Chapter XXXIX: Leges and Epinomis (2)

To take delight in gestures or songs which are manifestations of bad qualities, produces the same kind of mischievous effect upon the spectator as association with bad men in real life. His character becomes assimilated to the qualities in the manifestations of which he delights, although he may be ashamed to commend them. This is a grievous corruption, arising from bad musical and choric exhibitions, which the lawgiver must take care to prevent. He must not allow poets to exhibit what they may prefer or may think to be beautiful. He must follow the practice of Egypt, where both the music and the pictorial type has been determined by the Gods or by divine lawgivers from immemorial antiquity, according to the standard of natural rectitude and where the government allows neither poet nor painter to innovate or depart from this consecrated type.[58] Accordingly, Egyptian compositions of the present day are exactly like what they were ten thousand years ago: neither more nor less beautiful. The lawgiver must follow this example, and fix the type of his musical and choric exhibitions; forbidding all innovation introduced on the plea of greater satisfaction either to the poet or to the audience. In the festivals where there is competition among poets, the prize must not be awarded by the pleasure of the auditors, whose acclamations tend only to corrupt and pervert the poets. The auditors ought to hear nothing but what is better than their own characters, in order that their tastes may thus be exalted. The prize must be awarded according to the preference of a few elders--or better still, of one single elder--eminent for excellent training and virtue. This judge ought not to follow the taste of the auditors, but to consider himself as their teacher and improver.[59]

[Footnote 58: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 656-657.]

[Footnote 59: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 659 A, 668 A.]

[Side-note: The Spartan and Kretan agree with the Athenian, that poets must be kept under a strict censorship. But they do not agree as to what the poets are required to conform to.]

Such is the exposition given by the Athenian speaker, respecting the characteristic function, and proper regulating principles, of choric training (poems learnt, music and dancing) for the youth. The Spartan and Kretan cordially concur with him: especially with that provision which fixes and consecrates the old established type, forbidding all novelties and spontaneous inspiration of the poets. They claim this compulsory orthodoxy, tolerating no dissent from the ancient and consecrated canon of music and orchestic, as the special feature of their two states; as distinguishing Sparta and Krete from other Hellenic cities, which were invaded with impunity by novel compositions of every variety.[60]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 660 C-D.]

The Athenian is thus in full agreement with his two companions, on the general principle of subjecting the poets to an inflexible censorship. But the agreement disappears, when he comes to specify the dogmas which the poets are required to inculcate in their hymns. While complimenting his two friends upon their enforcement of an exclusive canon, he proceeds to assume that of course there can be but ONE canon;--that there is no doubt what the dogmas contained in it are to be. He then unfolds briefly the Platonic ethical creed. "You Spartans and Kretans (he says)[61] of course constrain your poets to proclaim that the just and temperate man is happy, whether he be tall, strong, and rich--or short, feeble, and poor: and that the bad man is wretched and lives in suffering, though he be richer than Midas, and possessor besides of every other advantage in life. Most men appreciate falsely good and evil things. They esteem as good things, health, beauty, strength, perfect sight and hearing, power, long life, immortality: they account the contrary to be bad things. But you and I take a different view.[62] We agree in proclaiming, that all these so-called good things are good only to the just man. To the unjust man, we affirm that health, strength, perfection of senses, power, long life, &c., are not good, but exceedingly bad. This, I presume, is the doctrine which you compel your poets to proclaim, and no other--in suitable rhythm and harmony.[63] You agree with me in this, do you not?"

[Footnote 61: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 660 E.]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 661 B. [Greek: u(mei=s de\ kai\ e)gô/ pou ta/de le/gomen, ô(s tau=ta/ e)sti xu/mpanta dikai/ois me\n kai\ o(si/ois a)ndra/sin a)/rista ktê/mata, a)di/kois de\ ka/kista xu/mpanta, a)rxa/mena a)po\ tê=s u(giei/as.]]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 661 C. [Greek: Tau=ta dê\ le/gein oi)=mai tou\s par' u(mi=n poiêta\s pei/sete kai\ a)nagka/sete], &c.]

"We agree with you (replies Kleinias) on some of your affirmations, but we disagree with you wholly on others."

"What? (says the Athenian.) Do you disagree with me when I affirm, that a man healthy, rich, strong, powerful, fearless, long-lived, exempt from all the things commonly reputed to be evils, but at the same time unjust and exorbitant--when I say that such a man is not happy, but miserable?"

"We _do_ disagree with you when you affirm this," answers the Kretan.

"But will you not admit that such a man lives basely or dishonourably?"

"Basely or dishonourably.--Yes, we grant it."

"What then--do you not grant farther, that he lives badly, disagreeably, disadvantageously, to himself?"

"No. We cannot possibly grant you that,"--replies Kleinias.

[Side-note: Ethical creed laid down by the Athenian--Poets required to conform to it.]

"Then (says the Athenian) you and I are in marked opposition.[64] For to me what I have affirmed appears as necessary as the existence of Krete is indisputable. If I were lawgiver, I should force the poets and all the citizens to proclaim it with one voice: and I should punish most severely every one[65] who affirmed that there could be any wicked men who lived agreeably--or that there could be any course advantageous or profitable, which was not at the same time the most just. These and other matters equally at variance with the opinions received among Kretans, Spartans, and mankind generally--should persuade my citizens to declare unanimously.--For let us assume for a moment your opinion, and let us ask any lawgiver or any father advising his son.--You say that the just course of life is one thing, and that the agreeable course is another: I ask you which of the two is the happiest? If you say that the agreeable course is the happiest, what do you mean by always exhorting me to be just? Do you wish me not to be happy?[66] If on the contrary you tell me that the just course of life is happier than the agreeable, I put another question--What is this Good and Beautiful which the lawgiver extols as superior to pleasure, and in which the just man's happiness consists? What good _can_ he possess, apart from pleasure?[67] He obtains praise and honour:--Is _that_ good, but disagreeable--and would the contrary, infamy, be agreeable? A life in which a man neither does wrong to others nor receives wrong from others,--is _that_ disagreeable, though good and honourable--and would the contrary life be agreeable, but dishonourable? You will not affirm that it is.[68]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 A-B. [Greek: ê)\ tou=to me/n i)/sôs a)\n xugchôrê/saite, to/ ge ai)schrô=s (zê=n)? _Kleini/as_. Pa/nu me\n ou)=n. _A)thênai=os_. Ti/ de/? to\ kai\ kakô=s? _Klein_. Ou)k a)\n e)/ti tou=th' o(moi/ôs. _A)thên_. Ti/ de/? to\ kai\ a)êdô/s kai\ mê\ xumphero/ntôs au)tô=|? _Klein_. Kai\ pô/s a)\n tau=ta/ g' e)/ti xugchôroi=men? _A)thên_. O(/pôs? ei) theo\s ê(mi=n ô(s e)/oiken, ô)= phi/loi, doi/ê tis sumphôni/an, ô(s nu=n ge schedo\n a)pa/|domen a)p' a)llê/lôn. E)moi\ ga\r dê\ phai/netai tau=ta ou(/tôs a)nagkai=a, ô(s ou)de\ Krê/tê nê=sos saphô=s.]]

