Chapter LXXXVII (1)

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN WAR.

It has been recounted in the preceding chapter, how Philip, during the continuance of the Social War, aggrandized himself in Macedonia and Thrace at the expense of Athens, by the acquisition of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa—the two last actually taken from her, the first captured only under false assurances held out to her while he was besieging it: how he had farther strengthened himself by enlisting Olynthus both as an ally of his own, and as an enemy of the Athenians. He had thus begun the war against Athens, usually spoken of as the war about Amphipolis, which lasted without any formal peace for twelve years. The resistance opposed by Athens to these his first aggressions had been faint and ineffective—partly owing to embarrassments. But the Social War had not yet terminated, when new embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature, sprang up elsewhere—known by the name of the Sacred War, rending the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia.

The Amphiktyonic assembly, which we shall now find exalted into an inauspicious notoriety, was an Hellenic institution ancient and venerable, but rarely invested with practical efficiency. Though political by occasion, it was religious in its main purpose, associated with the worship of Apollo at Delphi and of Dêmêtêr at Thermopylæ. Its assemblies were held twice annually—in spring at Delphi, in autumn at Thermopylæ; while in every fourth year it presided at the celebration of the great Pythian festival near Delphi, or appointed persons to preside in its name. It consisted of deputies called Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ, sent by the twelve ancient nations or fractions of the Hellenic name, who were recognized as its constituent body: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians, Œtæans or Ænianes, Achæans, Malians, Phokians, Dolopes. These were the twelve nations, sole partners in the Amphiktyonic sacred rites and meetings: each nation, small and great alike, having two votes in the decision and no more; and each city, small and great alike, contributing equally to make up the two votes of that nation to which it belonged. Thus Sparta counted only as one of the various communities forming the Dorian nation: Athens, in like manner in the Ionian, not superior in rank to Erythræ or Priênê.[509]

[509] Æschines, De Fals. Legat. p. 280. c. 36. For particulars
respecting the Amphiktyonic assembly see the treatise of Tittman,
Ueber den Amphiktyonischen Bund, p. 37, 45, _seqq._

That during the preceding century, the Amphiktyonic assembly had meddled rarely, and had never meddled to any important purpose, in the political affairs of Greece—is proved by the fact that it is not once mentioned either in the history of Thucydides, or in the Hellenica of Xenophon. But after the humiliation of Sparta at Leuktra, this great religious convocation of the Hellenic world, after long torpor, began to meet for the despatch of business. Unfortunately its manifestations of activity were for the most part abusive and mischievous. Probably not long after the battle of Leuktra, though we do not know the precise year—the Thebans exhibited before the Amphiktyons an accusation against Sparta, for having treacherously seized the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) in a period of profound peace. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced against her,[510] together with a fine of five hundred talents, doubled after a certain interval of non-payment. The act here put in accusation was indisputably a gross political wrong; and a pretence, though a very slight pretence, for bringing political wrong under cognizance of the Amphiktyons, might be found in the tenor of the old oath taken by each included city.[511] Still, every one knew that for generations past, the assembly had taken no actual cognizance of political wrong; so that both trial and sentence were alike glaring departures from understood Grecian custom—proving only the humiliation of Sparta and the insolence of Thebes. The Spartans of course did not submit to pay, nor were there any means of enforcement against them. No practical effect followed therefore, except (probably) the exclusion of Sparta from the Amphiktyonic assembly—as well as from the Delphian temple and the Pythian games. Indirectly, however, the example was most pernicious, as demonstrating that the authority of a Pan-hellenic convocation, venerable from its religious antiquity; could be abused to satisfy the political antipathies of a single leading state.

[510] Diodor. xvi. 23-29; Justin, viii. 1.

[511] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. p. 279. c. 35.

In the year 357 B. C., a second attempt was made by Thebes to employ the authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly as a means of crushing her neighbors the Phokians. The latter had been, from old time, border-enemies of the Thebans, Lokrians, and Thessalians. Until the battle of Leuktra, they had fought as allies of Sparta against Thebes, but had submitted to Thebes after that battle, and had continued to be her allies, though less and less cordial, until the battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas.[512] Since that time, the old antipathy appears to have been rekindled, especially on the part of Thebes. Irritated against the Phokians probably as having broken off from a sworn alliance, she determined to raise against them an accusation in the Amphiktyonic assembly. As to the substantive ground of accusation, we find different statements. According to one witness, they were accused of having cultivated some portion of the Kirrhæan plain, consecrated from of old to Apollo; according to another, they were charged with an aggressive invasion of Bœotia; while, according to a third, the war was caused by their having carried off Theano, a married Theban woman. Pausanias confesses that he cannot distinctly make out what was the allegation against them.[513] Assisted by the antipathy of the Thessalians and Lokrians, not less vehement than her own, Thebes had no difficulty in obtaining sentence of condemnation against the Phokians. A fine was imposed upon them; of what amount we are not told, but so heavy as to be far beyond their means of payment.

[512] Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23, and vii. 5, 4. About
the feud of the Thessalians and Phokians, see Herodot. vii. 176,
viii. 27; Æschines, De Fals. Leg. p. 289. c. 43—of the Lokrians
and Phokians, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 5, 3; Pausanias, iii. 9, 4.

[513] Diodor. xvi. 23; Justin, viii. 1; Pausanias, x. 2, 1; Duris
ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 560. Justin says, “Causa et origo hujus
mali, Thebani fuere; qui cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam
imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios et Phocenses,
quasi parva supplicia cædibus et rapinis luissent, apud commune
Græciæ concilium superbe accusaverunt Lacedæmoniis crimini datum,
quod arcem Thebanam induciarum tempore occupassent; Phocensibus,
quod Bœotiam depopulati essent; prorsus quasi post arma et bellum
locum legibus reliquissent.”

