Chapter XXXVI: Republic--Remarks on Its Main Thesis (1)

[Side-note: Summary of the preceding chapter.]

The preceding Chapter has described, in concise abstract, that splendid monument of Plato's genius, which passes under the name of the [Greek: Politei/a] or Republic. It is undoubtedly the grandest of all his compositions; including in itself all his different points of excellence. In the first Book, we have a subtle specimen of negative Dialectic,--of the Sokratic cross-examination or Elenchus. In the second Book, we find two examples of continuous or Ciceronian pleading (like that ascribed to Protagoras in the dialogue called by his name), which are surpassed by nothing in ancient literature, for acuteness and ability in the statement of a case. Next, we are introduced to Plato's most sublime effort of constructive ingenuity, in putting together both the individual man and the collective City: together with more information (imperfect as it is even here) about his Dialectic or Philosophy, than any other dialogue furnishes. The ninth Book exhibits his attempts to make good his own thesis against the case set forth in his own antecedent counter-pleadings. The last Book concludes with a highly poetical mythe, embodying a [Greek: Nekui/a] shaped after his own fancy,--and the outline of cosmical agencies afterwards developed, though with many differences, in the Timæus. The brilliancy of the Republic will appear all the more conspicuous, when we come to compare it with Plato's two posterior compositions: with the Pythagorean mysticism and theology of the Timæus--or with the severe and dictatorial solemnity of the Treatise De Legibus.

[Side-note: Title of the Republic, of ancient date, but only a partial indication of its contents.]

The title borne by this dialogue--the Republic or Polity--whether affixed by Plato himself or not, dates at least from his immediate disciples, Aristotle among them.[1] This title hardly presents a clear idea either of its proclaimed purpose or of its total contents.

[Footnote 1: See Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, p. 63 seq.; Stallbaum, Proleg. p. lviii. seq.]

The larger portion of the treatise is doubtless employed in expounding the generation of a commonwealth generally: from whence the author passes insensibly to the delineation of a Model-Commonwealth--enumerating the conditions of aptitude for its governors and guardian-soldiers, estimating the obstacles which prevent it from appearing in the full type of goodness--and pointing out the steps whereby, even if fully realised, it is likely to be brought to perversion and degeneracy. Nevertheless the avowed purpose of the treatise is, not to depict the ideal of a commonwealth, but to solve the questions, What is Justice? What is Injustice? Does Justice, in itself and by its own intrinsic working, make the just man happy, apart from all consequences, even though he is not known to be just, and is even treated as unjust, either by Gods or men? Does Injustice, under the like hypothesis, (_i.e._ leaving out all consideration of consequences either from Gods or from men), make the unjust man miserable? The reasonings respecting the best polity, are means to this end--intermediate steps to the settlement of this problem. We must recollect that Plato insists strongly on the parallelism between the individual and the state: he talks of "the polity" or Republic in each man's mind, as of that in the entire city.[2]

[Footnote 2: Plato, Repub. ix. p. 591 E. [Greek: a)poble/pôn pro\s tê\n e)n au(tô=| politei/an.] x. p. 608 B: [Greek: peri\ tê=s e)n au(tô=| politei/as dedio/ti], &c.]

[Side-note: Parallelism between the Commonwealth and the Individual.]

The Republic, or Commonwealth, is introduced by Plato as being the individual man "writ large," and therefore more clearly discernible and legible to an observer.[3] To illustrate the individual man, he begins by describing (to use Hobbes's language) the great Leviathan called a "Commonwealth or State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended".[4] He pursues in much detail this parallel between the individual and the commonwealth, as well as between the component parts and forces of the one, and those of the other. The perfection of the commonwealth (he represents) consists in its being One:[5] an integer or unit, of which the constituent individuals are merely functions, each having only a fractional, dependent, relative existence. As the commonwealth is an individual on a large scale, so the individual is a commonwealth on a small scale; in which the constituent fractions, Reason,--Energy or Courage,--and many-headed Appetite,--act each for itself and oppose each other. It is the tendency of Plato's imagination to bestow vivid reality on abstractions, and to reason upon metaphorical analogy as if it were close parallelism. His language exaggerates both the unity of the commonwealth, and the partibility of the individual, in illustrating the one by comparison with the other. The commonwealth is treated as capable of happiness or misery as an entire Person, apart from its component individuals:[6] while on the other hand, Reason, Energy, Appetite, are described as distinct and conflicting Persons, packed up in the same wrapper and therefore looking like One from the outside, yet really distinct, each acting and suffering by and for itself: like the charioteer and his two horses, which form the conspicuous metaphor in the Phædrus.[7] We are thus told, that though the man is apparently One, he is in reality Many or multipartite: though the perfect Commonwealth is apparently Many, it is in reality One.

[Footnote 3: Plato, Repub. ii. p. 368 D.

"New presbyter is but old priest writ large."--(Milton.)]

[Footnote 4: This is the language of Hobbes. Preface to the Leviathan. In the same treatise (Part ii. ch. 17, pp. 157-158, Molesworth's edition) Hobbes says:--"The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend men from the invasion of foreigners and the injury of one another, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person. This is more than consent or concord: _it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person_, made by covenant of every man with every man. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan," &c.]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423.]

[Footnote 6: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.]

[Footnote 7: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 588, x. p. 604, iv. pp. 436-441. ix. p. 588 E: [Greek: ô(/ste tô=| mê\ duname/nô| ta\ e)nto\s o(ra=|n, a)lla\ to\ e)/xô mo/non e)/lutron o(rô=nti, e(\n zô=on phai/nesthai, a)/nthrôpon.]]

[Side-note: Each of them a whole, composed of parts distinct in function and unequal in merit.]

