Chapter LXXXIII (2)

Profiting by his maritime command of the Gulf, Dionysius was enabled to enlarge his ambitious views even to distant ultramarine enterprises. To escape from his long arm, Syracusan exiles were obliged to flee to a greater distance, and one of their divisions either founded, or was admitted into, the city of Ancona, high up the Adriatic Gulf.[47] On the other side of that Gulf, in vicinity and alliance with the Illyrian tribes, Dionysius on his part sent a fleet, and established more than one settlement. To these schemes he was prompted by a dispossessed prince of the Epirotic Molossians, named Alketas, who, residing at Syracuse as an exile, had gained his confidence. He founded the town of Lissus (now Alessio) on the Illyrian coast, considerably north of Epidamnus; and he assisted the Parians in their plantation of two Grecian settlements, in sites still farther northward up the Adriatic Gulf—the islands of Issa and Pharos. His admiral at Lissus defeated the neighboring Illyrian coast-boats, which harassed these newly-settled Parians; but with the Illyrian tribes near to Lissus, he maintained an intimate alliance, and even furnished a large number of them with Grecian panoplies. It is affirmed to have been the purpose of Dionysius and Alketas to employ these warlike barbarians, first in invading Epirus and restoring Alketas to his Molossian principality; next in pillaging the wealthy temple of Delphi—a scheme far-reaching, yet not impracticable, and capable of being seconded by a Syracusan fleet, if circumstances favored its execution. The invasion of Epirus was accomplished, and the Molossians were defeated in a bloody battle, wherein fifteen thousand of them are said to have been slain. But the ulterior projects against Delphi were arrested by the intervention of Sparta, who sent a force to the spot and prevented all further march southward.[48] Alketas however seems to have remained prince of a portion of Epirus, in the territory nearly opposite to Korkyra; where we have already recognized him, in a former chapter, as having become the dependent of Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly.

[47] Strabo, v. p. 241. It would seem that the two maritime
towns, said to have been founded on the coast of Apulia on the
Adriatic by Dionysius the _younger_ during the first years of
his reign—according to Diodorus (xvi. 5)—must have been really
founded by the _elder_ Dionysius, near about the time to which we
have now reached.

[48] Diodor. xv. 13, 14.

Another enterprise undertaken by Dionysius about this time was a maritime expedition along the coasts of Latium, Etruria, and Corsica; partly under color of repressing the piracies committed from their maritime cities; but partly also, for the purpose of pillaging the rich and holy temple of Leukothea, at Agylla or its seaport Pyrgi. In this he succeeded, stripping it of money and precious ornaments to the amount of one thousand talents. The Agyllæans came forth to defend their temple, but were completely worsted, and lost so much both in plunder and in prisoners, that Dionysius, after returning to Syracuse and selling the prisoners, obtained an additional profit of five hundred talents.[49]

[49] Diodor. xv. 14; Strabo, v. p. 226; Servius ad Virgil. Æneid.
x. 184.

Such was the military celebrity now attained by Dionysius,[50] that the Gauls from Northern Italy, who had recently sacked Rome, sent to proffer their alliance and aid. He accepted the proposition; from whence perhaps the Gallic mercenaries whom we afterwards find in his service as mercenaries, may take their date. His long arms now reached from Lissus on one side to Agylla on the other. Master of most of Sicily and much of Southern Italy, as well as of the most powerful standing army in Greece—the unscrupulous plunderer of the holiest temples everywhere[51]—he inspired much terror and dislike throughout Central Greece. He was the more vulnerable to this sentiment, as he was not only a triumphant prince, but also a tragic poet; competitor, as such, for that applause and admiration which no force can extort. Since none of his tragedies have been preserved, we can form no judgment of our own respecting them. Yet when we learn that he had stood second or third, and that one of his compositions gained even the first prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens,[52] in 368-367 B. C.—the favorable judgment of an Athenian audience affords good reason for presuming that his poetical talents were considerable.

[50] Justin, xx. 5; Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 20.

[51] See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii. 20-41; Cicero, De Natur.
Deor. iii. 34, 82, 85: in which passages, however, there must be
several incorrect assertions as to the actual temples pillaged;
for Dionysius could not have been in Peloponnesus to rob the
temple of Zeus at _Olympia_, or of Æsculapius at _Epidaurus_.

Athenæus (xv. p. 693) recounts an anecdote that Dionysius
plundered the temple of Æsculapius at _Syracuse_ of a valuable
golden table; which is far more probable.

[52] Diodor. xv. 74. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad ann.
367 B. C.

During the years immediately succeeding 387 B. C., however, Dionysius the poet was not likely to receive an impartial hearing anywhere. For while on the one hand his own circle would applaud every word—on the other hand, a large proportion of independent Greeks would be biassed against what they heard by their fear and hatred of the author. If we believed the anecdotes recounted by Diodorus, we should conclude not merely that the tragedies were contemptible compositions, but that the irritability of Dionysius in regard to criticism was exaggerated even to silly weakness. The dithyrambic poet Philoxenus, a resident or visitor at Syracuse, after hearing one of these tragedies privately recited, was asked his opinion. He gave an unfavorable opinion, for which he was sent to prison:[53] on the next day the intercession of friends procured his release, and he contrived afterwards, by delicate wit and double-meaning phrases, to express an inoffensive sentiment without openly compromising truth. At the Olympic festival of 388 B. C., Dionysius had sent some of his compositions to Olympia, together with the best actors and chorists to recite them. But so contemptible were the poems (we are told), that in spite of every advantage of recitation, they were disgracefully hissed and ridiculed; moreover the actors in coming back to Syracuse were shipwrecked, and the crew of the ship ascribed all the suffering of their voyage to the badness of the poems entrusted to them. The flatterers of Dionysius, however (it is said), still continued to extol his genius, and to assure him that his ultimate success as a poet, though for a time interrupted by envy, was infallible; which Dionysius believed, and continued to compose tragedies without being disheartened.[54]

[53] See a different version of the story about Philoxenus in
Plutarch, De Fortun. Alexand. Magni, p. 334 C.