It was thus that the Thebans, who had never been able to attach to themselves a powerful confederacy such as that which formerly held its meetings at Sparta, supplied the deficiency by abusing their ascendency in the Amphiktyonic assembly to procure vengeance upon political enemies. A certain time was allowed for liquidating the fine, which the Phokians had neither means nor inclination to do. Complaint of the fact was then made at the next meeting of the Amphiktyons, when a decisive resolution was adopted, and engraven along with the rest on a column in the Delphian temple, to expropriate the recusant Phokians, and consecrate all their territory to Apollo—as Kirrha with its fertile plain had been treated two centuries before. It became necessary, at the same time, for the maintenance of consistency and equal dealing, to revive the mention of the previous fine still remaining unpaid by the Lacedæmonians; against whom it was proposed to pass a vote of something like excommunication.

Such impending dangers, likely to be soon realized under the instigation of Thebes, excited a resolute spirit of resistance among the Phokians. A wealthy and leading citizen of the Phokian town Ledon, named Philomelus son of Theotimus, stood forward as the head of this sentiment, setting himself energetically to organize means for the preservation of Phokian liberty as well as property. Among his assembled countrymen, he protested against the gross injustice of the recent sentence, amercing them in an enormous sum exceeding their means; when the strip of land, where they were alleged to have trespassed on the property of the god, was at best narrow and insignificant. Nothing was left, now, to avert from them utter ruin, except a bold front and an obstinate resistance, which he (Philomelus) would pledge himself to conduct with success, if they would intrust him with full powers. The Phokians (he contended) were the original and legitimate administrators of the Delphian temple—a privilege of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the Amphiktyonic assembly and the Delphians. “Let us reply to our enemies (he urged) by re-asserting our lost rights and seizing the temple; we shall obtain support and countenance from many Grecian states, whose interest is the same as our own, to resist the unjust decrees of the Amphiktyons.[514] Our enemies the Thebans (he added) are plotting the seizure of the temple for themselves, through the corrupt connivance of an Amphiktyonic majority: let us anticipate and prevent their injustice.”[515]

[514] Diodor. xvi. 23, 24; Pausanias, x. 2, 1.

[515] That this design, imputed to the Thebans, was a part of
the case made out by the Phokians for themselves, we may feel
assured from the passage in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347. s.
22. Demosthenes charges Æschines with having made false promises
and statements to the Athenian assembly, on returning from his
embassy in 346 B. C. Æschines told the Athenians (so Demosthenes
affirms) that he had persuaded Philip to act altogether in the
interest and policy of Athens; that the Athenians would very
presently see Thebes besieged by Philip, and the Bœotian towns
restored; and furthermore, τῷ θεῷ δὲ τὰ χρήματα εἰσπραττόμενα, οὐ
παρὰ Φωκέων, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ~Θηβαίων τῶν βουλευσάντων τὴν κατάληψιν
τοῦ ἱεροῦ~ διδάσκειν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὸν Φίλιππον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἧττον
~ἠσεβήκασιν οἱ βεβουλευκότες τῶν ταῖς χερσὶ πραξάντων~, καὶ διὰ
ταῦτα χρήμαθ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπικεκηρυχέναι.

How far Æschines really promised to the Athenians that which
Demosthenes here alleges him to have promised—is a matter to
be investigated when we arrive at the transactions of the year
346 B. C. But it seems to me clear that the imputation (true
or false) against the Thebans, of having been themselves in
conspiracy to seize the temple, must have emanated first from the
Phokians, as part of the justification of their own proceedings.
If the Thebans ever conceived such an idea, it must have been
_before_ the actual occupation of the temple by the Phokians, if
they were falsely charged with conceiving it, the false charge
would also be preferred at the time. Demosthenes would hardly
invent it twelve years after the Phokian occupation.

Here a new question was raised, respecting the right of presidency over the most venerated sanctuary in Greece; a question fraught with ruin to the peace of the Hellenic world. The claim of the Phokians was not a mere fiction, but founded on an ancient reality, and doubtless believed by themselves to be just. Delphi and its inhabitants were originally a portion of the Phokian name. In the Homeric Catalogue, which Philomelus emphatically cited, it stands enumerated among the Phokians commanded by Schedius and Epistrophus, under the name of the “rocky Pytho,”—a name still applied to it by Herodotus.[516] The Delphians had acquired sufficient force to sever themselves from their Phokian brethren—to stand out as a community by themselves—and to assume the lucrative privilege of administering the temple as their own peculiar. Their severance had been first brought about, and their pretensions as administrators espoused by Sparta,[517] upon whose powerful interest they mainly depended. But the Phokians had never ceased to press their claim, and so far was the dispute from being settled against them, even in 450 B. C., that they then had in their hands the actual administration. The Spartans despatched an army for the express purpose of taking it away from them and transferring it to the Delphians; but very shortly afterwards, when the Spartan forces had retired, the Athenians marched thither, and dispossessed the Delphians,[518] restoring the temple to the Phokians. This contest went by the name of the Sacred War. At that time the Athenians were masters of most parts of Bœotia, as well as of Megara and Pegæ; and had they continued so, the Phokians would probably have been sustained in their administration of the holy place; the rights of the Delphians on one side, against those of the Phokians on the other, being then obviously dependent on the comparative strength of Athens and Sparta. But presently evil days came upon Athens, so that she lost all her inland possessions north of Attica, and could no longer uphold her allies in Phokis. The Phokians now in fact passed into allies of Sparta, and were forced to relinquish their temple-management to the Delphians; who were confirmed in it by a formal article of the peace of Nikias in 421 B. C.,[519] and retained it without question, under the recognized Hellenic supremacy of Sparta, down to the battle of Leuktra. Even then, too, it continued undisturbed; since Thebes was nowise inclined to favor the claim of her enemies the Phokians, but was on the contrary glad to be assisted in crushing them by their rivals the Delphians, who, as managers of the temple, could materially contribute to a severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic assembly.

[516] Herodot. i. 54.

[517] Strabo, ix. p. 423.

[518] Thucyd. i. 12.

[519] Thucyd. v. 18.

