Chapter XC (3)

The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ accordingly took place, at some time between the two regular periods of spring and autumn. No legates attended from Athens—nor any from Thebes; a fact made known to us by Æschines, and remarkable as evincing an incipient tendency towards concurrence, such as had never existed before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing the Amphissians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According to Æschines, this force was brought together, marched against the Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them indulgent terms; requiring from them a fine to the Delphian god, payable at stated intervals—sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred domain—and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and brought back all the guilty leaders. Demosthenes, on the contrary, states, that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those that did come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether miscarried.[1043] The account of Demosthenes is the more probable of the two: for we know from Æschines himself that neither Athens nor Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B. C. There remained therefore only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians, even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither march by land through Bœotia, nor come with ease by sea while the Amphissians were masters of the port of Kirrha; and the Thessalians and their neighbors were not likely to take so intense an interest in the enterprize as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume that what Æschines represents as indulgent terms granted to the Lokrians and afterwards violated by them, was at best nothing more than a temporary accommodation; concluded because Kottyphus could not do anything—probably did not wish to do anything—without the intervention of Philip.

[1043] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

The next Pylæa, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued. Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to invoke the aid of Philip. “If you do not consent (they told the Amphiktyons[1044]), you must come forward personally in force, subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you prefer.” The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been in the former.

[1044] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277, 278.

At the autumnal meeting[1045] where this fatal measure of calling in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present (Æschines among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of Demosthenes had enacted that the usual custom should be followed, though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or extraordinary meeting. Æschines[1046] was not backward in advocating the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course, consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting. He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred, by the corrupt suggestions of Demosthenes, from heading the crusade against Amphissa, when the gods themselves had singled her out for that pious duty.[1047] What part Thebes took in the nomination of Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the Macedonians themselves; while many of the remaining members had become dependent on Macedonia—the Thessalians, Phthiot Achæans, Perrhæbians, Dolopians, Magnetes, etc.[1048] It was probably not very difficult for Kottyphus and Æschines to procure a vote investing Philip with the command. Even those who were not favorable might dread the charge of impiety if they opposed it.

[1045] The chronology of the events here recounted has been
differently conceived by different authors. According to my
view, the first motion raised by Æschines against the Amphissian
Lokrians, occurred in the spring meeting of the Amphiktyons at
Delphi in 339 B. C. (the year of the archon Theophrastus at
Athens); next, there was held a special or extraordinary meeting
of Amphiktyons, and a warlike manifestation against the Lokrians;
after which came the regular autumnal meeting at Thermopylæ (B.
C. 339—September—the year of the archon Lysimachides at Athens),
where the vote was passed to call in the military interference of
Philip.

This chronology does not, indeed, agree with the two so-called
decrees of the Amphiktyons, and with the documentary
statement—Ἄρχων Μνησιθείδης, Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἕκτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα—which we
read as incorporated in the oration De Coronâ, p. 279. But I have
already stated that I think these documents spurious.

The archon Mnesitheides (like all the other archons named in
the documents recited in the oration De Coronâ) is a wrong
name, and cannot have been quoted from any genuine document.
Next, the first decree of the Amphiktyons is not in harmony
with the statement of Æschines, himself the great mover, of
what the Amphiktyons really did. Lastly, the second decree
plainly intimates that the person who composed the two decrees
conceived the nomination of Philip to have taken place in the
very same Amphiktyonic assembly as the first movement against
the Lokrians. The same words, ἐπὶ ἱερέως Κλειναγόρου, ἐαρινῆς
πυλαίας—prefixed to both decrees, must be understood to indicate
the same assembly. Mr. Clinton’s supposition that the first
decree was passed at the spring meeting of 339 B. C.—and the
second at the spring meeting of 338 B. C.—Kleinagoras being the
eponymus in both years—appears to me nowise probable. The special
purpose and value of an eponymus would disappear, if the same
person served in that capacity for two successive years. Boeckh
adopts the conjecture of Reiske, altering ἐαρινῆς πυλαίας in the
second decree into ὀπωρινῆς πυλαίας. This would bring the second
decree into better harmony with chronology; but there is nothing
in the state of the text to justify such an innovation. Böhnecke
(Forsch. p. 498-508) adopts a supposition yet more improbable.
He supposes that Æschines was chosen Pylagoras at the beginning
of the Attic year 340-339 B. C., and that he attended first at
Delphi at the _autumnal_ meeting of the Amphiktyons 340 B. C.;
that he there raised the violent storm which he himself describes
in his speech; and that he afterwards, at the subsequent spring
meeting, came both the two decrees which we now read in the
oration De Coronâ. But the first of these two decrees can
never have come _after_ the outrageous proceeding described by
Æschines. I will add, that in the form of decree, the president
Kottyphus is called an Arcadian; whereas Æschines designates him
as a _Pharsalian_.

