Chapter XXXV: Platonic Republic--Abstract (3)

These intermingled male and female Guardians, in the discharge of their joint functions, will live together in common barracks and at common mess-tables. There must be no separate houses or separate family-relations between them. All are wives or husbands of all: no youth must know his own father, no mature man must know his own son: all the mature men and women are fathers or mothers of all the younger: all of the same age are brothers and sisters.[121] We do not intend, however, that the copulation between them shall take place in a promiscuous and arbitrary manner: we shall establish laws to regulate the intermarriages and breeding.[122] We must copy the example of those who regulate the copulation of horses, dogs, and other animals: we must bring together those who will give existence to the best offspring.[123] We must couple, as often as we can, the men who are best, with the women who are best, both in mind and body; and the men who are least good, with the women who are least good. We must bring up the offspring of the former couples--we must refuse to bring up the offspring of the latter.[124] And such results must be accomplished by underhand arrangements of the Elder Chiefs; so as to be unknown to every one else, in order to prevent discontent and quarrel among the body of the Guardians. These Elders will celebrate periodical festivals, in which they will bring together the fitting brides and bridegrooms, under solemn hymns and sacrifices. They must regulate the number of marriages in such manner as to keep the total list of Guardians as much as possible without increase as well as without diminution.[125] The Elders must make an artful use of the lot, so that these couplings shall appear to every one else the effect of chance. Distinguished warriors must be rewarded with a larger licence of copulation with different women, which will produce the farther advantage of having as many children as possible born from their procreation.[126] All the children as soon as born must be consigned to the Chiefs or Elders, male and female, who will conceal in some convenient manner those who are born either from the worst couples or with any bodily imperfection: while they place the offspring of the best couples in special outbuildings under the charge of nurses. Those mothers who are full of milk will be brought here to give suck, but every precaution will be taken that none of them shall know her own child: wet-nurses will also be provided in addition, to ensure a full supply: but all the care of the children will devolve on the public nurses, not on the mothers.[127]

[Footnote 121: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 457-458.]

[Footnote 122: Plato, Republic, v. p. 458 E.]

[Footnote 123: Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 A.]

[Footnote 124: Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 D-E. [Greek: dei= me\n e)k tô=n ô(mologême/nôn tou\s a)ri/stous tai=s a)ri/stais suggi/gnesthai ô(s pleista/kis, tou\s de\ phaulota/tous tai=s phaulota/tais tou)nanti/on, kai\ tô=n me\n ta\ e)/kgona tre/phein, tô=n de\ mê/, ei) me/llei to\ poi/mnion o(/, ti a)kro/taton ei)=nai; kai\ tau=ta pa/nta gigno/mena lantha/nein plê\n au)tou\s tou\s a)/rchontas, ei) au)= ê( a)ge/lê tô=n phula/kôn o(/, ti ma/lista a)stasi/astos e)/stai.]]

[Footnote 125: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 A.]

[Footnote 126: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 B.]

[Footnote 127: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 C-D.]

[Side-note: Regulations about age, for procreation--Children brought up under public authority.]

The age for such intermarriages, destined to be procreative for the benefit of the city, must be from thirty to fifty-five, for men--from twenty to forty, for women. No man or woman, above or below these limits of age, will be allowed to meddle with the function of intermarriage and procreation for the public; which function must always be conducted under superintendence of the authorities, with proper sacrifice and prayers to the Gods. Nor will any man, even within the licensed age, be allowed to approach any woman except by assignment from the authorities. If any infringement of this law should occur, the offspring arising from it will be pronounced spurious and outcast.[128] But when the above limits of age are passed, both men and women may have intercourse with whomsoever they please, except fathers with daughters or sons with mothers: under condition, however, that no offspring shall be born from such intercourse, or that if any offspring be born, it shall be exposed.[129]

[Footnote 128: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 A-B.]

[Footnote 129: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.]

How is the father to know his own daughter (it is asked), or the son his own mother? They cannot know (replies Sokrates): but each couple will consider every child born in the seventh month or tenth month after their marriage, as their child, and will address him or her by the appellation of son or daughter. The fathers and mothers will be fathers and mothers of all the children born at that time: the sons and daughters will be in filial relation to all the couples brought together at the given antecedent period.[130]

[Footnote 130: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 D.]

[Side-note: Perfect communion of sentiment and interest among the Guardians--Causes of pleasure and pain the same to all, like parts of the same organism.]

The main purpose of such regulations, in respect to family as in respect to property, is to establish the fullest communion between all the Guardians, male and female--and to eliminate as much as possible the feeling of separate interest in any fraction of them. The greatest evil to any city is, that which pulls it to pieces and makes it many instead of one: the greatest good to it is that which binds it together and makes it one. Now what is most efficacious in binding it together, is, community of the causes of pleasure and pain: when each individual feels pleasure from the same causes and on the same occasions as all the rest, and pain in like manner. On the other hand, when the causes of pleasure and pain are distinct, this tends to dissolution; and becomes fatal if the opposition is marked, so that some individuals are much delighted, and others much distressed, under the same circumstances. That city is the best arranged, wherein all the citizens pronounce the words _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, with reference to the same things: when they coalesce into an unity like the organism of a single individual. To him a blow in the finger is a blow to the whole man: so also in the city, pleasure or pain to any one citizen ought to communicate itself by sympathy as pleasure and pain to all.[131]

[Footnote 131: Plato, Republic, v. p. 462 D.]

[Side-note: Harmony--absence of conflicting interest--assured scale of equal comfort--consequent happiness--among the Guardians.]

