Chapter XC (1)

FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B. C., TO THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEIA AND THE DEATH OF PHILIP.

I have described in my last chapter the conclusion of the Sacred War, and the reëstablishment of the Amphiktyonic assembly by Philip; together with the dishonorable peace of 346 B. C., whereby Athens, after a war, feeble in management and inglorious in result, was betrayed by the treachery of her own envoys into the abandonment of the pass of Thermopylæ;—a new sacrifice, not required by her actual position, and more fatal to her future security than any of the previous losses. This important pass, the key of Greece, had now come into possession of Philip, who occupied it, together with the Phokian territory, by a permanent garrison of his own troops.[936] The Amphiktyonic assembly had become an instrument for his exaltation. Both Thebans and Thessalians were devoted to his interest; rejoicing in the ruin of their common enemies the Phokians, without reflecting on the more formidable power now established on their frontiers. Though the power of Thebes had been positively increased by regaining Orchomenus and Koroneia, yet, comparatively speaking, the new position of Philip brought upon her, as well as upon Athens and the rest of Greece, a degradation and extraneous mastery such as had never before been endured.[937]

[936] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 119.

[937] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62. νυνὶ δὲ Θηβαίοις πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὴν
χώραν κεκομίσθαι, κάλλιστα πέπρακται, πρὸς δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν,
αἴσχιστα, etc.

This new position of Philip, as champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and within the line of common Grecian defence, was profoundly felt by Demosthenes. A short time after the surrender of Thermopylæ, when the Thessalian and Macedonian envoys had arrived at Athens, announcing the recent determination of the Amphiktyons to confer upon Philip the place in that assembly from whence the Phokians had been just expelled, concurrence of Athens in this vote was invited; but the Athenians, mortified and exasperated at the recent turn of events, were hardly disposed to acquiesce. Here we find Demosthenes taking the cautious side, and strongly advising compliance. He insists upon the necessity of refraining from any measure calculated to break the existing peace, however deplorable may have been its conditions; and of giving no pretence to the Amphiktyons for voting conjoint war against Athens, to be executed by Philip.[938] These recommendations, prudent under the circumstances, prove that Demosthenes, though dissatisfied with the peace, was anxious to keep it now that it was made; and that if he afterwards came to renew his exhortations to war, this was owing to new encroachments and more menacing attitude on the part of Philip.

[938] Demosth. De Pace, p. 60, 61.

We have other evidences, besides the Demosthenic speech just cited, to attest the effect of Philip’s new position on the Grecian mind. Shortly after the peace, and before the breaking up of the Phokian towns into villages had been fully carried into detail—Isokrates published his letter addressed to Philip—the Oratio ad Philippum. The purpose of this letter is, to invite Philip to reconcile the four great cities of Greece—Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Argos; to put himself at the head of their united force, as well as of Greece generally; and to invade Asia, for the purpose of overthrowing the Persian empire, of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and of providing new homes for the unsettled wanderers in Greece. The remarkable point here is, that Isokrates puts the Hellenic world under subordination and pupilage to Philip, renouncing all idea of it as a self-sustaining and self-regulating system. He extols Philip’s exploits, good fortune, and power, above all historical parallels—treats him unequivocally as the chief of Greece—and only exhorts him to make as good use of his power, as his ancestor Herakles had made in early times.[939] He recommends him, by impartial and conciliatory behavior towards all, to acquire for himself the same devoted esteem among the Greeks as that which now prevailed among his own Macedonian officers—or as that which existed among the Lacedæmonians towards the Spartan kings.[940] Great and melancholy indeed is the change which had come over the old age of Isokrates, since he published the Panegyrical Oration (380 B. C.—thirty-four years before) wherein he invokes a united Pan-hellenic expedition against Asia, under the joint guidance of the two Hellenic chiefs by land and sea—Sparta and Athens; and wherein he indignantly denounces Sparta for having, at the peace of Antalkidas, introduced for her own purposes a Persian rescript to impose laws on the Grecian world. The prostration of Grecian dignity, serious as it was, involved in the peace of Antalkidas, was far less disgraceful than that recommended by Isokrates towards Philip—himself indeed personally of Hellenic parentage, but a Macedonian or barbarian (as Demosthenes[941] terms him) by power and position. As Æschines, when employed in embassy from Athens to Philip, thought that his principal duty consisted in trying to persuade him by eloquence to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and put down Thebes—so Isokrates relies upon his skilful pen to dispose the new chief to a good use of imperial power—to make him protector of Greece, and conquerer of Asia. If copious and elegant flattery could work such a miracle, Isokrates might hope for success. But it is painful to note the increasing subservience, on the part of estimable Athenian freemen like Isokrates, to a foreign potentate; and the declining sentiment of Hellenic independence and dignity, conspicuous after the peace of 346 B. C. in reference to Philip.

[939] Isokrates. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 128-135.

[940] Isokrat. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 91. ὅταν οὕτω διαθῆς τοὺς
Ἕλληνας, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς Λακεδαιμονίους τε πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν βασιλέας
ἔχοντας, τοὺς δ᾽ ἑταίρους τοὺς σοὺς πρὸς σὲ διακειμένους. Ἔστι δ᾽
οὐ χαλεπὸν τυχεῖν τούτων, ἢν ἐθελήσῃς κοινὸς ἅπασι γενέσθαι, etc.

[941] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 118.

