Chapter XXXIX: Leges and Epinomis (3)

[Footnote 114: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 693 B-C. Aristotle (Politic. ii. 6, pp. 1265-1266) alludes to this portion of Plato's doctrine, and approves what is said about the combination of diverse political elements; but he does not approve the doctrine which declares the two "mother-forms" of government to be extreme despotism or extreme democracy. He says that these two are either no governments at all, or the very worst of governments. Plato gives the same opinion about them, yet he thinks it convenient to make them the starting-points of his theory. The objection made by Aristotle appears to be dictated by a sentiment which often influences his theories--[Greek: To\ te/leion pro/tero/n e)sti tê=| phu/sei tou= a)telou=s]. The perfect is prior in order of nature to the imperfect. He does not choose to take his theoretical point of departure from the worst or most imperfect.]

[Side-note: Cyrus and Darius--Bad training of sons of kings.]

The Persians, according to Plato, at the time when they made their conquests under Cyrus, were not despotically governed, but enjoyed a fair measure of freedom under a brave and patriotic military chief, who kept the people together in mutual attachment. But Cyrus, though a great military chief, had neither received a good training himself, nor knew how to secure it for his own sons.[115] He left them to be educated by the women in the harem, where they were brought up with unmeasured indulgence, acquiring nothing but habits of insolence and caprice. Kambyses became a despot; and after committing great enormities, was ultimately deprived of empire by Smerdis and the Medians. Darius, not a born prince, but an usurper, renovated the Persian empire, and ruled it with as much ability and moderation as Cyrus. But he made the same mistake as Cyrus, in educating his sons in the harem. His son Xerxes became thoroughly corrupted, and ruled despotically. The same has been the case with all the successive kings, all brought up as destined for the sceptre, and morally ruined by a wretched education. The Persian government has been nothing but a despotism ever since Darius.[116] All freedom of action or speech has been extinguished, and the mutual attachment among the subjects exists no more.[117]

[Footnote 115: Plato, Legg. p. 694 C. [Greek: Manteu/omai peri/ ge Ku/rou ta\ me\n a)/ll' au)to\n stratêgo/n te a)gatho\n ei)=nai kai\ philo/polin, paidei/as de\ o)rthê=s ou)ch ê(=phthai to\ para/pan.]

I think it very probable that these words are intended to record Plato's dissent from the [Greek: Ku/rou Paidei/a] of Xenophon. Aulus Gellius (xiv. 3) had read that Xenophon composed the Cyropædia in opposition to the two first books of the Platonic Republic, and that between Xenophon and Plato there existed a grudge (_simultas_) or rivalry; so also Athenæus, xi. p. 504. It is possible that this may have been the case but no evidence is produced to prove it. Both of them selected Sokrates as the subject of their descriptions; in so far there may have been a literary competition between them: and various critics seem to have presumed that there could not be _æmulatio_ without _simultas_. Each of them composed a Symposion for the purpose of exhibiting Sokrates in his joyous moments. The differences between the two handlings are interesting to notice; but the evidences which some authors produce, to show that Xenophon in his Symposion alluded to the Symposion of Plato, are altogether uncertain. See the Preface of Schneider to his edition of the Xenophontic Symposion, and his extract from Cornarius.]

[Footnote 116: Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 694-695.]

[Footnote 117: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 697 D.]

[Side-note: Changes for the worse in government of Athens, after the Persian invasion of Greece.]

While the Persian government thus exhibits despotism in excess, that of Athens exhibits the contrary mischief--liberty in excess. This has been the growth of the time subsequent to the Persian invasion. At the time when that invasion occurred, the government of Athens was an ancient constitution with a quadruple scale of property, according to which scale political privilege and title to office were graduated: while the citizens generally were then far more reverential to authority, and obedient to the laws, than they are now. Moreover, the invasion itself, being dangerous and terrific in the extreme, was enough to make them obedient and united among themselves, for their own personal safety.[118] But after the invasion had been repelled, the government became altered. The people acquired a great increase of political power, assumed habits of independence and self-judgment, and became less reverential both to the magistrates and to the laws.

[Footnote 118: Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 698-699.]

[Side-note: This change began in music, and the poets introduced new modes of composition--they appealed to the sentiment of the people, and corrupted them.]

The first department in which this change was wrought at Athens was the department of music: from whence it gradually extended itself to the general habits of the people. Before the invasion, Music had been distributed, according to ancient practice and under the sanction of ancient authority, under four fixed categories--Hymns, Dirges, Pæans, Dithyrambs.[119] The ancient canons in regard to each were strictly enforced: the musical exhibitions were superintended, and the prizes adjudged by a few highly-trained elders: while the general body of citizens listened in respectful silence, without uttering a word of acclamation, or even conceiving themselves competent to judge what they heard. Any manifestations on their part were punished by blows from the sticks of the attendants.[120] But this docile submission of the Athenians to authority became gradually overthrown, after the repulse of the Persians, first in the theatre, next throughout all social and political life. The originators of this corruption were the poets: men indeed of poetical genius, but ignorant of the ethical purpose which their compositions ought to aim at, as well as of the rightful canons by which they ought to be guided and limited. These poets, looking to the pleasure of the audience as their true and only standard, exhibited pieces in which all the old musical distinctions were confounded together--hymns with dirges, the pæan with the dithyramb, and the flute with the harp. To such irregular rhythm and melody, words equally irregular were adapted. The poet submitted his compositions to the assembled audience, appealing to them as competent judges, and practically declaring them to be such. The audience responded to the appeal. Acclamation in the theatre was substituted for silence; and the judgment of the people became paramount instead of that pronounced by the enlightened few according to antecedent custom. Hence the people--having once shaken off the reverence for authority, and learnt to exercise their own judgment, in the theatre[121]--began speedily to do the same on other matters also. They fancied themselves wise enough to decide everything for themselves, and contracted a shameless disregard for the opinion of better and wiser men. An excessive measure of freedom was established, tending in its ultimate consequences to an anarchical or Titanic nature: indifferent to magistrates, laws, parents, elders, covenants, oaths, and the Gods themselves.[122]

[Footnote 119: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 700 B. [Greek: u(/mnoi--thrê=noi--paia=nes--dithu/rambos].]

