Chapter XXXIX: Leges and Epinomis (7)

Having demonstrated to his own full satisfaction, from the regularity of the celestial rotations, that the heavenly bodies are wise and good Gods, and that all things are full of Gods--Plato applies this conclusion to refute the second class of heretics--those who did not believe that the Gods directed all human affairs, the small things as well as the great;[376] that is, the lot of each individual person as well as that of the species or of its component aggregates. He himself affirms that they direct all things. It is inconsistent with their attributes of perfect intelligence, power, and goodness (he maintains) that they should leave anything, either small or great, without regulation. All good human administrators, generals, physicians, pilots, &c., regulate all things, small and great, in their respective provinces: the Gods cannot be inferior to them, and must be held to do the same. They regulate every thing with a view to the happiness of the whole, in which each man has his share and interest; and each man has his special controuling Deity watching over his minutest proceedings, whether the individual sees it or not.[377] Soul, both in its good variety and its bad variety, is essentially in change from one state to another, and passes from time to time out of one body into another. In the perpetual conflict between the good and the bad variety of soul, according as each man's soul inclines to the better or to the worse, the Gods or Fate exalt it to a higher region or degrade it to a lower. By this means the Gods do the best they can to ensure triumph to virtue, and defeat to vice, in the entire Kosmos. This reference to the entire Kosmos is overlooked by the heretics who deny the all-pervading management of the Gods.[378]

[Footnote 376: The language of Plato sometimes implies, that the opponents whom he is controverting disbelieve altogether the intervention of the Gods in human affairs, pp. 899 E, 900 A, 885 B. But the main stress of his argument is directed against those who, admitting the intervention of the Gods in great things, deny it in small, pp. 900 D, 901 A-B-C-D, 902 A-B.]

[Footnote 377: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 902-903 B-C.]

[Footnote 378: This argument is set forth from p. 903 B to 905 B. It is obscure and difficult to follow.]

[Side-note: Contrary doctrine of Plato in Republic.]

Plato gives here an outburst of religious eloquence which might prove impressive when addressed to fellow-believers--but which, if employed for the avowed purpose of convincing dissentients, would fail of its purpose, as involving assumptions to which they would not subscribe. As to the actual realities of human life, past as well as present, Plato himself always gives a very melancholy picture of them. "The heaven is full of good things, and also full of things opposite to good: but mostly of things not good."[379] Moreover, when we turn back to the Republic, we find Plato therein expressly blaming a doctrine very similar to what he declares true here in the Leges--as a dangerous heresy, although extensively believed, from the time of Homer downward. "Since God is good" (Plato had there affirmed[380]) "he cannot be the cause of all things, as most men pronounce him to be. He is the cause of a few things, but of most things he is not the cause: for the good things in our lot are much fewer than the evil. We must ascribe all the good things to him, but for the evil things we must seek some other cause, and not God." The confessed imperfection of the actual result[381] was one of the main circumstances urged by those heretics, who denied that all-pervading administration of the Gods which Plato in the Leges affirms.[382] If he undertook to convince them at all, he would have done well to state and answer more fully their arguments, and to clear up the apparent inconsistencies in his own creed.

[Footnote 379: Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ ga\r sugkechôrê/kamen ê(mi=n au)toi=s ei)=nai me\n to\n ou)rano\n pollô=n mesto\n a)gathô=n, ei)=nai de\ kai\ tô=n e)nanti/ôn, pleio/nôn de\ tô=n mê/, ma/chê dê/, phame/n, a)tha/nato/s e)stin ê( toiau/tê kai\ phulakê=s thaumastê=s deome/nê.] Ast in his note affirms that after [Greek: mê\] is understood [Greek: a)gathô=n]. Stallbaum thinks, though with some hesitation, that [Greek: e)nanti/ôn] is understood after [Greek: mê/]. I agree with Ast.

Compare iii. pp. 676-677, where Plato states that in the earlier history of the human race, a countless number of different societies ([Greek: muri/ai e)pi\ muri/ais]) have all successively grown up and successively perished, with extinction of all their comforts and civilization.]

[Footnote 380: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 379 C. [Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra o( theo\s, e)peidê\ a)gatho\s, pa/ntôn a)\n ei)/ê ai)/tios, ô(s oi( polloi\ le/gousin; a)ll' o)li/gôn me\n toi=s a)nthrô/pois ai)/tios, pollô=n de\ a)nai/tios; polu\ ga\r e)la/ttô ta)gatha\ tô=n kakô=n ê(mi=n; kai\ tô=n me\n a)gathô=n ou)de/na a)/llon ai)tiate/on, tô=n de\ kakô=n a)/ll' a(/tta zêtei=n dei= ta\ ai)/tia, a)ll' ou) to\n theo/n.] See a striking passage in Arnobius, adv. Gentes, ii. 46.]

[Footnote 381: Plato, Legg. x. p. 903 A-B. [Greek: Pei/thômen to\n neani/an toi=s lo/gois . . . ô(=n e(\n kai\ to\ so/n, ô)= sche/tlie, mo/rion ei)s to\ pa=n xuntei/nei ble/pon a)ei/.]]

[Footnote 382: Lucretius, v. 197:--

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam Naturam mundi: tantâ stat prædita culpâ.]

[Side-note: Argument of Plato to refute the third class of heretics.]

A similar criticism may be made still more forcibly, upon the demonstration whereby he professes to refute the third and most culpable class of heretics--"Those who believe that the Gods exercise an universal agency, but that they can be persuaded by prayer and conciliated by sacrifice". Here he was treading on dangerous ground: for he was himself a heretic, by his own confession, if compared with Grecian belief generally. Not merely the ordinary public, but the most esteemed and religious persons among the public[383]--poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests--believed the doctrine which he here so vehemently condemns. Moreover it was the received doctrine of the city[384]--that is, it was assumed as the basis of the official and authorised religious manifestations: and the law of the city was recognised by the Delphian oracle[385] as the proper standard of reference for individual enquirers who came there to ask for information on matters of doubtful religious propriety. In the received Grecian conception of religious worship, prayer and sacrifice were correlative and inseparable: sacrifice was the gift of man to the Gods, accompanying the prayer for gifts from the Gods to man, and accounted necessary to render the prayer efficacious.[386] The priest was the professional person competent and necessary to give advice as to the details: but as a general principle, it was considered disrespectful to ask favours from the Gods without tendering to them some present, suitable to the means of the petitioner.