We see thus that the claim now advanced by Philomelus was not fictitious, but genuine, and felt by himself as well as by other Phokians to be the recovery of an ancient privilege, lost only through superior force.[520] His views being heartily embraced by his countrymen, he was nominated general with full powers. It was his first measure to go to Sparta, upon whose aid he counted, in consequence of the heavy fine which still stood imposed upon her by the Amphiktyonic sentence. He explained his views privately to king Archidamus, engaging, if the Phokians should become masters of the temple, to erase the sentence and fine from the column of record. Archidamus did not dare to promise him public countenance or support; the rather, as Sparta had always been the chief supporter of the Delphian presidency (as against the Phokian) over the temple. But in secret he warmly encouraged the scheme; furnishing a sum of fifteen talents, besides a few mercenary soldiers, towards its execution. With this aid Philomelus returned home, provided an equal sum of fifteen talents from his own purse, and collected a body of peltasts, Phokians as well as strangers. He then executed his design against Delphi, attacking suddenly both the town and the temple, and capturing them, as it would appear, with little opposition. To the alarmed Delphians, generally, he promised security and good treatment; but he put to death the members of the Gens (or Clan) called Thrakidæ, and seized their property: these men constituted one among several holy Gentes, leading conductors of the political and religious agency of the place.[521] It is probable, that when thus suddenly assailed, they had sent to solicit aid from their neighbors, the Lokrians of Amphissa; for Philomelus was scarcely in possession of Delphi, when these latter marched up to the rescue. He defeated them however with serious loss, and compelled them to return home.

[520] Justin (viii. 1) takes no notice of this first position of
the Phokians in regard to the temple of Delphi. He treats them as
if they had been despoilers of the temple even at first; “velut
deo irascentes.”

[521] Diodor. xvi. 24. Hesychius (v. Λαφριάδαι) mentions another
phratry or gens at Delphi, called Laphriadæ. See Wilhelm Götte,
Das Delphische Orakel, p. 83. Leipsic, 1839.

It is stated by Pausanias, that the Phokians were bent upon
dealing with Delphi and its inhabitants in the harshest manner;
intending to kill all the men of military age, to sell the
remaining population as slaves, and to raze the whole town to
the ground. Archidamus, king of Sparta, (according to Pausanias)
induced the Phokians to abandon this resolution (Pausan. iii. 10,
4).

At what moment the Phokians ever determined on this step—or,
indeed, whether they ever really determined on it—we cannot feel
any certainty. Nor can we decide confidently, whether Pausanias
borrowed the statement from Theopompus, whom he quotes a little
before.

Thus completely successful in his first attempt, Philomelus lost no time in announcing solemnly and formally his real purpose. He proclaimed that he had come only to resume for the Phokians their ancient rights as administrators; that the treasures of the temple should be safe and respected as before; that no impiety or illegality of any kind should be tolerated; and that the temple and its oracle would be opened, as heretofore, for visitors, sacrificers, and inquirers. At the same time, well aware that his Lokrian enemies at Amphissa were very near, he erected a wall to protect the town and temple, which appears to have been hitherto undefended,—especially its western side. He further increased his levies of troops. While the Phokians, inspirited with this first advantage, obeyed his call in considerable numbers, he also attracted new mercenaries from abroad by the offer of higher pay. He was presently at the head of five thousand men, strong enough to hold a difficult post like Delphi against all immediate attack. But being still anxious to appease Grecian sentiment and avert hostility, he despatched envoys to all the principal states,—not merely to Sparta and Athens, but also to his enemy Thebes. His envoys were instructed to offer solemn assurances, that the Phokians had taken Delphi simply to reclaim their paternal right of presidency, against past wrongful usurpation; that they were prepared to give any security required by the Hellenic body, for strict preservation of the valuables in the temple, and to exhibit and verify all, by weight and number, before examiners; that conscious of their own rectitude of purpose, they did not hesitate to entreat positive support against their enemies, or at any rate, neutrality.[522] The answers sent to Philomelus were not all of the same tenor. On this memorable event, the sentiments of the Grecian world were painfully divided. While Athens, Sparta, the Peloponnesian Achæans and some other states in Peloponnesus, recognized the possession of the Phokians, and agreed to assist them in retaining it,—the Thebans and Thessalians declared strenuously against them, supported by all the states north of Bœotia, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Phthiot-Achæans, Magnêtes, Perrhæbians, Athamânes, and Dolopes. Several of these last were dependents of the Thessalians, and followed their example; many of them moreover belonging to the Amphiktyonic constituency, must have taken part in the votes of condemnation just rescinded by the Phokians.

[522] Didorus xvi. 27. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς
ἐπισημοτάτας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀπέστειλεν,
ἀπολογούμενος, ὅτι κατείληπται τοὺς Δελφοὺς, οὐ τοῖς ἱεροῖς
χρήμασιν ἐπιβουλεύων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ προστασίας ἀμφισβητῶν·
εἶναι γὰρ Φωκέων αὐτὴν ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις
ἀποδεδειγμένην. Τῶν δὲ χρημάτων τὸν λόγον ἔφη πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν
ἀποδώσειν, καὶ τόν τε σταθμὸν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀναθημάτων
ἕτοιμος εἶναι παραδιδόναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξετάζειν. Ἠξίου δὲ,
ἄν τις δι᾽ ἐχθρὰν ἢ φθόνον πολέμῃ Φωκεῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν ξυμμαχεῖν,
εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν.

In reference to the engagement taken by Philomelus, that he
would exhibit and verify, before any general Hellenic examiners,
all the valuable property in the Delphian temple, by weight
and number of articles—the reader will find interesting matter
of comparison in the Attic Inscriptions. No. 137-142, vol. i.
of Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt. Græcarum—with Boeckh’s valuable
commentary. These are the records of the numerous gold and
silver donatives, preserved in the Parthenon, handed over by the
treasurers of the goddess annually appointed, to their successors
at the end of the year, from one Panathenaic festival to the
next. The weight of each article is formally recorded, and the
new articles received each year (ἐπέτεια) are specified. Where an
article is transferred without being weighed (ἄσταθμον), the fact
is noticed. That the precious donatives in the Delphian temple
also, were carefully weighed, we may judge by the statement of
Herodotus, that the golden lion dedicated by Krœsus had lost
a fraction of its weight in the conflagration of the building
(Herodot. i. 50).

Pausanias (x. 2, 1) does not advert to the difference between
the first and the second part of the proceedings of Philomelus;
first, the seizure of the temple, without any spoliation of the
treasure, but simply upon the plea that the Phokians had the
best right to administer its affairs; next, the seizure of the
treasure and donatives of the temple—which he came to afterwards,
when he found it necessary for defence.