Now the Guardians under our regulations will present as much as possible this community of _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, as well as of pleasures and pains--and this exclusion of the separate individual _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, as well as of separate pleasures and pains. No individual among them will have either separate property or separate family relationship: each will have both one and the other in common with the rest.[132] No one will have property of his own to be increased, nor a family of his own to be benefited, apart from the rest: all will be as much as possible common recipients of pleasure and pain.[133] All the ordinary causes of dispute and litigation will thus be excluded. If two Guardians of the same age happen to quarrel, they must fight it out: this will discharge their wrath and prevent worse consequences--while at the same time it will encourage attention to gymnastic excellence.[134] But no younger Guardian will raise his hand against an older Guardian, whom he is taught to reverence as his father, and whom every one else would protect if attacked. If the Guardians maintain harmony among themselves, they will easily ensure it among the remaining inhabitants. Assured of sufficient but modest comforts, the Guardians will be relieved from all struggles for the maintenance of a family, from the arts of trade, and from subservience to the rich.[135] They will escape all these troubles, and will live a life happier than the envied Olympic victor: for they will gain the victory in an enterprise more illustrious than he undertakes, and they will receive from their fellow-citizens fuller maintenance and higher privilege than what is awarded to him, as well as honours after death.[136] Their lives are not to be put in comparison with those of the farmer or the shoemaker. They must not indeed aspire to any happiness incompatible with their condition and duty as Guardians. But that condition will itself involve the highest happiness. And if any silly ambition prompts them to depart from it, they will assuredly change for the worse.[137]

[Footnote 132: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 B.]

[Footnote 133: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 D. [Greek: pa/ntas ei)s to\ dunato\n o(mopathei=s lu/pês te kai\ ê(donê=s ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 134: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 E.]

[Footnote 135: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 C. [Greek: tô=n kakô=n . . . ô(=n a)pêllagme/noi a)\n ei)=en, kolakei/as te plousi/ôn pe/nêtes a)pori/as te kai\ a)lgêdo/nas], &c.]

[Footnote 136: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 D. [Greek: Pa/ntôn te dê\ tou/tôn a)palla/xontai, zê/sousi/ te tou= makaristou= bi/ou, o(\n oi( O)lumpioni=kai zô=si, makariô/teron.]]

[Footnote 137: Plato, Republic, v. p. 466 A-C.]

[Side-note: In case of war both sexes will go together to battle--Rewards to distinguished warriors.]

Such is the communion of sexes which must be kept up for the duties of Guardians, and for the exigencies of military defence. As in other races of animals, males and females must go out to fight, and each will inspire the other with bravery. The children must be taken out on horseback to see the encounters from a distance, so that they may be kept clear of danger, yet may nevertheless be gradually accustomed to the sight of it.[138] If any one runs away from the field, he must be degraded from the rank of Guardian to that of husbandman or craftsman. If any man suffers himself to be taken prisoner, he is no loss: the enemy may do what they choose with him. When any one distinguishes himself in battle, he shall be received on his return by garlands and by an affectionate welcome from the youth.[139] Should he be slain in battle, he shall be recognised as having become a Dæmon or Demigod (according to the Hesiodic doctrine), and his sepulchre shall be honoured by appropriate solemnities.[140]

[Footnote 138: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 466-467.]

[Footnote 139: Plato, Republic, v. p. 468 B.]

[Footnote 140: Plato, Republic, v. p. 469 B.]

[Side-note: War against Hellenic enemies to be carried on mildly--Hellens are all by nature kinsmen.]

In carrying on war, our Guardians will observe a marked difference in their manner of treating Hellenic enemies and barbaric enemies. They will never enslave any Hellenic city, nor hold any Hellenic person in slavery. They will never even strip the body of an Hellenic enemy, except so far as to take his arms. They will never pile up in their temples the arms, nor burn the houses and lands, of Hellenic enemies. They will always keep in mind the members of the Hellenic race as naturally kindred with each other, and bound to aid each other in mutual defence, against Barbaric aliens who are the natural enemies of all of them.[141] They will not think themselves authorised to carry on war as Hellens now do against each other, except when their enemies are Barbaric.

[Footnote 141: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 470-471.]

Enough of this, Sokrates, replies Glaukon. I admit that your city will have all the excellencies and advantages of which you boast. But you have yet to show me that it is practicable, and how.[142]

[Footnote 142: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 471-472.]

[Side-note: Question--How is the scheme practicable? It is difficult, yet practicable on one condition--That philosophy and political power should come into the same hands.]

The task which you impose (says Sokrates) is one of great difficulty: even if you grant me, what must be granted, that every reality must fall short of its ideal type.[143] One condition, and one only, is essential to render it practicable: a condition which you may ridicule as preposterous, but which, though not probable, is certainly supposable. Either philosophers must acquire the ruling power, or else the present rulers of mankind must themselves become genuine philosophers. In one or other of these two ways philosophy and political power must come into the into the same hands. Unless such condition be fulfilled, our city can never be made a reality, nor can there ever be any respite of suffering to the human race.[144]

[Footnote 143: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 472-473.]

[Footnote 144: Plato, Republic, v. p. 473 D.]

The supremacy which you claim for philosophers (replies Glaukon), will be listened to with repugnance and scorn. But at least you must show who the philosophers are, on whose behalf you invoke such supremacy. You must show that it belongs to them by nature both to pursue philosophy, and to rule in the various cities: and that by nature also, other men ought to obey them as well as to abstain from philosophy.[145]

[Footnote 145: Plato, Republic, v. p. 474 A-B.]

[Side-note: Characteristic marks of the philosopher--He contemplates and knows Entia or unchangeable Forms, as distinguished from fluctuating particulars or Fientia.]

