Chapter XXXV: Platonic Republic--Abstract (1)

The Republic is the longest of all the Platonic dialogues, except the dialogue De Legibus. It consists of ten books, each of them as long as any one of the dialogues which we have passed in review. Partly from its length--partly from its lofty pretensions as the great constructive work of Plato--I shall give little more than an abstract of it in the present chapter, and shall reserve remark and comment for the succeeding.

[Side-note: Declared theme of the Republic--Expansion and multiplication of the topics connected with it.]

The professed subject is--What is Justice? Is the just man happy in or by reason of his justice? whatever consequences may befall him? Is the unjust man unhappy by reason of his injustice? But the ground actually travelled over by Sokrates, from whose mouth the exposition proceeds, is far more extensive than could have been anticipated from this announced problem. An immense variety of topics, belonging to man and society, is adverted to more or less fully. A theory of psychology or phrenology generally, is laid down and advocated: likewise a theory of the Intellect, distributed into its two branches: 1. Science, with the Platonic Forms or Ideas as Realities corresponding to it; 2. Opinion, with the fluctuating semi-realities or pseudo-realities, which form its object. A sovereign rule, exercised by philosophy, is asserted as indispensable to human happiness. The fundamental conditions of a good society, as Plato conceived it, are set forth at considerable length, and contrasted with the social corruptions of various existing forms of government. The outline of a perfect education, intellectual and emotional, is drawn up and prescribed for the ruling class: with many accompanying remarks on the objectionable tendencies of the popular and consecrated poems. The post-existence, as well as the pre-existence of the soul, is affirmed in the concluding books. As the result of the whole, Plato emphatically proclaims his conviction, that the just man is happy in and through his justice, quite apart from all consideration of consequences--yet that the consequences also will be such as to add to his happiness, both during life as well as after death: and the unjust man unhappy in and through his injustice.[1]

[Footnote 1: Plat. Repub. i. pp. 328 A, 350 D, 354 A.]

[Side-note: Personages of the dialogue.]

The dramatic introduction of the dialogue (which is described as held during the summer, immediately after the festival of the Bendideia in Peiræus), with the picture of the aged Kephalus and his views upon old age, is among the richest and most spirited in the Platonic works: but the discussion does not properly begin until Kephalus retires, leaving it to be carried on by Sokrates with Polemarchus, Glaukon, Adeimantus, and Thrasymachus.

[Side-note: Views of Kephalus about old age.]

"Old age has its advantages to reasonable men (says Kephalus). If I have lost the pleasures of youth, I have at the same time lost the violent desires which then overmastered me. I now enjoy tranquillity and peace. Without doubt, this is in part owing to my wealth. But the best that wealth does for me is, that it enables me to make compensation for deceptions and injustice, practised on other men in my younger days--and to fulfil all vows made to the Gods. An old man who is too poor to render such atonement for past falsehood and injustice, becomes uneasy in his mind as death approaches; he begins to fear that the stories about Hades, which he has heard and ridiculed in his youth, may perhaps prove true."[2]

[Footnote 2: Plato, Repub. i. pp. 330-331.

Compare the language of Cato, more rhetorical and exaggerated than that of Kephalus, in Cic. De Senect. c. 13-14.]

[Side-note: Definition of Justice by Simonides--It consists in rendering to every man what is owing to him.]

"Is that your explanation of justice (asks Sokrates): that it consists in telling truth, and rendering to every one what you have had from him?" The old man Kephalus here withdraws; Polemarchus and the others prosecute the discussion. "The poet Simonides (says Polemarchus) gives an explanation like to that which you have stated--when he affirms, That just dealing consists in rendering to every man what is owing to him."

[Side-note: Objections to it by Sokrates--There are cases in which it is not right to restore what is owing, or to tell the truth.]

"I do not know what Simonides means," replies Sokrates. "He cannot mean that it is always right to tell the truth, or always right to give back a deposit. If my friend, having deposited arms with me, afterwards goes mad, and in that state demands them back, it would not be right in me either to restore the arms, or to tell the truth, to a man in that condition. Therefore to say that justice consists in speaking truth and in giving back what we have received, cannot be a good definition."[3]

[Footnote 3: Plato, Repub. i. p. 331 C-D.

The historical Sokrates argues in the same manner (in the Memorabilia of Xenophon. See his conversation with Euthydemus, iv. 2; and Cicero, De Offic. iii. 25, 94-95).]

Polemarchus here gives a peculiar meaning to the phrase of Simonides: a man owes good to his friends--evil to his enemies: and he ought to pay back both. Upon this Sokrates comments.[4]

[Footnote 4: Sokrates here remarks that the precepts--Speak truth; Restore what has been confided to you--ought not to be considered as universally binding. Sometimes justice, or those higher grounds upon which the rules of justice are founded, prescribe that we should disobey the precepts. Sokrates takes this for granted, as a matter which no one will dispute; and it is evident that what Plato had here in his mind was, the obvious consideration that to tell the truth or restore a weapon deposited, to one who had gone mad, would do no good to any one, and might do immense mischief: thus showing that general utility is both the foundation and the limiting principle of all precepts respecting just and unjust. That this is present to the mind of Plato appears evident from his assuming the position as a matter of course; it is moreover Sokratic, as we see by the Memorabilia of Xenophon.