We may clearly see that it was not at first the intention of Philomelus or his Phokian comrades to lay hands on the property of the Delphian temple; and Philomelus, while taking pains to set himself right in the eyes of Greece, tried to keep the prophetic agency of the temple in its ordinary working, so as to meet the exigencies of sacrificers and inquirers as before. He required the Pythian priestess to mount the tripod, submit herself to the prophetic inspiration, and pronounce the word thus put into her mouth, as usual. But the priestess,—chosen by the Delphians, and probably herself a member of one among the sacred Delphian Gentes,—obstinately refused to obey him; especially as the first question which he addressed concerned his own usurpation, and his chances of success against enemies. On his injunctions, that she should prophesy according to the traditional rites,—she replied that these rites were precisely what he had just overthrown; upon which he laid hold of her, and attempted to place her on the tripod by force. Subdued and frightened for her own personal safety, the priestess exclaimed involuntarily, that he might do what he chose. Philomelus gladly took this as an answer, favorable to his purpose. He caused it to be put in writing and proclaimed, as an oracle from the god, sanctioning and licensing his designs. He convened a special meeting of his partisans and the Delphians generally, wherein appeal was made to this encouraging answer, as warranting full confidence with reference to the impending war. So it was construed by all around, and confirmatory evidence was derived from farther signs and omens occurring at the moment.[523] It is probable, however, that Philomelus took care for the future to name a new priestess, more favorable to his interest, and disposed to deliver oracular answers under the new administrators in the same manner as under the old.

[523] Diodor. xvi. 25, 26, 27.

Though so large a portion of the Grecian name had thus declared war against the Phokians, yet none at first appear to have made hostile movements, except the Lokrians, with whom Philomelus was fully competent to deal. He found himself strong enough to overrun and plunder their territory, engaging in some indecisive skirmishes. At first the Lokrians would not even give up the bodies of his slain soldiers for burial, alleging that sacrilegious men were condemned by the general custom of Greece to be cast out without sepulture. Nor did they desist from their refusal until he threatened retaliation towards the bodies of their own slain.[524] So bitter was the exasperation arising out of this deplorable war throughout the Hellenic world! Even against the Lokrians alone, however, Philomelus soon found himself in want of money, for the payment of his soldiers,—native Phokians as well as mercenary strangers. Accordingly, while he still adhered to his pledge to respect the temple property, he did not think himself precluded from levying a forced contribution on the properties of his enemies, the wealthy Delphian citizens; and his arms were soon crowned with a brilliant success against the Lokrians, in a battle fought near the Rocks called Phædriades; a craggy and difficult locality so close to Delphi, that the Lokrians must evidently have been the aggressors, marching up with a view to relieve the town. They were defeated with great loss, both in slain and in prisoners; several of them only escaping the spear of the enemy by casting themselves to certain death down the precipitous cliffs.[525]

[524] Diodor. xvi. 25.

[525] Diodor. xvi. 28.

This victory, while imparting courage to the Phokians, proved the signal for fresh exertions among their numerous enemies. The loud complaints of the defeated Lokrians raised universal sympathy; and the Thebans, now pressed by fear, as well as animated by hatred, of the Phokians, put themselves at the head of the movement. Sending round envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphiktyonic states, they invoked aid and urged the necessity of mustering a common force,—“to assist the god,”—to vindicate the judicial dignity of the Amphiktyonic assembly,—and to put down the sacrilegious Phokians.[526] It appears that a special meeting of the assembly itself was convened; probably at Thermopylæ, since Delphi was in possession of the enemy. Decided resolutions were here taken to form an Amphiktyonic army of execution; accompanied by severe sentences of fine and other punishments, against the Phokian leaders, by name Philomelus and Onomarchus,—perhaps brothers, but at least joint commanders, together with others.[527]

[526] Diodor. xvi. 28. ψηφισαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων τὸν πρὸς
Φωκεῖς πόλεμον, πολλὴ ταραχὴ καὶ διάστασις ἦν καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν
Ἑλλάδα. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τοὺς Φωκεῖς,
ὡς ἱεροσύλους, κολάζειν· οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Φωκέων βοήθειαν
ἀπέκλιναν.

[527] Diodor. xvi. 32. about Onomarchus—πολλαῖς γὰρ καὶ μεγάλαις
δίκαις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἦν καταδεδικασμένος ὁμοίως τοῖς
ἄλλοις, etc.

Onomarchus is denominated the colleague of Philomelus, cap. 31,
and his brother, cap. 61.

The perils of the Phokians now became imminent. Their own unaided strength was nowise sufficient to resist the confederacy about to arm in defence of the Amphiktyonic assembly;[528] nor does it appear that either Athens or Sparta had as yet given them anything more than promises and encouragement. Their only chance of effective resistance lay in the levy of a large mercenary force; for which purpose neither their own funds, nor any farther aid derivable from private confiscation, could be made adequate. There remained no other resource except to employ the treasures and valuables in the Delphian temple, upon which accordingly Philomelus now laid hands. He did so, however, as his previous conduct evinced, with sincere reluctance, probably with various professions at first of borrowing only a given sum, destined to meet the actual emergency, and intended to be repaid as soon as safety should be provided for.[529] But whatever may have been his intentions at the outset, all such reserves or limits, or obligations to repay, were speedily forgotten in practice. When the feeling which protected the fund was broken through, it was as easy to take much as little, and the claimants became more numerous and importunate; besides which the exigencies of the war never ceased, and the implacable repugnance raised by the spoliation amidst half of the Grecian world, left to the Phokians no security except under the protection of a continued mercenary force.[530] Nor were Philomelus and his successors satisfied without also enriching their friends and adorning their wives or favorites.

[528] Even in 374 B. C., three years before the battle of
Leuktra, the Phokians had been unable to defend themselves
against Thebes without aid from Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 1).

