27, 1778, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell, with thirty-five hundred men of all arms, sailed from Sandy Hook, and anchored off Tybee Entrance December 23d. Meantime a deserter from an advance transport had given the Americans warning. Their commander was General Robert Howe, a good but unsuccessful officer, who had not been fortunate in securing the confidence of the authorities of Georgia. Ascertaining these facts, Campbell pressed on without awaiting the arrival of Brigadier-General Augustine Prevost with a reinforcement from Florida. On the 28th, late in the afternoon, the British fleet assembled in the Savannah River, off Giradeau's house on Brewton Hill, which is about two miles from Savannah in a straight line, though double that distance by road. A causeway, nearly half a mile in length, ran from the river to the bluff through a rice-field which in ordinary times could have been flooded, but over which the bluff was now accessible from all points.

On the morning of the 29th the Highlanders carried the position with trifling loss, when Campbell, advancing toward Savannah, found the Americans most advantageously posted across the highroad. Through no fault of Howe, his rear was attained, while he awaited an attack in front. The Americans suffered a severe loss, and only a small part of them succeeded in joining Lincoln beyond the Savannah River. Campbell pushed up the Savannah, and in ten days the frontier of Georgia was secured, and this was the condition when Prevost arrived and took command.

Although Lincoln had arrived at Charleston on December 6th, he was not able to reach Purisburgh before the 5th of January, 1779. His army, composed almost entirely of militia, refused under him, as it had under Howe, to be governed by the Continental rules of war.[1014]

At first it seemed to the enemy that the occupation of Georgia could be easily maintained, but the neighboring militia rallied under Pickens, and drove the British back. The American success, however, was brief, for Colonel Prevost, a brother of the general, turned upon General Ashe, who with a detachment from Lincoln's army was following the British retreat. The Americans were surprised and suffered a defeat, which cost Lincoln one third of his army and restored to Prevost his superiority in Georgia.[1015]

The scale again turned. Lincoln, reinforced, once more severed the British communications with the up-country Tories, when Prevost, to disconcert his adversary, at first sought to get between him and Charleston, and then suddenly advanced on the city itself. Here Moultrie, who had been watching the British advance, threw up some defences. Negotiations for a surrender followed, and Governor Rutledge, who was in the town, even proposed a scheme of neutrality for the State during the war, to which Prevost would not listen. The British now intercepted a messenger from Lincoln, and finding that general closing in upon him, Prevost suddenly decamped and marched toward Savannah.

The summer was uneventful; but in the early autumn D'Estaing, who after leaving Newport had been cruising with some success in the West Indies, now turned northerly, and on September 3 (1779) his advance ships arrived off the mouth of the Savannah River. A landing, however, was not effected until the 12th, when the troops landed at Beaulieu, on Ossabaw Sound, fourteen to sixteen miles from Savannah. They did not reach that town until the 16th, so that Prevost had time to call in his scattered detachments, and all but those from Beaufort had arrived when, on the evening of that day, D'Estaing, in the name of the king of France, summoned him to surrender. A correspondence followed, which was prolonged till the defences were strengthened and Maitland got up from Beaufort with eight hundred men, when Prevost refused to surrender.

D'Estaing had been all the more willing to grant the truce as Lincoln, who was looked for from Charleston, had not arrived on the 16th. By the 23d a considerable part of the Americans had joined the French, and siege operations were begun. Guns were brought up from the French ships and trenches pushed to within three hundred yards of the besieged lines. On September 24th a sortie was made by the garrison for the purpose of developing the strength of the besiegers. The sortie was repulsed with ease, but the French, following the assailants back to their lines, were exposed to a murderous fire, and incurred a heavy loss in killed and wounded. The bombardment was then begun with vigor, but with little effect. At last, on October 8th, D'Estaing declared that he could not keep his vessels longer exposed to the Atlantic gales. An assault was determined on. In the night the sergeant-major of one of the Charleston militia regiments deserted to the enemy and gave full information of the intended movement, and further declared that the attack on the British left would be only a feint, the real attack being directed against the Spring Hill redoubt, on the right.[1016]

The assault took place, and failed as much by a lack of coöperation between the columns as by the treachery. This disaster so dispirited the allies that Lincoln crossed the river on the 19th, and when he was safe on the other side the French withdrew to their ships and sailed away,—their last frigate leaving the river on the 2d of November.

Sketched from a marginal view on a chart of _The Harbour of Charlestown, from the surveys of Sir Jas. Wallace, Captain in his Majesty's navy and others_, published in London by Des Barres, Nov. 1, 1777, and making part of the _Atlantic Neptune_. Cf. _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ (1883), p. 830. _The Catal. of the king's maps_ (Brit. Mus.) shows an engraved view of 1739, and other early views are noted in Vol. V., p. 331. There is a view by Leitch, in 1776. In a paper, "Up the Ashley and Cooper", by C. F. Woolson, in _Harper's Magazine_, lii. p. 1, there is a view of Drayton house, occupied by Cornwallis as headquarters.—ED.]

From the Commodore Tucker Papers in Harvard College library.—ED.]

The sailing of the French left the coast again exposed, and Clinton, coming from New York, now prepared to attack Charleston. On the 11th of February, 1780, a landing was made on Simmons' Island, just to the north of the North Edisto River. Thence by John's Island, Stono Ferry, Wappoo Cut and River, the Ashley was reached, and a lodgment was effected on the neck of land at the seaward end of which Charleston stands. Clinton advanced with caution. On the 1st of April the first parallel was opened about eight hundred yards from the American works.

