Chapter XXXIX: Leges and Epinomis (1)

[Side-note: Leges, the longest of Plato's works--Persons of the dialogue.]

The Dialogue, entitled Leges--De Legibus--The Laws--distributed into twelve books, besides its Appendix the Epinomis, and longer than any other of the Platonic compositions--is presented to us as held in Krete during a walk from the town of Knossus to the temple of Zeus under Mount Ida--between three elderly persons: Megillus, a Spartan--Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus--and an Athenian who bears no name, but serves as the principal expositor and conductor. That this dialogue was composed by Plato after the Republic, we know from the express deposition of Aristotle: that it was the work of Plato's old age--probably the last which he ever composed, and perhaps not completely finished at his death--is what we learn from the scanty amount of external evidence accessible to us. The internal evidence, as far as it goes, tends to bear out the same conclusion, and to show that it was written during the last seven years of his life, when he was more than seventy years of age.[1]

[Footnote 1: The allusions of Aristotle to Plato as the author of the Laws, after the Republic, occur in Politica, ii. b. 1264, b. 26, 1267, b. 5, 1271, b. 1, 1274, b. 9. According to Diogenes Laertius (v. 22) Aristotle had composed separate works [Greek: Ta\ e)k No/môn Pla/tônos g--Ta\ e)k tê=s Politei/as b].

Plutarch (De Isid. et Osir. p. 370 E) ascribes the composition of the Laws to Plato's old age. In the [Greek: Prolego/mena ei)s tê\n Pla/tônos philosophi/an], it is said that the treatise was left unfinished at his death, and completed afterwards by his disciple the Opuntian Philippus (Hermann's Edition of Plato's Works, vol. vi. p. 218).--Diog. Laert. iii. 37.

See the learned Prolegomena of Stallbaum, who collects all the information on this subject, and who gives his own judgment (p. lxxxi.) respecting the tone of senility pervading the Leges, in terms which deserve the more attention as coming from so unqualified an admirer of Plato: "Totum Legum opus nescio quid senile refert, ut profecto etiam hanc ob caussam a sene scriptum esse longé verisimillimum videatur." The allusion in the Laws (i. p. 638 B) to the conquest of the Epizephyrian Lokrians by the Syracusans, which occurred in 356 B.C., is pointed out by Boeckh as showing that the composition was posterior to that date (Boeckh, ad Platon. Minoem, pp. 72-73).

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in canvassing the opinions delivered by the [Greek: A)thênai=os xe/nos] in the Laws, cites them as the opinions of Sokrates (Politic. ii. 1265, b. 11), who, however, does not appear at all in the dialogue. Either this is a lapse of memory on the part of Aristotle; or else (which I think very possible) the Laws were originally composed with Sokrates as the expositor introduced, the change of name being subsequently made from a feeling of impropriety in transporting Sokrates to Krete, and from the dogmatising anti-dialectic tone which pervades the lectures ascribed to him. Some Platonic expositors regarded the Athenian Stranger in Leges as Plato himself (Diog. Laert. iii. 52; Schol. ad Legg. 1). Diogenes himself calls him a [Greek: pla/sma a)nô/numon].]

[Side-note: Abandonment of Plato's philosophical projects prior to the Leges.]

All critics have remarked the many and important differences between the Republic and the Laws. And it seems certain, that during the interval which separates the two, Plato's point of view must have undergone a considerable change. We know from himself that he intended the Kritias as a sequel to the Timæus and Republic: a portion of the Kritias still exists--as we have just seen--but it breaks off abruptly, and there is no ground for believing that it was ever completed. We know farther from himself that he projected an ulterior dialogue or exposition, assigned to Hermokrates, as sequel to the Kritias: both being destined to exhibit in actual working and manifestation, the political scheme, of which the Republic had described the constituent elements.[2] While the Kritias was prematurely arrested in its progress towards maturity, the Hermokrates probably was never born. Yet we know certainly that both the one and the other were conceived by Plato, as parts of one comprehensive project, afterwards abandoned. Nay, the Kritias was so abruptly abandoned, that it terminates with an unfinished sentence: as I have stated in the last chapter.

[Footnote 2: Plato, Timæus, pp. 20-27. Plato, Kritias, p. 108.]

[Side-note: Untoward circumstances of Plato's later life--His altered tone in regard to philosophy.]

To what extent such change of project was brought about by external circumstances in Plato's life, we cannot with certainty determine. But we know that there really occurred circumstances, well calculated to produce a material change in his intellectual character and point of view. His personal adventures and experience, after his sixty-first year, and after the death of the elder Dionysius (B.C. 367), were of an eventful and melancholy character. Among them were included his two visits to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse; together with the earnest sympathy and counsel which he bestowed on his friend Dion; whose chequered career terminated, after an interval of brilliant promise, in disappointment, disgrace, and violent death. Plato not only suffered much distress, but incurred more or less of censure, from the share which he had taken, or was at least supposed to have taken, in the tragedy. His own letters remain to attest the fact.[3] Considering the numerous enemies which philosophy has had at all times, we may be sure that such enemies would be furnished with abundant materials for invidious remark--by the entire failure of Plato himself at Syracuse as well as by the disgraceful proceedings first of Dion, next, of his assassin Kallippus: both of them pupils, and the former a favourite pupil, of Plato in the Academy. The prospect, which accident had opened, of exalting philosophy into active influence over mankind, had been closed in a way no less mournful than dishonourable. Plato must have felt this keenly enough, even apart from the taunts of opponents. We might naturally expect that his latest written compositions would be coloured by such a temper of mind: that he would contract, if not an alienation from philosophy, at least a comparative mistrust of any practical good to come from it: and that if his senile fancy still continued to throw out any schemes of social construction, they would be made to rest upon other foundations, eliminating or reducing to a minimum that ascendancy of the philosophical mind, which he had once held to be omnipotent and indispensable.

[Footnote 3: See especially the interesting and valuable Epistola vii. of Plato; also the life of Dion by Plutarch.

The reader will find a full account of Plato's proceedings in Sicily, and of the adventures of Dion, in chap. 84 of my 'History of Greece'.