[529] Diodor. xvi. 30. ἠναγκάζετο (Philomelus) τοῖς ἱεροῖς
ἀναθήμασιν ἐπιβαλεῖν τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συλᾷν τὸ μαντεῖον. A similar
proposition had been started by the Corinthian envoys in the
congress at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war; they
suggested as one of their ways and means the borrowing from
the treasures of Delphi and Olympia, to be afterwards repaid
(Thucyd. i. 121). Perikles made the like proposition in the
Athenian assembly; “for purposes of security,” the property
of the temples might be employed to defray the cost of war,
subject to the obligation of replacing the whole afterwards
(χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστῆσαι
πάλιν, Thucyd. ii. 13). After the disaster before Syracuse,
and during the years of struggle intervening before the close
of the war, the Athenians were driven by financial distress to
appropriate to public purposes many of the rich donatives in the
Parthenon, which they were never afterwards able to replace. Of
this abstraction, proof is found in the Inscriptions published by
Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 137-142, which contain the official
records of the successive Boards of Treasurers of Athênê. It is
stated in an instructive recent Dissertation, by J. L. Ussing
(De Parthenone ejusque partibus Disputatio, p. 3. Copenhagen,
1849), “Multæ in arce Athenarum inventæ sunt tabulæ Quæstorum
Minervæ, in quibus quotannis inscribebant, quænam vasa aurea
aliæque res pretiosæ in æde Minervæ dedicata extarent. Harum
longe maxima pars ante Euclidem archontem scripta est...: Nec
tamen una tabula templi dona continebat universa, sed separatim
quæ in Pronao, quæ in Hecatompedo, quæ in Parthenone (the part
of the temple specially so called), servabantur, separatim suis
quæque lapidibus consignata erant. Singulari quadam fortuna
contigit, ut inde ab anno 434 B. C., ad 407 B. C., tam multa
fragmenta tabularum servata sint, ut hos donorum catalogos
aliquatenus restituere possimus. In quo etiam ad historiam
illius temporis pertinet, quod florentibus Athenarum rebus opes
Deæ semper augeri, fractis autem bello Siculo, inde ab anno 412
B. C., eas paulatim deminui videmus.... Urgente pecuniæ inopia
Athenienses ad Deam confugiebant, et jam ante annum 406 B. C.,
pleraque Pronai dona ablata esse videmus. Proximis annis sine
dubio nec Hecatompedo nec Parthenoni pepercerunt; nec mirum est,
post bellum Peloponnesiacum ex antiquis illis donis fere nulla
comparere.”

[530] Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot; Athenæ. xiii. p. 605, vi.
p. 232; Ephorus, Frag. 155, ed. Didot; Diodor. xvi. 64.

Availing himself of the large resources of the temple, Philomelus raised the pay of his troops to a sum half as large again as before, and issued proclamations inviting new levies at the same rate. Through such tempting offers he was speedily enabled to muster a force, horse and foot together, said to amount to 10,000 men; chiefly, as we are told, men of peculiarly wicked and reckless character, since no pious Greek would enlist in such a service. With these he attacked the Lokrians, who were however now assisted by the Thebans from one side, and by the Thessalians with their circumjacent allies from the other. Philomelus gained successive advantages against both of them, and conceived increased hopes from a reinforcement of 1500 Achæans who came to him from Peloponnesus. The war assumed a peculiarly ferocious character; for the Thebans,[531] confident in their superior force and chance of success, even though the Delphian treasure was employed against them, began by putting to death all their prisoners, as sacrilegious men standing condemned by the Amphiktyonic assembly. This so exasperated the troops of Philomelus, that they constrained him to retaliate upon the Bœotian prisoners. For some time such rigorous inflictions were continued on both sides, until at length the Thebans felt compelled to desist, and Philomelus followed their example. The war lasted a while with indecisive results, the Thebans and their allies being greatly superior in number. But presently Philomelus incautiously exposed himself to attack in an unfavorable position, near the town of Neon, amidst embarrassing woods and rocks. He was here defeated with severe loss, and his army dispersed; himself receiving several wounds, and fighting with desperate bravery, until farther resistance became impossible. He then tried to escape, but found himself driven to the brink of a precipice, where he could only avoid the tortures of captivity by leaping down and perishing. The remnant of his vanquished army was rallied at some distance by Onomarchus.[532]

[531] Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philippum) s. 60. τελευτῶντες δὲ
πρὸς Φωκέας πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν (the Thebans), ὡς τῶν τε πόλεων
ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κρατήσοντες, τόν τε τόπον ἅπαντα τὸν περιέχοντα
κατασχήσοντες, τῶν τε χρημάτων τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς περιγενησόμενοι
ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων δαπάναις.

[532] Diodor. xvi. 31; Pausan. x. 2, 1. The dates and duration
of these events are only known to us in a loose and superficial
manner from the narrative of Diodorus.

The Thebans and their allies, instead of pressing the important victory recently gained over Philomelus, seem to have supposed that the Phokians would now disperse or submit of their own accord, and accordingly returned home. Their remissness gave time to Onomarchus to reorganize his dispirited countrymen. Convening at Delphi a general assembly of Phokians and allies, he strenuously exhorted them to persevere in the projects, and avenge the death, of their late general. He found, however, no inconsiderable amount of opposition; for many of the Phokians—noway prepared for the struggle in which they now found themselves embarked, and themselves ashamed of the spoliation of the temple—were anxious by some accommodation to put themselves again within the pale of Hellenic religious sentiment. Onomarchus doubtless replied, and with too good reason, that peace was unattainable upon any terms short of absolute ruin; and that there was no course open except to maintain their ground as they stood, by renewed efforts of force. But even if the necessities of the case had been less imperative, he would have been able to overbear all opposition of his own countrymen through the numerous mercenary strangers, now in Phokis and present at the assembly under the name of allies.[533] In fact, so irresistible was his ascendency by means of this large paid force under his command, that both Demosthenes and Æschines[534] denominate him (as well as his predecessor and his successor) not general, but despot, of the Phokians. The soldiers were not less anxious than Onomarchus to prosecute the war, and to employ the yet unexhausted wealth of the temple in every way conducive to ultimate success. In this sense the assembly decreed, naming Onomarchus general with full powers for carrying the decree into effect.

