Chapter XXXV: Platonic Republic--Abstract (2)

[Footnote 46: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369.]

[Footnote 47: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 371.

It is remarkable that in this first outline of the city Plato recognises only free labour, not slave labour.]

[Side-note: Moderate equipment of a sound and healthy city--Few wants.]

Such is the full equipment of the sound and healthy city, confined to what is simple and necessary. Those who compose it will have sufficient provision of wheat and barley, for loaves and cakes--of wine to drink--of clothing and shoes--of houses for shelter, and of myrtle and yew twigs for beds. They will enjoy their cheerful social festivals, with wine, garlands, and hymns to the Gods. They will take care not to beget children in numbers greater than their means, knowing that the consequence thereof must be poverty or war.[48] They will have, as condiment, salt and cheese, olives, figs, and chestnuts, peas, beans, and onions. They will pass their lives in peace, and will die in a healthy old age, bequeathing a similar lot to their children. Justice and injustice, which we are seeking for, will be founded on a certain mode of mutual want and dealing with each other.[49]

[Footnote 48: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 372 B-C. [Greek: ou)ch u(pe\r tê\n ou)si/an poiou/menoi tou\s pai=das, eu)labou/menoi peni/an ê)\ po/lemon.]]

[Footnote 49: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 372 A. [Greek: e)n au)tô=n tou/tôn chrei/a| tini\ tê=| pro\s a)llê/lous.]]

You feed your citizens, Sokrates (observes Glaukon), as if you were feeding pigs. You must at least supply them with as many sweets and condiments as are common at Athens: and with beds and tables besides.

[Side-note: Enlargement of the city--Multiplied wants and services. First origin of war and strife with neighbours--It arises out of these multiplied wants.]

I understand you (replies Sokrates): you are not satisfied with a city of genuine simplicity: you want a city luxurious and inflated. Well then--we will suppose it enlarged until it comprehends all the varieties of elegant and costly enjoyment: gold, silver, and ivory: musicians and painters in their various branches: physicians: and all the crowd of attendants required for a society thus enlarged. Such extension of consumption will carry with it a numerous population, who cannot be maintained from the lands belonging to the city. We shall be obliged to make war upon our neighbours and seize some of their lands. They too will do the same by us, if they have acquired luxurious habits. Here we see the first genesis of war, with all its consequent evils: springing from the acquisition of wealth, beyond the limit of necessity.[50] Having war upon our hands, we need soldiers, and a considerable camp of them. Now war is essentially a separate craft and function, requiring to be carried on by persons devoted to it, who have nothing else to do. We laid down from the beginning, that every citizen ought to confine himself exclusively to that business for which he was naturally fit; and that no one could be allowed to engage in two distinct occupations. This rule is above all things essential for the business of war. The soldier must perform the duties of a soldier, and undertake no others.[51]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 373.]

[Footnote 51: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 374.]

[Side-note: Separate class of soldiers or Guardians. One man cannot do well more than one business. Character required in the Guardians--Mildness at home with pugnacity against enemies.]

The functions of these soldiers are more important than those of any one else. Upon them the security of the whole community depends. They are the Guardians of the city: or rather, those few seniors among them, who are selected from superior merit and experience, and from a more perfect education to exercise command, are the proper Guardians: while the remaining soldiers are their Auxiliaries.[52] These Guardians, or Guardians and their Auxiliaries, must be first chosen with the greatest care, to ensure that they have appropriate natural dispositions: next, their training and education must be continued as well as systematic. Appropriate natural dispositions are difficult to find: for we require the coincidence of qualities which are rarely found together. The Auxiliaries must be mild and gentle towards their fellow citizens, passionate and fierce towards enemies. They must be like generous dogs, full of kindness towards those whom they know, angrily disposed towards those whom they do not know.[53]

[Footnote 52: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 414 B.]

[Footnote 53: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376.]

[Side-note: Peculiar education necessary, musical as well as gymnastical.]

Assuming children of these dispositions to be found, we must provide for them the best training and education. The training must be twofold: musical, addressed to the mind: gymnastical, addressed to the body--pursuant to the distribution dating from ancient times.[54] Music includes all training by means of words or sounds: speech and song, recital and repetition, reading and writing, &c.

[Footnote 54: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 E. [Greek: Ti/s ou)=n ê( paidei/a? ê)\ chalepo\n eu(rei=n belti/ô tê=s u(po\ tou= pollou= chro/nou eu(rême/nês e)/sti de/ pou ê( me\n e)pi\ sô/masi gumnastikê/, ê( d' e)pi\ psuchê=| mousikê/.]

This appeal of Plato to antiquity and established custom deserves notice.]

[Side-note: Musical education, by fictions as well as by truth. Fictions addressed to the young: the religious legends now circulating are often pernicious: censorship necessary.]

The earliest training of every child begins from the stories or fables which he hears recounted: most of which are false, though some among them are true. We must train the child partly by means of falsehood, partly by means of truth: and we must begin first with the falsehood. The tenor of these fictions, which the child first hears, has a powerful effect in determining his future temper and character. But such fictions as are now currently repeated, will tend to corrupt his mind, and to form in him sentiments and opinions adverse to those which we wish him to entertain in after life. We must not allow the invention and circulation of stories at the pleasure of the authors: we must establish a censorship over all authors; licensing only such of their productions as we approve, and excluding all the rest, together with most of those now in circulation.[55] The fables told by Homer, Hesiod, and other poets, respecting the Gods and Heroes, are in very many cases pernicious, and ought to be suppressed. They are not true; and even were they true, ought not to be mentioned before children. Stories about battles between the Gods and the Giants, or quarrels among the Gods themselves, are mischievous, whether intended as allegories or not: for young hearers cannot discriminate the allegorical from the literal.[56]

[Footnote 55: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 377 C. [Greek: ô(=n de\ nu=n le/gousi tou\s pollou\s e)kblête/on.]