[Footnote 383: Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 D; Republic, ii. pp. 364-365-366.]

[Footnote 384: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 366 A-B. [Greek: a)ll' ô)phelê/sousin a(gnizome/nous ai( teletai\ kai\ oi( lu/sioi theoi/, ô(s ai( me/gistai po/leis le/gousi kai\ oi( theô=n pai=des, poiêtai\ kai\ prophê=tai tô=n theô=n geno/menoi, oi(\ tau=ta ou(/tôs e)/chein mênu/ousin.]]

[Footnote 385: Xenophon, Memor. i. 3, 1, iv. 3, 16; Cicero, Legg. ii. 16.]

[Footnote 386: See Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, Part 5, 1, p. 194 seq., where this doctrine is set forth and largely illustrated.

In approaching a king a satrap or any other person of exalted position above the level of ordinary men, it was the custom to come with a present. Thucyd. ii. 97; Xenoph. Anab. vii. 3, 26; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 10-12.

The great person, to whom the presents were made, usually requited them magnificently.]

[Side-note: General belief in Greece about the efficacy of prayer and sacrifice to appease the Gods.]

Plato himself states this view explicitly in his Politikus.[387] Moreover, when a man desired information from the Gods on any contemplated project or on any grave matter of doubt, he sought it by means of sacrifice.[388] Such sacrifice was a debt to the God: and if it remained unpaid, his displeasure was incurred.[389] The motive for sacrificing to the Gods was thus, not simply to ensure the granting of prayers, but to pay a debt: and thus either to prevent or to appease the wrath of the Gods. The religious practice of Greece rested upon the received belief that the Gods were not merely pleased with presents, but exacted them as a mark of respect, and were angry if they were not offered: yet that being angry, their wrath might be appeased by acceptable presents and supplications.[390] To learn what proceedings of this kind _were_ suitable, a man went to consult the oracle, the priests, or the Exêgêtæ: in cases wherein he believed that he had incurred the displeasure of the Gods by any wrong or omission.[391]

[Footnote 387: Plato, Politikus, p. 290 D. [Greek: kai\ mê\n kai\ to\ tô=n i(ere/ôn au)= ge/nos, ô(s to\ no/mimo/n phêsi, para\ me\n ê(mô=n dôrea\s theoi=s dia\ thusiô=n e)pistê=mo/n e)sti kata\ nou=n e)kei/nois dôrei=sthai, para\ de\ e)kei/nôn ê(mi=n eu)chai=s ktê=sin a)gathô=n ai)tê/sasthai.] Compare Euthyphron, p. 14.]

[Footnote 388: Xenophon, Anab. vii. 6, 44; Euripid. Ion. 234.]

[Footnote 389: Plato, Republic, i. p. 331 B. Compare also Phædon, p. 118, the last words spoken by Sokrates before his decease--[Greek: o)phei/lomen A)sklêpiô=| a)lektru/ona; a)ll' a)po/dote kai\ mê\ a)melê/sête.]]

[Footnote 390: See Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 211-213.]

[Footnote 391: See, as one example among a thousand, the proceeding of the Spartan government, Thucyd. i. 134; also ii. 48-54.]

[Side-note: Incongruities of Plato's own doctrine.]

Now it is against this latter sentiment--that which recognised the Gods as placable or forgiving[392]--that Plato declares war as the worst of all heresies. He admits indeed, implicitly, that the Gods are influenced by prayer and sacrifice; since he directs both the one and the other to be constantly offered up, by the citizens of his Magnêtic city, in this very Treatise. He even implies that the Gods are too facile and compliant: for in his second Alkibiadês, Sokrates is made to remark that it was dangerous for an ignorant man to pray for specific advantages, because he might very probably bring ruin upon himself by having his prayers granted--

"Evertêre domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles."

Farthermore Plato does not scruple to notice[393] it as a real proceeding of the Gods, that they executed the prayer or curse of Theseus, by bringing a cruel death upon the blameless youth Hippolytus; which Theseus himself is the first to deplore when he becomes acquainted with the true facts. That the Gods should inflict punishment on a person who did not deserve it, Plato accounts not unworthy of their dignity: but that they should remit punishment in any case where he conceives it to have been deserved, he repudiates with indignation. Though accessible and easily influenced by prayer and sacrifice from other persons, they are deaf and inexorable to those who have incurred their displeasure by wrong-doing.[394] The prayer so offered is called by Plato a treacherous cajolery, the sacrifice a guilty bribe, to purchase their indulgence.[395] Since, in human affairs, no good magistrate, general, physician, pilot, &c., will allow himself to be persuaded by prayers or presents to betray his trust: much less can we suppose (he argues) the Gods to be capable of such betrayal.[396]

[Footnote 392: The common sentiment is expressed in a verse of Euripides--[Greek: Ti/na dei= maka/rôn e)kthusame/nous Eu(rei=n mo/chthôn a)na/paulan]--(Fragm. Ino 155); compare Eurip. Hippol. 1323.]

[Footnote 393: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 931 C. [Greek: a)rai=os ga\r goneu\s e)kgo/nois ô(s ou)dei\s e(/teros a)/llois, _dikaio/tata_.] Also iii. p. 687 D.]

[Footnote 394: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 716-717.]

[Footnote 395: Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 B. [Greek: thôpei/ais lo/gôn].]

[Footnote 396: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 906-907.]

[Side-note: Both Herodotus and Sokrates dissented from Plato's doctrine.]