[Footnote 120: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 700 C. [Greek: to\ de\ ku=ros tou/tôn gnô=nai/ te kai\ a(/ma gno/nta dika/sai, zêmiou=n te au)= to\n mê\ peitho/menon, ou) su/rigx ê)=n ou)de/ tines a)/mousoi boai\ plê/thous, _katha/per ta\ nu=n_, ou)d' au)= kro/toi e)pai/nous a)podido/ntes, a)lla\ toi=s me\n gegono/si peri\ pai/deusin dedogme/non a)kou/ein ê)=n au)toi=s meta\ sigê=s dia\ te/lous, paisi\ de\ kai\ paidagôgoi=s kai\ tô=| plei/stô| o)/chlô| r(a/bdou kosmou/sês ê( nouthe/têsis e)gi/gneto.]

The testimony here given by Plato respecting the practice of his own time is curious and deserves notice: respecting the practice of the times anterior to the Persian invasion he could have had no means of accurate knowledge.]

[Footnote 121: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 701 A. [Greek: nu=n de\ ê)=rxe me\n ê(mi=n e)k mousikê=s ê( pa/ntôn ei)s pa/nta sophi/as do/xa kai\ paranomi/a, xunephe/speto de\ e)leutheri/a.]]

[Footnote 122: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 701 B. [Greek: _E)phexê=s dê\ tau/tê|_ tê=| e)leutheri/a| ê( tou= mê\ e)the/lein toi=s a)/rchousi douleu/ein _gi/gnoit' a)/n_.]

The phrase here employed by Plato affirms inferential tendencies--not facts realised. How much of the tendencies had passed into reality at Athens, he leaves to the imagination of his readers to supply. It is curious to contrast the faithless and lawless character of Athens, here insinuated by Plato--with the oration of Demosthenes adv. Leptinem (delivered B.C. 355, near upon the time when the Platonic Leges were composed), where the main argument which the orator brings to bear upon the Dikasts, emphatically and repeatedly, to induce them to reject the proposition of Leptines, is--[Greek: to\ tê=s po/leôs ê)=thos a)pseude\s kai\ chrêsto/n, ou) to\ lusitele/staton pro\s a)rgu/rion skopou=n, a)lla/ ti kai\ kalo\n pra=xai] (p. 461) . . . [Greek: ou)d' o( plei=stos lo/gos e)/moige peri\ tê=s a)telei/as e)/stin, a)ll' u(pe\r tou= ponêro\n e)/thos ei)sa/gein to\n no/mon, kai\ toiou=ton di' ou)= pant' a)/pist' o(/sa o( dê=mos di/dôsin e)/stai], also pp. 500-507, and indeed throughout nearly the whole oration. So also in the other discourses, not only of Demosthenes but of the other orators also--good faith, public and private, and respectful obedience to the laws, are constantly invoked as primary and imperative necessities.

Indeed, in order to find a contradiction to the picture here presented by Plato, of Athenian tendencies since the Persian war, we need not go farther than Plato himself. We have only to read the Menexenus, wherein he professes to describe and panegyrise the achievements of Athens during that very period which he paints in such gloomy colours in the Leges--the period succeeding the Persian invasion. Who is to believe that the people, upon whose virtue he pronounces these encomiums, had thrown off all reverence for good faith, obligation, and social authority? As for the [Greek: Titanikê\ phu/sis], to which Plato represents the Athenians as approximating, the analogy is principally to be found in the person of the Titan Promêtheus, with his philanthropic disposition (see Plato, Menexenus, pp. 243 E, 244 E), and the beneficent suggestions which he imparted to mankind in the way of science and art (Æschyl. Prom. 440-507--[Greek: Pa=sai te/chnai brotoi=sin e)k Promêthe/ôs]).]

[Side-note: Danger of changes in the national music--declared by Damon, the musical teacher.]

The opinion here expressed by Plato--that the political constitution of Athens was too democratical, and that the changes (effected by Perikles and others during the half century succeeding the Persian invasion) whereby it had been rendered more democratical, were mischievous--was held by him in common with a respectable and intelligent minority at Athens. That minority had full opportunity of expressing their disapprobation--as we may see by the language of Plato himself; though he commends the Spartans for not allowing any such opportunity to dissenters at Sparta, and expressly prohibits any open expression of dissent in his own community. But his assertion, that the deterioration at Athens was introduced and originated by an innovation in the established canon of music and poetry--is more peculiarly his own. The general doctrine of the powerful revolutionising effect wrought by changes in the national music, towards subverting the political constitution, was adopted by him from the distinguished musical teacher Damon,[123] the contemporary and companion of Perikles. The fear of such danger to the national institutions is said to have operated on the authorities at Sparta, when they forbade the musical innovations of the poet Timotheus, and destroyed the four new strings which he had just added to the established seven strings of his lyre.[124]

[Footnote 123: Plato, Republ. iv. p. 424 D.]

[Footnote 124: Cicero, De Legib. ii. 15; Pausanias, iii. 12.

Cicero agrees with Plato as to the mischievous tendency of changes in the national music.]

[Side-note: Plato's aversion to the tragic and comic poetry at Athens.]