On the 21st of March the British fleet, commanded by Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot in person, had crossed the bar unopposed. Some time was spent in taking on board their provisions and guns. Then on the afternoon of the 7th, 8th, or 9th of April—for there is a hopeless confusion as to the exact date—in the midst of a furious thunder-shower the fleet ran by Fort Moultrie without material damage, except to the store-ship "Eolus", which was abandoned. The greater portion of the garrison of Moultrie, commanded by Colonel C. C. Pinckney, was then withdrawn,—the feeble remnant surrendering on the 6th of May, with scarcely a show of resistance.

On the 8th of April guns were mounted in battery in the first British parallel. On the 11th, Lincoln having refused to surrender, fire was opened. The second parallel was completed on the 19th, bringing the British to within four hundred and fifty yards of the opposing line.

After a picture by Col. Sargent, owned by the Mass. Hist. Society (_Proc._, Jan., 1807, vol. i. p. 192; _Catal. Cabinet_, no. 13). A copy by Herring was engraved by T. Illman. Cf. Jones's _Georgia_, vol. ii. (bust only); Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed., vol. iii.; _Harper's Mag._, lxiii. 341. A rude contemporary copperplate print, by Norman, appeared in the Boston ed. of _An Impartial Hist. of the War_ (1784), vol. iii. 64.—ED.]

On the morning of the 13th Tarleton and Ferguson, by a sudden push, dispersed the force at Monk's Corner, which had guarded Lincoln's supplies. On the 18th a reinforcement of three thousand men arrived from New York, and enabled Clinton to complete the investment of the town, the command on the eastern side of the Cooper being given to Cornwallis. There was during the next few days a sortie, some desultory fighting, and an unsuccessful correspondence for a surrender. On May 8th the third parallel was completed, bringing the besiegers to within forty yards of the works, while the canal in front of the lines was partly drained and the batteries were ready to open fire. Clinton again summoned the garrison, but again Lincoln declined to surrender,—this time because Clinton refused to regard the citizens as anything but prisoners on parole. On the 11th the British reached the ditch and advanced to within twenty-five yards of the works. Resistance was no longer to be thought of, especially as the citizens themselves now petitioned to have the terms offered by Clinton accepted. The articles were accordingly drawn up and signed on the 12th, and the English took possession.

From Andrews' _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. ii. There is an engraving after an original drawing by T. Prattent in the _European Mag._, Aug., 1786. There are engravings of him later in life in Lee's _Memoir of the War in the Southern Department_ (Philadelphia, 1872), vol. ii., and in the _Cornwallis Correspondence_. Cf. _Harper's Mag._, lxiii. p. 325; Irving's _Washington_, ii. 282; Boyle's _Official Baronage_, i. 459. Reynolds painted him in 1780, having already painted him in 1761. The former picture was engraved by Chas. Knight in 1780. Cf. Hamilton's _Engraved Works of Reynolds_, pp. 19, 169. There is a mezzotint by D. Gardiner. Cf. John C. Smith's _Brit. Mez. Port._, ii. 745; and in _Ibid._, iv. 1,444, an engraving by Ward after a picture by Buckley is noted. There is a contemporary account of Cornwallis in the _Polit. Mag._, ii. 450.—ED.]

On that day the Continentals to the number of perhaps fifteen hundred—there were about five hundred in the hospital at the time—marched out, with colors cased and drums beating the "Turk's March", and laid down their arms. By regarding every adult capable of bearing arms as a militiaman, Clinton reckoned his prisoners at five thousand. Lincoln has been severely censured for this defence, but if the Carolinians had rallied as expected, he might have held out until the heats of the summer and the arrival of De Ternay would have compelled Clinton's retirement.

Clinton now sent out three expeditions to the up-country, the most important of which was destined to secure the region north of the Santee and Wateree.[1017] Cornwallis, commanding this expedition, detached Tarleton against Buford, who had with him the remnants of the American cavalry and some Continentals from Virginia. Tarleton overtook him at Waxhaw Creek on the 29th of May. Of the five hundred Americans who entered the fight, one hundred and thirteen were killed, while one hundred and fifty were wounded. The slaughter was vindictive, and "Tarleton's Quarters" will never be forgotten in the upper regions of South Carolina.

Clinton and Arbuthnot, judging their conquest of the province permanent, now proclaimed as rebels all who refused the oath of allegiance, and then sailed for New York, leaving Cornwallis in command.

From the _London Mag._, June, 1781 (p. 251).—ED.]

The new commander's proclamations, following upon those of Clinton and Arbuthnot, were enough at variance with them to create discontent among those inclined toward the British side. The spirits of the patriots began to revive, especially in the back regions, where Colonels Locke and Williams and Generals Rutherford and Sumter gathered strong bands around their standards. The fights at Ramsour Mills, Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Musgrove Mills, which these partisans conducted, were in the main successful, but all were lost to sight in the great disaster which soon overtook the American arms near Camden.

Early in the spring of 1780, it had been decided to send a reinforcement under De Kalb to Lincoln, at Charleston. With about fourteen hundred men of the Maryland and Delaware lines, that general left Morristown on the 16th of April, 1780, and on the 1st of June, in Petersburg, he learned of the fall of Charleston. He decided to push on with the utmost speed, in the hope that his coming might still save the interior of the State. But delay after delay occurred, and De Kalb did not reach the Deep River before the 6th of July, when he found nothing prepared for his reception; and what was still more inexcusable, the North Carolina militia, under Caswell, were holding aloof. On the 25th a new commander of the Southern armies arrived in Horatio Gates, the popular hero of Saratoga. His appointment had been made by Congress against the wishes of Washington, but in obedience to a general popular consent. De Kalb received Gates with genuine pleasure, and took his place at the head of the regulars, then forming the whole army.