The general doctrine, upon which Plato here lays so much stress, and the dissent from which he pronounces to be a capital offence--that the Gods, though persuadeable by every one else, were thoroughly unforgiving, deaf to any prayer or sacrifice from one who had done wrong--is a doctrine from which Sokrates[397] himself dissented; and to which few of Plato's contemporaries, perhaps hardly even himself, consistently adhered. The argument, upon which Plato rests for convincing all these numerous dissentients, is derived from his conception of the character and functions of the Gods. But this, though satisfactory to himself, would not have been granted by his opponents. The Gods were conceived by Herodotus as jealous, meddlesome, intolerant of human happiness beyond a narrow limit, and keeping all human calculations in a state of uncertainty:[398] in this latter attribute Sokrates also agreed. He affirmed that the Gods kept all the important results essentially unpredictable by human study, reserving them for special revelations by way of prophecy to those whom they preferred. These were privileged and exclusive communications to favoured individuals, among whom Sokrates was one:[399] and Plato, though not made a recipient of the same favour as Sokrates, declares his own full belief in the reality of such special revelations from the Gods, to particular persons and at particular places.[400] Aristotle, on the other hand, pronounces action and construction, especially action in details, to be petty and unworthy of the Gods; whom he regards as employed in perpetual contemplation and theorising, as the only occupation worthy to characterise their blessed immortality.[401] Epikurus and his numerous followers, though not agreeing with Aristotle in regarding the Gods as occupied in intellectual contemplation, agreed with him fully in considering the existence of the Gods as too dignified and enviable to be disturbed by the vexation of meddling with human affairs, or to take on the anxieties of regard for one man, displeasure towards another.

[Footnote 397: Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 2, 14. [Greek: Su\ ou)=n, ô)= pai=, a)\n sôphronê=|s, tou\s me\n theou\s paraitê/sê| suggnô/mona/s soi ei)=nai, ei)/ ti parême/lêkas tê=s mêtro/s, mê/ se kai\ ou(=toi nomi/santes a)cha/riston ei)=nai ou)k e)the/lôsin eu)= poiei=n.]

At the same time, Sokrates maintains that the Gods accepted sacrifices from good men with greater favour than sacrifices from bad men. Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 3.]

[Footnote 398: Herodotus, i. 32, iii. 40.]

[Footnote 399: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 8-9. [Greek: tou\s theou\s ga/r, oi(=s a)\n ô)=sin i(/leô|, sêmai/nein.] Also i. 3, 4, iv. 3, 12; Cyropæd. i. 6, 5-23-46. [Greek: theoi\ a)ei\ o)/ntes pa/nta i)/sasi . . . kai\ tô=n sumbouleuome/nôn a)nthrô/pôn oi(=s a)\n i(/leô| ô)=si, prosêmai/nousin a(/ te chrê\ poiei=n kai\ a(\ ou) chrê/. Ei) de\ mê\ pa=sin e)the/lousi sumbouleu/ein, ou)de\n thaumasto/n; ou) ga\r a)na/gkê au)toi=s e)stin, ô(=n a)\n mê\ the/lôsin, e)pimelei=sthai] (Cyrop. i. 6, 46).

Solon. Frag. v. 53, ed. Gaisf.:--

[Greek: A)/llon ma/nten e)/thêkin a)/nax e(ka/ergos A)po/llôn; E)/gnô d' a)ndri\ kako\n tê/lothen e)rcho/menon.]

See the curious narrative in Herodotus ix. 94 seq. about the prophetic gifts bestowed on Euenius. The same narrative attests the full belief prevalent respecting both the displeasure of the Gods and their placability on the proper expiation being made. It conflicts signally in every respect with the canon of orthodoxy set up by Plato.]

[Footnote 400: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 738 C, 747 E, vii. p. 811 D; Republic, vi. pp. 496 C, 499 C.]

[Footnote 401: Aristotle, Ethic. Nikom. x. 8, p. 1178 b. 21. [Greek: ô(/ste ê( tou= theou= e)ne/rgeia, makario/têti diaphe/rousa, theôrêtikê\ a)\n ei)/ê.]]

[Side-note: Great opposition which Plato's doctrine would have encountered in Greece.]

The orthodox religious belief, which Plato imposes upon his 5040 Magnêtic citizens under the severest penalties, would thus be found inconsistent with the general belief, not merely of ordinary Greeks, but also of the various lettered and philosophical individuals who thought for themselves. Most of these latter would have passed, under one of the three heads of Platonic heresy, into the Platonic prison for five years, and from thence either to recantation or death. The arguments which Plato considered so irresistible, that none but silly youths could be deaf to them--did not appear conclusive to Aristotle and other intelligent contemporaries. Plato makes up his own mind, what proceedings he thinks worthy and unworthy of the Gods, and then proclaims with confidence as a matter of indisputable fact, that they act conformably. But neither Herodotus, nor Aristotle, would have granted his premisses: they conceived the attributes and character of the Gods differently from him, and differently from each other. And if we turn to the Kratylus of Plato, we find Sokrates there declaring, that men knew nothing about the Gods: that speculations about the Gods were in reality speculations about the opinions of men respecting the Gods.[402]

[Footnote 402: Plato, Kratylus, pp. 400-401. [Greek: Peri\ theô=n ou)de\n i)/smen, ou)/te peri\ au)tô=n, ou)/te peri\ tô=n o)noma/tôn, a(/tta pote\ au)toi\ e(autou\s kalou=si] (400 D) . . . [Greek: skopô=men ô(/sper proeipo/ntes toi=s theoi=s o(/ti peri\ au)tô=n ou)de\n ê(mei=s skepso/metha, ou) ga\r a)xiou=men oi(=oi/ t' a)\n ei)=nai skopei=n, a)lla\ peri\ tô=n a)nthrô/pôn, ê(/ntina/ pote do/xan e)/chontes e)ti/thento au)toi=s ta\ o)no/mata; tou=to ga\r a)neme/sêton] (401 A). Compare also Kratyl. p. 425 B.]

[Side-note: Local infallibility was claimed as a rule in each community, though rarely enforced with severity: Plato both claims it more emphatically, and enforces it more rigorously.]