[Footnote 65: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 B-C. [Greek: zêmi/an te o)li/gou megi/stên e)pitithei/ên a)\n, ei) tis e)n tê=| chô/ra| phthe/gxaito ô(s ei)si/ tines a)/nthrôpoi/ pote ponêroi\ me/n, ê(de/ôs de\ zô=ntes], &c.]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 D-E.]

[Footnote 67: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 E. [Greek: ei) d' au)= to\n dikaio/taton eu)daimone/staton a)pophai/noito bi/on ei)=nai, zêtoi= pou pa=s a)\n o( a)kou/ôn, oi)=mai, ti/ pot' e)n au)tô=| to\ tê=s ê(donê=s krei=tton a)gatho/n te kai\ kalo\n o( no/mos e)no\n e)painei=? ti/ ga\r dê\ dikai/ô| chôrizo/menon ê(donê=s a)gatho\n a)\n gi/gnoito?]]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 A.]

"Surely then, my doctrine--which regards the pleasurable, the just, the good, and the honourable, as indissolubly connected,--has at least a certain force of persuasion, if it has nothing more, towards inducing men to live a just and holy life: so that the lawgiver would be both base and wanting to his own purposes, if he did not proclaim it as a truth. For no one will be willingly persuaded to do anything which does not carry with it in its consequences more pleasure than pain.[69] There is indeed confusion in every man's vision, when he looks at these consequences in distant outline: but it is the duty of the lawgiver to clear up such confusion, and to teach his citizens in the best way he can, by habits, encouraging praises, discourses, &c., how they ought to judge amidst these deceptive outlines. Injustice, when looked at thus in prospect, seems to the unjust man pleasurable, while justice seems to him thoroughly disagreeable. On the contrary, to the just man, the appearance is exactly contrary: to him justice seems pleasurable, injustice repulsive. Now which of these two judgments shall we pronounce to be the truth? That of the just man. The verdict of the better soul is unquestionably more trustworthy than that of the worse. We must therefore admit it to be a truth, that the unjust life is not merely viler and more dishonourable, but also in truth more disagreeable, than the just life."[70]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o( me\n mê\ chôri/zôn lo/gos ê(du/ te kai\ di/kaion kai\ a)gatho/n te kai\ kalo/n, pithano\s g', ei) mêde\n e(/teron, pro\s to/ tina e)the/lein zê=n to\n o(/sion kai\ di/kaion bi/on; ô(/ste nomothe/tê| ge ai)/schistos lo/gôn kai\ e)nantiô/tatos, o(\s a)\n mê\ phê=| tau=ta ou(/tôs e)/chein; ou)dei\s ga\r a)\n e(kô\n e)/theloi pei/thesthai pra/ttein tou=to, o(/tô| mê\ to\ chai/rein tou= lupei=sthai ple/on e(/petai.]]

[Footnote 70: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 C-D.]

[Side-note: The Spartan and Kretan do not agree with him.]

Such is the course of proof which Plato's Athenian speaker considers sufficient to establish this ethical doctrine. But he proceeds to carry the reasoning a step farther, as follows:--

"Nay, even if this were not a true position--as I have just shown it to be--any lawgiver even of moderate worth, if ever he ventured to tell a falsehood to youth for useful purposes, could proclaim no falsehood more useful than this, nor more efficacious towards making them disposed to practise justice willingly, without compulsory force."[71]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 D-E. [Greek: Nomothe/tês de/, ou(= ti kai\ smikro\n o)/phelos, ei) kai\ mê\ tou=to ê)=n ou(/tôs e)/chon, ô(s kai\ nu=n au)to\ ê(/|rêch' o( lo/gos e)/chein, ei)/per ti kai\ a)/llo e)to/lmêsen a)\n e)p' a)gathô=| pseu/desthai pro\s tou\s ne/ous, e)/stin o(/, ti tou/ton pseu=dos lusitele/steron a)\n e)pseu/sato/ pote, kai\ duna/menon ma=llon poiei=n mê\ bi/a| a)ll' e(ko/ntas pa/nta ta\ di/kaia?]]

"Truth is honourable (observes the Kretan) and durable. You will not find it easy to make them believe what you propose."

"Why, it was found easy (replies the Athenian) to make men believe the mythe respecting Kadmus and the armed men who sprang out of the earth after the sowing of the dragon's teeth--and many other mythes equally incredible. Such examples show conclusively that the lawgiver can implant in youthful minds any beliefs which he tries to implant. He need therefore look to nothing, except to determine what are those beliefs which, if implanted, would be most beneficial to the city. Having determined this, he will employ all his machinery to make all his citizens proclaim these beliefs constantly, with one voice, and without contradiction, in all hymns, stories, and discourses."[72]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 A.]

"This brings me to my own proposition. My three Choruses (youthful, mature, elderly) will be required to sing perpetually to the tender minds of children all the honourable and good doctrines which I shall prescribe in detail. But the sum and substance of them will be--The best life has been declared by the Gods to be also the most pleasurable, and it _is_ the most pleasurable.[73] The whole city--man, boy, freeman, slave, male, female--will be always singing this doctrine to itself in choric songs, diversified by the poets in such manner as to keep up the interest and satisfaction of the singers."[74]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 B.]