Against the advice of his ablest officer, Otho H. Williams, Gates determined to join the North Carolinians in their camp near Lynch's Creek, since they would not join him, and with them he hoped to seize Camden. Two days after his arrival, on July 27th, the march began, and after the most acute suffering from hunger the regulars joined the militia. So lax was the discipline among Caswell's men, that Williams and a party of officers rode through their lines and camp without being once challenged. Approaching the general's tent, they were informed that it was an unseasonable hour for gentlemen to call. Yet Caswell was within striking distance of a disciplined army, commanded by an enterprising general, Lord Rawdon. Marching a little farther, the British were found in a strong position on the southern bank of Little Lynch's Creek.

From Du Simitière's _Thirteen Portraits_ (London, 1783).—ED.]

By a march up the creek, Gates might have placed his superior force on Rawdon's flank and rear. This was what Rawdon feared, and what De Kalb is said to have advised. Instead he passed two days in idleness, and then, inclining to the right, marched to Clermont or Rugeley's Mill, on the road from Charlotte to Camden, and not more than thirteen miles from the latter. There, seven hundred militia from Virginia joined him. From that place, too, he sent four hundred men, including some regulars, to assist Sumter in a contemplated attack on the enemy's communications. It was now determined to seek a more defensible position on the banks of a creek seven miles nearer Camden. This position could be turned only by marching a considerable distance either up or down the creek. Exactly what Gates had in view by this movement can not now be ascertained.[1018]

Cornwallis arrived at the front on the morning of August 14th, and decided to surprise Gates; but the two armies started on respective marches at precisely the same hour, ten o'clock of the evening of August 15, 1780. Their advanced guards met at about half past two the next morning. Armand, a French adventurer, with his "legion" forming the American van, retired panic-stricken, and the two armies deployed across the road. The position in which the opposing generals now found themselves was singularly favorable to the smaller numbers of the British, as the front was necessarily very short, owing to a marsh which protected while limiting either flank. This advantage Cornwallis was not slow to perceive. A hurried council was held on the American side, and it was decided that there was no alternative but to fight. At dawn the enemy was observed getting into position on the extreme left. Stevens, with the Virginia militia, already in line, was ordered to charge before the enemy's formation was complete. It so happened that Cornwallis, thinking the Virginians were making some change in their dispositions, ordered his right forward. Led by the gallant Webster, the British came on with such a rush that the men of Virginia threw down their loaded guns with bayonets set, broke and dispersed to the rear. Nor did the North Carolinians do better. Seeing the Virginians break, they did not await the onset, but threw away their arms and fled. One regiment indeed, inspired by the example of the regulars, fired several rounds before it broke. Deserted by those whom they had marched so many weary miles to succor, the men of Maryland and Delaware fought till to fight longer was criminal. Then the under-officers, on their own responsibility, brought off all they could, for their commander, De Kalb, overwhelmed by eleven wounds, had fallen into the hands of the enemy,—"a fate", says Williams, "which probably was avoided by other generals only by an opportune retreat." That night Gates found himself at Charlotte, sixty miles from the scene of conflict. Caswell was with him, and they were soon joined by Smallwood and Gist. In fact, excepting the one order issued to the Virginians at the outset, the leaders seem to have left the conduct of the fight to De Kalb and the subordinate officers. From Charlotte Gates retired to Hillsborough, where the legislature was then sitting.

Cornwallis seems to have been satisfied with the havoc wrought on the field of battle, for he pursued without vigor, and soon returned to Camden and gave his attention to Sumter. That enterprising but negligent chieftain had captured the redoubt at the ferry over the Wateree, and had ensnared a convoy destined for Cornwallis. On the night of the 17th, hearing of Gates's overthrow, Sumter left his camp, and moved with such celerity that a corps which Cornwallis sent against him failed to strike him. Shortly after, Tarleton found him less vigilant, and came upon him so unexpectedly that resistance was hardly attempted, and Sumter escaped with scarcely half his force.

Gates has been severely blamed for this defeat; too severely, it seems to me. The march of the regulars from Buffalo Ford to Lynch's Creek was undoubtedly full of hardship, but it was well planned and executed. Nor do the troops who made it seem to have been demoralized by it. On the contrary, seldom have men fought more gallantly than De Kalb's division fought on the morning of August 16, 1780. The Virginians, whose flight made defeat probable, followed the Continentals in the march across the "desert", and did not suffer nearly as much as the leading division. The North Carolina militia, whose panic turned a probable defeat into a rout, had no part whatever in that painful march. The disaster was due to the over-confidence which Gates felt in his men. Had the militia stood firm, the event of the campaign might have been different. There was no defect in Gates as a strategist or tactician. He had a larger number of men in line than his opponent. His dispositions were as perfect as the time and place permitted. The defeat Was "brought on", to use the emphatic words of Stevens, the gallant leader of the Virginians, "by the damned cowardly behavior of the militia."