Compare the animadversions in Sextus Empiricus about the mischievous doctrines to be found in the poets, adv. Mathematicos, i. s. 276-293.]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Republ. p. 378 D.]

[Side-note: Orthodox type to be laid down: all poets are required to conform their legends to it. The Gods are causes of nothing but good: therefore they are causes of few things. Great preponderance of actual evil.]

I am no poet (continues the Platonic Sokrates), nor can I pretend to compose legends myself: but I shall lay down a type of theological orthodoxy, to which all the divine legends in our city must conform. Every poet must proclaim that the Gods are good, and therefore cannot be the cause of anything except good. No poet can be allowed to describe the Gods (according to what we now read in Homer and elsewhere) as dispensing both good and evil to mankind. The Gods must be announced as causes of all the good which exists, but other causes must be found for all the evil: the Gods therefore are causes of comparatively few things, since bad things are far more abundant among us than good.[57] No poetical tale can be tolerated which represents the Gods as assuming the forms of different persons, and going about to deceive men into false beliefs.[58] Falsehood is odious both to Gods and to men: though there are some cases in which it is necessary as a precaution against harm, towards enemies, or even towards friends during seasons of folly or derangement.[59] But none of these exceptional circumstances can apply to the Gods.

[Footnote 57: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 379 C. [Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra o( theo/s, e)peidê\ a)gatho/s, pa/ntôn a)\n ei)/ê ai)/tios, ô(s oi( polloi\ le/gousin, a)ll' o)li/gôn me\n toi=s a)nthrô/pois ai)/tios, pollô=n de\ a)nai/tios; polu\ ga\r e)la/ttô ta)gatha\ tô=n kakô=n ê(mi=n. Kai\ tô=n me\n a)gathô=n ou)de/na a)/llon ai)tiate/on, tô=n de\ kakô=n a)/ll' a)/tta dei= zêtei=n ta\ ai)/tia, a)ll' ou) to\n theo/n.]]

[Footnote 58: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 380-381.

Dacier blames Plato for this as an error, saying, that God may appear, and has appeared to men, under the form of an Angel or of some man whom he has created after his own image (Traduction de Platon, tom. i. p. 172).]

[Footnote 59: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 382 C.]

[Side-note: The Guardians must not fear death. No terrible descriptions of Hades must be presented to them: no intense sorrow, nor violent nor sensual passion, must be recounted either of Gods or Heroes.]

It is indispensable to inspire these youthful minds with courage, and to make them fear death as little as possible. But the terrific descriptions, given by the poets, of Hades and the underworld, are above all things likely to aggravate the fear of death. Such descriptions must therefore be interdicted, as neither true nor useful. Even if poetically striking, they are all the more pernicious to be listened to by youths whom we wish to train up as spirited free-men, fearing enslavement more than death.[60] We must also prohibit the representations of intense grief and distress, imputed by Homer to Heroes or Gods, to Achilles, Priam, or Zeus, for the death of friends and relatives. A perfectly reasonable man will account death no great evil, either for himself or for his friend: he will be, in a peculiar degree, sufficient to himself for his own happiness, and will therefore endure with comparative equanimity the loss of friends, relatives, or fortune.[61] We must teach youth to be ashamed of indulging in immoderate grief or in violent laughter.[62] We must teach them also veracity and temperance, striking out all those passages in Homer which represent the Gods or Heroes as incontinent, sensual, furiously vindictive, reckless of obligation, or money-loving.[63] The poets must either not recount such proceedings at all, or must not ascribe them to Gods and Heroes.

[Footnote 60: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 386-387.]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 387 D-E.]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 388 B-E.]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 390-391.]

[Side-note: Type for all narratives respecting men.]

We have thus prescribed the model to which all poets must accommodate their narratives respecting Gods and Heroes. We ought now to set out a similar model for their narratives respecting men. But this is impossible, until our present investigation is brought to a close: because one of the worst misrepresentations which the poets give of human affairs, is, when they say that there are many men unjust, yet happy--just, yet still miserable:--that successful injustice is profitable, and that justice is a benefit to other persons, but a loss to the agent. We affirm that this is a misrepresentation; but we cannot assume it as such at present, since the present enquiry is intended to prove that it is so.[64]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 392 C.]

[Side-note: Style of narratives. The poet must not practise variety of imitation: he must not speak in the name of bad characters.]

From the substance of these stories we pass to the style and manner. The poet will recount either in his own person, by simple narrative: or he will assume the characters and speak in the names of others, thus making his composition imitative. He will imitate every diversity of character, good and bad, wise and foolish. This however cannot be tolerated in our city. We can permit no imitation except that of the reasonable and virtuous man. Every man in our city exercises one simple function: we have no double-faced or many-faced citizens. We shall respectfully dismiss the poet who captivates us by variety of characters, and shall be satisfied with the dry recital of simple stories useful in their tendency, expressing the feeling of the reasonable man and no other.[65]

[Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 396-398.]

[Side-note: Rhythm and Melody regulated. None but simple and grave music allowed: only the Dorian and Phrygian moods, with the lyre and harp.]