Of the parts composing a man, as well as of the parts composing a commonwealth, some are better, others worse. A few are good and excellent; the greater number are low and bad; while there are intermediate gradations between the two. The perfection of a commonwealth, and the perfection of an individual man, is attained when each part performs its own appropriate function and no more,--not interfering with the rest. In the commonwealth there are a small number of wise Elders or philosophers, whose appropriate function it is to look out for the good or happiness of the whole; and to controul the ordinary commonplace multitude, with a view to that end. Each of the multitude has his own special duty or aptitude, to which he confines himself, and which he executes in subordination to the wise or governing Few. And to ensure such subordination, there are an intermediate number of trained, or disciplined Guardians; who employ their force under the orders of the ruling Few, to controul the multitude within, as well as to repel enemies without. So too in the perfect man. Reason is the small but excellent organ whose appropriate function is, to controul the multitude of desires and to watch over the good of the whole: the function of Energy or Courage is, while itself obeying the Reason, to assist Reason in maintaining this controul over the Desires: the function of each several desire is to obey, pursuing its own special end in due harmony with the rest.

[Side-note: End proposed by Plato. Happiness of the Commonwealth. Happiness of the individual. Conditions of happiness.]

The End to be accomplished, and with reference to which Plato tests the perfection of the means, is, the happiness of the entire commonwealth,--the happiness of the entire individual man. In order to be happy, a commonwealth or an individual man must be at once wise, brave, temperate, just. There is however this difference between the four qualities. Though all four are essential, yet wisdom and bravery belong only to separate fractions of the commonwealth and separate fractions of the individual: while justice and temperance belong equally to all the fractions of the commonwealth and all the fractions of the individual. In the perfect commonwealth, Wisdom or Reason is found only in the One or Few Ruling Elders:--Energy or Courage only in the Soldiers or Guardians: but Elders, Guardians, and the working multitude, alike exhibit Justice and Temperance. All are just, inasmuch as each performs his appropriate business: all are temperate, inasmuch as all agree in recognising what is the appropriate business of each fraction--that of the Elders is, to rule--that of the others is, to obey. So too the individual: he is wise only in his Reason, brave only in his Energy or Courage: but he is just and temperate in his Reason, Courage, and Appetites alike--each of these Fractions acting in its own sphere under proper relations to the rest. In fact, according to the definitions given by Plato in the Republic, justice and temperance are scarce at all distinguishable from each other--and must at any rate be inseparable.

[Side-note: Peculiar view of Justice taken by Plato.]

Now in regard to the definition here given by Plato of Justice, which is the avowed object of his Treatise, we may first remark that it is altogether peculiar to Plato; and that if we reason about Justice in the Platonic sense, we must take care not to affirm of it predicates which might be true in a more usual acceptation of the word. Next, that even adopting Plato's own meaning of Justice, it does not answer the purpose for which he produces it--_viz._: to provide reply to the objections, and solution for the difficulties, which he had himself placed in the mouths of Glaukon and Adeimantus.

[Side-note: Pleadings of Glaukon and Adeimantus.]

These two speakers (in the second Book) have advanced the position (which they affirm to be held by every one, past and present)--That justice is a good thing or a cause of happiness to the just agent--not in itself or separately, since the performance of just acts is more or less onerous and sometimes painful, presenting itself in the aspect of an obligation, but--because of its consequences, as being indispensable to procure for him some ulterior good, such as esteem and just treatment from others. Sokrates on the other hand declares justice to be good, or a cause of happiness, to the just agent, most of all in itself--but also, additionally, in its consequences: and injustice to be bad, or a cause of misery to the unjust agent, on both grounds also.

Suppose (we have seen it urged by Glaukon and Adeimantus) that a man is just, but is mis-esteemed by the society among whom he lives, and believed to be unjust. He will certainly be hated and ill-used by others, and may be ill-used to the greatest possible extent--impoverishment, scourging, torture, crucifixion. Again, suppose a man to be unjust, but to be in like manner misconceived, and treated as if he were just. He will receive from others golden opinions, just dealing, and goodwill, producing to him comfortable consequences: and he will obtain, besides, the profits of injustice. Evidently, under these supposed circumstances, the just man will be miserable, in spite of his justice: the unjust man will, to say the least, be the happier of the two.

Moreover (so argues Glaukon), all fathers exhort their sons to be just, and forbid them to be unjust, admitting that justice is a troublesome obligation, but insisting upon it as indispensable to avert evil consequences and procure good. So also poets and teachers. All of them assume that justice is not inviting for itself, but only by reason of its consequences: and that injustice is in itself easy and inviting, were it not for mischievous consequences and penalties more than countervailing the temptation. All of them either anticipate, or seek to provide, penalties to be inflicted in case the agent commits injustice, and not to be inflicted if he continues just: so that the treatment which he receives afterwards shall be favourable, or severe, conditional upon his own conduct. Such treatment may emanate either from Gods or from men: but in either case, it is assumed that the agent shall be known, or shall seem, to be what he really is: that the unjust agent shall seem, or be known, to be unjust--and that the just shall seem also to be what he is.

[Side-note: The arguments which they enforce were not invented by the Sophists, but were the received views anterior to Plato.]

It is against this doctrine that the Platonic Sokrates in the Republic professes to contend. To refute it, he sets forth his own explanation, wherein justice consists. How far, or with what qualifications, the Sophists inculcated the doctrine (as various commentators tell us) we do not know. But Plato himself informs us that it was current and received in society, before Protagoras and Prodikus were born: taught by parents to their children, and by poets in their compositions generally circulated.[8] Moreover, Sokrates himself (in the Platonic Apology) recommends virtue on the ground of its remunerative consequences to the agent in the shape of wealth and other good things.[9] Again, the Xenophontic Sokrates, as well as Xenophon himself, agree in the same general doctrine: presenting virtue as laborious and troublesome in itself, but as being fully requited by its remunerative consequences in the form of esteem and honour, to the attainment of which it is indispensable. In the memorable Choice of Heraklês, that youth is represented as choosing a life of toil and painful self-denial, crowned ultimately by the attainment of honourable and beneficial results--in preference to a life of easy and inactive enjoyment.[10]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 363-364.]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. p. 30 B.

[Greek: le/gôn o(/ti ou)k e)k chrêma/tôn a)retê\ gi/gnetai, a)ll' e)x a)retê=s chrê/mata kai\ ta)/lla a)gatha\ toi=s a)nthrô/pois a(/panta kai\ i)di/a kai\ dêmosi/a|.]