From Camden Cornwallis advanced to Charlotte, overcoming all obstacles which the militia under Davie interposed. Other militia, meanwhile, under Clarke, advanced on Augusta, but British reinforcements from Ninety-Six, under Cruger, forced Clarke to abandon the attack, and, burdened with the families of some leading Whigs, he retired towards the mountains. Cornwallis, hearing of this, ordered Ferguson, who had been beating up recruits in the upper country, to endeavor to cut Clarke off. Now it happened that at this very time the sturdy frontiersmen, under the leadership of Colonel William Campbell, Colonel Isaac Shelby, Lieutenant-Colonel John Sevier, and Colonel Charles McDowell, had assembled at Watauga, bent on the destruction of Ferguson and his little army.[1019] To the number of one thousand and forty they left their place of meeting on September 26th and marched for Gilberton, where Ferguson was supposed to be. On the 30th they were joined by Colonel Cleveland, with three hundred and fifty men from North Carolina. The senior officer was McDowell, but from his slowness he was not deemed the best man to conduct such an arduous enterprise, and while he was sent to Gates to name a leader they chose Campbell for their chief. Pressing on, they reached the Cowpens, where they were joined by Williams and Lacy, with about four hundred men from the Carolinas.

Meantime Ferguson, not ignorant of the approach of this formidable force, which appeared to have sprung from the earth, had begun his retreat towards Charlotte. Anxious to intercept Clarke, he had delayed his march longer than was prudent, and had taken post on the top of a spur of King's Mountain, where he probably hoped to be reinforced before the enemy should come up with him. While at the Cowpens, on October 6th, the Americans received certain information of Ferguson's position. They resolved to select the best mounted of their little army, and, leaving the poorly mounted and the footmen to follow, to go in pursuit of Ferguson and fight him wherever found. In the evening, therefore, they broke up from the Cowpens, and, marching all night, reached, without being discovered, the foot of King's Mountain on the afternoon of the next day. The spot on which the British were found was singularly well suited to the mode of fighting in which the backwoodsmen were adepts. King's Mountain proper is sixteen miles long, and in some places is high and steep. The southern end, however, where Ferguson was encamped, rises only about sixty feet. It was wooded, except on the summit, which partook of the nature of a plateau. The Americans, under their respective leaders, so timed their movements that Ferguson was surrounded almost before he knew it. The band led by Campbell seems to have made the first attack from the south. It was speedily driven back at the point of the bayonet, but re-formed at the foot of the hill and returned to the charge. Meantime Shelby was pressing on from the north. He, too, was driven back, when, re-forming his men, he also returned to the fight. These charges and countercharges were three times repeated. Cleveland, Sevier, and the rest did their work splendidly in their respective positions. The British, inspired by the example of their heroic leader, fought bravely and well; but their position was so perilous that their loss was double that of the assailants. Ferguson, while leading a charge, or perhaps while endeavoring to cut his way out, was killed. De Peyster, the second in command, showed the white flag, as was his duty, resistance being useless, but the firing did not cease for some time, even though the beaten Tories were suing for quarter. At that moment an attack was made from the rear by another band of British, who were probably returning from a foraging expedition. This new and sudden attack led to a renewal of the slaughter of the unresisting foe on the hill.

The neighborhood was bare of provisions, and the next morning the now half famished victors, with their no less hungry prisoners, made a hurried retreat towards the mountains. On the 13th the Americans arrived at a place then called Bickerstaff's Old Fields, about nine miles from the present hamlet of Rutherfordton. There they improvised a court, and sentenced thirty to forty of their prisoners to death. But after nine had been hanged, the remainder were reprieved or pardoned.

Such was the famous battle of King's Mountain in South Carolina. It changed to a great extent the whole course of the war in the Southern department, as it deprived Cornwallis of the only corps that he could afford to hazard for a long time out of supporting distance. As for Cornwallis, as soon as he heard of the disaster, instead of sending Tarleton in pursuit, he broke up from Charlotte, and retired as fast as he could to Wynnesborough, in South Carolina, midway between Camden and Ninety-Six, where he would be within supporting distance of either in case they were attacked. He was followed by Gates, who encamped at Charlotte, his light parties advancing even to Rugeley's.

Not long after his arrival at Wynnesborough, Cornwallis detached Tarleton, with a portion of the Legion, to disperse the band with which Marion awed the country between the Santee and Pedee rivers. Tarleton had now to deal with a soldier both bold and discreet. All his artifices were unavailing to entrap Marion, and he was recalled to go in pursuit of Sumter, who had encamped at Fishdam Ford, not far from the British headquarters. Meanwhile, Major Wemyss had attacked Sumter just before daybreak on the morning of November 11th. He approached the camp unchallenged at first, but he soon encountered a picket, which fired five shots before retiring. Two shots disabled Wemyss. His second in command, continuing the attack without a proper knowledge of the ground, was repulsed. Sumter, hearing of the approach of Tarleton, prudently withdrew from such a dangerous neighborhood, and had reached the ford of the Tyger, near Blackstocks, when Tarleton appeared. Unable to cross, he drew up his men on the side of a hill. Tarleton, rashly attacking with his advance, was beaten off with great loss. The British leader withdrew to his main body, and prepared to storm the hill the following morning; but in the night Sumter crossed the river, and once over his men dispersed in every direction. The American loss at these two actions was small, though a wound received at the Blackstocks kept Sumter from the field for several months.