But Plato, in another passage of the Republic, clothes this Sokratic doctrine in a language and hypothesis of his own. He sets up Forms or Ideas, _per se_. The Just,--The Unjust,--The Honourable,--The Base, &c. He distinguishes each of these from the many separate manifestations in which it is specialised. The Form, though one reality in itself, appears manifold when embodied and disguised in these diversified accompaniments. It remains One and Unchanged, the object of Science and universal infallible truth; but each of its separate manifestations is peculiar to itself, appears differently to different minds, and admits of no higher certainty than fallible opinion. Though the Form of Justice always remains the same, yet its subordinate embodiments ever fluctuate; there is no given act nor assemblage of acts which is always just. Every just act (see Republic, v. pp. 476 A-479 A) is liable under certain circumstances to become unjust; or to be invaded and overclouded by the Form of Injustice. The genuine philosopher will detect the Form of Justice wherever it is to be found, in the midst of accompaniments however discrepant and confused, over all which he will ascend to the region of universal truth and reality. The unphilosophical mind cannot accomplish this ascent, nor detect the pure Form, nor even recognise its real existence: but sees nothing beyond the multiplicity of diverse particular cases in which it is or appears to be embodied. Respecting these particular cases there is no constant or universal truth, no full science. They cannot be thrown into classes to which the superior Form constantly and unconditionally adheres. They are midway between reality and non-reality: they are matters of opinion more or less reasonable, but not of certain science or unconditional affirmation. Among mankind generally, who see nothing of true and absolute Form, the received rules and dogmas respecting the Just, the Beautiful, &c., are of this intermediate and ambiguous kind: they can neither be affirmed universally, nor denied universally; they are partly true, partly false, determinable only by opinion in each separate case. Plato, Repub. v. p. 479 C-D: [Greek: ou)/t' ei)=nai ou)/te mê\ ei)=nai ou)de\n au)tô=n dunato\n pagi/ôs noê=sai, ou)/te a)mpho/tera ou)/te ou)de/teron . . . Ta\ tô=n pollô=n polla\ no/mima, kalou= te pe/ri kai\ tô=n a)/llôn, metaxu/ pou kulindei=tai tou= te mê\ o)/ntos kai\ tou= o)/ntos ei)likrinô=s.]

Of the distinction here drawn in general terms by Plato, between the pure unchangeable Form, and the subordinate classes of particulars in which that Form is or appears to be embodied, the reasoning above cited respecting truth-telling and giving back a deposit is an example.]

[Side-note: Explanation by Polemarchus--Farther interrogations by Sokrates--Justice renders what is proper and suitable: but how? in what cases, proper? Under what circumstances is Justice useful?]

_S._--Simonides meant to say (you tell me) that Justice consists in rendering benefits to your friends, evil to your enemies: that is, in rendering to each what is proper and suitable. But we must ask him farther--Proper and suitable--how? in what cases? to whom? The medical art is that which renders what is proper and suitable, of nourishment and medicaments for the health of the body: the art of cookery is that which renders what is proper and suitable, of savoury ingredients for the satisfaction of the palate. In like manner, the cases must be specified in which justice renders what is proper and suitable--to whom, how, or what?[5] _P._--Justice consists in doing good to friends, evil to enemies. _S._--Who is it that is most efficient in benefiting his friends and injuring his enemies, as to health or disease? _P._--It is the physician. _S._--Who, in reference to the dangers in navigation by sea? _P._--The steersman. _S._--In what matters is it that the just man shows his special efficiency, to benefit friends and hurt enemies?[6] _P._--In war: as a combatant for the one and against the other. _S._--To men who are not sick, the physician is of no use nor the steersman, to men on dry land: Do you mean in like manner, that the just man is useless to those who are not at war? _P._--No: I do not mean that. Justice is useful in peace also. _S._--So also is husbandry, for raising food--shoemaking, for providing shoes. Tell me for what want or acquisition justice is useful during peace? _P._--It is useful for the common dealings and joint transactions between man and man. _S._--When we are engaged in playing at draughts, the good player is our useful co-operator: when in laying bricks and stones, the skilful mason: much more than the just man. Can you specify in what particular transactions the just man has any superior usefulness as a co-operator? _P._--In affairs of money, I think. _S._--Surely not in the employment of money. When you want to buy a horse, you must take for your assistant, not the just man, but one who knows horses: so also, if you are purchasing a ship. What are those modes of jointly employing money, in which the just man is more useful than others? _P._--He is useful when you wish to have your money safely kept. _S._--That is, when your money is not to be employed, but to lie idle: so that when your money is useless, then is the time when justice is useful for it. _P._--So it seems. _S._--In regard to other things also, a sickle, a shield, a lyre when you want to use them, the pruner, the hoplite, the musician, must be invoked as co-operators: justice is useful only when you are to keep them unused. In a word, justice is useless for the use of any thing, and useful merely for things not in use. Upon this showing, it is at least a matter of no great worth.[7]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 D. [Greek: ê( ou)=n dê\ ti/si ti/ a)podidou=sa te/chnê dikaiosu/nê a)\n kaloi=to?]]

[Footnote 6: Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 E. [Greek: o( di/kaios e)n ti/ni pra/xei kai\ pro\s ti/ e)/rgon dunatô/tatos phi/lous ô)phelei=n kai\ e)chthrou\s bla/ptein?]]

[Footnote 7: Plat. Repub. i. pp. 332-333. 333 E: [Greek: Ou)k a)\n ou)=n pa/nu ge/ ti spoudai=on ei)/ê ê( dikaiosu/nê, ei) pro\s ta\ a)/chrêsta chrê/simon o)\n tugcha/nei?]]

[Side-note: The just man, being good for keeping property guarded, must also be good for stealing property--Analogies cited.]

But let us pursue the investigation (continues Sokrates). In boxing or in battle, is not he who is best in striking, best also in defending himself? In regard to disease, is not he who can best guard himself against it, the most formidable for imparting it to others? Is not the general who watches best over his own camp, also the most effective in surprising and over-reaching the enemy? In a word, whenever a man is effective as a guard of any thing, is he not also effective as a thief of it? _P._--Such seems the course of the discussion. _S._--Well then, the just man turns out to be a sort of thief, like the Homeric Autolykus. According to the explanation of Simonides, justice is a mode of thieving, for the profit of friends and damage of enemies.[8] _P._--It cannot be so. I am in utter confusion. Yet I think still that justice is profitable to friends, and hurtful to enemies.