Xenophon in the Cyropædia puts the following language into the mouth of the hero Cyrus, in addressing his officers (Cyrop. i. 5, 9). [Greek: Kai/toi e)/gôge oi)=mai, ou)demi/an a)retê\n a)skei=sthai u(p' a)nthrô/pôn, ô(s mêde\n ple/on e)/chôsin oi( e)sthloi\ geno/menoi tô=n ponêrô=n; a)ll' oi(/ te tô=n parauti/ka ê(donô=n a)pecho/menoi, ou)/ch i(/na mêde/pote eu)phranthô=si, tou=to pra/ttousin, a)ll' ô(s dia\ tau/tên tê\n e)gkra/teian pollapla/sia ei)s to\n e)/peita chro/non eu)phranou/menoi, ou(/tô paraskeua/zontai], &c.

The love of praise is represented as the prominent motive of Cyrus to the practice of virtue (i. 5, 12, i. 2, 1).

Compare also Xenophon, Cyropæd. ii. 3, 5-15, vii. 5, 82, and Xenophon, Economic. xiv. 5-9; Xenophon, De Venatione, xii. 15-19.]

[Footnote 10: Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 1, 19-20, &c. We read in the 'Works and Days' of Hesiod, 287:--

[Greek: Tê\n me/n toi kako/têta kai\ i)lado\n e)/stin e)le/sthai R(êi+di/ôs; lei/ê me\n o(do/s, ma/la d' e)ggu/thi nai/ei. Tê=s d' a)retê=s i(drô=ta theoi\ propa/roithen e)/thêkan A)tha/natoi; makro\s de\ kai\ o)/rthios oi)=mos e)p' au)tê/n, Kai\ trê=chus toprô=ton; e)pê\n d' ei)s a)/kron i(/kêai, R(êi+di/ê d' ê)peita pe/lei, chalepê/ per e)ou=sa.]

It is remarkable that while the Xenophontic Sokrates cites these verses from Hesiod as illustrating and enforcing the drift of his exhortation, the Platonic Sokrates cites them as misleading, and as a specimen of the hurtful errors instilled by the poets (Republic, ii. p. 364 D).]

We see thus that the doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates impugns in the Republic, is countenanced elsewhere by Sokratic authority. It is, in my judgment, more true than that which he opposes to it. The exhortations and orders of parents to their children, which he condemns--were founded upon views of fact and reality more correct than those which the Sokrates of the Republic would substitute in place of them.

[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates to refute them. Sentiments in which it originates. Panegyric on Justice.]

Let us note the sentiment in which Plato's creed here originates. He desires, above every thing, to stand forward as the champion and panegyrist of justice--as the enemy and denouncer of injustice. To praise justice, not in itself, but for its consequences--and to blame injustice in like manner--appears to him disparaging and insulting to justice.[11] He is not satisfied with showing that the just man benefits others by his justice, and that the unjust man hurts others by his injustice: he admits nothing into his calculation, except happiness or misery to the agent himself: and happiness, moreover, inherent in the process of just behaviour--misery inherent in the process of unjust behaviour--whatever be the treatment which the agent may receive from either Gods or men. Justice _per se_ (affirms Plato) is the cause of happiness to the just agent, absolutely and unconditionally: injustice, in like manner, of misery to the unjust--_quand même_--whatever the consequences may be either from men or Gods. This is the extreme strain of panegyric suggested by Plato's feeling, and announced as a conclusion substantiated by his reasons. Nothing more thoroughgoing can be advanced in eulogy of justice. "Neither the eastern star nor the western star is so admirable"--to borrow a phrase from Aristotle.[12]

[Footnote 11: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 368 B-C. [Greek: de/doika ga\r mê\ ou)d' o(/sion ê)=| parageno/menon dikaiosu/nê| kakêgoroume/nê| a)pagoreu/ein kai\ mê\ boêthei=n], &c.]

[Footnote 12: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. v. 3 (1), 1129, b. 28. [Greek: ou)/th' e(/speros ou)/th' e(ô=|os ou(/tô thaumasto/s.]]

Plato is here the first proclaimer of the doctrine afterwards so much insisted on by the Stoics--the all-sufficiency of virtue to the happiness of the virtuous agent, whatever may be his fate in other respects--without requiring any farther conditions or adjuncts. It will be seen that Plato maintains this thesis with reference to the terms _justice_ and its opposite _injustice_; sometimes (though not often) using the general term _virtue_ or wisdom, which was the ordinary term with the Stoics afterwards.

[Side-note: Different senses of justice--wider and narrower sense.]

The ambiguous meaning of the word _justice_ is known to Plato himself (as it is also to Aristotle). One professed purpose of the dialogue called the Republic is to remove such ambiguity. Apart from the many other differences of meaning (arising from dissentient sentiments of different men and different ages), there is one duplicity of meaning which Aristotle particularly dwells upon.[13] In the stricter and narrower sense, justice comprehends only those obligations which each individual agent owes to others, and for the omission of which he becomes punishable as unjust--though the performance of them, under ordinary circumstances, carries little positive merit: in another and a larger sense, justice comprehends these and a great deal more, becoming co-extensive with wise, virtuous, and meritorious character generally. The narrower sense is that which is in more common use; and it is that which Plato assumes provisionally when he puts forward the case of opponents in the speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. But when he comes to set forth his own explanation, and to draw up his own case, we see that he uses the term justice in its larger sense, as the condition of a mind perfectly well-balanced and well-regulated: as if a man could not be just, without being at the same time wise, courageous, and temperate. The just man described in the counter-pleadings of Glaukon and Adeimantus, would be a person like the Athenian Aristeides: the unjust man whom they contrast with him, would be one who maltreats, plunders, or deceives others, or usurps power over them. But the just man, when Sokrates replies to them and unfolds his own thesis, is made to include a great deal more: he is a person in whose mind each of the three constituent elements is in proper relation of controul or obedience to the others, so that the whole mind is perfect: a person whose Reason, being illuminated by contemplation of the Universals or self-existent Ideas of Goodness, Justice, Virtue, has become qualified to exercise controul over the two inferior elements: one of which (Energy) is its willing subordinate and auxiliary--while the lowest of the three (Appetite) is kept in regulation by the joint action of the two. The just man, so described, becomes identical with the true philosopher: no man who is not a philosopher can be just.[14] Aristeides would not at all correspond to the Platonic ideal of justice. He would be a stranger to the pleasure extolled by Plato as the exclusive privilege of the just and virtuous--the pleasure of contemplating universal Ideas and acquiring extended knowledge.[15]

[Footnote 13: Aristotel. Eth. Nikom. v. 2 (1), 1129, a. 25. [Greek: e)/oike de\ pleonachô=s le/gesthai ê( dikaiosu/nê kai\ ê( a)diki/a.]