The passage of Plato in Legg. iv. 709-710 (alluding to the concurrence and co-operation of a youthful despot, sober-minded and moderate, but not exalted up to the level of philosophy, with a competent lawgiver for the purpose of constructing a civic community, furnished with the best laws) is supposed by K. F. Hermann (System der Platon. Philos. p. 69) and by Zeller (Phil. d. Griech. vol. ii. p. 310, ed. 2nd.) to allude to the hopes which Plato cherished when he undertook his first visit to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. See Epistol. vii. pp. 327 C, 330 A-B, 334 C; Epistol. ii. 311 B.

Such allusion is sufficiently probable. Yet we must remember that the Magnetic community, described by Plato in the Treatise De Legibus, does not derive its origin from any established despot or prince, but from a general resolution supposed to have been taken by the Kretan cities, and from a Decemviral executive Board of Knossian citizens nominated by them. Kleinias, as a chief member of this Board, solicits the suggestion of laws from the Athenian elder (Legg. iii. p. 702 C). This is more analogous to Plato's subsequent counsel, _after_ his attempt to guide the younger Dionysius had failed. See Epistol. vii. p. 337 C-E.]

[Side-note: General comparison of Leges with Plato's earlier works.]

Comparing the Laws with the earlier compositions of Plato, the difference between them will be found to correspond pretty nearly with the change thus indicated in his point of view. If we turn to the Republic, we find Plato dividing the intelligible world ([Greek: to\ noêto\n]) into two sections: the higher, that of pure and absolute Ideas, with which philosophy and dialectics deal--the lower, that of Ideas not quite pure, but implicated more or less with sensible illustration, to which the mathematician applies himself: the chief use of the lower section is said to consist in its serving as preparation for a comprehension of the higher.[4] But in the Laws, this higher or dialectical section--the last finish or crowning result of the teaching process, is left out; while even the lower or mathematical section is wrapped up with theology. Moreover, the teaching provided in the Laws, for the ruling Elders, is presented as something new, which Plato has much difficulty both in devising and in explaining: we must therefore understand him to distinguish it pointedly from the teaching which he had before provided for the Elders in the Republic.[5] Again, literary occupation is now kept down rather than encouraged: Plato is more afraid lest his citizens should have too much of it than too little.[6] As for the Sokratic Elenchus, it is not merely not commended, but it is even proscribed and denounced by implication, since free speech and criticism generally is barred out by the rigorous Platonic censorship. On the other hand, the ethical sentiment in the Leges, with its terms designating the varieties of virtue, is much the same as in other Platonic compositions: the political and social doctrine also, though different in some material points, is yet very analogous on several others. But these ethical and political doctrines appear in the Laws much more merged in dogmatic theology than in other dialogues. This theology is of Pythagorean character--implicated directly and intimately with astronomy--and indirectly with arithmetic and geometry also. We have here an astronomical religion, or a religious astronomy, by whichever of the two names it may be called. Right belief on astronomy is orthodoxy and virtue: erroneous belief on astronomy is heretical and criminal.

[Footnote 4: See the passages, Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 811 B-819 A. Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 510-511. [Greek: ta\ du/o tmê/mata] or [Greek: ei)/dê tou= noêtou=]. vii. p. 534 E: [Greek: ô(/sper thrigko\s toi=s mathê/masin ê( dialektikê\ ê(mi=n e)pa/nô kei=sthai.]]

[Footnote 5: Plat. Legg. p. 966 D, xii. pp. 968 C-E, 969 A. Compare vii. p. 818 E. In p. 966 D, the study of astronomy is enforced on the ground that it is one of the strongest evidence of natural theology: in p. 818 C, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy are advocated as studies, because, without having gone through them, a man cannot become a God, a Dæmon, or a Hero, competent to exercise effective care over mankind. This is altogether different from the Republic.]

[Footnote 6: Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 811 B, 819 A.]

In the Timæus, Plato recommended the study of astronomy, in order that the rotations of man's soul in his cranium, which were from the beginning disturbed and irregular, might become regularised, and assimilated by continued contemplation to the perfect uniformity of the celestial and cosmical movements.[7] In the Leges, he recommends astronomy to be studied, because without it we fall into blasphemous errors respecting the cosmical movements, and because such cosmical errors are among the three varieties of heresy, to one or other of which the commission of all crimes against society may be traced.[8] Hence we find Plato, in the city here described, consecrating his astronomical views as a part of the state-religion, and prohibiting dissent from them under the most stringent penalties. In the general spirit of the Treatise de Legibus, Plato approximates to Xenophon and the Spartan model. He keeps his eye fixed on the perpetual coercive discipline of the average citizen. This discipline, prescribed in all its details by the lawgiver, includes a modicum of literary teaching equal to all; small in quantity, and rigorously sifted as to quality, through the censorial sieve. The intellectual and speculative genius of the community, which other Platonic dialogues bring into the foreground, has disappeared from the Treatise de Legibus. We find here no youths pregnant with undisclosed original thought, which Sokrates assists them in bringing forth: such as Theætêtus, Charmidês, Kleinias, and others--pictures among the most interesting which the ancient world presents, and lending peculiar charm to the earlier dialogues. Not only no provision is made for them, but severe precautions are taken against them. Even in the Republic, Plato had banished poets, or had at least forbidden them to follow the free inspirations of the Muse, and had subjected them to censorial controul. But such controul was presumed to be exercised by highly trained speculative and philosophical minds, for the perpetual succession of whom express provision was made. In the Treatise De Legibus, such speculative minds are no longer admitted. Philosophy is interdicted or put in chains as well as poetry. An orthodox religious creed is exalted into exclusive ascendancy. All crime or immorality is ascribed to a departure from this creed.[9] The early communities (Plato tells us[10]), who were simple and ignorant, destitute of arts and letters, but who at the same time believed implicitly all that they heard from their seniors respecting Gods and men, and adopted the dicta of their seniors respecting good and evil, without enquiry or suspicion--were decidedly superior to his contemporaries in all the departments of virtue--justice, temperance, and courage. This antithesis, between virtue and religious faith on the one side, and arts and letters with an inquisitive spirit on the other, presenting the latter as a depraving influence, antagonistic to the former--is analogous to the Bacchæ of Euripides--the work of that poet's old age[11]--and analogous also to the Nubes of Aristophanes, wherein the literary and philosophical teaching of Sokrates is represented as withdrawing youth from the received religious creed, and as leading them by consequence to the commission of fraud and crime.[12]

[Footnote 7: Plato, Timæus, p. 47 B-C.]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 821 D, 822 C; x. pp. 885 B, 886 E.]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 B.]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679. Compare p. 689 D.]