We must farther regulate the style of the Odes and Songs, consistent with what has been already laid down. Having prescribed what the sense of the words must be, we must now give directions about melody and rhythm. We shall permit nothing but simple music, calculated less to please the ear, than to inspire grave, dignified, and resolute sentiment. We shall not allow either the wailing Lydian, or the soft and convivial Ionic mood: but only the Phrygian and Dorian moods. Nor shall we tolerate either the fife, or complicated stringed instruments: nothing except the lyre and harp, with the panspipe for rural abodes.[66] The rhythm or measure must also be simple, suitable to the movements of a calm and moderate man. Both good rhythm, graceful and elegant speaking, and excellence of sense, flow from good and virtuous dispositions, tending to inspire the same dispositions in others:[67] just as bad rhythm, ungraceful and indecorous demeanour, defective proportion, &c., are companions of bad speech and bad dispositions. Contrasts of this kind pervade not only speech and song, but also every branch of visible art: painting, architecture, weaving, embroidery, pottery, and even the natural bodies of animals and plants. In all of them we distinguish grace and beauty, the accompaniments of a good and sober disposition--from ungracefulness and deformity, visible signs of the contrary disposition. Now our youthful Guardians, if they are ever to become qualified for their functions, must be trained to recognise and copy such grace and beauty.[68] For this purpose our poets, painters, architects, and artisans, must be prohibited from embodying in their works any ungraceful or unseemly type. None will be tolerated as artists, except such as can detect and embody the type of the beautiful. Our youth will thus insensibly contract exclusive familiarity, both through the eye and through the ear, with beauty in its various manifestations: so that their minds will be brought into harmonious preparation for the subsequent influence of beautiful discourse.[69]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 398-399.]

[Footnote 67: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 400 A.]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 400-401.]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 401 C-D.]

[Side-note: Effect of musical training of the mind--makes youth love the Beautiful and hate the Ugly.]

This indeed (continues Sokrates) is the principal benefit arising from musical tuition, that the internal mind of a youth becomes imbued with rhythm and harmony. Hence he learns to commend and be delighted with the beautiful, and to hate and blame what is ugly; before he is able to render any reason for his sentiments: so that when mature age arrives, his sentiments are found in unison with what reason enjoins, and already predisposed to welcome it.[70] He becomes qualified to recognise the Forms of Temperance, Courage, Liberality, Magnanimity, and their embodiments in particular persons. To a man brought up in such sentiments, no spectacle can be so lovely as that of youths combining beauty of mental disposition with beauty of exterior form. He may indeed tolerate some defects in the body, but none in the mind.[71] His love, being genuine and growing out of musical and regulated contemplations, will attach itself to what is tempered and beautiful; not to the intense pleasures of sense, which are inconsistent with all temperance. Such will be the attachments subsisting in our city, and such is the final purpose of musical training--To generate love of the Beautiful.[72]

[Footnote 70: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 A.]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 D-E.]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 403 C. [Greek: dei= de/ pou teleuta=|n ta\ mousika\ ei)s ta\ tou= kalou= e)rôtika/.]]

[Side-note: Training of the body--simple and sober. No refined medical art allowed. Wounds or temporary ailments treated; but sickly frames cannot be kept alive.]

We next proceed to gymnastic training, which must be simple, for the body--just as our musical training was simple for the mind. We cannot admit luxuries and refinements either in the one or in the other. Our gymnastics must impart health and strength to the body, as our music imparts sobriety to the mind.[73] We shall require few courts of justice and few physicians. Where many of either are needed, this is a proof that ill-regulated minds and diseased bodies abound. It would be a disgrace to our Guardians if they could not agree on what is right and proper among themselves, without appealing to the decision of others. Physicians too are only needed for wounds or other temporary and special diseases. We cannot admit those refinements of the medical art, and that elaborate nomenclature and classification of diseases, which the clever sons of Æsculapius have invented, in times more recent than Æsculapius himself.[74] He knew, but despised, such artifices; which, having been devised chiefly by Herodikus, serve only to keep alive sickly and suffering men--who are disqualified for all active duty through the necessity of perpetual attention to health,--and whose lives are worthless both to themselves and to the city. In our city, every man has his distinct and special function, which he is required to discharge. If he be disqualified by some temporary ailment, the medical art will be well employed in relieving and restoring him to activity: but he has no leisure to pass his life as a patient under cure, and if he be permanently unfit to fill his place in the established cycle of duties, his life ought not to be prolonged by art, since it is useless to himself and useless to the city also.[75] Our medical treatment for evils of the body, and our judicial treatment for evils of the mind, must be governed by analogous principles. Where body and mind are sound at bottom, we must do our best to heal temporary derangements: but if a man has a body radically unsound, he must be suffered to die--and if he has a mind unsound and incurable, he must be put to death by ourselves.[76]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 404 B.]

[Footnote 74: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 405 D. [Greek: phu/sas te kai\ kata/r)r(ous nosê/masin o)no/mata ti/thesthai a)nagka/zein tou\s kompsou\s A)sklêpia/das, ou)k ai)schro\n dokei=? Kai\ ma/l', e)/phê, ô(s a)lêthô=s kaina\ tau=ta kai\ a)/topa nosêma/tôn o)no/mata. Oi(=a, ô(s oi)=mai, ou)k ê)=n e)p' A)sklêpiou=.] Also 406 C.]

[Footnote 75: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 406 C. [Greek: ou)deni\ scholê\ dia\ bi/ou ka/mnein i)atreuome/nô|.] 406 D: [Greek: ou) scholê\ ka/mnein ou)de\ lusitelei= ou(/tô zê=n, nosê/mati to\n nou=n prose/chonta, tê=s de\ prokeime/nês e)rgasi/as a)melou=nta.] 407 D-E: [Greek: a)lla\ to\n mê\ duna/menon e)n tê=| kathestêkui/a| perio/dô| zê\n, mê\ oi)/esthai dei=n therapeu/ein, ô(s ou)/te au(tô=| ou)/te po/lei lusitelê=.] P. 408 A.]

[Footnote 76: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 409-410.]

[Side-note: Value of Gymnastic in imparting courage to the mind--Gymnastic and Music necessary to correct each other.]

Gymnastic training does some good in strengthening the body, but it is still more serviceable in imparting force and courage to the mind. As regards the mind, gymnastic and music form the indispensable supplement one to the other. Gymnastic by itself makes a man's nature too savage and violent: he acquires no relish for knowledge, comes to hate discourse, and disdains verbal persuasion.[77] On the other hand, music by itself makes him soft, cowardly, and sensitive, unfit for danger or hardship. The judicious combination of the two is the only way to form a well-balanced mind and character.[78]

[Footnote 77: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 411 D. [Greek: Misolo/gos dê\ o( toiou=tos gi/gnetai kai\ a)/mousos, kai\ peithoi= me\n dia\ lo/gôn ou)de\n e)/ti chrê=tai], &c.]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 410-411.]