[1046] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 278.

[1047] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72 ... τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν
ἡγεμονίαν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν παραδεδωκότων, τῆς δὲ Δημοσθένους
δωροδοκίας ἐμποδὼν γεγενημένης.

[1048] See Isokrates, Orat. V. (Philipp.) s. 22. 23.

During the spring and summer of this year 339 B. C. (the interval between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed. He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thessaly and Thermopylæ, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god upon the unholy Lokrians of Amphissa. The Amphiktyonic deputies, and the Amphiktyonic contingents in greater or less numbers, accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylæ, he took Nikæa (one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of Phokis in 346 B. C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in the occupation.[1049] Not being yet assured of the concurrence of the Thebans in his farther projects, he thought it safer to consign this important town to the Thessalians, who were thoroughly in his dependence.

[1049] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. ἐπειδὴ Φίλιππος αὐτῶν
ἀφελόμενος Νίκαιαν Θετταλοῖς παρέδωκε, etc.

Compare Demosthen. ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 153. ὑποπτεύεται δὲ
ὑπὸ Θηβαίων Νίκαιαν μὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχων, etc.

His march from Thermopylæ whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into Bœotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still continued in the defenceless condition to which it had been condemned by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B. C., without a single fortified town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began forthwith to reëstablish the walls, converting it into a strong place for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied Kytinium,[1050] the principal town in the little territory of Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus, situated in the short mountain road from Thermopylæ to Amphissa.

[1050] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to re-fortify and garrison it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something different—or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly invited her coöperation as his ally, against enemies odious to her as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand aloof—he claimed of them at least a free passage through Bœotia, that he might invade Attica with his own forces.[1051]

[1051] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 293-299. Justin, ix. 3, “diu
dissimulatum bellum Atheniensibus infert.” This expression is
correct in the sense, that Philip, who had hitherto pretended
to be on his march against Amphissa, disclosed his real purpose
to be against Athens at the moment when he seized Elateia.
Otherwise, he had been at open war with Athens, ever since the
sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus in the preceding year.

The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in 346 B. C. Yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about coöperation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian politicians—Eubulus—Aristophon—and Demosthenes himself, whom Æschines tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by the Thebans.[1052] Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted, nothing had ever been accomplished.[1053] The enmity still remained, and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe Demosthenes[1054]) during the six months which elapsed since the breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Æschines and the partisans of Philip in both cities.

[1052] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47.

[1053] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 281.

[1054] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 276, 281, 284. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖσε
ἐπάνειμι, ὅτι τὸν ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πόλεμον τούτου (Æschines) μὲν
ποιήσαντος, συμπεραναμένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνέργων αὐτοῦ τὴν
πρὸς Θηβαίους ἐχθρὰν, συνέβη τὸν Φίλιππον ἐλθεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς,
οὗπερ ἕνεκα τὰς πόλεις οὗτοι συνέκρουον, etc. Οὕτω μέχρι πόῤῥω
προήγαγον οὗτοι τὴν ἐχθράν.