[533] Diodor. xvi. 32. Οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς—ἐπανῆλθον εἰς Δελφοὺς καὶ
συνελθόντες ~μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων~ εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐβουλεύοντο
περὶ τοῦ πολέμου.

[534] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41. τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι
τυράννων, etc. Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. s. 147.
Φαύλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς ἤ τις ἄλλος δυναστὴς, etc.

His energetic measures presently retrieved the Phokian cause. Employing the temple-funds still more profusely than Philomelus, he invited fresh soldiers from all quarters, and found himself, after some time, at the head of a larger army than before. The temple exhibited many donatives, not only of gold and silver, but also of brass and iron. While Onomarchus melted the precious metals and coined them into money, he at the same time turned the brass and iron into arms;[535] so that he was enabled to equip both his own soldiers disarmed in the recent defeat, and a class of volunteers poorer than the ordinary self-armed mercenaries. Besides paying soldiers, he scattered everywhere presents or bribes to gain influential partisans in the cities favorable to his cause; probably Athens and Sparta first of all. We are told that the Spartan king Archidamus, with his wife Deïnicha, were among the recipients; indeed the same corrupt participation was imputed, by the statement of the hostile-minded Messenians,[536] to the Spartan ephors and senate. Even among enemies, Onomarchus employed his gold with effect, contriving thus to gain or neutralize a portion of the Thessalians; among them the powerful despots of Pheræ, whom we afterwards find allied to him. Thus was the great Delphian treasure turned to account in every way; and the unscrupulous Phokian despot strengthened his hands yet farther, by seizing such of his fellow-countrymen as had been prominent in opposition to his views, putting them to death, and confiscating their property.[537]

[535] Diodor. xvi. 33. The numerous iron spits, dedicated by the
courtezan Rhodôpis at Delphi, may probably have been applied to
this military purpose. Herodotus (ii. 135) saw them at Delphi;
in the time of Plutarch, the guide of the Temple only showed the
place in which they had once stood (Plutarch, De Pythiæ Oraculis,
p. 400).

[536] Theopompus, Frag. 255, ed. Didot; Pausanias, iii. 10, 2;
iv. 5, 1. As Archidamus is said to have furnished fifteen talents
privately to Philomelus (Diodor. xvi. 24), he may, perhaps, have
received now repayment out of the temple property.

[537] Diodor. xvi. 33.

Through such combination of profuse allurement, corruption, and violence, the tide began to turn again in favor of the Phokians. Onomarchus found himself shortly at the head of a formidable army, which he marched forth from Delphi, and subdued successively the Lokrians of Amphissa, the Epiknemidian Lokrians, and the neighboring territory of Doris. He carried his conquests even as far as the vicinity of Thermopylæ; capturing Thronium, one of the towns which commanded that important pass, and reducing its inhabitants to slavery. It is probable that he also took Nikæa and Alpônus—two other valuable positions near Thermopylæ, which we know to have been in the power of the Phokians until the moment immediately preceding their ruin—since we find him henceforward master of Thermopylæ, and speedily opening his communications with Thessaly.[538] Besides this extension of dominion to the north and east of Phokis, Onomarchus also invaded Bœotia. The Thebans, now deprived of their northern allies, did not at first meet him in the field, so that he was enabled to capture Orchomenus. But when he proceeded to attack Chæroneia, they made an effective effort to relieve the place. They brought out their forces, and defeated him, in an action not very decisive, yet sufficient to constrain him to retire into Phokis.

[538] Diodor. xvi. 33. His account of the operations of
Onomarchus is, as usual, very meagre—εἰς δὲ τὴν πολεμίαν
ἐμβαλὼν, Θρόνιον μὲν ἐκπολιορκήσας ἐξηνδραποδίσατο, Ἀμφισσεῖς δὲ
καταπληξάμενος, τὰς δ᾽ ἐν Δωριεῦσι πόλεις πορθήσας, τὴν χώραν
αὐτῶν ἐδῄωσεν.

That Thronium, with Alpônus and Nikæa, were the three places
which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ—and that all the three
were in possession of the Phokians immediately before they
were conquered by Philip of Macedon in 346 B. C.—we know from
Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41.

... πρέσβεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς (the Athenians) ἦλθον ἐκ Φωκέων, βοηθεῖν
αὑτοῖς κελεύοντες, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι παραδώσειν Ἀλπωνὸν καὶ
Θρόνιον καὶ Νίκαιαν, τὰ τῶν παρόδων τῶν εἰς Πύλας χωρία κύρια.

In order to conquer Thronium, Onomarchus must have marched
through and mastered the Epiknemidian Lokrians; and though no
place except Thronium is specified by Diodorus, it seems plain
that Onomarchus can not have conquered Thronium alone.

Probably the Thebans were at this time much pressed, and prevented from acting effectively against the Phokians, by want of money. We know at least that in the midst of the Phokian war they hired out a force of 5000 hoplites commanded by Pammenes, to Artabazus the revolted Phrygian satrap. Here Pammenes with his soldiers acquired some renown, gaining two important victories over the Persians.[539] The Thebans, it would seem, having no fleet and no maritime dependencies, were less afraid of giving offence to the Great King than Athens had been, when she interdicted Chares from aiding Artabazus, and acquiesced in the unfavorable pacification which terminated the Social War. How long Pammenes and the Thebans remained in Asia, we are not informed. But in spite of the victories gained by them, Artabazus was not long able to maintain himself against the Persian arms. Three years afterwards, we hear of him and his brother-in-law Memnon as expelled from Asia, and as exiles residing with Philip of Macedon.[540]

[539] Diodor. xvi. 34.

[540] Diodor. xvi. 52.

While Pammenes was serving under Artabazus, the Athenian general Chares recaptured Sestos in the Hellespont, which appears to have revolted from Athens during the Social War. He treated the captive Sestians with rigor; putting to death the men of military age, and selling the remainder as slaves.[541] This was an important acquisition for Athens, as a condition of security in the Chersonese as well as of preponderance in the Hellespont.

[541] Diodor. xvi. 34.