[Footnote 11: Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 623. "Superest fabula (Euripidis), Bacchæ, dithyrambi quam tragoediæ similior, totaque ita comparata, ut contra illius temporis Rationalistas scripta videatur; qua et Bacchicarum religionum sanctimonia commendatur . . . et rerum divinarum disceptatio ab eruditorum judiciis ad populi transfertur suffragia:--

[Greek: sopha\n d' a)/peche prapi/da phre/na te perissô=n para\ phôtô=n; to\ plê=thos o(/, ti to\ phaulo/teron e)no/mise chrê=tai/ te, to/de toi legoi/man. [le/goim' a)/n], Matthiæ] (427).

Compare vv. 200-203 of the same drama.]

[Footnote 12: Aristophan. Nubes, 116-875, &c.]

[Side-note: Scene of the Leges, not in Athens, but in Krete. Persons Kretan and Spartan, comparatively illiterate.]

The submergence and discredit of letters and philosophy, which pervades the Dialogue De Legibus, is farther indicated by the personages introduced as conversing. In all the other Platonic dialogues, the scene is laid at Athens, and the speakers are educated citizens of Athens; sometimes visitors, equally or better educated, from other Grecian cities. Generally, they are either adults who have already acquired some intellectual eminence, or youths anxious to acquire it. Nikias and Laches, Melesias and Lysimachus (in the Lachês), are among the leaders (past or present) of the Athenian public assembly. Anytus (in the Menon) is a man not so much ignorant of letters as despising letters.[13] Moreover Sokrates himself formally disclaims positive knowledge, professing to be only a searcher for truth along with the rest.[14] But the scene of the Laws is laid in Krete, not at Athens: the three speakers are not merely all old men, but frequently allude to their old age. One of them only is an Athenian, to whom the positive and expository duty is assigned: the other two are Megillus, a Spartan, and Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus. Now both Sparta, and the communities of Krete, were among the most unlettered portions of the Hellenic name. They were not only strangers to that impulse of rhetoric, dialectic, and philosophical speculation which, having its chief domicile at Athens, had become diffused more or less over a large portion of Greece since the Persian war--but they were sparingly conversant even with that old poetical culture, epic and lyric, which belonged to the age of Solon and the Seven Wise Men. The public training of youth at Sparta, equal for all the citizens, included nothing of letters and music, which in other cities were considered to be the characteristics of an educated Greek:[15] though probably individual Spartans, more or fewer, acquired these accomplishments for themselves. Gymnastics, with a slight admixture of simple chronic music and a still slighter admixture of poetry and letters, formed the characteristic culture of Sparta and Krete.[16] In the Leges, Plato not only notes the fact, but treats it as indicating a better social condition, compared with Athens and other Greeks--that both Spartans and Kretans were alike unacquainted with the old epic or theological poems (Hesiod, Orpheus, &c.), and with the modern philosophical speculations.[17]

[Footnote 13: Tacitus, Dialog. de Orator. c. 2. "Aper, communi eruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat."

Nikias is said to have made his son Nikêratus learn by heart the entire Iliad and Odyssey of Homer; at least this is the statement of Nikêratus himself in the Symposion of Xenophon (iii. 5).]

[Footnote 14: This profession appears even in the Gorgias (p. 506 A) and in the Republic (v. p. 450 D).]

[Footnote 15: See Xenophon, Republ. Laced. c. 2.

Compare the description given by Xenophon in the Cyropædia (i. 2, 6), of the public training of Persian youth, which passage bears striking analogy to his description of the Spartan training. The public [Greek: dida/skaloi] are not mentioned as teaching [Greek: gra/mmata], which belong to Athens and other cities, but as teaching justice, temperance, self-command, obedience, bodily endurance, the use of the bow and the javelin, &c.]

[Footnote 16: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 673 B.]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Legg. x. p. 886 B-C. [Greek: ei)si\n ê(mi=n e)n gra/mmasi lo/goi kei/menoi, _oi(/ par' u(mi=n ou)k ei)si\ di' a)retê\n politei/as_, ô(s e)gô\ mantha/nô, oi( me\n e)/n tisi me/trois, oi( de\ kai\ a)/neu me/trôn le/gontes peri\ theô=n, oi( me\n palaio/tataoi, ô(s ge/gonen ê( prô/tê phu/sis ou)ra/nou tô=n te a)/llôn, proi+o/ntes de\ tê=s a)rchê=s ou) polu\ theogoni/an diexe/rchontai, geno/menoi/ te ô(s pro\s a)llê/lous ô(mi/lêsan. A(\ toi=s a)kou/ousin ei) me\n ei)s a)/llo ti kalô=s ê)\ mê\ kalô=s e)/chei, ou) r(a/|dion e)pitima=|n palaioi=s ou)=si], &c.]

[Side-note: Gymnastic training, military drill, and public mess, in Krete and Sparta.]

Not simply on this negative ground, but on another positive ground also, Sparta and Krête were well suited to furnish listeners for the Laws.[18] Their gymnastic discipline and military drill, especially the Spartan, were stricter and more continuous than anywhere else in Greece: including toilsome fatigue, endurance of pain, heat, and cold, and frequent conflicts with and without arms between different factions of citizens. The individual and the family were more thoroughly merged in the community: the citizens were trained for war, interdicted from industry, and forbidden to go abroad without permission: attendance on the public mess-table was compulsory on all citizens: the training of youth was uniform, under official authority: the two systems were instituted, both of them, by divine authority--the Spartan by Apollo, the Kretan by Zeus--Lykurgus and Minos, semi-divine persons, being the respective instruments and mediators. In neither of them was any public criticism tolerated upon the laws and institutions (this is a point capital in Plato's view[19]). No voice was allowed among the young men except that of constant eulogy, extolling the system as not merely excellent but of divine origin, and resenting all contradiction: none but an old man was permitted to suggest doubts, and he only in private whisper to the Archon, when no young man was near. Both in Sparta and Krete the public authorities stood forward as the conspicuous, positive, constant, agents; enforcing upon each individual a known type of character and habits. There was thus an intelligible purpose, political and social, as contrasted with other neighbouring societies, in which no special purpose revealed itself.[20] Both Sparta and Krete, moreover, had continued in the main unchanged from a time immemorial. In this, as in numerous other points, the two systems were cognate and similar.[21]