Of this general doctrine, however, Plato makes a particular application in the passage now before us, which he would have found few Athenians, either oligarchical or democratical, to ratify. What he really condemns is, the tragic and comic poetical representations at Athens, which began to acquire importance only after the Persian war, and continued to increase in importance for the next half century. The greatest revolution which Grecian music and poetry ever underwent was that whereby Attic tragedy and comedy were first constituted:--built up by distinguished poets from combination and enlargement of the simpler pre-existent forms--out of the dithyrambic and phallic choruses.[125] The first who imparted to tragedy its grand development and its special novelty of character was Æschylus--a combatant at Marathon as well as one of the greatest among ancient poets: after him, Sophokles carried improvement still further. It is them that Plato probably means, when he speaks of the authors of this revolution as men of true poetical genius, but ignorant of the lawful purpose of the Muse--as authors who did not recognise any rightful canon of music, nor any end to be aimed at beyond the emotional satisfaction of a miscellaneous audience. The abundance of dramatic poetry existing in Plato's time must have been prodigious (a few choice specimens only have descended to us):--while its variety of ingredients and its popularity outshone those four ancient and simple manifestations, which alone he will tolerate as legitimate. He censures the innovations of Æschylus and Sophokles as a deplorable triumph of popular preference over rectitude of standard and purpose. He tacitly assumes--what Aristotle certainly does not believe, and what, so far as I can see, there is no ground for believing--that the earlier audience were passive, showing no marks of favour or disfavour: and that the earlier poets had higher aims, adapting their compositions to the judgment of a wise few, and careless about giving satisfaction to the general audience. This would be the practice in the Platonic city, but it never was the practice at Athens. We may surely presume that Æschylus stood distinguished from his predecessors not by desiring popularity more, but by greater success in attaining it: and that he attained it partly from his superior genius, partly from increasing splendour in the means of exhibition at Athens. The simpler early compositions had been adapted to the taste of the audience who heard them, and gave satisfaction for the time; until the loftier genius of Æschylus and the other great constructive dramatists was manifested.

[Footnote 125: Aristotle, Poetic. c. 4. p. 1449 a.

The ethical repugnance expressed by Plato against the many-sided and deceptive spirit of tragic and comic compositions, is also expressed in the censure said to have been pronounced by Solon against Thespis, when the latter first produced his dramas (Plutarch, Solon, 29; Diog. Laert. i. 59).]

[Side-note: This aversion peculiar to himself, not shared either by oligarchical politicians, or by other philosophers.]

However Plato--while he tolerates no poetry except in so far as it produces ethical correction or regulation of the emotions, and blames as hurtful the poet who simply touches or kindles emotion--is in a peculiar manner averse to dramatic poetry, with its diversity of assumed characters and its obligation of giving speech to different points of view. His aversion had been exhibited before, both in the Republic and in the Gorgias:[126] but it reappears here in the Treatise De Legibus, with this aggravating feature--that the revolution in music and poetry is represented as generating cause of a deteriorated character and an ultra-democratical polity of Athens. This (as I have before remarked) is a sentiment peculiar to Plato. For undoubtedly, oligarchical politicians (such as Thucydides, Nikias, Kritias), who agreed with him in disliking the democracy, would never have thought of ascribing what they disliked to such a cause as alteration in the Athenian music and poetry. They would much more have agreed with Aristotle,[127] when he attributes the important change both in the character and polity of the Athenian people after the Persian invasion, to the events of that invasion itself--to the heroic and universal efforts made by the citizens, on shipboard as well as on land, against the invading host--and to the necessity for continuing those efforts by organising the confederacy of Delos. Hence arose a new spirit of self-reliance and enterprise--or rather an intensification of what had already begun after the expulsion of Hippias and the reform by Kleisthenes--which rendered the previous constitutional forms too narrow to give satisfaction.[128] The creation of new and grander forms of poetry may fairly be looked upon as one symptom of this energetic general outburst: but it is in no way a primary or causal fact, as Plato wishes us to believe. Nor can Plato himself have supposed it to be so, at the time when he composed his Menexenus: wherein the events of the post-Xerxeian period are presented in a light very different from that in which he viewed them when he wrote his Leges--presented with glowing commendations on his countrymen.

[Footnote 126: Plato, Republ. iii. pp. 395-396, x. p. 605 B; Gorgias, p. 502 B; Legg. iv. p. 719 B.

Aristotle takes a view of tragedy quite opposed to that of Plato: he considers it as calculated to purge or purify the emotions of fear, compassion, &c. (Aristot. Poet. c. 13. Compare Politic. viii. 7, 9). Unfortunately the Poetica exist only as a fragment, so that his doctrine about [Greek: ka/tharsis] is only declared and not fully developed.

Rousseau (in his Lettre à d'Alembert Sur les Spectacles, p. 33 seq.) impugns this doctrine of Aristotle, and condemns theatrical representations, partly with arguments similar to those of Plato, partly with others of his own.]

[Footnote 127: Aristotel. Politic. v. 4, p. 1304, a. 20; ii. 12, p. 1274, a. 12; viii. 6, 1340, a. 30.]

[Footnote 128: Herodot. v. 78.]

[Side-note: Doctrines of Plato in this prefatory matter.]

The long ethical prefatory matter[129] which we have gone through, includes these among other doctrines--1. That the life of justice, and the life of pleasure, are essentially coincident. 2. That Reason, as declared by the lawgiver, ought to controul all our passions and emotions. 3. That intoxication, under certain conditions, is an useful stimulus to elderly men. 4. That the political constitution of society ought not to be founded upon one single principle of authority, but upon a combination of several. 5. That the extreme of liberty, and the extreme of despotism, are both bad.[130]

[Footnote 129: What Aristotle calls [Greek: toi=s e)/xôthen lo/gois], in reference to the Republic of Plato (Aristotel. Politic. ii. 36, p. 1264, b. 39).]

[Footnote 130: Compare on this point Plato's Epistol. viii. pp. 354-355, where this same view is enforced.]

[Side-note: Compared with those of the Republic and of the Xenophontic Cyropædia.]