[Footnote 74: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 665 C.

It will be understood that here, as elsewhere, I give the substance of Plato's reasoning without binding myself to the translation of the particular words.]

[Side-note: Chorus of Elders are required to set an example in keeping up the purity of the music prescribed.]

Here, then, we have the general doctrine, ethical and social, which is to be maintained in exclusive possession of the voice, ear, and mind, of the Platonic citizens. The imitative movements of the tripartite Chorus must be kept in perfect accordance with it:[75] for all music is imitative, and care must be taken to imitate the right things in a right manner. To ensure such accordance, magistrates must be specially chosen as censors over both poets and singers. But this, in Plato's view, is not enough. He requires, besides, that the choristers should themselves understand both what they ought to imitate, and how it should be imitated. Such understanding cannot be expected from the Chorus of youths nor even from that of mature men. But it may be expected, and it must be required, in the chorus of Elders: which will thus set an example to the other two, of strict adherence to the rectitude of the musical standard.[76] The purity of the Platonic musical training depends mainly upon the constant and efficacious choric activity of the old citizens.

[Footnote 75: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 668 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n mousikê/n ge pa=sa/n phamen ei)kastikê/n te ei)=nai kai\ mimêtikê/n?]]

[Footnote 76: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 670 B-D; vi. p. 764 C; vii. p. 812 B.

Aristotle directs that the elders shall be relieved from active participation in choric duties, and confined to the function of judging or criticising (Politic. viii. 6, 1340, b. 38).]

But how is such activity to be obtained? Old men will not only find it repugnant to their natural dispositions, but will even be ashamed to exhibit themselves in choric music and dance before the younger citizens.

[Side-note: The Elders require the stimulus of wine, in order to go through the choric duties with spirit.]

It is here that Plato invokes the aid of wine-drinking and intoxication. The stimulus of wine, drunk by the old men at the Dionysiac banquets, will revive in them a temporary fit of something like juvenile activity, and will supply an antidote to inconvenient diffidence.[77] Under such partial excitement, they will stand forward freely to discharge their parts in the choric exhibitions; which, as performed by them, will be always in full conformity with the canon of musical rectitude, and will prevent it from becoming corrupted or relaxed by the younger choristers. To ensure however that the excitement shall not overpass due limits, Plato prescribes that the president of the banquet shall be a grave person drinking no wine at all. The commendation or reproof of such a president will sustain the reason and self-command of the guests, at the pitch compatible with full execution of their choric duty.[78] Plato interdicts wine altogether to youths, until 18 years of age--allows it only in small quantities until the age of 40--but permits and even encourages elders above 40 to partake of the full inspiration of the Dionysiac banquets.[79]

[Footnote 77: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 B-C. [Greek: e)pi/kouron tê=s tou= gê/rôs au)stêro/têtos e)dôrê/sato (Dio/nusos) to\n oi)=non, pha/rmakon, ô(/ste a)nêba=|n ê(ma=s . . . prô=ton me\n dê\ diatethei\s ou(/tôs e(/kastos a)=r' ou)k a)\n e)/theloi prothumo/tero/n ge, ê(=tton ai)schuno/menos . . . a)/|dein.]]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 671.]

[Footnote 79: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 A.]

[Side-note: Peculiar views of Plato about intoxication.]

This manner of regarding intoxication must probably have occurred to Plato at a time later than the composition of the Republic, wherein we find it differently handled.[80] It deserves attention as an illustration, both of his boldness in following out his own ethical views, in spite of the consciousness[81] that they would appear strange to others--and of the prominent function which he assigns to old men in this dialogue De Legibus. He condemns intoxication decidedly, when considered simply as a mode of enjoyment, and left to the taste of the company without any president or regulation. But with most moralists such condemnation is an unreflecting and undistinguishing sentiment. Against this Plato enters his protest. He considers that intoxication, if properly regulated, may be made conducive to valuable ends, ethical and social. Without it the old men cannot be wound up to the pitch of choric activity; without such activity, constant and unfaltering, the rectitude of the choric system has no adequate security against corruption: without such security, the emotional training of the citizens generally will degenerate. Farthermore, Plato takes occasion from drunkenness to lay down a general doctrine respecting pleasures. Men must be trained to self-command against pleasures, as they are against pains, not by keeping out of the way of temptation, but by regulated exposure to temptations, with motives at hand to help them in the task of resistance. Both these views are original and suggestive, like so many others in the Platonic writings: tending to rescue Ethics from that tissue of rhetorical and emotional commonplace in which it so frequently appears;--and to keep present before those who handle it, those ideas of an end to be attained, and of discrimination as to means--which are essential to its pretensions as a science.

[Footnote 80: In the Republic (iii. p. 398 E) Plato pronounced intoxication ([Greek: me/thê]) to be most unbecoming for his Guardians. He places it in the same class of defects as indolence and effeminacy. He also repudiates those varieties of musical harmony called _Ionic_ and _Lydian_, because they were languid, effeminate, symposiac, or suitable for a drinking society ([Greek: malakai/ te kai\ sumpotikai/, chalarai/]). Various musical critics of the day ([Greek: tô=n peri\ tê\n mousikê/n tines]--we learn this curious fact from Aristotle, Polit. viii. 7, near the end) impugned this opinion of Plato. They affirmed that drunkenness was exciting and stimulating,--not relaxing nor favourable to languor and heaviness: that the effeminate musical modes were not congenial to drunkenness. When we read the Treatise De Legibus, we observe that Plato altered his opinion respecting [Greek: me/thê], and had come round to agree with these musical critics. He treats [Greek: me/thê] as exciting and stimulating, not relaxing and indolent; he even applies it as a positive stimulus to wind up the Elders. Moreover, instead of repudiating it absolutely, he defends its usefulness under proper regulations. Perhaps the change of his opinion may have been partly owing to these very criticisms.]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 665 B. Old Philokleon, in the Vespæ of Aristophanes (1320 seq.), under the influence of wine and jovial excitement, is a pregnant subject for comic humour.]

[Side-note: General ethical doctrine held by Plato in Leges.]