Such opinions were local, traditional, and dissentient, among the numerous distinct cities and tribes which divided the inhabited earth between them in Plato's time.[403] Each of these claimed a local infallibility, principally as to religious rites and customs, indirectly also as to dogmas and creed: and Plato's Magnêtic community, if it had come into existence, would have added one to the number of distinct varieties. To this general sentiment, deeply rooted in the emotions and unused to the scrutiny of reason, the philosophers were always more or less odious, as dissenters, enquirers, and critics, each on his own ground.[404] At Athens the sentiment manifested itself occasionally in severe decrees and judicial sentences against obnoxious freethinkers, especially in the case of Sokrates. If the Athenians had carried out consistently and systematically the principle involved in their sentence against Sokrates, philosophy must have been banished from Athens.[405] The school of Plato could never have been maintained. But the principle of intolerance was usually left dormant at Athens: philosophical debate continued active and unshackled, so that the school of Plato subsisted in the city without interruption for nearly forty years until his death. We might have expected that the philosophers, to whose security toleration of free dissent and debate was essential, would have upheld it as a general principle against the public. But here we find the most eminent among them, at the close of a long life, not only disallowing all liberty of philosophising to others, and assuming to himself the exclusive right of dictating the belief, as well as the conduct, of his imaginary citizens--but also enforcing this exclusive principle with an amount of systematic rigour, which I do not believe to have been equalled in any actual Grecian city. This is a memorable fact in the history of Grecian philosophy. The Stoic Kleanthes, in the century after Plato's death, declared that the Samian astronomer Aristarchus ought to be indicted for impiety, because he had publicly advocated the doctrine of the Earth's rotation round the Sun. Kleanthês and Plato thus stand out as known examples, among Grecian philosophers before the Christian era, of that intolerance which would apply legal penalties against individual dissenters and competitors.[406]

[Footnote 403: Plato, Politikus, p. 262 D. [Greek: ge/nesin a)pei/rois ou)=si kai\ a)mi/ktois kai\ a)sumphô/nois pro\s a)/llêla.] Herodot. iii. 39.]

[Footnote 404: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3.]

[Footnote 405: See the Apologies both of Plato and Xenophon. In one of the rhetorical discourses cited by Aristotle, on the subject of the trial of Sokrates (seemingly that by the Rhetor Theodektês), the point is put thus:--[Greek: Me/llete de\ kri/nein, ou) peri\ Sôkra/tous, a)lla\ peri\ e)pitêdeu/matos, ei) chrê\ philosophei=n] (Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 1399, a. 8, b. 10).]

[Footnote 406: The Platonist and astronomer Derkyllides afterwards (about 100-120 A.D.) declares those who affirm the doctrine, that the earth moves and that the stars are stationary, to be accursed and impious--[Greek: tou\s de\ ta\ kinêta\ stê/santas, ta\ de\ a)ki/nêta phu/sei kai\ e(/dra| kinê/santas, ô(s para\ ta\s tê=s mantikê=s u(pothe/seis, a)podiopompei=tai.] (Theon Smyrnæus, De Astronomiâ, ch. 41, p. 328, fol. 26, ed. Martin.)]

[Side-note: Farther civil and political regulations for the Magnêtic community. No evidence that Plato had studied the working of different institutions in practice.]

The eleventh Book of the Treatise De Legibus, and the larger portion of the twelfth, are devoted to a string of civil and political regulations for the Magnêtic community. Each regulation is ushered in with an expository prologue, often with severe reproof towards persons committing the various forbidden acts. There is little of systematic order in the enumeration of subjects. In general we may remark that neither here nor elsewhere in the Treatise is there any proof, that Plato--though doubtless he had visited Italy, Sicily, and Egypt, perhaps other countries--had taken much pains to acquaint himself with the practice of human life, or that he had studied and compared the working of different institutions in different communities. His experience seems all derived from Athenian law and practice: the criticisms and modifications which he applies to it flow from his own sentiment and theory: from his religious or ethical likings or dislikings. He sets up a type of character which he desires to enforce among his citizens, and which he guards against adulteration by very stringent interference. The displeasure of the Gods is constantly appealed to, as a justification for the penalties which he proposed: sometimes even the current mythes are invoked as authority, though in other places Plato so greatly disparages them.[407]

[Footnote 407: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 913 D.]

[Side-note: Modes of acquiring property--legitimate and illegitimate.]

Various modes of acquiring property are first forbidden as illegitimate. The maxim[408]--"That which you have not put down, do not take up"--is rigorously enforced: any man who finds a buried treasure is prohibited from touching it, though he find it by accident and though the person who buried it be unknown. If a man violates this law, every one, freeman or slave, is invited and commanded to inform against him. Should he be found guilty, a special message must be sent to the Delphian oracle, to ask what is to be done both with the treasure and with the offender. So again, an article of property left on the highway is declared to be under protection of the Goddess or Dæmon of the Highway: whoever finds and takes it, if he be a slave, shall be severely flogged by any freeman above thirty years of age who meets him: if he be a freeman, he shall be disgraced and shall pay, besides, ten times its value to the person who left it.[409] These are average specimens of Plato's point of view and manner of handling offences respecting property.

[Footnote 408: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 913 C. [Greek: A(\ mê\ kate/thou, mê\ a)nelê=|.] This does not include, however, what has been deposited by a man's father or grandfather.]

[Footnote 409: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 914. Seemingly, if any man found a treasure buried in the ground, or a purse lying on the road without an owner, he was not considered by most persons dishonest if he appropriated it; to do so was looked upon as an admissible piece of good luck. See Theophrastus, [Greek: peri\ Mempsimoiri/as]. From Plato's language we gather that the finder sometimes went to consult the prophets what he should do, p. 913 B--[Greek: mê/te toi=s legome/nois ma/ntesin a)nakoinô/saimi]: his phrase is not very respectful towards the prophets.]

[Side-note: Plato's general regulations leave little room for disputes about ownership.]

The general constitution of Plato's community restricts within comparatively narrow limits the occasions of proprietary dispute. His 5040 lots of land are all marked out, unchangeable, and indivisible, each possessed by one citizen. No man is allowed to acquire or possess movable property to a greater value than four times the lot of land: every article of property possessed by every man is registered by the magistrates. Disputes as to ownership, if they arise, are settled by reference to this register.[410] If the disputed article be not registered, the possessor is bound to produce the seller or donor from whom he received it. All purchases and sales are required to take place in the public market before the Agoranomi: and all for ready-money, or by immediate interchange and delivery. If a man chooses to deliver his property, without receiving the consideration, or in any private place, he does so at his own risk: he has no legal claim against the receiver.[411] So likewise respecting the Eranoi or Associations for mutual Succour and Benefit. Plato gives no legal remedy to a contributor or complainant respecting any matter arising out of these associations. He requires that every man shall contribute at his own risk: and trust for requital to the honesty or equity of his fellow-contributors.[412]

[Footnote 410: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 914 D.]