Also v. 3 (1), 1130, a. 3. [Greek: dia\ de\ to\ au)to\ tou=to kai\ a)llo/trion a)gatho\n dokei= ei)=nai ê( dikaiosu/nê, mo/nê tô=n a)retô=n, o(/ti pro\s e(/teron e)stin; a)/llô| ga\r ta\ sumphe/ronta pra/ttei, ê)\ a)/rchonti ê)\ koinô=|.]

This proposition--that justice is [Greek: a)llo/trion a)gatho/n]--is the very proposition which Thrasymachus is introduced as affirming and Sokrates as combating, in the first book of the Republic.

Compare also Aristotle's Ethica Magna, i. 34, p. 1193, b. 19, where the same explanation of justice is given: also p. 1194, a. 7, where the Republic of Plato is cited, and the principle of reciprocity, as laid down at the end of the second book of the Republic, is repeated. We read in a fragment of the lost treatise of Cicero, De Republicâ (iii. 6, 7):--"Justitia foras spectat, et projecta tota est atque eminet.--Quæ virtus, præter cæteras, tota se ad alienas porrigit utilitates atque explicat."]

[Footnote 14: This is the same distinction as that drawn by Epiktetus between the [Greek: philo/sophos] and the [Greek: i)diô/tês] (Arrian, Epiktet. iii. 19). An [Greek: i)diô/tês] may be just in the ordinary meaning of the word. Aristeides was an [Greek: i)diô/tês]. The Greek word [Greek: i)diô/tês], designating the ordinary average citizen, as distinguished from any special or professional training, is highly convenient.]

[Footnote 15: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C. [Greek: tê=s de\ tou= o)/ntos the/as, oi(/an ê(donê\n e)/chei, a)du/naton a)/llô| gegeu=sthai plê\n tô=| philoso/phô|.]]

[Side-note: Plato's sense of the word Justice or Virtue--self-regarding.]

The Platonic conception of justice or Virtue on the one side, and of Injustice or Vice on the other, is self-regarding and prudential. Justice is in the mind a condition analogous to good health and strength in the body--(_mens sana in corpore sano_)--Injustice is a condition analogous to sickness, corruption, impotence, in the body.[16] The body is healthy, when each of its constituent parts performs its appropriate function: it is unhealthy, when there is failure in this respect, either defective working of any part, or interference of one part with the rest. So too in the just mind, each of its tripartite constituents performs its appropriate function--the rational mind directing and controuling, the energetic and appetitive minds obeying such controul. In the unjust mind, the case is opposite: Reason exercises no supremacy: Passion and Appetite, acting each for itself, are disorderly, reckless, exorbitant. To possess a healthy body is desirable for its consequences as a means towards other constituents of happiness; but it is still more desirable in itself, as an essential element of happiness _per se_, _i.e._, the negation of sickness, which would of itself make us miserable. On the other hand, an unhealthy or corrupt body is miserable by reason of its consequences, but still more miserable _per se_, even apart from consequences. In like manner, the just mind blesses the possessor twice: first and chiefly, as bringing to him happiness in itself--next also, as it leads to ulterior happy results:[17] the unjust mind is a curse to its possessor in itself, and apart from results--though it also leads to ulterior results which render it still more a curse to him.

[Footnote 16: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B, iv. p. 444 E.]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 C. [Greek: e)peidê\ ou)=n ô(molo/gêsas tô=n megi/stôn a)gathô=n ei)=nai dikaiosu/nên, a(\ tô=n te a)pobaino/ntôn a)p' au)tô=n e(/neka a)/xia kektê=sthai, _polu\ de\ ma=llon au)ta\ au(tô=n_], &c.]

This theory respecting justice and injustice was first introduced into ethical speculation by Plato. He tells us himself (throughout the speeches ascribed to Glaukon and Adeimantus), that no one before him had announced it: that all with one accord[18]--both the poets in addressing an audience, and private citizens in exhorting their children--inculcated a different doctrine, enforcing justice as an onerous duty, and not as a self-recommending process: that he was the first who extolled justice in itself, as conferring happiness on the just agent, apart from all reciprocity or recognition either by men or Gods--and the first who condemned injustice in itself, as inflicting misery on the unjust agent, independent of any recognition by others. Here then we have the first introduction of this theory into ethical speculation. Injustice is an internal taint, corruption of mind, which (like bad bodily health) is in itself misery to the agent, however he may be judged or treated by men or Gods; and justice is (like good bodily health) a state of internal happiness to the agent, independent of all recognition and responsive treatment from others.

[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 364 A. [Greek: pa/ntes e)x e(no\s sto/matos u(mnou=sin], &c. Also p. 366 D.]

[Side-note: He represents the motives to it, as arising from the internal happiness of the just agents.]