Alarmed at the successes of Chares in the Hellespont, the Thracian prince Kersobleptes now entered on an intrigue with Pammenes in Asia, and with Philip of Macedon (who was on the coast of Thrace, attacking Abdêra and Maroneia), for the purpose of checking the progress of the Athenian arms. Philip appears to have made a forward movement, and to have menaced the possessions of Athens in the Chersonese; but his access thither was forbidden by Amadokus, another prince of Thrace, master of the intermediate territory, as well as by the presence of Chares with his fleet off the Thracian coast.[542] Apollonides of Kardia was the agent of Kersobleptes; who however finding his schemes abortive, and intimidated by the presence of Chares, came to terms with Athens, and surrendered to her the portion of the Chersonese which still remained to him, with the exception of Kardia. The Athenians sent to the Chersonese a farther detachment of Kleruchs or out-settlers, for whom considerable room must have been made as well by the depopulation of Sestos, as by the recent cession from Kersobleptes.[543] It was in the ensuing year (352 B. C.) that the Athenians also despatched a fresh batch of 2000 citizens as settlers to Samos, in addition to those who had been sent thither thirteen years before.[544]

[542] Polyænus, iv. 2, 22, seems to belong to this juncture.

[543] We derive what is here stated from the comparison of two
passages, put together as well as the uncertainty of their tenor
admits, Diodor. xvi. 34, with Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
681. s. 219 (s. 183, in Weber’s edition, whose note ought to be
consulted). Demosthenes says, Φιλίππου γὰρ εἰς Μαρώνειαν ἐλθόντος
ἔπεμψε (Kersobleptes) πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀπολλωνίδην, πίστεις δοὺς ἐκείνῳ
καὶ Παμμένει· καὶ εἰ μὴ κρατῶν τῆς χώρας Ἀμάδοκος ἀπεῖπε Φιλίππῳ
μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καρδιανοὺς
ἤδη καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην. Καὶ ὅτι ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ λέγω, λαβὲ τὴν Χάρητος
ἐπιστολήν.

The mention of Pammenes, as being within reach of communication
with Kersobleptes—the mention of Chares as being at the
Chersonese, and sending home despatches—and the notice of Philip
as being at Maroneia—all conspire to connect this passage with
the year 353-352 B. C., and with the facts referred to that
year by Diodorus, xvi. 34. There is an interval of five years
between the presence of Chares here alluded to, and the presence
of Chares noticed before in the same oration, p. 678. s. 206,
immediately after the successful expedition to Eubœa in 358 B.
C. During these five years, Kersobleptes had acted in a hostile
manner towards Athens in the neighborhood of the Chersonese (p.
680. s. 214), and also towards the two rival Thracian princes,
friends of Athens. At the same time Sestos had again revolted;
the forces of Athens being engaged in the Social War, from 358
to 355 B. C. In 353 B. C. Chares is at the Hellespont, recovers
Sestos, and again defeats the intrigues of Kersobleptes, who
makes cession to Athens of a portion of territory which he
still held in the Chersonese. Diodorus ascribes this cession
of Kersobleptes to the motive of aversion towards Philip and
good-will towards the Athenians. Possibly these may have been
the motives pretended by Kersobleptes, to whom a certain party
at Athens gave credit for more favorable dispositions than the
Demosthenic oration against Aristokrates recognizes—as we may see
from that oration itself. But I rather apprehend that Diodorus,
in describing Kersobleptes as hostile to Philip, and friendly to
Athens, has applied to the year 353 B. C. a state of relations
which did not become true until a later date, nearer to the time
when peace was made between Philip and the Athenians in 346 B. C.

[544] Dionysius, Hal. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 664; Strabo. xiv. p.
638.

The mention of Philip as attacking Maroneia and menacing the Thracian Chersonese, shows the indefatigable activity of that prince and the steady enlargement of his power. In 358 B. C., he had taken Amphipolis; before 355 B. C., he had captured Pydna and Potidæa, founded the new town of Philippi, and opened for himself the resource of the adjoining auriferous region; he had established relations with Thessaly, assisting the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa in their struggle against Lykophron and Peitholaus, the despots of Pheræ:[545] he had farther again chastised the interior tribes bordering on Macedonia, Thracians. Pæonians, and Illyrians, who were never long at rest, and who had combined to regain their independence.[546] It appears to have been in 354-353 B. C., that he attacked Methônê, the last remaining possession of Athens on the Macedonian coast. Situated on the Thermaic Gulf, Methônê was doubtless a convenient station for Athenian privateers to intercept trading vessels, not merely to and from Macedonian ports, but also from Olynthus and Potidæa; so that the Olynthians, then in alliance with Philip against Athens, would be glad to see it pass into his power, and may perhaps have lent him their aid. He pressed the siege of the place with his usual vigor, employing all the engines and means of assault then known; while the besieged on their side were not less resolute in the defence. They repelled his attacks for so long a time, that news of the danger of the place reached Athens, and ample time was afforded for sending relief, had the Athenians been ready and vigorous in their movement. But unfortunately they had not even now learnt experience from the loss of Pydna and Potidæa. Either the Etesian winds usual in summer, or the storms of winter, both which circumstances were taken into account by Philip in adjusting the season of his enterprises[547]—or (which is more probable) the aversion of the Athenian respectable citizens to personal service on shipboard, and their slackness even in pecuniary payment—caused so much delay in preparations, that the expedition sent out did not reach Methônê until too late.[548] The Methonæans, having gallantly held out until all their means were exhausted, were at length compelled to surrender. Diodorus tells us that Philip granted terms so far lenient as to allow them to depart with the clothes on their backs.[549] But this can hardly be accurate, since we know that there were Athenian citizens among them sold as slaves, some of whom were ransomed by Demosthenes with his own money.[550]

[545] Diodor. xvi, 14. This passage relates to the year 357-356
B. C., and possibly Philip may have begun to meddle in the
Thessalian party-disputes even as early as that year; but his
effective interference comes two or three years later. See the
general order of Philip’s aggressions indicated by Demosthenes,
Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13.

[546] Diodor. xvi. 22.

[547] See a striking passage in Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p.
48. s. 35. There was another place called Methônê—the Thracian
Methônê—situated in the Chalkidic or Thracian peninsula, near
Olynthus and Apollonia—of which we shall hear presently.