Of these five positions, the two first are coincident with the doctrines of the Republic: the third is not coincident compared with them, but indirectly in opposition to them: the fourth and fifth put Plato on a standing point quite different from that of the Republic, and different also from that of the Xenophontic Cyropædia. In the Cyropædia, all government is strictly personal: the subjects both obey willingly, and are rendered comfortable because of the supreme and manifold excellence of one person--their chief, Cyrus--in every department of practical administration, civil as well as military. In the Platonic Republic, the government is also personal: to this extent--that Plato provides neither political checks, nor magistrates, nor laws, nor judicature: but aims only at the perfect training of the Guardians, and the still more elaborate and philosophical training of those few chief or elder Guardians, who are to direct the rest. He demands only a succession of these philosophers, corresponding to the regal Artist sketched in the Politikus: and he leaves all ulterior directions to them. Upon their perfect dispositions and competence, all the weal or woe of the community depends. All is personal government; but it is lodged in the hands of a few philosophers, assumed to be super-excellent, like the one chief in the Xenophontic Cyropædia. When however we come to the Leges, we find that Plato ceases to presume upon such supreme personal excellence. He drops it as something beyond the limit of human attainment, and as fit only for the golden or Saturnian age.[131] He declares that power, without adequate restraints, is a privilege with which no man can be trusted.[132] Nevertheless the magistrates must be vested with sufficient power: since excess of liberty is equally dangerous. To steer between these two rocks,[133] you want not only a good despot but a sagacious lawgiver. It is he who must construct a constitutional system, having regard to the various natural foundations of authority in the minds of the citizens. He must provide fixed laws, magistrates, and a competent judicature: moreover, both the magistrates and the judicature must be servants of the law, and nothing beyond.[134] The lawgiver must frame his laws with single-minded view, not to the happiness of any separate section of the city, but to that of the whole. He must look to the virtue of the whole, in its most comprehensive sense, and to all good things, ranked in their triple subordination and their comparative value--that is, First, the good things belonging to the mind--Secondly, Those belonging to the body--Thirdly, Wealth and External acquisitions.[135]

[Footnote 131: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 713-714.]

[Footnote 132: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 687 E--iv. p. 713 B, ix. p. 875 C.]]

[Footnote 133: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 710-711.]

[Footnote 134: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 715 C-D. [Greek: tou\s d' a)/rchontas legome/nous nu=n u(pêre/tas toi=s no/mois e)ka/lesa, ou)= ti kainotomi/as o)noma/tôn e(/neka, a)ll'], &c. It appears as if this phrase, calling "magistrates the servants or ministers of the law," was likely to be regarded as a harsh and novel metaphor.]

[Footnote 135: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 707 B, 714 B; iii. p. 697 A.]

[Side-note: Constructive scheme--Plato's new point of view.]

We now enter upon this constructive effort of Plato's old age. That a political constitution with fixed laws (he makes the Athenian say) and with magistrates acting merely as servants of the laws, is the only salvation for a city and its people--this is a truth which every man sees most distinctly in his old age, though when younger he was very dull in discerning it.[136] Probably enough what we here read represents the change in Plato's own mind: the acquisition of a new point of view, which was not present to him when he composed his Republic and his Politikus.

[Footnote 136: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 715 E. [Greek: Ne/os me\n ga\r ô)\n pa=s a)/nthrôpos ta\ toiau=ta a)mblu/tata au)to\s o(ra=|, ge/rôn de\ o)xu/tata.]

Compare vii. pp. 819 D-821 D, for marks of Plato's old age and newly acquired opinions.]

[Side-note: New Colony to be founded in Krete--its general conditions.]

Here the exposition assumes a definite shape. The Kretan Kleinias apprises his Athenian companion, that the Knossians with other Kretans are about to establish a new colony on an unsettled point in Krete; and that himself with nine others are named commissioners for framing and applying the necessary regulations. He invites the co-operation of the Athenian:[137] who accordingly sets himself to the task of suggesting such laws and measures as are best calculated to secure the march of the new Magnetic settlement towards the great objects defined in the preceding programme.

[Footnote 137: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 702 C.]

The new city is to be about nine English miles from the sea. The land round it is rough, poor, and without any timber for shipbuilding; but it is capable of producing all supplies absolutely indispensable, so that little need will be felt of importation from abroad. The Athenian wishes that the site were farther from the sea. Yet he considers the general conditions to be tolerably good; inasmuch as the city need not become commercial and maritime, and cannot have the means of acquiring much gold and silver--which is among the greatest evils that can befall a city, since it corrupts justice and goodness in the citizens.[138] The settlers are all Greeks, from various towns of Krete and Peloponnesus. This (remarks the Athenian) is on the whole better than if they came from one single city. Though it may introduce some additional chance of discord, it will nevertheless render them more open-minded and persuadable for the reception of new institutions.[139]

[Footnote 138: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 705.]

[Footnote 139: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 708.]

[Side-note: The Athenian declares that he will not merely promulgate peremptory laws, but will recommend them to the citizens by prologues or hortatory discourses.]

The colonists being supposed to be assembled in their new domicile and ready for settlement, Plato, or his Athenian spokesman, addresses to them a solemn exhortation, inculcating piety towards the Gods, celestial and subterranean, as well as to the Dæmons and Heroes--and also reverence to parents.[140] He then intimates that, though he does not intend to consult the settlers on the acceptance or rejection of laws, but assumes to himself the power of prescribing such laws as he thinks best for them--he nevertheless will not content himself with promulgating his mandates in a naked and peremptory way. He will preface each law with a proëm or prologue (_i.e._ a string of preliminary recommendations): in order to predispose their minds favourably, and to obtain from them a willing obedience.[141] He will employ not command only, but persuasion along with or antecedent to command: as the physician treats his patients when they are freemen, not as he sends his slaves to treat slave-patients, with a simple compulsory order.[142] To begin with an introductory proëm or prelude, prior to the announcement of the positive law, is (he says) the natural course of proceeding. It is essential to all artistic vocal performances: it is carefully studied and practised both by the rhetor and the musician.[143] Yet in spite of this analogy, no lawgiver has ever yet been found to prefix proëms to his laws: every one has contented himself with issuing peremptory commands.[144] Here then Plato undertakes to set the example of prefixing such prefatory introductions. The nature of the case would prescribe that every law, every speech, every song, should have its suitable proëm: but such prolixity would be impolitic. A discretion must be entrusted to the lawgiver, as it is to the orator and the musician. Proëms or prologues must be confined to the great and important laws.[145]

[Footnote 140: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 716-718.]

[Footnote 141: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 718-719-723.]

[Footnote 142: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 720. This is a curious indication respecting the medical profession and practice at Athens.]

[Footnote 143: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 722 D-723 D. [Greek: tô=| te r(ê/tori kai\ tô=| melô|dô=| kai\ tô=| nomothe/tê| to\ toiou=ton e(ka/stote e)pitrepte/on.]]

[Footnote 144: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 722 B-E.

The [Greek: prooi/mia dêmêgorika/] of Demosthenes are well known.]