The first requisite for a philosopher (replies Sokrates) is, that he shall love and pursue eagerly every sort of knowledge or wisdom, without shrinking from labour for such purpose. But it is not sufficient that he should be eager about hearing tragedies or learning the minor arts. Other men, accomplished and curious, are fond of hearing beautiful sounds and discourses, or of seeing beautiful forms and colours. But the philosopher alone can see or distinguish truth.[146] It is only he who can distinguish the genuine Form or Idea, in which truth consists, from the particular embodiments in which it occurs. These Forms or Ideas exist, eternal and unchangeable. Since Pulchrum is the opposite of Turpe, they must be two, and each of them must be One: the same about Just and Unjust, Good and Evil; each of these is a distinct Form or Idea, existing as One and Unchangeable by itself, but exhibiting itself in appearance as manifold, diverse, and frequently changing, through communion with different objects and events, and through communion of each Form with others.[147] Now the accomplished, but unphilosophical, man cannot see or recognise this Form in itself. He can see only the different particular cases and complications in which it appears embodied.[148] None but the philosopher can contemplate each Form by itself, and discriminate it from the various particulars in conjunction with which it appears. Such philosophers are few in number, but they are the only persons who can be said truly to live. Ordinary and even accomplished men--who recognise beautiful things, but cannot recognise Beauty in itself, nor even follow an instructor who points it out to them--pass their lives in a sort of dream or reverie: for the dreamer, whether asleep or awake, is one who believes what is similar to another thing to be not merely similar, but to be the actual thing itself.[149] The philosopher alone, who embraces in his mind the one and unchangeable Form or Idea, along with, yet distinguished from, its particular embodiments, possesses knowledge or science. The unphilosophical man, whose mind embraces nothing higher than variable particulars, does not know--but only opines, or has opinions.[150]

[Footnote 146: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 474-475. [Greek: tou\s tê=s a)lêthei/as philothea/monas] (p. 475 E).]

[Footnote 147: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 A. [Greek: E)peidê/ e)stin e)nanti/on kalo\n ai)schrô=|, du/o au)tô\ ei)=nai . . . Ou)kou=n e)peidê\ du/o, kai\ e(\n e)ka/teron? . . . Kai\ peri\ dikai/ou kai\ a)di/kou kai\ a)gathou= kai\ kakou= kai\ pa/ntôn tô=n ei)dô=n pe/ri, o( au)to\s lo/gos, au)to\ me\n e(\n e(/kaston ei)=nai, tê=| de\ tô=n pra/xeôn kai\ sôma/tôn kai\ a)llê/lôn koinôni/a| pantachou= phantazo/mena polla\ phai/nesthai e(/kaston?]]

[Footnote 148: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]

[Footnote 149: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]

[Footnote 150: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n tou/tou me\n tê\n dia/noian ô(s gignô/skontos _gnô/mên_ a)\n o)rthô=s phai=men ei)=nai, tou= de\ _do/xan_, ô(s doxa/zontos.]]

[Side-note: Ens alone can be known--Non-Ens is unknowable. That which is midway between Ens and Non-Ens (particulars) is matter only of opinion. Ordinary men attain nothing beyond opinion.]

This latter, the unphilosophical man, will not admit what we say. Accordingly, we must prove it to him. You cannot know without knowing Something: that is, Some Ens: for Non-Ens cannot be known. That which is completely and absolutely Ens, is completely and absolutely cognizable: that which is Non-Ens and nowhere, is in every way uncognizable. If then there be anything which is at once Ens and Non-Ens, it will lie midway between these two: it will be something neither absolutely and completely cognizable, nor absolutely and completely uncognizable: it belongs to something between ignorance and science. Now science or knowledge is one thing, its object is, complete Ens. Opinion is another thing, its object also is different. Knowing and Opining belong, like Sight and Hearing, to the class of Entia called Powers or Faculties, which we and others possess, and by means of which--that is, by means of one or other of them--we accomplish everything that we do accomplish. Now no one of these powers or faculties has either colour or figure, whereby it may be recognised or distinguished from others. Each is known and distinguished, not by what it is in itself, but by what it accomplishes, and by the object to which it has special relation. That which has the same object and accomplishes the same result, I call the same power or faculty: that which has a different object, and accomplishes a different result, I call a different power or faculty. Now Knowing, Cognition, Science, is one of our faculties or powers, and the strongest of all: Opining is another, and a different one. A marked distinction between the two is, that Knowing or Cognition is infallible--Opining is fallible. Since Cognition is one power or faculty, and Opining another--the object of one must be different from the object of the other. But the object of Cognition is, the Complete Ens: the object of Opining must therefore be, not the Complete Ens, but something different from it. What then is the object of Opining? It is not Complete Ens, but it is still Something. It is not Non-Ens, or Nothing; for Non-Ens or Nothing is not thinkable or opinable: you cannot think or opine, and yet think or opine nothing. Whoever opines or thinks, must opine or think something. Ens is the object of Cognition, Non-Ens is the object of non-Cognition or Ignorance: Opination or Opinion is midway between Cognition and Ignorance, darker than the former, but clearer than the latter. The object of opination is therefore something midway between Ens and Non-Ens.

[Side-note: Particulars fluctuate: they are sometimes just or beautiful, sometimes unjust or ugly. Forms or Entia alone remain constant.]

But what is this Something, midway between Ens and Particulars Non-Ens, and partaking of both--which is the object of Opination? To make out this, we must revert to the case of the unphilosophical man. We have described him, as not believing in the existence of the Form or Idea of Beauty, or Justice _per se_; not enduring to hear it spoken of as a real Ens and Unum; not knowing anything except of the many diverse particulars, beautiful and just. We must remind him that every one of these particular beautiful things will appear repulsive also: every one of these just and holy particulars, will appear unjust and unholy also. He cannot refuse to admit that each of them will appear under certain circumstances beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, holy and unholy. In like manner, every particular double will appear also a half: every light thing will appear heavy: every little thing great. Of each among these many particulars, if you can truly predicate any one quality about it, you may with equal truth predicate the opposite quality also. Each of them both is, and is not, the substratum of all these different and opposite qualities. You cannot pronounce them to be either one or the other, with fixity and permanence: they are at once both and neither.

[Side-note: The many cannot discern or admit the reality of Forms--Their minds are always fluctuating among particulars.]