From Isokrates as well as from Demosthenes, we thus obtain evidence of the imposing and intimidating effect of Philip’s name in Greece after the peace of 346 B. C. Ochus, the Persian king, was at this time embarrassed by unsubdued revolt among his subjects; which Isokrates urges as one motive for Philip to attack him. Not only Egypt, but also Phenicia and Cyprus, were in revolt against the Persian king. One expedition (if not two) on a large scale, undertaken by him for the purpose of reconquering Egypt, had been disgracefully repulsed, in consequence of the ability of the generals (Diophantus an Athenian and Lamius a Spartan) who commanded the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian prince Nektanebus.[942] About the time of the peace of 346 B. C. in Greece, however, Ochus appears to have renewed with better success his attack on Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt. To reconquer Cyprus, he put in requisition the force of the Karian prince Idrieus (brother and successor of Mausolus and Artemisia), at this time not only the most powerful prince in Asia Minor, but also master of the Grecian islands Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, probably by means of an internal oligarchy in each, who ruled in his interest and through his soldiers.[943] Idrieus sent to Cyprus a force of forty triremes and eight thousand mercenary troops, under the command of the Athenian Phokion and of Evagoras, an exiled member of the dynasty reigning at Salamis in the island. After a long siege of Salamis itself, which was held against the Persian king by Protagoras, probably another member of the same dynasty—and after extensive operations throughout the rest of this rich island, affording copious plunder to the soldiers, so as to attract numerous volunteers from the mainland—all Cyprus was again brought under the Persian authority.[944]

[942] Isokrates, Or. v. Philipp. s. 118; Diodor. xv. 40, 44, 48.
Diodorus alludes three several times to this repulse of Ochus
from Egypt. Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libert. p. 193.

Trogus mentioned three different expeditions of Ochus against
Egypt (Argument. ad Justin. lib. x).

[943] Isokrates, Or. v. Philipp. s. 102. Ἰδριέα γε τὸν
εὐπορώτατον ~τῶν νῦν~ περὶ τὴν ἤπειρον, etc.

Demosth. De Pace, p. 63. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐῶμεν—καὶ τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς ~νήσους~
καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, etc. An oration delivered
in the latter half of 346 B. C. after the peace.

Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libertat. p. 121, an oration four years
earlier.

[944] Diodor. xvi. 42-46. In the Inscription No. 87. of Boeckh’s
Corpus Inscriptt., we find a decree passed by the Athenians
recognizing friendship and hospitality with the Sidonian prince
Strato—from whom they seem to have received a donation of ten
talents. The note of date in this decree is not preserved; but M.
Boeckh conceives it to date between Olympiad 101-104.

The Phenicians had revolted from Ochus at the same time as the Cypriots, and in concert with Nektanebus prince of Egypt, from whom they received a reinforcement of four thousand Greek mercenaries under Mentor the Rhodian. Of the three great Phenician cities, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus—each a separate political community, but administering their common affairs at a joint town called Tripolis, composed of three separate walled circuits, a furlong apart from each other—Sidon was at once the oldest, the richest, and the greatest sufferer from Persian oppression. Hence the Sidonian population, with their prince Tennes, stood foremost in the revolt against Ochus, employing their great wealth in hiring soldiers, preparing arms, and accumulating every means of defence. In the first outbreak they expelled the Persian garrison, seized and punished some of the principal officers, and destroyed the adjoining palace and park reserved for the satrap or king. Having farther defeated the neighboring satraps of Kilikia and Syria, they strengthened the defences of the city by triple ditches, heightened walls, and a fleet of one hundred triremes and quinqueremes. Incensed at these proceedings, Ochus marched with an immense force from Babylon. But his means of corruption served him better than his arms. The Sidonian prince Tennes, in combination with Mentor, entered into private bargain with him, betrayed to him first one hundred of the principal citizens, and next placed the Persian army in possession of the city-walls. Ochus, having slain the hundred citizens surrendered to him, together with five hundred more who came to him with boughs of supplication, intimated his purpose of taking signal revenge on the Sidonians generally; who took the desperate resolution, first of burning their fleet that no one might escape—next, of shutting themselves up with their families, and setting fire each man to his own house. In this deplorable conflagration forty thousand persons are said to have perished; and such was the wealth destroyed, that the privilege of searching the ruins was purchased for a large sum of money. Instead of rewarding the traitor Tennes, Ochus concluded the tragedy by putting him to death.[945]

[945] Diodor. xvi. 42, 43, 45. “Occisis optimatibus Sidona cepit
Ochus” (Trogus, Argum. ad Justin. lib x).

Flushed with this unexpected success, Ochus marched with an immense force against Egypt. He had in his army ten thousand Greeks; six thousand by requisition from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; three thousand by request from Argos; and one thousand from Thebes.[946] To Athens and Sparta, he had sent a like request, but had received from both a courteous refusal. His army, Greek and Asiatic, the largest which Persia had sent forth for many years, was distributed into three divisions, each commanded by one Greek and one Persian general; one of the three divisions was confided to Mentor and the eunuch Bagoas, the two ablest servants of the Persian king. The Egyptian prince Nektanebus, having been long aware of the impending attack, had also assembled a numerous force: no less than twenty thousand mercenary Greeks, with a far larger body of Egyptians and Libyans. He had also taken special care to put the eastern branch of the Nile, with the fortress of Pelusium at its mouth, in a full state of defence. But these ample means of defence were rendered unavailing, partly by his own unskilfulness and incompetence, partly by the ability and cunning of Mentor and Bagoas. Nektanebus was obliged to retire into Ethiopia; all Egypt fell, with little resistance, into the hands of the Persians; the fortified places capitulated—the temples were pillaged, with an immense booty to the victors—and even the sacred archives of the temples were carried off, to be afterwards resold to the priests for an additional sum of money. The wealthy territory of Egypt again became a Persian province, under the satrap Pherendates; while Ochus returned to Babylon, with a large increase both of dominion and of reputation. The Greek mercenaries were dismissed to return home, with an ample harvest both of pay and plunder.[947] They constituted in fact the principal element of force on both sides; some Greeks enabled the Persian king to subdue revolters,[948] while others lent their strength to the revolters against him.

[946] Diodor. xvi. 47; Isokrates, Or. xii. Panathenaic. s. 171.

[947] Diodor. xvi. 47-51. Ley, Fata et Conditio, Ægypti sub Regno
Persarum, p. 25, 26.

[948] Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 149. καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους
τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς βασιλέως συγκαταστρεφόμεθα, etc.