The Platonic theory, or something substantially equivalent to it under various forms of words, has been ever since upheld by various ethical theorists, from the time of Plato downward.[19] Every one would be glad if it could be made out as true: Glaukon and Adeimantus are already enlisted in its favour, and only demand from Sokrates a decent justification for their belief. Moreover, those who deny its truth incur the reproach of being deficient in love of virtue or in hatred of vice. What is still more remarkable--Plato has been complimented as if his theory had been the first antithesis to what is called the "selfish theory of morals"--a compliment which is certainly noway merited: for Plato's theory is essentially self-regarding.[20] He does not indeed lay his main stress on the retribution and punishments which follow injustice, because he represents injustice as being itself a state of misery to the unjust agent: nor upon the rewards attached to justice, because he represents justice itself as a state of intrinsic happiness to the just agent. Nevertheless the motive to performance of justice, and to avoidance of injustice, is derived in his theory (as it is in what is called the selfish theory) entirely from the happiness or misery of the agent himself. The just man is not called upon for any self-denial or self-sacrifice, since by the mere fact of being just, he acquires a large amount of happiness: it is the unjust man who, from ignorance or perversion, sacrifices that happiness which just behaviour would have ensured to him. Thus the Platonic theory is entirely self-regarding; looking to the conduct of each separate agent as it affects his own happiness, not as it affects the happiness of others.

[Footnote 19: It will be found maintained by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and impugned by Rutherford in his Essay on Virtue: also advocated by Sir James Mackintosh in his Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica; and controverted, or rather reduced to its proper limits, by Mr. James Mill, in his very acute and philosophical volume, Fragment on Mackintosh, published in 1835, see pp. 174-188 seq. Sir James indeed uses the word Benevolence where Plato uses that of Justice: he speaks of "the inherent delights and intrinsic happiness of Benevolence," &c.]

[Footnote 20: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Rep. p. lvii. "Quo facto deinceps ad gravissimam totius sermonis partem ita transitur, ut inter colloquentes conveniat, justitiæ vim et naturam eo modo esse investigandam, ut emolumentorum atque commodorum ex eâ redundantium nulla plané ratio habeatur."

This is not strictly exact, for Plato claims on behalf of justice not only that the performance of it is happy in itself, but also that it entails an independent result of ulterior happiness. But he dwells much less upon the second point; which indeed would be superfluous if the first could be thoroughly established. Compare Cicero, Tusc. Disput. v. 12-34, and the notes on Mr. James Harris's Three Treatises, p. 351 seq., wherein the Stoical doctrine--[Greek: Pa/nta au(tou= e(/neka pra/ttein]--is explained.]

[Side-note: His theory departs more widely from the truth than that which he opposes. Argument of Adeimantus discussed.]

So much to explain what the Platonic theory is. But when we ask whether it consists with the main facts of society, or with the ordinary feelings of men living in society, the reply must be in the negative.

"If" (says Plato, putting the words into the counter-pleading of Adeimantus)--"If the Platonic theory were preached by all of you, and impressed upon our belief from childhood, we should not have watched each other to prevent injustice; since each man would have been the best watch upon himself, from fear lest by committing injustice he should take to his bosom the maximum of evil."[21]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 A. [Greek: ei) ga\r ou(/tôs e)le/geto e)x a)rchê=s u(po\ pa/ntôn u(mô=n kai\ e)k ne/ôn ê(ma=s e)pei/thete, ou)k a)\n a)llê/lous e)phula/ttomen mê\ a)dikei=n, a)ll' au)to\s au(tou= ê)=n e(/kastos a)/ristos phu/lax, dediô\s mê\ a)dikô=n tô=| megi/stô| kakô=| xu/noikos ê)=|.]

These words are remarkable. They admit of two constructions:--1. If this Platonic theory were true. 2. If the Platonic theory, though not true, were constantly preached and impressed upon every one's belief from childhood.

Understanding the words in the first of these two constructions, the hypothetical proposition put into the mouth of Adeimantus is a valid argument against the theory afterwards maintained by Sokrates. If the theory were conformable to facts, no precautions would need to be taken by men against the injustice of each other. But such precautions have been universally recognised as indispensable, and universally adopted. Therefore the Sokratic theory is not conformable to facts. It is not true that the performance of duty (considered apart from consequences) is self-inviting and self-remunerative--the contrary path self-deterring and self-punitory--to each individual agent. Plato might perhaps argue that it would be true, if men were properly educated; and that the elaborate education which he provides for his Guardians in the Republic would suffice for this purpose. But even if this were granted, we must recollect that the producing Many of his Republic would receive no such peculiar education.

Understanding the words in the second construction, they would then mean that the doctrine, though not true, ought to be preached and accredited by the lawgiver as an useful fiction: that if every one were told so from his childhood, without ever hearing either doubt or contradiction, it would become an established creed which each man would believe, and each agent would act upon: that the effect in reference to society would therefore be the same as if the doctrine were true. This is in fact expressly affirmed by Plato in another place.[22] Now undoubtedly the effect of preaching and teaching, assuming it to be constant and unanimous, is very great in accrediting all kinds of dogmas. Plato believed it to be capable of almost unlimited extension--as we may see by the prescriptions which he gives for the training of the Guardians in his Republic. But to persuade every one that the path of duty and justice was in itself inviting, would be a task overpassing the eloquence even of Plato, since every man's internal sentiment would refute it. You might just as well expect to convince a child, through the declarations and encouragements of his nurse, that the medicine prescribed to him during sickness was very nice. Every child has to learn obedience as a necessity, under the authority and sanction of his parents. You may assure him that what is at first repulsive will become by habit comparatively easy: and that the self-reproach, connected with evasion of duty, will by association become a greater pain than that which is experienced in performing duty. This is to a great degree true, but it is by no means true to the full extent: still less can it be made to appear true before it has been actually realised. You cannot cause a fiction like this to be universally accredited. A child is compelled to practise justice by the fear of displeasure and other painful consequences from those in authority over him: the reason for bringing this artificial motive to bear upon him, is, that it is essential in the first instance for the comfort and security of others: in the second instance for his own. In Plato's theory, the first consideration is omitted, while not only the whole stress is laid upon the second, but more is promised in regard to the second than the reality warrants.

[Footnote 22: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663-664.]