[548] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 50. s. 40; Olynth. i. p. 11. s.
9.

[549] Diodorus (xvi. 31-34) mentions the capture of Methônê by
Philip twice, in two successive years: first, in 354-353 B. C.;
again, more copiously, in 353-352 B. C. In my judgment, the
earlier of the two dates is the more probable. In 353-352 B. C.,
Philip carried on his war in Thrace, near Abdera and Maroneia—and
also his war against Onomarchus in Thessaly; which transactions
seem enough to fill up the time. From the language of Demosthenes
(Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13), we see that Philip did not attack
Thessaly until after the capture of Methônê. Diodorus as well as
Strabo (vii. p. 330), and Justin (vii. 6) state that Philip was
wounded and lost the sight of one eye in this siege. But this
seems to have happened afterwards, near the Thracian Methônê.

Compare Justin, vii. 6; Polyænus, iv. 2. 15. Under the year
354-353 B. C., Diodorus mentions not only the capture of Methônê
by Philip, but also the capture of _Pagæ_. Παγὰς δὲ χειρωσάμενος,
ἠνάγκασεν ὑποταγῆναι. _Pagæ_ is unknown, anywhere near Macedonia
and Thessaly. Wesseling and Mr. Clinton suppose _Pagasæ_ in
Thessaly to be meant. But it seems to me impossible that Philip,
who had no considerable power at sea, can have taken Pagasæ,
before his wars in Thessaly, and before he had become master of
Pheræ, which events did not occur until one year or two years
afterwards. Pagasæ is the port of Pheræ, and Lykophron the despot
of Pheræ was still powerful and unconquered. If, therefore, the
word intended by Diodorus be Παγασὰς instead of Παγὰς, I think
the matter of fact asserted cannot be correct.

[550] This fact is mentioned in the public vote of gratitude
passed by the Athenian people to Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vitæ X.
Orat. p. 851).

Being now master of the last port possessed by Athens in the Thermaic Gulf—an acquisition of great importance, which had never before[551] belonged to the Macedonian kings—Philip was enabled to extend his military operations to the neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese on the one side, and to that of Thermopylæ on the other. How he threatened the Chersonese, has been already related; and his campaign in Thessaly was yet more important. That country was, as usual, torn by intestine disputes. Lykophron the despot of Pheræ possessed the greatest sway; while the Aleuadæ of Larissa, too weak to contend against him with their own forces, invited assistance from Philip; who entered Thessaly with a powerful army. Such a reinforcement so completely altered the balance of Thessalian power, that Lykophron in his turn was compelled to entreat aid from Onomarchus and the Phokians.

[551] Thucyd. vi. 7. Μεθώνην τὴν ὅμορον Μακεδονίᾳ, etc.

So strong were the Phokians now, that they were more than a match for the Thebans with their other hostile neighbors, and had means to spare for combating Philip in Thessaly. As their force consisted of a large body of mercenaries, whom they were constrained for security to retain in pay—to keep them employed beyond the border was a point not undesirable. Hence they readily entered upon the Thessalian campaign. At this moment they counted, in the comparative assessment of Hellenic forces, as an item of first-rate magnitude. They were hailed both by Athenians and Spartans as the natural enemy and counterpoise of Thebes, alike odious to both. While the Phokians maintained their actual power, Athens could manage her foreign policy abroad, and Sparta her designs in Peloponnesus, with diminished apprehensions of being counterworked by Thebes. Both Athens and Sparta had at first supported the Phokians against unjust persecution by Thebes and abuse of Amphiktyonic jurisdiction, before the spoliation of the Delphian temple was consummated or even anticipated. And though, when that spoliation actually occurred, it was doubtless viewed with reprobation among Athenians, accustomed to unlimited freedom of public discussion—as well as at Sparta, in so far as it became known amidst the habitual secrecy of public affairs—nevertheless political interests so far prevailed, that the Phokians (perhaps in part by aid of bribery) were still countenanced, though not much assisted, as useful rivals to Thebes.[552] To restrain “the Leuktric insolence of the Thebans,”[553] and to see the Bœotian towns Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, restored to their pristine autonomy, was an object of paramount desire with each of the two ancient heads of Greece. So far both Athens and Sparta felt in unison. But Sparta cherished a farther hope—in which Athens by no means concurred—to avail herself of the embarrassments of Thebes for the purpose of breaking up Megalopolis and Messênê, and recovering her former Peloponnesian dominion. These two new Peloponnesian cities, erected by Epaminondas on the frontier of Laconia, had been hitherto upheld against Sparta by the certainty of Theban interference if they were menaced. But so little did Thebes seem in a condition to interfere, while Onomarchus and the Phokians were triumphant in 353-352 B. C., that the Megalopolitans despatched envoys to Athens to entreat protection and alliance, while the Spartans on their side sent to oppose the petition.

[552] Such is the description of Athenian feeling, as it then
stood, given by Demosthenes twenty-four years afterwards in the
Oration De Coronâ, p. 230. s. 21.

Τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάντος πολέμου, πρῶτον μὲν ὑμεῖς οὕτω
διέκεισθε, ὥστε Φωκέας μὲν βούλεσθαι σωθῆναι, καίπερ οὐ δίκαια
ποιοῦντας ὁρῶντες, Θηβαίοις δ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ἐφησθῆναι παθοῦσιν, οὐκ
ἀλόγως οὐδ᾽ ἀδίκως αὐτοῖς ὀργιζόμενοι, etc.

[553] Diodor. xvi. 58. Βουλόμενος τὰ Λευκτρικὰ φρονήματα
συστεῖλαι τῶν Βοιωτῶν, etc., an expression used in reference to
Philip a few years afterwards, but more animated and emphatic
than we usually find in Diodorus, who, perhaps, borrowed it from
Theopompus.

It is on occasion of the political debates in Athens during the years 354 and 353 B. C., that we first have before us the Athenian Demosthenes, as adviser of his countrymen in the public assembly. His first discourse of public advice was delivered in 354-353 B. C., on an alarm of approaching war with Persia; his second, in 353-352 B. C., was intended to point out the policy proper for Athens in dealing with the Spartan and Megalopolitan envoys.