[Footnote 411: The same principle is laid down by Plato, Republic, viii. p. 556 A, and was also laid down by Charondas (Theophrast. ap. Stobæum Serm. xliv. 21, p. 204). Aristotle alludes to some Grecian cities in which it was the established law. K. F. Hermann, Privat-Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 71, n. 10.]

[Footnote 412: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 915 D-E.]

[Side-note: Plato's principles of legislation, not consistent--comparison of them with the Attic law about Eranoi.]

A remark must here be made upon Plato's refusal to allow any legal redress in such matters as sale on credit, or payments for the purpose of mutual succour and relief. Such refusal appears to contradict his general manner of proceeding: for his usual practice is, to estimate offences not according to the mischief which they inflict, but according to the degree of wickedness or impiety which he supposes them to imply in the doer. Now the contributor to an association for mutual succour, who, after paying his contributions for the aid of his associates, finds that they refuse to contribute to his aid when the hour of his necessity arrives--suffers not only heavy calamity but grievous disappointment: which implies very bad dispositions on the part of those who, not being themselves distressed, nevertheless refuse. Of such dispositions Plato takes no notice in the present case. He does not expatiate (as he does in many other cases far more trifling and disputable) upon the displeasure of the Gods when they see a man who has been benefited in distress by his neighbour's contributions, refusing all requital at the time of that neighbour's need. Plato indeed treats it as a private affair between friends. You do a service to your friend, and you must take your chance whether he will do you a service in return: you must not ask for legal redress, if he refuses: what you have contributed was a present voluntarily given, not a loan lent to be repaid. This is an intelligible point of view, but it excludes those ethical and sentimental considerations which Plato usually delights in enforcing.[413] His ethics here show themselves by leading him to turn aside from that which takes the form of a pecuniary contract. It was in this form that the Eranoi or Mutual Assurance Associations were regarded by Attic judicature: that is, they seem to have been considered as a sort of imperfect obligation, which the Dikastery would enforce against any citizen whose circumstances were tolerably prosperous, but not against one in bad circumstances. Such Eranic actions before the Attic Dikastery were among those that enjoyed the privilege of speedy adjudication ([Greek: e)/mmênoi di/kai]).[414]

[Footnote 413: In Xenophon's ideal legislation, or rather education of the Persian youth, in the Cyropædia, he introduces legal trial and punishment for ingratitude generally (Cyropæd. i. 2, 7). The Attic judicature took cognizance of neglect or bad conduct towards parents, which Xenophon ranks as a sort of ingratitude--but not of ingratitude towards any one else (Xenoph. Memor. ii. 2, 13). There is an interesting discussion in Seneca (De Beneficiis, iii. 6-18) about the propriety of treating ingratitude as a legal offence.]

[Footnote 414: Respecting the [Greek: e)ranikai\ di/kai] at Athens, see Heraldus, Animadversiones in Salmasium, vi. 1, p. 407 seq.; Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 540 seq.; K. F. Hermann, Staats Alterth. s. 146, not. 9.

The word [Greek: e)/ranos] meant very different things--a pic-nic banquet, a club for festive meetings kept up by subscription with a common purse, a contribution made to relieve a friend in distress, carrying obligation on the receiver to requite it if the donor fell into equal distress. This last sense is the prevalent one in the Attic orators, and is brought out well in the passage of Theophrastus--[Greek: Peri\ Mempsimoiri/as]. Probably the Attic [Greek: e)ranikai\ di/kai] took cognizance of complaints arising out of [Greek: e)/ranos] in all its senses.]

[Side-note: Regulations about slaves, and about freedmen.]

As to property in slaves, Plato allows any owner to lay hold of a fugitive slave belonging either to himself or to any friend. If a third party reclaims the slave as being not rightfully in servitude, he must provide three competent sureties, and the slave will then be set free until legal trial can be had. Moreover, Plato enacts, respecting one who has been a slave, but has been manumitted, that such freedman ([Greek: a)peleu/thros]), if he omits to pay "proper attention" to his manumitter, may be laid hold of by the latter and re-enslaved. Proper attention consists in: 1. Going three times per month to the house of his former master, to tender service in all lawful ways. 2. Not contracting marriage without consulting his former master. 3. Not acquiring so much wealth as to become richer than his former master: if he should do so the latter may appropriate all that is above the limit. The freed man, when liberated, does not become a citizen, but is only a non-citizen or metic. He is therefore subject to the same necessity as all other metics--of departing from the territory after a residence of twenty years,[415] and of never acquiring more wealth than is possessed by the second class of citizens enrolled in the Schedule.

[Footnote 415: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 915 A-B.]

The duties imposed by Plato on the freedman towards his former master--involving a formal recognition at least of the prior dependence, and some positive duties besides--are deserving of remark, as we know so little of the condition or treatment of this class of persons in antiquity.

[Side-note: Provisions in case a slave is sold, having a distemper upon him.]

Regulations are made to provide for the case where a slave, sold by his master, is found to be distempered or mad, or to have committed a murder. If the sale has been made to a physician or a gymnast, Plato holds that these persons ought to judge for themselves about the bodily condition of the slave bought: he therefore grants them no redress. But if the buyer be a non-professional man, he may within one month restore the distempered slave (or within one year, if the distemper be the Morbus Sacer), and may cause a jury of physicians to examine the case. Should they decide the distemper of the slave to be undoubted, the seller must take him back: repaying the full price, if he be a private man--double the price, if he be a professional man, who ought to have known, and perhaps did know, the real condition of the slave sold.[416]

[Footnote 416: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 916 B-C.]

[Side-note: Retailers. Strict regulations about them. No citizen can be a retailer.]