By this reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, Ochus relieved himself from that contempt into which he had fallen through the failure of his former expedition,[949] and even exalted the Persian empire in force and credit to a point nearly as high as it had ever occupied before. The Rhodian Mentor, and the Persian Bagoas, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the Egyptian campaign, became from this time among his most effective officers. Bagoas accompanied Ochus into the interior provinces, retaining his full confidence; while Mentor, rewarded with a sum of 100 talents, and loaded with Egyptian plunder, was invested with the satrapy of the Asiatic seaboard.[950] He here got together a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, with whom he rendered signal service to the Persian king. Though the whole coast was understood to belong to the Persian empire, yet there were many separate strong towns and positions, held by chiefs who had their own military force; neither paying tribute nor obeying orders. Among these chiefs, one of the most conspicuous was Hermeias, who resided in the stronghold of Atarneus (on the mainland opposite to Lesbos), but had in pay many troops and kept garrisons in many neighboring places. Though partially disabled by accidental injury in childhood,[951] Hermeias was a man of singular energy and ability, and had conquered for himself this dominion. But what has contributed most to his celebrity, is, that he was the attached friend and admirer of Aristotle; who passed three years with him at Atarneus, after the death of Plato in 348-347 B. C.—and who has commemorated his merits in a noble ode. By treachery and false promises, Mentor seduced Hermeias into an interview, seized his person, and employed his signet-ring to send counterfeit orders whereby he became master of Atarneus and all the remaining places held by Hermeias. Thus, by successful perfidy, Mentor reduced the most vigorous of the independent chiefs on the Asiatic coast; after which, by successive conquests of the same kind, he at length brought the whole coast effectively under Persian dominion.[952]

[949] Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 117, 121, 160. Diodorus
places the successful expeditions of Ochus against Phenicia and
Egypt during the three years between 351-348 B. C. (Diodor. xvi.
40-52). In my judgment, they were not executed until after the
conclusion of the peace between Philip and Athens in March 346
B. C.; they were probably brought to a close in the two summers
of 346-345 B. C. The Discourse or Letter of Isokrates to Philip
appears better evidence on this point of chronology, than the
assertion of Diodorus. The Discourse of Isokrates was published
shortly after the peace of March 346 B. C., and addressed to a
prince perfectly well informed of all the public events of his
time. One of the main arguments used by Isokrates to induce
Philip to attack the Persian empire, is the weakness of Ochus
in consequence of Egypt and Phenicia being still in revolt and
unsubdued—and the contempt into which Ochus had fallen from
having tried to reconquer Egypt and having been ignominiously
repulsed—ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν (Ochus) οὐ μόνον ἡττηθεὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ
καταγελασθεὶς, καὶ δόξας οὔτε βασιλεύειν οὔτε στρατηγεῖν ἄξιος
εἶναι (s. 188) ... οὕτω σφόδρα μεμισημένος καὶ καταπεφρονημένος
ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν βασιλευσάντων (s. 160).

The reconquest of Egypt by Ochus, with an immense army and a
large number of Greeks engaged on both sides, must have been one
of the most impressive events of the age. Diodorus may perhaps
have confounded the date of the _first_ expedition, wherein Ochus
failed, with that of the _second_, wherein he succeeded.

[950] Diodor. xvi. 50-52.

[951] Strabo, xvi. p. 610. Suidas v. Aristotelis—θλιβίας ἐκ
παιδός.

[952] Diodorus places the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of
the Asiatic coast, and his seizure of Hermeias, in Olymp. 107,
4 (349-348 B. C.), immediately after the successful invasion of
Egypt.

But this date cannot be correct, since Aristotle visited Hermeias
at Atarneus after the death of Plato, and passed three years
with him—from the archonship of Theophilus (348-347 B. C. Olymp.
108, 1), in which year Plato died—to the archonship of Eubulus
(345-344 B. C. Olymp. 108, 4) (Vita Aristotelis ap. Dionys.
Hal. Epist. ad Ammæum, c. 5; Scriptt. Biographici, p. 397, ed.
Westermann); Diogen. Laert. v. 7.

Here is another reason confirming the remark made in my former
note, that Diodorus has placed the conquest of Egypt by Ochus
three or four years too early; since the appointment of Mentor
to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast follows naturally and
immediately after the distinguished part which he had taken in
the conquest of Egypt.

The seizure of Hermeias by Mentor must probably have taken place
about 343 B. C. The stay of Aristotle with Hermeias will probably
have occupied the three years between 347 and 344 B. C.

Respecting the chronology of these events, Mr. Clinton follows
Diodorus; Böhnecke dissents from him—rightly, in my judgment
(Forschungen, p. 460-734, note). Böhnecke seems to think that
the person mentioned in Demosth. Philipp. iv. (p. 139, 140) as
having been seized and carried up prisoner to the king of Persia,
accused of plotting with Philip measures of hostility against the
latter—is Hermeias. This is not in itself improbable, but the
authority of the commentator Ulpian seems hardly sufficient to
warrant us in positively asserting the identity.

It is remarkable that Diodorus makes no mention of the peace of
346 B. C. between Philip and the Athenians.

The peace between Philip and the Athenians lasted without any formal renunciation on either side for more than six years; from March 346 B. C. to beyond Midsummer 340 B. C. But though never formally renounced during that interval, it became gradually more and more violated in practice by both parties. To furnish a consecutive history of the events of these few years, is beyond our power. We have nothing to guide us but a few orations of Demosthenes;[953] which, while conveying a lively idea of the feeling of the time, touch, by way of allusion, and as materials for reasoning, upon some few facts; yet hardly enabling us to string together those facts into an historical series. A brief sketch of the general tendencies of this period is all that we can venture upon.