[54] Diodor. xiv. 109; xv. 6.

Amidst such malicious jests, circulated by witty men at the expense of the princely poet, we may trace some important matter of fact. Perhaps in the year 388 B. C., but certainly in the year 384 B. C. (both of them Olympic years), Dionysius sent tragedies to be recited, and chariots to run, before the crowd assembled in festival at Olympia. The year 387 B. C. was a memorable year both in Central Greece and in Sicily. In the former, it was signalized by the momentous peace of Antalkidas, which terminated a general war of eight years’ standing: in the latter, it marked the close of the Italian campaign of Dionysius, with the defeat and humiliation of Kroton and the other Italiot Greeks, and subversion of three Grecian cities,—Hipponium, Kaulonia, and Rhegium—the fate of the Rhegines having been characterized by incidents most pathetic and impressive. The first Olympic festival which occurred after 387 B. C. was accordingly a distinguished epoch. The two festivals immediately preceding (those of 392 B. C. and 388 B. C.) having been celebrated in the midst of a general war, had not been visited by a large proportion of the Hellenic body; so that the next ensuing festival, the 99th Olympiad in 384 B. C., was stamped with a peculiar character (like the 90th Olympiad[55] in 420 B. C.) as bringing together in religious fraternity those who had long been separated.[56] To every ambitious Greek (as to Alkibiades in 420 B. C.) it was an object of unusual ambition to make individual figure at such a festival. To Dionysius, the temptation was peculiarly seductive, since he was triumphant over all neighboring enemies—at the pinnacle of his power—and disengaged from all war requiring his own personal command. Accordingly he sent thither his Theôre, or solemn legation for sacrifice, decked in the richest garments, furnished with abundant gold and silver plate, and provided with splendid tents to serve for their lodging on the sacred ground of Olympia. He farther sent several chariots-and-four to contend in the regular chariot races: and lastly, he also sent reciters and chorists, skilful as well as highly trained, to exhibit his own poetical compositions before such as were willing to hear them. We must remember that poetical recitation was not included in the formal programme of the festival.

[55] See Vol. VII. of this History, Ch. LV. p. 57 _seqq._

[56] See above, in this work, Vol. X. Ch. LXXVII. p. 76. I have
already noticed the peculiarity of this Olympic festival of 384
B. C., in reference to the position and sentiment of the Greeks
in Peloponnesus and Asia. I am now obliged to notice it again,
in reference to the Greeks of Sicily and Italy—especially to
Dionysius.

All this prodigious outfit, under the superintendence of Thearides, brother of Dionysius, was exhibited with dazzling effect before the Olympic crowd. No name stood so prominently and ostentatiously before them as that of the despot of Syracuse. Every man, even from the most distant regions of Greece, was stimulated to inquire into his past exploits and character. There were probably many persons present, peculiarly forward in answering such inquiries—the numerous sufferers, from Italian and Sicilian Greece, whom his conquests had thrown into exile; and their answers would be of a nature to raise the strongest antipathy against Dionysius. Besides the numerous depopulations and mutations of inhabitants which he had occasioned in Sicily, we have already seen that he had, within the last three years, extinguished three free Grecian communities—Rhegium, Kaulonia, Hipponium; transporting all the inhabitants of the two latter to Syracuse. In the case of Kaulonia, an accidental circumstance occurred to impress its recent extinction vividly upon the spectators. The runner who gained the great prize in the stadium, in 384 B. C., was Dikon, a native of Kaulonia. He was a man preëminently swift of foot, celebrated as having gained previous victories in the stadium, and always proclaimed (pursuant to custom) along with the title of his native city—“Dikon the Kauloniate.” To hear this well-known runner now proclaimed as “Dikon the Syracusan,”[57] gave painful publicity to the fact, that the free community of Kaulonia no longer existed,—and to the absorptions of Grecian freedom effected by Dionysius.

[57] Diodor. xv. 14. Παρὰ δ᾽ Ἠλείοις Ὀλυμπιὰς ἤχθη ἐννενηκοστὴ
ἐννάτη (B. C. 384), καθ᾽ ἣν ἐνίκα στάδιον Δίκων Συρακούσιος.

Pausanias, vi. 3, 5. Δίκων δὲ ὁ Καλλιμβρότου πέντε μὲν Πυθοῖ
δρόμου νίκας, τρεῖς δὲ ἀνείλετο Ἰσθμίων, τέσσαρας δὲ ἐν Νεμέᾳ,
καὶ Ὀλυμπιακὰς μίαν μὲν ἐν παισὶ, δύο δὲ ἄλλας ἀνδρῶν· καὶ οἱ καὶ
ἀνδριάντες ἴσοι ταῖς νίκαις εἰσὶν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ· παιδὶ μὲν δὴ ὄντι
αὐτῷ ~Καυλωνιάτῃ, καθάπερ γε καὶ ἦν, ὑπῆρξεν ἀναγορευθῆναι~· τὸ
δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου ~Συρακούσιον αὑτὸν ἀνηγόρευσεν ἐπὶ χρήμασι~.

Pausanias here states, that Dikon received a bribe to permit
himself to be proclaimed as a Syracusan, and not as a Kauloniate.
Such corruption did occasionally take place (compare another case
of similar bribery, attempted by Syracusan envoys, Pausan. vi. 2,
4), prompted by the vanity of the Grecian cities to appropriate
to themselves the celebrity of a distinguished victor at Olympia.
But in this instance, the blame imputed to Dikon is more than he
deserves. Kaulonia had been already depopulated and incorporated
with Lokri; the inhabitants being taken away to Syracuse and
made Syracusan citizens (Diodor. xiv. 106). Dikon therefore
could not have been proclaimed a Kauloniate, even had he desired
it—when the city of Kaulonia no longer existed. The city was
indeed afterwards reëstablished; and this circumstance doubtless
contributed to mislead Pausanias, who does not seem to have been
aware of its temporary subversion by Dionysius.