The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when Philip took possession of Elateia, was so acknowledged, that he had good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as impossible.[1055] To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his ally, would continue to act as such at this critical juncture, he despatched thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian, Dolopian, Phthiot Achæan, Ætolian, and Ænianes—the Amphiktyonic allies who were now accompanying his march.[1056]

[1055] Demosth. De Coronâ—ἧκεν ἔχων (Philip) τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν
Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι συμπνευσάντων ἂν
ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

[1056] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may easily understand how intense was the alarm among the Athenians, when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well as felt to be prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate, that free passage, and a Theban reinforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten years before, Demosthenes himself (in his first Olynthiac) had asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on Attica.[1057] If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had hitherto been not merely rapid, but also understood as directed towards Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations for the defence of their frontier. Neither their families nor their movable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours, an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during the Peloponnesian war, under a commander far abler than Archidamus or Agis.[1058]

[1057] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16. Ἂν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ,
τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Θηβαῖοι; οἳ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν
εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν ἑτοίμως.

[1058] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304. ἡ γὰρ ἐμὴ πολιτεία, ἧς οὗτος
(Æschines) κατηγορεῖ, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ Θηβαίους μετὰ Φιλίππου
συνεμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν, ~ὃ πάντες ᾤοντο~, μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν
παραταξαμένους ἐκεῖνον κωλύειν ἐποίησεν, etc.

Though the general history of this important period can be made out only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenes a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the prytanes (or senators of the presiding tribe) were at supper in their official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to call the generals whose duty it was to convoke the public assembly, with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; so that the Senate and assembly were convoked for the next morning at daybreak. Others bestirred themselves in clearing out the market-place, which was full of booths and stands, for traders selling merchandize. They even set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear. Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the public assembly was crowded at the earliest dawn, even before the Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for the opening ceremonies. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual words—“Who wishes to speak?” Not a man came forward. He proclaimed it again and again; yet still no one rose.

At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenes rose to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given it utterance—that the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. “Suffer not yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by fraud and corruption; but he has not the whole city. There is yet a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favorable to you. It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes, overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration from the city in his favor—that he is making display of his force at Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you, acting on your old aversion towards Thebes, shall now hold aloof, Philip’s partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For your own security, you must shake off these old feelings, however well-grounded—and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans in Thebes, to speak out openly against their philippizing opponents who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes; giving them full powers, in conjunction with the generals, to call in your military force whenever they think fit. Let your envoys demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves to blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of honor as well as of policy.”[1059]

[1059] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 286, 287; Diodor. xvi. 84. I have
given the substance, in brief, of what Demosthenes represents
himself to have said.

The recommendation of Demosthenes, alike wise and generous, was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without opposition.[1060] Neither Æschines, nor any one else, said a word against it. Demosthenes himself, being named chief of the ten envoys, proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was at the same time marched to the frontier.

[1060] This decree, or a document claiming to be such, is
given _verbatim_ in Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 289, 290. It
bears date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion (June),
under the archonship of Nausikles. This archon is a wrong or
pseud-eponymous archon: and the document, to say nothing of its
verbosity, implies that Athens was now about to pass out of
pacific relations with Philip, and to begin war against him—which
is contrary to the real fact.

There also appear inserted, a few pages before, in the same
speech (p. 282), four other documents, purporting to relate to
the time immediately preceding the capture of Elateia by Philip.
1. A decree of the Athenians, dated in the month Elaphebolion
of the archon _Heropythus_. 2. Another decree, in the month
Munychion of the same _archon_. 3. An answer addressed by Philip
to the Athenians. 4. An answer addressed by Philip to the Thebans.

Here again, the archon called _Heropythus_ is a wrong and unknown
archon. Such manifest error of date would alone be enough to
preclude me from trusting the document as genuine. Droysen is
right, in my judgment, in rejecting all these five documents as
spurious. The answer of Philip to the Athenians is adapted to the
two decrees of the Athenians, and cannot be genuine if they are
spurious.