Here then we find the appropriate object of Opination: that which is neither Ens nor Non-Ens, but something between both. Particulars are the object of Opination, as distinguished from universal Entities, Forms, or Ideas, which are the object of Cognition. The many, who disbelieve or ignore the existence of these Forms, and whose minds dwell exclusively among particulars--cannot know, but only opine. Their usages and creeds, as to beautiful, just, honourable, float between positive Ens and Non-Ens. It is these intermediate fluctuations which are caught up by their opining faculty, intermediate as it is between Cognition and Ignorance. It is these also, the objects of Opination, which they love and delight in: they neither recognise nor love the objects of Cognition or Knowledge. They are lovers of opinion and its objects, not lovers of Knowledge. The philosopher alone recognises and loves Knowledge and the objects of Knowledge. His mind dwells, not amidst the fluctuating, diverse, and numerous particulars, but in contemplation of the One, Universal, permanent, unchangeable, Form or Idea.

[Side-note: The philosopher will be ardent for all varieties of knowledge--His excellent moral attributes--He will be trained to capacity for active life.]

Here is the characteristic difference (continues Sokrates) which you required me to point out, between the philosopher and the unphilosophical man, however accomplished. The philosopher sees, knows, and contemplates, the One, Real, unchangeable, Form or Idea: the unphilosophical man knows nothing of this Form _per se_, and sees only its multifarious manifestations, each perpetually variable and different from all the rest. The philosopher, having present to his mind this type--and approximating to it, as far as may be, the real institutions and practices--will be the person most competent to rule our city: especially as his education will give him farthermore--besides such familiarity with the Form or Type--as large a measure of experience, and as much virtue, as can fall to the lot of the unphilosophical man.[151] The nature and disposition of the true philosopher, if improved by education, will include all the virtue and competence of the practical man. The philosopher is bent on learning everything which can make him familiar with Universal Forms and Essences in their pure state, not floating amidst the confusion of generated and destroyed realities: and with Forms and Essences little as well as great, mean as well as sublime.[152] Devoted to knowledge and truth--hating falsehood--he has little room in his mind for the ordinary desires: he is temperate, indifferent to money, free from all meanness or shabbiness. A man like him, whose contemplations stretch over all time and all essence, thinks human life a small affair, and has no fear of death. He will be just, mild in his demeanour, quick in apprehension, retentive in memory, elegant in his tastes and movements. All these excellences will be united in the philosophers to whom we confide the rule of our city.[153]

[Footnote 151: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 484.]

[Footnote 152: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 485 A.]

[Footnote 153: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 485-486.]

[Side-note: Adeimantus does not dispute the conclusion, but remarks that it is at variance with actual facts--Existing philosophers are either worthless pretenders, or when they are good, useless.]

It is impossible, Sokrates (remarks Adeimantus), to answer in the negative to your questions. Nevertheless we who hear and answer, are not convinced of the truth of your conclusion. Unskilled as we are in the interrogatory process, we feel ourselves led astray little by little at each successive question; until at length, through the accumulated effect of such small deviations, we are driven up into a corner without the power of moving, like a bad player at draughts defeated by one superior to himself.[154] Here in this particular case your conclusion has been reached by steps to which we cannot refuse assent. Yet if we look at the facts, we see something quite the reverse as to the actual position of philosophers. Those who study philosophy, not simply as a branch of juvenile education but as a continued occupation throughout life, are in most cases strange creatures, not to say thoroughly unprincipled: while the few of them who are most reasonable, derive nothing from this pursuit which you so much extol, except that they become useless in their respective cities.[155]

[Footnote 154: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 B. [Greek: Pro\s me\n tau=ta soi ou)dei\s a)\n oi(=o/s t' ei)/ê a)nteipei=n; a)lla\ ga\r toio/nde ti pa/schousin oi( a)kou/ontes e(ka/stote a)\ nu=n le/geis; ê(gou=ntai di' a)peiri/an tou= e)rôta=|n te kai\ a)pokri/nesthai u(po\ tou= lo/gou par' e(/kaston to\ e)rô/têma smikro\n parago/menoi, a)throisthe/ntôn tô=n smikrô=n e)pi\ teleutê=s tô=n lo/gôn, me/ga to\ spha/lma kai\ e)nanti/on toi=s prô/tois a)naphai/nesthai], &c.

This is an interesting remark on the effect produced upon many hearers by the Sokratic and Platonic dialogues,--puzzling, silencing, and ultimately stimulating the mind, but not satisfying or convincing, rather raising suspicions as to the trustworthiness of the process, which suspicions have to be turned over and scrutinised by subsequent meditation.]

[Footnote 155: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 D.]

[Side-note: Sokrates admits the fact to be so--His simile of the able steersman on shipboard, among a disobedient crew.]

Yes (replies Sokrates), your picture is a correct one. The position of true and reasonable philosophers, in their respective cities, is difficult and uncomfortable. Conceive a ship on her voyage, under the management of a steersman distinguished for force of body as well as for skill in his craft, but not clever in dealing with, or acting upon other men. Conceive the seamen all quarrelling with each other to get possession of the rudder; each man thinking himself qualified to steer, though he has never learnt it--nor had any master in it--nor even believes it to be teachable, but is ready to massacre all who affirm that it is teachable.[156] Imagine, besides, these seamen importuning the qualified steersman to commit the rudder to them, each being ready to expel or kill any others whom he may prefer to them: and at last proceeding to stupify with wine or drugs the qualified steersman, and then to navigate the vessel themselves according to their own views; feasting plentifully on the stores. These men know nothing of what constitutes true and able steersmanship. They extol, as a perfect steersman, that leader who is most efficacious, either by persuasion or force, in seizing the rudder for them to manage: they despise as useless any one who does not possess this talent. They never reflect that the genuine steersman has enough to do in surmounting the dangers of his own especial art, and in watching the stars and the winds: and that if he is to acquire technical skill and practice adequate to such a purpose, he cannot at the same time possess skill and practice in keeping his hold of the rudder whether the crew are pleased with him or not. Such being the condition of the ship and the crew, you see plainly that they will despise and set aside the true steersman as an useless proser and star-gazer.[157]

[Footnote 156: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488.]

[Footnote 157: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488 D-E.]

[Side-note: The uselessness of the true philosopher is the fault of the citizen, who will not invoke his guidance.]