But the general ethical discussion--which Plato tells us[82] that he introduces to establish premisses for his enactment respecting drunkenness--is of greater importance than the enactment itself. He prescribes imperatively the doctrine and matter which alone is to be tolerated in his choric hymns or heard in his city. I have given an abstract (p. 292-297) of the doctrine here laid down and the reasonings connected therewith, because they admit of being placed in instructive comparison with his manner of treating the same subject in other dialogues.

[Footnote 82: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 D.]

[Side-note: Pleasure--Good--Happiness--What is the relation between them?]

What is the relation between Pleasure, Good, and Happiness? Pain, Evil, Unhappiness? Do the names in the first triplet mean substantially the same thing, only looked at in different aspects and under different conditions? Or do they mean three distinct things, separable and occurring the one without the other? This important question was much debated, and answered in many different ways, by Grecian philosophers from the time of Sokrates downward--and by Roman philosophers after them. Plato handles it not merely in the dialogue now before us, but in several others--differently too in each: in Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, Philêbus, &c.[83]

[Footnote 83: See above, vol. ii. ch. xxiv. pp. 353.]

[Side-note: Comparison of the doctrine laid down in Leges.]

Here, in the Dialogue De Legibus (by incidental allusion, too, in some of the Epistles), we have the latest form in which these doctrines about Pleasure, Happiness, Good--and their respective contraries--found expression in Plato's compositions. Much of the doctrines is the same--yet with some material variation. It is here reasserted, by the Athenian, that the just and temperate man is happy, and that the unjust man is miserable, whatever may befall him: moreover that good things (such as health, strength, sight, hearing, &c.) are good only to the just man, evil to the unjust--while the contrary (such as sickness, weakness, blindness) are good things to the unjust, evil only to the just. To this position both the Spartan and the Kretan distinctly refuse their assent: and Plato himself admits that mankind in general would agree with them in such refusal.[84] He vindicates his own opinion by a new argument which had not before appeared. "The just man himself" (he urges), "one who has been fully trained in just dispositions, will feel it to be as I say: the unjust man will feel the contrary. But the just man is much more trustworthy than the unjust: therefore we must believe what he says to be the truth."[85] Appeal is here made, not to the Wise Man or Artist, but to the just man: whose sentence is invested with a self-justifying authority, wherein Plato looks for his _aliquid inconcussum_. Now it is for philosophy, or for the true Artist, that this pre-eminence is claimed in the Republic,[86] where Sokrates declares, that each of the three souls combined in the individual man (the rational or philosophical, in the head--the passionate or ambitious, between the neck and the diaphragm--and the appetitive, below the diaphragm) has its special pleasures; that each prefers its own; but that the judgment of the philosophical man must be regarded as paramount over the other two.[87] Comparing this demonstration in the Republic with the unsupported inference here noted in the Leges--we perceive the contrast of the oracular and ethical character of the latter, with the intellectual and dialectic character of the former.

[Footnote 84: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 C.]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 C.]

[Footnote 86: Plato, Repub. ix. pp. 580 E-583 A.]

[Footnote 87: Plato, Repub. ix. p. 583 A. [Greek: A)na/gkê a(\ o( philo/sopho/s te kai\ o( philolo/gos e)painei=, a)lêthe/stata ei)=nai . . . ku/rios gou=n e)paine/tês ô)\n e)painei= to\n e(autou= bi/on o( phro/nimos.]]

Again, here in the Leges, the Athenian puts it to his two companions, Whether the unjust man, assuming him to possess every imaginable endowment and advantage in life, will not live, nevertheless, both dishonourably and miserably? They admit that he will live dishonourably: they deny that he will live miserably.[88] The Athenian replies by reasserting emphatically his own opinion, without any attempt to prove it. Now in the Gorgias, the same issue is raised between Sokrates and Polus: Sokrates refutes his opponent by a dialectic argument, showing that if the first of the two doctrines (the living dishonourably--[Greek: ai)schrô=s]) be granted, the second (the living miserably--[Greek: kakô=s]) cannot be consistently denied.[89] The dialectic of Sokrates is indeed more ingenious than conclusive: but still it _is_ dialectic--and thus stands contrasted with the oracular emphasis which is substituted for it in Leges.

[Footnote 88: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 A.]

[Footnote 89: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 474 C, 478 E.]

[Side-note: Doctrine in Leges about Pleasure and Good--approximates more nearly to the Protagoras than to Gorgias and Philêbus.]

Farthermore, the distinction between Pleasure and Good, in the language of the Athenian speaker in the Leges, approximates more nearly to the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, than to his doctrine in the Gorgias, Philêbus, and Republic. The Athenian proclaims that he is dealing with men, and not with Gods, and that he must therefore recognise the nature of man, with its fundamental characteristics: that no man will willingly do anything from which he does not anticipate more pleasure than pain: that every man desires the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain, and desires nothing else: that there neither is nor can be any Good, apart from Pleasure or superior to Pleasure: that to insist upon a man being just, if you believe that he will obtain more pleasure or less pain from an unjust mode of life, is absurd and inconsistent: that the doctrine which declares the life of pleasure and the life of justice to lead in two distinct paths, is a heresy deserving not only censure but punishment.[90] Plato here enunciates, as distinctly as Epikurus did after him, that Pleasures and Pains must be regulated (here regulated by the lawgiver), so that each man may attain the maximum of the former with the minimum of the latter: and that Good, apart from maximum of pleasure or minimum of pain accruing to the agent himself,[91] cannot be made consistent with the nature or aspirations of man.

[Footnote 90: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 662 C-D-E, 663 B.

In v. pp. 732 E to 734, the Athenian speaker delivers [Greek: ta\ a)nthrô/pina] of the general preface or proëm to his Laws, after having previously delivered [Greek: ta\ thei=a] (v. pp. 727-732).

[Greek: Ta\ thei=a]. These are precepts respecting piety to the Gods, and behaviour to parents, strangers, suppliants; and respecting the duty of rendering due honour, first to the mind, next to the body--of maintaining both the one and the other in a sound and honourable condition. Repeated exhortation is given to obey the enactments whereby the lawgiver regulates pleasures and pains: the precepts are also enforced by insisting on the suffering which will accrue to the agent if they be neglected. We also read (what is said also in Gorgias) that the [Greek: di/kê kakourgi/as megi/stê] is [Greek: to\ o(moiou=sthai kakoi=s a)ndra/sin] (p. 728 B).

[Greek: Ta\ a)nthrô/pina], which follow [Greek: ta\ thei=a], indicate the essential conditions of human character which limit and determine the application of such precepts to man. To love pleasure--to hate pain--are the paramount and indefeasible attributes of man; but they admit of being regulated, and they ought to be regulated by wisdom--the [Greek: metrêtikê\ te/chnê]--insisted on by Sokrates in the Protagoras (p. 356 E). Compare Legg. i. p. 636 E, ii. p. 653 A.]

[Footnote 91: It is among the tests of a well-disciplined army (according to Xenophon, Cyropæd. i. 6, 26) [Greek: o(po/te to\ pei/thesthai au)toi=s ê(/dion ei)/ê tou= a)peithei=n.]]

[Side-note: Comparison of Leges with Republic and Gorgias.]

There is another point too in which the Athenian speaker here recedes from the lofty pretensions of Sokrates in the Republic and the Gorgias. In the second Book of the Republic, we saw Glaukon and Adeimantus challenge Sokrates to prove that justice, apart from all its natural consequences, will suffice _per se_ to make the just man happy;[92] _per se_, that is, even though all the society misconceive his character, and render no justice to him, but heap upon him nothing except obloquy and persecution. If (Glaukon urges) you can only recommend justice when taken in conjunction with the requiting esteem and reciprocating justice from others towards the just agent, this is no recommendation of justice at all. Your argument implies a tacit admission, that it will be better still if he can pass himself off as just in the opinion of others, without really being just himself: and you must be understood as recommending to him this latter course--if he can do it successfully. Sokrates accepts the challenge, and professes to demonstrate the thesis tendered to him: which is in substance the cardinal dogma afterwards espoused by the Stoics. I have endeavoured to show (in a former chapter[93]), that his demonstration is altogether unsuccessful: and when we turn to the Treatise De Legibus, we shall see that the Athenian speaker recedes from the doctrine altogether: confining himself to the defence of justice _with_ its requiting and reciprocating consequences, not _without_ them. The just man, as the Athenian speaker conceives him, is one who performs his obligations towards others, and towards whom others perform their obligations also: he is one who obtains from others that just dealing and that esteem which is his due: and when so conceived, his existence is one of pleasure and happiness.[94] This is, in substance, the Epikurean doctrine substituted for the Stoic. It is that which Glaukon and Adeimantus in the Republic deprecate as unworthy disparagement of justice; and which they adjure Sokrates, by his attachment to justice, to stand up and repel.[95] Now even this, the Epikurean doctrine, is true only with certain qualifications: since there are various other conditions essential to happiness, over and above the ethical conditions. Still it is not so utterly at variance with the truth as the doctrine which Sokrates undertakes to prove, but never does prove, in the Republic.

[Footnote 92: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 359-367.]

[Footnote 93: See above, chap. xxviii. p. 150,** seq.]

[Footnote 94: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 A.]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 368 B. [Greek: de/doika ga\r mê\ ou)d' o(/sion ê)=| parageno/menon dikaiosu/nê| kakêgoroume/nê| mê\ boêthei=n.]]

[Side-note: Plato here mistrusts the goodness of his own proof. He falls back upon useful fiction.]

The last point which I shall here remark in this portion of the Treatise De Legibus is, the sort of mistrust manifested by Plato of the completeness of his own proof. Notwithstanding the vehement phrases in which the Athenian speaker proclaims his internal persuasion of the truth of his doctrine,** while acknowledging at the same time that not only his two companions, but most other persons also, took the opposite view[96]--he finds it convenient to reinforce the demonstration of the expositor by the omnipotent infallibility of the lawgiver. He descends from the region of established truth to that of useful fiction. "Even if the doctrine (that the pleasurable, the just, the good, and the honourable, are indissoluble) were not true, the lawgiver ought to adopt it as an useful fiction for youth, effective towards inducing them to behave justly without compulsion. The law giver can obtain belief for any fiction which he pleases to circulate, as may be seen by the implicit belief obtained for the Theban mythe about the dragon's teeth, and a thousand other mythes equally difficult of credence. He must proclaim the doctrine as an imperative article of faith; carefully providing that it shall be perpetually recited, by one and all his citizens, in the public hymns, narratives, and discourses, without any voice being heard to call it in question."[97]

[Footnote 96: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 B.]

[Footnote 97: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 D. [Greek: e)p' a)gathô=| pseu/desthai pro\s tou\s ne/ous], &c. Also 664 A. So, in the Bacchæ of Euripides (332), the two old men, Kadmus and Teiresias, after vainly attempting to inculcate upon Pentheus the belief in and the worship of Dionysus, at last appeal to his prudence, and admonish him of the danger of unbelief:--

[Greek: kei\ mê\ ga/r e)stin o( theo\s ou(=tos, ô(s su\ phê/s, para\ soi\ lege/sthô, kai\ katapseu/dou kalô=s ô(s e)/sti, Seme/lê th' i(/na dokê=| theo\n tekei=n, ê(mi=n te timê\ A)ktai/ônos a)/thlion mo/ron? . . . o(\ mê\ pathê=|s su/.]]

[Side-note: Deliberate ethical fiction employed as means of governing.]

Here is a second attempt on the part of Plato, in addition to that which we have seen in the Republic,[98] to employ deliberate ethical fiction as a means of governing his citizens: first to implant and accredit it--next to prescribe its incessant iteration by all the citizens in the choric ceremonies--lastly to consecrate it, and to forbid all questioners or opponents: all application of the Sokratic Elenchus to test it. In this treatise he speaks of the task as easier to the lawgiver than he had described it to be in his Republic: in which latter we found him regarding a new article of faith as difficult to implant, but as easy to uphold if once it be implanted; while in the Treatise De Legibus both processes are treated as alike achievable and certain. The conception of dogmatic omnipotence had become stronger in Plato's mind during the interval between the two treatises. Intending to postulate for himself the complete regulation not merely of the actions, but also of the thoughts and feelings of his citizens--intending moreover to exclude free or insubordinate intellects--he naturally looks upon all as docile recipients of any faith which he thinks it right to preach. When he appeals, however, as proofs of the facility of his plan, to the analogy of the numerous mythes received with implicit faith throughout the world around him--we see how low an estimate he formed of the process whereby beliefs are generated in the human mind, and of their evidentiary value as certifying the truth of what is believed. People believed what was told them at first by some imposing authority, and transmitted the belief to their successors, even without the extraneous support of inquisitorial restrictions such as the Platonic lawgiver throws round the Magnêtic community in the Leges. It is in reference to such self-supporting beliefs that Sokrates stands forth, in the earlier Platonic compositions, as an enquirer into the reasons on which they rested--a task useful as well as unpleasant to those whom he questioned--attracting unpopularity as well as reputation to himself. Plato had then keenly felt the inestimable value of this Elenchus or examining function personified in his master; but in the Treatise De Legibus the master has no place, and the function is severely proscribed. Plato has come round to the dogmatic pole, extolling the virtue of passive recipient minds who have no other sentiment than that which the lawgiver issues to them. Yet while he postulates in his own city the infallible authority of the lawgiver, and enforces it by penalties, as final and all-sufficient to determine the ethical beliefs of all the Platonic citizens--we shall find in a subsequent book of this Treatise that he denounces and punishes those who generalise this very postulate; and who declare the various ethical beliefs, actually existing in communities of men, to have been planted each by some human authority--not to have sprung from any unseen oracle called Nature.[99]

[Footnote 98: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414; v. p. 459 D.]

[Footnote 99: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 889-890.]

[Side-note: Importance of music and chorus as an engine of teaching for Plato. Views of Xenophon and Aristotle compared.]

Such is the ethical doctrine which Plato proclaims in the Leges, and which he directs to be sung by each Chorus among the three (boys, men, elders), with appropriate music and dancing. It is on the constancy, strictness, and sameness of these choric and musical influences, that he relies for the emotional training of youth. If the musical training be either intermitted or allowed to vary from the orthodox canon--if the theatrical exhibitions be regulated by the taste of the general audience, and not by the judgment of a few discerning censors--the worst consequences will arise: the character of the citizens will degenerate, and the institutions of his city will have no foundation to rest upon.[100] The important effects of music, as an instrument in the hands of the lawgiver for regulating the emotions of the citizens, and especially for inspiring a given emotional character to youth--are among the characteristic features of Plato's point of view, common to both the Republic and the Laws. There is little trace of this point of view either in Xenophon or in Isokrates; but Aristotle embraces it to a considerable extent. It grew out of the practice and tradition of the Grecian cities, in most of which the literary teaching of youth was imparted by making them read, learn, recite, or chaunt the works of various poets; while the use of the lyre was also taught, together with regulated movements in the dance. The powerful ethical effect of musical teaching (even when confined to the simplest choric psalmody and dance), enforced by perpetual drill both of boys and men, upon the unlettered Arcadians--may be seen recognised even by a practical politician like Polybius,[101] who considers it indispensable for the softening of violent and sanguinary tempers: the diversity of the effect, according to the different modes of music employed, is noted by Aristotle,[102] and was indeed matter of common repute. Plato, as lawgiver, postulates poetry and music of his own dictation. He relies upon constant supplies of this wholesome nutriment, for generating in the youth such emotional dispositions and habits as will be in harmony, both with the doctrines which he preaches, and with the laws which he intends to impose upon them as adults. Here (as in Republic and Timæus) he proclaims that the perfection of character consists in willing obedience or harmonious adjustment of the pleasures and pains, the desires and aversions, to the paramount authority of reason or wisdom--or to the rational conviction of each individual as to what is good and honourable. If, instead of obedience and harmony, there be discord--if the individual, though rationally convinced that a proceeding is just and honourable, nevertheless hates it--or if, while convinced that a proceeding is unjust and dishonourable, he nevertheless loves it--such discord is the worst state of stupidity or mental incompetence.[103] We must recollect that (according to the postulate of Treatise De Legibus) the rational convictions of each individual, respecting what is just and honourable, are assumed to be accepted implicitly from the lawgiver, and never called in question by any one. There exists therefore only one individual reason in the community--that of the lawgiver, or Plato himself.

[Footnote 100: Plato, Republ. iv. p. 424 C-D; Legg. iii. pp. 700-701.]

[Footnote 101: Polybius, iv. pp. 20-21, about the rude Arcadians of Kynætha. He ascribes to this simple choric practice the same effect which Ovid ascribes to "ingenuæ artes," or elegant literature generally:--

Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.

See the remarkable contention between Æschylus and Euripides in Aristophan. Ran. 876 seq., about the function and comparative excellence of poets (also Nubes, 955). Aristophanes, comparing Æschylus with Euripides, denounces music as having degenerated, and poetry as having been corrupted, at Athens. So far he agrees with Plato; but he ascribes this corruption in a great degree to the conversation of Euripides with Sokrates (Ranæ, 1487); and here Plato would not have gone along with him--at least not when Plato composed his earlier dialogues--though the [Greek: ê)=thos] of the Treatise De Legibus is in harmony with this sentiment. Polybius cites, with some displeasure, the remark of the historian Ephorus, who asserted that musical teaching was introduced among men for purposes of cheating and mystification--[Greek: e)p' a)pa/tê| kai\ goêtei/a| pareiskê=chthai toi=s a)nthrô/pois, ou)damô=s a(rmo/zonta lo/gon au)tô=| r(i/psas] (iv. 20). Polybius considers this an unbecoming criticism.]

[Footnote 102: Aristotle, Polit. viii. c. 4-5-7, p. 1340, a. 10, 1341, a. 15, 1342, a. 30. We see by these chapters how much the subject was discussed in his day.

The ethical and emotional effects conveyed by the sense of hearing, and distinguishing it from the other senses, are noticed in the Problemata of Aristotle, xix. 27-29, pp. 919-920.]

[Footnote 103: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 689 A. [Greek: ê( megi/stê a)mathi/a . . . o(/tan tô=| ti do/xê| kalo\n ê)\ a)gatho\n ei)=nai, mê\ philê=| tou=to a)lla\ misê=|, to\ de\ ponêro\n kai\ a)/dikon dokou=n ei)=nai philê=| te kai\ a)spa/zêtai; tau/tên tê\n diaphôni/an lu/pês te kai\ ê(donê=s pro\s tê\n kata\ lo/gon do/xan, a(mathi/an phêmi\ ei)=nai tê\n e)scha/tên.] Compare p. 688 A.]

[Side-note: Historical retrospect as to the growth of cities--Frequent destruction of established communities, with only a small remnant left.]

Besides all the ethical prefatory matter, above noticed, Plato gives us also some historical and social prefatory matter, not essential to his constructive scheme (which after all takes its start partly from theoretical principles laid down by himself, partly from a supposed opportunity of applying those principles in the foundation of a new colony), but tending to illustrate the growth of political society, and the abuses into which it naturally tends to lapse. There existed in his time a great variety of distinct communities: some in the simplest, most patriarchal, Cyclopian condition, nothing more than families--some highly advanced in civilization, with its accompanying good and evil--some in each intermediate stage between these two extremes.--The human race (Plato supposes) has perhaps had no beginning, and will have no end. At any rate it has existed from an indefinite antiquity, subject to periodical crises, destructive kosmical outbursts, deluges, epidemic distempers, &c.[104] A deluge, when it occurs, sweeps away all the existing communities with their property, arts, instruments, &c., leaving only a small remnant, who, finding shelter on the top of some high mountain not covered with water, preserve only their lives. Society, he thinks, has gone through a countless number of these cycles.[105] At the end of each, when the deluge recedes, each associated remnant has to begin its development anew, from the rudest and poorest condition. Each little family or sept exists at first separately, with a patriarch whom all implicitly obey, and peculiar customs of its own. Several of these septs gradually coalesce together into one community, choosing one or a few lawgivers to adjust and modify their respective customs into harmonious order, and submitting implicitly to the authority of such chosen few.[106] By successive coalitions of this kind, operated in a vast length of time,[107] large cities are gradually formed on the plain and on the seaboard. Property and public force is again accumulated; together with letters, arts, and all the muniments of life.

[Footnote 104: Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 677-678, vi. p. 782 A.]

[Footnote 105: Plato, Legg. p. 680 A. [Greek: toi=s e)n tou/tô| _tô=| me/rei tê=s perio/dou_ gegono/sin], &c.]

[Footnote 106: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 681 C-D.]

[Footnote 107: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 683 A. [Greek: e)n chro/nou tino\s mê/kesin a)ple/tois.]]

[Side-note: Historical or legendary retrospect--The Trojan war--The return of the Herakleids.]

Such is the idea which Plato here puts forth of the natural genesis and development of human society. Having thus arrived at the formation of considerable cities with powerful military armaments, he carries us into the midst of Hellenic legend--the Trojan War, the hostile reception which the victorious heroes found on their return to Greece after the siege, the Return of the Herakleids to Peloponnesus, and the establishment of the three Herakleid brethren, Têmenus, Kresphontês, Aristodêmus, as kings of Argos, Messênê, and Sparta. The triple Herakleid kingdom was originally founded (he affirms) as a mode of uniting and consolidating the force of Hellas against the Asiatics, who were eager to avenge the capture of Troy. It received strong promises of permanence, both from prophets and from the Delphian oracle.[108] But these hopes were frustrated by misconduct on the part of the kings of Argos and Messênê: who, being youths destitute of presiding reason, and without external checks, obeyed the impulse of unmeasured ambition, oppressed their subjects, and broke down their own power.

[Footnote 108: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 685-686.]

[Side-note: Difficulties of government--Conflicts about command--Seven distinct titles to command exist among mankind, all equally natural, and liable to conflict.]

To conduct a political community well is difficult; for there are inherent causes of discord and sedition which can only be neutralised in their effects, but can never be eradicated. Among the foremost of these inherent causes, Plato numbers the many distinct and conflicting titles to obedience which are found among mankind, all co-existent and co-ordinate. There are seven such titles, all founded in the nature of man and the essential conditions of society:[109]--1. Parents over children. 2. Men of high birth and breed (such as the Herakleids at Sparta) over men of low birth. 3. Old over young. 4. Masters over slaves. 5. The stronger man over the weaker. 6. The wiser man over the man destitute of wisdom. 7. The fortunate man, who enjoys the favour of the Gods (one case of this is indicated by drawing of the best lot), over the less fortunate man (who draws an inferior lot).

[Footnote 109: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 690 A-D. [Greek: _a)xiô/mata_ tou= te a)/rchein kai\ a)/rchesthai], &c. . . . [Greek: O(/sa e)sti\ pro\s a)/rchontas a)xiô/mata kai\ o(/ti pephuko/ta pro\s a)llêla e)nanti/ôs.]]

Of these seven titles to command, coexisting, distinct, and conflicting with each other, Plato pronounces the sixth--that of superior reason and wisdom--to be the greatest, preferable to all the rest, in his judgment: though he admits the fifth--that of superior force to be the most extensively prevalent in the actual world.[110]

[Footnote 110: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 690 C.

This enumeration by Plato of seven distinct and conflicting [Greek: a)xiô/mata tou= a)/rchein kai\ a)/rchesthai], deserves notice in many ways. All the seven are _natural_: nature is considered as including multifarious and conflicting titles (compare Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 6, 21), and therefore as not furnishing in itself any justification or ground of preference for one above the rest. The [Greek: a)xi/ôma] of superior force is just as _natural_ as the [Greek: a)xi/ôma] of superior wisdom, though Plato himself pronounces the latter to be the greatest; that is--greatest, not [Greek: phu/sei] but [Greek: no/mô|] or [Greek: te/chnê|], according to his own rational and deliberate estimation. Plato is not uniform in this view, for he uses elsewhere the phrases [Greek: phu/sei] and [Greek: kata\ phu/sin] as if they specially and exclusively belonged to that which he approves, and furnished a justification for it (see Legg. x. pp. 889-890, besides the Republic and the Gorgias). Again the lot, or the process of sortition, is here described as carrying with it both the preference of the Gods and the principles of justice ([Greek: to\ dikaio/taton ei)=nai/ phamen]). The Gods determine upon whom the lot should fall--compare Homer, Iliad, vii. 179. This is a remarkable view of the lot, and represents a feeling much diffused among the ancient democracies.