These decrees, too, like that dated in Skirrophorion, are not
consistent with the true relations between Athens and Philip.
They imply that she was at peace with him, and that hostilities
were first undertaken against him by her after his occupation of
Elateia; whereas open war had been prevailing between them for
more than a year, ever since the summer of 340 B. C., and the
maritime operations against him in the Propontis. That the war
was going on without interruption during all this period—that
Philip could not get near to Athens to strike a blow at her and
close the war, except by bringing the Thebans and Thessalians
into coöperation with him—and that for the attainment of this
last purpose, he caused the Amphissian war to be kindled, through
the corrupt agency of Æschines—is the express statement of
Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 275, 276. Hence I find it impossible
to believe in the authenticity either of the four documents here
quoted, or of this supposed very long decree of the Athenians, on
forming their alliance with Thebes, bearing date on the 16th of
the month Skirrophorion, and cited De Coronâ, p. 289. I will add,
that the two decrees which we read in p. 282, profess themselves
as having been passed in the months Elaphebolion and Munychion,
and bear the name of the archon _Heropythus_; while the decree
cited, p. 289, bears date the 16th of Skirrophorion, and the
name of a different archon, _Nausikles_. Now if the decrees
were genuine, the events which are described in both must have
happened under the same archon, at an interval of about six weeks
between the last day of Munychion and the 16th of Skirrophorion.
It is impossible to suppose an interval of one year and six weeks
between them.

It appears to me, on reading attentively the words of Demosthenes
himself, that the _falsarius_ or person who composed these four
first documents, has not properly conceived what it was that
Demosthenes caused to be read by the public secretary. The point
which Demosthenes is here making, is to show how ably he had
managed, and how well he had deserved of his country, by bringing
the Thebans into alliance with Athens immediately after Philip’s
capture of Elateia. For this purpose he dwells upon the bad state
of feeling between Athens and Thebes before that event, brought
about by the secret instigations of Philip through corrupt
partisans in both places. Now it is to illustrate this hostile
feeling _between Athens and Thebes_, that he causes the secretary
to read certain decrees and answers—ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἦτη ἤδη ~τὰ πρὸς
ἀλλήλους~, τουτωνὶ τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἀκούσαντες καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων
εἴσεσθε. Καί μοι λέγε ταῦτα λαβών.... (p. 282). The documents
here announced to be read do not bear upon the relations between
_Athens and Philip_ (which were those of active warfare, needing
no illustration)—but to the relation between _Athens and Thebes_.
There had plainly been interchanges of bickering and ungracious
feeling between the two cities, manifested in public decrees or
public answers to complaints or remonstrances. Instead of which,
the two Athenian decrees, which we now read as following, are
addressed, not to the Thebans, but to Philip; the first of them
does not mention Thebes at all; the second mentions Thebes only
to recite as a ground of complaint against Philip, that he was
trying to put the two cities at variance; and this too, among
other grounds of complaint, much more grave and imputing more
hostile purposes. Then follow two answers—which are not answers
between Athens and Thebes, as they ought to be—but answers from
Philip, the first to the Athenians, the second to the Thebans.
Neither the decrees, nor the answers, as they here stand, go
to illustrate the point at which Demosthenes is aiming—the bad
feeling and mutual provocations which had been exchanged a little
before between Athens and Thebes. Neither the one nor the other
justify the words of the orator immediately after the documents
have been read—Οὕτω διαθεὶς ὁ Φίλιππος τὰς πόλεις ~πρὸς ἀλλήλας
διὰ τούτων~ (through Æschines and his supporters), καὶ τούτοις
ἐπαρθεὶς τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν, ἧκεν ἔχων τὴν
δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι
συμπνευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

Demosthenes describes Philip as acting upon Thebes and Athens
through the agency of corrupt citizens in each; the author of
these documents conceives Philip as acting by his own despatches.

The decree of the 16th Skirrophorion enacts, not only that
there shall be alliance with Thebes, but also that the right of
_intermarriage_ between the two cities shall be established. Now
at the moment when the decree was passed, the Thebans both had
been, and still were, on bad terms with Athens, so that it was
doubtful whether they would entertain or reject the proposition;
nay, the chances even were, that they would reject it and join
Philip. We can hardly believe it possible, that under such a
state of probabilities, the Athenians would go so far as to
pronounce for the establishment of _intermarriage_ between the
two cities.