[953]
Delivered in
Demosthenes, Philippic ii. B. C. 344-343
—— De Halonneso, not genuine B. C. 343-342
—— De Falsâ Legatione _ib._
Æschines, De Falsâ Legatione _ib._
Demosthenes, De Chersoneso B. C. 342-341
—— Philipp. iii. _ib._
—— Philipp. iv. B. C. 341-340
—— ad Philipp. Epist. B. C. 340-339

Philip was the great aggressor of the age. The movement everywhere, in or near Greece, began with him, and with those parties in the various cities, who acted on his instigation and looked up to him for support. We hear of his direct intervention, or of the effects of his exciting suggestions, everywhere; in Peloponnesus, at Ambrakia and Leukas, in Eubœa, and in Thrace. The inhabitants of Megalopolis, Messênê, and Argos, were soliciting his presence in Peloponnesus, and his active coöperation against Sparta. Philip intimated a purpose of going there himself, and sent in the mean time soldiers and money, with a formal injunction to Sparta that she must renounce all pretension to Messênê.[954] He established a footing in Elis,[955] by furnishing troops to an oligarchical faction, and enabling them to become masters of the government, after a violent revolution. Connected probably with this intervention in Elis, was his capture of the three Eleian colonies, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elateia, on the coast of the Epirotic Kassopia, near the Gulf of Ambrakia. He made over these three towns to his brother-in-law Alexander, whom he exalted to be prince of the Epirotic Molossians[956]—deposing the reigning prince Arrhybas. He farther attacked the two principal Grecian cities in that region, Ambrakia and Leukas; but here he appears to have failed.[957] Detachments of his troops showed themselves near Megara and Eretria, to the aid of philippizing parties in these cities and to the serious alarm of the Athenians. Philip established more firmly his dominion over Thessaly, distributing the country into four divisions, and planting a garrison in Pheræ, the city most disaffected to him.[958] We also read, that he again overran and subdued the Illyrian, Dardanian, and Pæonian tribes on his northern and western boundary; capturing many of their towns, and bringing back much spoil; and that he defeated the Thracian prince Kersobleptes, to the great satisfaction of the Greek cities on and near the Hellespont.[959] He is said farther to have redistributed the population of Macedonia, transferring inhabitants from one town to another according as he desired to favor or discourage residence—to the great misery and suffering of the families so removed.[960]

[954] Demosth. De Pace, p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 69.

[955] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424; Pausan. iv. 28, 3.

[956] Justin, viii. 6. Diodorus states that Alexander did not
become prince until after the death of Arrhybas (xvi. 72).

[957] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
424-435; Philippic iii. p. 117-120; Philippic iv. p. 133.

As these enterprises of Philip against Ambrakia and Leukas are
not noticed in the second Philippic, but only in orations of
later date, we may perhaps presume that they did not take place
till after Olymp. 109, 1 = B. C. 344-343. But this is not a very
certain inference.

[958] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 424, 436; Philipp. iii. 117,
118. iv. p. 133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso,
p. 84.

Compare Harpokration v. Δεκαδαρχία.

[959] Diodor. xvi. 69, 71.

[960] Justin, viii. 5, 6. “Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores
nunc in hybernos, nunc in æstivos saltus trajiciunt—sic ille
populos et urbes, ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quæquæ
loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transfert. Miseranda ubique
facies et similis excidio erat,” etc. Compare Livy, xl. 3, where
similar proceedings of Philip son of Demetrius (B. C. 182) are
described.

Such was the exuberant activity of Philip, felt everywhere from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian sea and the Corinthian Gulf. Every year his power increased; while the cities of the Grecian world remained passive, uncombined, and without recognizing any one of their own number as leader. The philippizing factions were everywhere rising in arms or conspiring to seize the governments for their own account under Philip’s auspices; while those who clung to free and popular Hellenism were discouraged and thrown on the defensive.[961]

[961] See a striking passage in the fourth Philippic of
Demosthenes, p. 132.

It was Philip’s policy to avoid or postpone any breach of peace with Athens; the only power under whom Grecian combination against him was practicable. But a politician like Demosthenes foresaw clearly enough the coming absorption of the Grecian world, Athens included, into the dominion of Macedonia, unless some means could be found of reviving among its members a spirit of vigorous and united defence. In or before the year 344 B. C., we find this orator again coming forward in the Athenian assembly, persuading his countrymen to send a mission into Peloponnesus, and going himself among the envoys.[962] He addressed both to the Messenians and Argeians emphatic remonstrances on their devotion to Philip; reminding them that from excessive fear and antipathy towards Sparta, they were betraying to him their own freedom, as well as that of all their Hellenic brethren.[963] Though heard with approbation, he does not flatter himself with having worked any practical change in their views.[964] But it appears that envoys reached Athens (in 344-343 B. C.), to whom some answer was required, and it is in suggesting that answer that Demosthenes delivers his second Philippic. He denounces Philip anew, as an aggressor stretching his power on every side, violating the peace with Athens, and preparing ruin for the Grecian world.[965] Without advising immediate war, he calls on the Athenians to keep watch and ward, and to organize defensive alliance among the Greeks generally.

[962] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.

[963] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 71, 72. Demosthenes himself
reports to the Athenian assembly (in 344-343 B. C.) what he had
said to the Messenians and Argeians.

[964] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 72.

[965] Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 66-72. Who these envoys were, or
from whence they came, does not appear from the oration. Libanius
in his Argument says that they had come jointly from Philip, from
the Argeians, and from the Messenians. Dionysius Hal. (ad Ammæum,
p. 737) states that they came out of Peloponnesus.

I cannot bring myself to believe, on the authority of Libanius,
that there were any envoys present from Philip. The tenor of the
discourse appears to contradict that supposition.

The activity of Athens, unfortunately, was shown in nothing but words; to set off against the vigorous deeds of Philip. But they were words of Demosthenes, the force of which was felt by Philip’s partisans in Greece, and occasioned such annoyance to Philip himself that he sent to Athens more than once envoys and letters of remonstrance. His envoy, an eloquent Byzantine named Python,[966] addressed the Athenian assembly with much success, complaining of the calumnies of the orators against Philip—asserting emphatically that Philip was animated with the best sentiments towards Athens, and desired only to have an opportunity of rendering service to her—and offering to review and amend the terms of the late peace. Such general assurances of friendship, given with eloquence and emphasis, produced considerable effect in the Athenian assembly, as they had done from the mouth of Æschines during the discussions on the peace. The proposal of Python was taken up by the Athenians, and two amendments were proposed. 1. Instead of the existing words of the peace—“that each party should have what they actually had”—it was moved to substitute this phrase—“That each party should have their own.”[967] 2. That not merely the allies of Athens and of Philip, but also all the other Greeks, should be included in the peace; That all of them should remain free and autonomous; That if any of them were attacked, the parties to the treaty on both sides would lend them armed assistance forthwith. 3. That Philip should be required to make restitution of those places, Doriskus, Serreium, etc., which he had captured from Kersobleptes after the day when peace was sworn at Athens.