[Footnote 8: Plat. Repub. i. p. 334 B. [Greek: e)/oiken ou)=n ê( dikaiosu/nê . . . kleptikê/ tis ri)=nai, e)p' ô)phelei/a| me/ntoi tô=n phi/lôn, kai\ e)pi\ bla/bê| tô=n e)chthrô=n.]]

[Side-note: Justice consists in doing good to friends, evil to enemies--But how, if a man mistakes who his friends are, and makes friends of bad men?]

_S._--Whom do you call friends: those whom a man believes to be good,--or those who really are good, whether he believes them to be so or not: and the like, in reference to enemies? _P._--I mean those whom he believes to be good. It is natural that he should love _them_ and that he should hate those whom he believes to be evil. _S._--But is not a man often mistaken in this belief? _P._--Yes: often. _S._--In so far as a man is mistaken, the good men are his enemies, and the evil men his friends. Justice, therefore, on your showing, consists in doing good to the evil men, and evil to the good men. _P._--So it appears. _S._--Now good men are just, and do no wrong to any one. It is therefore just, on your explanation, to hurt those who do no wrong. _P._--Impossible! that is a monstrous doctrine. _S._--You mean, then, that it is just to hurt unjust men, and to benefit just men? _P._--Yes; that is something better. _S._--It will often happen, therefore, when a man misjudges about others, that justice will consist in hurting his friends, since they are in his estimation the evil men: and in benefiting his enemies, since they are in his estimation the good men. Now this is the direct contrary of what Simonides defined to be justice.[9]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Republic, i. p. 334 D.]

[Side-note: Justice consists in doing good to your friend, if really a good man: hurt to your enemy, with the like proviso. Sokrates affirms that the just man will do no hurt to any one. Definition of Simonides rejected.]

"We have misconceived the meaning of Simonides (replies Polemarchus). He must have meant that justice consists in benefiting your friend, assuming him to be a good man: and in hurting your enemy, assuming him to be an evil man." Sokrates proceeds to impugn the definition in this new sense. He shows that justice does not admit of our hurting any man, either evil or good. By hurting the evil man, we only make him more evil than he was before. To do this belongs not to justice, but to injustice.[10] The definition of justice--That it consists in rendering benefit to friends and hurt to enemies--is not suitable to a wise man like Simonides, but to some rich potentate like Periander or Xerxes, who thinks his own power irresistible.[11]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 335-336.]

[Footnote 11: Here is a characteristic specimen of searching cross-examination in the Platonic or Sokratic style: citing multiplied analogies, and requiring the generalities of a definition to be clothed with particulars, that its sufficiency may be proved in each of many successive as well as different cases.]

[Side-note: Thrasymachus takes up the dialogue--Repulsive portrait drawn of him.]

At this turn of the dialogue, when the definition given by Simonides has just been refuted, Thrasymachus breaks in, and takes up the conversation with Sokrates. He is depicted as angry, self-confident to excess, and coarse in his manners even to the length of insult. The portrait given of him is memorable for its dramatic vivacity, and is calculated to present in an odious point of view the doctrines which he advances: like the personal deformities which Homer heaps upon Thersites in the Iliad.[12] But how far it is a copy of the real man, we have no evidence to inform us.

[Footnote 12: Homer, Iliad B 216. Respecting Thrasymachus the reader should compare Spengel--[Greek: Sunagôgê\ Technô=n]--pp. 94-98: which abates the odium inspired by this picture in the Republic.]

[Side-note: Violence of Thrasymachus--Subdued manner of Sokrates--Conditions of useful colloquy.]

In the contrast between Sokrates and Thrasymachus, Plato gives valuable hints as to the conditions of instructive colloquy. "What nonsense is all this!" (exclaims Thrasymachus). "Do not content yourself with asking questions, Sokrates, which you know is much easier than answering: but tell us yourself what Justice is: give us a plain answer: do not tell us that it is what is right--or profitable--or for our interest--or gainful--or advantageous: for I will not listen to any trash like this." "Be not so harsh with us, Thrasymachus" (replies Sokrates, in a subdued tone). "If we have taken the wrong course of inquiry, it is against our own will. You ought to feel pity for us rather than anger." "I thought" (rejoined Thrasymachus, with a scornful laugh) "that you would have recourse to your usual pretence of ignorance, and would decline answering." _S._--How can I possibly answer, when you prescribe beforehand what I am to say or not to say? If you ask men--How much is twelve? and at the same time say--Don't tell me that it is twice six, or three times four, or four times three--how can any man answer your question? _T._--As if the two cases were similar! _S._--Why not similar? But even though they be not similar, yet if the respondent thinks them so, how can he help answering according as the matter appears to him, whether we forbid him or not? _T._--Is that what you intend to do? Are you going to give me one of those answers which I forbade? _S._--Very likely I may, if on consideration it appears to me the proper answer.[13] _T._--What will you say if I show you another answer better than all of them? What penalty will you then impose upon yourself? _S._--What penalty?--why, that which properly falls upon the ignorant. It is their proper fate to learn from men wiser than themselves: that is the penalty which I am prepared for.[14]

[Footnote 13: Plato, Repub. i. p. 337 C. [Greek: Ei) d' ou)=n _kai\ mê\ e)/stin o(/moion, phai/netai de\ tô=| e)rôtêthe/nti toiou=ton, ê(=tto/n ti au)to\n oi)/ei a)pokrinei=sthai to\ phaino/menon e(autô=|_, e)a/n te ê(mei=s a)pagoreu/ômen, e)a/n te mê/? A)/llo ti ou)=n, e)/phê, kai\ su\ ou(/tô poiê/seis? ô(=n e)gô\ a)pei=pon, tou/tôn ti a)pokrinei=? Ou)k a)\n thauma/saimi, ê)=n d' e)gô/, _ei)/ moi skepsame/nô| ou(/tô_ do/xeien.]