The opponents whom the Platonic Sokrates here seeks to confute held--That Justice is an obligation in itself onerous to the agent, but indispensable in order to ensure to him just dealing and estimation from others--That injustice is a path in itself easy and inviting to the agent, but necessary to be avoided, because he forfeits his chance of receiving justice from others, and draws upon himself hatred and other evil consequences. This doctrine (argues Plato) represents the advantages of justice to the just agent as arising, not from his actually being just, but from his seeming to be so, and being reputed by others to be so: in like manner, it represents the misery of injustice to the unjust agent as arising not from his actually being unjust, but from his being reputed to be so by others. The inference which a man will naturally draw from hence (adds Plato) is, That he must aim only at seeming to be just, not at being just in reality: that he must seek to avoid the reputation of injustice, not injustice in reality: that the mode of life most enviable is, to be unjust in reality, but just in seeming--to study the means either of deceiving others into a belief that you are just, or of coercing others into submission to your injustice.[23] This indeed cannot be done unless you are strong or artful: it you are weak or simple-minded, the best thing which you can do is to be just. The weak alone are gainers by justice: the strong are losers by it, and gainers by injustice.[24]

[Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 362-367.]

[Footnote 24: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 366 C.]

These are legitimate corollaries (so Glaukon and Adeimantus are here made to argue) from the doctrine preached by most fathers to their children, that the obligations of justice are in themselves onerous to the just agent, and remunerative only so far as they determine just conduct on the part of others towards him. Plato means, not that fathers, in exhorting their children, actually drew these corollaries: but that if they followed out their own doctrine consistently, they would have drawn them: and that there is no way of escaping them, except by adopting the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates--That justice is in itself a source of happiness to the just agent, and injustice a source of misery to the unjust agent--however each of them may be esteemed or treated by others.

[Side-note: A Reciprocity of rights and duties between men in social life--different feelings towards one and towards the other.]

Now upon this we may observe, that Plato, from anxiety to escape corollaries which are only partially true, and which, in so far as they are true, may be obviated by precautions--has endeavoured to accredit a fiction misrepresenting the constant phenomena and standing conditions of social life. Among those conditions, reciprocity of services is one of the most fundamental. The difference of feeling which attaches to the services which a man renders, called duties or obligations--and the services which he receives from others, called his rights--is alike obvious and undeniable. Each individual has both duties and rights: each is both an agent towards others, and a patient or sentient from others. He is required to be just towards others, they are required to be just towards him: he in his actions must have regard, within certain limits, to their comfort and security--they in their actions must have regard to his. If he has obligations towards them, he has also rights against them; or (which is the same thing) they have obligations towards him. If punishment is requisite to deter him from doing wrong to them, it is equally requisite to deter them from doing wrong to him. Whoever theorises upon society, contemplating it as a connected scheme or system including different individual agents, must accept this reciprocity as a fundamental condition. The rights and obligations, of each towards the rest, must form inseparable and correlative parts of the theory. Each agent must be dealt with by others according to his works, and must be able to reckon beforehand on being so dealt with:--on escaping injury or hurt, and receiving justice, from others, if he behaves justly towards them. The theory supposes, that whether just or unjust, he will appear to others what he really is, and will be appreciated accordingly.[25]

[Footnote 25: Euripid. Herakleid. 425.

[Greek: Ou) ga\r turanni/d', ô(/ste barba/rôn, e)/chô, A)ll', ê)\n di/kaia drô=, di/kaia pei/somai.]

In a remarkable passage of the Laws, Plato sets a far higher value upon correct estimation from others, which in the Republic he depicts under the contemptuous appellation of show or seeming.

Plato, Legg. xii. p. 950 B. [Greek: Chrê\ de\ ou)/pote peri\ smikrou= poiei=sthai to\ dokei=n a)gathou\s ei)=nai toi=s a)/llois ê)\ mê\ dokei=n; ou) ga\r o(/son ou)si/as a)retê=s a)pesphalme/noi tugcha/nousin oi( polloi/, tosou=ton kai\ tou= kri/nein tou\s a)/llous oi( ponêroi\ kai\ a)/chrêstoi, thei=on de/ ti kai\ eu)/stocho/n e)sti kai\ toi=s kakoi=s. ô(/ste pa/mpolloi kai\ tô=n spho/dra kakô=n eu)= toi=s lo/gois kai\ tai=s do/xais diairou=ntai tou\s a)mei/nous tô=n a)nthrô/pôn kai\ tou\s chei/rous. Dio\ kalo\n tai=s pollai=s po/lesi to\ parake/leusma/ e)sti, protima=|n tê\n eu)doxi/an pro\s tô=n pollô=n; to\ me\n ga\r o)rtho/taton kai\ me/giston, o)/nta a)gatho\n a)lêthô=s ou(/tô to\n eu)/doxon bi/on thêreu/ein--chôri\s de\ mêdamô=s, to/n ge te/leon a)/ndra e)so/menon.]]

The fathers of families, whose doctrine Plato censures, adopted this doctrine of reciprocity, and built upon it their exhortations to their children. "Be just to others: without that condition, you cannot expect that they will be just to you." Plato objects to their doctrine, on the ground, that it assumed justice to be onerous to the agent, and therefore indirectly encouraged the evading of the onerous preliminary condition, for the purpose of extorting or stealing the valuable consequent without earning it fairly. Persons acting thus unjustly would efface reciprocity by taking away the antecedent. Now Plato, in correcting them, sets up a counter-doctrine which effaces reciprocity by removing the consequent. His counter-doctrine promises me that if I am just towards others, I shall be happy in and through that single circumstance; and that I ought not to care whether they behave justly or unjustly towards me. Reciprocity thus disappears. The authoritative terms _right_ and _obligation_ lose all their specific meaning.

[Side-note: Plato's own theory, respecting the genesis of society, is based on reciprocity.]