Now the crew of this ship represent the citizens and leaders of our actual cities: the steersman represents the true philosopher. He is, and must be, useless in the ship: but his uselessness is the fault of the crew and not his own. It is not for the true steersman to entreat permission from the seamen, that they will allow him to command; nor for the wise man to solicit employment at the doors of the rich. It is for the sick man, whether he be poor or rich, to ask for the aid of the physician; and for every one who needs to be commanded, to invoke the authority of the person qualified to command. No man really qualified will submit to ask command as a favour.[158]

[Footnote 158: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 B. [Greek: tê=s me/ntoi a)chrêsti/as tou\s mê\ chrôme/nous ke/leue ai)tia=sthai, a)lla\ mê\ tou\s e)pieikei=s. Ou) ga\r e)/chei phu/sin kubernê/tên nautô=n dei=sthai a)/rchesthai u(ph' au(tou=], &c.]

Thus, Adeimantus (continues Sokrates), I have dealt with the first part of your remark, that the true philosopher is an useless man in cities as now constituted: I have shown you this is not his fault--that it could not be otherwise,--and that a man even of the highest aptitude, cannot enjoy reputation among those whose turn of mind is altogether at variance with his own.[159]

[Footnote 159: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 D. [Greek: e)/k te toi/nun tou/tôn kai\ e)n tou/tois ou) r(a/|dion eu)dokimei=n to\ be/ltiston e)pitê/deuma u(po\ tô=n ta)nanti/a e)pitêdeuo/ntôn.]]

I shall now deal with your second observation--That while even the best philosophers are useless, the majority of those who cultivate philosophy are worthless men, who bring upon her merited discredit. I admit that this also is correct; but I shall prove that philosophy is not to be blamed for it.[160]

[Footnote 160: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 E. [Greek: o(/ti ou)de\ tou/tou philosophi/a ai)ti/a, peirathô=men dei=xai.]]

[Side-note: The great qualities required to form a philosopher, become sources of perversion, under a misguiding public opinion.]

You will remember the great combination of excellent dispositions, intellectual as well as moral, which I laid down as indispensable to form the fundamental character of the true philosopher. Such a combination is always rare. Even under the best circumstances philosophers must be very few. But these few stand exposed, in our existing cities, to such powerful causes of corruption, that they are prevented from reaching maturity, except by some happy accident. First, each one of those very qualities, which, when combined, constitute the true philosopher,--serves as a cause of corruption, if it exists by itself and apart from the rest. Next, what are called good things, or external advantages, act in the same manner--such as beauty, strength, wealth, powerful connections, &c. Again, the stronger a man's natural aptitudes and the greater his external advantages,--the better will he become under favourable circumstances, the worse will he become, if circumstances are unfavourable. Heinous iniquity always springs from a powerful nature perverted by bad training: not from a feeble nature, which will produce no great effects either for good or evil. Thus the eminent predispositions,--which, if properly improved, would raise a man to the highest rank in virtue,--will, if planted in an unfavourable soil, produce a master-mind in deeds of iniquity, unless counteracted by some providential interposition.

[Side-note: Mistake of supposing that such perversion arises from the Sophists. Irresistible effect of the public opinion generally, in tempting or forcing a dissenter into orthodoxy.]

The multitude treat these latter as men corrupted by the Sophists. But this is a mistake. Neither Sophists nor other private individuals produce mischief worth mentioning. It is the multitude themselves, utterers of these complaints, who are the most active Sophists and teachers: it is they who educate and mould every individual, man and woman, young and old, into such a character as they please.[161] When they are assembled in the public assembly or the dikastery, in the theatre or the camp--when they praise some things and blame others, with vociferation and vehemence echoed from the rocks around--how irresistible will be the impression produced upon the mind of a youth who hears them! No private training which he may have previously received can hold out against it. All will be washed away by this impetuous current of multitudinous praise or blame, which carries him along with it. He will declare honourable or base the same things as they declare to be so: he will adopt the character, and follow the pursuits, which they enjoin. Moreover, if he resists such persuasive influence, these multitudinous teachers and Sophists have stronger pressure in store for him.[162] They punish the disobedient with disgrace, fine, and even death. What other Sophist, or what private exhortation, can contend successfully against teachers such as these? Surely none. The attempt to do so is insane. There neither is, nor has been, nor will be, any individual human disposition educated to virtue in opposition to the training of the multitude:[163] I say _human_, as distinguished from _divine_, of which I make exception: for in the existing state of society, any individual who is preserved from these ascendant influences to acquire philosophical excellence, owes his preservation to the divine favour.

[Footnote 161: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 A. [Greek: ê)\ kai\ su\ ê(gei=, ô(/sper oi( polloi/, diaphtheirome/nous tina\s ei)=nai u(po\ sophistô=n ne/ous, diaphthei/rontas de/ tinas sophista\s i)diôtikou/s, o(/, ti kai\ a)/xion lo/gon, a)ll' ou)k au)tou\s tou\s tau=ta le/gontas megi/stous me\n ei)=nai sophista/s? paideu/ein de\ teleô/tata kai\ a)perga/zesthai oi(/ous bou/lontai ei)=nai kai\ ne/ous kai\ presbute/rous kai\ a)/ndras kai\ gunai=kas?]]

[Footnote 162: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 C-D. [Greek: Kai\ phê/sein te ta\ au)ta\ tou/tois kala\ kai\ ai)schra\ ei)=nai, kai\ e)pitêdeu/sein a(/per a)\n ou(=toi, kai\ e)/sesthai toiou=ton . . . Kai\ mê\n ou(/pô tê\n megi/stên a)na/gkên ei)rê/kamen. Poi/an? E(\n e)/rgô| prostithe/asi, lo/gô| mê\ pei/thontes, ou(=toi oi( paideutai/ te kai\ sophistai/. Ê)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti to\n mê\ peitho/menon a)timi/ais te kai\ chrê/masi kai\ thana/tois kola/zousin? Kai\ ma/la, e)/phê, spho/dra.]]