This passage deserves notice, inasmuch as Plato here affirms, in very plain language, the Protagorean doctrine, which we have seen him trying to refute in the Theætêtus and Kratylus,--"Homo Mensura,--Every man is a measure to himself. That is true or false to every man which appears to him so."

Most of Plato's dialogues indeed imply this truth; for no man makes more constant appeal to the internal assent or dissent of the individual interlocutor. But it is seldom that he declares it in such express terms.]

[Footnote 14: Plato, Republic, i. p. 337 D.]

[Side-note: Definition given by Thrasymachus--Justice is that which is advantageous to the more powerful. Comments by Sokrates. What if the powerful man mistakes his own advantage?]

After a few more words, in the same offensive and insolent tone ascribed to him from the beginning, Thrasymachus produces his definition of Justice:--"Justice is that which is advantageous to the more powerful". Some comments from Sokrates bring out a fuller explanation, whereby the definition stands amended:--"Justice is that which is advantageous to the constituted authority, or to that which holds power, in each different community: monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, as the case may be. Each of these authorities makes laws and ordinances for its own interest: declares what is just and unjust: and punishes all citizens who infringe its commands. Justice consists in obeying these commands. In this sense, justice is everywhere that which is for the interest or advantage of the more powerful."[15] "I too believe" (says Sokrates) "that justice is something advantageous, in a certain sense. But whether you are right in adding these words--'to the more powerful'--is a point for investigation.[16] Assuming that the authorities in each state make ordinances for their own advantage, you will admit that they sometimes mistake, and enact ordinances tending to their own disadvantage. In so far as they do this, justice is not that which is advantageous, but that which is disadvantageous, to the more powerful.[17] Your definition therefore will not hold."

[Footnote 15: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 338-339.]

[Footnote 16: Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 B. [Greek: e)peidê\ ga\r xumphe/ron ge/ ti ei)=nai kai\ e)gô\ o(mologô= to\ di/kaion, su\ de\ prosti/thês kai\ au)to\ phê\s ei)=nai _to\ tou= krei/ttonos_, e)gô\ de\ a)gnoô=, skepte/on dê/.]]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 E.]

[Side-note: Correction by Thrasymachus--if the Ruler mistakes, he is _pro tanto_ no Ruler--The Ruler, _quâ_ Ruler--_quâ_ Craftsman--is infallible.]

Thrasymachus might have replied to this objection by saying, that he meant what the superior power conceived to be for its own advantage, and enacted accordingly, whether such conception was correct or erroneous. This interpretation, though indicated by a remark put into the mouth of Kleitophon, is not farther pursued.[18] But in the reply really ascribed to Thrasymachus, he is made to retract what he had just before admitted--that the superior authority sometimes commits mistakes. In so far as a superior or a ruler makes mistakes (Thrasymachus says), he is not a superior. We say, indeed, speaking loosely, that the ruler falls into error, just as we say that the physician or the steersman falls into error. The physician does not err _quâ_ physician, nor the steersman _quâ_ steersman. No craftsman errs _quâ_ craftsman. If he errs, it is not from his craft, but from want of knowledge: that is, from want of craft.[19] What the ruler, as such, declares to be best for himself, and therefore enacts, is always really best for himself: this is justice for the persons under his rule.

[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 B.]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 E. [Greek: e)pilipou/sês ga\r e)pistê/mês o( a(marta/nôn a(marta/nei, e)n ô(=| ou)/k e)sti dêmiourgo/s; ô(/ste dêmiourgo\s ê)\ sopho\s ê)\ a)/rchôn ou)dei\s a(marta/nei to/te o(/tan a)/rchôn ê)=|.]]

[Side-note: Reply by Sokrates--The Ruler, _quâ_ infallible Craftsman, studies the interest of those whom he governs, and not his own interest.]

To this subtle distinction, Sokrates replies by saying (in substance), "If you take the craftsman in this strict meaning, as representing the abstraction Craft, it is not true that his proceedings are directed towards his own interest or advantage. What he studies is, the advantage of his subjects or clients, not his own. The physician, as such, has it in view to cure his patients: the steersman, to bring his passengers safely to harbour: the ruler, so far forth as craftsman, makes laws for the benefit of his subjects, and not for his own. If obedience to these laws constitutes justice, therefore, it is not true that justice consists in what is advantageous to the superior or governing power. It would rather consist in what is advantageous to the governed."[20]

[Footnote 20: Plato, Republic, i. p. 342.]

[Side-note: Thrasymachus denies this--Justice is the good of another. The just many are worse off than the unjust One, and are forced to submit to his superior strength.]

Thrasymachus is now represented as renouncing the abstraction above noted,[21] and reverting to the actualities of life. "Such talk is childish!" (he exclaims, with the coarseness imputed to him in this dialogue). "Shepherds and herdsmen tend and fatten their flocks and herds, not for the benefit of the sheep and oxen, but for the profit of themselves and the proprietors. So too the genuine ruler in a city: he regards his subjects as so many sheep, looking only to the amount of profit which he can draw from them.[22] Justice is, in real truth, the good of another; it is the profit of him who is more powerful and rules--the loss of those who are weaker and must obey. It is the unjust man who rules over the multitude of just and well-meaning men. They serve him because he is the stronger: they build up his happiness at the cost of their own. Everywhere, both in private dealing and in public function, the just man is worse off than the unjust. I mean by the unjust, one who has the power to commit wrongful seizure on a large scale. You may see this if you look at the greatest injustice of all--the case of the despot, who makes himself happy while the juster men over whom he rules are miserable. One who is detected in the commission of petty crimes is punished, and gets a bad name: but if a man has force enough to commit crime on the grand scale, to enslave the persons of the citizens, and to appropriate their goods--instead of being called by a bad name, he is envied and regarded as happy, not only by the citizens themselves, but by all who hear him named. Those who blame injustice, do so from the fear of suffering it, not from the fear of doing it. Thus then injustice, in its successful efficiency, is strong, free, and over-ruling, as compared with justice. Injustice is profitable to a man's self: justice (as I said before) is what is profitable to some other man stronger than he."[23]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Republic, p. 345 B-C.]

[Footnote 22: Plato, Republic, p. 343 B.

A similar comparison is put into the mouth of Sokrates himself by Plato in the Theætêtus, p. 174 D.]

[Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 343-344.]

[Side-note: Position laid for the subsequent debate and exposition.]

Thrasymachus is described as laying down this position in very peremptory language, and as anxious to depart immediately after it, if he had not been detained by the other persons present. His position forms the pivot of the subsequent conversation. The two opinions included in it--(That justice consists in obedience yielded by the weak to the orders of the strong, for the advantage of the strong--That injustice, if successful, is profitable and confers happiness: justice the contrary)--are disputed, both of them, by Sokrates as well as by Glaukon.[24]

[Footnote 24: Plato, Repub. i. pp. 345 A-348 A.]

[Side-note: Arguments of Sokrates--Injustice is a source of weakness--Every multitude must observe justice among themselves, in order to avoid perpetual quarrels. The same about any single individual: if he is unjust, he will be at war with himself, and perpetually weak.]

Sokrates is represented as confuting and humiliating Thrasymachus by various arguments, of which the two first at least are more subtle than cogent.[25] He next proceeds to argue that injustice, far from being a source of strength, is a source of weakness--That any community of men, among whom injustice prevails, must be in continual dispute; and therefore incapable of combined action against others--That a camp of mercenary soldiers or robbers, who plunder every one else, must at least observe justice among themselves--That if they have force, this is because they are unjust only by halves: that if they were thoroughly unjust, they would also be thoroughly impotent--That the like is true also of an individual separately taken, who, so far as he is unjust, is in a perpetual state of hatred and conflict with himself, as well as with just men and with the Gods: and would thus be divested of all power to accomplish any purpose.[26]

[Footnote 25: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 346-350.]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 351-352 D.]

[Side-note: Farther argument of Sokrates--The just man is happy, the unjust man miserable--Thrasymachus is confuted and silenced. Sokrates complains that he does not yet know what Justice is.]

Having thus shown that justice is stronger than injustice, Sokrates next offers an argument to prove that it is happier or confers more happiness than injustice. The conclusion of this argument is--That the just man is happy, and the unjust miserable.[27] Thrasymachus is confuted, and retires humiliated from the debate. Yet Sokrates himself is represented as dissatisfied with the result. "At the close of our debate" (he says) "I find that I know nothing about the matter. For as I do not know what justice is, I can hardly expect to know whether it is a virtue or not; nor whether the man who possesses it is happy or not happy."[28]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 353-354 A.]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Republic, i. fin. p. 354 C. [Greek: ô(/ste moi ge/gonen e)k tou= dialo/gou mêde\n ei)de/nai; o(po/te ga\r to\ di/kaion mê\ oi)=da o(\ e)sti, scholê=| ei)/somai ei)/te a)retê/ tis ou)=sa tugcha/nei ei)/te kai\ ou)/, kai\ po/teron o( e)/chôn au)to\ ou)k eu)dai/môn e)sti\n ê)\ eu)dai/môn.]]

[Side-note: Glaukon intimates that he is not satisfied with the proof, though he agrees in the opinion expressed by Sokrates. Tripartite distribution of Good--To which of the three heads does Justice belong?]

Here Glaukon enters the lists, intimating that he too is dissatisfied with the proof given by Sokrates, that justice is every way better than injustice: though he adopts the conclusion, and desires much to hear it fully demonstrated. "You know" (he says), "Sokrates, that there are three varieties of Good--1. Good, _per se_, and for its own sake (apart from any regard to ulterior consequences): such as enjoyment and the innocuous pleasures. 2. Good both in itself, and by reason of its ulterior consequences: such as full health, perfect vision, intelligence, &c. 3. Good, not in itself, but altogether by reason of its consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment, professional business, &c. Now in which of these branches do you rank Justice?" _S._--I rank it in the noblest--that is--in the second branch: which is good both in itself, and by reason of its consequences. _G._--Most persons put it in the third branch: as being in itself difficult and laborious, but deserving to be cultivated in consequence of the reward and good name which attaches to the man who is reputed just.[29] _S._--I know that this is the view taken by Thrasymachus and many others: but it is not mine. _G._--Neither is it mine.

[Footnote 29: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357.]

[Side-note: Glaukon undertakes to set forth the case against Sokrates, though professing not to agree with it.]

Yet still I think that you have not made out your case against Thrasymachus, and that he has given up the game too readily. I will therefore re-state his argument, not at all adopting his opinion as my own, but simply in order to provoke a full refutation of it from you, such as I have never yet heard from any one. First, I shall show what his partisans say as to the nature and origin of justice. Next, I shall show that all who practise justice, practise it unwillingly; not as good _per se_, but as a necessity. Lastly, I shall prove that such conduct on their part is reasonable. If these points can be made out, it will follow that the life of the unjust man is much better than that of the just.[30]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 358.]

[Side-note: Pleading of Glaukon. Justice is in the nature of a compromise for all--a medium between what is best and what is worst.]

The case, as set forth first by Glaukon, next by Adeimantus, making themselves advocates of Thrasymachus--is as follows. "To do injustice, is by nature good: to suffer injustice is by nature evil: but the last is greater as an evil, than the first as a good: so that when men have tasted of both, they find it advantageous to agree with each other, that none shall either do or suffer injustice. These agreements are embodied in laws; and what is prescribed by the law is called lawful and just. Here you have the generation and essence of justice, which is intermediate between what is best and what is worst: that is, between the power of committing injustice with impunity, and the liability to suffer injustice without protection or redress. Men acquiesce in such compromise, not as in itself good, but because they are too weak to commit injustice safely. For if any man were strong enough to do so, and had the dispositions of a man, he would not make such a compromise with any one: it would be madness in him to do so.[31]

[Footnote 31: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 358-359.]

"That men are just, only because they are too weak to be unjust, will appear if we imagine any of them, either the just or the unjust, armed with full power and impunity, such as would be conferred by the ring of Gyges, which rendered the wearer invisible at pleasure. If the just man could become thus privileged, he would act in the same manner as the unjust: his temper would never be adamantine enough to resist the temptations which naturally prompt every man to unlimited satisfaction of his desires. Such temptations are now counteracted by the force of law and opinion; but if these sanctions were nullified, every man, just or unjust, would seize every thing that he desired, without regard to others. When he is just, he is so not willingly, but by compulsion. He chooses that course not as being the best for him absolutely, but as the best which his circumstances will permit.

[Side-note: Comparison of the happiness of the just man derived from his justice alone, when others are unjust to him with that of the unjust man under parallel circumstances.]

"To determine which of the two is happiest, the just man or the unjust, let us assume each to be perfect in his part, and then compare them. The unjust man must be assumed to have at his command all means of force and fraud, so as to procure for himself the maximum of success; _i.e._, the reputation of being a just man, along with all the profitable enormities of injustice. Against him we will set the just man, perfect in his own simplicity and righteousness; a man who cares only for being just in reality, and not for seeming to be so. We shall suppose him, though really just, to be accounted by every one else thoroughly unjust. It is only thus that we can test the true value of his justice: for if he be esteemed just by others, he will be honoured and recompensed, so that we cannot be sure that his justice is not dictated by regard to these adventitious consequences. He must be assumed as just through life, yet accounted by every one else unjust, and treated accordingly: while the unjust man, with whom we compare him, is considered and esteemed by others as if he were perfectly just. Which of the two will have the happiest life? Unquestionably the unjust man. He will have all the advantages derived from his unscrupulous use of means, together with all that extrinsic favour and support which proceeds from good estimation on the part of others: he will acquire superior wealth, which will enable him both to purchase partisans, and to offer costly sacrifices ensuring to him the patronage of the Gods. The just man, on the contrary, will not only be destitute of all these advantages, but will be exposed to a life of extreme suffering and torture. He will learn by painful experience that his happiness depends, not upon being really just, but upon being accounted just by others."[32]

[Footnote 32: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 361-362.]

[Side-note: Pleading of Adeimantus on the same side. He cites advice given by fathers to their sons, recommending just behaviour by reason of its consequences.]

Here Glaukon concludes. Adeimantus now steps in as second counsel on the same side, to the following effect:[33] "Much yet remains to be added to the argument. To make it clearer, we must advert to the topics insisted on by those who oppose Glaukon--those who panegyrise justice and denounce injustice. A father, who exhorts his sons to be just, says nothing about the intrinsic advantages of justice _per se_: he dwells upon the beneficial consequences which will accrue to them from being just. Through such reputation they will obtain from men favours, honours, commands, prosperous alliances--from the Gods, recompenses yet more varied and abundant. If, on the contrary, they commit injustice, they will be disgraced and ill-treated among men, severely punished by the Gods. Such are the arguments whereby a father recommends justice, and dissuades injustice, he talks about opinions and after consequences only, he says nothing about justice or injustice in themselves. Such are the allegations even of those who wish to praise and enforce justice. But there are others, and many among them, who hold an opposite language, proclaiming unreservedly that temperance and justice are difficult to practise--injustice and intemperance easy and agreeable, though law and opinion brand them as disgraceful. These men affirm that the unjust life is for the most part more profitable than the just. They are full of panegyrics towards the wealthy and powerful, however unprincipled; despising the poor and weak, whom nevertheless they admit to be better men.[34] They even say that the Gods themselves entail misery upon many good men, and confer prosperity on the wicked. Then there come the prophets and jugglers, who profess to instruct rich men, out of many books, composed by Orpheus and Musæus, how they may by appropriate presents and sacrifices atone for all their crimes and die happy.[35]

[Footnote 33: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 362-367.]

[Footnote 34: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 364 A-B.]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Republic, p. 364 C-E.]

"When we find that the case is thus stated respecting justice, both by its panegyrists and by its enemies--that the former extol it only from the reputation which it procures, and that the latter promise to the unjust man, if clever and energetic, a higher recompense than any such reputation can obtain for him--what effect can we expect to be produced on the minds of young men of ability, station, and ambition? What course of life are they likely to choose? Surely they will thus reason: A just life is admitted to be burdensome--and it will serve no purpose, unless I acquire, besides, the reputation of justice in the esteem of others. Now the unjust man, who can establish such reputation, enjoys the perfection of existence. My happiness turns not upon the reality, but upon the seeming: upon my reputation with others.[36] Such reputation then it must be my aim to acquire. I must combine the real profit of injustice with the outside show and reputation of justice. Such combination is difficult: but all considerable enterprises are difficult: I must confederate with partisans to carry my point by force or fraud. If I succeed, I attain the greatest prize to which man can aspire. I may be told that the Gods will punish me; but the same poets, who declare the existence of the Gods, assure me also that they are placable by prayer and sacrifice: and the poets are as good authority on the one point as on the other.[37] Such" (continues Adeimantus) "will be the natural reasoning of a powerful, energetic, aspiring, man. How can we expect that such a man should prefer justice, when the rewards of injustice on its largest scale are within his reach?[38] Unless he be averse to injustice, from some divine peculiarity of disposition--or unless he has been taught to abstain from it by the acquisition of knowledge,--he will treat the current encomiums on justice as ridiculous. No man is just by his own impulse. Weak men or old men censure injustice, because they have not force enough to commit it with success: which is proved by the fact than any one of them who acquires power, immediately becomes unjust as far as his power reaches.

[Footnote 36: Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 365 E, 366 A.]

[Footnote 37: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 365 B-D.]

[Footnote 38: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 B-D.]

[Side-note: Nobody recommends Justice _per se_, but only by reason of its consequences.]

"The case as I set it forth" (pursues Adeimantus) "admits of no answer on the ground commonly taken by those who extol justice and blame injustice, from the earliest poets down to the present day.[39] What they praise is not justice _per se_, but the reputation which the just man obtains, and the consequences flowing from it. What they blame is not injustice _per se_, but its results. They never commend, nor even mention, justice as it exists in and moulds the internal mind and character of the just man; even though he be unknown, misconceived and detested, by Gods as well as by men. Nor do they ever talk of the internal and intrinsic effects of injustice upon the mind of the unjust man, but merely of his ulterior prospects. They never attempt to show that injustice itself, in the mind of the unjust man, is the gravest intrinsic evil: and justice in the mind of the just man, the highest intrinsic good: apart from consequences on either side. If you had all held this language from the beginning, and had impressed upon us such persuasion from our childhood, there would have been no necessity for our keeping watch upon each other to prevent injustice. Every man would have been the best watch upon himself, through fear lest by becoming unjust he might take into his own bosom the gravest evil.[40]

[Footnote 39: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 D-E. [Greek: pa/ntôn u(mô=n, o(/soi e)paine/tai phate\ dikaiosu/nês ei)=nai, a)po\ tô=n e)x a)rchê=s ê(rô/ôn a)rxa/menoi, o(/sôn lo/goi leleimme/noi, me/chri tô=n nu=n a)nthrô/pôn, ou)dei\s pô/pote e)/psexen a)diki/an ou)d' e)pê/|nese dikaiosu/nên a)/llôs ê)\ do/xas te kai\ tima\s kai\ dôrea\s ta\s a)p' au)tô=n duna/mei e)n tê=| tou= e)/chontos psuchê=| e)no\n kai\ lantha/non theou/s te kai\ a)nthrô/pous, ou)dei\s pô/pote ou)/t' e)n poiê/sei ou)/t' e)n i)di/ois lo/gois e)pexê=lthen i(kanô=s tô=| lo/gô|], &c. Compare p. 362 E.

Whoever reads this, will see that Plato does not intend (as most of his commentators assert) that the arguments which Sokrates combats in the Republic were the invention of Protagoras, Prodikus, and other Sophists of the Platonic century.]

[Footnote 40: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 A. [Greek: ei) ga\r ou)/tôs e)le/geto e)x a)rchê=s u(po\ pa/ntôn u(mô=n, kai\ e)k ne/ôn ê(ma=s e)pei/thete, ou)k a)n a)llê/lous e)phula/ttomen mê\ a)dikei=n, a)ll' au)to\s au(tou= ê)=n e(/kastos phu/lax, dediô\s mê\ a)dikô=n tô=| megi/stô| kakô=| xu/noikos ê)=|.]]

[Side-note: Adeimantus calls upon Sokrates to recommend and enforce Justice on its own grounds, and to explain how Justice in itself benefits the mind of the just man.]

"Here therefore is a deficiency in the argument on behalf of justice, which I call upon you,[41] Sokrates, who have employed all your life in these meditations, to supply. You have declared justice to be good indeed for its consequences, but still more of a good from its own intrinsic nature. Explain how it is good, and how injustice is evil, in its own intrinsic nature: what effect each produces on the mind, so as to deserve such an appellation. Omit all notice of consequences accruing to the just or unjust man, from the opinion, favourable or otherwise, entertained towards him by others. You must even go farther: you must suppose that both of them are misconceived, and that the just man is disgraced and punished as if he were unjust--the unjust man honoured and rewarded as if he were just. This is the only way of testing the real intrinsic value of justice and injustice, considered in their effects upon the mind. If you expatiate on the consequences--if you regard justice as in itself indifferent, but valuable on account of the profitable reputation which it procures, and injustice as in itself profitable, but dangerous to the unjust man from the hostile sentiment and damage which it brings upon him--the real drift of your exhortation will be, to make us aspire to be unjust in reality, but to aim at maintaining a reputation of justice along with it. In that line of argument you will concede substantially the opinion of Thrasymachus--That justice is another man's good, the advantage of the more powerful: and injustice the good or profit of the agent, but detrimental to the weaker."[42]

[Footnote 41: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 367 E. [Greek: dio/ti pa/nta to\n bi/on ou)de\n a)/llo skopô=n dielê/luthas ê)\ tou=to] (_you_, Sokrates).]

[Footnote 42: Plat. Republic, ii. p. 367 C-D.]

[Side-note: Relation of Glaukon and Adeimantus to Thrasymachus.]

With the invocation here addressed to Sokrates, Adeimantus concludes his discourse. Like Glaukon, he disclaims participation in the sentiments which the speech embodies. Both of them, professing to be dissatisfied with the previous refutation of Thrasymachus by Sokrates, call for a deeper exposition of the subject. Both of them then enunciate a doctrine, resembling partially, though not entirely, that of Thrasymachus--but without his offensive manner, and with superior force of argument. They propose it as a difficult problem, which none but Sokrates can adequately solve. He accepts the challenge, though with apparent diffidence: and we now enter upon his solution, which occupies the remaining eight books and a half of the Republic. All these last books are in fact expository, though in the broken form of dialogue. The other speakers advance scarce any opinions for Sokrates to confute, but simply intervene with expressions of assent, or doubt, or demand for farther information.

[Side-note: Statement of the question as it stands after the speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. What Sokrates undertakes to prove.]

I here repeat the precise state of the question, which is very apt to be lost amidst the mæanderings of a Platonic dialogue.

First, What is Justice? Sokrates had declared at the close of the first book, that he did not know what Justice was; and that therefore he could not possibly decide, whether it was a virtue or not:--nor whether the possessor of it was happy or not.

Secondly, To which of the three classes of good things does Justice belong? To the second class--_i. e._ things good _per se_, and good also in their consequences? Or to the third class--_i. e._ things not good _per se_, but good only in their consequences? Sokrates replies (in the beginning of the second book) that it belongs to the second class.

Evidently, these two questions cannot stand together. In answering the second, Sokrates presupposes a certain determination of the first; inconsistent with that unqualified ignorance, of which he had just made profession. Sokrates now professes to know, not merely that Justice is a good, but to what class of good things it belongs. The first question has thus been tacitly dropped without express solution, and has given place to the second. Yet Sokrates, in providing his answer to the second, includes implicitly an answer to the first, so far as to assume that Justice is a good thing, and proceeds to show in what way it is good.

Some say that Justice is good (_i.e._ that it ensures, or at least contributes to, the happiness of the agent), but not _per se_: only in its ulterior consequences. Taken _per se_, it imposes privation, loss, self-denial; diminishing instead of augmenting the agent's happiness. But taken along with its results, this preliminary advance is more than adequately repaid; since without it the agent would not obtain from others that reciprocity of justice, forbearance, and good treatment without which his life would be intolerable.

If this last opinion be granted, Glaukon argues that Justice would indeed be good for weak and middling agents, but not for men of power and energy, who had a good chance of extorting the benefit without paying the antecedent price. And Thrasymachus, carrying this view still farther, assumes that there are in every society men of power who despotise over the rest; and maintains that Justice consists, for the society generally, in obeying the orders of these despots. It is all gain to the strong, all loss to the weak. These latter profit by it in no other way than by saving themselves from farther punishment or ill usage on the part of the strong.

[Side-note: Position to be proved by Sokrates--Justice makes the just man happy _per se_, whatever be its results.]

Sokrates undertakes to maintain the opposite--That Justice is a good _per se_, ensuring the happiness of the agent by its direct and intrinsic effects on the mind: whatever its ulterior consequences may be. He maintains indeed that these ulterior consequences are also good: but that they do not constitute the paramount benefit, or the main recommendation of Justice: that the good of Justice _per se_ is much greater. In this point of view, Justice is not less valuable and necessary to the strong than to the weak. He proceeds to show, what Justice is, and how it is beneficial _per se_ to the agent, apart from consequences: also, what Injustice is, and how it is injurious to the agent _per se_, apart from consequences.[43]

[Footnote 43: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 368 seq.]

[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates to show what Justice is--Assumed analogy between the city and the individual.]

He begins by affirming the analogy between an entire city or community, and each individual man or agent. There is justice (he says) in the entire city--and justice in each individual man. In the city, the characteristics of Justice are stamped in larger letters or magnified, so as to be more easily legible. We will therefore first read them in the city, and then apply the lesson to explain what appears in smaller type in the individual man.[44] We will trace the steps by which a city is generated, in order that we may see how justice and injustice spring up in it.

[Footnote 44: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 368-369.]

It is in this way that Plato first conducts us to the formation of a political community. A parallel is assumed between the entire city and each individual man: the city is a man on a great scale--the man is a city on a small scale. Justice belongs both to one and to the other. The city is described and analysed, not merely as a problem for its own sake, but in order that the relation between its constituent parts may throw light on the analogous constituent parts, which are assumed to exist in each individual man.[45]

[Footnote 45: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 A. [Greek: tê\n tou= mei/zonos o(moio/têta e)n tê=| tou= e)la/ttonos i)de/a| e)piskopou=ntes.]]

[Side-note: Fundamental principle, to which communities of mankind owe their origin--Reciprocity of want and service between individuals--No individual can suffice to himself.]

The fundamental principle (Sokrates affirms) to which cities or communities owe their origin, is, existence of wants and necessities in all men. No single man is sufficient for himself: every one is in want of many things, and is therefore compelled to seek communion or partnership with neighbours and auxiliaries. Reciprocal dealings begin: each man gives to others, and receives from others, under the persuasion that it is better for him to do so.[46] Common needs, helplessness of individuals apart, reciprocity of service when they are brought together--are the generating causes of this nascent association. The simplest association, comprising the mere necessaries of life, will consist only of four or five men: the husbandman, builder, weaver, shoemaker, &c. It is soon found advantageous to all, that each of these should confine himself to his own proper business: that the husbandman should not attempt to build his own house or make his own shoes, but should produce corn enough for all, and exchange his surplus for that of the rest in their respective departments. Each man has his own distinct aptitudes and dispositions; so that he executes both more work and better work, by employing himself exclusively in the avocation for which he is suited. The division of labour thus becomes established, as reciprocally advantageous to all. This principle soon extends itself: new wants arise: the number of different employments is multiplied. Smiths, carpenters, and other artisans, find a place: also shepherds and herdsmen, to provide oxen for the farmer, wool and hides for the weaver and the shoemaker. Presently a farther sub-division of labour is introduced for carrying on exchange and distribution: markets are established: money is coined: foreign merchants will import and export commodities: dealers, men of weak body, and fit for sedentary work, will establish themselves to purchase wholesale the produce brought by the husbandman, and to sell it again by retail in quantities suitable for distribution. Lastly, the complement of the city will be made up by a section of labouring men who do jobs for hire: men of great bodily strength, though not adding much to the intelligence of the community.[47]