Chapter XXXV: Platonic Republic--Abstract (4)

But tell me, Sokrates (asks Adeimantus), what do _you_ conceive the Good to be--Intelligence or Pleasure, or any other thing different from these? I do not profess to know (replies Sokrates), and cannot tell you. We must decline the problem, What Good itself is? as more arduous than our present impetus will enable us to reach.[192] Nevertheless I will partially supply the deficiency by describing to you the offspring of Good, very like its parent. You will recollect that we have distinguished the Many from the One: the many just particulars, beautiful particulars, from the One Universal Idea or Form, Just _per se_, Beautiful _per se_. The many particulars are seen but not conceived: the one Idea is conceived, but not seen.[193] We see the many particulars through the auxiliary agency of light, which emanates from the Sun, the God of the visible world. Our organ and sense of vision are not the Sun itself, but they are akin to the Sun in a greater degree than any of our other senses. They imbibe their peculiar faculty from the influence of the Sun.[194] The Sun furnishes to objects the power of being seen, and to our eyes the power of seeing: we can see no colour unless we turn to objects enlightened by its rays. Moreover it is the Sun which also brings about the generation, the growth, and the nourishment, of these objects, though it is itself out of the limits of generation: it generates and keeps them in existence, besides rendering them visible.[195] Now the Sun is the offspring and representative of the Idea of Good: what the Sun is in the sensible and visible world, the Idea of Good is in the intelligible or conceivable world.[196] As the Sun not only brings into being the objects of sense, but imparts to them the power of being seen so the Idea of Good brings into being the objects of conception or cognition, imparts to them the power of being known, and to the mind the power of knowing them.[197] It is from the Idea of Good that all knowledge, all truth, and all real essence spring. Yet the Idea of Good is itself extra-essential; out of or beyond the limits of essence, and superior in beauty and dignity both to knowledge and to truth; which are not Good itself, but akin to Good, as vision is akin to the Sun.[198]

[Footnote 192: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 B-E. [Greek: Au)to\ me\n ti/ pot' e)sti\ ta)gatho\n e)a/sômen ta\ nu=n ei)=nai; ple/on ga/r moi phai/netai ê)\ kata\ tê\n parou=san o(rmê\n e)phike/sthai tou= ge dokou=ntos e)moi\ ta\ nu=n; o(/s de\ e)/kgono/s te tou= a)gathou= phai/netai kai\ o(moio/tatos e)kei/nô|, le/gein e)the/lô] (p. 506 E).]

[Footnote 193: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 507 B-C. [Greek: Kai\ ta\ me\n (polla\) dê\ o(ra=sthai/ phamen, noei=sthai de\ ou)/; ta\s d' au)= i)de/as noei=sthai me/n, o(ra=sthai de\ ou)/.]]

[Footnote 194: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 A. [Greek: ê( o)/psis--ê(lioeide/staton tô=n peri\ ta\s ai)sthê/seis o)rga/nôn.]]

[Footnote 195: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. [Greek: To\n ê(/lion toi=s o(rôme/nois ou) mo/non tê\n tou= o(ra=sthai du/namin pare/chein phê/seis, a)lla\ kai\ tê\n ge/nesin kai\ au)/xên kai\ trophê/n, ou) ge/nesin au)to\n o)/nta.]]

[Footnote 196: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 B-C. [Greek: Tou=ton (to\n ê(/lion) to\n tou= a)gathou= e)/kgonon, o(\n ta)gatho\n e)ge/nnêsen a)na/logon e(autô=|, o(/, ti per au)to\ e)n tô=| noêtô=| to/pô| pro/s te nou=n kai\ ta\ noou/mena, tou=to tou=ton e)n tô=| o(ratô=| pro/s te o)/psin kai\ ta\ o(rô/mena.]]

[Footnote 197: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E. [Greek: Tou=to toi/nun to\ tê\n a)lê/theian pare/chon toi=s gignôskome/nois kai\ tô=| gignô/skonti tê\n du/namin a)podido\n tê\n tou= a)gathou= i)de/an pha/thi ei)=nai, ai)ti/an d' e)pistê/mês ou)=san kai\ a)lêthei/as ô(s gignôskome/nês], &c.]

[Footnote 198: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. [Greek: Kai\ toi=s gignôskome/nois toi/nun mê\ mo/non to\ gignô/skesthai pha/nai u(po\ tou= a)gathou= parei=nai, a)lla\ kai\ to\ ei)=nai te kai\ tê\n ou)si/an u(p' e)kei/nou au)tois prosei=nai, ou)k ou)si/as o)/ntos tou= a)gathou=, a)ll' e)/ti e)pe/keina tê=s ou)si/as presbei/a| kai\ duna/mei u(pere/chontos. Kai\ o( Glau/kôn ma/la geloi/ôs, A)/pollon, e)/phê, daimoni/as u(perbolê=s! Su\ ga/r, ê)=n d' e)gô/, ai)/tios, a)nagka/zôn ta\ e)moi\ dokou=nta peri\ au)tou= le/gein.]--Also p. 509 A.]

[Side-note: The Idea of Good rules the ideal or intelligible world, as the Sun rules the sensible or visible world.]

Here then we have two distinct regions or genera; one, the conceivable or intelligible, ruled by the Idea of Good--the other the visible, ruled by the Sun, which is the offspring of Good. Now let us subdivide each of these regions or genera, into two portions. The two portions of the visible will be--first, real objects, visible such as animals, plants, works of art, &c.--second, the images or representations of these, such as shadows, reflexions in water or in mirrors, &c. The first of these two subdivisions will be greatly superior in clearness to the second: it will be distinguished from the second as truth is distinguished from not-truth.[199] Matter of knowledge is in the same relation to matter of opinion, as an original to its copy. Next, the conceivable or intelligible region must be subdivided into two portions, similarly related one to the other: the first of these portions will be analogous to the real objects of vision, the second to the images or representations of these objects: the first will thus be the Forms, Ideas, or Realities of Conception or Intellect--the second will be particular images or embodiments thereof.[200]

[Footnote 199: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 509-510. 510 A: [Greek: diê|rê=sthai a)lêthei/a| te kai\ mê/, ô(s to\ doxasto\n pro\s to\ gnôsto/n, ou)/tô to\ o(moiôthe\n pro\s to\ ô(=| ô(moiô/thê.]]

[Footnote 200: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B.]

[Side-note: To the intelligible world there are applicable two distinct modes of procedure--the Geometrical--the Dialectic. Geometrical procedure assumes diagrams.]

Now in regard to these two portions of the conceivable or intelligible region, two different procedures of the mind are employed: the pure Dialectic, and the Geometrical, procedure. The Geometer or the Arithmetician begins with certain visible images, lines, figures, or numbered objects, of sense: he takes his departure from certain hypotheses or assumptions, such as given numbers, odd and even--given figures and angles, of three different sorts.[201] He assumes these as data without rendering account of them, or allowing them to be called in question, as if they were self-evident to every one. From these premisses he deduces his conclusions, carrying them down by uncontradicted steps to the solution of the problem which he is examining.[202] But though he has before his eyes the visible parallelogram inscribed on the sand, with its visible diagonal, and though all his propositions are affirmed respecting these--yet what he has really in his mind is something quite different--the Parallelogram _per se_, or the Form of a Parallelogram--the Form of a Diagonal, &c. The visible figure before him is used only as an image or representative of this self-existent form; which last he can contemplate only in conception, though all his propositions are intended to apply to it.[203] He is unable to take his departure directly from this Form, as from a first principle: he is forced to assume the visible figure as his point of departure, and cannot ascend above it: he treats it as something privileged and self-evident.[204]

[Footnote 201: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B. [Greek: ê(=| to me\n au)tou= (tmê=ma) toi=s to/te tmêthei=sin ô(s ei)ko/si chrôme/nê] (this is farther illustrated by p. 511 A--[Greek: ei)ko/si chrôme/nên au)toi=s toi=s u(po\ tô=n ka/tô a)peikasthei=si) psuchê\ zêtei=n a)nagka/zetai e)x u(pothe/seôn, ou)k e)p' a)rchê\n poreuome/nê a)ll' e)pi\ teleutê/n], &c.]

[Footnote 202: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 C-D. [Greek: oi( peri\ ta\s geômetri/as te kai\ logismou\s kai\ ta\ toiau=ta pragmateuo/menoi, u(pothe/menoi to/ te peritto\n kai\ to\ a)/rtion kai\ ta\ schê/mata kai\ gôniô=n tritta\ ei)/dê kai\ a)/lla tou/tôn a)delpha\ kath' e(ka/stên me/thodon, tau=ta me\n ô(s ei)do/tes, poiêsa/menoi u(pothe/seis au)ta/, ou)de/na lo/gon ou)/te au(toi=s ou)/te toi=s a)/llois e)/ti a)xiou=si peri\ au)tô=n dido/nai, ô(s panti\ phanerô=n; e)k tou/tôn d' a)rcho/menoi ta\ loipa\ ê)/dê diexio/ntes teleutô=sin o(mologoume/nôs e)pi\ tou=to, ou)= a)\n e)pi\ ske/psin o(rmê/sôsin.]]

[Footnote 203: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 D-E. [Greek: toi=s o(rôme/nois ei)/desi proschrô=ntai, kai\ tou\s lo/gous peri\ au)tô=n poiou=ntai, ou) peri\ tou/tôn dianoou/menoi, a)ll' e)kei/nôn pe/ri oi(=s tau=ta e)/oike, tou= tetragô/nou au)tou= e(/neka tou\s lo/gous poiou/menoi kai\ diame/tron au)tê=s, a)ll' ou) tau/tês ê(\n gra/phousi, kai\ ta)/lla ou(/tôs; au)ta\ me\n tau=ta a(\ pla/ttousi/ te kai\ gra/phousin, ô(=n] kai\ skiai\ kai\ e)n u(/dasin ei)ko/nes ei)si/, tou/tois me\n ô(s ei)ko/sin au)= chrô/menoi, zêtou=nte/s te au)ta\ e)kei=na i)dei=n, a(\ ou)k a)\n a)/llôs i)/doi tis ê)\ tê=| dianoi/a|.]

[Footnote 204: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 A. [Greek: ou)k e)p' a)rchê\n i)ou=san, ô(s ou) duname/nên tô=n u(pothe/seôn a)nôte/rô e)kbai/nein, ei)ko/si de\ chrôme/nên au)toi=s toi=s u(po\ tô=n ka/tô a)peikasthei=sin, kai\ e)kei/nois pro\s e)kei=na ô(s e)narge/si dedoxasme/nois te kai\ tetimême/nois.]]

[Side-note: Dialectic procedure assumes nothing. It departs from the highest Form, and steps gradually down to the lowest, without meddling with any thing except Forms.]

From the geometrical procedure thus described, we must now distinguish the other section--the pure Dialectic. Here the Intellect ascends to the absolute Form, and grasps it directly. Particular assumptions or hypotheses are indeed employed, but only as intervening stepping-stones, by which the Intellect is to ascend to the Form: they are afterwards to be discarded: they are not used here for first principles of reasoning, as they are by the Geometer.[205] The Dialectician uses for his first principle the highest absolute Form; he descends from this to the next highest, and so lower and lower through the orderly gradation of Forms, until he comes to the end or lowest: never employing throughout the whole descent any hypothesis or assumption, nor any illustrative aid from sense. He contemplates and reasons upon the pure intelligible essence, directly and immediately: whereas the Geometer can only contemplate it indirectly and mediately, through the intervening aid of particular assumptions.[206]

[Footnote 205: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 B. [Greek: to\ e(/teron tmê=ma tou= noêtou= . . . ou)= au)to\s o( lo/gos a(/ptetai tê=| tou= diale/gesthai duna/mei, ta\s u(pothe/seis poiou/menos ou)k a)rcha\s a)lla\ tô=| o)/nti u(pothe/seis, oi(=on e)piba/seis te kai\ o(rma/s, i(/na me/chri tou= a)nupothe/tou, e)pi\ tê\n tou= panto\s a)rchê\n i)ô/n, a(psa/menos au)tê=s, pa/lin au)= e)cho/menos tô=n e)kei/nês e)chome/nôn, ou(/tôs e)pi\ teleutê\n katabai/nê|, ai)sthêtô=| panta/pasin ou)deni\ proschrô/menos, a)ll' ei)/desin au)toi=s di' au)tô=n ei)s au)ta/, kai\ teleuta=| ei)s ei)/dê.]]

[Footnote 206: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 C. [Greek: saphe/steron ei)=nai to\ u(po\ tê=s tou= diale/gesthai e)pistê/mês tou= o)/ntos te kai\ noêtou= theôrou/menon ê)\ to\ u(po\ tô=n technô=n kaloume/nôn, ai(=s ai( u(pothe/seis a)rchai/], &c.]

[Side-note: Two distinct grades of Cognition--Direct or Superior--Noûs--Indirect or Inferior--Dianoia.]

The distinction here indicated between the two different sections of the Intelligible Region, and the two different sections of the Region of Sense--we shall mark (continues Sokrates) by appropriate terms. The Dialectician alone has Noûs or Intellect, direct or the highest cognition: he alone grasps and comprehends directly the pure intelligible essence or absolute Form. The Geometer does not ascend to this direct contemplation or intuition of the Form: he knows it only through the medium of particular assumptions, by indirect Cognition or Dianoia; which is a lower faculty than Noûs or Intellect, yet nevertheless higher than Opinion.

[Side-note: Two distinct grades of Opinion also in the Sensible World--Faith or Belief--Conjecture.]

As we assign two distinct grades of Cognition to the Intelligible Region, so we also assign two distinct grades of Opinion to the Region of Sense, and its two sections. To the first of these two sections, or to real objects of sense, we assign the highest grade of Opinion, _viz._: Faith or Belief. To the second of the two, or to the images of real objects of sense, we assign the lower grade, _viz._: Conjecture.

Here then are the four grades. Two grades of Cognition--1. Noûs, or Direct Cognition. 2. Dianoia, or Indirect Cognition: both of them belonging to the Intelligible Region, and both of them higher than Opinion. Next follow the two grades of Opinion. 3. The higher grade, Faith or Belief. 4. The lower grade, Conjecture. Both the two last belong to the sensible world; the first to real objects, the last to images of those objects.[207]

[Footnote 207: Plato, Republic, p. 511 D-E.]

[Side-note: Distinction between the philosopher and the unphilosophical public, illustrated by the simile of the Cave, and the captives imprisoned therein.]

Sokrates now proceeds to illustrate the contrast between the philosopher and the unphilosophical or ordinary man, by the memorable simile of the cave and its shadows. Mankind live in a cave, with its aperture directed towards the light of the sun; but they are so chained, that their backs are constantly turned towards this aperture, so that they cannot see the sun and sunlight. What they do see is by means of a fire which is always burning behind them. Between them and this fire there is a wall; along the wall are posted men who carry backwards and forwards representations or images of all sorts of objects; so that the shadows of these objects by the firelight are projected from behind these chained men upon the ground in front of them, and pass to and fro before their vision. All the experience which such chained men acquire, consists in what they observe of the appearance and disappearance, the transition, sequences, and co-existences, of these shadows, which they mistake for truth and realities, having no no acquaintance with any other phenomena.[208] If now we suppose any one of them to be liberated from his chains, turned round, and brought up to the light of the sun and to real objects--his eyesight would be at first altogether dazzled, confounded, and distressed. Distinguishing as yet nothing clearly, he would believe that the shadows which he had seen in his former state were true and distinct objects, and that the new mode of vision to which he had been suddenly introduced was illusory and unprofitable. He would require a long time to accustom him to daylight: at first his eyes would bear nothing but shadows--next images in the water--then the stars at night--lastly, the full brightness of the Sun. He would learn that it was the Sun which not only gave light, but was the cause of varying seasons, growth, and all the productions of the visible world. And when his mind had been thus opened, he would consider himself much to be envied for the change, looking back with pity on his companions still in the cave.[209] He would think them all miserably ignorant, as being conversant not with realities, but only with the shadows which passed before their eyes. He would have no esteem even for the chosen few in the cave, who were honoured by their fellows as having best observed the co-existences and sequences among these shadows, so as to predict most exactly how the shadows would appear in future.[210] Moreover if, after having become fully accustomed to daylight and the contemplation of realities, he were to descend again into the cave, his eyesight would be dim and confused in that comparative darkness; so that he would not well recognise the shadows, and would get into disputes about them with his companions. They on their side would deride him as having spoilt his sight as well as his judgment, and would point him out as an example to deter others from emerging out of the cave into daylight.[211] Far from wishing to emerge themselves, they would kill, if they could, any one who tried to unchain them and assist them in escaping.[212]

[Footnote 208: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 514-515.]

[Footnote 209: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 515-516.]

[Footnote 210: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 516 C. [Greek: Timai\ de\ kai\ e)/painoi ei)/ tines au)toi=s ê)=san to/te par' a)llê/lôn kai\ ge/ra tô=| o)xu/tata kathorô=nti ta\ pario/nta, kai\ mnêmoneu/onti ma/lista o(/sa te pro/tera au)tô=n kai\ u(/stera ei)ô/thei kai\ a(/ma poreu/esthai, kai\ e)k tou/tôn dê\ dunatô/tata a)pomanteuome/nô| to\ me/llon ê(/xein, dokei=s a)\n au)to\n e)pithumêtikô=s au)tô=n e)/chein kai\ zêlou=n tou\s par' e)kei/nois timôme/nous te kai\ e)ndunasteu/ontas?]]

[Footnote 211: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A. [Greek: a)=r' ou) ge/lôt' a)\n para/schoi kai\ le/goito a)\n peri\ au)tou= ô(s a)naba\s a)/nô diephtharme/nos ê(/kei ta\ o)/mmata, kai\ o(/ti ou)k a)/xion ou)de\ peira=sthai a)/nô i)e/nai?]]

[Footnote 212: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A. [Greek: kai\ to\n e)picheirou=nta lu/ein te kai\ a)na/gein, ei)/ pôs e)n tai=s chersi\ du/naito labei=n kai\ a)poktei=nai, a)poktinnu/nai a)\n?]]

[Side-note: Daylight of philosophy contrasted with the firelight and shadows of the Cave.]

By this simile (continues Sokrates) I intend to illustrate, as far as I can, yet without speaking confidently,[213] the relations of the sensible world to the intelligible world: the world of transitory shadows, dimly seen and admitting only opinion, contrasted with that of unchangeable realities steadily contemplated and known, illuminated by the Idea of Good, which is itself visible in the background, being the cause both of truth in speculation and of rectitude in action.[214] No wonder that the few who can ascend into the intelligible region, amidst the clear contemplations of Truth and Justice _per se_, are averse to meddle again with the miseries of human affairs and to contend with the opinions formed by ordinary men respecting the shadows of Justice, the reality of which these ordinary men have never seen. There are two causes of temporary confused vision: one, when a man moves out of darkness into light--the other when he moves from light into darkness. It is from the latter cause that the philosopher suffers when he redescends into the obscure cave.[215]

[Footnote 213: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517. [Greek: tê=s g' e)mê=s e)lpi/dos, e)peidê\ tau/tês e)pithumei=s a)kou/ein; _theo\s de/ pou oi)=den ei) a)lêthê\s ou)=sa tugcha/nei_.]

This tone of uncertainty in Plato deserves notice. It forms a striking contrast with the dogmatism of many among his commentators.]

[Footnote 214: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 C.]

[Footnote 215: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 517-518.]

[Side-note: Purpose of a philosophical training, to turn a man round from facing the bad light of the Cave to face the daylight of philosophy, and to see the eternal Forms.]

The great purpose of education is to turn a man round from his natural position at the bottom of this dark cave, where he sees nothing but shadows: to fix his eyes in the other direction, and to induce him to ascend into clear daylight. Education does not, as some suppose, either pour knowledge into an empty mind, or impart visual power to blind persons. Men have good eyes, but these eyes are turned in the wrong direction. The clever among them see sharply enough what is before them: but they have nothing before them except shadows, and the sharper their vision the more mischief they do.[216] What is required is to turn them round and draw them up so as to face the real objects of daylight. Their natural eyesight would then suffice to enable them to see these objects well.[217] The task of our education must be, to turn round the men of superior natural aptitude, and to draw them up into the daylight of realities. Next, when they shall have become sufficiently initiated in truth and philosophy, we must not allow them to bury themselves permanently in such studies--as they will themselves be but too eager to do. We must compel them to come down again into the cave and exercise ascendancy among their companions, for whose benefit their superior mental condition will thus become available.[218]

[Footnote 216: Plato, Republic, p. 519 A-B.]

[Footnote 217: Plato, Republic, p. 519 B. [Greek: ô(=n ei) a)pallage\n periestre/pheto ei)s ta)lêthê=, kai\ e)kei=na a)\n to\ au)to\ tou=to tô=n au)tô=n a)nthrô/pôn o)xu/tata e(ô/ra, ô(/sper kai\ e)ph' a)\ nu=n te/traptai.]]

[Footnote 218: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 519-520.]

[Side-note: Those who have emerged from the Cave into full daylight amidst eternal Forms, must be forced to come down again and undertake active duties--Their reluctance to do this.]

Coming as they do from the better light, they will, after a little temporary perplexity, be able to see the dim shadows better than those who have never looked at anything else. Having contemplated the true and real Forms of the Just, Beautiful, Good--they will better appreciate the images of these Forms which come and go, pass by and repass in the cave.[219] They will indeed be very reluctant to undertake the duties or exercise the powers of government: their genuine delight is in philosophy; and if left to themselves, they would cultivate nothing else. But such reluctance is in itself one proof that they are the fittest persons to govern. If government be placed in the hands of men eager to possess it, there will be others eager to dispossess them, so that competition and factions will arise. Those who come forward to govern, having no good of their own, and seeking to extract their own good from the exercise of power, are both unworthy of trust and sure to be resisted by opponents of the like disposition. The philosopher alone has his own good in himself. He enjoys a life better than that of a ruler; which life he is compelled to forego when he accepts power and becomes a ruler.[220]

[Footnote 219: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 520 C.]

[Footnote 220: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 520-521.]

[Side-note: Studies serving as introduction to philosophy--Arithmetic, its awakening power--shock to the mind by felt contradiction.]

The main purpose of education, I have said (continues Sokrates) is, to turn round the faces of the superior men, and to invite them upwards from darkness to light--from the region of perishable shadows to that of imperishable realities.[221] Now what cognitions, calculated to aid such a purpose, can we find to teach?[222] Gymnastic, music, the vulgar arts, are all useful to be taught: but they do not tend to that which we are here seeking. Arithmetic does so to a certain extent, if properly taught which at present it is not.[223] It furnishes a stimulus to awaken the dormant intellectual and reflective capacity. Among the variety of sensible phenomena, there are some in which the senses yield a clear and satisfactory judgment, leaving no demand in the mind for anything beyond: there are others in which the senses land us in apparent equivocation, puzzle, and contradiction--so that the mind is stung by this apparent perplexity, and instigated to find a solution by some intellectual effort.[224] Thus, if we see or feel the fingers of our hand, they always appear to the sense, fingers: in whatever order or manner they may be looked at, there is no contradiction or discrepancy in the judgment of sense. But if we see or feel them as great or small, thick or thin, hard or soft, &c., they then appear differently according as they are seen or felt in different order or under different circumstances. The same object which now appears great, will at another time appear small: it will seem to the sense hard or soft, light or heavy, according as it is seen under different comparisons and relations.[225] Here then, sense is involved in an apparent contradiction, declaring the same object to be both hard and soft, great and small, light and heavy, &c. The mind, painfully confounded by such a contradiction, is obliged to invoke intellectual reflection to clear it up. Great and small are presented by the sense as inhering in the same object. Are they one thing, or two separate things? Intellectual reflection informs us that they are two: enabling us to conceive separately two things, which to our sense appeared confounded together. Intellectual (or abstract) conception is thus developed in our mind, as distinguished from sense, and as a refuge from the confusion and difficulties of sense, which furnish the stimulus whereby it is awakened.[226]

[Footnote 221: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C. [Greek: psuchê=s periagôgê/, e)k nukterinê=s tino\s ê(me/ras ei)s a)lêthinê\n tou= o)/ntos i)ou/sês e)pa/nodon, ê(\n dê\ philosophi/an a)lêthê= phê/somen ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 222: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C. [Greek: Ti/ a)\n ou)=n ei)/ê ma/thêma psuchê=s o(lko\n a)po\ tou= gignome/nou e)pi\ to\ o)/n?]]

[Footnote 223: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 522-523 A.]

[Footnote 224: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 523 C.]

[Footnote 225: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523-524.]

[Footnote 226: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 524 B-C.]

[Side-note: Perplexity arising from the One and Many, stimulates the mind to an intellectual effort for clearing it up.]

Now arithmetic, besides its practical usefulness for arrangements of war, includes difficulties and furnishes a stimulus of this nature. We see the same thing both as One and as infinite in multitude: as definite and indefinite in number.[227] We can emerge from these difficulties only by intellectual and abstract reflection. It is for this purpose, and not for purposes of traffic, that our intended philosophers must learn Arithmetic. Their minds must be raised from the confusion of the sensible world to the clear daylight of the intelligible.[228] In teaching Arithmetic, the master sets before his pupils numbers in the concrete, that is, embodied in visible and tangible objects--so many balls or pebbles.[229] Each of these balls he enumerates as One, though they be unequal in magnitude, and whatever be the magnitude of each. If you remark that the balls are unequal--and that each of them is Many as well as One, being divisible into as many parts as you please--he will laugh at the objection as irrelevant. He will tell you that the units to which his numeration refers are each _Unum per se_, indivisible and without parts; and all equal among themselves without the least shade of difference. He will add that such units cannot be exhibited to the senses, but can only be conceived by the intellect: that the balls before you are not such units in reality, but serve to suggest and facilitate the effort of abstract conception.[230] In this manner arithmetical teaching conducts us to numbers in the abstract--to the real, intelligible, indivisible unit--the _Unum per se_.

[Footnote 227: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 A. [Greek: a(/ma ga\r tau)to\n ô(s e(/n te o(rô=men kai\ ô(s a)/peira to\ plê=thos.]]

[Footnote 228: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 B. [Greek: dia\ to\ tê=s ou)si/as a(pte/on ei)=nai gene/seôs e)xanadu/nti], &c.]

[Footnote 229: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 D. [Greek: o(rata\ ê)\ a(pta\ sô/mata e)/chontas a)rithmou\s], &c.]

[Footnote 230: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 526 A. [Greek: ei)/ tis e)/roito au)tou/s, Ô)= thauma/sioi, peri\ poi/ôn a)rithmô=n diale/gesthe, e)n oi(=s to\ e(\n oi(=on u(mei=s a)xiou=te/ e)stin, i)/son te e(/kaston pa=n panti\ kai\ ou)de\ smikro\n diaphe/ron, mo/rio/n te e)/chon e)n e(autô=| ou)de/n? ti/ a)\n oi)/ei au)tou\s a)pokri/nasthai? Tou=to e)/gôge, o(/ti peri\ tou/tôn le/gousin ô(=n dianoêthê=nai mo/non e)gchôrei=, a)/llôs d' ou)damô=s metacheiri/zesthai dunato/n.]]

[Side-note: Geometry conducts the mind to wards Universal Ens.]

Geometrical teaching conducts the mind to the same order of contemplations; leading it away from variable particulars to unchangeable universal Essence. Some persons extol Geometry chiefly on the ground of its usefulness in applications to practice. But this is a mistake: its real value is in conducing to knowledge, and to elevated contemplations of the mind. It does, however, like Arithmetic, yield useful results in practice: and both of them are farther valuable as auxiliaries to other studies.[231]

[Footnote 231: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 526-527.]

[Side-note: Astronomy--how useful--not useful as now taught--must be studied by ideal figures, not by observation.]

After Geometry--the measurement of lines and superficial areas--the proper immediate sequel is Stereometry, the measurement of solids. But this latter is nowhere properly honoured and cultivated: though from its intrinsic excellence, it forces its way partially even against public neglect and discouragement.[232] Most persons omit it, and treat Astronomy as if it were the immediate sequel to Geometry: which is a mistake, for Astronomy relates to solid bodies in a state of rotatory movement, and ought to be preceded by the treatment of solid bodies generally.[233] Assuming Stereometry, therefore, as if it existed, we proceed to Astronomy.

[Footnote 232: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-C.]

[Footnote 233: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-B. [Greek: e)n periphora=| o)\n ê)/dê stereo\n labo/ntes, pri\n au)to\ kath' au(to\ labei=n.] Also 528 E.]

Certainly (remarks Glaukon) Astronomy, besides its usefulness in regard to the calendar, and the seasons, must be admitted by every one to carry the mind upwards, to the contemplation of things not below but on high. I do not admit this at all (replies Sokrates), as Astronomy is now cultivated: at least in my sense of the words, _looking upwards and looking downwards_. If a man lies on his back, contemplating the ornaments of the ceiling, he may carry his eyes upward, but not his mind.[234] To look upwards, as I understand it, is to carry the mind away from the contemplation of sensible things, whereof no science is attainable--to the contemplation of intelligible things, entities invisible and unchangeable, which alone are the objects of science. Observation of the stars, such as astronomers now teach, does not fulfil any such condition. The heavenly bodies are the most beautiful of all visible bodies and the most regular of all visible movements, approximating most nearly, though still with a long interval of inferiority, to the ideal figures and movements of genuine and self-existent Forms--quickness, slowness, number, figure, &c., as they are in themselves, not visible to the eye, but conceivable only by reason and intellect.[235] The movements of the heavenly bodies are exemplifications, approaching nearest to the perfection of these ideal movements, but still falling greatly short of them. They are like visible circles or triangles drawn by some very exact artist; which, however beautiful as works of art, are far from answering to the conditions of the idea and its definition, and from exhibiting exact equality and proportion.[236] So about the movements of the sun and stars: they are comparatively regular, but they are yet bodily and visible, never attaining the perfect sameness and unchangeableness of the intelligible world and its forms. We cannot learn truth by observation of phenomena constantly fluctuating and varying. We must study astronomy, as we do geometry, not by observation, but by mathematical theorems and hypotheses: which is a far more arduous task than astronomy as taught at present. Only in this way can it be made available to improve and strengthen the intellectual organ of the mind.[237]

[Footnote 234: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 B.]

[Footnote 235: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 D.]

[Footnote 236: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 529-530.]

[Footnote 237: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 530 B. [Greek: Problê/masin a)/ra chrô/menoi ô(/sper geômetri/an, ou(/tô kai\ a)stronomi/an me/timen; ta\ d' e)n tô=| ou)ra/nô| e)a/somen], &c.]

[Side-note: Acoustics, in like manner--The student will be thus conducted to the highest of all studies--Dialectic: and to the region of pure intelligible Forms.]

In like manner (continues Sokrates), Acoustics or Harmonics must be studied, not by the ear, listening to and comparing various sounds, but by the contemplative intellect, applying arithmetical relations and theories.[238]

[Footnote 238: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531.]

After going through all these different studies, the student will have his mind elevated so as to perceive the affinity of method[239] and principle which pervades them all. In this state he will be prepared for entering on Dialectic, which is the final consummation of his intellectual career. He will then have ascended from the cave into daylight. He will have learnt to see real objects, and ultimately the Sun itself, instead of the dim and transitory shadows below. He will become qualified to grasp the pure Intelligible Form with his pure Intellect alone, without either aid or disturbance from sense. He will acquire that dialectical discursive power which deals exclusively with these Intelligible Forms, carrying on ratiocination by means of them only, with no reference to sensible objects. He will attain at length the last goal of the Dialectician--the contemplation of Bonum _per se_ (the highest perfection and elevation of the Intelligible)[240] with Intellect _per se_ in its full purity: the best part of his mind will have been raised to the contemplation and knowledge of the best and purest entity.[241]

[Footnote 239: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531 D.]

[Footnote 240: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 A. [Greek: ou(/tô kai\ o(/tan tis tô=| diale/gesthai e)picheirê=|, a)/neu pasô=n tô=n ai)sthê/seôn dia\ tou= lo/gou e)p' au)to\ o(\ e)/stin e(/kaston o(rma=|, kai\ mê\ a)postê=| pri\n a)\n au)to\ o(\ e)/stin a)gatho\n au)tê=| tê=| noê/sei la/bê|, e)p' au)tô=| gi/gnetai tô=| tou= noêtou= te/lei], &c.]

[Footnote 241: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 D.]

[Side-note: Question by Glaukon--What is the Dialectic Power? Sokrates declares that he cannot answer with certainty, and that Glaukon could not follow him if he did.]

I know not whether I ought to admit your doctrine, Sokrates (observes Glaukon). There are difficulties both in admitting and denying it. However, let us assume it for the present. Your next step must be to tell us what is the characteristic function of this Dialectic power--what are its different varieties and ways of proceeding? I would willingly do so (replies Sokrates), but you would not be able to follow me.[242] I would lay before you not merely an image of the truth but the very truth itself; as it appears to me at least, whether I am correct or not--for I ought not to be sure of my own correctness.

[Footnote 242: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 A.]

[Side-note: He answers partially--It is the consummation of all the sciences, raising the student to the contemplation of pure Forms, and especially to that of the highest Form--_Good_.]

But I am sure that the dialectic power is something of the nature which I have described. It is the only force which can make plain the full truth to students who have gone through the preliminary studies that we have described. It is the only study which investigates rationally real forms and essences[243]--what each thing is, truly in itself. Other branches of study are directed either towards the opinions and preferences of men--or towards generation and combination of particular results--or towards upholding of combinations already produced or naturally springing up: while even as to geometry and the other kindred studies, we have seen that as to real essence, they have nothing better than dreams[244]--and that they cannot see it as it is, so long as they take for their principle or point of departure certain assumptions or hypotheses of which they can render no account. The principle being thus unknown, and the conclusion as well as the intermediate items being spun together out of that unknown, how can such a convention deserve the name of Science?[245] Pursuant to custom, indeed, we call these by the name of Sciences. But they deserve no higher title than that of Intellectual Cognitions, lower than Science, yet higher than mere Opinion. It is the Dialectician alone who discards all assumptions, ascending at once to real essence as his principle and point of departure:[246] defining, and discriminating by appropriate words, each variety of real essence--rendering account of it to others--and carrying it safely through the cross-examining process of question and answer.[247] Whoever cannot discriminate in this way the Idea or Form of Good from every thing else, will have no proper cognition of Good itself, but only, at best, opinions respecting the various shadows of Good. Dialectic--the capacity of discriminating real Forms and maintaining them in cross-examining dialogue is thus the coping-stone, completion, or consummation, of all the other sciences.[248]

[Footnote 243: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 B. [Greek: ô(s au)tou= ge e(ka/stou pe/ri, o(\ e)/stin e(/kaston, ou)k a)/llê tis e)picheirei= me/thodos o(dô=| peri\ panto\s lamba/nein], &c.]

[Footnote 244: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 C. [Greek: ô(s o)neirô/ttousi me\n peri\ to\ o)/n, u(/par de\ a)du/naton au)tai=s i)dei=n, e(/ôs a)\n u(pothe/sesi chrô/menai tau/tas a)kinê/tous e)ô=sin], &c.]

[Footnote 245: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 D.]

[Footnote 246: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 E.]

[Footnote 247: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 B. [Greek: ê)= kai\ dialektiko\n kalei=s to\n lo/gon e(/kastou lamba/nonta tê=s ou)si/as?]]

[Footnote 248: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 C-E. [Greek: ô(/sper thrigko\s toi=s mathê/masin ê( dialektikê\ ê(mi=n e)pa/nô kei=sthai], &c.]

[Side-note: The Synoptic view peculiar to the Dialectician.]

[Side-note: Scale and duration of various studies for the Guardians, from youth upwards.]

The preliminary sciences must be imparted to our Guardians during the earlier years of life, together with such bodily and mental training as may test their energy and perseverance of character.[249] After the age of twenty, those who have distinguished themselves in the juvenile studies and gymnastics, must be placed in a select class of honour above the rest, and must be initiated in a synoptic view of the affinity pervading all the separate cognitions which have been imparted to them. They must also be introduced to the view of Real Essence and its nature. This is the test of aptitude for Dialectics: it is the synoptic view only, which constitutes the Dialectician.[250]

[Footnote 249: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 535-536 D.]

[Footnote 250: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 536-537 C. [Greek: kai\ megi/stê pei=ra dialektikê=s phu/seôs kai\ mê/; o( me\n ga\r sunoptiko\s dialektiko/s, o( de\ mê/, ou)/.]]

In these new studies they will continue until thirty years of age: after which a farther selection must be made, of those who have most distinguished themselves. The men selected will be enrolled in a class of yet higher honour, and will be tested by dialectic cross-examination: so that we may discover who among them are competent to apprehend true, pure, and real Essence, renouncing all visual and sensible perceptions.[251] It is important that such Dialectic exercises should be deferred until this advanced age--and not imparted, as they are among us at present, to immature youths: who abuse the license of interrogation, find all their homegrown opinions uncertain, and end by losing all positive convictions.[252] Our students will remain under such dialectic tuition for five years, until they are thirty-five years of age: after which they must be brought again down into the cave, and constrained to acquire practical experience by undertaking military and administrative functions. In such employments they will spend fifteen years: during which they will undergo still farther scrutiny, to ascertain whether they can act up to their previous training, in spite of all provocations and temptations.[253] Those who well sustain all these trials will become, at fifty years of age, the finished Elders or Chiefs of the Republic. They will pass their remaining years partly in philosophical contemplations, partly in application of philosophy to the regulation of the city. It is these Elders whose mental eye will have been so trained as to contemplate the Real Essence of Good, and to copy it as an archetype in all their ordinances and administration. They will be the Moderators of the city: but they will perform this function as a matter of duty and necessity--not being at all ambitious of it as a matter of honour.[254]

[Footnote 251: Plato, Republic, p. 537 D.]

[Footnote 252: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 538-539.]

[Footnote 253: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 539 D-E.]

[Footnote 254: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 539-540.]

[Side-note: All these studies, and this education, are common to females as well as males.]

What has here been said about the male guardians and philosophers must be understood to apply equally to the female. We recognise no difference in this respect between the two sexes. Those females who have gone through the same education and have shown themselves capable of enduring the same trials as males, will participate, after fifty years of age, in the like philosophical contemplations, and in superintendence of the city.[255]

[Footnote 255: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 C.]

[Side-note: First formation of the Platonic city--how brought about: difficult, but not impossible.]

I have thus shown (Sokrates pursues) how the fundamental postulate for our city may be brought about.--That philosophers, a single man or a few, shall become possessed of supreme rule: being sufficiently exalted in character to despise the vulgar gratifications of ambition, and to carry out systematically the dictates of rectitude and justice. The postulate is indeed hard to be realised--yet not impossible.[256] Such philosophical rulers, as a means for first introducing their system into a new city, will send all the inhabitants above ten years old away into the country, reserving only the children, whom they will train up in their own peculiar manners and principles. In this way the city, according to our scheme, will be first formed: when formed, it will itself be happy, and will confer inestimable benefit on the nation to which it belongs.[257]

[Footnote 256: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 E.]

[Footnote 257: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 541 A.]

Plato thus assumes his city, and the individual man forming a parallel to his city, to be perfectly well constituted. Reason, the higher element, exercises steady controul: the lower elements, Energy and Appetite, both acquiesce contentedly in her right to controul, and obey her orders--the former constantly and forwardly--the latter sometimes requiring constraint by the strength of the former.]

[Side-note: The city thus formed will last long, but not for ever. After a certain time, it will begin to degenerate. Stages of its degeneracy.]

But even under the best possible administration, the city, though it will last long, will not last for ever. Eternal continuance belongs only to Ens; every thing generated must one day or other be destroyed.[258] The fatal period will at length arrive, when the breed of Guardians will degenerate. A series of changes for the worse will then commence, whereby the Platonic city will pass successively into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, despotism. The first change will be, that the love of individual wealth and landed property will get possession of the Guardians: who, having in themselves the force of the city, will divide the territory among themselves, and reduce the other citizens to dependence and slavery.[259] They will at the same time retain a part of their former mental training. They will continue their warlike habits and drill: they will be ashamed of their wealth, and will enjoy it only in secret: they will repudiate money-getting occupations as disgraceful. They will devote themselves to the contests of war and political ambition--the rational soul becoming subordinate to the energetic and courageous.[260] The system which thus obtains footing will be analogous to the Spartan and Kretan, which have many admirers.[261] The change in individual character will correspond to this change in the city. Reason partially losing its ascendancy, while energy and appetite both gain ground--an intermediate character is formed in which energy or courage predominates. We have the haughty, domineering, contentious, man.[262]

[Footnote 258: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 546 A. [Greek: genome/nô| panti\ phthora/ e)stin], &c.]

[Footnote 259: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 547.]

[Footnote 260: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 547-548 D. [Greek: diaphane/staton d' e)n au)tê=| e)sti\n e(/n ti mo/non u(po\ tou= thumoeidou=s kratou=ntos--philonei/kiai kai\ philoti/miai.]]

[Footnote 261: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 544 C.]

[Footnote 262: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 549-550.]

[Side-note: 1. Timocracy and the timocratical individual. 2 Oligarchy, and the oligarchical individual.]

Out of this timocracy, or timarchy, the city will next pass into an oligarchy, or government of wealth. The rich will here govern, to the exclusion of the poor. Reason, in the timocracy, was under the dominion of energy or courage: in the oligarchy, it will be under the dominion of appetite. The love of wealth will become predominant, instead of the love of force and aggrandisement. Now the love of wealth is distinctly opposed to the love of virtue: virtue and wealth are like weights in opposite scales.[263] The oligarchical city will lose all its unity, and will consist of a few rich with a multitude of discontented poor ready to rise against them.[264] The character of the individual citizen will undergo a modification similar to that of the collective city. He will be under the rule of appetite: his reason will be only invoked as the servant of appetite, to teach him how he may best enrich himself.[265] He will be frugal,--will abstain from all unnecessary expenditure, even for generous and liberal purposes--and will keep up a fair show of honesty, from the fear of losing what he has already got.[266]

[Footnote 263: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 550 D-E-551 A. 550 E: [Greek: proi+o/ntes ei)s to\ pro/sthen tou= chrêmati/zesthai, o(/sô| a)\n tou=to timiô/teron ê(gô=ntai, tosou/tô| a)retê\n a)timote/ran. ê)\ ou)ch ou(/tô plou/tou a)retê\ die/stêken, ô(/sper e)n pla/stiggi zugou= keime/nou e(kate/rou a)ei\ tou)nanti/on r(e/ponte?] Also p. 555 D.]

[Footnote 264: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 552 D-E.]

[Footnote 265: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 553 C.]

[Footnote 266: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 554 D.]

[Side-note: 3. Democracy, and the democratical individual.]

The oligarchical city will presently be transformed into a democracy, mainly through the abuse and exaggeration of its own ruling impulse--the love of wealth. The rulers, anxious to enrich themselves, rather encourage than check the extravagance of young spendthrifts, to whom they lend money at high interest, or whose property they buy on advantageous terms. In this manner there arises a class of energetic men, with ruined fortunes and habits of indulgence. Such are the adventurers who put themselves at the head of the discontented poor, and overthrow the oligarchy.[267] The ruling few being expelled or put down, a democracy is established with equal franchise, and generally with officers chosen by lot.[268]

[Footnote 267: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 555-556.]

[Footnote 268: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 557 A.]

The characteristic of the democracy is equal freedom and open speech to all, with liberty to each man to shape his own life as he chooses. Hence there arises a great diversity of individual taste and character. Uniformity of pursuit or conduct is scarcely enforced: there is little restraint upon any one. A man offers himself for office whenever he chooses and not unless he chooses. He is at war or at peace, not by obedience to any public authority, but according to his own individual preference. If he be even condemned by a court of justice, he remains in the city careless of the sentence, which is never enforced against him. This democracy is an equal, agreeable, diversified, society, with little or no government: equal in regard to all--to the good, bad, and indifferent.[269]

[Footnote 269: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 557-558.]