At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the philippizing Thebans full of triumph; while the friends of Athens were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenes, sent home immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast.[1061] According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klearchus were the Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus.[1062] Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra. The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendency over Bœotia. “If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—or join our march; whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder of that country, instead of being impoverished by having Bœotia as the seat of war.”[1063]

[1061] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298.

[1062] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. Daochus and Thrasylaus are named
by Demosthenes as Thessalian partisans of Philip (Demosth. De
Coronâ, p. 324).

[1063] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298, 299. Aristot. Rhetoric. ii.
23; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 744; Diodor. xvi. 85.

All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively impression. How Demosthenes replied to them, we are not permitted to know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the preëstablished feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contact with the Macedonian arms—combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that of Philip; a choice in which all presumption was in favor of the latter, as present ally and recent benefactor—against the former, as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the chances thus against him, Demosthenes carried his point in the Theban assembly; determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts with good reason, of such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph;[1064] by which he not only obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also—a benefit yet more important—rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus extol the unrivalled eloquence whereby Demosthenes kindled in the bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-hellenic patriotism. But it was not simply by superior eloquence[1065]—though that doubtless was an essential condition—that his triumph at Thebes was achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the Athenians to make—of unconditional alliance without any references to the jealousies and animosities of the past, and on terms even favorable to Thebes, as being mere exposed than Athens in the war against Philip.[1066]

[1064] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304-307. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ~μετέγνωσαν~
εὐθέως, ὡς ταῦτ᾽ εἶδον, οἱ Θηβαῖοι, καὶ μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐγένοντο, etc.

[1065] Theopompus, Frag. 239, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18.

[1066] We may here trust the more fully the boasts made by
Demosthenes of his own statesmanship and oratory, since we
possess the comments of Æschines, and therefore know the worst
that can be said by an unfriendly critic. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph.
p. 73, 74) says that the Thebans were induced to join Athens, not
by the oratory of Demosthenes, but by the fear of Philip’s near
approach, and by their displeasure in consequence of having Nikæa
taken from them. Demosthenes says in fact the same. Doubtless
the ablest orator must be furnished with some suitable points to
work up in his pleadings. But the orators on the other side would
find in the history of the past a far more copious collection
of matters, capable of being appealed to as causes of antipathy
against Athens, and of favour to Philip; and against this
superior case Demosthenes had to contend.

The answer brought back by Demosthenes was cheering. The important alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army, already mustered in Attica, was invited into Bœotia, and marched to Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force at the northern frontier of Bœotia to resist the approach of Philip, the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenes extols not only the kindness with which they were received in private houses, but also their correct and orderly behavior amidst the families and properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred against them.[1067] The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities seemed effaced in cordial coöperation against the common enemy. Of the cost of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the allies; and the centre of operations was constituted at Thebes.[1068]

[1067] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 299, 300.

[1068] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74.

In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip, giving increased ascendency to Demosthenes, impressed upon the counsels of Athens a vigor long unknown. The orator prevailed upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal, in order that more money might be devoted to military operations. He also carried a farther point which he had long aimed at accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion of the Theoric Fund to military purposes.[1069] So preponderant was the impression of danger at Athens, that Demosthenes was now able to propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course, he must first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was made penal even to submit the motion.

[1069] Philochorus Frag. 135, ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum,
p. 742.

To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return for benefits conferred—and having been doubtless assured by his partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban coöperation against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with an overawing army—he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies. Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy.[1070] But having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa,—and to write to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying much embarrassment, according to Demosthenes.[1071] As far as we can judge they do not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy for the Peloponnesians to join Philip—either by land, while Bœotia was hostile—or by sea while the Amphissians held Kirrha, and the Athenians had a superior navy.

[1070] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. Æschines remarks the
fact—but perverts the inferences deducible from it.