[Footnote 145: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 723 C-D. About [Greek: ta\ tô=n no/môn prooi/mia], compare what Plato says about his communications with the younger Dionysius, shortly after his (Plato's) second arrival at Syracuse, Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 316 A.]

[Side-note: General character of these prologues--didactic or rhetorical homilies.]

Accordingly, from hence to the end of the Treatise De Legg., Plato proceeds upon the principle here laid down. He either prefixes a prologue to each of his laws--or blends the law with its proëm--or gives what may be called a proëm without a law, that is a string of hortatory or comminatory precepts. There are various points (he says) on which the lawgiver cannot propose any distinct and peremptory enactment, but must confine himself to emphatic censure[146] and declaration of opinion, with threats of displeasure on the part of the Gods: the rather as he cannot hope to accomplish his public objects, without the largest interference with private habits--nor without bringing his regulations to bear upon individual life, where positive law can hardly reach.[147] The Platonic prologues are sometimes expositions of the reasons of the law--_i. e._ of the dangers which it is intended to ward off, or the advantages to be secured by it. But far more frequently, they are morsels of rhetoric--lectures, discourses, or homilies--addressed to the emotions and not to the reason, insisting on the ethical and religious point of view, and destined to operate with persuasive or intimidating effect upon an uninstructed multitude.[148]

[Footnote 146: Cicero (De Legg. ii. 6) professes to follow Plato in this practice of prefixing proëms to his Laws. He calls the proëm an encomium upon the law, which in most cases it is--"ut priusquam ipsam legem recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam".]

[Footnote 147: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A.]

[Footnote 148: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 722 B. [Greek: pro\s tou/tô| de\ ou)dei\s e)/oike dianoêthê=nai pô/pote tô=n nomothetô=n, ô(s e)xo\n duoi=n chrê=sthai pro\s ta\s nomothesi/as, peithoi= kai\ bi/a|, kath' o(/son oi(=o/n te e)pi\ to\n a)/peiron paidei/as o)/chlon tô=| e(te/rô| chrô=ntai mo/non.]]

[Side-note: Great value set by Plato himself upon these prologues. They are to serve as type for all poets. No one is allowed to contradict them.]

It seems that Plato took credit to himself for what he thought a beneficial innovation, in thus blending persuasive exhortation with compulsory command. His assurance, that no Grecian lawgiver had ever done so before, is doubtless trustworthy:[149] though we may remark that the confusion of the two has been the general rule with Oriental lawgivers--the Hindoos, the Jews, the Mahommedan Arabs, &c. But with him the innovation serves a farther purpose. He makes it the means of turning rhetoric to account; and of enlisting in his service, as lawgiver, not only all the rhetoric but all the poetry, in his community. His Athenian speaker is so well satisfied with these prologues, that he considers them to possess the charm of a poetical work, and suspects them to have been dictated by inspiration from the Gods.[150] He pronounces them the best and most suitable compositions for the teaching of youth, and therefore prescribes that teachers shall cause the youth to recite and learn them, instead of the poetical and rhetorical works usually employed. He farther enjoins that his prologues shall serve as type and canon whereby all other poetical and rhetorical compositions shall be tried. If there be any compositions in full harmony and analogy with this type, the teachers shall be compelled to learn them by heart, and teach them to pupils. Any teacher refusing to do so shall be dismissed.[151] Nor shall any poet be allowed to compose and publish works containing sentiments contradictory to the declaration of the lawgiver.[152]

[Footnote 149: The testimony of Plato shows that the [Greek: prooi/mia tê=s nomothesi/as] ascribed to Zaleukus and Charondas (Diodor. xii. 12-20) are composed by authors later than his time, and probably in imitation of his [Greek: prooi/mia]: which indeed is probable enough on other grounds. See Heyne, Opuscula, vol. ii., Prolus i. vi., De Zaleuci et Charondæ Legibus.

Cicero read the proëms ascribed to Zaleukus and Charondas as genuine (Legg. ii. 6); so did Diodôrus, xii. 17-20; Stobæus, Serm. xlii.]

[Footnote 150: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 C. [Greek: ou)k a)/neu tino\s e)pipnoi/as theô=n, e)/doxan d' ou)=n moi panta/pasi poiê/sei tini\ prosomoi/ôs ei)rê=sthai.]]

[Footnote 151: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 D-E.]

[Footnote 152: Plato, Legg. p. 811 E.]

[Side-note: Contrast of Leges with Gorgias and Phædrus.]

As a contrast to this view of Plato in his later years, it is interesting to turn to that which he entertained in an earlier part of his life, in the Gorgias and the Phædrus, respecting rhetoric. In the former dialogue, Gorgias is recognised as a master of the art of persuasion, especially as addressed to a numerous audience, and respecting ethical questions, What is just, and what is unjust? Sokrates, on the contrary, pointedly distinguishes persuasion from teaching--discredits simple persuasion, without teaching, as merely deceptive--and contends that rhetorical discourse addressed to a multitude, upon such topics, can never convey any teaching.[153] But in the Leges we find that the art of persuasion has risen greatly in Plato's estimation. Whether it be a true art, or a mere unartistic knack, he now recognises its efficacy in modifying the dispositions of the uninstructed multitude, and announces himself to be the first lawgiver who will employ it systematically for that purpose. He combines the seductions of the rhetor with the unpalatable severities of the lawgiver: the two distinct functions of Gorgias and his brother the physician Herodikus, when Gorgias accompanied his brother to visit suffering patients, and succeeded by force of rhetoric in overcoming their repugnance to the cutting and burning indispensable for cure.[154] Again, in the Phædrus, Plato treats the art of persuasion, when applied at once to a mixed assemblage of persons, either by writing or discourse, as worthless and unavailing.[155] He affirms that it makes no durable impression on the internal mind of the individuals: the same discourse will never suit all. Individuals differ materially in their cast of mind; moreover, they differ in opinion upon ethical topics (just and unjust) more than upon any other. Some men are open to persuasion by topics which will have no effect on others. Accordingly, you must go through a laborious discrimination: first, you must discriminate generally the various classes of minds and the various classes of discourse--next, you must know to which classes of minds the individuals of the multitude before you belong. You must then address to each mind the mode of persuasion specially adapted to it. The dialectic philosopher is the only one who possesses the true art of persuasion. Such was Plato's point of view in the Phædrus. I need hardly point out how completely it is dropped in his Leges: wherein he pours persuasion into the ears of an indiscriminate multitude, through the common channel of a rhetorical lecture, considering it of such impressive efficacy as to justify the supposition of inspiration from the Gods.[156]

[Footnote 153: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 454-456.]

[Footnote 154: Plato, Gorgias, p. 456 B.]

[Footnote 155: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263 A, 271-272-273 E--275 E--276 A--277 C.]

[Footnote 156: Zeller, in his 'Platonische Studien' (pp. 66-72-88, &c.), insists much on the rhetorical declamatory prolixity visible throughout the Treatise De Legibus, as quite at variance with the manner of Plato in his earlier and better dialogues, and even as specimens of what Plato there notes as the rhetorical or sophistical manner. He expresses his surprise that the Athenian should be made to ascribe such discourses to the inspiration of the Gods (p. 107). Zeller enumerates these and many other dissimilarities in the Treatise De Legibus, as compared with other Platonic dialogues, as premisses to sustain his conclusion that the treatise is not by Plato. In my judgment they do not bear out that conclusion (which indeed Zeller has since renounced in his subsequent work); but they are not the less real and notable, marking the change in Plato's own mind.

How poor an opinion had Plato of the efficacy of the [Greek: nouthetêtiko\n ei)=dos lo/gôn] at the time when he composed the Sophistês (p. 230 A)! What a superabundance of such discourse does he deliver in the Treatise De Legibus, taking especial pride in the peculiarity!]

[Side-note: Regulations for the new colony--About religious worship, the oracles of Delphi and Dodona are to be consulted.]

After this unusual length of preliminaries, Plato enters on the positive regulation of his colony. As to the worship of the Gods, he directs little or nothing of his own authority. The colony must follow the advice of the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Ammon--together with any consecrated traditions, epiphanies, or inspirations from the Gods belonging to the spot--as to the Gods who shall be publicly worshipped, and the suitable temples and rites. Only he directs that to each portion of the territory set apart for civil purposes, some God, Dæmon, or Hero, shall be specially assigned as Patron,[157] with a chapel and precinct wherein all meetings of the citizens of the district shall be held, whether for religious ceremonies, or for recreation, or for political duties.

[Footnote 157: Plato, Legg. v. p. 738 C-D. [Greek: o(/pôs a)\n xu/llogoi e(ka/stôn tô=n merô=n kata\ chro/nous gigno/menoi tou\s prostachthe/ntas . . . meta\ thusiô=n.]

That such "ordained seasons" for meetings and sacrifices should be punctually attended to--was a matter of great moment, on religious no less than on civil grounds. It was with a view to that object principally that each Grecian city arranged its calendar and its system of intercalation. Plato himself states this (vii. p. 809 D).

Sir George Lewis, in his Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, adverts to the passage of Plato here cited, and gives a very instructive picture of the state of the Hellenic world as to Calendar and computation of time (see p. 19; also the greater part of chapter i. of his valuable work). The object of all the cities was to adjust lunar time with solar time by convenient intercalations, but hardly any two cities agreed in the method of doing so. Different schemes of intercalation and periods (trietêric, octaetêric, enneadekaetêric) were either adopted by civic authority or suggested by private astronomers, such as Kleostratus and Meton. The practical dissonance and confusion was great, and the theoretical dissatisfaction also.

Now in this dialogue De Legibus, Plato recognises both the importance of the object and the problem to be solved, yet he suggests no means of his own for solving it. He makes no arrangement for the calendar of his new Magnêtic city. I confess that this is to me a matter of some surprise. To combine an exertion of authority with an effort of arithmetical calculation, is in his vein; and the exactness of observances as respects the Gods, in harmony with the religious tone of the treatise, depended on some tolerable solution of the problem.

We may perhaps presume that Plato refused to deal with the problem because he considered it as mathematically insoluble. Days, months, and years are not exactly commensurable with each other. In the Timæus (p. 36 C) Plato declares that the rotation of the Circle of the Same, or the outermost sidereal sphere, upon which the succession of day and night depends, is according to the side of a parallelogram ([Greek: kata\ pleura/n])--while the rotations of the Moon and Sun (two of the seven branches composing the Circle of the Different) are according to the diagonal thereof ([Greek: kata\ dia/metron]): now the side and the diagonal represented the type of incommensurable magnitudes among the ancient reasoners. It would appear also that he considers the rotations of the Moon and Sun to be incommensurable with each other, both of them being members included in the Circle of the Different.

Since an exact mathematical solution was thus unattainable, Plato may probably have despised a merely approximative solution, sufficient for practical convenience--to which last object he generally pays little attention. He might also fancy that even the attempt to meddle with the problem betokened that confusion of the incommensurable with the commensurable, which he denounces in this very treatise (vii. pp. 819-820).]

[Side-note: Perpetuity of number of citizens, and of lots of land, one to each, inalienable and indivisible.]

Plato requires for his community a fixed and peremptory total of 5040 citizens, never to be increased, and never to be diminished: a total sufficient, in his judgment, to defend the territory against invaders, and to lend aid on occasion to an oppressed neighbour. He distributes the whole territory into 5040 lots of land, each of equal value, assigning one lot to each citizen. Each lot is assumed to be sufficient for the maintenance of a family of sober habits, and no more. The total number (5040) is selected because of the great variety of divisors by which it may be divided without remainder.[158]

[Footnote 158: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 737-738, vi. p. 771 C.

Aristotle declares this total of 5040 to be extravagantly great, inasmuch as it would require an amount of territory beyond the scale which can be reckoned upon for a Grecian city, to maintain so many unproductive persons, including not merely the 5040 adult citizens, but also their wives, children, and personal attendants, none of whom would take part in any productive industry (Politic. ii. 6, p. 1265, b. 16).