[966] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 82. Winiewski (Comment
Histor. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 140) thinks that the embassy
of Python to Athens is the very embassy to which the second
Philippic of Demosthenes provides or introduces a reply. I agree
with Böhnecke in regarding this supposition as improbable.

[967] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης,
ἢν ~ἔδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου πεμφθέντες
ἐπανορθώσασθαι, ὅτι ἐπηνωρθωσάμεθα~, ὃ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
ὁμολογεῖται δίκαιον εἶναι, ~ἑκατέρους ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν~,
ἀμφισβητεῖ (Philip) μὴ δεδωκέναι, μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ᾽
εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, etc.

Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398.

The first amendment appears to have been moved by a citizen named Hegesippus, a strenuous anti-philippizing politician, supporting the same views as Demosthenes. Python, with the other envoys of Philip, present in the assembly, either accepted these amendments, or at least did not protest against them. He partook of the public hospitality of the city as upon an understanding mutually settled.[968] Hegesippus with other Athenians was sent to Macedonia to procure the ratification of Philip; who admitted the justice of the second amendment, offered arbitration respecting the third, but refused to ratify the first—disavowing both the general proposition, and the subsequent acceptance of his envoys at Athens.[969] Moreover he displayed great harshness in the reception of Hegesippus and his colleagues; banishing from Macedonia the Athenian poet Xenokleides, for having shown hospitality towards them.[970] The original treaty, therefore, remained unaltered.

[968] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. See Ulpian ad Demosth.
Fals. Leg. p. 364.

[969] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 84, 85. ἀμφισβητεῖ μὴ
δεδωκέναι (Philip contends that he never tendered the terms of
peace for amendment) μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ᾽ εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς
... Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα (the second amendment) ὁμολογῶν ἐν τῇ
ἐπιστολῇ, ὡς ἀκούετε, δίκαιόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, etc.

[970] Hegesippus was much denounced by the philippizing orators
at Athens (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 364). His embassy to Philip
has been treated by some authors as enforcing a “grossly
sophistical construction of an article in the peace,” which
Philip justly resented. But in my judgment it was no construction
of the original treaty, nor was there any sophistry on the part
of Athens. It was an amended clause, presented by the Athenians
in place of the original. They never affirmed that the amended
clause meant the same thing as the clause prior to amendment. On
the contrary, they imply that the meaning is _not_ the same—and
it is on that ground that they submit the amended form of words.

Hegesippus and his colleagues had gone to Macedonia, not simply to present for Philip’s acceptance the two amendments just indicated, but also to demand from him the restoration of the little island of Halonnesus (near Skiathos), which he had taken since the peace. Philip denied that the island belonged to the Athenians, or that they had any right to make such a demand; affirming that he had taken it, not from them, but from a pirate named Sostratus, who was endangering the navigation of the neighboring sea—and that it now belonged to him. If the Athenians disputed this, he offered to submit the question to arbitration; to _restore_ the island to Athens, should the arbitrators decide against him—or to _give_ it to her, even should they decide in his favor.[971]

[971] Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 77, and the
Epistola Philippi, p. 162. The former says, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς τοιούτους λόγους, ~ὅτε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν~, ὡς λῃστὰς
ἀφελόμενος ταύτην τὴν νῆσον κτήσαιτο, καὶ προσήκειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ
εἶναι.

Philip’s letter agrees as to the main facts.

Since we know that Philip treated Hegesippus and the other envoys with peculiar harshness, it is probable that the diplomatic argument between them, about Halonnesus as well as about other matters, was conducted with angry feeling on both sides. Hence an island, in itself small and insignificant, became the subject of prolonged altercation for two or three years. When Hegesippus and Demosthenes maintained that Philip had wronged the Athenians about Halonnesus, and that it could only be received from him in restitution of rightful Athenian ownership, not as a gift _proprio motu_—Æschines and others treated the question with derision, as a controversy about syllables.[972] “Philip (they said) offers to give us Halonnesus. Let us take it, and set the question at rest. What need to care whether he _gives it_ to us, or _gives it back_ to us?” The comic writers made various jests on the same verbal distinction, as though it were a mere silly subtlety. But though party-orators and wits might here find a point to turn or a sarcasm to place, it is certain that well-conducted diplomacy, modern as well as ancient, has been always careful to note the distinction as important. The question here had no reference to capture during war, but during peace. No modern diplomatist will accept restitution of what has been unlawfully taken, if he is called upon to recognize it as gratuitous cession from the captor. The plea of Philip—that he had taken the island, not from Athens, but from the pirate Sostratus—was not a valid excuse, assuming that the island really belonged to Athens. If Sostratus had committed piratical damage, Philip ought to have applied to Athens for redress, which he evidently did not do. It was only in case of redress being refused, that he could be entitled to right himself by force; and even then, it may be doubted whether his taking of the island could give him any right to it against Athens. The Athenians refused his proposition of arbitration; partly because they were satisfied of their own right to the island—partly because they were jealous of admitting Philip to any recognized right of interference with their insular ascendency.[973]

[972] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 65. c. 30. περὶ συλλαβῶν
διαφερόμενος, etc.

[973] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 78-80.

Halonnesus remained under garrison by Philip, forming one among many topics of angry communication by letters and by envoys, between him and Athens—until at length (seemingly about 341 B. C.) the inhabitants of the neighboring island of Peparêthus retook it and carried off his garrison. Upon this proceeding, Philip addressed several remonstrances, both to the Peparethians and to the Athenians. Obtaining no redress, he attacked Peparêthus and took severe revenge upon the inhabitants. The Athenians then ordered their admiral to make reprisals upon him, so that the war, though not yet actually declared, was approaching nearer and nearer towards renewal.[974]

[974] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 162. The oration of
Pseudo-Demosthenes De Halonneso is a discourse addressed to the
people on one of these epistolary communications of Philip,
brought by some envoys who had also addressed the people _vivâ
voce_. The letter of Philip adverted to several other topics
besides, but that of Halonnesus came first.

But it was not only in Halonnesus that Athens found herself beset by Philip and the philippizing factions. Even her own frontier on the side towards Bœotia now required constant watching, since the Thebans had been relieved from their Phokian enemies; so that she was obliged to keep garrisons of hoplites at Drymus and Panaktum.[975] In Megara an insurgent party under Perilaus had laid plans for seizing the city through the aid of a body of Philip’s troops, which could easily be sent from the Macedonian army now occupying Phokis, by sea to Pegæ, the Megarian post on the Krissæan Gulf. Apprized of this conspiracy, the Megarian government solicited aid from Athens. Phokion, conducting the Athenian hoplites to Megara with the utmost celerity, assured the safety of the city, and at the same time reëstablished the Long Walls to Nisæa, so as to render it always accessible to Athenians by sea.[976] In Eubœa, the cities of Oreus and Eretria fell into the hands of the philippizing leaders, and became hostile to Athens. In Oreus, the greater part of the citizens were persuaded to second the views of Philip’s chief adherent, Philistides; who prevailed on them to silence the remonstrances, and imprison the person, of the opposing leader Euphræus, as a disturber of the public peace. Philistides then, watching his opportunity, procured the introduction of a body of Macedonian troops, by means of whom he assured to himself the rule of the city as Philip’s instrument; while Euphræus, agonized with grief and alarm, slew himself in prison. At Eretria, Kleitarchus with others carried on the like conspiracy. Having expelled their principal opponents, and refused admission to Athenian envoys, they procured a thousand Macedonian troops under Hipponikus; they thus mastered Eretria itself, and destroyed the fortified seaport called Porthmus, in order to break the easy communication with Athens. Oreus and Eretria are represented by Demosthenes as suffering miserable oppression under these two despots, Philistides and Kleitarchus.[977] On the other hand, Chalkis, the chief city in Eubœa, appears to have been still free, and leaning to Athens rather than to Philip, under the predominant influence of a leading citizen named Kallias.

[975] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 446. I take these words to denote,
not any one particular outmarch to these places, but a standing
guard kept there, since the exposure of the northern frontier of
Attica after the peace. For the great importance of Panaktum, as
a frontier position between Athens and Thebes, see Thucydides, v.
35, 36, 39.

[976] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 435, 446, 448; Philippic iv. p.
133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[977] The general state of things, as here given, at Oreus and
Eretria, existed at the time when Demosthenes delivered his two
orations—the third Philippic and the oration on the Chersonese;
in the late spring and summer of 341 B. C.—De Chersoneso, p. 98,
99, 104; Philipp. iii. p. 112, 115, 125, 126.

... δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι (the people of
Eretria under Kleitarchus, p. 128).

At this time, it appears, Philip was personally occupied with operations in Thrace; where he passed at least eleven months and probably more,[978] leaving the management of affairs in Eubœa to his commanders in Phokis and Thessaly. He was now seemingly preparing his schemes for mastering the important outlets from the Euxine into the Ægean—the Bosphorus and Hellespont—and the Greek cities on those coasts. Upon these straits depended the main supply of imported corn for Athens and a large part of the Grecian world; and hence the great value of the Athenian possession of the Chersonese.

[978] Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 99.

Respecting this peninsula, angry disputes now arose. To protect her settlers there established, Athens had sent Diopeithes with a body of mercenaries—unprovided with pay, however, and left to levy contributions where they could; while Philip had taken under his protection and garrisoned Kardia—a city situated within the peninsula near its isthmus, but ill-disposed to Athens, asserting independence, and admitted at the peace of 346 B. C., by Æschines and the Athenian envoys, as an ally of Philip to take part in the peace-oaths.[979] In conjunction with the Kardians, Philip had appropriated and distributed lands which the Athenian settlers affirmed to be theirs; and when they complained, he insisted that they should deal with Kardia as an independent city, by reference to arbitration.[980] This they refused, though their envoy Æschines had recognized Kardia as an independent ally of Philip when the peace was sworn.

[979] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p 677. De Fals. Leg. p. 396; De
Chersoneso, p. 104, 105.

[980] Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87.

Here was a state of conflicting pretensions, out of which hostilities were sure to grow. The Macedonian troops overran the Chersonese, while Diopeithes on his side made excursions out of the peninsula, invading portions of Thrace subject to Philip; who sent letters of remonstrance to Athens.[981] While thus complaining at Athens, Philip was at the same time pushing his conquests in Thrace against the Thracian princes Kersobleptes, Teres, and Sitalkes,[982] upon whom the honorary grant of Athenian citizenship had been conferred.

[981] Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 93; Pseudo-Demosth. De
Halonneso, p. 87; Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 161.