[Side-note: Out of the Guardians a few of the very best must be chosen as Elders or Rulers--highly educated and severely tested.]

Such must be the training, from childhood upwards, of these Guardians and Auxiliaries of our city. We must now select from among these men themselves, a few to be Governors or chief Guardians; the rest serving as auxiliaries. The oldest and best of them must be chosen for this purpose, those who possess in the greatest perfection the qualities requisite for Guardians. They must be intelligent, capable, and solicitous for the welfare of the city. Now a man is solicitous for the welfare of that which he loves. He loves those whose interests he believes to be the same as his own; those whose well-being he believes to coincide with his own well-being[79]--the contrary, with the contrary. The Guardians chosen for Chiefs must be those who are most thoroughly penetrated with such sympathy; who have preserved most tenaciously throughout all their lives the resolution to do every thing which they think best for the city, and nothing which they do not think to be best for it. They must be watched and tested in temptations pleasurable as well as painful, to see whether they depart from this resolution. The elders who have best stood such trial, must be named Governors.[80] These few will be the chief Guardians or Rulers: the remaining Guardians will be their auxiliaries or soldiers, acting under their orders.

[Footnote 79: Plato, Republ. iii. p. 412 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n phroni/mous te ei)s tou=to dei= u(pa/rchein kai\ dunatou\s kai\ e)/ti kêdemo/nas tê=s po/leôs? E)/sti tau=ta. Kê/doito de/ g' a)/n tis ma/lista tou/tou o(\ tugcha/noi philô=n. A)na/gkê. Kai\ mê\n tou=to/ g' a)\n ma/lista philoi=, ô(=| xumphe/rein ê(goi=to ta\ au)ta\ kai\ e(autô=| kai\ o(/tan ma/lista e)kei/nou me\n eu)= pra/ttontos oi)/oito xumbai/nein kai\ e(autô=| ei)= pra/ttein, mê\ de/, tou)nanti/on.]]

[Footnote 80: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 413-414.

Refer to De Leg. (I. p. 633-636-637) about resisting pleasure as well as pain.]

[Side-note: Fundamental creed required to be planted in the minds of all the citizens respecting their breed and relationship.]

Here then our city will take its start; the body of Guardians marching in arms under the orders of their Chiefs, and encamping in a convenient acropolis, from whence they may best be able to keep order in the interior and to repel foreign attack.[81] But it is indispensable that both they and the remaining citizens should be made to believe a certain tale,--which yet is altogether fictitious and of our own invention. They must be told that they are all earthborn, sprung from the very soil which they inhabit: all therefore brethren, from the same mother Earth: the auxiliaries or soldiers, born with their arms and equipments. But there was this difference (we shall tell them) between the different brethren. Those fit for Chiefs or Rulers, were born with a certain mixture of gold in their constitution: those fit for soldiers or Guardians simply, with a like mixture of silver: the remainder, with brass or iron. In most individual cases, each of these classes will beget an offspring like themselves. But exceptions will sometimes happen, in which the golden man will have a child of silver, or brass,--or the brazen or iron man, a child of nobler metal than his own. Now it is of the last importance that the Rulers should keep watch to preserve the purity of these breeds. If any one of their own children should turn out to be of brass or iron, they must place him out among the husbandmen or artisans: if any of the brazen or iron men should chance to produce a child of gold, they must receive him among themselves, since he belongs to them by his natural constitution. Upon the maintenance of these distinct breeds, each in its appropriate function, depends the entire fate of the city: for an oracle has declared that it will perish, if ever iron or brazen men shall become its Guardians.[82]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D.]

[Footnote 82: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 414-415.]

[Side-note: How is such a fiction to be accredited in the first instance? Difficulty extreme, of first beginning; but if once accredited, it will easily transmit itself by tradition.]

It is indispensable (continues Sokrates) that this fiction should be circulated and accredited, as the fundamental, consecrated, unquestioned, creed of the whole city, from which the feeling of harmony and brotherhood among the citizens springs. But how can we implant such unanimous and unshaken belief, in a story altogether untrue? Similar fables have often obtained implicit credence in past times: but no such case has happened of late, and I question whether it could happen now.[83] The postulate seems extravagant: do _you_ see by what means it could be realised?--I see no means (replies Glaukon) by which the fiction could be first passed off and accredited, among these men themselves: but if it were once firmly implanted, in any one generation, I do not doubt that their children and descendants would inherit and perpetuate it.[84] We must be satisfied with thus much (replies Sokrates): assuming the thing to be done, and leaving the process of implanting it to spontaneous and oracular inspiration.[85] I now proceed with the description of the city.

[Footnote 83: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414 B. [Greek: Ti/s a)\n ou)=n ê(mi=n mêchanê\ ge/noito tô=n pseudô=n tô=n e)n de/onti gignome/nôn, ô(=n dê\ nu=n e)le/gomen, gennai=o/n ti e(\n pseudome/nous pei=sai ma/lista me\n kai\ au)tou\s tou\s a)/rchontas, ei) de\ mê/, tê\n a)/llên po/lin? . . . Mêde\n kaino/n, a)lla\ Phoinikiko/n ti, pro/teron me\n ê)/dê pollachou= gegono/s, ô(/s phasin oi( poiêtai\ kai\ pepei/kasin, e)ph' ê(mô=n de\ ou) gegono\s ou)d' oi)=da ei) geno/menon a)/n, pei=sai de\ suchnê=s peithou=s.]]