In regard to Retail Selling, and to frauds committed either in sale or in barter, Plato provides or enjoins strict regulations. The profession of the retailer, and the function of money as auxiliary to it, he pronounces to be useful and almost indispensable to society, for the purpose of rendering different articles of value commensurable with each other, and of ensuring a distribution suitable to the requirements of individuals. This could not be done without retailers, merchants, hired agents, &c.[417] But though retailing is thus useful, if properly conducted, it slides easily and almost naturally into cheating, lying, extortion, &c., from the love of money inherent in most men. Such abuses must be restrained: at any rate they must not be allowed to corrupt the best part of the community. Accordingly, none of the 5040 citizens will be allowed either to practise retailing, or to exercise any hired function, except under his own senior relatives, and of a dignified character. The discrimination of what is dignified and not dignified must be made according to the liking or antipathy of a court of honour, composed of such citizens as have obtained prizes for virtue.[418] None must be permitted to sell by retail except metics or non-citizens: and these must be kept under strict watch by the Nomophylakes, who, after enquiring into the details of each article, will fix its price at such sum as will afford to the dealer a moderate profit.[419]

[Footnote 417: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 918 B. The like view of retail trade is given in the Republic, ii. p. 371. It indicates just and penetrating social observation, taken in reference to Plato's age.]

[Footnote 418: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 918-919. 919 E: [Greek: to\ d' e)leutheriko\n kai\ a)neleu/theron a)kribô=s me\n ou) r(a/|dion nomothetei=n, krine/sthô ge mê\n u(po\ tô=n ta\ a)ristei=a ei)lêpho/tôn tô=| e)kei/nôn _mi/sei te kai\ a)spasmô=|_.]]

[Footnote 419: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920 B-C.]

[Side-note: Frauds committed by sellers--severe punishments on them.]

If there be any fraud committed by the seller (which is nearly akin to retailing),[420] Plato prescribes severe penalty. The seller must never name two prices for his article during the same day. He must declare his price: and if no one will give it, he must withdraw the article for the day.[421] He is not allowed to praise his own articles, or to take any oath respecting them. If he shall take any oath, any citizen above thirty years of age shall be held bound to thrash him, and may do so with impunity: such citizen, if he neglect to thrash the swearer, will himself be amenable to censure for betraying the laws. If the seller shall sell a spurious or fraudulent article, the magistrates must be informed of it by any one cognizant. The informer, if a slave or a metic, shall be rewarded by having the article made over to him. If he be a citizen, he will receive the article, but is bound to consecrate it to the Gods who preside over the market: if being cognizant he omits to inform, he shall be proclaimed a wicked man, for defrauding the Gods of that to which they are entitled. The magistrates, on receiving information, will not only deprive the seller of the spurious article, but will cause him to be flogged by the herald in the market-place--one stripe for every drachma contained in the price demanded. The herald will publicly proclaim the reason why the flogging is given. Besides this, the magistrates will collect and write up in the market-place both regulations of detail for the sellers, and information to put buyers on their guard.[422]

[Footnote 420: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920 C. [Greek: tê=s kibdêlei/as pe/ri, xuggenou=s tou/tô| (kapêlei/a|) pra/gmatos], &c.

Plato is more rigorous on these matters than the Attic law. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Privat-Alterthümer, s. 62.]

[Footnote 421: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 917 B-C. I do not quite see how this is to be reconciled with Plato's direction that the prices of articles sold shall be fixed by the magistrates; but both of the two are here found.]

[Footnote 422: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 917 B-D.]

[Side-note: Comparison with the lighter punishment inflicted by Attic law.]

Compare this enactment in Plato with the manner in which the Attic law would have dealt with the like offence. The defrauded buyer would have brought his action before the Dikastery against the fraudulent seller, who, if found guilty, would have been condemned in damages to make good the wrong: perhaps fined besides. The penalties inflicted by the usual course of law at Athens were fine, disfranchisement, civil disability of one kind or other, banishment, confiscation of property: occasionally imprisonment--sometimes, though rarely, death by the cup of hemlock in prison.[423] Except in very rare cases, an accused person might retire into banishment if he chose, and might thus escape any penalty worse than banishment and confiscation of property. But corporal punishment was never inflicted by the law at Athens. The people, especially the poorer citizens, were very sensitive on this point,[424] regarding it as one great line of distinction between the freeman and the slave. At Sparta, on the contrary, corporal chastisement was largely employed as a penalty: moreover the use of the fist in private contentions, by the younger citizens, was encouraged rather than forbidden.[425]

[Footnote 423: See Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, B. iv. Chap. 13, 740.]

[Footnote 424: See Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 58.]

[Footnote 425: Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 3, 11: De Republ. Laced. ii. 8, iv. 6, ix. 5; Aristophanes, Aves, 1013.]

Plato follows the analogy of Sparta in preference to that of Athens. Here, as elsewhere, he employs corporal punishment abundantly as a penalty. Here, as elsewhere, he not only prescribes that it shall be inflicted by a public agent under the supervision of magistrates, but also directs it to be administered, against certain offenders, by private unofficial citizens. I believe that this feature of his system would have been more repugnant than any other, to the feelings of all classes of Athenian citizens--to all the different types of character represented by Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Isokrates, Demosthenes, and Sokrates. Abstinence from manual violence was characteristic of Athenian manners. Whatever licence might be allowed to the tongue, it was at least a substitute for the aggressive employment of the arm and hand. Athens exhibited marked respect for the sanctity of the person against blows--much equality of dealing between man and man--much tolerance, public as well as private, of individual diversity in taste and character--much keenness of intellectual and oral competition, liable to degenerate into unfair stratagem in political, forensic, professional, and commercial life, as well as in rhetorical, dialectical, and philosophical exercises. All these elements, not excepting even the first, were distasteful to Plato. But those who copy the disparaging judgment which he pronounces against Athenian manners, ought in fairness to take account of the point of view from which that judgment is delivered. To a philosopher whose ideal is depicted in the two treatises De Republicâ and De Legibus, Athenian society would appear repulsive enough. We learn from these two treatises what it was that a great speculative politician of the day desired to establish as a substitute.

[Side-note: Regulations about Orphans and Guardians: also about Testamentary powers.]