In thus eliminating reciprocity--in affirming that the performance of justice is not an onerous duty, but in itself happiness-giving, to the just agent--Plato contradicts his own theory respecting the genesis and foundation of society. What is the explanation which he himself gives (in this very Republic) of the primary origin of a city? It arises (he says) from the fact, that each individual among us is not self-sufficing, but full of wants. All having many wants, each takes to himself others as partners and auxiliaries to supply them: thus grows up the aggregation called a city.[26] Each man gives to another, and receives from another, in the belief that it will be better for him to do so. It is found most advantageous to all, that each man shall devote himself exclusively to one mode of production, and shall exchange his produce with that of others. Such interchange of productions and services is the generating motive which brings about civic communion.[27] Justice and injustice will be found in certain modes of carrying on this useful interchange between each man and the rest.[28]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B-C. [Greek: gi/gnetai po/lis, e)peidê\ tugcha/nei ê(mô=n e(/kastos ou)k au)ta/rkês a)lla\ pollô=n e)ndeê/s . . . metadi/dôsi dê\ a)/llos a)/llô|, ei)/ ti metadi/dôsin, ê)\ metalamba/nei, _oi)o/menos au(tô=| a)/meinon ei)=nai_ . . . poiê/sei de\ au)tê\n (tê\n po/lin), ô(s e)/oiken, ê)\ _ê(mete/ra chrei/a_.]]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 371 B. [Greek: Ti/ de\ dê/? e)n au)tê=| tê=| po/lei pô=s a)llê/lois metadô/sousin ô(=n a)\n e(/kastoi e)rga/zôntai? _ô(=n dê\_ e(/neka _kai\ koinôni/an poiêsa/menoi po/lin ô)|ki/samen_.]]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Republ. ii. pp. 371 E-372 A. [Greek: Pou= ou)=n a)/n pote e)n au)tê=| (tê=| po/lei) ei)/ê ê(/ te dikaiosu/nê kai\ ê( a)diki/a? . . . E)gô\ ou)k e(nnoô=, ei) mê/ pou _e)n au)tô=n tou/tôn chrei/a| tini\ tê=| pro\s a)llê/lous_.]]

Here Plato expressly declares the principle of reciprocity to be the fundamental cause which generates and sustains the communion called the city. No man suffices to himself: every man has wants which require supply from others: every man can contribute something to supply the wants of others. Justice or injustice have place, according as this reciprocal service is carried out in one manner or another. Each man labours to supply the wants of others as well as his own.

This is the primitive, constant, indispensable, bond whereby society is brought and held together. Doubtless it is not the only bond, nor does Plato say that it is. There are other auxiliary social principles besides, of great value and importance: but they presuppose and are built upon the fundamental principle--reciprocity of need and service--which remains when we reduce society to its lowest terms; and which is not the less real as underlying groundwork, though it is seldom enunciated separately, but appears overlaid, disguised, and adorned, by numerous additions and refinements. Plato correctly announces the reciprocity of need and service as one indivisible, though complex fact, when looked at with reference to the social communion. Neither of the two parts of that fact, without the other part, would serve as adequate groundwork. Each man must act, not for himself alone, but for others also: he must keep in view the requirements of others, to a certain extent, as well as his own. In his purposes and scheme of life, the two must be steadily combined.

[Side-note: Antithesis and correlation of obligation and right. Necessity of keeping the two ideas together, as the basis of any theory respecting society.]

It is clear that Plato--in thus laying down the principle of reciprocity, or interchange of service, as the ground-work of the social union--recognises the antithesis, and at the same time the correlation, between obligation and right. The service which each man renders to supply the wants of others is in the nature of an onerous duty; the requital for which is furnished to him in the services rendered by others to supply his wants. It is payment against receipt, and is expressly so stated by Plato--which every man conforms to, "believing that he will be better off thereby". Taking the two together, every man is better off; but no man would be so by the payment alone; nor could any one continue paying out, if he received nothing in return. Justice consists in the proper carrying on of this interchange in its two correlative parts.[29]

[Footnote 29: We may remark that Plato, though he states the principle of reciprocity very justly, does not state it completely. He brings out the reciprocity of need and service; he does not mention the reciprocal liability of injury. Each man can do hurt to others: each man may receive hurt from others. Abstinence on the part of each from hurting others, and security to each that he shall not be hurt by others, are necessities quite as fundamental as that of production and interchange.

The reciprocal feeling of security, or absence of all fear of ill-usage from others ([Greek: to\ kath' ê(me/ran a)dee\s kai\ a)nepibou/leuton pro\s a)llê/lous], to use the phrase of Thucydides iii. 37), is no less essential to social sentiment, than the reciprocal confidence that each man may obtain from others a supply of his wants, on condition of supplying theirs.]

We see therefore that Plato contradicts his own fundamental principle, when he denies the doing of justice to be an onerous duty, and when he maintains that it is in itself happiness-giving to the just agent, whether other men account him just and do justice to him in return--or not. By this latter doctrine he sets aside that reciprocity of want and service, upon which he had affirmed the social union to rest. The fathers, whom he blames, gave advice in full conformity with his own principle of reciprocity--when they exhorted their sons to the practice of justice, not as self-inviting, but as an onerous service towards others, to be requited by corresponding services and goodwill from others towards them. If (as he urges) such advice operates as an encouragement to crime, because it admits that the successful tyrant or impostor, who gets the services of others for nothing, is better off than the just man who gets them only in exchange for an onerous equivalent--this inference equally flows from that proclaimed reciprocity of need and service, which he himself affirms to be the generating cause of human society. If it be true (as Plato states) that each individual is full of wants, and stands in need of the services of others--then it cannot be true, that payment without receipt, as a systematic practice, is self-inviting and self-satisfying. That there are temptations for strong or cunning men to evade obligation and to usurp wrongful power, is an undeniable fact. We may wish that it were not a fact: but we gain nothing by denying or ignoring it. The more clearly the fact is stated, the better; in order that society may take precaution against such dangers--a task which has always been found necessary and often difficult. In reviewing the Gorgias,[30] we found Sokrates declaring, that Archelaus, the energetic and powerful king of Macedonia, who had usurped the throne by means of crime and bloodshed, was thoroughly miserable: far more miserable than he would have been, had he been defeated in his enterprise and suffered cruel punishment. Such a declaration represents the genuine sentiment of Sokrates as to what he _himself_ would feel, and what ought to be (in his conviction) the feeling of every one, after having perpetrated such nefarious acts. But it does not represent the feeling of Archelaus himself, nor that of the large majority of bystanders: both to these latter, and to himself, Archelaus appears an object of envy and admiration.[31] And it would be a fatal mistake, if the peculiar sentiment of Sokrates were accepted as common to others besides, and as forming a sound presumption to act upon: that is, if, under the belief that no ambitious man will voluntarily bring upon himself so much misery, it were supposed that precautions against his designs were unnecessary. The rational and tutelary purpose of punishment is, to make the proposition true and obvious to all--That the wrong-doer will draw upon himself a large preponderance of mischief by his wrong-doing. But to proclaim the proposition by voice of herald (which Plato here proposes) as if it were already an established fact of human nature, independent of all such precautions--would be only an unhappy delusion.[32]