[Footnote 84: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 C-D [Greek: Tou=ton ou)=n to\n mu=thon o(/pôs a)\n peisthei=en, e)/cheis tina\ mêchanê/n? Ou)damô=s, e)/phê, o(/pôs g' a)\n au)toi\ ou(=toi; o(/pôs me/nt' a)\n oi( tou/tôn ui(ei=s kai\ oi( e)/peita, oi(/ t' a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi oi( u(/steron.]]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D. [Greek: Kai\ tou=to me\n dê\ e(/xei o(/pê| a)\n au)to\ ê( phê/mê a)ga/gê|.]

[Side-note: Guardians to reside in barracks and mess together; to have no private property or home; to be maintained by contribution from the people.]

The Rulers and their auxiliaries the body of Guardians must be lodged in residences, sufficient for shelter and comfort, yet suitable for military men, and not for tradesmen. Every arrangement must be made for rendering them faithful guardians of the remaining citizens. It would be awful indeed, if they were to employ their superior strength in oppressing instead of protecting the flock entrusted to them. To ensure their gentleness and fidelity, the most essential guarantee is to be found in the good musical and gymnastic training which they will have received. But this alone will not suffice. All the conditions of their lives must be so determined, that they shall have the least possible motive for committing injustice towards the other citizens. None of them must have any separate property of his own, unless in special case of proved necessity: nor any house or store cupboard from which others are excluded. They must receive, from the contributions of the remaining citizens, sufficient subsistence for the health and comfort of military men, but nothing beyond. They must live together in their camp or barrack, and dine together at a public mess-table. They must not be allowed either to possess gold and silver, or to drink in cups of those metals, or to wear them as appendages to clothing, or even to have them under the same roof. They must be told, that these metals, though not forbidden to the other citizens, are forbidden to them, because they have permanently inherent in their mental constitution the divine gold and silver, which would be corrupted by intermixture with human.[86]

[Footnote 86: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 416-417.]

[Side-note: If the Guardians fail in these precautions, and acquire private interests, the city will be ruined.]

If these precautions be maintained, the Guardians may be secure themselves, and may uphold in security the entire city. But if the precautions be relinquished--if the Guardians or Soldiers acquire separate property in lands, houses, and money--they will then become householders and husbandmen instead of Guardians or Soldiers: hostile masters, instead of allies and protectors to their fellow-citizens. They will hate their fellow-citizens, and be hated by them in return: they will conspire against them, and will be themselves conspired against. In this manner they will pass their lives, dreading their enemies within far more than their enemies without. They, and the whole city along with them, will be perpetually on the brink of destruction.[87]

[Footnote 87: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 417 A-B.]

[Side-note: Complete unity of the city, every man performing his own special function.]

But surely (remarks Adeimantus), according to this picture, your Guardians or Soldiers, though masters of all the city, will be worse off than any of the other citizens. They will be deprived of those means of happiness which the others are allowed to enjoy. Perhaps they will (replies Sokrates): yet I should not be surprised if they were to be the happiest of all. Be that as it may, however, my purpose is, not to make _them_ especially happy, but to make the whole city happy. The Guardians can enjoy only such happiness as consists with the due performance of their functions as Guardians. Every man in our city must perform his appropriate function, and must be content with such happiness as his disposition will admit, subject to this condition.[88] In regard to all the citizens without exception, it must be the duty of the Guardians to keep out both riches and poverty, both of which spoil the character of every one. No one must be rich, and no one must be poor.[89] In case of war, the constant discipline of our soldiers will be of more avail than money, in making them efficient combatants against other cities.[90] Moreover, other cities are divided against themselves: each is many cities, and not one: poor and rich are at variance with each other, and various fractions of each of these classes against other fractions. Our city alone, constituted as I propose, will be really and truly One. It will thus be the greatest of all cities, even though it have only one thousand fighting men. It may be permitted to increase, so long as it will preserve its complete unity, but no farther.[91] Farthermore, each of our citizens is one and not many: confined to that special function for which he is qualified by his nature.

[Footnote 88: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.]

[Footnote 89: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 E.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 422 B.]

[Footnote 91: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423 A.]

[Side-note: The maintenance of the city depends upon that of the habits, character, and education of the Guardians.]

It will devolve upon our Guardians to keep up this form of communion unimpaired; and they will have no difficulty in doing so, as long as they maintain their own education and training unimpaired. No change must be allowed either in the musical or gymnastic training: especially not in the former, where changes are apt to creep in, with pernicious effect.[92] Upon this education depends the character and competence of the Guardians. They will provide legislation in detail, which will be good, if their general character is good--bad, on the contrary supposition. If their character and the constitution of the city be defective at the bottom, it is useless for us to prescribe regulations of detail, as we would do for sick men. The laws in detail cannot be good, while the general constitution of the city is bad. Those teachers are mistaken who exhort us to correct the former, but to leave the latter untouched.[93]

[Footnote 92: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 424 A.]

[Footnote 93: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 425-426.]

[Side-note: Religious legislation--Consult the Delphian Apollo.]

In regard to religious legislation--the raising of temples, arrangement of sacrifices, &c.--we must consult Apollo at Delphi, and obey what he directs. We know nothing ourselves about these matters, nor is there any other authority equally trustworthy.[94]

[Footnote 94: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 427 B. [Greek: ta\ ga\r dê\ toiau=ta ou)/t' e)pista/metha ê(mei=s], &c.]

[Side-note: The city is now constituted as a good city--that is, wise, courageous, temperate, just. Where is its Justice?]

Our city is now constituted and peopled (continues Sokrates). We mast examine it, and see where we can find Justice and Injustice--reverting to our original problem, which was, to know what each of them was, and which of the two conferred happiness. Now assuming our city to be rightly constituted, it will be perfectly good: that is, it will be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. These four constituents cover the whole: accordingly, if we can discover and set out Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance--that which remains afterwards will be Justice.[95]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 427-428.]

[Side-note: First, where is the wisdom of the city? It resides in the few elder Rulers.]