From this time on the war in the Southern department assumed a new and brighter aspect, for on December 2, 1780, less than a month after the affair at the Blackstocks, Nathanael Greene arrived at Charlotte, and took command of the remnants of the gallant Continentals who had fought so splendidly at Camden. He was respectfully received by Gates, who retired to his Virginia farm.[1020]

The task that Greene had before him might well have appalled the boldest. Without food, without money or credit, almost without an army, he was expected to face the most enterprising commanders—Cornwallis, Rawdon, and Tarleton—that the British had on this continent, while they were at the head of a large and well-appointed army. But Greene was not the man to be easily disheartened. With the possible exception of Washington, the best soldier of high rank in the American army, he resembled his chief in being a careful observer of men. His judgment, too, with regard to all matters connected with war was excellent, and has seldom been surpassed. As a strategist he had no equal in the opposing army, while he possessed the rare power of being able to adapt his tactics to the army and to the country, although it has been claimed that credit has been given him for what really was the product of another mind.

Gates handed over to his successor an army which numbered on paper twenty-three hundred and seven men, including nine hundred and forty-nine Continentals. But so many were insufficiently clad and equipped that, to use the new commander's own words, "not more than eight hundred were present and fit for duty." Food was scarce, and the _morale_ of the army was low. Greene sought a new camp on the eastern bank of the Pedee, opposite Cheraw Hill, where food was more abundant. There he subjected his men to a discipline to which they had long been strangers, while Morgan, with a strong detachment, threatened Cornwallis's other flank.

Morgan took with him four hundred of the Maryland line, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Howard, two companies of Virginia militia, and about one hundred dragoons led by William Washington. To these were afterwards added more than five hundred militia from the Carolinas. Morgan advanced to Grindall's Ford on the Pacolet, near its confluence with Broad River. In this position he seriously menaced Ninety-Six and even Augusta itself. Cornwallis needed to dislodge him before he could advance far in his projected invasion of North Carolina. He therefore detached Tarleton, with his Legion and a strong infantry support, against Morgan, while he himself advanced with the main body along the upper road to North Carolina, thus placing himself on Morgan's line of retreat whenever that commander should be driven back. Learning of these movements, Morgan retired from Grindall's Ford, and moving with commendable speed on the night of January 16, 1781, encamped at the Cowpens. Tarleton was now close upon him, and, marching the greater part of the night, he discovered the Americans drawn up in line of battle on the morning of the 17th. The position which Morgan had chosen was in many respects a weak one. The country was well fitted for the use of cavalry, in which the British excelled, while the Broad River, flowing parallel to his rear, made retreat difficult if not impossible. Nor were the flanks protected in any manner.[1021] Hardly waiting for his line to be formed, and with his reserve too far in the rear, Tarleton dashed forward.[1022] A militia skirmish line was easily brushed aside, and the main body of militia, after firing a few rounds with terrible precision, also retreated. The Continentals, however, under their gallant leader, stood firm. But Howard's flank soon became enveloped. He ordered his flank company to change its front. Mistaking the order, the company fell back, and the whole line was ordered to retire upon the cavalry. The British, who had been joined by the reserve, thinking that the Americans were retreating, came on like a mob. Seeing this, Howard ordered the 1st Maryland to face about. They obeyed, and poured such an unexpected and murderous fire into the advancing foe that the British line paused, became panic-stricken, turned, and fled. In vain did Tarleton call upon his dragoons for a charge. His order was either not delivered or was misunderstood. Colonel Washington, on the other hand, advanced with a rush, and the day was won. Almost to a man the British infantry was either killed or captured. But they had fought well, and their loss, especially in officers, bears testimony to their splendid conduct on the field.[1023]

King's Mountain lost to Cornwallis his best corps of scouts. This disaster deprived him of his light infantry, whose presence during the forced marches now to come would have been of incalculable service. For this reason the affair at the Cowpens, while in reality only a fight between two small bodies of troops, in importance of results deserves to be ranked among the most important conflicts of the war. It was indeed, as has so often been said, "the Bennington of the South."

Cornwallis, when he had detached Tarleton to the defence of Ninety-Six, and later, when he had ordered him to push Morgan to the utmost, had expected to be able to get on Morgan's line of retreat, and thus drive him into the mountains, or at least prevent his rejoining Greene. But with Greene on his flank at the Cheraws, he had been afraid to move far from Camden before Leslie with the reinforcements could get out of Greene's reach. He was, therefore, no further advanced than Turkey Creek, twenty-five miles away, when the news of the disaster at the Cowpens reached him. On the 18th, Leslie, with two battalions of the Guards under O'Hara and the Hessian regiment of Bose, arrived. On the 19th the pursuit was begun, and on the 24th Cornwallis reached the crossing of the Little Catawba at Ramsour's Mill, only to learn that Morgan had crossed at the same place two days before. In fact, that enterprising leader, instead of being dazzled by the victory at the Cowpens, passed the Broad River on the evening of the day of action, and, pursuing his route toward the mountains, passed Ramsour's Mill on the 21st. With the bulk of his detachment he then sought a junction with the main body under Greene. Turning to the east, he crossed the Catawba at Sherrald's Ford on the 23d, and took post on the eastern bank. At this place he finally rid himself of his prisoners, sending them to Virginia under an escort of militia.

There can be little doubt of the chagrin Cornwallis experienced at the escape of Morgan. It prompted him to destroy what he thought was useless baggage, and to make another attempt to overtake the Americans. This burning of his train occupied two days, and, necessary as it may have seemed, the consequent lack of supplies led to the fearful suffering of his army after Guilford, and made his retreat to Wilmington a necessity. It was his first grave error in his struggle with Greene. On the 27th he put his troops in motion for the Catawba, but before he reached the fords a sudden rise of the river made the crossing an impossibility, and gave Morgan two days' respite. The delay was still more important in giving Greene time to reach the post of danger and take command of the detachment. The news of the victory at Cowpens had not reached the camp at the Cheraws until the 25th. Instantly divining the course that Cornwallis would pursue, Greene sent an express to Lee, who, as soon as he had joined, had been dispatched to coöperate with Marion in an attack on Georgetown, next to Charleston then the most important seaport in South Carolina. The attack failed for some reason that is not quite apparent; but Lee brought off his troops in safety, and rejoined Greene in time to render most important service. On the 29th, the main army, under command of General Huger, left the camp for Salisbury, where Greene hoped to be able to concentrate his entire force. On the 31st the Catawba began to subside. Putting their troops in motion, Greene and Morgan directed their steps toward Salisbury, where they arrived on February 2d. The Yadkin was crossed in safety the next day, though rising rapidly all the time; then sending orders to Huger to join him at Guilford Court-House, and not at Salisbury as formerly ordered, Greene once more breathed freely.

On the afternoon of the 1st, Cornwallis had also put his troops in motion. His design was to make a feint of crossing at Beattie's Ford while with the Guards he should pass the river at the less known Cowan's Ford. By some means, Davidson, who commanded the militia in that region, became cognizant of the design, and stationed himself at Cowan's with about four hundred men, where he expected to hold Cornwallis in check long enough to be of real service to the retiring Americans.

Shortly before daybreak Cornwallis reached the river, and saw the watch-fires on the opposite bank. Without a moment's hesitation the Guards rushed into the rapid stream. When about halfway across they were discovered, and a fire was opened upon them by the militia. But now occurred one of those accidents that so often in war defeat the best-laid plans. The ford, turning in mid-stream at an angle with the direct line, ran under a bank where the militia were waiting for the British; but when they arrived at the turning-point, instead of inclining to the right, the Guards—their guide having deserted through fear—kept straight on, and gained the bank with a loss of only sixty in killed, wounded, and missing. The militia retired, and although Tarleton was sent after them, they made good their retreat with a loss which would have been trifling but for a mortal wound under which the gallant Davidson fell. There were many hair-breadth escapes during this splendid charge. Cornwallis's horse was shot under him, but reached the bank before he fell. Leslie was carried down stream, and O'Hara's horse rolled over with his rider while in the water.

Pushing on with all speed possible in the wretched condition of the roads, Cornwallis's van, under O'Hara, reached the Yadkin at the Trading Ford a few hours after the Americans had crossed; but O'Hara, though he missed the soldiers, captured a train of wagons belonging to the country people who were flying with the army. Here again the forces of nature came to the assistance of the Americans, for the Yadkin rose so rapidly that it could not be forded, and Greene had carefully secured all the boats on the eastern bank.

Cornwallis now gave up all idea of preventing the union of the two wings of the opposing army, which, indeed, was effected soon after at Martinsville, near Guilford. The British commander decided to place himself between his opponents and the fords of the Dan, hoping thereby to prevent the Americans taking refuge in Virginia. Accordingly, on the 7th he crossed the Yadkin at the Shallow Ford. It was now a serious question with Greene to escape the new danger. The militia failing to come to his aid, he was obliged to protect his Continentals by a flight into Virginia. He determined to cross the Dan at Irwin's Ferry, and sent orders to have boats ready at that point. On the 10th the march was renewed. The light troops, united in one division, were placed under the command of O. H. Williams, with orders to delay the enemy as much as possible. By rapid marching the main army reached Irwin's Ferry and crossed on the 13th and 14th, before Williams and the rear-guard came in sight. The experience of this light division has been well told by Lee, whose Legion first measured sabres with Tarleton's men on the 12th. From that time the rear of the Americans and the advance of O'Hara were almost constantly in sight of each other. At every crossing or other suitable place Williams would draw his men out and thus compel the British to deploy; then, his object being accomplished, and the British delayed for a few minutes, the march would be resumed, and the two armies would soon be marching as one again. Cornwallis, conscious finally that his prey had escaped, turned back to Hillsborough, and, erecting the Royal Standard, called upon all loyal North Carolinians to rally to the aid of their royal master.

On the 18th, only four days after his escape, recruits had come in so rapidly that Greene detached Lee across the Dan to seek information, and to show the Tories that the Americans were by no means beaten. Lee had, in addition to his legion, two companies of the Maryland line. He was joined on the southern side of the river by Pickens with a considerable body of Carolina militia.

On the 23d Greene himself crossed the Dan with the main army, and sought the difficult country on the head-waters of the Haw, as the Cape Fear River is called in its upper course. Here again, as during the retreat, the light troops were put into the hands of Williams. The two divisions manœuvred with such precision that Cornwallis was held at arm's length, while militia and Continentals came into the American camp from all directions. The American commander saw that the time had now come to give way no more. He stationed himself on a hillside near Guilford, and awaited the approach of the British. The position which had attracted his attention during the retreat possessed a combination of rising ground, cleared spaces, and woods which could hardly be surpassed for the irregular formation that Greene, following the example set by Morgan at the Cowpens, deemed best suited to his troops.

To Cornwallis, the presence of Greene had been most disastrous. Strategy had failed to annihilate his opponent, and the offered battle, even on ground of the American general's own selection, was welcome to the British commander; and on the morning of the 15th of March, 1781, the trial came.

In his front line Greene put the North Carolina militia, their flanks resting in the woods, the centre being protected in some measure by a rail fence. Three hundred yards behind were posted the Virginia militia under Stevens and Lawson. Though militia in name, some of those under Stevens were veterans in reality. But, taught by his bitter experience at Camden, Stevens posted riflemen behind his line, with orders to shoot any who should run. The Virginians were entirely in the woods. Three to four hundred yards behind them, on the brow of a declivity, with open fields in their front, were the regulars. On the right was the Virginia brigade under Huger. Then, after an interval for the artillery under Singleton, came the Maryland brigade, commanded by Williams. The first regiment was led by Gunby, with Howard as lieutenant-colonel. This was the regiment which had aroused universal admiration by its splendid conduct at Camden and its wonderful subordination at the Cowpens, when a gallant charge converted a bloody check into a crushing disaster. The second Maryland regiment, commanded by Ford, was new to the service. It held the extreme left of the line. The regulars presented a convex front. Lee with the "Legion" and Campbell's riflemen from the backwoods acted as a corps of observation on the left, while Washington, with the regular cavalry and the remnant of the Delaware regiment under the heroic Kirkwood and Lynch's riflemen, protected the right flank.

As soon as Cornwallis found himself in the presence of his enemy, he deployed without reserves, except the British dragoons under Tarleton. The "Hessian" regiment of Bose and the 71st under Leslie, with the 1st battalion of the Guards in support, held the right; next came the 23d and 33d regiments under Webster, with the Grenadiers and the 2d battalion of the Guards under O'Hara in support; while the extreme left was occupied by the light infantry of the Guards and the Jägers. The artillery was on the road with Tarleton. As the line moved forward it first encountered the North Carolinians, who fired a volley, and perhaps more, before they broke. On the extreme right, however, Lee with his light troops held the regiment of Bose and the 1st battalion of the Guards in check. But the defection of the North Carolinians separated him from the rest of the army. The first line being broken, Webster rushed upon the Virginians. But the woods were so thick, and the defence of the Virginians so stout, that his loss at this point was very considerable. At length, Stevens having been wounded in the thigh, the Virginians retired and Webster advanced upon the Continentals. On his right was Leslie with the 71st. When the advancing line reached the front of the 1st Maryland, it was received with such a murderous fire that it stopped. The Marylanders then advanced with the bayonet, and the British gave way and retreated. It has been said by writers on both sides, that had Greene thrown forward another regiment at this moment the day would have been won. But this is by no means certain, as the events of the next few minutes were to show. For Leslie with the 71st and O'Hara with the Guards now came up and assailed the 2d Maryland with such fierceness that it broke and fled. But the 1st Maryland was not far off. Wheeling into line, it opposed the Guards until Washington charged and broke the British line. J. E. Howard—now in command, Gunby having been dismounted—then followed with the bayonet, and pressed the enemy so hard that re-formation was for the moment impossible. Cornwallis, seeing that the flight must be stopped at all hazards, ordered his artillery—posted on an eminence in the centre of the field—to open on the Marylanders through the ranks of his own men. In this way the pursuit was checked, though at terrible loss to the British.

Greene's hopes were soon dashed. The shattered lines of the enemy re-formed and returned to the conflict. Pressing heavily on the Virginia regulars, and reinforced by the 1st battalion of the Guards, which had disengaged itself from Lee, the whole American line was endangered. Greene, who wished to run no chances, and who probably did not know that Lee had once more connected himself with the main line, ordered a retreat. The artillery, the horses having been killed, was left on the ground, but otherwise the withdrawal was easily and skilfully effected.

Such was the battle of Guilford. Numerically, Greene was superior; but of good troops he had only a handful. When the two leaders summed up their losses, it became evident that a decisive blow had been struck at Cornwallis. The Americans lost seventy-nine killed and one hundred and eighty-four wounded, together with one thousand and forty-six missing. Of these last some may have been wounded, but by far the greater part were militiamen, who had returned to their homes. Cornwallis reported his own loss at ninety-three killed, and four hundred and thirteen wounded, and twenty-six missing—a most serious diminution of his force.

Cornwallis in his proclamation and letters maintained, however, that he had achieved a great triumph. It was his despatch to Germain which occasioned the well-known assertion of Charles James Fox that "another such victory would destroy the British army." Even before the fight it had been almost a necessity to open communications with the sea, as the army was suffering for want of the stores that had been destroyed at Ramsour's Mill. Believing the Cape Fear River navigable as far as Cross Creek, Cornwallis had sent Major Craig to seize Wilmington and to open navigation as far as possible, which he succeeded in doing to a point at a short distance above Wilmington. Leaving his wounded at the New Garden Quaker Meeting-house, near the battlefield, Cornwallis set out on the morning of the 18th for Wilmington, arriving there on April 7, 1781. Greene had pursued as soon as possible. But his ammunition, never very abundant, was now almost exhausted. Besides, food was very scarce in the district to be traversed, and Greene arrived at Ramsey's Mill only to find that Cornwallis had built a bridge over Deep River at that point and escaped, although Lee had pressed so hard on his rear that the bridge could not be destroyed. Here the pursuit ended; for the Virginia militia, now that their time was up, refused to serve longer. Though Cornwallis escaped, and though Greene had lost one of the best contested battles of the war, he had won the campaign. He was free once more to turn his attention toward relieving South Carolina of her military rulers. On April 6th, one day before Cornwallis arrived at Wilmington, the southward march began, Lee being detached to operate on the line of Rawdon's communications with Charleston.

Lee soon joined Marion, who was skulking in swamps between the Pedee and Santee, and, uniting forces, the two captured a fortified depot of Watson, the British officer scouring this region, and then endeavored to prevent his rejoining Rawdon.

On the 7th of April Greene had broken up from Ramsey's, and, taking the direct road, had encamped on Hobkirk's Hill, to the north of Camden, and about a mile and a half from the British works at that place. As Rawdon did not come out from his intrenchments, Greene on the 23d moved nearer. Anxious for Marion and Lee, and desirous of supporting some artillery which he detached to them, Greene moved to a position south of Camden. It appears, however, that on the 23d or 24th he decided to fall back. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 24th he reëncamped on Hobkirk's Hill. During that night a renegade drummer-boy informed Rawdon of the position and number of the American force. He also said that Greene had neither artillery nor trains near at hand, although both were on the march to join him. It was a most propitious time to strike, and Rawdon determined to attempt a surprise the next morning.

Making a considerable detour to the right, he struck the American left almost unperceived. Greene had thrown out a strong picket in that direction, but the superiority of the British was so great that they drove in the guards and were upon the Americans before the formation was complete. That the attack was not a disaster was due to the prudence of Greene, who had encamped in order of battle. Perceiving that Rawdon's line was very short, Greene ordered Ford with the 2d Maryland to flank it on the right, and Campbell was told to do the same on the left. Gunby with the 1st Maryland, and Hawes with the Virginia regulars, were ordered to attack with the bayonet in front, while Washington with the cavalry was to get into the rear and take advantage of any opening that might offer. Unfortunately, neither Ford nor Campbell were able to put in their men before Rawdon, seeing his danger, brought up his reserves and extended his flank. This was owing partly to Ford being struck down in the beginning of the movement.

The defeat of Greene, however, was due to one of those accidents against which no foresight can provide. It seems that as the 1st Maryland was getting into position to charge, or perhaps as it was moving forward, Beattie, the captain of one of the leading companies, was shot. His men began firing, and fell into confusion. Then Gunby, instead of pushing his rear companies forward, as Greene always declared he should have done, ordered the regiment to form on the rear companies. The men retiring were seized with a panic, and the heroes of three battles broke. They were rallied soon after, but it was then too late. The whole line was compromised, and Greene ordered a retreat.

Though Greene was not surprised, the attack was most unexpected. This was owing in a great measure to the woods in his front, which permitted Rawdon to reach the picket line without discovery. Even then Greene fully expected victory, and had his men done their duty, as he had a perfect right to expect, this adventurous attempt of the young British commander would have resulted in his complete overthrow. Such was Greene's opinion, and such is the opinion of most American writers.[1024] Retiring first to Sanders Creek or Gum Swamp, the very spot Gates was trying to reach when he met Cornwallis, and later to Rugeley's Mill, Greene brought up his provisions and recruited the strength of his men. Though not beaten at Hobkirk's Hill, Greene was greatly discouraged. Especially distressing was the non-arrival of expected reinforcements. The terms of service of his best men were expiring, and he could see no source from which to draw recruits. His losses in the recent engagement had not been so great as those of his opponent; but Marion and Lee had been unable to prevent Watson from rejoining his chief. Still Greene did not lose heart. As soon as his men had recovered from fatigue he crossed the Wateree and posted himself at Twenty-five-Mile Creek, on the road from Camden to Fishing Creek and the Catawba settlements.

Watson reached Camden on May 7th. On the evening of the same day Rawdon moved out from his fortifications, and, crossing the Wateree, turned on Greene, intending to pass his flank and attack him from the rear. But Greene was too vigilant, for, learning of Rawdon's departure from Camden, he retired still higher up the river, first to Sandy's Creek and later to Colonel's Creek, the latter being nine miles from his former position. The position on the further bank of Colonel's Creek was very favorable to the party attacked. The light troops had been left in the front, as at Hobkirk's Hill. Coming upon them at Sandy's Creek, Rawdon mistook them for the main body, and their position seemed so strong that he did not feel willing to risk an attack. It was impossible for him to remain longer in Camden with Greene in such threatening attitude, especially as his line of communication with Charleston was in the hands of Lee and Marion. On the 10th, leaving his wounded who were unable to be moved at Camden, Rawdon evacuated that place, and marching to the east of the Santee, he crossed at Nelson's Ferry and took post at Monk's Corner, not more than thirty miles from Charleston.

From Doyle's _Official Baronage_, ii. 151. The likeness by Reynolds was painted in 1789, and is at Windsor Castle, and is engraved in the _European Mag._, June, 1791; it was also engraved in mezzotint by John Jones. Cf. Hamilton's _Engraved Works of Reynolds_, pp. 56, 183, and J. C. Smith's _Brit. Mezzotint Portraits_, ii. 767. Cf. Irving's _Washington_, 4^o ed., iv. 331.—ED.] There is an account of Rawdon's career to date in _Pol. Mag._, ii. 339, and Lossing has given a sketch of his life in _Harper's Monthly_, xlvii. 15. He is better known by his later title of Marquis of Hastings, which he bore as governor-general of India. Cf. note to p. 49 of _Cornwallis Corresp._ It is to be noted that both he and his chief, Cornwallis, showed a humanity in after life which did not grace their careers in America.]