The remark here cited indicates the small numerical scale upon which the calculations of a Greek politician were framed. But we can hardly be surprised at it, seeing that the new city is intended for the Island of Krete, where none even of the existing cities were considerable. Moreover Aristotle had probably present to his mind the analogy of Sparta. The Spartan citizens were in a situation more analogous to the 5040 than any other Grecian residents. But the Spartan citizens could not have been near so numerous as 5040 at that time; not even one-fifth of it--Aristotle tells us, Politic. ii. 9, 1270, a. 31. Aristotle goes on to remark on the definition given by Plato of the size and value of each lot of land sufficient for the citizen and his family to live [Greek: sôphro/nôs]: it ought to be (says Aristotle) [Greek: sôphro/nôs kai\ e)leutheri/ôs]. These are the two modes of excellence, and the only two, which a man can display in the use of his property (1265, a. 35). But this change would only aggravate the difficulty as to the total area of land required for the 5040. Compare the remark of Aristotle on the scheme of Hippodamus, Politic. ii. 8, 1268, a. 42.]

[Side-note: Plato reasserts his adherence to the principle of the Republic, though the repugnance of others hinders him from realising it.]

We thus see that Plato, in laying down his fundamental principle ([Greek: u(po/thesin]), recognises separate individual property and separate family among his citizens: both of which had been strenuously condemned and strictly excluded, in respect to the Guardians of his Republic. But he admits the principle only with the proviso that there shall be a peremptory limit to number of citizens, to individual wealth, and to individual poverty: moreover, even with this proviso, he admits it only as a second-best, because mankind will not accept, and are not sufficiently exalted to work out, what is in itself the best. He reasserts the principle of the Republic, that separate property and separate family are both essentially mischievous: that all individuality, either of interest or sympathy or sentiment, ought to be extinguished as far as possible.[159] Though constrained against his will to renounce this object, he will still approximate to it as near as he can in his second-best. Moreover, he may possibly, at some future time (D.V.), propose a third-best. When once departure from the genuine standard is allowed, the departure may be made in many different ways.

[Footnote 159: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 739-740; vii. p. 807 B.]

This declaration deserves notice as attesting the undiminished adhesion of Plato to the main doctrines of his Republic. The point here noted is one main difference of principle between the Treatise De Legibus and the Republic: the enactment of written fundamental laws with prologues serving as homilies to be preached to the citizens, is another. Both of them are differences of principle: each gives rise to many subordinate differences or corollaries.[160]

[Footnote 160: Plato, Legg. v. p. 739 E. [Greek: ê(\n de\ nu=n ê(mei=s e)pikecheirê/kamen, ei)/ê te a)\n genome/nê pôs a)thanasi/as e)ggu/tata kai\ ê( mi/a deute/rôs; tri/tên de\ meta\ tau=ta, e)a\n theo\s e)the/lê|, diaperanou/metha.] Upon this passage K. F. Hermann observes: "Hæc enim est quam ordine tertiam appellat Plato, quæ Aristoteli [Politic. iv. 1, 2] [Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs politei/a] dicitur: quod tamen nolim ita accipi, ut à nonnullis factum est, ut hanc quoque olim singulari scripto persecuturum fuisse philosophum credamus, quasi tribus exemplis absolvi rerum publicarum formas censuisset; innumeræ enim pro singularum nationum et urbium fortuna esse possunt," &c. (De Vestigiis Instit. Vet. imprimis Attic. per Plat. de Legg. libros indag., p. 16).

That Plato _did_ intend to compose a _third_ work upon an analogous subject appears to me clear from the words,--but it does not at all follow that he thought that three varieties would exhaust all possibility. Upon this point I dissent from Hermann, and also upon his interpretation of Aristotle's phrase [Greek: ê( e)x u(pothe/seôs politei/a]. Aristotle distinguishes three distinct varieties of end which the political constructor may propose to himself:--1. [Greek: tê\n politei/an tê\n a(plô=s a)ri/stên, tê\n ma/lista kat' eu)chê/n]. 2. [Greek: Tê\n e)k tô=n u(pokeime/nôn a)ri/stên]. 3. [Greek: Tê\n e)x u(pothe/seôs a)ri/stên]. Now K. F. Hermann here maintains, and Boeckh had already maintained before him (ad Platonis Minoem et de Legibus, pp. 66-67), that the city sketched in Plato's treatise De Legibus coincides with No. 2 in Aristotle's enumeration, and that the projected [Greek: tri/tê] in Plato coincides with No. 3--[Greek: tê\n e)x u(pothe/seôs]. I differ from them here. There is no ground for presuming that what Plato puts _third_ must also be put by Aristotle _third_. I think that the Platonic city De Legibus corresponds to No. 3 in Aristotle and not to No. 2. It is a city [Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs], not [Greek: e)k tô=n u(pokeime/nôn a)ri/stên]. Plato borrows little or nothing from [Greek: ta\ u(pokei/mena], and almost everything from his own [Greek: u(po/thesis] or assumed principle, which in this case is the fixed number of the citizens as well as of the lots of land, the imposition of a limit on each man's proprietary acquisitions, and the recognition of separate family establishments subject to these limits. This is the [Greek: u(po/thesis] of Plato's second city, to which all his regulations of detail are accommodated: it is substituted by him (unwillingly, because of the repugnance of others) in place of the [Greek: u(po/thesis] of his first city or the Republic, which [Greek: u(po/thesis] is perfect communism among the [Greek: phu/lakes], without either separate property or separate family. This last is Plato's [Greek: a(plôs a)ri/stê].]

[Side-note: Regulations about land, successions, marriages, &c. The number of citizens must not be allowed to increase.]

Each citizen proprietor shall hold his lot of land, not as his own, but as part and parcel of the entire territory, which, taken as a whole, is Goddess and Mistress--conjointly with all the local Gods and Heroes--of the body of citizens generally. No citizen shall either sell or otherwise alienate his lot, nor divide it, nor trench upon its integrity. The total number of lots, the integrity of each lot, and the total number of citizens, shall all remain consecrated in perpetuity, without increase or diminution. Each citizen in dying shall leave one son as successor to his lot: if he has more than one, he may choose which of them he will prefer. The successor so chosen shall maintain the perpetuity of worship of the Gods, reverential rites to the family and deceased ancestors, and obligations towards the city.[161] If the citizen has other sons, they will be adopted into the families of other citizens who happen to be childless: if he has daughters, he will give them out in marriage, but without any dowry. Such family relations will be watched over by a special board of magistrates: with this peremptory condition, that they shall on no account permit either the number of citizen proprietors, or the number of separate lots, to depart from the consecrated 5040.[162] Each citizen's name, and each lot of land, will be registered on tablets of cypress wood. These registers will be preserved in the temples, in order that the magistrates may be able to prevent fraud.[163]

[Footnote 161: Plato, Legg. v. p. 740 A-B.]