In following the history of affairs in Central Greece, I have already dwelt upon the strong sentiment excited among Grecian patriots by the peace of Antalkidas, wherein Sparta made herself the ostentatious champion and enforcer of a Persian rescript, purchased by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King. It was natural that this emotion should manifest itself at the next ensuing Olympic festival in 384 B. C., wherein not only Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, and Corinthians, but also Asiatic and Sicilian Greeks, were reunited after a long separation. The emotion found an eloquent spokesman in the orator Lysias. Descended from Syracusan ancestors, and once a citizen of Thurii,[58] Lysias had peculiar grounds for sympathy with the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. He delivered a public harangue upon the actual state of political affairs, in which he dwelt upon the mournful present and upon the serious dangers of the future. “The Grecian world (he said) is burning away at both extremities. Our eastern brethren have passed into slavery under the Great King, our western under the despotism of Dionysius.[59] These two are the great potentates, both in naval force and in money, the real instruments of dominion:[60] if both of them combine, they will extinguish what remains of freedom in Greece. They have been allowed to consummate all this ruin unopposed, because of the past dissensions among the leading Grecian cities; but it is now high time that these cities should unite cordially to oppose farther ruin. How can Sparta, our legitimate president, sit still while the Hellenic world is on fire and consuming? The misfortunes of our ruined brethren ought to be to us as our own. Let us not lie idle, waiting until Artaxerxes and Dionysius attack us with their united force: let us check their insolence at once, while it is yet in our power.”[61]

[58] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysâ, p. 452, Reisk.

[59] Lysias, Fragm. Orat. 33. ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 521. ὁρῶν οὕτως
αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ
βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.

[60] Lysias, Fr. Or. 33. _l. c._ Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν
κρατούντων τῆς θαλάττης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· τὰ δὲ
τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων· ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς
κέκτηται, πολλὰς δ᾽ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας.

[61] Lysias, Orat. Frag. _l. c._ Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους
πάντων μάλιστα, τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα
περιορῶσιν, ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, etc.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν ἀλλ᾽
οἰκείας· ~οὐδ᾽ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις
ἀμφοτέρων ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι~.

I give in the text the principal points of what remains out of
this discourse of Lysias, without confining myself to the words.

Unfortunately we possess but a scanty fragment of this emphatic harangue (a panegyrical harangue, in the ancient sense of the word) delivered at Olympia by Lysias. But we see the alarming picture of the time which he labored to impress: Hellas already enslaved, both in the east and in the west, by the two greatest potentates of the age,[62] Artaxerxes and Dionysius—and now threatened in her centre by their combined efforts. To feel the full probability of so gloomy an anticipation, we must recollect that only in the preceding year Dionysius, already master of Sicily and of a considerable fraction of Italian Greece, had stretched his naval force across to Illyria, armed a host of Illyrian barbarians, and sent them southward under Alketas against the Molossians, with the view of ultimately proceeding farther and pillaging the Delphian temple. The Lacedæmonians had been obliged to send a force to arrest their progress.[63] No wonder then that Lysias should depict the despot of Syracuse as meditating ulterior projects against Central Greece; and as an object not only of hatred for what he had done, but of terror for what he was about to do, in conjunction with the other great enemy from the east.[64]

[62] Diodor. xv. 23. οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν τότε δυναστῶν, etc.

[63] Diodor. xv. 13.

[64] Isokrates holds similar language, both about the
destructive conquests of Dionysius, and the past sufferings
and present danger of Hellas, in his Orat. IV. (Panegyric.)
composed about 380 B. C., and (probably enough) read at the
Olympic festival of that year (s. 197). ἴσως δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς
εὐηθείας πολλοὶ καταγελάσειαν, εἰ δυστυχίας ἀνδρῶν ὀδυροίμην ἐν
τοιούτοις καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς Ἰταλία μὲν ἀνάστατος γέγονε, Σικελία
δὲ καταδεδούλωται (compare s. 145), τοσαῦται δὲ πόλεις τοῖς
βαρβάροις ἐκδέδονται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς
μεγίστοις κινδύνοις ἐστίν.

Isokrates had addressed a letter to the elder Dionysius. He
alludes briefly to it in his Orat. ad Philippum (Orat. v. s. 93),
in terms which appear to indicate that it was bold and plain
spoken (θρασύτερον τῶν ἄλλων). The first letter, among the ten
ascribed to Isokrates, purports to be a letter to Dionysius; but
it seems rather (to judge by the last words) to be the preface of
a letter about to follow. Nothing distinct can be made out from
it as it now stands.

Of these two enemies, one (the Persian King) was out of reach. But the second—Dionysius—though not present in person, stood forth by his envoys and appurtenances conspicuous even to ostentation, beyond any man on the ground. His Theôry or solemn legation outshone every other by the splendor of its tents and decorations: his chariots to run in the races were magnificent: his horses were of rare excellence, bred from the Venetian stock, imported out of the innermost depths of the Adriatic Gulf:[65] his poems, recited by the best artists in Greece, solicited applause—by excellent delivery and fine choric equipments, if not by superior intrinsic merit. Now the antipathy against Dionysius was not only aggravated by all this display, contrasted with the wretchedness of impoverished exiles whom he had dispossessed—but was also furnished with something to strike at and vent itself upon. Of such opportunity for present action against a visible object, Lysias did not fail to avail himself. While he vehemently preached a crusade to dethrone Dionysius and liberate Sicily, he at the same time pointed to the gold and purple tent before them, rich and proud above all its fellows, which lodged the brother of the despot with his Syracusan legation. He exhorted his hearers to put forth at once an avenging hand, in partial retribution for the sufferings of free Greece, by plundering the tent which insulted them by its showy decorations. He adjured them to interfere and prevent the envoys of this impious despot from sacrificing or entering their chariots in the lists, or taking any part in the holy Pan-hellenic festival.[66]

[65] Strabo, v. p. 212.

[66] Dionys. Hal. p. 519. Jud. de Lysiâ. Ἐστὶ δή τις αὐτῷ
πανηγυρικὸς λόγος, ἐν ᾧ πείθει τοὺς Ἕλληνας ... ἐκβάλλειν
Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ Σικελίαν ἐλευθερῶσαι,
ἄρξασθαί τε τῆς ἐχθρᾶς αὐτίκα μάλα, διαρπάσαντας τὴν τοῦ τυράννου
σκηνὴν χρυσῷ τε καὶ πορφύρᾳ καὶ ἄλλῳ πλούτῳ πολλῷ κεκοσμημένην,
etc.

Diodor. xiv. 109. Λυσίας ... προετρέπετο τὰ πλήθη μὴ προσδέχεσθαι
τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀγῶσι τοὺς ἐξ ἀσεβεστάτης τυραννίδος ἀπεσταλμένους
θεωρούς.

Compare Plutarch Vit. x. Orator, p. 836 D.

We cannot doubt that a large proportion of the spectators on the plain of Olympia felt with greater or less intensity the generous Pan-hellenic patriotism and indignation to which Lysias gave utterance. To what extent his hearers acted upon the unbecoming violence of his practical recommendations—how far they actually laid hands on the tents, or tried to hinder the Syracusans from sacrificing, or impeded the bringing out of their chariots for the race—we are unable to say. We are told that some ventured to plunder the tents:[67] how much was effected we do not hear. It is certain that the superintending Eleian authorities would interfere most strenuously to check any such attempt at desecrating the festival, and to protect the Syracusan envoys in their tents, their regular sacrifice, and their chariot-running. And it is farther certain, as far as our account goes, that the Syracusan chariots actually did run on the lists; because they were, though by various accidents, disgracefully unsuccessful, or overturned and broken in pieces.[68]

[67] Diodor. xiv. 109. ὥστε τινὰς τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.

[68] Diodor. xiv. 109.

To any one however who reflects on the Olympic festival, with all its solemnity and its competition for honors of various kinds, it will appear that the mere manifestation of so violent an antipathy, even though restrained from breaking out into act, would be sufficiently galling to the Syracusan envoys. But the case would be far worse, when the poems of Dionysius came to be recited. These were volunteer manifestations, delivered (like the harangue of Lysias) before such persons as chose to come and hear; not comprised in the regular solemnity, nor therefore under any peculiar protection by the Eleian authorities. Dionysius stood forward of his own accord to put himself upon his trial as a poet before the auditors. Here therefore the antipathy against the despot might be manifested by the most unreserved explosions. And when we are told that the badness of the poems[69] caused them to be received with opprobrious ridicule, in spite of the excellence of the recitation, it is easy to see that the hatred intended for the person of Dionysius was discharged upon his verses. Of course the hissers and hooters would make it clearly understood what they really meant, and would indulge in the full license of heaping curses upon his name and acts. Neither the best reciters of Greece, nor the best poems even of Sophokles or Pindar, could have any chance against such predetermined antipathy. And the whole scene would end in the keenest disappointment and humiliation, inflicted upon the Syracusan envoys as well as upon the actors; being the only channel through which the retributive chastisement of Hellas could be made to reach the author.

[69] Diodor. xiv. 109.

Though not present in person at Olympia, the despot felt the chastisement in his inmost soul. The mere narrative of what had passed plunged him into an agony of sorrow, which for some time seemed to grow worse by brooding on the scene, and at length drove him nearly mad. He was smitten with intolerable consciousness of the profound hatred borne towards him, even throughout a large portion of the distant and independent Hellenic world. He fancied that this hatred was shared by all around him, and suspected every one as plotting against his life. To such an excess of cruelty did this morbid excitement carry him, that he seized several of his best friends, under false accusations, or surmises, and caused them to be slain.[70] Even his brother Leptinês, and his ancient partisan Philistus, men who had devoted their lives first to his exaltation, and afterwards to his service, did not escape. Having given umbrage to him by an intermarriage between their families made without his privity, both were banished from Syracuse, and retired to Thurii in Italy, where they received that shelter and welcome which Leptinês had peculiarly merited by his conduct in the Lucanian war. The exile of Leptinês did not last longer than (apparently) about a year, after which Dionysius relented, recalled him, and gave him his daughter in marriage. But Philistus remained in banishment more than sixteen years; not returning to Syracuse until after the death of Dionysius the elder, and the accession of Dionysius the younger.[71]

[70] Diodor. xv. 7. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ἀκούσας τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων
καταφρόνησιν, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν λύπης. Ἀεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ
πάθους ἐπίτασιν λαμβάνοντος, μανιωδὴς διάθεσις κάτεσχε τὴν ψυχὴν
αὐτοῦ, καὶ φθονεῖν αὐτῷ φάσκων ἅπαντας, τοὺς φίλους ὑπώπτευεν
ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντας· καὶ πέρας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο προῆλθε λύπης καὶ
παρακοπῆς, ὥστε τῶν φίλων πολλοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ ψευδέσιν αἰτίαις
ἀνελεῖν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ἐφυγάδευσεν· ἐν οἷς ἦν Φίλιστος καὶ
Λεπτίνης ὁ ἀδελφὸς, etc.

[71] For the banishment, and the return of Philistus and
Leptinês, compare Diodor. xv. 7, and Plutarch, Dion. c.
11. Probably it was on this occasion that Polyxenus, the
brother-in-law of Dionysius, took flight as the only means of
preserving his life (Plutarch, Dion. c. 21).

Plutarch mentions the incident which offended Dionysius and
caused both Philistus and Leptinês to be banished. Diodorus does
not notice this incident; yet it is not irreconcilable with his
narrative. Plutarch does not mention the banishment of Leptinês,
but only that of Philistus.

On the other hand, he affirms (and Nepos also, Dion. c. 3) that
Philistus did not return until after the death of the elder
Dionysius, while Diodorus states his return conjointly with that
of Leptinês—not indicating any difference of time. Here I follow
Plutarch’s statement as the more probable.

There is, however, one point which is perplexing. Plutarch
(Timoleon, c. 15) animadverts upon a passage in the history of
Philistus, wherein that historian had dwelt, with a pathos which
Plutarch thinks childish and excessive, upon the melancholy
condition of the daughters of Leptinês, “who had fallen from the
splendor of a court into a poor and mean condition.” How is this
reconcilable with the fact stated by Diodorus, that Leptinês was
recalled from exile by Dionysius after a short time, taken into
favor again, and invested with command at the battle of Kronium,
where he was slain? It seems difficult to believe that Philistus
could have insisted with so much sympathy upon the privations
endured by the daughters of Leptinês, if the exile of the father
had lasted only a short time.

Such was the memorable scene at the Olympic festival of 384 B. C., together with its effect upon the mind of Dionysius. Diodorus, while noticing all the facts, has cast an air of ridicule over them by recognizing nothing except the vexation of Dionysius, at the ill success of his poem, as the cause of his mental suffering; and by referring to the years 388 B. C. and 386 B. C., that which properly belongs to 384 B. C.[72] Now it is improbable, in the first place, that the poem of Dionysius,—himself a man of ability and having every opportunity of profiting by good critics whom he had purposely assembled around him[73]—should have been so ridiculously bad as to disgust an impartial audience: next, it is still more improbable that a simple poetical failure, though doubtless mortifying to him, should work with such fearful effect as to plunge him into anguish and madness. To unnerve thus violently a person like Dionysius—deeply stained with the great crimes of unscrupulous ambition, but remarkably exempt from infirmities—some more powerful cause is required; and that cause stands out conspicuously, when we conceive the full circumstances of the Olympic festival of 384 B. C. He had accumulated for this occasion all the means of showing himself off, like Krœsus in his interview with Solon, as the most prosperous and powerful man in the Hellenic world;[74] means beyond the reach of any contemporary, and surpassing even Hiero or Thero of former days, whose praises in the odes of Pindar he probably had in his mind. He counted, probably with good reason, that his splendid legation, chariots, and outfit of acting and recitation for the poems, would surpass everything else seen on the holy plain; and he fully expected such reward as the public were always glad to bestow on rich men who exhausted their purses in the recognized vein of Hellenic pious ostentation. In this high wrought state of expectation, what does Dionysius hear, by his messengers returning from the festival? That their mission had proved a total failure, and even worse than a failure; that the display had called forth none of the usual admiration, not because there were rivals on the ground equal or superior, but simply because it came from _him_; that its very magnificence had operated to render the explosion of antipathy against him louder and more violent; that his tents in the sacred ground had been actually assailed, and that access to sacrifice, as well as to the matches, had been secured to him only by the interposition of authority. We learn indeed that his chariots failed in the field by unlucky accidents; but in the existing temper of the crowd, these very accidents would be seized as occasions for derisory cheering against him. To this we must add explosions of hatred, yet more furious, elicited by his poems, putting the reciters to utter shame. At the moment when Dionysius expected to hear the account of an unparalleled triumph, he is thus informed, not merely of disappointment, but of insults to himself, direct and personal, the most poignant ever offered by Greeks to a Greek, amidst the holiest and most frequented ceremony of the Hellenic world.[75] Never in any other case do we read of public antipathy, against an individual, being carried to the pitch of desecrating by violence the majesty of the Olympic festival.

[72] In a former chapter of this History (Vol. X. Ch. LXXVII. p.
75), I have already shown grounds, derived from the circumstances
of Central Greece and Persia, for referring the discourse of
Lysias, just noticed, to Olympiad 99 or 384 B. C. I here add
certain additional reasons, derived from what is said about
Dionysius, towards the same conclusion.

In xiv. 109, Diodorus describes the events of 388 B. C., the
year of Olympiad 98, during which Dionysius was still engaged
in war in Italy, besieging Rhegium. He says that Dionysius made
unparalleled efforts to send a great display to this festival;
a splendid legation, with richly decorated tents, several fine
chariots-and-four, and poems to be recited by the best actors.
He states that Lysias the orator delivered a strong invective
against him, exciting those who heard it to exclude the Syracusan
despot from sacrificing, and to plunder the rich tents. He then
details how the purposes of Dionysius failed miserably on every
point; the fine tents were assailed, the chariots all ran wrong
or were broken, the poems were hissed, the ships returning to
Syracuse were wrecked, etc. Yet in spite of this accumulation of
misfortunes (he tells us) Dionysius was completely soothed by
his flatterers (who told him that such envy always followed upon
greatness), and did not desist from poetical efforts.

Again, in xv. 6, 7, Diodorus describes the events of 386 B.
C. Here he again tells us, that Dionysius, persevering in
his poetical occupations, composed verses which were very
indifferent—that he was angry with and punished Philoxenus and
others who criticized them freely—that he sent some of these
compositions to be recited at the Olympic festival, with the best
actors and reciters—that the poems, in spite of these advantages,
were despised and derided by the Olympic audience—that Dionysius
was distressed by this repulse, even to anguish and madness, and
to the various severities and cruelties against his friends which
have been already mentioned in my text.

Now upon this we must remark:—

1. The year 386 B. C. is _not_ an Olympic year. Accordingly,
the proceedings described by Diodorus in xv. 6, 7, all done by
Dionysius after his hands were free from war, must be transferred
to the next Olympic year, 384 B. C. The year in which Dionysius
was so deeply stung by the events of Olympia, must therefore have
been 384 B. C., or Olympiad 99 (relating to 388 B. C.).

2. Compare Diodor. xiv. 109 with xv. 7. In the first passage,
Dionysius is represented as making the most prodigious efforts
to display himself at Olympia in every way, by fine tents,
chariots, poems, etc.—and also as having undergone the signal
insult from the orator Lysias, with the most disgraceful failure
in every way. Yet all this he is described to have borne with
tolerable equanimity, being soothed by his flatterers. But, in
xv. 7 (relating to 386 B. C., or more probably to 384 B. C.) he
is represented as having merely failed in respect to the effect
of his poems; nothing whatever being said about display of any
other kind, nor about an harangue from Lysias, nor insult to the
envoys or the tents. Yet the simple repulse of the poems is on
this occasion affirmed to have thrown Dionysius into a paroxysm
of sorrow and madness.

Now if the great and insulting treatment, which Diodorus refers
to 388 B. C., could be borne patiently by Dionysius—how are
we to believe that he was driven mad by the far less striking
failure in 384 B. C.? Surely it stands to reason that the violent
invective of Lysias and the profound humiliation of Dionysius,
are parts of one and the same Olympic phænomenon; the former as
cause, or an essential part of the cause—the latter as effect.
The facts will then read consistently and in proper harmony. As
they now appear in Diodorus, there is no rational explanation
of the terrible suffering of Dionysius described in xv. 7; it
appears like a comic exaggeration of reality.

3. Again, the prodigious efforts and outlay, which Diodorus
affirms Dionysius to have made in 388 B. C. for display at the
Olympic games—come just at the time when Dionysius, being in the
middle of his Italian war, could hardly have had either leisure
or funds to devote so much to the other purpose; whereas at the
next Olympic festival, or 384 B. C., he was free from war, and
had nothing to divert him from preparing with great efforts all
the means of Olympic success.

It appears to me that the facts which Diodorus has stated are
nearly all correct, but that he has misdated them, referring to
388 B. C., or Olymp. 98—what properly belongs to 384 B. C., or
Olymp. 99. Very possibly Dionysius may have sent one or more
chariots to run in the former of the two Olympiads; but his
signal efforts, with his insulting failure brought about partly
by Lysias, belong to the latter.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to whom we owe the citation from the
oration of Lysias, does not specify to which of the Olympiads it
belongs.

[73] Diodor. xv. 7. διὸ καὶ ποιήματα γράφειν ὑπεστήσατο μετὰ
πολλῆς σπουδῆς, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις δόξαν ἔχοντας μετεπέμπετο,
καὶ προτιμῶν αὐτοὺς συνδιέτριβε, καὶ τῶν ~ποιημάτων ἐπιστάτας καὶ
διορθωτὰς εἶχεν~.

The Syracusan historian Athanis (or Athenis) had noticed some
peculiar phrases which appeared in the verses of Dionysius: see
Athenæus, iii. p. 98.

[74] Thucyd. vi. 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν
τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν, τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάζε θεωρίας
(speech of Alkibiadês).

[75] See a striking passage in the discourse called _Archidamus_
(Or. vi. s. 111, 112) of Isokrates, in which the Spartans are
made to feel keenly their altered position after the defeat of
Leuktra: especially the insupportable pain of encountering, when
they attended the Olympic festival, slights or disparagement from
the spectators, embittered by open taunts from the reëstablished
Messenians—instead of the honor and reverence which they had
become accustomed to expect.

This may help us to form some estimate of the painful sentiment
of Dionysius, when his envoys returned from the Olympic festival
of 384 B. C.

Here then were the real and sufficient causes—not the mere ill-success of his poem—which penetrated the soul of Dionysius, driving him into anguish and temporary madness. Though he had silenced the Vox Populi at Syracuse, not all his mercenaries, ships, and forts in Ortygia, could save him from feeling its force, when thus emphatically poured forth against him by the free-spoken crowd at Olympia.

It was apparently shortly after the peace of 387 B. C., that Dionysius received at Syracuse the visit of the philosopher Plato.[76] The latter—having come to Sicily on a voyage of inquiry and curiosity, especially to see Mount Ætna—was introduced by his friends, the philosophers of Tarentum, to Dion, then a young man, resident at Syracuse, and brother of Aristomachê, the wife of Dionysius. Of Plato and Dion I shall speak more elsewhere: here I notice the philosopher only as illustrating the history and character of Dionysius. Dion, having been profoundly impressed with the conversation of Plato, prevailed upon Dionysius to invite and talk with him also. Plato discoursed eloquently upon justice and virtue, enforcing his doctrine that wicked men were inevitably miserable—that true happiness belonged only to the virtuous—and that despots could not lay claim to the merit of courage.[77] This meagre abstract does not at all enable us to follow the philosopher’s argument. But it is plain that he set forth his general views on social and political subjects with as much freedom and dignity of speech before Dionysius as before any simple citizen; and we are farther told, that the by-standers were greatly captivated by his manner and language. Not so the despot himself. After one or two repetitions of the like discourse, he became not merely averse to the doctrine, but hostile to the person, of Plato. According to the statement of Diodorus, he caused the philosopher to be seized, taken down to the Syracusan slave-market, and there put up for sale as a slave at the price of twenty minæ; which his friends subscribed to pay, and thus released him. According to Plutarch, Plato himself was anxious to depart, and was put by Dion aboard a trireme which was about to convey home the Lacedæmonian envoy Pollis. But Dionysius secretly entreated Pollis to cause him to be slain on the voyage—or at least to sell him as a slave. Plato was accordingly landed at Ægina, and there sold. He was purchased, or repurchased, by Annikeris of Kyrênê, and sent back to Athens. This latter is the more probable story of the two; but it seems to be a certain fact that Plato was really sold, and became for a moment a slave.[78]

[76] There are different statements about the precise year in
which Plato was born: see Diogenes Laert. iii. 1-6. The accounts
fluctuate between 429 and 428 B. C.; and Hermodorus (ap. Diog. L.
iii. 6) appears to have put it in 427 B. C.: see Corsini, Fast.
Attic. iii. p. 230; Ast. Platon’s Leben, p. 14.

Plato (Epistol. vii. p. 324) states himself to have been about
(σχεδὸν) forty years of age when he visited Sicily for the first
time. If we accept as the date of his birth 428 B. C., he would
be forty years of age in 388 B. C.

It seems improbable that the conversation of Plato with Dion at
Syracuse (which was continued sufficiently long to exercise a
marked and permanent influence on the character of the latter),
and his interviews with Dionysius, should have taken place
while Dionysius was carrying on the Italian war or the siege of
Rhegium. I think that the date of the interview must be placed
after the capture of Rhegium in 387 B. C. And the expression
of Plato (given in a letter written more than thirty years
afterwards) about his own age, is not to be taken as excluding
the supposition that he might have been forty-one or forty-two
when he came to Syracuse.

Athenæus (xi. p. 507) mentions the visit of Plato.

[77] Plutarch, Dion. c. 5.

[78] Plutarch, Dion, c. 5; Diodor. xv. 7; Diogen. Laert. iii. 17;
Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 2.

That Dionysius should listen to the discourse of Plato with repugnance, not less decided than that which the Emperor Napoleon was wont to show towards ideologists—was an event naturally to be expected. But that, not satisfied with dismissing the philosopher, he should seek to kill, maltreat, or disgrace him, illustrates forcibly the vindictive and irritable elements of his character, and shows how little he was likely to respect the lives of those who stood in his way as political opponents.

Dionysius was at the same time occupied with new constructions, military, civil, and religious, at Syracuse. He enlarged the fortifications of the city by adding a new line of wall, extending along the southern cliff of Epipolæ, from Euryalus to the suburb called Neapolis; which suburb was now, it would appear, surrounded by a separate wall of its own—or perhaps may have been so surrounded a few years earlier, though we know that it was unfortified and open during the attack of Imilkon in 396 B. C.[79] At the time, probably, the fort at the Euryalus was enlarged and completed to the point of grandeur which its present remains indicate. The whole slope of Epipolæ became thus bordered and protected by fortifications, from its base at Achradina to its apex at Euryalus. And Syracuse now comprised five separately fortified portions,—Epipolæ, Neapolis, Tychê, Achradina, and Ortygia; each portion having its own fortification, though the four first were included within the same outer walls. Syracuse thus became the largest fortified city in all Greece; larger even than Athens in its then existing state, though not so large as Athens had been during the Peloponnesian war, while the Phaleric wall was yet standing.

[79] Diodor. xiv. 6.3. It was in the construction of these
extensive fortifications, seemingly, that Dionysius demolished
the chapel which had been erected by the Syracusans in honor of
Dioklês (Diodor. xiii. 635).

Serra di Falco (Antichità di Sicilia, vol. iv. p. 107) thinks
that Dionysius constructed only the northern wall up the cliff of
Epipolæ, not the southern. This latter (in his opinion) was not
constructed until the time of Hiero II.

I dissent from him on this point. The passage here referred to in
Diodorus affords to my mind sufficient evidence that the elder
Dionysius constructed both the southern wall of Epipolæ and the
fortification of Neapolis. The same conclusion moreover appears
to result from what we read of the proceedings of Dion and
Timoleon afterwards.

Besides these extensive fortifications, Dionysius also enlarged the docks and arsenals so as to provide accommodation for two hundred men of war. He constructed spacious gymnasia on the banks of the river Anapus, without the city walls; and he further decorated the city with various new temples in honor of different gods.[80]

[80] Diodor. xv. 13.

Such costly novelties added grandeur as well as security to Syracuse, and conferred imposing celebrity on the despot himself. They were dictated by the same aspirations as had prompted his ostentatious legation to Olympia in 384 B. C.; a legation of which the result had been so untoward and intolerable to his feelings. They were intended to console, and doubtless did in part console, the Syracusan people for the loss of their freedom. And they were further designed to serve as fuller preparations for the war against Carthage, which he was now bent upon renewing. He was obliged to look about for a pretext, since the Carthaginians had given him no just cause. But this, though an aggression, was a Pan-hellenic aggression,[81] calculated to win for him the sympathies of all Greeks, philosophers as well as the multitude. And as the war was begun in the year immediately succeeding the insult cast upon him at Olympia, we may ascribe it in part to a wish to perform exploits such as might rescue his name from the like opprobrium in future.

[81] See Plato, Epist. vii. p. 333, 336—also some striking lines,
addressed by the poet Theokritus to Hiero II. despot at Syracuse
in the succeeding century: Theokrit. xvi. 75-85.

Dionysius—ἐζήτει λαβεῖν πρόφασιν εὔλογον τοῦ πολέμου, etc.

The sum of fifteen hundred talents, recently pillaged from the temple at Agylla,[82] enabled Dionysius to fit out a large army for his projected war. Entering into intrigues with some of the disaffected dependencies of Carthage in Sicily, he encouraged them to revolt, and received them into his alliance. The Carthaginians sent envoys to remonstrate, but could obtain no redress; upon which they on their side prepared for war, accumulated a large force of hired foreign mercenaries under Magon, and contracted alliance with some of the Italiot Greeks hostile to Dionysius. Both parties distributed their forces so as to act partly in Sicily, partly in the adjoining peninsula of Italy; but the great stress of war fell on Sicily, where Dionysius and Magon both commanded in person. After several combats partial and indecisive, a general battle was joined at a place called Kabala. The contest was murderous, and the bravery great on both sides; but at length Dionysius gained a complete victory. Magon himself and ten thousand men of his army were slain; five thousand were made prisoners; while the remainder were driven to retreat to a neighboring eminence, strong, but destitute of water. They were forced to send envoys entreating peace; which Dionysius consented to grant, but only on condition that every Carthaginian should be immediately withdrawn from all the cities in the island, and that he should be reimbursed for the costs of the war.[83]

[82] Diodor. xv. 15.

[83] Diodor. xv. 15.

The Carthaginian generals affected to accept the terms offered, but stated (what was probably the truth), that they could not pledge themselves for the execution of such terms, without assent from the authorities at home. They solicited a truce of a few days, to enable them to send thither for instructions. Persuaded that they could not escape, Dionysius granted their request. Accounting the emancipation of Sicily from the Punic yoke to be already a fact accomplished, he triumphantly exalted himself on a pedestal higher even than that of Gelon. But this very confidence threw him off his guard and proved ruinous to him; as it happened frequently in Grecian military proceedings. The defeated Carthaginian army gradually recovered their spirits. In place of the slain general Magon, who was buried with magnificence, his son was named commander; a youth of extraordinary energy and ability, who so contrived to reassure and reorganize his troops, that when the truce expired, he was ready for a second battle. Probably the Syracusans were taken by surprise and not fully prepared. At least the fortune of Dionysius had fled. In this second action, fought at a spot called Kronium, he underwent a terrible and ruinous defeat. His brother Leptinês, who commanded on one wing, was slain gallantly fighting; those around him were defeated; while Dionysius himself, with his select troops on the other wing, had at first some advantage, but was at length beaten and driven back. The whole army fled in disorder to the camp, pursued with merciless vehemence by the Carthaginians, who, incensed by their previous defeat, neither gave quarter nor took prisoners. Fourteen thousand dead bodies, of the defeated Syracusan army, are said to have been picked up for burial; the rest were only preserved by night and by the shelter of their camp.[84]

[84] Diodor. xv. 16, 17.

Such was the signal victory—the salvation of the army, perhaps even of Carthage herself—gained at Kronium by the youthful son of Magon. Immediately after it, he retired to Panormus. His army probably had been too much enfeebled by the former defeat to undertake farther offensive operations; moreover he himself had as yet no regular appointment as general. The Carthaginian authorities too had the prudence to seize this favorable moment for making peace, and sent to Dionysius envoys with full powers. But Dionysius only obtained peace by large concessions; giving up to Carthage Selinus with its territory, as well as half the Agrigentine territory—all that lay to the west of the river Halykus; and farther covenanting to pay to Carthage the sum of one thousand talents.[85] To these unfavorable conditions Dionysius was constrained to subscribe; after having but a few days before required the Carthaginians to evacuate all Sicily, and pay the costs of the war. As it seems doubtful whether Dionysius would have so large a sum ready to pay down at once, we may reasonably presume that he would undertake to liquidate it by annual instalments. And we thus find confirmation of the memorable statement of Plato, that Dionysius became tributary to the Carthaginians.[86]

[85] Diodor. xv. 17.

[86] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 A. After reciting the advice
which Dion and he had given to Dionysius the younger, he
proceeds to say—ἕτοιμον γὰρ εἶναι, τούτων γενομένων, πολὺ μᾶλλον
δουλώσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τῆς ἐπὶ Γέλωνος αὐτοῖς γενομένης
δουλείας, ~ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ, ὥσπερ νῦν τοὐναντίον, ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ φόρον
ἐτάξατο φέρειν τοῖς βαρβάροις~, etc.

Such are the painful gaps in Grecian history as it is transmitted to us, that we hear scarcely anything about Dionysius for thirteen years after the peace of 383-382 B. C. It seems that the Carthaginians (in 379 B. C.) sent an armament to the southern portion of Italy for the purpose of reëstablishing the town of Hipponium and its inhabitants.[87] But their attention appears to have been withdrawn from this enterprise by the recurrence of previous misfortunes—fearful pestilence, and revolt of their Libyan dependencies, which seriously threatened the safety of their city. Again, Dionysius also, during one of these years, undertook some operations, of which a faint echo reaches us, in this same Italian peninsula (now Calabria Ultra). He projected a line of wall across the narrowest portion or isthmus of the peninsula, from the Gulf of Skylletium to that of Hipponium, so as to separate the territory of Lokri from the northern portion of Italy, and secure it completely to his own control. Professedly the wall was destined to repel the incursions of the Lucanians; but in reality (we are told) Dionysius wished to cut off the connection between Lokri and the other Greeks in the Tarentine Gulf. These latter are said to have interposed from without, and prevented the execution of the scheme; but its natural difficulties would be in themselves no small impediment, nor are we sure that the wall was even begun.[88]

[87] Diodor. xv. 24.

[88] Strabo, vi. p. 261; Pliny, H. N. iii. 10. The latter calls
the isthmus twenty miles broad, and says that Dionysius wished
(intercisam) to cut it through: Strabo says that he proposed to
wall it across (διατειχίζειν), which is more probable.

During this interval, momentous events (recounted in my previous chapters) had occurred in Central Greece. In 382 B. C., the Spartans made themselves by fraud masters of Thebes, and placed a permanent garrison in the Kadmeia. In 380 B. C., they put down the Olynthian confederacy, thus attaining the maximum of their power. But in 379 B. C., there occurred the revolution at Thebes achieved by the conspiracy of Pelopidas, who expelled the Lacedæmonians from the Kadmeia. Involved in a burdensome war against Thebes and Athens, together with other allies the Lacedæmonians gradually lost ground, and had become much reduced before the peace of 371 B. C., which left them to contend with Thebes alone. Then came the fatal battle of Leuktra which prostrated their military ascendency altogether. These incidents have been already related at large in former chapters. Two years before the battle of Leuktra, Dionysius sent to the aid of the Lacedæmonians at Korkyra a squadron of ten ships, all of which were captured by Iphikrates; about three years after the battle, when the Thebans and their allies were pressing Sparta in Peloponnesus, he twice sent thither a military force of Gauls and Iberians to reinforce her army. But his troops neither stayed long, nor rendered any very conspicuous service.[89]

[89] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 4, 33; vii i. 20-28. Diodor. xv. 70.