First, we can easily see where Wisdom resides. The city includes in itself a great variety of cognitions, corresponding to all the different functions in which its citizens are employed. But it is not called _wise_, from its knowledge of husbandry, or of brazier's and carpenter's craft: since these are specialties which cover only a small fraction of its total proceedings. It is called _wise_, or well-advised, from that variety of intelligence or cognition which directs it as a whole, in its entire affairs: that is, the intelligence possessed by the chief Guardians or Rulers. Now the number of persons possessing this variety of intelligence is smaller than the number of those who possess any other variety. The wisdom of the entire city resides in this very small presiding fraction, and in them alone.[96]

[Footnote 96: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 428-429.]

[Side-note: Where is the Courage? In the body of Guardians or Soldiers.]

Next, we can also discern without difficulty in what fraction of the city Courage resides. The city is called courageous from the valour of those Guardians or Soldiers upon whom its defence rests. These men will have learnt, in the course of their training, what are really legitimate objects of fear, and what are not legitimate objects of fear. To such convictions they will resolutely adhere, through the force of mind implanted by their training, in defiance of all disturbing impulses. It is these right convictions, respecting the legitimate objects of fear, which I (says Sokrates) call true political courage, when they are designedly inculcated and worked in by regular educational authority: when they spring up without any rational foundation, as in animals or slaves, I do not call them Courage. The Courage of the entire city thus resides in its Guardians or Soldiers.[97]

[Footnote 97: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 429-430.]

[Side-note: Where is the Temperance? It resides in all and each, Rulers, Guardians, and People. Superiors rule and Inferiors obey.]

Thirdly, wherein resides the Temperance of the city? Temperance implies a due relation, proportion, or accord, between different elements. The temperate man is called superior to himself: but this expression, on first hearing, seems unmeaning, since the man must also be inferior to himself. But the expression acquires a definite meaning, when we recognise it as implying that there are in the same man's mind better and worse elements: and that when the better rules over the worse, he is called superior to himself, or temperate--when the worse rules over the better, he is called inferior to himself, or intemperate. Our city will be temperate, because the better part of it, though smaller in number, rules over the worse and inferior part, numerically greater. The pleasures, pains, and desires of our few Rulers, which are moderate and reasonable, are preponderant: controuling those of the Many, which are miscellaneous, irregular, and violent. And this command is exercised with the perfect consent and good-will of the subordinates. The Many are not less willing to obey than the Few to command. There is perfect unanimity between them as to the point--Who ought to command, and who ought to obey? It is this unanimity which constitutes the temperance of the city: which thus resides, not in any one section of the city, like Courage and Wisdom, but in all sections alike: each recognising and discharging its legitimate function.[98]

[Footnote 98: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 431-432.]

[Side-note: Where is the Justice? In all and each of them also. It consists in each performing his own special function, and not meddling with the function of the others.]

There remains only Justice for us to discover. Wherein does the Justice of the city reside? Not far off. Its justice consists in that which we pointed out at first as the fundamental characteristic of the city, when we required each citizen to discharge one function, and one alone--that for which he was best fitted by nature. That each citizen shall do his own work, and not meddle with others in their work--that each shall enjoy his own property, as well as do his own work--this is true Justice.[99] It is the fundamental condition without which neither temperance, nor courage, nor wisdom could exist; and it fills up the good remaining after we have allowed for the effects of the preceding three.[100] All the four are alike indispensable to make up the entire Good of the city: Justice, or each person (man, woman, freeman, slave, craftsman, guardian) doing his or her own work--Temperance, or unanimity as to command and obedience between Chiefs, Guardians, and the remaining citizens--Courage, or the adherence of the Guardians to right reason, respecting what is terrible and not terrible--Wisdom, or the tutelary superintendence of the Chiefs, who protect each person in the enjoyment of his own property.[101]

[Footnote 99: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 432-433. 433 A: [Greek: Kai\ mê\n o(/ti ge to\ ta\ au(tou= pra/ttein kai\ mê\ polupragmonei=n dikaiosu/nê e)sti/, kai\ tou=to a)/llôn te pollô=n a)kêko/amen, kai\ au)toi\ polla/kis ei)rê/kamen.]

433 E. [Greek: ê( tou= oi)kei/ou te kai\ e(autou= e(/xis te kai\ pra=xis dikaiosu/nê a)\n o(mologoi=to.]]

[Footnote 100: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 B. [Greek: dokei= moi to\ u(po/loipon e)n tê=| po/lei ô(=n e)ske/mmetha, sôphrosu/nês kai\ a)ndrei/as kai\ phronê/seôs, tou=to ei)=nai o(\ pa=sin e)kei/nois tê\n du/namin pa/reschen ô(/ste e)ggene/sthai, kai\ e)ggenome/nois ge sôtêri/an pare/chein, e(/ôs per a)\n e)nê=|.]]

[Footnote 101: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 D.]

[Side-note: Injustice arises when any one part of the city interferes with the functions of the other part, or undertakes double functions.]

As justice consists in each person doing his own work, and not meddling with that of another--so injustice occurs, when a person undertakes the work of another instead of his own, or in addition to his own. The mischief is not great, when such interference takes place only in the subordinate functions: when, for example, the carpenter pretends to do the work of the shoemaker, or _vice versâ_; or when either of them undertake both. But the mischief becomes grave and deplorable, when a man from the subordinate functions meddles with the higher--when a craftsman, availing himself of some collateral support, wealth or party or strength, thrusts himself into the functions of a soldier or auxiliary--or when the Guardian, by similar artifice, usurps the functions of a Chief--or when any one person combines these several functions all at once in himself. Herein consists the true injustice, ruinous to the city: when the line of demarcation is confounded between these three classes--men of business, Guardians, Chiefs. That each of these classes should do its own work, is Justice: that either of them should meddle with the work of the rest, and especially that the subordinate should meddle with the business of the superior, is Injustice, with ruin following in its train.[102] It is from these opposite characteristics that the titles Just or Unjust will be rightfully bestowed upon our city.

[Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 434 B-C. [Greek: ê( triô=n a)/ra o)/ntôn genô=n polupragmosu/nê kai\ metabolê\ ei)s a)/llêla, megi/stê te bla/bê tê=| po/lei kai\ o)rtho/tat' a)\n prosagoreu/oito ma/lista kakourgi/a . . . Kakourgi/an de\ tê\n megi/stên tê=s e(autou= po/leôs ou)k a)diki/an phê/seis ei)=nai? . . .

chrêmatistikou=, e)pikourikou=, phulakikou=, ge/nous oi)keiopragi/a, . . . dikaiosu/nê t' a)\n ei)/ê, kai\ tê\n po/lin dikai/an pa/rechoi.]]

[Side-note: Analogy of the city to the individual--Each man is tripartite, having in his mind Reason, Energy, Appetite. These three elements are distinct, and often conflicting.]

We must now apply, as we undertook to do, the analogy of the city to the individual. The just man, so far forth as justice is concerned, cannot differ from the just city. He must therefore have in his own individual mind three distinct parts, elements, or classes, corresponding to the three classes above distinguished in the city. But is it the fact that there are in each man three such mental constituents--three different classes, sorts, or varieties, of mind?

To settle this point as it ought to be settled, would require a stricter investigation than our present dialogue will permit: but we may contribute something towards it.[103] It is manifest that there exist different individuals in whom reason, energy (courage or passion), and appetite, are separately and unequally developed: thus in the Thracians there is a predominance of energy or courage--in the Phoenicians of appetite--in the Athenians, of intellect or reason. The question is, whether we employ one and the same mind for all the three--reason, energy, and appetite; or whether we do not employ a different mind or portion of mind, when we exercise reason--another, when we are under the influence of energy--and a third, when we follow appetite.[104]

[Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 435 C.

Schleiermacher (in the Introduction to his translation of the Republic, p. 71) considers that this passage of the Republic is intended to note as a desideratum the exposition in the Timæus; wherein the constituent elements of mind or soul are more fully laid down, and its connection with the fundamental elements of the Kosmos.]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 436 A.]

To determine this question, we must consider that the same thing cannot at the same time do or suffer opposites, in the same respect and with reference to the same thing. The same thing or person cannot at the same time, and in the same respect, both stand still and move. This may be laid down as an universal truth: but since some may not admit it to be so, we will at any rate assume it as an hypothesis.[105] Now in reference to the mind, we experience at the same time various movements or affections contrary to each other: assent and dissent--desire and aversion--the attracting any thing to ourselves, and the repelling it from ourselves: each of these is different from and contrary to the other. As a specimen of desires, we will take thirst. When a man is in this condition, his mind desires nothing else but to drink; and strains entirely towards that object. If there be any thing which drags back his mind when in this condition, it must be something different from that which pulls him forward and attracts him to drink. That which attracts him, and that which repels him, cannot be the same: just as when the archer at the same time pulls his bow towards him and pushes it away from him, it is one of his hands that pulls and another that pushes.[106] Now it often happens that a man athirst refuses to drink: there is something within him that prompts him to drink, and something still more powerful that forbids him. These two cannot be the same: one of them is different from the other: that which prompts is appetite, that which forbids is reason. The rational element of the mind is in like manner something different or distinguishable from all the appetites, which tend towards repletion and pleasure.

[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 437 A.]

[Footnote 106: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 A-B.]

[Side-note: Reason, Energy, Appetite, in the individual--analogous to Rulers, Guardians, Craftsmen in the city. Reason is to rule Appetite. Energy assists Reason in ruling it.]

Here then we have two distinct species, forms, or kinds, existing in the mind.[107] Besides these two, however, there is a third, distinct from both: Energy, Passion, Courage, which neither belongs to Appetite nor to individual Reason. Each of these three acts apart from, and sometimes in contrariety to, each of the others.[108] There are thus three distinct elements or varieties of mind in the individual--Reason, Energy, Appetite: corresponding to the three constituent portions of the city--The Chiefs or Rulers--The Guardians or Soldiers--The Craftsmen, or the remaining Community.[109] The Wisdom of the city resides in its Elders: that of the individual in his Reason. The Courage of the city resides in its Guardians or Soldiers: that of the individual in his Energy. But in the city as well as in the individual, it is the right and privilege of the rational element to exercise command, because it alone looks to the welfare and advantage of the whole compound:[110] it is the duty of the two other elements--the energetic and the appetitive--to obey. It is moreover the special function of the Guardians in the city to second the Chiefs in enforcing obedience upon the Craftsmen: so also in the individual, it is the special function of Energy or Courage to second Reason in controuling Appetite.

[Footnote 107: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 E. [Greek: Tau=ta me\n toi/nun du/o ê(mi=n ô(ri/sthô ei)/dê e)n psuchê=| e)no/nta], &c.]

[Footnote 108: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 440-441.]

[Footnote 109: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 C. [Greek: ta\ au)ta\ me\n e)n po/lei, ta\ au)ta\ d' e)n e(no\s e(ka/stou tê=| psuchê=| ge/nê e)nei=nai, kai\ i)/sa to\n a)rithmo/n.] 443 D: [Greek: ta\ e)n tê=| psuchê=| ge/nê], &c.]

[Footnote 110: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 E, 442 C. [Greek: tô=| me\n logistikô=| a)/rchein prosê/kei, sophô=| o)/nti kai\ e)/chonti tê\n u(pe\r a(pa/sês tê=s psuchê=s promê/theian . . . . Sopho\n de/ ge (e(/na e(/kaston kalou=men) e)kei/nô| tô=| smikrô=| me/rei, tô=| o(\ ê)=rche/ t' e)n au)tô=| kai\ tau=ta parê/ggellen, e)/chon au)= ka)kei=no e)pistê/mên e)n au(tô=| tê\n tou= xumphe/rontos e(ka/stô| te kai\ o(/lô| tô=| koinô=| sphô=n au)tô=n triô=n o)/ntôn.]]