[982] Epistol. Philipp. _l. c._

The complaints of Philip, and the speeches of his partisans at Athens, raised a strong feeling against Diopeithes at Athens, so that the people seemed disposed to recall and punish him. It is against this step that Demosthenes protests in his speech on the Chersonese. Both that speech, and his third Philippic were delivered in 341-340 B. C.; seemingly in the last half of 341 B. C. In both, he resumes that energetic and uncompromising tone of hostility towards Philip, which had characterized the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs. He calls upon his countrymen not only to sustain Diopeithes, but also to renew the war vigorously against Philip in every other way. Philip (he says), while pretending in words to keep the peace, had long ago broken it by his acts, and by aggressions in numberless quarters. If Athens chose to imitate him by keeping the peace in name, let her do so; but at any rate, let her imitate him also by prosecuting a strenuous war in reality.[983] Chersonesus, the ancient possession of Athens, could be protected only by encouraging and reinforcing Diopeithes; Byzantium also was sure to become the next object of Philip’s attack, and ought to be preserved, as essential to the interests of Athens, though hitherto the Byzantines had been disaffected towards her. But even these interests, important as they were, must be viewed only as parts of a still more important whole. The Hellenic world altogether was in imminent danger;[984] overridden by Philip’s prodigious military force; torn in pieces by local factions leaning upon his support; and sinking every day into degradation more irrecoverable. There was no hope of rescue for the Hellenic name except from the energetic and well-directed military action of Athens. She must stand forth in all her might and resolution; her citizens must serve in person, pay direct taxes readily, and forego for the time their festival-fund; when they had thus shown themselves ready to bear the real pinch and hardship of the contest, then let them send round envoys to invoke the aid of other Greeks against the common enemy.[985]

[983] Philippic iii. p. 112.

[984] Philippic iii. p. 118, 119.

[985] Philippic iii. p. 129, 130.

Such, in its general tone, is the striking harangue known as the third Philippic. It appears that the Athenians were now coming round more into harmony with Demosthenes than they had ever been before. They perceived,—what the orator had long ago pointed out,—that Philip went on pushing from one acquisition to another, and became only the more dangerous in proportion as others were quiescent. They were really alarmed for the safety of the two important positions of the Hellespont and Bosphorus. From this time to the battle of Chæroneia, the positive influence of Demosthenes in determining the proceedings of his countrymen, becomes very considerable. He had already been employed several times as envoy,—to Peloponnesus (344-343 B. C.), to Ambrakia, Leukas, Korkyra, the Illyrians, and Thessaly. He now moved, first a mission of envoys to Eubœa, where a plan of operations was probably concerted with Kallias and the Chalkidians,—and subsequently, the despatch of a military force to the same island, against Oreus and Eretria.[986] This expedition, commanded by Phokion, was successful. Oreus and Eretria were liberated; Kleitarchus and Philistides, with the Macedonian troops, were expelled from the island, though both in vain tried to propitiate Athens.[987] Kallias, also, with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, and the Megarians, contributed as auxiliaries to this success.[988] On his proposition, supported by Demosthenes, the attendance and tribute from deputies of the Euboic cities to the synod at Athens, were renounced; and in place of it was constituted an Euboic synod, sitting at Chalkis; independent of, yet allied with, Athens.[989] In this Euboic synod Kallias was the leading man; forward both as a partisan of Athens and as an enemy of Philip. He pushed his attack beyond the limits of Eubœa to the Gulf of Pagasæ, from whence probably came the Macedonian troops who had formed the garrison of Oreus under Philistides. He here captured several of the towns allied with or garrisoned by Philip; together with various Macedonian vessels, the crews of which he sold as slaves. For these successes the Athenians awarded to him a public vote of thanks.[990] He also employed himself (during the autumn and winter of 341-340 B. C.) in travelling as missionary throughout Peloponnesus, to organize a confederacy against Philip. In that mission he strenuously urged the cities to send deputies to a congress at Athens, in the ensuing month Anthesterion (February), 340 B. C. But though he made flattering announcement at Athens of concurrence and support promised to him, the projected congress came to nothing.[991]

[986] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.

[987] Diodor. xvi. 74.

[988] Stephanus Byz. v. Ὠρεός.

[989] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68. Æschines greatly
stigmatizes Demosthenes for having deprived the Athenian synod of
these important members. But the Eubœan members certainly had not
been productive of any good to Athens by their attendance, real
or nominal, at her synod, for some years past. The formation of a
free Euboic synod probably afforded the best chance of ensuring
real harmony between the island and Athens.

Æschines gives here a long detail of allegations, about the
corrupt intrigues between Demosthenes and Kallias at Athens. Many
of these allegations are impossible to reconcile with what we
know of the course of history at the time. We must recollect that
Æschines makes the statement eleven years after the events.

[990] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159.

[991] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. _l. c._ Æschines here specifies the
month, but not the year. It appears to me that Anthesterion, 340
B. C. (Olymp. 109, 4) is the most likely date; though Böhnecke
and others place it a year earlier.

While the important success in Eubœa relieved Athens from anxiety on that side, Demosthenes was sent as envoy to the Chersonese and to Byzantium. He would doubtless encourage Diopeithes, and may perhaps have carried to him some reinforcements. But his services were principally useful at Byzantium. That city had long been badly disposed towards Athens,—from recollections of the Social War, and from jealousy about the dues on corn-ships passing the Bosphorus; moreover, it had been for some time in alliance with Philip; who was now exerting all his efforts to prevail on the Byzantines to join him in active warfare against Athens. So effectively did Demosthenes employ his eloquence, at Byzantium, that he frustrated this purpose, overcame the unfriendly sentiment of the citizens, and brought them to see how much it concerned both their interest and their safety to combine with Athens in resisting the farther preponderance of Philip. The Byzantines, together with their allies and neighbors the Perinthians, contracted alliance with Athens. Demosthenes takes just pride in having achieved for his countrymen this success as a statesman and diplomatist, in spite of adverse probabilities. Had Philip been able to obtain the active coöperation of Byzantium and Perinthus, he would have become master of the corn-supply, and probably of the Hellespont also, so that war in those regions would have become almost impracticable for Athens.[992]

[992] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 254, 304, 308. βουλόμενος τῆς
σιτοπομπίας κύριος γενέσθαι (Philip), παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης
Βυζαντίους συμμάχους ὄντας αὑτῷ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠξίου συμπολεμεῖν
τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον, etc.

ἡ μὲν ἐμὴ πολίτεια ... ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἔχειν
Φίλιππον, λαβόντα Βυζάντιον, συμπολεμεῖν τοὺς Βυζαντίους μεθ᾽
ἡμῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἐποίησεν) ... Τίς ὁ κωλύσας τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον
ἀλλοτριωθῆναι κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους; (p. 255.)

Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 90.