So too the democratical individual. The son of one among these frugal and money-getting oligarchs, departing from the habits and disregarding the advice of his father, contracts a taste for expensive and varied indulgences. He loses sight of the distinction between what is necessary, and what is not necessary, in respect to desires and pleasures. If he be of a quiet temperament, not quite out of the reach of advice, he keeps clear of ruinous excess in any one direction; but he gives himself up to a great diversity of successive occupations and amusements, passing from one to the other without discrimination of good from bad, necessary from unnecessary.[270] His life and character thus becomes an agreeable, unconstrained, changeful, comprehensive, miscellany, like the society to which he belongs.[271]

[Footnote 270: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 560-561 B. [Greek: ei)s i)/son dê/ ti katastê/sas ta\s ê(dona\s dia/gei, tê=| parapiptou/sê| a)ei\ ô(/sper lachou/sê| tê\n e(autou= a)rchê\n paradidou/s, e(/ôs a)\n plêrôthê=|, kai\ au)=this a)/llê|, ou)demi/an a)tima/zôn, a)ll' e)x i)/sou tre/phôn.]]

[Footnote 271: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 561 D-E. [Greek: pantodapo/n te kai\ plei/stôn ê(thô=n mesto/n, kai\ to\n kalo/n te kai\ poiki/lon, ô(/sper e)kei/nên tê\n po/lin, tou=ton to\n a)/ndra ei)=nai.]]

[Side-note: 4. Passage from democracy to despotism. Character of the despotic city.]

Democracy, like oligarchy, becomes ultimately subverted by an abuse of its own characteristic principle. Freedom is gradually pushed into extravagance and excess, while all other considerations are neglected. No obedience is practised: no authority is recognised. The son feels himself equal to his father, the disciple to his teacher, the metic to the citizen, the wife to her husband, the slave to his master. Nay, even horses, asses, and dogs, go free about, so that they run against you in the road, if you do not make way for them.[272] The laws are not obeyed: every man is his own master.

[Footnote 272: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 562-563 C.]

The subversion of such a democracy arises from the men who rise to be popular leaders in it: violent, ambitious, extravagant, men, who gain the favour of the people by distributing among them confiscations from the property of the rich. The rich, resisting these injustices, become enemies to the constitution: the people, in order to put them down, range themselves under the banners of the most energetic popular leader, who takes advantage of such a position to render himself a despot.[273] He begins his rule by some acceptable measures, such as abolition of debts, and assignment of lands to the poorer citizens, until he has expelled or destroyed the parties opposed to him. He seeks pretences for foreign war, in order that the people may stand in need of a leader, and may be kept poor by the contributions necessary to sustain war. But presently he finds, or suspects, dissatisfaction among the more liberal spirits. He kills or banishes them as enemies: and to ensure the continuance of his rule, he is under the necessity of dispatching in like manner every citizen prominent either for magnanimity, intelligence, or wealth.[274] Becoming thus odious to all the better citizens, he is obliged to seek support by enlisting a guard of mercenary foreigners and manumitted slaves. He cannot pay his guards, without plundering the temples, extorting perpetual contributions from the people, and grinding them down by severe oppression and suffering.[275] Such is the government of the despot, which Euripides and other poets employ their genius in extolling.[276]

[Footnote 273: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 565-566.]

[Footnote 274: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 567 B.]

[Footnote 275: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 568-569.]

[Footnote 276: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 568 B.]

[Side-note: Despotic individual corresponding to that city.]

We have now to describe the despotic individual, the parallel of the despotised city. As the democratic individual arises from the son of an oligarchical citizen departing from the frugality of his father and contracting habits of costly indulgence: so the son of this democrat will contract desires still more immoderate and extravagant than his father, and will thus be put into training for the despotic character. He becomes intoxicated by insane appetites, which serve as seconds and auxiliaries to one despotic passion or mania, swaying his whole soul.[277] To gratify such desires, he spends all his possessions, and then begins to borrow money wherever he can. That resource being exhausted, he procures additional funds by fraud or extortion; he cheats and ruins his father and mother; he resorts to plunder and violence. If such men are only a small minority, amidst citizens of better character, they live by committing crimes on the smaller scale. But if they are more numerous, they set up as a despot the most unprincipled and energetic of their number, and become his agents for the enslavement of their fellow-citizens.[278] The despotic man passes his life always in the company of masters, or instruments, or flatterers: he knows neither freedom nor true friendship--nothing but the relation of master and slave. The despot is the worst and most unjust of mankind: the longer he continues despot, the worse he becomes.[279]

[Footnote 277: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 572-573 D. [Greek: E)/rôs tu/rannos e)/ndon oi)kô=n diakuberna=| ta\ tê=s psuchê=s a(/panta.] 574 E-575 A: [Greek: turanneuthei\s u(po\ E)/rôtos--E)/rôs mo/narchos], &c.]

[Footnote 278: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 574-575.]

[Footnote 279: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 575-576.]

[Side-note: The city has thus passed by four stages, from best to worse. Question--How are Happiness and Misery apportioned among them?]

We have thus gone through the four successive depravations which our perfect city will undergo--timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, despotism. Step by step we have passed from the best to the worst--from one extreme to the other. As is the city, so is the individual citizen--good or bad: the despotic city is like the despotic individual,--and so about the rest. Now it remains to decide whether in each case happiness and misery is proportioned to good and evil: whether the best is the happiest, the worst the most miserable,--and so proportionally about the intermediate.[280] On this point there is much difference of opinion.[281]

[Footnote 280: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 D.]

[Footnote 281: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 C. [Greek: toi=s de\ polloi=s polla\ kai\ dokei=.]]

[Side-note: Misery of the despotised city.]

If we look at the condition of the despotised city, it plainly exhibits the extreme of misery; while our model city presents the extreme of happiness. Every one in the despotised city is miserable, according to universal admission, except the despot himself with his immediate favourites and guards. To be sure, in the eyes of superficial observers, the despots with these few favourites will appear perfectly happy and enviable. But if we penetrate beyond this false exterior show, and follow him into his interior, we shall find him too not less miserable than those over whom he tyrannises.[282]

[Footnote 282: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 A.]

[Side-note: Supreme Misery of the despotising individual.]