[1071] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 279. Δὸς δή μοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν,
ἥν, ὡς οὐχ ὑπήκουον οἱ Θηβαῖοι, πέμπει πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ
συμμάχους ὁ Φίλιππος, ἵν᾽ εἴδητε καὶ ἐκ ταύτης σαφῶς ὅτι τὴν
μὲν ἀληθῆ πρόφασιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ ταῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ
τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἀπεκρύπτετο, κοινὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς
Ἀμφικτύοσι δόξαντα ποιεῖν προσεποιεῖτο, etc.

Then follows a letter, purporting to be written by Philip to
the Peloponnesians. I concur with Droysen in mistrusting its
authenticity. I do not rest any statements on its evidence.
The Macedonian month Löus does not appear to coincide with the
Attic Boëdromion; nor is it probable that Philip in writing to
Peloponnesians, would allude at all to Attic months. Various
subsequent letters written by Philip to the Peloponnesians, and
intimating much embarrassment, are alluded to by Demosthenes
further on—Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵας τότ᾽ ἠφίει φωνὰς ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ἐν οἵαις
ἦν ταραχαῖς ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἐκείνου μαθήσεσθε ὧν
εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἔπεμπεν (p. 301, 302). Demosthenes causes the
letters to be read publicly, but no letters appear _verbatim_.

War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of Bœotia, during the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. The Athenians and Thebans not only maintained their ground against Philip, but even gained some advantages over him; especially in two engagements—called the battle on the river, and the winter-battle—of which Demosthenes finds room to boast, and which called forth manifestations of rejoicing and sacrifice, when made known at Athens.[1072] To Demosthenes himself, as the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a wreath of gold was proposed by Demomeles and Hyperides, and decreed by the people; and though a citizen named Diondas impeached the mover for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable to the fine of one thousand drachms.[1073] Demosthenes was crowned with public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March 338 B. C.[1074]

[1072] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 300.

[1073] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 302; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator., p.
848.

[1074] That Demosthenes was crowned at the Dionysiac festival
(March 338 B. C.) is contended by Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 534,
535); upon grounds which seem sufficient, against the opinion of
Boeckh and Winiewski (Comment. ad Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250),
who think that he was not crowned until the Panathenaic festival,
in the ensuing July.

But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and Thebans, in this joint war against Philip, was that of reconstituting the Phokians as an independent and self-defending section of the Hellenic name. On the part of the Thebans, hitherto the bitterest enemies of the Phokians, this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved and generous policy, worthy of the Pan-hellenic cause in which they had now embarked. In 346 B. C., the Phokians had been conquered and ruined by the arms of Philip, under condemnation pronounced by the Amphiktyons. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their population distributed in villages, impoverished, or driven into exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in reoccupying and securing their towns.[1075] Some indeed of these towns were so small, such as Parapotamii[1076] and others, that it was thought inexpedient to reconstitute them. Their population was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength. Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was refortified by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black stone of the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two.[1077] These walls were seen, five centuries afterwards, by the traveller Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures in the ancient world.[1078] Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians and Thebans as a military position for the defence of Bœotia, inasmuch as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which the Lacedæmonian king Kleombrotus[1079] had forced when he marched from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; eluding Epaminondas and the main Theban force, who were posted to resist him on the more frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-western parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.

[1075] Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

[1076] Pausanias, x. 33, 4.

[1077] Pausanias, x. 36, 2.

[1078] Pausanias, iv. 31, 5. He places the fortifications of
Ambrysus in a class with those of Byzantium and Rhodes.

[1079] Pausan. ix. 13, 2; Diodor. xv. 53; Xenoph. Hell. vi. 4, 3.

The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other—ended with the fatal battle of Chæroneia, fought in August 338 B. C.; having continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia.[1080] But respecting the intermediate events, we are unfortunately without distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies, the Eubœans, Achæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians, and Korkyræans—arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less than fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry;[1081] and pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either in Phokis or at Chæroneia, we cannot determine; we verify the Achæans and the Corinthians.[1082] As far as we can trust Demosthenes, the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. was a season of advantages gained by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip, testified by his urgent requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with which they did not comply. Demosthenes was the war-minister of the day, exercising greater influence than the generals—deliberating at Thebes in concert with the Bœotarchs—advising and swaying the Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian—and probably in mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military efforts.[1083] The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B. C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting the Macedonian invasion.