[Footnote 163: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 D.]

[Side-note: The Sophists and other private teachers accept the prevalent orthodoxy, and conform their teaching to it.]

Moreover, though the multitude complain of these professional teachers as rivals, and decry them as Sophists--yet we must recollect that such teachers inculcate only the opinions received among the multitude themselves, and extol these same opinions as wisdom.[164] The teachers know nothing of what is really honourable and base,--good and evil,--just and unjust. They distribute all these names only with reference to the opinions of the multitude:--pronouncing those things which please the multitude to be good, and those which displease to be evil,--without furnishing any other rational account. They call things necessary by the name of just and honourable; not knowing the material difference between what is good and what is necessary, nor being able to point out that difference to others. Thus preposterous are the teachers, who count it wisdom to suit the taste and feelings of the multitude, whether in painting or in music or in social affairs. For whoever lives among them, publicly exhibiting either poetry or other performances private or official, thus making the multitude his masters beyond the strict limits of necessity--the consequence is infallible, that he must adapt his works to that which they praise. But whether the works which he executes are really good and honourable, he will be unable to render any tolerable account.[165]

[Footnote 164: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 A. [Greek: e(/kaston tô=n mistharnou/ntôn i)diôtô=n, ou(\s dê\ ou(=toi sophista\s kalou=si kai\ a)ntite/chnous ê(gou=ntai, mê\ a)/lla paideu/ein ê)\ tau=ta ta\ tô=n pollô=n do/gmata, a(\ doxa/zousin o(/tan a)throisthô=si, kai\ sophi/an tau/tên kalei=n.]]

[Footnote 165: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 C-D.]

[Side-note: The people generally hate philosophy--A youth who aspires to it will be hated by the people, and persecuted even by his own relatives.]

It is therefore the multitude, or the general voice of society--not the Sophists or private teachers, mere echoes of that general voice--which works upon and moulds individuals. Now the multitude cannot tolerate or believe in the existence of those Universals or Forms which the philosopher contemplates. They know only the many particulars, not the One Universal. Incapable of becoming philosophers themselves, they look upon the philosopher with hatred: and this sentiment is adopted by all those so-called philosophers who seek to please them.[166] Under these circumstances, what chance is there that those eminent predispositions, which we pointed out as the foundation of the future philosopher, can ever be matured to their proper result? A youth of such promise, especially if his body be on a par with his mind, will be at once foremost among all his fellows. His relatives and fellow-citizens, eager to make use of him for their own purposes, and anxious to appropriate to themselves his growing force, will besiege him betimes with solicitations and flatteries.[167] Under these influences, if we assume him to be rich, well born, and in a powerful city, he will naturally become intoxicated with unlimited hopes and ambition; fancying himself competent to manage the affairs of all governments, and giving himself the empty airs of a lofty potentate.[168] If there be any one to give him a quiet hint that he has not yet acquired intelligence, nor can acquire it without labour--he will turn a deaf ear. But suppose that such advice should by chance prevail, in one out of many cases, so that the youth alters his tendencies and devotes himself to philosophy--what will be the conduct of those who see, that they will thereby be deprived of his usefulness and party-service, towards their own views? They will leave no means untried to prevent him from following the advice, and even to ruin the adviser, by private conspiracy and judicial prosecution.[169] It is impossible that the young man can really turn to philosophy, against obstructions thus powerful. You see that those very excellences and advantages, which form the initial point of the growing philosopher, become means and temptations for corrupting him. The best natures, rare as they always are, become thus not only ruined, but turned into instruments of evil. For the same men (as I have already said) who, under favourable training, would have done the greatest good, become perpetrators of the greatest evil, if they are badly placed. Small men will do nothing important, either in the one way or the other.[170]

[Footnote 166: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 A. [Greek: philo/sophon me\n a)/ra plê=thos a)du/naton ei)=nai . . . Kai\ tou\s philsophou=ntas a)/ra a)na/gkê pse/gesthai u(p' au)tô=n . . . kai\ u(po\ tou/tôn dê\ tô=n i)diôtô=n, o(/soi prosomilou=ntes o)/chlô| a)re/skein au)tô=| e)pithumou=sin.]]

[Footnote 167: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 B.]

[Footnote 168: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 C. [Greek: plêrôthê/sesthai a)mêcha/nou e)lpi/dos, ê(gou/menon kai\ ta\ tô=n E(llê/nôn kai\ ta\ tô=n barba/rôn i(kano\n ei)=nai pra/ttein.]]

[Footnote 169: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 D-E. [Greek: e)a\n d' ou)=n, dia\ to\ eu)= pephuke/nai kai\ to\ xuggene\s tô=n lo/gôn, ei)=s ai)stha/nêtai/ te/ pê| kai\ ka/mptêtai kai\ e(/lkêtai pro\s philosophi/an, ti/ oi)o/metha dra/sein e)kei/nous tou\s ê(goume/nous a)pollu/nai au)tou= tê\n chrei/an te kai\ e(tairei/an? ou) pa=n me\n e)/rgon, pa=n d' e)/pos, le/gonta/s te kai\ pra/ttontas kai\ peri\ au)to/n, o(/pôs a)\n mê\ peisthê=|, kai\ peri\ to\n pei/thonta, o(/pôs a)\n mê\ oi(=o/s t' ê)=|, kai\ i)di/a| e)pibouleu/ontas kai\ dêmosi/a| ei)s a)gô=nas kathi/stantas?]]

[Footnote 170: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 A-B.]

[Side-note: The really great minds are thus driven away from the path of philosophy--which is left to empty pretenders.]