[Footnote 18: Ephorus, ap. Strabo, x. 480; Xenophon, Repub. Lac. c. 4-6; Isokrates, Busiris, Orat. xi. s. 19; Aristot. Politic. ii. capp. 9 and 10, pp. 1270-1271, and viii. 9, p. 1338, b. 15; also chap. vi. of the second part of my 'History of Greece,' with the references there given.]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Legg. i. p. 634 D-E. [Greek: u(mi=n me\n ga/r, ei)/per kai\ metri/ôs kateskeu/astai ta\ tô=n no/môn, ei(=s tô=n kalli/stôn a)\n ei)/ê no/môn mê\ zêtei=n tô=n ne/ôn mêde/na e)a=|n poi=a kalô=s au)tô=n ê)\ mê\ kalô=s e)/chei, mia=| de\ phônê=| kai\ e)x e(no\s sto/matos pa/ntas sumphônei=n ô(s pa/nta kalô=s kei/tai the/ntôn theô=n, kai\ e)a/n a)/llôs le/gê|, mê\ a)ne/chesthai to\ para/pan a)kou/ontas], &c.

Compare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. p. 489, where a similar affirmation is made respecting Sparta.]

[Footnote 20: These other cities are what Plato calls [Greek: ai( tô=n ei)kê=| politeuome/nôn politei=ai] (Legg. i. p. 635 E), and what Aristotle calls [Greek: no/mima chu/dên kei/mena], Polit. vii. 1324, b. 5.]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Legg. i. p. 624, iii. pp. 691 E, 696 A, iii. p. 683. Krete and Sparta, [Greek: a)delphoi\ no/moi].

K. F. Hermann (in his instructive Dissertation, De Vestigiis Institutorum veterum imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis) represents Sparta and Krete as types of customs and institutions which had once been general in Greece, but had been discontinued in the other Grecian cities. "Hoc imprimis in Lacedæmoniorum et Cretensium res publicas cadit, quæ quum et antiquissimam Græciæ indolem fidelissimé servasse viderentur, et moribus ac disciplinâ publicâ optimé fundatæ essent, non mirum est eas Græco philosopho adeò placuisse ut earum formam et libris de Civitate et Legibus quasi pro fundamento subjiceret" (p. 19, compare pp. 13-15-23) . . . "unde (sc. a legitimis Græcarum civitatum principiis) licet plurimi temporum decursu descivissent atque in aliâ omnia abiissent, nihil tamen Plato proposuit, nisi quod optimus quisque in Græciâ semper expetierat ac persecutus erat" (p. 15). I think this view is not correct, though it is adopted more or less by various critics. Sparta and Krete are not specimens (in my judgment) of what all or most Grecian cities once had been--nor of pure Dorism, as K. O. Müller affirms. On the contrary I believe them to have been very peculiar, Sparta especially. So far they resembled all early Greeks, that neither literature nor luxury had grown up among them. But neither the Syssitia nor the _disciplina publica_ had ever subsisted among other Greeks: and these were the two characteristic features of Krete and Sparta, more especially of the latter. They were the two features which arrested Plato's attention, and upon which he brought his constructive imagination to bear; constructing upon one principle in his Republic, and upon a different principle in his Dialogue de Legibus. While he copies these two main features from Sparta, he borrows many or most of his special laws from Athens; but the ends, with reference to which he puts these elements together, are his own. K. F. Hermann, in his anxiety to rescue Plato from the charge of rashness ("temerario ingenii lusu," p. 18), understates Plato's originality.]

[Side-note: Difference between Leges and Republic, illustrated by reference to the Politikus.]

Comparing the Platonic Leges with the Platonic Republic the difference between them will be illustrated by the theory laid down in the Politikus. We read therein,[22] that the process of governing mankind well is an art, depending upon scientific principles; like the art of the physician, the general, the steersman: that it aims at the attainment of a given End, the well-being of the governed--and that none except the scientific or artistic Ruler know either the end or the means of attaining it: that such rulers are the rarest of all artists, never more than one or a very few, combining philosophical aptitude with philosophical training: but that when they are found, society ought to trust and obey their directions without any fixed law: that no peremptory law can be made to fit all contingencies, and that their art is the only law which they ought to follow in each particular conjuncture. If no such persons can be found, good government is an impossibility: but the next best thing to be done is, to establish fixed laws, as good as you can, and to ensure that they shall be obeyed by every one. Now the Platonic Republic aims at realising the first of these two ideal projects: everything in it turns upon the discretionary orders of the philosophical King or Oligarchy, and even the elaborate training of the Guardians serves only to make them perfect instruments for the execution of those orders. But the Platonic Leges or Treatise on Laws corresponds only to the second or less ambitious project--a tolerable imitation of the first and best.[23] Instead of philosophical rulers, one or a few invested with discretionary power, we have a scheme of political constitution--an alternation of powers temporary and responsible, an apportionment of functions and duties--a variety of laws enacted, with magistrates and dikasteries provided to apply them. Plato, or his Athenian spokesman, appears as adviser and as persuader; but the laws must be such as the body of citizens can be persuaded to adopt. There is moreover a scheme of education embodied in the laws: the individual citizen is placed under dominion at once spiritual and temporal: but the infallibility resides in the laws, and authority is exercised over him only by periodical magistrates who enforce them and determine in their name. It is the Laws which govern--not philosophical Artists of King-Craft.

[Footnote 22: See above, vol. iii. ch. xxx. p. 273, seq.]

[Footnote 23: Plato, Politikus, pp. 293 C-297 C.]

[Side-note: Large proportion of preliminary discussions and didactic exhortation in the Leges.]

The three first books of the Leges are occupied with general preliminary discussions on the ends at which laws and political institutions ought to aim--on the means which they ought to employ--and on the ethical effects of various institutions in moulding the character of the citizens. "For private citizens" (the Athenian says), "it is enough to say, in reply to the criticism of strangers, This is the law or custom with us. But what I propose to examine is, the wisdom of the lawgiver from whom the law proceeds."[24] At the end of book three, Kleinias announces that the Kretans are about to found a new colony on a deserted site at one end of the island, and that they have confided to a committee of ten Knossians (himself among the number), the task of establishing a constitution and laws for the colony. He invites the Athenian to advise and co-operate with this committee. In the fourth book, we enter upon the special conditions of this colonial project, to which the constitution and laws must conform. It is not until the fifth book that the Athenian speaker begins to declare what constitutional provisions, and what legal enactments, he recommends. His recommendations are continued throughout all the remaining Treatise--from the fifth book, to the twelfth or last. They are however largely interspersed with persuasive addresses, expositions, homilies, and comminations, sometimes of extreme prolixity and vehemence,[25] on various topics of ethics and religion: which indeed occupy a much larger space than the laws themselves.

[Footnote 24: Plato, Legg. i. p. 637 C-D. [Greek: pa=s ga\r a)pokrino/menos e)rei= thauma/zonti xe/nô|, tê\n par' au)toi=s a)ê/theian o(rô=nti, Mê\ thau/maze, ô)= xe/ne; no/mos e)/sth' ê(mi=n ou(=tos, i)/sôs d' u(mi=n peri\ au)tô=n tou/tôn e(/teros; ê(mi=n d' e)sti\ nu=n ou) peri\ tô=n a)nthrô/pôn tô=n a)/llôn o( lo/gos, a)lla\ peri\ tô=n nomothetô=n au)tô=n kaki/as te kai\ a)retê=s.]]

[Footnote 25: This is what Plato alludes to in the Politikus (p. 304 A) as "rhetoric enlisted in the service of the Ruler,"--[Greek: o(/sê basilikê=| koinônou=sa r(êtorei/a xugdiakuberna=| ta\s e)n tai=s po/lesi pra/xeis.]]

[Side-note: Scope of the discussion laid down by the Athenian speaker--The Spartan institutions are framed only for war--This is narrow and erroneous.]

The Athenian speaker avails himself of the privilege of old age to criticise the Spartan and Kretan institutions more freely than is approved by his two companions; who feel bound to uphold against all dissentients the divine origin of their respective polities.[26] On enquiring from them what is the purpose of their peculiar institutions--the Syssitia or public mess-table--the gymnastic discipline--the military drill--he is informed by both, that the purpose is to ensure habits of courage, strength, and skill, with a view to superiority in war over foreign enemies: war being, in their judgment, the usual and natural condition of the different communities into which mankind are distributed.[27] Such is the test according to which they determine the good constitution of a city. But the Athenian--proclaiming as the scope of his enquiry,[28] What is it which is _right or wrong by nature, in laws_?--will not admit the test as thus laid down. War against foreign enemies (_i.e._ enemies foreign to the city-community) is only one among many varieties of war. There exist other varieties besides:--war among the citizens of the same town--among the constituent villages of the same city-community--among the brethren of the same family--among the constituent elements of the same individual man.[29] Though these varieties of war or discord are of frequent occurrence, they are not the less evils, inconsistent with that _idéal_ of the Best which a wise lawgiver will seek to approach.[30] Whenever any of them occur, he ought to ensure to the good and wise elements victory over the evil and stupid. But his _idéal_ should be, to obviate the occurrence of war altogether--to adjust harmoniously the relation between the better and worse elements, disposing the latter towards a willing subordination and co-operation with the former.[31] Though courage in war is one indispensable virtue, it stands only fourth on the list--wisdom, justice, and temperance, being before it. _Your_ aim is to inculcate not virtue, but only one part of virtue.[32] Many mercenary soldiers, possessing courage in perfection, are unjust, foolish, and worthless in all other respects.[33]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Legg. i. p. 630 D, ii. p. 667 A.]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 625-626. [Greek: o(/ron tê=s eu)= politeuome/nês po/leôs], &c. (p. 626 B).]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Legg. i. p. 627 C. [Greek: o)rtho/têto/s te kai\ a(marti/as pe/ri no/môn, ê(/tis pot' e)sti\ phu/sei.] Also 630 E.

Compare the inquiry in the Kratylus respecting naming, wherein consists the [Greek: o)rtho/tês phu/sei tô=n o)noma/tôn]. See above, vol. iii. ch. xxxi. p. 285, seq.]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Legg. i. p. 626.]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Legg. i. p. 628 D.]

[Footnote 31: Plato, Legg. i. p. 627 E. [Greek: o(\s a)\n tou\s me\n chrêstou\s a)/rchein, tou\s chei/rous d' e)a/sas zê=|n a)/rchesthai e(/kontas poiê/seie.]

The _idéal_ which Plato here sets forth coincides mainly with that which Xenophon adopts as his theme both in the Cyropædia and in the Oeconomicus (see the beginning of the former and the close of the latter) [Greek: to\ e)thelo/ntôn a)/rchein].]

[Footnote 32: Aristotle cites and approves this criticism of Plato, [Greek: e)n toi=s No/mois], Politic. ii. 9, p. 1271, b. 1. Compare vii. 14, 1333, b. 15.]

[Footnote 33: Plato, Legg. i. p. 630 A. The doctrine--that courage is possessed by many persons who have no other virtue--which is here assigned by Plato to his leading speaker the Athenian, appears in the Protagoras as advocated by Protagoras and impugned by Sokrates (p. 349 D-E). But the arguments whereby Sokrates impugns it are (according to Stallbaum) known by Plato himself to be mere captious tricks (laquei dialetici--captiosé et arguté conclusa, ad sophistam ludendum et perturbandum comparata) employed only for the purpose of puzzling and turning into ridicule an eminent Sophist. (See Stallbaum, not. ad Protag. p. 349 E. and Præf. ad Protag. p. 28.) I have already remarked elsewhere, that I think this supposition alike gratuitous and improbable.]

[Side-note: Principles on which the institutions of a state ought to be defended--You must show that its ethical purpose and working is good.]

If you wish (says the Athenian to Kleinias) to make out a plenary defence and advocacy of the Kretan system, you ought to do it in the following way:

Our laws deserve the celebrity which they have acquired in Greece, because they make us happy, and provide us with all kinds of good things: both with such as are divine and with such as are human. The divine are, Wisdom or Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Courage: the human are, Health, Beauty, Strength, Activity, Wealth. The human depend upon the divine, are certain to follow them, and are not to be obtained without them. All the regulations and precepts of the lawgiver are directed to the attainment and protection of these ends--to establish among the citizens a moral tone of praise and blame favourable to that purpose. He seeks to inculcate on the citizens a body of sentiment, as to what is honourable and not honourable--such as may guide their pleasures and pains, their desires and aversions--and such as may keep their minds right amidst all the disaster (disease, war, poverty, &c.) as well as the prosperity of life. He next regulates the properties, the acquisitions, and the expenditure of the citizens, together with their relations to each other on these heads, upon principles of justice enforced by suitable penalties. Lastly, he appoints magistrates of approved wisdom and right judgment to enforce the regulations. The cementing authority is thus wisdom, following out purposes of temperance and justice, not of ambition or love of money.

Such is the course of exposition (says the Athenian) which ought to be adopted. Now tell me--In what manner are the objects here defined ensured by the institutions of Apollo and Zeus at Sparta and Krete? You two ought to show me: for I myself cannot discern it.[34]

[Footnote 34: Plato, Legg. i. p. 632.]

[Side-note: Religious and ethical character postulated by Plato for a community.]

This passage is of some value, because it gives us, thus early in the Treatise, a brief summary of that which Plato desiderates in the two systems here noted--and of that which he intends to supply in his own. We see that he looks upon a political constitution and laws as merely secondary and instrumental: that he postulates as the primary and fundamental fabric, a given religious and ethical character implanted in the citizens: that the lawgiver, in his view, combines the spiritual and temporal authority, making the latter subordinate to the former, and determining not merely what laws the citizens shall obey, but how they shall distribute their approval and aversion--religious, ethical, and æsthetical. It is the lawgiver alone who is responsible and who is open to praise or censure: for to the people, of each different community and different system, established custom is always a valid authority.[35]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Legg. i. p. 637 D.]

[Side-note: Endurance of pain enforced as a part of the public discipline at Sparta.]

We Spartans (says Megillus) implant courage in our citizens not merely by our public mess-table and gymnastic, but also by inuring them to support pain and hardship. We cause them to suffer severe pain in the gymnopædia, in pugilistic contests, and other ways: we put them to hardships and privations in the Kryptia and in hunting. We thus accustom them to endurance. Moreover, we strictly forbid all indulgences such as drunkenness. Nothing of the kind is seen at Sparta, not even at the festival of Dionysus; nothing like the drinking which I have seen at Athens, and still more at Tarentum.[36]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 633-B 637 A.

Plato puts into the mouth of the Athenian a remark that in some other cities (not Sparta or Kretan) these [Greek: sussi/tia] or public mess-tables had been found to lead to intestine sedition and disturbance (p. 636 B). He instances the cases of the Boeotians, the Milesians, and the Thurians. It is much to be lamented that we cannot assign the particular events and conjunctures here adverted to. The Spartan and Kretan Syssitia were daily, compulsory, and universal among the citizens, besides the strictness of the regulations: under such conditions they were peculiar to these two places, as far as our knowledge goes: the Syssitia in Southern Italy (noticed by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 10, p. 1329 b.) are not known and seemingly unimportant. The Syssitia in Boeotia, &c., may probably have been occasional or periodical banquets among members of the same tribe, deme, club, or [Greek: thi/asos]--and voluntary besides, neither prescribed nor regulated by law. Such meetings might very probably give occasion to disturbances under particular circumstances.]

[Side-note: Why are not the citizens tested in like manner, in regard to resistance against the seductions of pleasure?]

How is it (says the Athenian) that you deal so differently with pains and pleasures? To make your citizens firm against pain, you expose them designedly to severe pains: if they were kept free from pains, you would have no confidence in their firmness against painful actualities, when any such shall occur. But in regard to pleasures, you are content with simple prohibition. You provide no means for strengthening your citizens against the temptations of pleasure. Are you satisfied that their courage (or self-command) shall be lame or one-sided--good against pains, but not good against pleasures?[37] In determining about laws, the whole enquiry turns upon pleasures and pains, both in the city and in individual dispositions. These are the two natural fountains, from which he who draws such draughts as is proper, obtains happiness: while every one who draws unwisely and out of season, will fail of obtaining happiness.[38]

[Footnote 37: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 633-634 A. [Greek: chôlê\n tê\n a)ndrei/an].]

[Footnote 38: Plato, Legg. i. p. 636 D-E.]

[Side-note: Drunkenness forbidden at Sparta, and blamed by the Spartan converser. The Athenian proceeds to inquire how far such unqualified prohibition is justifiable.]

Besides, as to drunkenness, we must not be too hasty in condemnation of it. We must not pronounce generally respecting any institution without examining the circumstances, persons, regulations, &c., attending it. Such hasty praise and censure is very misleading. Many other nations act upon the opposite practice. But I (says Plato) shall not pretend to decide the point by witnesses and authority. I shall adopt another course of investigation, and shall show you, in this particular case, a specimen of the way in which all such institutions ought to be criticised and appreciated.[39]

[Footnote 39: Plato, Legg. i. p. 638 D-E. [Greek: Tro/pon de\ a)/llon, o(\n e)moi\ phai/netai dei=n, e)the/lô le/gein peri\ au)tou= tou/tou, tê=s me/thês, _peirô/menos a)\n a)/ra du/nômai tê\n peri\ a(pa/ntôn tou/tôn o)rthê\n me/thodon u(mi=n dêlou=n_, e)peidê\ kai\ muri/a e)pi\ muri/ois e)/thnê peri\ au)tô=n a)mphisbêtou=nta u(mi=n po/lesi duei=n tô=| lo/gô| diama/choit' a)/n.]

Here Plato (as in the Sophistês, Politikus, and elsewhere) announces that the special inquiry is intended to illustrate a general method.]

Plato here digresses[40] from his main purpose to examine the question of drunkenness. He will not allow it to be set aside absolutely and offhand, by a self-justifying ethical sentiment, without reason assigned, defence tendered, accompanying precautions discussed. Upon this, as upon the social functions proper for the female sex, he is a dissenter from the common view. He selects the subject as a case for exhibiting the proper method of criticism respecting social institutions; not without some consciousness that the discussion, if looked at in itself (like the examples of scientific classification or diæresis in the Sophistês and Politikus), would appear unduly prolonged.[41]

[Footnote 40: He himself notes it as a digression, iii. p. 682 E.]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 642 A, 645 D. Compare the Politikus, pp. 264 A-286 C-E.]

[Side-note: Description of Sokrates in the Symposion--his self-command under abundant potations.]

To illustrate his peculiar views[42] on the subject of drunkenness, we may refer to the picture of Sokrates which he presents in the Symposion, more especially in the latter half of that dialogue, after the appearance of Alkibiades. In this dialogue the occasion is supposed to be festive and joyous. Eros is in the ascendant, and is made the subject of a panegyric by each of the guests in succession. Sokrates partakes in the temper of the society, proclaiming himself to be ignorant of all other matters except those relating to Love.[43] In all the Platonic writings there is hardly anything more striking than the panegyric upon Eros there pronounced by Sokrates, blending the idea of love with that of philosophical dialectics, and refining the erotic impulse into an enthusiastic aspiration for that generation of new contemplative power, by the colloquial intercourse of two minds reciprocally stimulating each other, which brings them at last into a clear view of the objects of the ideal or intelligible world. Until the appearance of Alkibiades, little wine is swallowed, and the guests are perfectly sober. But Alkibiades, being intoxicated when he first comes in, becomes at once the prominent character of the piece. He is represented as directing the large wine-cooler to be filled with wine (about four pints), first swallowing the whole himself then ordering it to be filled again for Sokrates, who does the like: Alkibiades observing, "Whatever quantity of wine you prescribe to Sokrates, he will drink it without becoming drunk".[44] Alkibiades then, instead of panegyrising Eros, undertakes to pronounce a panegyric on Sokrates: proclaiming that nothing shall be said but what is true, and being relieved from all reserve by his drunken condition.[45] In this panegyric he describes emphatically the playful irony of Sokrates, and the magical influence exercised by his conversation over young men. But though Sokrates thus acquired irresistible ascendancy over others, himself (Alkibiades) included, no one else acquired the least hold over Sokrates. His will and character, under a playful exterior, were self-sufficing and self-determining; independent of influences from without, to such a degree as was almost insulting to any one who sought either to captivate or oblige him.[46] The self-command of Sokrates was unshaken either by seduction on one side, or by pain and hardship on the other. He faced danger with a courage never surpassed; he endured hunger, fatigue, the extremities of heat and cold, in a manner such as none of his comrades in the army could parallel.[47] He was indifferent to the gratifications of love, even when they were presented to him in a manner the most irresistible to Grecian imagination; while at festive banquets, though he did not drink of his own accord, yet if the society imposed obligation to do so, he outdid all in respect to quantity of wine. No one ever saw Sokrates intoxicated.[48] Such is the tenor of the panegyric pronounced by Alkibiades upon Sokrates. A general drinking-bout closes the Symposion, in which Sokrates swallows large draughts of wine along with the rest, but persists all the while in his dialectic cross-examination, with unabated clearness of head. One by one the guests drop asleep, and at daybreak Sokrates alone is left awake. He rises and departs, goes forthwith to the Lykeum, and there passes the whole day in his usual colloquial occupation, without being at all affected by the potations of the preceding night.[49]

[Footnote 42: Aristotle especially notes this as one among the peculiarities of Plato (Politic. ii. 9, 20).

[Footnote 43: Plato, Symp. p. 177 D. [Greek: e)gô\ o(\s ou)de/n phêmi a)/llo e)pi/stasthai ê)\ ta\ e)rôtika/], &c. 198 D: [Greek: e)/phên ei)=nai deino\s ta\ e)rôtika/.]]

[Footnote 44: Plato, Symp. pp. 213-214.]

[Footnote 45: Plato, Symp. pp. 214-215-217 E.]

[Footnote 46: Plato, Symp. pp. 219 C. [Greek: tê=s Sôkra/tous u(perêphani/as]. Compare 222 A.]

[Footnote 47: Plato, Symp. p. 220.]

[Footnote 48: Plato, Symp. p. 220 A.

What has been here briefly recapitulated will be found in my twenty-sixth chapter, vol. iii. pp. 20-21, seq.]

[Footnote 49: Plato, Sympos. p. 223. Compare what Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the Protagoras (p. 347 D): well educated men will carry on a dialectic debate with intelligence and propriety, "_though they may drink ever so much wine_,"--[Greek: ka)\n pa/nu polu\n oi)=non pi/ôsin].]

[Side-note: Sokrates--an ideal of self-command, both as to pain and as to pleasure.]

I have thus cited the Symposion to illustrate Plato's view of the ideal of character. The self-command of Sokrates is tested both by pain and by pleasure. He resists both of them alike and equally: under the one as well as under the other, his reason works with unimpaired efficacy, and his deliberate purposes are pursued with unclouded serenity. This is not because he keeps out of the way of temptation and seduction: on the contrary, he is frequently exposed to situations of a tempting character, and is always found superior to them.

[Side-note: Trials for testing the self-controul of the citizen, under the influence of wine. Dionysiac banquets, under a sober president.]

Now Plato's purpose is, to impart to his citizens the character which he here ascribes to Sokrates, and to make them capable of maintaining unimpaired the controul of reason against the disturbances both of pain and pleasure. He remarks that the Spartan training kept in check the first of these two enemies, but not the second. He thinks that the citizen ought to be put through a regulated system of trials for measuring and testing his competence to contend with pleasure, as the Spartans provided in regard to pain. The Dionysiac festivals[50] afforded occasions of applying these trials of pleasure, just as the Gymnopædia at Sparta were made to furnish deliberate inflictions of pain. But the Dionysiac banquets ought to be conducted under the superintendence of a discreet president, himself perfectly sober throughout the whole ceremony. All the guests would drink largely of wine, and each would show how far and how long he could resist its disturbing tendencies. As there was competition among the youths at the Gymnopædia, to show how much pain each could endure without flinching--honour being shown to those who endured most, and most successfully--so there would be competition at the Dionysia to prove how much wine each could bear without having his reason and modesty overset. The sober president would decide as judge. Each man's self-command, as against seductive influences, would be strengthened by a repetition of such trials, while proof would be afforded how far each man could be counted on.[51]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 650 A, 637 A. 633 D.]

[Footnote 51: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 647 D-E-649 D.

Compare the Republic, iii. pp. 412-413, where the same general doctrine is enforced.]

[Side-note: The gifts of Dionysus may, by precautions, be rendered useful--Desultory manner of Plato.]

This is one mode in which the unmeasured potations (common throughout the Grecian cities, with the exception of Sparta and Krete) might under proper regulation be rendered useful for civic training. But there is another mode also, connected with the general musical and gymnastical training of the city. Plato will not allow Dionysus--and wine, the special gift of that God to mankind--to be censured as absolutely mischievous.[52]

[Footnote 52: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 672 A.]

In developing this second topic, he is led into a general theory of ethical and æsthetical education for his city. This happens frequently enough in the desultory manner of the Platonic dialogues. We are sometimes conducted from an incidental and outlying corollary, without warning and through a side door, into the central theory from which it ramifies. The practice is noway favourable to facility of comprehension, but it flows naturally from the unsystematic and spontaneous sequence of the dialogue.

[Side-note: Theory of ethical and æsthetical education--Training of the emotions of youth through the influence of the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus. Choric practice and ceremonies.]

Education of youth consists mainly in giving proper direction to their pleasures and pains--their love and their hatred. Young persons are capable only of emotions, well or ill directed: in this consists their virtue or vice. At that age they cannot bear serious teaching: they are incapable of acquiring reason, or true, firm opinions, which constitute the perfection of the mature man; indeed, if a man acquires these even when old, he may be looked on as fortunate.[53] The young can only have their emotions cultivated so as to conform to reason: they may thus be made to love what reason, personified in and enforced by the lawgiver, enjoins--and to hate what reason forbids--but without knowing wherefore. Unfortunately the hard realities of life are perpetually giving a wrong turn to the emotions. To counteract and correct this, the influence of the Muses, of Apollo, and of Dionysus, are indispensable: together with the periodical festivals of which these Deities are respectively presidents and auxiliaries. Their influence is exercised through the choric ceremony--music, singing, dancing, blended together. Every young man is spontaneously disposed to constant indeterminate movement and exercise of various kinds--running, jumping, speaking, &c. This belongs to man in common with the young of other animals: but what is peculiar to man exclusively is, the sense of rhythm and harmony, as well as of the contrary, in these movements and sounds. Such rhythm and harmony, in song and dance united, is expressed by the chorus at the festivals, in which the Muses and Apollo take part along with the assembled youth. Here we find the only way of properly schooling the emotions.[54] The unschooled man is he who has not gone through a good choric practice; which will require that the matter which he sings shall be good and honourable, while the movements of his frame and the tones of his voice must be rhythmical and graceful. Such choric practice must be universal among the citizens, distributed into three classes: youths, mature men, elders.[55]

[Footnote 53: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 653-659 D-E. [Greek: paidei/a me/n e)sth' ê( paidô=n o(lkê/ te kai\ a)gôgê\ pro\s to\n u(po\ tou= no/mou lo/gon o)rtho\n ei)rême/non kai\ toi=s e)pieikesta/tois kai\ presbuta/tois di' e)mpeiri/an xundidogme/non, ô(s o)/ntôs o)rtho/s e)stin; i(/n' ou)=n ê( psuchê\ tou= paido\s mê\ e)nanti/a chai/rein kai\ lupei=sthai e)thi/zêtai tô=| no/mô| kai\ toi=s u(po\ tou= no/mou pepeisme/nois, a)lla\ xune/pêtai chai/rousa/ te kai\ lupoume/nê toi=s au)tois tou/tois oi(=sper o( ge/rôn, tou/tôn e(/neka, a(\s ô)|da\s kalou=men, o)/ntôs me\n e)pô|dai\ tai\s psuchai=s au(=tai nu=n gegone/nai, pro\s tê\n toiau/tên ê\n le/gomen xumphôni/an e)spoudasme/nai, dia\ de\ to\ spoudê\n mê\ du/nasthai phe/rein ta\s tô=n ne/ôn psucha\s paidiai/ te kai\ ô)|dai\ kalei=sthai kai\ pra/ttesthai], &c.]

[Footnote 54: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 654-660 A.]

[Footnote 55: This triple distribution of classes for choric instruction and practice is borrowed from Spartan customs, Plutarch, Lykurgus, 21; Schol. ad Legg. p. 633 A.]

[Side-note: Music and dancing--imitation of the voice and movements of brave and virtuous men. Youth must be taught to take delight in this.]

But what _is_ the good and honourable--or the bad and dishonourable? We must be able to settle this point:--otherwise we cannot know how far the chorus complies with the conditions above-named. Suppose a brave man and a coward in the face of danger: the gestures and speech of the former will be strikingly different from those of the latter. So with other virtues and vices. Now the manifestations, bodily and mental, of the virtuous man, are beautiful and honourable: those of the vicious man, are ugly and base. These are the _really beautiful_,--the same universally, or what ought to be beautiful to all: this is the standard of rectitude in music. But they do not always _appear_ beautiful to all. There is great diversity in the tastes and sentiments of different persons: what appears to one man agreeable and pleasurable, appears to another disgusting or indifferent.[56] Such diversity is either in the natural disposition, or in the habits acquired. A man's pleasure depends upon the former, his judgment of approbation on the latter. If both his nature and his acquired habits coincide with the standard of rectitude, he will both delight in what is really beautiful, and will approve it as beautiful. But if his nature be in discordance with the standard, while his habits coincide with that standard he will approve of what is honourable, but he will take no delight in it: he will delight in what is base, but will at the same time disapprove it as base. He will however be ashamed to proclaim his delight before persons whom he respects, and will never indulge himself in the delightful music except when he is alone.[57]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Legg. p. 655 B.]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Legg. pp. 655-656.]

[Side-note: Bad musical exhibitions and poetry forbidden by the lawgiver. Songs and dances must be consecrated by public authority. Prizes at the musical festivals to be awarded by select judges.]