That Demosthenes foresaw, several months earlier, the plans
of Philip upon Byzantium, is evident from the orations De
Chersoneso, p. 93-106, and Philippic iii. p. 115.

As this unexpected revolution in the policy of Byzantium was eminently advantageous to Athens, so it was proportionally mortifying to Philip; who resented it so much, that he shortly afterwards commenced the siege of Perinthus by land and sea,[993] a little before midsummer 340 B. C. He brought up his fleet through the Hellespont into the Propontis, and protected it in its passage, against the attack of the Athenians in the Chersonese,[994] by causing his land-force to traverse and lay waste that peninsula. This was a violation of Athenian territory, adding one more to the already accumulated causes of war. At the same time, it appears that he now let loose his cruisers against the Athenian merchantmen, many of which he captured and appropriated. These captures, together with the incursions on the Chersonese, served as last additional provocations, working up the minds of the Athenians to a positive declaration of war.[995] Shortly after midsummer 340 B. C., at the beginning of the archonship of Theophrastus, they passed a formal decree[996] to remove the column on which the peace of 346 B. C. stood recorded, and to renew the war openly and explicitly against Philip. It seems probable that this was done while Demosthenes was still absent on his mission at the Hellespont and Bosphorus; for he expressly states that none of the decrees immediately bringing on hostilities were moved by him, but all of them by other citizens;[997] a statement which we may reasonably believe, since he would be rather proud than ashamed of such an initiative.

[993] Diodor. xvi. 74.

[994] Epistola Philippi ap. Demosth. p. 163.

[995] That these were the two last causes which immediately
preceded and determined the declaration of war, we may see by
Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 249—Καὶ μὴν τὴν εἰρήνην γ᾽ ἐκεῖνος
ἔλυσε τὰ πλοῖα λαβὼν, οὐχ ἡ πόλις, etc.

Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ φανερῶς ἤδη τὰ πλοῖα ἐσεσύλητο, Χεῤῥόνησος ἐπορθεῖτο,
ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύεθ᾽ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκέτ᾽ ἐν ἀμφισβητησίμῳ τὰ
πράγματα ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνειστήκει πόλεμος, etc. (p. 274.)

[996] Philochorus, Frag. 135. ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum,
p. 738-741; Diodorus, xvi. 77. The citation given by Dionysius
out of Philochorus is on one point not quite accurate. It states
that Demosthenes moved the decisive resolution for declaring war;
whereas Demosthenes himself tells us that none of the motions at
this juncture were made by him (De Coronâ, p. 250).

[997] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250. It will be seen that I take
no notice of the two decrees of the Athenians, and the letter
of Philip, embodied in the oration De Coronâ, p. 249, 250,
251. I have already stated that all the documents which we
read as attached to this oration are so tainted either with
manifest error or with causes of doubt, that I cannot cite them
as authorities in this history, wherever they stand alone.
Accordingly, I take no account either of the supposed siege of
Selymbria, mentioned in Philip’s pretended letter, but mentioned
nowhere else—nor of the twenty Athenian ships captured by the
Macedonian admiral Amyntas, and afterwards restored by Philip on
the remonstrance of the Athenians, mentioned in the pretended
Athenian decree moved by Eubulus. Neither Demosthenes, nor
Philochorus, nor Diodorus, nor Justin, says anything about the
siege of Selymbria, though all of them allude to the attacks
on Byzantium and Perinthus. I do not believe that the siege of
Selymbria ever occurred. Moreover, Athenian vessels captured, but
afterwards restored by Philip on remonstrance from the Athenians,
can hardly have been the actual cause of war.

The pretended decrees and letter do not fit the passage of
Demosthenes to which they are attached.

About the same time, as it would appear, Philip on his side, addressed a manifesto and declaration of war to the Athenians. In this paper he enumerated many wrongs done by them to him, and still remaining unredressed in spite of formal remonstrance; for which wrongs he announced his intention of taking a just revenge by open hostilities.[998] He adverted to the seizure, on Macedonian soil, of Nikias his herald carrying despatches; the Athenians (he alleged) had detained this herald as prisoner for ten months and had read the despatches publicly in their assembly. He complained that Athens had encouraged the inhabitants of Thasos, in harboring triremes from Byzantium and privateers from other quarters, to the annoyance of Macedonian commerce. He dwelt on the aggressive proceedings of Diopeithes in Thrace, and of Kallias in the Gulf of Pagasæ. He denounced the application made by Athens to the Persians for aid against him, as a departure from Hellenic patriotism, and from the Athenian maxims of aforetime. He alluded to the unbecoming intervention of Athens in defence of the Thracian princes Teres and Kersobleptes, neither of them among the sworn partners in the peace, against him; to the protection conferred by Athens on the inhabitants of Peparethus, whom he had punished for hostilities against his garrison in Halonnesus; to the danger incurred by his fleet in sailing up the Hellespont, from the hostilities of the Athenian settlers in the Chersonese, who had coöperated with his enemies the Byzantines, and had rendered it necessary for him to guard the ships by marching a land-force through the Chersonese. He vindicated his own proceedings in aiding his allies the inhabitants of Kardia, complaining that the Athenians had refused to submit their differences with that city to an equitable arbitration. He repelled the Athenian pretensions of right to Amphipolis, asserting his own better right to the place, on all grounds. He insisted especially on the offensive behavior of the Athenians, in refusing, when he had sent envoys conjointly with all his allies, to “conclude a just convention on behalf of the Greeks generally”—“Had you acceded to this proposition (he said), you might have placed out of danger all those who really suspected my purposes, or you might have exposed me publicly as the most worthless of men. It was to the interest of your people to accede, but not to the interest of your orators. To them—as those affirm who know your government best—peace is war, and war, peace; for they always make money at the expense of your generals, either as accusers or as defenders; moreover by reviling in the public assembly your leading citizens at home, and other men of eminence abroad, they acquire with the multitude credit for popular dispositions. It would be easy for me, by the most trifling presents, to silence their invectives and make them trumpet my praises. But I should be ashamed of appearing to purchase your good-will from _them_.[999]”