It is thus that the path of philosophy is deserted by those who ought to have trodden it, and who pervert their exalted powers to unworthy objects. That path--being left vacant, yet still full of imposing titles and pretensions, and carrying a show of superior dignity as compared with the vulgar professions--becomes invaded by interlopers of inferior worth and ability, who quit their own small craft, and set up as philosophers.[171] Such men, poorly endowed by nature, and debased by habits of trade, exhibit themselves, in their self-assumed exaltation as philosophers, like a slave recently manumitted, who has put on new clothes and married his master's daughter.[172] Having intruded themselves into a career for which they are unfit, they cannot produce any grand or genuine philosophical thoughts, or any thing better than mere neat sophisms, pleasing to the ear.[173] Through them arises the discredit which is now attached to philosophers.

[Footnote 171: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 C-D. [Greek: kathorô=ntes ga\r a)/lloi a)nthrôpi/skoi kenê\n tê\n chô/ran tau/tên gignome/nên, kalô=n de\ o)noma/tôn kai\ proschêma/tôn mestê/n, ô(/sper oi( e)k tô=n ei)rgmô=n ei)s ta\ i(era\ a)podidra/skontes, a)/smenoi kai\ ou(=toi e)k tô=n technô=n e)kpêdô=sin ei)s tê\n philosophi/an.]]

[Footnote 172: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 E.]

[Footnote 173: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 A.]

[Side-note: Rare cases in which a highly qualified philosopher remains--Being at variance with public opinion, he can achieve nothing, and is lucky if he can obtain safety by silence.]

Amidst such general degradation of philosophy, some few and rare cases are left, in which the pre-eminent natures qualified for philosophy remain by some favourable accident uncorrupted. One of these is Theagês, who would have been long ago drawn away from philosophy to active politics, had he not been disqualified by bad health. The restraining Dæmon, peculiar to myself (says Sokrates), is another case.[174] Such an exceptional man, having once tasted the sweetness and happiness of philosophy, embraces it as an exclusive profession. He sees that the mass of society are wrongheaded--that scarce any one takes wholesome views on social matters--that he can find no partisans to aid him in upholding justice[175]--that while he will not take part in injustice, he is too weak to contend single-handed against the violence of all, and would only become a victim to it without doing any good either to the city or to his friends--like a man who has fallen among wild beasts. On these grounds he stands aloof in his own separate pursuit, like one sheltering himself under a wall against a hurricane of wind and dust. Witnessing the injustice committed by all around, he is content if he can keep himself clear and pure from it during his life here, so as to die with satisfaction and good hopes.

[Footnote 174: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 D.]

[Footnote 175: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 C-D. [Greek: kai\ tou/tôn dê\ tô=n o)li/gôn oi( geuo/menoi kai\ geusa/menoi ô(s ê(du\ kai\ maka/rion to\ ktê=ma, kai\ tô=n pollô=n au)= i(kanô=s i)do/ntes tê\n mani/an, kai\ o(/ti ou)dei\s ou)de\n u(gie\s, ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n, peri\ ta\ tô=n po/leôn pra/ttei, ou)d' e)/sti xu/mmachos meth' o(/tou tis i)ô\n e)pi\ tê\n tô=n dikai/ôn boê/theian sô/zoit' a)/n, a)ll' ô(/sper ei)s thêri/a a)/nthrôpos e)mpesô/n, ou)/te xunadikei=n e)the/lôn ou)/te i(kano\s ô)\n ei(=s pa=sin a)gri/ois a)nte/chein, pri/n ti tê\n po/lin ê)\ phi/lous o)nêsai proapolo/menos a)nôphelê\s au(tô=| te kai\ toi=s a)/llois a)\n ge/noito--tau=ta pa/nta logismô=| labô=n, ê(suchi/an e)/chôn kai\ ta\ au)tou= pra/ttôn . . . o(rô=n tou\s a)/llous katapimplame/nous a)nomi/as, a)gapa=| ei)/ pê au)to\s katharo\s a)diki/as], &c.]

He will perform no small achievement (remarks Adeimantus) if he keeps clear to the end.[176]

[Footnote 176: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 A.]

[Side-note: The philosopher must have a community suitable to him, and worthy of him.]

True (replies Sokrates)--yet nevertheless he can perform no great achievement, unless he meets with a community suited to him. Amidst such a community he will himself rise to greatness, and will preserve the public happiness as well as his own. But there exists no such community anywhere, at the present moment. Not one of those now existing is worthy of a philosophical disposition:[177] which accordingly becomes perverted, and degenerates into a different type adapted to its actual abode, like exotic seed transported to a foreign soil. But if this philosophical disposition were planted in a worthy community, so as to be able to assert its own superior excellence, it would then prove itself truly divine, leaving other dispositions and pursuits behind as merely human.

[Footnote 177: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 B-C.]

[Side-note: It must be such a community as Sokrates has been describing--But means must be taken to keep up a perpetual succession of philosophers as Rulers.]

You mean by a worthy community (observes Adeimantus), such an one as that of which you have been drawing the outline?--I do (replies Sokrates): with this addition, already hinted but not explained, that there must always be maintained in it a perpetual supervising authority representing the scheme and purpose of the primitive lawgiver. This authority must consist of philosophers: and the question now arises--difficult but indispensable--how such philosophers are to be trained up and made efficient for the good of the city.

[Side-note: Proper manner of teaching philosophy--Not to begin at a very early age.]

The plan now pursued for imparting philosophy is bad. Some do not learn it at all: and even to those who learn it best, the most difficult part (that which relates to debate and discourse) is taught when they are youths just emerging from boyhood, in the intervals of practical business and money-getting.[178] After that period, in their mature age, they abandon it altogether; they will scarcely so much as go to hear an occasional lecture on the subject, without any effort of their own: accordingly it has all died out within them, when they become mature in years. This manner of teaching philosophy ought to be reversed. In childhood and youth, instruction of an easy character and suitable to that age ought to be imparted; while the greatest care is taken to improve and strengthen the body during its period of growth, as a minister and instrument to philosophy. As age proceeds, and the mind advances to perfection, the mental exercises ought to become more difficult and absorbing. Lastly, when the age of bodily effort passes away, philosophy ought to become the main and principal pursuit.[179]

[Footnote 178: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 A. [Greek: Nu=n me\n oi( kai\ a(pto/menoi meira/kia o)/nta a)/rti e)k paidô=n to\ metaxu\ oi)konomi/as kai\ chrêmatismou= plêsia/santes au)tou= tô=| chalepôta/tô| a)palla/ttontai, oi( philosophô/tatoi poiou/menoi; le/gô de\ chalepô/taton to\ peri\ tou\s lo/gous; e)n de\ tô=| e)/peita, e)a\n kai\ a)/llôn tou=to pratto/ntôn parakalou/menoi e)the/lôsin a)kroatai\ gi/gnesthai, mega/la ê(gou=ntai, pa/rergon oi)o/menoi au)to\ dei=n pra/ttein.]]