The relation of master and slave counts, in Plato's view, among the natural relations, with its consequent rights and obligations.

The force of [Greek: eu)tuchi/a], as a title to command, is illustrated in the speech addressed by Alkibiades to the Athenian assembly. Thucyd. vi. 16-17: he allows it even in his competitor Nikias--[Greek: a)ll' e(/ôs te e)/ti a)kma/zô met' au)tê=s kai\ o( Niki/as eu)tuchê\s dokei= ei)=nai, a)pochrê/sasthe tê=| e(kate/rou ê(mô=n ô)pheli/a.] Compare also the language of Nikias himself in his own last speech under the extreme distress of the Athenian army in Sicily, Thucyd. vii. 77.

In the Politikus (p. 293 and elsewhere) Plato admits no [Greek: a)xi/ôma tou= a)/rchein] as genuine or justifiable, except Science, Art, superior wisdom, in one or a few Artists of governing; the same in Republic, v. p. 474 C, respecting what he there calls [Greek: philosophi/a].]

[Side-note: Imprudence of founding government upon any one of these titles separately--Governments of Argos and Messênê ruined by the single principle--Sparta avoided it.]

Plato thinks it imprudent to found the government of society upon any one of these seven titles singly and separately. He requires that each one of them shall be checked and modified by the conjoint operation of others. Messênê and Argos were depraved and ruined by the single principle: while Sparta was preserved and exalted by a mixture of different elements. The kings of Argos and Messênê, irrational youths with nothing to restrain them (except oaths, which they despised), employed their power to abuse and mischief. Such was the consequence of trusting to the exclusive title of high breed, embodied in one individual person. But Apollo and Lykurgus provided better for Sparta. They softened regal insolence by establishing the double line of co-ordinate kings: they introduced the title of old age, along with that of high breed, by founding the Senate of twenty-eight elders: they farther introduced the title of sortition, or something near it, by nominating the annual Ephors. The mixed government of Sparta was thus made to work for good, while the unmixed systems of Argos and Messênê both went wrong.[111] Both the two latter states were in perpetual war with Sparta, so as to frustrate that purpose--union against Asiatics--with a view to which the triple Herakleid kingdom was originally erected in Peloponnesus. Had each of these three kingdoms been temperately and moderately governed, like Sparta, so as to maintain unimpaired the projected triple union--the Persian invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes would never have taken place.[112]

[Footnote 111: Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 691-692.]

[Footnote 112: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 692 C-D.]

[Side-note: Plato casts Hellenic legend into accordance with his own political theories.]

Such is the way in which Plato casts the legendary event, called the Return of the Herakleids, into accordance with a political theory of his own. That event, in his view, afforded the means of uniting Hellas internally, and of presenting such a defensive combination as would have deterred all invasions from Asia, if only the proper principles of legislation and government had been understood and applied. The lesson to be derived from this failure is, that we ought not to concentrate great authority in one hand; and that we ought to blend together several principles of authority, instead of resorting to the exclusive action of one alone.[113] This lesson deserves attention, as a portion of political theory; but I feel convinced that neither Herodotus nor Thucydides would have concurred in Plato's historical views. Neither of them would have admitted the disunion between Sparta, Argos, and Messênê as a main cause of the Persian invasion of Greece.

[Footnote 113: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 693 A. [Greek: ô(s a)/ra ou) dei= mega/las a)rcha\s ou)d' au)= a)mi/ktous nomothetei=n]. Compare pp. 685-686.

Plato here affirms not only that Messênê and Argos were and had been constantly at war with Sparta, but that they were so at the time of the Persian invasion of Greece--and that Messênê thus hindered the Spartans from assisting the Athenians at Marathon, pp. 692 E, 698 E. His statement that Argos was at least neutral, if not treacherous and philo-Persian, during the invasion of Xerxes, is coincident with Herodotus; but not so his statement that the Lacedæmonians were kept back by the war against Messênê. Indeed at that time the Messenians had no separate domicile or independent station in Peloponnesus. They had been conquered by Sparta long before, and their descendants in the same territory were Helots (Thucyd. i. 101). It is true that there always existed struggling remnants of expatriated Messenians, who maintained the name, and whom Athens protected and favoured during the Peloponnesian war; but there was no independent Messenian government in Peloponnesus until the foundation of the city of Messênê by Epaminondas in 369 B.C., two years after the battle of Leuktra: there had never been any _city_ of that name in the Peloponnesus before.

Now Plato wrote his Treatise De Legibus _after_ the foundation of this city of Messênê and the re-establishment of an independent Messenian community in Peloponnesus. The new city was peopled partly by returning Messenian exiles, partly by enfranchised Helots. It is probable enough that both these classes might be disposed to disguise (as far as they could) the past period of servitude--and to represent the Messenian name and community as never having been wholly effaced in the neighbourhood of Ithômê, though always struggling against an oppressive neighbour. Traditions of this tenor would become current, and Plato has adopted one of them in his historical sketch.

If we look back to what Plato says about the Kretan prophet Epimenides, we shall see that here too he must have followed erroneous traditions. He makes Epimenides contemporary with the invasion of Greece by Darius, instead of contemporary with the Kylonian sacrilege (B.C. 612). When a prophet had got reputation, a great many new prophecies were fathered upon him (as upon Bakis and Musæus) with very little care about chronological consistency. Plato may well have been misled by one of these fictions (Legg. i. p. 642, iii. p. 677).]

[Side-note: Persia and Athens compared--Excess of despotism. Excess of liberty.]

A lesson--analogous, though not exactly the same--is derived by Plato from the comparison of the Persian with the Athenian government. Persia presents an excess of despotism: Athens an excess of liberty. There are two distinct primordial forms of government--_mother-polities_, Plato calls them--out of which all existing governments may be said to have been generated or diversified. One of these is monarchy, of which the Persians manifest the extreme: the other is democracy, of which Athens manifests the extreme. Both extremes are mischievous. The wise law-giver must blend and combine the two together in proper proportion. Without such combination, he cannot attain good government, with its three indispensable constituents--freedom, intelligence or temperance, and mutual attachment among the citizens.[114]