[Footnote 30: See above, ch. xxiv., vol. ii., pp. 325-29.]

[Footnote 31: Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 3, 52-53. Cyrus says:--

[Greek: A)=r' ou)k, ei) me/llousi toiau=tai dia/noiai e)ggenê/sesthai a)nthrô/pois kai\ e)/mmonoi e)/sesthai, prô=ton me\n no/mous u(pa/rxai dei= toiou/tous, di' ô(=n _toi=s me\n a)gathoi=s e)/ntimos kai\ e)leuthe/rios o( bi/os paraskeuasthê/setai_, toi=s _de\ kakoi=s tapeino/s te kai\ a)lgeino\s_ kai\ a)bi/ôtos o( ai)ô\n e)panakei/setai? E)/peita de\ didaska/lous, oi)/mai, dei= kai\ a)/rchontas e)pi\ tou/tois gene/sthai, oi(/tines dei/xousi/ te o)rthô=s kai\ dida/xousi kai\ e)thi/sousi tau=ta dra=|n, e)/st' a)\n e)gge/nêtai au)toi=s, tou\s me\n _a)gathou\s kai\ eu)kleei=s eu)daimonesta/tous_ tô=| o)/nti nomi/zein, tou\s de\ _kakou\s kai\ duskleei=s a)thliôta/tous_ a(pa/ntôn ê(gei=sthai.]

Xenophon here uses language at variance with that of Plato, and consonant to that of the fathers of families whom Plato censures. To create habits of just action, and to repress habits of unjust action, society must meet both the one and the other by a suitable response. Assuming such conditional reciprocity to be realised, you may then persuade each agent that the unjust man, whom society brands with dishonour, is miserable ([Greek: oi( kakoi\ _kai\_ duskleei=s]).]

[Footnote 32: Xenophon, Economic. xiii. 11. Ischomachus there declares:--

[Greek: Pa/nu ga/r moi dokei=, ô)= Sô/krates, a)thumi/a e)ggi/gnesthai toi=s a)gathoi=s, o(/tan o(rô=si ta\ me\n e)/rga di' au)tô=n katapratto/mena, tô=n de\ o(moi/ôn tugcha/nontas e(autoi=s tou\s mê/te ponei=n mê/te kinduneu/ein e)the/lontas, o(/tan de/ê|.]--Also xiv. 9-10.]

[Side-note: Characteristic feature of the Platonic Commonwealth--specialization of services to that function for which each man is fit--will not apply to one individual separately.]

The characteristic feature of the Platonic commonwealth is to specialize the service of each individual in that function for which he is most fit. It is assumed, that each will render due service to the rest, and will receive from them due service in requital. Upon this assumption, Plato pronounces that the community will be happy.

Let us grant for the present that this conclusion follows from his premisses. He proceeds forthwith to apply it by analogy to another and a different case--the case of the individual man. He presumes complete analogy between the community and an individual.[33] To a certain extent, the analogy is real: but it fails on the main point which Plato's inference requires as a basis. The community, composed of various and differently endowed members, suffices to itself and its own happiness: "the individual is not sufficient to himself, but stands in need of much aid from others"[34]--a grave fact which Plato himself proclaims as the generating cause and basis of society. Though we should admit, therefore, that Plato's commonwealth is perfectly well-constituted, and that a well-constituted commonwealth will be happy--we cannot from thence infer that an individual, however well-constituted, will be happy. His happiness depends upon others as well as upon himself. He may have in him the three different mental varieties of souls, or three different persons--Reason, Energy, Appetite--well tempered and adjusted; so as to produce a full disposition to just behaviour on his part: but constant injustice on the part of others will nevertheless be effectual in rendering him miserable. From the happiness of a community, all composed of just men--you cannot draw any fair inference to that of one just man in an unjust community.

[Footnote 33: The parallel between the Commonwealth and the individual is perpetually reproduced in Plato's reasoning. Republic, ii. pp. 368-369, vii. p. 541 B, ix. pp. 577 C-D, 579 E, &c.]

[Footnote 34: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B.]

Thus much to show that the parallel between the community and the individual, which Plato pursues through the larger portion of the Republic, is fallacious. His affirmation--That the just man is happy in his justice, _quand même_--in his own mental perfection, whatever supposition may be made as to the community among whom he lives--implies that the just man is self-sufficing: and Plato himself expressly declares that no individual is self-sufficing. Indeed, no author can set forth more powerfully than Plato himself in this very dialogue--the uncomfortable and perilous position of a philosophical individual, when standing singly as a dissenter among a community with fixed habits and sentiments--unphilosophical and anti-philosophical. Such a person (Plato says) is like a man who has fallen into a den of wild beasts: he may think himself fortunate, if by careful retirement and absence from public manifestation, he can preserve himself secure and uncorrupted: but his characteristic and superior qualities can obtain no manifestation. The philosopher requires a community suited to his character. Nowhere does any such community (so Plato says) exist at present.[35]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Repub. vi. pp. 494 E, 496 D, 497 B. [Greek: ô(/sper ei)s thêri/a a)/nthrôpos e)mpesô/n], &c. Compare also ix. p. 592 A.]

[Side-note: Plato has not made good his refutation--the thesis which he impugns is true.]