[Footnote 179: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 C.]

[Side-note: If the multitude could once see a real, perfect, philosopher, they could not fail to love him: but this never happens.]

Most people will hear all this (continues Sokrates) with mingled incredulity and repugnance. We cannot wonder that they do so: for they have had no experience of one or a few virtuously trained men ruling in a city suitably prepared.[180] Such combination of philosophical rulers within a community adapted to them, we must assume to be realised.[181] Though difficult, it is noway impracticable: and even the multitude will become reconciled to it, if you explain to them mildly what sort of persons we mean by philosophers. We do not mean such persons as the multitude now call by that name; interlopers in the pursuit, violent in dispute and quarrel with each other, and perpetually talking personal scandal.[182] The multitude cannot hate a philosophical temper such as we depict, when they once come to know it--a man who, indifferent to all party disputes, dwells in contemplation of the Universal Forms, and tries to mould himself and others into harmony with them.[183] Such a philosopher will not pretend to make regulations, either for a city or for an individual, until he has purified it thoroughly. He will then make regulations framed upon the type of the Eternal Forms--Justice, Temperance, Beauty--adapting them as well as he can to human exigencies.[184] The multitude, when they know what is really meant, will become perfectly reconciled to it. One single prince, if he rises so as to become a philosopher, and has a consenting community, will suffice to introduce the system which we have been describing. So fortunate an accident can undoubtedly occur but seldom; yet it is not impossible, and one day or other it will really occur.[185]

[Footnote 180: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 E.]

[Footnote 181: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 499 B-C.]

[Footnote 182: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 499-500.]

[Footnote 183: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 500 C-D.]

[Footnote 184: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 501 A.]

[Footnote 185: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 502.]

[Side-note: Course of training in the Platonic city, for imparting philosophy to the Rulers. They must be taught to ascend to the Idea of Good. But what is Good?]

I must now (continues Sokrates) explain more in detail the studies and training through which these preservers Rulers of our city, the complete philosophers, must be created. The most perfect among the Guardians, after having been tested by years of exercises and temptations of various kinds, will occupy that distinguished place. Very few will be found uniting those distinct and almost incompatible excellences which qualify them for the post. They must give proof of self-command against pleasures as well as pains, and of competence to deal with the highest studies.[186] But what are the highest studies? What is the supreme object of knowledge? It is the Idea of Good--the Form of Good: to the acquisition of which our philosophers must be trained to ascend, however laborious and difficult the process may be.[187] Neither justice nor any thing else can be useful or profitable, unless we superadd to them a knowledge of the Idea of Good: without this, it would profit us nothing to possess all other knowledge.[188]

[Footnote 186: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 503.]

[Footnote 187: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 504.]

[Footnote 188: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A. [Greek: o(/ti ge ê( tou= a)gathou= i)de/a me/giston ma/thêma polla/kis a)kê/koas, ê)=| di/kaia kai\ ta)/lla proschrêsa/mena chrê/sima kai\ ô)phe/lima gi/gnetai], &c.]

[Side-note: Ancient disputes upon this point, though every one yearns after Good. Some say Intelligence; some say Pleasure. Neither is satisfactory.]

Now as to the question, What Good is? there are great and long-standing disputes. Every mind pursues Good, and does every thing for the sake of it--yet without either knowledge or firm assurance what Good is, and consequently with perpetual failure in deriving benefit from other acquisitions.[189] Most people say that Pleasure is the Good: an ingenious few identify Intelligence with the Good. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. For when a man says that Intelligence is the Good, our next question to him must be, What sort of Intelligence do you mean?--Intelligence of what? To this he must reply, Intelligence of the Good: which is absurd, since it presumes us to know already what the Good is--the very point which he is pretending to elucidate. Again, he who contends that Pleasure is the Good, is forced in discussion to admit that there are such things as bad pleasures: in other words, that pleasure is sometimes good, sometimes bad.[190] From these doubts and disputes about the real nature of good, we shall require our philosophical Guardians to have emancipated themselves, and to have attained a clear vision. They will be unfit for their post it they do not well know what the Good is, and in what manner just or honourable things come to be good.[191] Our city will have received its final consummation, when it is placed under the superintendence of one who knows what the Good is.

[Footnote 189: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 E. [Greek: O(\ dê\ diô/kei me\n a(/pasa psuchê\ kai\ tou/tou e(/neka pa/nta pra/ttei, a)pomanteuome/nê ti\ ei)=nai, a)porou=sa de\ kai\ ou)k e)/chousa labei=n i(kanô=s ti/ pot' e)sti/n, ou)de\ pi/stei chrê/sasthai moni/mô|, oi(/a| kai\ peri\ ta)/lla, dia\ tou=to de\ a)potugcha/nei kai\ tô=n a)/llôn ei)/ ti o)/phelos ê)=n], &c.]

[Footnote 190: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 C.]

[Footnote 191: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A. [Greek: di/kaia/ te kai\ kala\ a)gnoou/mena o(/pê| pote\ a)gatha/ e)stin, ou) pollou= tino\s a)/xion phu/laka kektê=sthai a)\n e(autô=n to\n tou=to a)gnoou=nta.]]

[Side-note: Adeimantus asks what Sokrates says. Sokrates says that he can not answer: but he compares it by a metaphor to the Sun.]