[1080] The chronology of this period has caused much perplexity,
and has been differently arranged by different authors. But
it will be found that all the difficulties and controversies
regarding it have arisen from resting on the spurious decrees
embodied in the speech of Demosthenes De Coronâ, as if they were
so much genuine history. Mr. Clinton, in his Fasti Hellenici,
cites these decrees as if they were parts of Demosthenes himself.
When we once put aside these documents, the general statements
both of Demosthenes and Æschines, though they are not precise or
specific, will appear perfectly clear and consistent respecting
the chronology of the period.

That the battle of Chæroneia took place on the 7th of the Attic
month Metageitnion (August) B. C. 338 (the second month of the
archon Chærondas at Athens)—is affirmed by Plutarch (Camill. c.
19) and generally admitted.

The time when Philip first occupied Elateia has been stated
by Mr. Clinton and most authors as the preceding month of
Skirrophorion, fifty days or thereabouts earlier. But this
rests exclusively on the evidence of the pretended decree, for
alliance between Athens and Thebes, which appears in Demosthenes
De Coronâ, p. 289. Even those who defend the authenticity of the
decree, can hardly confide in the truth of the month-date, when
the name of the archon Nausikles is confessedly wrong. To me
neither this document, nor the other so-called Athenian decrees
professing to bear date in Munychion and Elaphebolion (p. 282),
carry any evidence whatever.

The general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, indicate
the appointment of Philip as Amphiktyonic general to have been
made in the autumnal convocation of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ.
Shortly after this appointment, Philip marched his army into
Greece with the professed purpose of acting upon it. In this
march he came upon Elateia and began to fortify it; probably
about the month of October 339 B. C. The Athenians, Thebans,
and other Greeks, carried on the war against him in Phokis for
about ten months, until the battle of Chæroneia. That this war
must have lasted as long as ten months, we may see by the facts
mentioned in my last page—the reëstablishment of the Phokians
and their towns, and especially the elaborate fortification
of Ambrysus. Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 533) points out justly
(though I do not agree with his general arrangement of the events
of the war) that this restoration of the Phokian towns implies
a considerable interval between the occupation of Elateia and
the battle of Chæroneia. We have also two battles gained against
Philip, one of them a μάχη χειμερινὴ, which perfectly suits with
this arrangement.

[1081] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 306; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 17. In
the decree of the Athenian people (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p.
850) passed after the death of Demosthenes, granting various
honors and a statue to his memory—it is recorded that he brought
in by his persuasions not only the allies enumerated in the text,
but also the Lokrians and the Messenians; and that he procured
from the allies a total contribution of above five hundred
talents. The Messenians, however, certainly did not fight at
Chæroneia; nor is it correct to say that Demosthenes induced the
Amphissian Lokrians to become allies of Athens.

[1082] Strabo, ix. p. 414; Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.

[1083] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 48. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p.
74) puts these same facts—the great personal ascendency of
Demosthenes at this period—in an invidious point of view.

Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; at the very worst, upon her neutrality between him and Athens. That she would cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; nor could so improbable a result have been brought about, had not the game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgment by Demosthenes. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly indeed drive him to send instant propositions of peace;[1084] but they would admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with means adequate to the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organization after the continued improvements of his twenty years’ reign—would be marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B. C., to put down the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age, came along with them.

[1084] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. ὥστε εὐθὺς ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι
δεόμενον εἰρήνης, etc.

It is possible that Philip may have tried to disunite the enemies
assembled against him, by separate propositions addressed to some
of them.