Plato next goes on to make regulations about orphans and guardians, and in general for cases arising out of the death of a citizen. The first question presenting itself naturally is, How far is the citizen to be allowed to direct by testament the disposition of his family and property? What restriction is to be placed upon his power of making a valid will? Many persons (Plato says) affirmed that it was unjust to impose any restriction: that the dying man had a right to make such dispositions as he chose, for his property and family after his death. Against this view Plato enters his decided protest. Each man--and still more each man's property--belongs not to himself, but to his family and to the city: besides which, an old man's judgment is constantly liable to be perverted by decline of faculties, disease, or the cajoleries of those around him.[426] Accordingly Plato grants only a limited liberty of testation. Here, as elsewhere, he adopts the main provisions of the Attic law, with such modifications as were required by the fundamental principles of his Magnêtic city: especially by the fixed total of 5040 lots or _fundi_, each untransferable and indivisible. The lot, together with the plant or stock for cultivating it,[427] must descend entire to one son: but the father, if he has more than one son, may determine by will to which of them it shall descend. If there be any one among the sons whom another citizen (being childless) is disposed to adopt, such adoption can only take place with the father's consent. But if the father gives his consent, he cannot bequeath his own lot to the son so adopted, because two lots cannot be united in the same possessor. Whatever property the father possesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances, he may distribute by will among his other sons, in any proportion he pleases. If he dies, leaving no sons, but only daughters, he may select which of them he pleases; and may appoint by will some suitable husband, of a citizen family, to marry her and inherit his lot. If a citizen (being childless) has adopted a son out of any other family, he must bequeath to that son the whole of his property, except one-tenth part of what he possesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances: this tenth he may bequeath to any one whom he chooses.[428]

[Footnote 426: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 923 B.

It is to be observed that Plato does not make any allusion to these misguiding influences operating upon an aged man, when he talks about the curse of a father against his son being constantly executed by the Gods: xi. p. 931 B.]

[Footnote 427: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 923 D. [Greek: plê\n tou= patrô/|ou klê/rou kai\ tê=s peri\ to\n klê=ron kataskeu/ês pa/sês.]]

[Footnote 428: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 923-924. The language of Plato seems to imply that this childless citizen would not be likely to make any will, but that having adopted a son, the son so adopted would hardly be satisfied unless he inherited the whole.]

If the father dies intestate, leaving only daughters, the nearest relative who has no lot of his own shall marry one of the daughters, and succeed to the lot. The nearest is the brother of the deceased; next, the brother of the deceased's wife (paternal and maternal uncles of the maiden); next, their sons; next, the parental and maternal uncle of the deceased father, and their sons. If all these relatives be wanting, the magistrates will provide a suitable husband, in order that the lot of land may not remain unoccupied.[429] If a citizen die both intestate and childless, two of his nearest unmarried relatives, male and female, shall intermarry and succeed to his property: reckoning in the order of kinship above mentioned.[430] In thus imposing marriage as a legal obligation upon persons in a certain degree of kinship, Plato is aware that there will be individual cases of great hardship and of repugnance almost insurmountable. He treats this as unavoidable: providing however that there shall be a select judicial Board of Appeal, before which persons who feel aggrieved by the law may bring their complaints, and submit their grounds for dispensation.[431]

[Footnote 429: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 924-925.]

[Footnote 430: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 925 C-D. These provisions appear to me not very clear.]

[Footnote 431: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 926 B-D. He directs also (p. 925 A) that the Dikasts shall determine the fit season when these young persons become marriageable by examining their naked bodies: that is, the males quite naked, the females half naked. A direction seemingly copied from Athenian practice, and illustrating curiously the language of Philokleon in Aristophanes, Vesp. 598. See K. F. Hermann, Vestig. Juris Domestici ap. Platonem cum Græciæ Institutis Comparata, p. 27.]

[Side-note: Plato's general coincidence with Attic law and its sentiment.]

These provisions deserve notice as showing how largely Plato coincides with the prevalent Attic sentiment respecting family and relationship. He does not award the slightest preference to primogeniture, among brothers: he grants to agnates a preference over cognates: he regards it as a public misfortune that any house shall be left empty, so as to cause interruption of the sacred rites of the family: lastly, he ensures that the family, in default of lineal male heirs, shall be continued by inter-marriage with the nearest relatives--and he especially approves the marriage of an heiress with her paternal or maternal uncle. On these points Plato is in full harmony with his countrymen, though he dissents widely from modern sentiment.

[Side-note: Tutelage of Orphans--Disagreement of Married Couples--Divorce.]

Respecting tutelage of orphans, he makes careful provision against abuse, as the Attic law also did: he tries also to meet the cases of family discord, where father and son are in bitter wrath against each other. A father may formally renounce his son, but not without previously obtaining the concurrence of a _conseil de famille_: if the father has become imbecile with age, and wastes his substance, the son may institute a suit as for lunacy, but not without the permission of the Nomophylakes.[432] Respecting disagreement between married couples, ten of the Nomophylakes, together with ten women chosen as supervisors of marriages, are constituted a Board of reference,[433] to obtain a reconciliation, if it be possible: but if this be impossible, then to divorce the couple, and unite each with some more suitable partner. The lawgiver must keep in view, as far as he can, to obtain from each married couple a sufficiency of children--that is, one male and one female child from each, whereby the total of 5040 lots may be kept up.[434] If a husband loses his wife before he has these two children, the law requires him to marry another wife: but if he becomes a widower, having already the sufficiency of children, he is advised not to marry a second wife (who will become stepmother), though not prohibited from doing so, if he chooses. So also, if a woman becomes a widow, not having the sufficient number of children, she must be compelled to marry again: if she already has the sufficient number, she is directed to remain in the house, and to bring them up. In case she is still young, and her health requires a husband, her relatives will apply to the Female Supervisors of Marriage, and will make such arrangements as may seem advisable.[435]

[Footnote 432: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 928-929.]

[Footnote 433: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 929-930.]

[Footnote 434: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 930 D. [Greek: pai/dôn de\ i(kano/tês a)kribê\s a)/r)r(ên kai\ thê/leia e)/stô tô=| no/mô|.]]

[Footnote 435: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 930 C.]

[Side-note: Neglect of Parents.]

Against neglect of aged parents by their children, Plato both denounces the most stringent legal penalties, and delivers the most emphatic reproofs: commending with full faith the ancient traditional narratives, that the curse of an offended parent against his sons was always executed by the Gods, as in the cases of Oedipus, Theseus, Amyntor, &c.[436] In the event of lunacy, he directs that the lunatic shall be kept in private custody by his relatives, who will be fined if they neglect the duty.[437]

[Footnote 436: Plato, Legg, xi. p. 931-932.]

[Footnote 437: Plato, Legg, xi. p. 934 D.]

_Hurt or damage_, not deadly, done by one man to another.--Plato enumerates two different modes of inflicting damage:--1. By drugs (applied externally or internally), magic, or sorcery. 2. By theft or force.[438]

[Footnote 438: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 932 E-933 E. Both these come under the general head [Greek: o(/sa tis a)/llos a)/llon _pêmai/nei_.]]

[Side-note: Poison--Magic--Incantations--Severe punishment.]

As to the first mode, if the drug be administered by a physician, he must be put to death: if by one not a physician, the Dikasts will determine the nature of his punishment. And in the case of magical arts, or incantations, if the person who resorts to them be a prophet, or an inspector of prodigies, he must be put to death: another person doing the same will be punished at the discretion of the Dikasts. Here we see that the prophet is ranked as a professional person (the like appears in Homer) along with the physician,[439]--who must know what he is about, while another person perhaps may not know. But Plato's own opinion respecting magical incantations is delivered with singular reserve. He will neither avouch them nor reject them. He intimates that a man can hardly find out what is true on the subject; and even if he could, it would be harder still to convince others. Most men are in serious alarm when they see waxen statuettes hung at their doors or at their family tombs; and it is useless to attempt to tranquillise them by reminding them that they have no certain evidence on the subject.[440] Here we see how Plato discourages the received legends and the current faith, when he believes them to be hurtful--as contrasted with his vehemence in upholding them when he thinks them useful: as in the case of the paternal curse, and the judgments of the Gods. The question of their truth is made to depend on their usefulness.[441] The Gods are made to act exactly as he thinks they ought to act. They are not merely invoked, but positively counted on, as executioners of Plato's ethical sentences.

[Footnote 439: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933 C. [Greek: ô(s prô=ton me\n to\n e)picheirou=nta pharma/ttein ou)k ei)do/ta ti/ dra=|, ta/ te kata\ sô/mata, e)a\n mê\ tugcha/nê| e)pistê/môn ô)\n i)atrikê=s, ta/ te au)= peri\ ta\ magganeu/mata, e)a\n mê\ ma/ntis ê)\ teratosko/pos ô)\n tugcha/nê|.]

Homer, Odys. Xvii. 383:--

. . . [Greek: tô=n oi(\ dêmioergoi\ e)/asi, ma/ntin, ê)\ i)ê/têra kakô=n, ê)\ te/ktona dou/rôn, ê)\ kai\ the/spin a)oido/n], &c.]

[Footnote 440: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933 B. [Greek: a)/n pote i)/dôsi/ pou kê/rina mimê/mata peplasme/na.] Compare Theokritus, Idyll, ii. 28-59.

See the remarkable narrative of the death of Germanicus in Syria, supposed to have been brought about by the magical artifices wrought under the auspices of Piso (Tacitus, Ann. ii. 69).]

[Footnote 441: Cicero, Legg, ii. 7, 16. "Utiles autem esse has opiniones, quis neget, cum intelligat, quam multa firmentur jurejurando," &c.]

[Side-note: Punishment is inflicted with a view to future prevention or amendment.]

Respecting the second mode of damage--by theft or violence--Plato's law forms a striking contrast to that which has been just set forth. The person who inflicts damage must repay it, or make full compensation for it, to the sufferer: small, if the damage be small--great, if it be great. Besides this, the guilty person must undergo some farther punishment with a view to correction or reformation. This will be smaller, if he be young and seduced by the persuasion of others; but it must be graver, if he be self-impelled by his own desires, fears, wrath, jealousy, &c. Understand, however (adds Plato), that such ulterior punishment is not imposed on account of the past misdeed--for the past cannot be recalled or undone--but on account of the future: to ensure that he shall afterwards hate wrong-doing, and that those who see him punished shall hate it also. The Dikasts must follow out in detail the general principle here laid down.[442]

[Footnote 442: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 933-934. Compare Plato, Protagor. p. 324 B.]

This passage proclaims distinctly an important principle in regard to the infliction of legal penalties: which principle, if kept in mind, might have lead Plato to alter or omit a large portion of the Leges.

[Side-note: Penalty for abusive words--for libellous comedy. Mendicity forbidden.]

Respecting _words of abuse, or revilement_, or insulting derision.--These are altogether forbidden. If used in any temple, market, or public and frequented place, the magistrate presiding must punish the offender forthwith, as he thinks fit: if elsewhere, any citizen by-stander, being older than the offender, is authorised thrash him.[443] No writer of comedy is allowed to ridicule or libel any citizen.

[Footnote 443: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 935 C-D. The Attic law expressly forbade the utterance of abusive words against any individual _in an office or public place_ upon any pretence (Lysias, Or. ix. Pro Milite, s. 6-9). Demosthenes (contra Konon. p. 1263) speaks of [Greek: kakêgori/a] or [Greek: loidori/a] as in itself trifling, but as forbidden by the law, lest it should lead to violence and blows.]

Mendicity is strictly prohibited. Every mendicant must be sent away at once, in order that the territory may be rid of such a creature.[444] Every man, who has passed an honest life, will be sure to have made friends who will protect him against the extremity of want.

[Footnote 444: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 936 C. [Greek: o(/pôs ê( chô/ra tou= toiou/tou zô/ou kathara\ gi/gnêtai to\ para/pan.]]

[Side-note: Regulations about witnesses on judicial trials.]

The rules provided by Plato about witnesses in judicial trials and indictments for perjury, are pretty much the same as those prevalent at Athens: with some peculiarities. Thus he permits a free woman to bear witness, and to address the court in support of a party interested, provided she be above forty years of age. Moreover, she may institute a suit, if she have no husband: but not if she be married.[445] A slave or a child may bear witness at a trial for murder; provided security be given that they will remain in the city to await an indictment for perjury, if presented against them.

[Footnote 445: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 937 A-B.