[Side-note: A man is just when these different parts of his mind exercise their appropriate functions without hindrance.]

These special functions of the separate parts being laid down, Justice as well as Temperance will appear analogous in the individual and in the city. Both Justice and Temperance reside in all the parts equally: not in one of them exclusively, as Wisdom and Courage reside. Justice and Temperance belong to the subordinate as well as to the dominant parts. Justice exists when each of the parts performs its own function, without encroaching on the function of the others: Temperance exists when all the parts are of one opinion as to the title of the higher or rational element to exercise command.[111]

[Footnote 111: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442 C, 443 B.]

A man as well as a city is just, when each of his three sorts or varieties of mind confines itself to its own legitimate function: when Reason reigns over and controuls the other two, and when Energy seconds Reason in controuling Appetite. Such a man will not commit fraud, theft, treachery, perjury, or any like proceedings.[112] On the contrary, injustice exists when the parts are in conflict with each other: when either of them encroaches on the function of the other: or when those parts which ought to be subordinate rise in insurrection against that which ought to be superior.

[Footnote 112: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442-443.]

[Side-note: Justice and Injustice in the mind--what health and disease are in the body.]

Justice is in the mind what health is in the body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be controuled pursuant to the dictates of nature. Injustice is in the mind what disease is in the body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be controuled contrary to the dictates of nature. Virtue is thus the health, beauty, good condition of the mind: Vice is the disease, ugliness, weakness, of the mind.[113]

[Footnote 113: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 444 B-C.]

[Side-note: Original question now resumed--Does Justice make a man happy, and Injustice make him miserable, apart from all consequences? Answer--Yes.]

Having thus ascertained the nature of justice and injustice, we are now in a condition (continues Sokrates) to reply to the question proposed for investigation--Is it profitable to a man to be just and to do justice _per se_, even though he be not known as just either by Gods or men, and may thus be debarred from the consequences which would ensue if he were known? Or is it profitable to him to be unjust, if he can contrive to escape detection and punishment? We are enabled to answer the first question in the affirmative, and the second question in the negative. As health is the greatest good, and sickness the greatest evil, of body: so Justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil, of mind. No measure of luxury, wealth, or power, could render life tolerable, if we lost our bodily health: no amount of prosperity could make life tolerable, without mental health or justice. As bodily health is good _per se_, and sickness evil _per se_, even apart from its consequences: so justice also is good in itself, and injustice evil in itself, apart from its consequences.[114]

[Footnote 114: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 445 A.]

[Side-note: Glaukon requires farther explanation about the condition of the Guardians, in regard to sexual and family ties.]

Sokrates now assumes the special question of the dialogue to be answered, and the picture of the just or perfect city, as well as of the just or perfect individual, to be completed. He is next proceeding to set forth the contrasts to this picture--that is, the varieties of injustice, or the various modes of depravation and corruption--when he is arrested by Polemarchus and Adeimantus: who call upon him to explain more at large the position of the body of Guardians or Soldiers in the city, in regard to women, children, and the family.[115]

[Footnote 115: Plato, Republic, v. p. 449 C.]

[Side-note: Men and women will live together and perform the duties of Guardians alike--They will receive the same gymnastic and musical training.]

In reply, Sokrates announces his intention to make such provision as will exclude separate family ties, as well as separate property, among these Guardians. The Guardians will consist both of men and women. The women will receive the same training, both musical and gymnastical, as the men.[116] They will take part both in the bodily exercises of the palæstra, in the military drill, and in the combats of war. Those who deride these naked exercises as preposterous for the female sex, should be reminded (Sokrates says) that not long ago it was considered unseemly among the Greeks (as it still is among many of the _barbari_) for men to expose their naked bodies in the palæstra: but such repugnance has been overpowered by the marked usefulness of the practice: the Kretans first setting the example, next the Lacedæmonians; lastly all other Greeks doing the same.[117] We maintain the principle which we laid down in the beginning, that one person should perform only one duty--that for which he is best qualified. But there is no one function, or class of functions, for which women as such are peculiarly qualified, or peculiarly disqualified. Between women generally, and men generally, in reference to the discharge of duties, there is no other difference, except that men are superior to women in every thing:[118] the best women will be on a level only with the second-best men, but they will be superior to all men lower than the second best. But among women, as among men, there are great individual differences: one woman is fit for one duty, another for another: and in our city, each must be employed for the duty suitable to her individual disposition. Those who are best qualified by nature for the office of Guardians, must be allotted to that office: they must discharge it along with the men, and must be trained for it by the same education as the men, musical and gymnastical.

[Footnote 116: Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 A.]

[Footnote 117: Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 D.]

[Footnote 118: Plato, Republic, v. p. 455 C-D.]

[Side-note: Nature does not prescribe any distribution of functions between men and women. Women are inferior to men in every thing. The best women are equal to second-best men.]

If an objector accuses us of proposing arrangements contrary to nature, we not only deny the force of the objection, but we retort the charge. We affirm that the arrangements now existing in society, which restrict all women to a limited number of domestic and family functions, are contrary to nature--and that ours are founded upon the genuine and real dictates of nature.[119] The only difference admissible between men and women, in the joint discharge of the functions of Guardians, is, that the easier portion of such functions must in general be assigned to women, and the more difficult to men, in consequence of the inferiority of the feminine nature.[120]

[Footnote 119: Plato, Republic, v. p. 456 C. [Greek: kata\ phu/sin e)ti/themen to\n no/mon; a)lla\ ta\ nu=n para\ tau=ta gigno/mena para\ phu/sin ma=llon, ô(s e)/oike, gi/gnetai.]]

[Footnote 120: Plato, Republic, v. p. 457 B.]

[Side-note: Community of life and relations between the male and female Guardians. Temporary marriages arranged by contrivance of the Elders. No separate families.]