[Footnote 162: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 740 D-742 C. Aristotle remarks that in order to attain the object which Plato here proclaims, restriction ought to be imposed on [Greek: teknopoii+/a]. No citizen ought to be allowed to beget more than a certain number of children. He observes that this last-mentioned restriction, if imposed alone and without any others, would do more than all the rest to maintain the permanent 5040 lots, and that without this no other restrictions could be efficacious (Politic. ii. 6, 1265, a. 37, 1266, b. 9).

Plato concurs in this opinion, though he trusts to prudence and the admonition of elders for bringing about this indispensable limitation of births in a family, without legal prohibition. I have already touched upon this matter in my review of Plato's Republic. See above--chap. xxxvii. p. 198 seq.

The [Greek: no/moi thetikoi\] of Philolaus at Thebes, regulating [Greek: tê\n paidopoii+/an] with a view to keep the lots of land unchanged, are only known by the brief allusion of Aristotle, Polit. ii. 12, 1274, b. 4.]

[Footnote 163: Plato, Legg. v. p. 741 C. [Greek: kuparitti/nas mnê/mas], &c.]

[Side-note: Position of the city and akropolis--Distribution of the territory and citizens into twelve equal sections or tribes.]

The city, with its appropriate accessories, shall be placed as nearly as possible in the middle of the territory. The akropolis, sacred to Hestia and Athênê, will be taken as a centre from whence twelve radiating lines will be drawn to the extremity of the territory, so as to distribute the whole area into twelve sections, not all equal in magnitude, but equalised in value by diminishing the area in proportion to superior goodness of land. The total number of citizens will be distributed also in twelve sections, of 420 each (5040/12), among whom the lots of land contained in each twelfth will be apportioned. This duodecimal division, the fundamental canon of Plato's municipal arrangements, is a sanctified present from the Gods, in harmony with the months and with the kosmical revolutions.[164] Each twelfth, land and citizens together, will be constituted a Tribe, and will be consecrated to some God (determined by lot) whose name it will bear, and at whose altar two monthly festivals will be celebrated: one for the tribe, the other for the entire city. The tribes are peremptorily equal in respect to number of citizens; but care shall also be taken to make them as nearly equal as possible in respect to registered property: that is, in respect to property other than land, which each citizen brings with him to the settlement, and which will all be recorded (as well as the land) in the public registers.[165] The lot of land assigned to each citizen will include a portion near the centre, and a portion near the circumference: the most central portion being coupled with the most outlying, and so on in order. Each citizen will thus have two separate residences:[166] one nearer to the city, the other more distant from it.

[Footnote 164: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 771 B. Plato here reckons the different numerical divisions adopted in different cities as being all both natural and consecrated, but he considers his own as the most fortunate and right. He insists much upon the importance of symmetrical distribution, with definite numerical ratio, in all the departments of life: in the various civil subdivisions of the Tribe, such as Phratries, Dêmes, Villages--in the arrangements of the citizens for military service, [Greek: ta/xeis kai\ a)gôga/s]--in the coins, weights and measures--in the modulations of the voice, and in the direction of movements either rectilinear or rotatory. (Whoever looks at Aristophanes, Aves, 1010 seq., will see all such regularity and symmetry derided in the person of Meton.) Nay, he enjoins that all the vessels made for common use shall be exact fractions or exact multiples of each other. This will make it necessary for all the citizens to learn elementary arithmetic, which Plato considers to be of essential value, not only for practical use but as a stimulus to the dormant intelligence. On this point he notes the Egyptians and Phenicians as standing higher than the Greeks (vii. p. 818), but as applying their superior arithmetical knowledge only to a mean and disgraceful thirst for wealth. Against this last defect Plato reckons upon guarding his citizens by other precautions, while he encourages in them the learning of arithmetic (Legg. v. p. 747). Plato here speaks of the Egyptians and Phenicians, much as the Jews have been spoken of in later times. And it is curious that he seems to consider their peculiarities of character as referable to their local domicile. He maintains that one place is intrinsically different from another in respect to producing good and bad characters; some places are even privileged by [Greek: thei/a e)pi/pnoia kai\ daimo/nôn lê/xeis] &c.]

[Footnote 165: Plato, Legg. v. p. 745.]

[Footnote 166: Plato, Legg. v. p. 745, vi. p. 771 D.]

[Side-note: Movable property--Inequality therein reluctantly allowed, as far as four to one, but no farther.]

Plato would be glad if he were able to establish among all the citizens, equality not merely of landed property, but property of all other property besides. This, however, he recognises his inability to exact. The colonists will bring with them movable property--some more, some less: and inequality must be tolerated up to a certain limit. Each citizen is allowed to possess movable property as far as four times the value of his lot of land, but no more. The maximum of wealth possessed by any citizen will thus be equal to five times the value of his lot of land: the minimum of the poorest citizen will be the lot of land itself, which cannot, under the worst circumstances, be alienated or diminished. If any citizen shall in any way acquire property above the maximum here named, he is directed to make it over to the city and to the Gods. In case of disobedience, he may be indicted before the Nomophylakes; and if found guilty, shall be disgraced, excluded from his share of public distributions, and condemned to pay twice as much--half being assigned as recompense to the prosecutor.[167] The public register kept by the magistrates, in which is enrolled all the property of every kind belonging to each citizen, will enable them to enforce this regulation, and will be farther useful in all individual suits respecting money.

[Footnote 167: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 744-745, vi. p. 754 E.]

[Side-note: Census of the citizens--four classes, with graduated scale of property. No citizen to possess gold or silver. No loans or interest. No debts enforced by law.]