It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes, that in levying mercenary troops, he wrongfully took the public money to pay men who never appeared; and farther, that he placed at the disposal of the Amphissians a large body of ten thousand mercenary troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never have been defeated. Æschines affirms that he himself strenuously opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.[1085] It would appear that Philip attacked and took Amphissa. We read of his having deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false despatch intended to be intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road which led to that place.[1086] The sacred domain was restored, and the Amphissians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part against Delphi, were banished.[1087]

[1085] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74. Deinarchus mentions a Theban
named Proxenus, whom he calls a traitor, as having commanded
these mercenary troops at Amphissa (Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p.
99).

[1086] Polyænus, iv. 2, 8.

[1087] We gather this from the edict issued by Polysperchon some
years afterwards (Diodor. xviii. 56).

It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August) that the allied Grecian army met Philip near Chæroneia; the last Bœotian town on the frontiers of Phokis. He seems to have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and is said to have drawn down the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste the neighboring fields.[1088] His numbers are stated by Diodorus at thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse; he doubtless had with him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him, the total is not known.[1089] We can therefore make no comparison as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organization is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens, under Lysikles and Chares—and of Thebes, commanded by Theagenes; there were, besides, Phokians, Achæans, and Corinthians—probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, took no part in the war.[1090] All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides; by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards Philip as a protector against her—though on this occasion they took no positive part.

[1088] Polyænus, iv. 2, 14.

[1089] Diodorus affirms that Philip’s army was superior in
number; Justin states the reverse (Diodor. xvi. 85; Justin, ix.
3).

[1090] Pausanias, iv. 2, 82; v. 4, 5; viii. 6, 1.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenes at least ensured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphikrates was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean.[1091] Portents were said to have occurred—oracles, and prophecies, were in circulation—calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes, animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and combined in defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same indifference[1092] as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuktra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippizing. Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement of Æschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and the Bœotarchs inclined to accept them—Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one who should broach the proposition of peace,[1093] and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to attack Philip single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by Æschines; who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival, by intimating that the Bœotarchs were so eager for peace, that they proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that Demosthenes “became out of his mind”[1094] (such is the expression of Æschines) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip would have gained his point even without a battle, if, by holding out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune, not likely to be reproduced, should it once slip away. And if Demosthenes, by warm or even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he rendered the valuable service of ensuring to Grecian liberty a full trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the very worst, a catastrophe worthy and honorable.

[1091] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[1092] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 19, 20; Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

[1093] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 74, 75.

[1094] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 75. Ὡς δ᾽ οὐ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ
(Δημοσθένει) οἱ ἄρχοντες οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
στρατιώτας τοὺς ὑμετέρους πάλιν ἀνέστρεψαν ἐξεληλυθότας, ἵνα
βουλεύσαισθε περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐνταῦθα παντάπασιν ἔκφρων ἐγένετο,
etc.

It is, seemingly, this disposition on the part of Philip to open
negotiations which is alluded to by Plutarch as having been
(Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16) favorably received by Phokion.

In the field of battle near Chæroneia, Philip himself commanded a chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians, while his youthful son, Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is said to have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander[1095] here first displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and perished in their ranks,[1096] while the Theban phalanx was broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, “Let us pursue them even to Macedonia.”[1097] It is farther said that Philip on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more likely to be true—that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks.[1098] Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to flight with severe loss.[1099]

[1095] Diodor. xvi. 85. Alexander himself, after his vast
conquests in Asia and shortly before his death, alludes briefly
to his own presence at Chæroneia, in a speech delivered to his
army (Arrian, vii. 9, 5).

[1096] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18.

[1097] Polyænus, iv. 2, 2. He mentions Stratokles as the Athenian
general from whom this exclamation came. We know from Æschines
(adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) that Stratokles was general of the Athenian
troops at or near Thebes shortly after the alliance with the
Thebans was formed. But it seems that Chares and Lysikles
commanded at Chæroneia. It is possible, therefore, that the
anecdote reported by Polyænus may refer to one of the earlier
battles fought, before that of Chæroneia.

[1098] Polyænus, iv. 2, 7; Frontinus.

[1099] Diodor. xvi. 85, 86.

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete training, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa—in the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost soldiers—and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip’s improved phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæroneia.