Chapter XC (2)

[998] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 165. This Epistle of
Philip to the Athenians appears here inserted among the orations
of Demosthenes. Some critics reject it as spurious; but I
see no sufficient ground for such an opinion. Whether it be
the composition of Philip himself, or of some Greek employed
in Philip’s cabinet, is a point which we have no means of
determining.

The oration of Demosthenes which is said to be delivered in reply
to this letter of Philip (Orat. xi), is, in my judgment, wrongly
described. Not only it has no peculiar bearing on the points
contained in the letter—but it must also be two or three months
later in date, since it mentions the aid sent by the Persian
satraps to Perinthus, and the raising of the siege of that city
by Philip (p. 153).

[999] Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159, 164; compare
Isokrates. Or. v. (Philip.) s. 82.

It is of little moment to verify or appreciate the particular complaints here set forth, even if we had adequate information for the purpose. Under the feeling which had prevailed during the last two years between the Athenians and Philip, we cannot doubt that many detached acts of a hostile character had been committed on their side as well as on his. Philip’s allegation—that he had repeatedly proposed to them amicable adjustment of differences—whether true or not, is little to the purpose. It was greatly to his interest to keep Athens at peace and tranquil, while he established his ascendency everywhere else, and accumulated a power for ultimate employment such as she would be unable to resist. The Athenians had at length been made to feel, that farther acquiescence in these proceedings would only ensure to them the amount of favor tendered by Polyphemus to Odysseus—that they should be devoured last. But the lecture which he thinks fit to administer both to them and to their popular orators, is little better than insulting derision. It is strange to read encomiums on peace—as if it were indisputably advantageous to the Athenian public, and as if recommendations of war originated only with venal and calumnious orators for their own profit—pronounced by the greatest aggressor and conqueror of his age, whose whole life was passed in war and in the elaborate organization of great military force; and addressed to a people whose leading infirmity then was, an aversion almost unconquerable to the personal hardships and pecuniary sacrifices of effective war. This passage of the manifesto may probably be intended as a theme for Æschines and the other philippizing partisans in the Athenian assembly.

War was now an avowed fact on both sides. At the instigation of Demosthenes and others, the Athenians decreed to equip a naval force, which was sent under Chares to the Hellespont and Propontis.

Meanwhile Philip brought up to the siege of Perinthus an army of thirty thousand men, and a stock of engines and projectiles such as had never before been seen.[1000] His attack on this place was remarkable not only for great bravery and perseverance on both sides, but also for the extended scale of the military operations.[1001] Perinthus was strong and defensible; situated on a promontory terminating in abrupt cliffs southward towards the Propontis, unassailable from seaward, but sloping, though with a steep declivity towards the land, with which it was joined by an isthmus of not more than a furlong in breadth. Across this isthmus stretched the outer wall, behind which were seen the houses of the town, lofty, strongly built, and rising one above the other in terraces up the ascent of the promontory. Philip pressed the place with repeated assaults on the outer wall; battering it with rams, undermining it by sap, and rolling up movable towers said to be one hundred and twenty feet in height (higher even than the towers of the Perinthian wall), so as to chase away the defenders by missiles, and to attempt an assault by boarding-planks hand to hand. The Perinthians, defending themselves with energetic valor, repelled him for a long time from the outer wall. At length the besieging engines, with the reiterated attacks of Macedonian soldiers animated by Philip’s promises, overpowered this wall, and drove them back into the town. It was found, however, that the town itself supplied a new defensible position to its citizens. The lower range of houses, united by strong barricades across the streets, enabled the Perinthians still to hold out. In spite of all their efforts, however, the town would have shared the fate of Olynthus, had they not been sustained by effective foreign aid. Not only did their Byzantine kinsmen exhaust themselves to furnish every sort of assistance by sea, but also the Athenian fleet, and Persian satraps on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, coöperated. A body of Grecian mercenaries under Apollodorus, sent across from Asia by the Phrygian satrap Arsites, together with ample supplies of stores by sea, placed Perinthus in condition to defy the besiegers.[1002]

[1000] How much improvement Philip had made in engines for siege,
as a part of his general military organization—is attested in
a curious passage of a later author on mechanics. Athenæus, De
Machinis ap. Auctor. Mathem. Veter. p. 3, ed. Paris.—ἐπίδοσιν δὲ
ἔλαβεν ἡ τοαιύτη μηχανοποιΐα ἅπασα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ
Σικελιώτου τυραννίδα, κατά τε τὴν Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀμύντου βασίλειαν,
ὅτε ἐπολιόρκει Βυζαντίους Φίλιππος. Εὐημέρει δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ
Πολύειδος ὁ Θεσσαλὸς, οὗ οἱ μαθηταὶ συνεστρατεύοντο Ἀλεξάνδρῷ.

Respecting the engines employed by Dionysius of Syracuse, see
Diodor. xiv. 42, 48, 50.

[1001] Diodor. xvi. 74-76; Plutarch, Vit. Alexandri, c. 70; also
Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 215, and De Fortunâ Alexan. p. 339.

[1002] Demosth. ad Philip. Epistol. p. 153; Diodor. xvi. 75;
Pausanias, i. 29, 7.

After a siege which can hardly have lasted less than three months, Philip found all his efforts against Perinthus baffled. He then changed his plan, withdrew a portion of his forces, and suddenly appeared before Byzantium. The walls were strong, but inadequately manned and prepared; much of the Byzantine force being in service at Perinthus. Among several vigorous attacks, Philip contrived to effect a surprise on a dark and stormy night, which was very near succeeding. The Byzantines defended themselves bravely, and even defeated his fleet; but they too were rescued chiefly by foreign aid. The Athenians—now acting under the inspirations of Demosthenes, who exhorted them to bury in a generous oblivion all their past grounds of offence against Byzantium—sent a still more powerful fleet to the rescue, under the vigorous guidance of Phokion[1003] instead of the loose and rapacious Chares. Moreover the danger of Byzantium called forth strenuous efforts from the chief islanders of the Ægean—Chians, Rhodians, Koans, etc., to whom it was highly important that Philip should not become master of the great passage for imported corn into the Grecian seas. The large combined fleet thus assembled was fully sufficient to protect Byzantium.[1004] Compelled to abandon the siege of that city as well as of Perinthus, Philip was farther baffled in an attack on the Chersonese. Phokion not only maintained against him the full security of the Propontis and its adjoining straits, but also gained various advantages over him both by land and sea.[1005]

[1003] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p.
848-851. To this fleet of Phokion, Demosthenes contributed the
outfit of a trireme, while the orator Hyperides sailed with
the fleet as trierarch. See Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische
Seewesen, p. 441, 442, 498. From that source the obscure
chronology of the period now before us derives some light;
since it becomes certain that the expedition of Chares began
during the archonship of Nichomaclides; that is, in the year
_before_ Midsummer 340 B. C.; while the expedition of Phokion and
Kephisophon began in the year following—_after_ Midsummer 340 B. C.

See some anecdotes respecting this siege of Byzantium by Philip,
collected from later authors (Dionysius Byzantinus, Hesychius
Milesius, and others) by the diligence of Böhnecke—Forschungen,
p. 470 _seqq._

[1004] Diodor. xvi. 77: Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 17.

[1005] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14.

These operations probably occupied the last six months of 340 B. C. They constituted the most important success gained by Athens, and the most serious reverse experienced by Philip, since the commencement of war between them. Coming as they did immediately after the liberation of Eubœa in the previous year, they materially improved the position of Athens against Philip. Phokion and his fleet not only saved the citizens of Byzantium from all the misery of a capture by Macedonian soldiers, but checked privateering, and protected the trade-ships so efficaciously, that corn became unusually abundant and cheap both at Athens and throughout Greece:[1006] and Demosthenes, as statesman and diplomatist, enjoyed the credit of having converted Eubœa into a friendly and covering neighbor for Athens, instead of being a shelter for Philip’s marauding cruisers—as well as of bringing round Byzantium from the Macedonian alliance to that of Athens, and thus preventing both the Hellespont and the corn-trade from passing into Philip’s hands.[1007] The warmest votes of thanks, together with wreaths in token of gratitude, were decreed to Athens by the public assemblies of Byzantium, Perinthus, and the various towns of the Chersonese;[1008] while the Athenian public assembly also decreed and publicly proclaimed a similar vote of thanks and admiration to Demosthenes. The decree, moved by Aristonikus, was so unanimously popular at the time, that neither Æschines nor any of the other enemies of Demosthenes thought it safe to impeach the mover.[1009]

[1006] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255; Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p.
350.

[1007] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 305, 306, 307: comp. p. 253. μετὰ
ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ἀπέστειλα, καθ᾽ οὓς Χεῤῥόνησος
ἐσώθη, καὶ Βυζάντιον καὶ πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι, etc.

[1008] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255, 257. That these votes of
thanks were passed, is authenticated by the words of the oration
itself. Documents are inserted in the oration, purporting to be
the decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, and that of the
Chersonesite cities. I do not venture to cite these as genuine,
considering how many of the other documents annexed to this
oration are decidedly spurious.

[1009] Demosth. p. 253. Aristonikus is again mentioned, p.
302. A document appears, p. 253, purporting to be the vote
of the Athenians to thank and crown Demosthenes, proposed by
Aristonikus. The name of the Athenian archon is wrong, as in all
the other documents embodied in this oration, where the name of
an Athenian archon appears.

In the recent military operations, on so large a scale, against Byzantium and Perinthus, Philip had found himself in conflict not merely with Athens, but also with Chians, Rhodians and others; an unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To break up this confederacy, he found it convenient to propose peace, and to abandon his designs against Byzantium and Perinthus—the point on which the alarm of the confederates chiefly turned. By withdrawing his forces from the Propontis, he was enabled to conclude peace with the Byzantines and most of the maritime Greeks who had joined in relieving them. The combination against him was thus dissolved, though with Athens[1010] and her more intimate allies his naval war still continued. While he multiplied cruisers and privateers to make up by prizes his heavy outlay during the late sieges, he undertook with his land-force an enterprize, during the spring of 339 B. C., against the Scythian king Atheas; whose country, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, he invaded with success, bringing away as spoil a multitude of youthful slaves of both sexes, as well as cattle. On his return however across Mount Hæmus, he was attacked on a sudden by the Thracian tribe Triballi, and sustained a defeat; losing all his accompanying captives, and being badly wounded through the thigh.[1011] This expedition and its consequences occupied Philip during the spring and summer of 339 B. C.

[1010] Diodorus (xvi. 77) mentions this peace; stating that
Philip raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, and made
peace πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους.

Wesseling (ad loc.) and Weiske (De Hyperbolê, ii. p. 41) both
doubt the reality of this peace. Neither Böhnecke nor Winiewski
recognize it. Mr. Clinton admits it in a note to his Appendix 16.
p. 292; though he does not insert it in his column of events in
the tables.

I perfectly concur with these authors in dissenting from
Diodorus, so far as _Athens_ is concerned. The supposition that
peace was concluded between Philip and Athens at this time is
distinctly negatived by the language of Demosthenes (De Coronâ,
p. 275, 276); indirectly also by Æschines. Both from Demosthenes
and from Philochorus it appeals sufficiently clear, in my
judgment, that the war between Philip and the Athenians went on
without interruption from the summer of 340 B. C., to the battle
of Chæroneia, in August 338.

But I see no reason for disbelieving Diodorus, in so far as he
states that Philip made peace with the other Greeks—Byzantines,
Perinthians, Chians, Rhodians, etc.

[1011] Justin, ix. 2, 3. Æschines alludes to this expedition
against the Scythians during the spring of the archon
Theophrastus, or 339 B. C. (Æschin. cont. Ktesiph. p. 71).

Meanwhile the naval war of Athens against Philip was more effectively carried on, and her marine better organized, than ever it had been before. This was chiefly owing to an important reform proposed and carried by Demosthenes, immediately on the declaration of war against Philip in the summer of 340 B. C. Enjoying as he did, now after long public experience, the increased confidence of his fellow-citizens, and being named superintendent of the navy,[1012] he employed his influence not only in procuring energetic interference both as to Eubœa and Byzantium, but also in correcting deep-seated abuses which nullified the efficiency of the Athenian marine department.

[1012] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 85. c. 80. ἐπιστάτης τοῦ
ναυτικοῦ.

The law of Periander (adopted in 357 B. C.) had distributed the burthen of the trierarchy among the twelve hundred richest citizens on the taxable property-schedule, arranged in twenty fractions called Symmories, of sixty persons each. Among these men, the three hundred richest, standing distinguished, as leaders of the Symmories, were invested with the direction and enforcement of all that concerned their collective agency and duties. The purpose of this law had been to transfer the cost of trierarchy—a sum of about forty, fifty or sixty minæ for each trireme, defraying more or less of the outfit—which had originally been borne by a single rich man as his turn came round, and afterwards by two rich men in conjunction—to a partnership more or less numerous, consisting of five, six, or even fifteen or sixteen members of the same symmory. The number of such partners varied according to the number of triremes required by the state to be fitted out in any one year. If only few triremes were required, sixteen contributors might be allotted to defray collectively the trierarchic cost of each: if on the other hand many triremes were needed, a less number of partners, perhaps no more than five or six, could be allotted to each—since the total number of citizens whose turn it was to be assessed in that particular year was fixed. The assessment upon each partner was of course heavier, in proportion as the number of partners assigned to a trireme was smaller. Each member of the partnership, whether it consisted of five, of six, or of sixteen, contributed in equal proportion towards the cost.[1013] The richer members of the partnership thus paid no greater sum than the poorer; and sometimes even evaded any payment of their own, by contracting with some one to discharge the duties of the post, on condition of a total sum not greater than that which they had themselves collected from these poorer members.

[1013] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 260-262. ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς
ἡγεμόσι τῶν συμμοριῶν) ἐκ μὲν τῶν προτέρων νόμων συνεκκαίδεκα
λειτουργεῖν—αὐτοῖς μὲν μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσιν, τοὺς δ᾽
ἀπόρους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιτρίβουσιν ... ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ νόμου τὸ
γιγνόμενον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἕκαστον τιθέναι· καὶ δυοῖν ἐφάνη
τριήραρχος ὁ τῆς μιᾶς ἕκτος καὶ δέκατος πρότερον συντελής· οὐδὲ
γὰρ τριηράρχους ἔτι ὠνόμαζον ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ συντελεῖς.

The trierarchy, and the trierarchic symmories, at Athens, are
subjects not perfectly known; the best expositions respecting
them are to be found in Boeckh’s Public Economy of Athens (b. iv.
ch. 11-13), and in his other work, Urkunden über das Attische
Seewesen (ch. xi. xii. xiii.); besides Parreidt, De Symmoriis,
part ii. p. 22, seq.

The fragment of Hyperides (cited by Harpokration v. Συμμορία)
alluding to the trierarchic reform of Demosthenes, though briefly
and obscurely, is an interesting confirmation of the oration De
Coronâ.

According to Demosthenes, the poorer members of these trierarchic symmories were sometimes pressed down almost to ruin by the sums demanded; so that they complained bitterly, and even planted themselves in the characteristic attitude of suppliants at Munychia or elsewhere in the city. When their liabilities to the state were not furnished in time, they became subject to imprisonment by the officers superintending the outfit of the armament In addition to such private hardship, there arose great public mischief from the money not being at once forthcoming; the armament being delayed in its departure, and forced to leave Peiræus either in bad condition or without its full numbers. Hence arose in great part, the ill-success of Athens in her maritime enterprises against Philip, before the peace of 346 B. C.[1014]

[1014] There is a point in the earlier oration of Demosthenes
De Symmoriis, illustrating the grievance which he now reformed.
That grievance consisted, for one main portion, in the fact,
that the richest citizen in a trierarchic partnership paid a
sum no greater (sometimes even less) than the poorest. Now it
is remarkable that this unfair apportionment of charge might
have occurred, and is noway guarded against, in the symmories as
proposed by Demosthenes himself. His symmories, each comprising
sixty persons or one-twentieth of the total active twelve
hundred, are directed to divide themselves into five fractions
of twelve persons each, or a hundredth of the twelve hundred.
Each group of twelve is to comprise the richest alongside of
the poorest members of the sixty (ἀνταναπληροῦντας πρὸς τὸν
εὐπορώτατον ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους, p. 182), so that each group
would contain individuals very unequal in wealth, though the
aggregate wealth of one group would be nearly equal to that of
another. These twelve persons were to defray collectively the
cost of trierarchy for one ship, two ships, or three ships,
according to the number of ships which the state might require
(p. 183). But Demosthenes nowhere points out in what proportions
they were to share the expense among them; whether the richest
citizens among the twelve were to pay only an equal sum with
the poorest, or a sum greater in proportion to their wealth.
There is nothing in his project to prevent the richer members
from insisting that all should pay equally. This is the very
abuse that he denounced afterwards (in 340 B. C.), as actually
realized—and corrected by a new law. The oration of Demosthenes
De Symmoriis, omitting as it does all positive determination as
to proportions of payment, helps us to understand how the abuse
grew up.

The same influences, which had led originally to the introduction of such abuses, stood opposed to the orator in his attempted amendment. The body of Three Hundred, the richest men in the state—the leader or richest individual in each symmory, with those who stood second or third in order of wealth—employed every effort to throw out the proposition, and tendered large bribes to Demosthenes (if we may credit his assertion) as inducements for dropping it. He was impeached moreover under the Graphê Paranomon, as mover of an unconstitutional or illegal decree. It required no small share of firmness and public spirit, combined with approved eloquence and an established name, to enable Demosthenes to contend against these mighty enemies.

His new law caused the charge of trierarchy to be levied upon all the members of the symmories, or upon all above a certain minimum of property, in proportion to their rated property; but it seems, if we rightly make out, to have somewhat heightened the minimum, so that the aggregate number of persons chargeable was diminished.[1015] Every citizen rated at ten talents was assessed singly for the charge of trierarchy belonging to one trireme; if rated at twenty talents, for the trierarchy of two; at thirty talents, for the trierarchy of three; if above thirty talents, for that of three triremes and a service boat—which was held to be the maximum payable by any single individual. Citizens rated at less than ten talents, were grouped together into ratings of ten talents in the aggregate, in order to bear collectively the trierarchy of one of a trireme; the contributions furnished by each person in the group being proportional to the sum for which he stood rated. This new proposition, while materially relieving the poorer citizens, made large addition to the assessments of the rich. A man rated at twenty talents, who had before been chargeable for only the sixteenth part of the expense of one trierarchy, along with partners much poorer than himself but equally assessed—now became chargeable with the entire expense of two trierarchies. All persons liable were assessed in fair proportion to the sum for which they stood rated in the schedule. When the impeachment against Demosthenes came to be tried before the Dikastery, he was acquitted by more than four-fifths of the Dikasts; so that the accuser was compelled to pay the established fine. And so animated was the temper of the public at that moment, in favor of vigorous measures for prosecuting the war just declared, that they went heartily along with him, and adopted the main features of his trierarchic reform. The resistance from the rich, however, though insufficient to throw out the measure, constrained him to modify it more than once, during the progress of the discussion;[1016] partly in consequence of the opposition of Æschines, whom he accuses of having been hired by the rich for the purpose.[1017] It is deeply to be regretted that the speeches of both of them—especially those of Demosthenes, which must have been numerous—have not been preserved.

[1015] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 86) charges Demosthenes with
“having stolen away from the city the trierarchs of sixty-five
swift sailing vessels.” This implies, I imagine, that the new law
diminished the total number of persons chargeable with trierarchy.

[1016] Deinarchus adv. Demosthen. p. 95. s. 43. Εἰσί τινες ἐν
τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίοις γεγενημένων, ὅθ᾽ οὗτος
(Demosthenes) ἐτίθει τὸν περὶ τῶν τριηράρχων νόμον. Οὐ φράσετε
τοῖς πλησίον ὅτι τρία τάλαντα λαβὼν μετέγραφε καὶ μετεσκεύαζε τὸν
νόμον καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπώλει ὦν εἰλήφει τὴν
τιμὴν, τὰ δ᾽ ἀποδόμενος οὐκ ἐβεβαίου;

Without accepting this assertion of a hostile speaker, so far
as it goes to accuse Demosthenes of having accepted bribes—we
may safely accept it, so far as it affirms that he made several
changes and modifications in the law before it finally passed; a
fact not at all surprising, considering the intense opposition
which it called forth.

Some of the Dikasts, before whom Deinarchus was pleading, had
been included among the Three Hundred (that is, the richest
citizens in the State) when Demosthenes proposed his trierarchic
reform. This will show, among various other proofs which might
be produced, that the Athenian Dikasts did not always belong to
the poorest class of citizens, as the jests of Aristophanes would
lead us to believe.

[1017] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 329. Boeckh (Attisch. Seewesen,
p. 183, and Publ. Econ. Ath. iv. 14) thinks that this
passage—διτάλαντον δ᾽ εἶχες ἔρανον δωρεὰν παρὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων
τῶν συμμοριῶν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐλυμῄνω τὸν τριηραρχικὸν νόμον—must
allude to injury done by Æschines to the law in later years,
after it became a law. But I am unable to see the reason for so
restricting its meaning. The rich men would surely bribe most
highly, and raise most opposition, against the first passing of
the law, as they were then most likely to be successful; and
Æschines, whether bribed or not bribed, would most naturally as
well as most effectively stand out against the novelty introduced
by his rival, without waiting to see it actually become a part of
the laws of the State.

Thus were the trierarchic symmories distributed and assessed anew upon each man in the ratio of his wealth, and therefore most largely upon the Three Hundred richest.[1018] How long the law remained unchanged, we do not know. But it was found to work admirably well; and Demosthenes boasts that during the entire war (that is, from the renewal of the war about August 340 B. C., to the battle of Chæroneia in August 338 B. C.) all the trierarchs named under the law were ready in time without complaint or suffering; while the ships, well-equipped and exempt from the previous causes of delay, were found prompt and effective for all exigencies. Not one was either left behind, or lost at sea, throughout these two years.[1019]

[1018] See the citation from Hyperides in Harpokrat. v. Συμμορία.
The Symmories are mentioned in Inscription xiv. of Boeckh’s
Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen (p. 465), which Inscription
bears the date of 325 B. C. Many of these Inscriptions name
individual citizens, in different numbers three, five, or six, as
joint trierarchs of the same vessel.

[1019] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 262.

Probably the first fruits of the Demosthenic reform in Athenian naval administration, was, the fleet equipped under Phokion, which acted so successfully at and near Byzantium. The operations of Athenians at sea, though not known in detail, appear to have been better conducted and more prosperous in their general effect than they had ever been since the Social War. But there arose now a grave and melancholy dispute in the interior of Greece, which threw her upon her defence by land. This new disturbing cause was nothing less than another Sacred War, declared by the Amphiktyonic assembly against the Lokrians of Amphissa. Kindled chiefly by the Athenian Æschines, it more than compensated Philip for his repulse at Byzantium and his defeat by the Triballi; bringing, like the former Sacred War, aggrandizement to him alone, and ruin to Grecian liberty.

I have recounted, in the fourth volume of this work,[1020] the first Sacred War recorded in Grecian history (590-580 B. C.), about two centuries before the birth of Æschines and Demosthenes. That war had been undertaken by the Amphiktyonic Greeks to punish, and ended by destroying, the flourishing seaport of Kirrha, situated near the mouth of the river Pleistus, on the coast of the fertile plain stretching from the southern declivity of Delphi to the sea. Kirrha was originally the port of Delphi; and of the ancient Phokian town of Krissa, to which Delphi was once an annexed sanctuary.[1021] But in process of time Kirrha increased at the expense of both; through profits accumulated from the innumerable visitors by sea who landed there as the nearest access to the temple. The prosperous Kirrhæans, inspiring jealousy at Delphi and Krissa, were accused of extortion in the tolls levied from visitors, as well as of other guilty or offensive proceedings. An Amphiktyonic war, wherein the Athenian Solon stood prominently forward, being declared against them, Kirrha was taken and destroyed. Its fertile plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, under an oath taken by all the Amphiktyonic members, with solemn pledges and formidable imprecations against all disturbers. The entire space between the temple and the sea now became, as the oracle had required, sacred property of the god; that is, incapable of being tilled, planted, or occupied in any permanent way, by man, and devoted only to spontaneous herbage with pasturing animals.

[1020] Chap. xxviii. p. 62 _seqq._

[1021] For the topography of the country round Delphi, see
the instructive work of Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in
Griechenland (Bremen, 1840) chapters i. and ii. about Kirrha and
Krissa.

But though the Delphians thus procured the extirpation of their troublesome neighbors at Kirrha, it was indispensable that on or near the same spot there should exist a town and port, for the accommodation of the guests who came from all quarters to Delphi; the more so, as such persons, not merely visitors, but also traders with goods to sell, now came in greater multitudes than ever, from the increased attractions imparted out of the rich spoils of Kirrha itself, to the Pythian festival. How this want was at first supplied, while the remembrance of the oath was yet fresh, we are not informed. But in process of time Kirrha became reoccupied and refortified by the western neighbors of Delphi—the Lokrians of Amphissa—on whose borders it stood, and for whom probably it served as a port not less than for Delphi. These new occupants received the guests coming to the temple, enriched themselves by the accompanying profit and took into cultivation a certain portion of the plain around the town.[1022]

[1022] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69; compare Livy, xlii. 5;
Pausanias, x. 37, 4. The distance from Delphi to Kirrha is given
by Pausanias at sixty stadia, or about seven English miles: by
Strabo at eighty stadia.

At what period the occupation by the Lokrians had its origin, we are unable to say. So much however we make out—not merely from Demosthenes, but even from Æschines—that in their time it was an ancient and established occupation—not a recent intrusion or novelty. The town was fortified; the space immediately adjacent being tilled and claimed by the Lokrians as their own.[1023] This indeed was a departure from the oath, sworn by Solon with his Amphiktyonic contemporaries, to consecrate Kirrha and its lands to the Delphian god. But if that oath had been literally carried out, the god himself, and the Delphians among whom he dwelt, would have been the principal losers; because the want of a convenient port would have been a serious discouragement, if not a positive barrier, against the arrival of visitors, most of whom came by sea. Accordingly the renovation of the town and port of Kirrha, doubtless on a modest scale, together with a space of adjacent land for tillage, was at least tolerated, if not encouraged. Much of the plain, indeed, still remained unfilled and unplanted, as the property of Apollo; the boundaries being perhaps not accurately drawn.

[1023] Æschines, _l. c._; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. τὴν
χώραν ἣν οἱ μὲν Ἀμφισσεῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν γεωργεῖν ἔφασαν, οὗτος δὲ
(Æschines) τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας ᾐτιᾶτο εἶναι, etc.

While the Lokrians had thus been serviceable to the Delphian temple by occupying Kirrha, they had been still more valuable as its foremost auxiliaries and protectors against the Phokians, their enemies of long standing.[1024] One of the first objects of Philomelus the Phokian, after defeating the Lokrian armed force, was to fortify the sacred precinct of Delphi on its western side, against their attacks;[1025] and we cannot doubt that their position in close neighborhood to Delphi must have been one of positive suffering as well as of danger, during the years when the Phokian leaders, with their numerous mercenary bands, remained in victorious occupation of the temple, and probably of the harbor of Kirrha also. The subsequent turn of fortune,—when Philip crushed the Phokians and when the Amphiktyonic assembly was reorganized, with him as its chief,—must have found the Amphissian Lokrians among the warmest allies and sympathizers. Resuming possession of Kirrha, they may perhaps have been emboldened, in such a moment of triumphant reaction, to enlarge their occupancy round the walls to a greater extent than they had done before. Moreover they were animated with feelings attached to Thebes; and were hostile to Athens, as the ally and upholder of their enemies the Phokians.

[1024] Diodor. xvi. 24; Thucyd. iii. 101.

[1025] Diodor. xvi. 25.

Matters were in this condition when the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic assembly (February or March 339 B. C.) was held at Delphi. Diognetus was named by the Athenians to attend it as Hieromnemon, or chief legate; with three Pylagoræ or vice-legates, Æschines, Meidias, and Thrasykles.[1026] We need hardly believe Demosthenes, when he states that the name of Æschines was put up without foreknowledge on the part of any one; and that though it passed, yet not more than two or three hands were held up in his favor.[1027] Soon after they reached Delphi, Diognetus was seized with a fever, so that the task of speaking in the Amphiktyonic assembly was confided to Æschines.

[1026] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.

[1027] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.

There stood in the Delphian temple some golden or gilt shields dedicated as an offering out of the spoils taken at the battle of Platæa, a century and a half before,—with an inscription to this effect,—“Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks.” It appears that these shields had recently been set up afresh (having been perhaps stript of their gilding by the Phokian plunderers), in a new cell or chapel, without the full customary forms of prayer or solemnities;[1028] which perhaps might be supposed unnecessary, as the offering was not now dedicated for the first time. The inscription, little noticed and perhaps obscured by the lapse of time on the original shields, would now stand forth brightly and conspicuously on the new gilding; reviving historical recollections highly offensive to the Thebans,[1029] and to the Amphissian Lokrians as friends of Thebes. These latter not only remonstrated against it in the Amphiktyonic assembly, but were even preparing (if we are to believe Æschines), to accuse Athens of impiety; and to invoke against her a fine of fifty talents, for omission of the religious solemnities.[1030] But this is denied by Demosthenes;[1031] who states that the Lokrians could not bring any such accusation against Athens without sending a formal summons,—which they had never sent. Demosthenes would be doubtless right as to the regular form, probably also as to the actual fact; though Æschines accuses him of having received bribes[1032] to defend the iniquities of the Lokrians. Whether the Lokrians went so far as to invoke a penalty, or not,—at any rate they spoke in terms of complaint against the proceeding. Such complaint was not without real foundation; since it was better for the common safety of Hellenic liberty against the Macedonian aggressor, that the treason of Thebes at the battle of Platæa should stand as a matter of past antiquity, rather than be republished in a new edition. But this was not the ground taken by the complainants, nor could they directly impeach the right of Athens to burnish up her old donatives. Accordingly they assailed the act on the allegation of impiety, as not having been preceded by the proper religious solemnities; whereby they obtained the opportunity of inveighing against Athens, as ally of the Phokians in their recent sacrilege, and enemy of Thebes the steadfast champion of the god.

[1028] This must have been an ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἀναθημάτων
(compare Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 13), requiring to be preceded by
solemn ceremonies, sometimes specially directed by the oracle.

[1029] How painfully the Thebans of the Demosthenic age felt the
recollection of the alliance of their ancestors with the Persians
at Platæa, we may read in Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 187.

It appears that the Thebans also had erected a new chapel at
Delphi (after 346 B. C.) out of the spoils acquired from the
conquered Phokians—ὁ ἀπὸ Φωκέων ναὸς, ὃν ἱδρύσαντο Θηβαῖοι
(Diodor. xvii. 10).

[1030] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. The words of his speech
do not however give either a full or a clear account of the
transaction; which I have endeavored, as well as I can, to supply
in the text.

[1031] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.

[1032] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.

“The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main recital, though not the exact words, of Æschines), a friendly person came to acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on their accusation against Athens. My sick colleagues requested me immediately to enter the assembly and undertake her defence. I made haste to comply, and was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian,—of extreme rudeness and brutality,—perhaps even under the influence of some misguiding divine impulse,—interrupted me and exclaimed,—‘Do not hear him, men of Hellas! Do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred ground, like men under a curse.’ With that he denounced us for our alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous invectives against the city.

“To me (continues Æschines) all this was intolerable to hear; I cannot even now think on it with calmness—and at the moment, I was provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The thought crossed me that I would retort upon the Amphissians for their impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible throughout. ‘You see, Amphiktyons (said I), that plain cultivated by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and pottery! You have before your eyes the harbor, consecrated by the oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You know of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, that these Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the sacred harbor!’ I then caused to be read publicly the ancient oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first Sacred War, wherein Kirrha was destroyed). Then continuing, I said—‘Here am I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property, according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice, and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared to clear my own city of her obligations to the gods do you take counsel forthwith for yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well then,—where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage, to pronounce such supplications, if you permit these accursed Amphissians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring,—They who do not stand forward to vindicate Apollo, Artemis, Latona, and Athênê Pronæa, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favorable acceptance.’”

Such is the graphic and impressive description,[1033] given by Æschines himself some years afterwards to the Athenian assembly, of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B. C.; on the lofty sight of the Delphian Pylæa, with Kirrha and its plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by, readable by every one. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was not like that of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory, and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible of high-wrought intellectual excitement—admiration or repugnance as the case might be—they discharged it all in the final vote, and then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparatively rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was a rarity. When Æschines, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the curse of Kirrha[1034]—assisted by all the force of visible and local association—they were worked up to madness; while in such minds as theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but required to be discharged by instant action.

[1033] Æschines adv. Ktesiph, p. 70.

[1034] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. ὡς δὲ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα
λαβὼν (Æschines) ἀφίκετο εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας, πάντα τἄλλ᾽ ἀφεὶς
καὶ παριδὼν ἐπέραινεν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐμισθώθη, καὶ λόγους εὐπροσώπους
καὶ μύθους, ὅθεν ἡ Κιῤῥαία χώρα καθιερώθη, συνθεὶς καὶ διεξελθὼν,
~ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων~ καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορωμένους, τοὺς
Ἀμφικτύονας, πείθει ψηφίσασθαι, etc.

How intense and ungovernable that emotion became, is shown by the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphissian speaker coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to exaggeration—was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impiety of which Æschines had accused the Amphissians themselves. About the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The Amphissian speakers appear to have fled—since even their persons would hardly have been safe amidst such an excitement. And if the day had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha.[1035] On account of the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed which the herald formally proclaimed,—That on the morrow at daybreak, the whole Delphian population, of sixteen years and upwards, freemen as well as slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place, provided with spades and pickaxes: That the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there meet them, to act in defence of the god and the sacred property: That if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.[1036]

[1035] Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. κραυγὴ πολλὴ καὶ θόρυβος ἦν
τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, καὶ λόγος ἦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἀσπίδων ἃς ἡμεῖς
ἀνέθεμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων τιμωρίας. Ἤδη δὲ πόῤῥω
τῆς ἡμέρας οὔσης, προελθὼν ὁ κῆρυξ, etc.

[1036] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.

At daybreak, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian multitude came with their implements for demolition:—the Amphiktyons with Æschines placed themselves at the head:—and all marched down to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident—probably astounded and terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population with whom, a few hours before, they had been on friendly terms—abandoned the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbor-conveniences, and even set fire to the houses in the town. This Æschines himself tells us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the multitude thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing, but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on. Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames, arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenes, some were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost immediately.[1037] None were put to death; an escape which they probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.

[1037] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277. According to the second
decree of the Amphiktyons cited in this oration (p. 278), some of
the Amphiktyons were wounded. But I concur with Droysen, Franke,
and others, in disputing the genuineness of these decrees; and
the assertion, that some of the Amphiktyons were wounded, is one
among the grounds for disputing it: for if such had been the
fact, Æschines could hardly have failed to mention it; since it
would have suited exactly the drift and purpose of his speech.

Æschines is by far the best witness for the proceedings at this
spring meeting of the Amphiktyons. He was not only present, but
the leading person concerned; if he makes a wrong statement,
it must be by design. But if the facts as stated by Æschines
are at all near the truth, it is hardly possible that the two
decrees cited in Demosthenes can have been the real decrees
passed by the Amphiktyons. The substance of what was resolved,
as given by Æschines, pp. 70, 71, is materially different from
the first decree quoted in the oration of Demosthenes, p. 278.
There is no mention, in the letter, of those vivid and prominent
circumstances—the summoning of all the Delphians, freemen and
slaves above sixteen years of age, with spades and mattocks—the
exclusion from the temple, and the cursing, of any city which did
not appear to take part.

The compiler of those decrees appears to have had only
Demosthenes before him, and to have known nothing of Æschines.
Of the violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons, both provoked and
described by Æschines, Demosthenes says nothing.

On the morning after this narrow escape, the president, a Thessalian of Pharsalus, named Kottyphus, convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia; that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and co-legates deputed from the various cities,—but also, along with them, the promiscuous multitude present for purpose of sacrifice and consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations pronounced in this meeting against the Amphissians; while Athens was eulogized as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphissians should be punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained, each should come to a special meeting, appointed at Thermopylæ for a future day,—seemingly not far distant, and certainly prior to the regular season of autumnal convocation.

Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled, of a second Amphiktyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion of the former in 346 B. C. What has been just recounted comes to us from Æschines, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here judge him, not from accusations preferred by his rival Demosthenes, but from his own depositions; and from facts which he details not simply without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by debates in the religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Here we have the political sentiment of the Amphissian Lokrians,—their sympathy for Thebes, and dislike to Athens,—dictating complaint and invective against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if parties were on the look-out for it; while defence was difficult, and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command of the accuser. Accordingly Æschines troubles himself little with the defence, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the Amphissians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory, as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphiktyons to a pitch of religious ardor, in vindication of the god, such as to make them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of political prudence. Demosthenes—giving credit to the Amphiktyons for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Æschines, when accusing the Lokrians,—on a matter of which he had given no notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment when he made his speech[1038]—found these Amphiktyons so inflammable in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to execute this purpose with brutal violence, creating the maximum of exasperation in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphiktyonic legates, and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion, thrown out by the Lokrian orator against Athens, may have been futile and malicious; but the retort of Æschines was far worse, extending as well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the Amphiktyonic assembly in a contest from which there was no exit except by the sword of Philip.

[1038] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. ~ἐπῆλθε δ᾽ οὖν μοι ἐπὶ
τὴν γνώμην~ μνησθῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων περὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν ἱερὰν
ἀσεβείας, etc.

Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite, partly because it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness, respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Æschines returned to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time in the same manner as he stated them afterwards, in the oration now preserved. The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians against Athens, were disposed to take part in that movement of pious enthusiasm which Æschines had kindled on the subject of Kirrha, pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers.[1039] So forcibly was the religious point of view of this question thrust upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenes was hardly listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had happened, saying—“Æschines, you are bringing war into Attica—an Amphiktyonic war.” But his predictions were cried down as allusions or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival.[1040] Æschines denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious Lokrians;[1041] a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these Lokrians themselves, who are described by Æschines as gratuitously insulting Athens.

[1039] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71. καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἡμῶν
ἀποδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου, καὶ τῆς πόλεως πάσης προαιρουμένης
εὐσεβεῖν, etc. Οὐκ ἐᾷ (Demosthenes) μεμνῆσθαι τῶν ὅρκων, οὓς οἱ
πρόγονοι ὤμοσαν, οὐδὲ τῆς ἀρᾶς οὐδὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείας.

[1040] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 275.

[1041] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69-71.

But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the return of Æschines, was favorable to his proceedings at Delphi, it did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand. The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But farther information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbor was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been cast by the Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find Demosthenes affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorized burst of ill-temper from some rude individual.—Though Æschines had obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet when his proposition came to be made—that Athens should take part in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the Amphissians—the opposition of Demosthenes was found more effective. Both the Senate, and the public assembly passed a resolution peremptorily forbidding all interference on the part of Athens at that special meeting. “The Hieromnemon and the Pylagoræ of Athens (so the decree prescribed) shall take no part either in word or deed or resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They shall visit Delphi and Thermopylæ at the regular times fixed by our forefathers.” This important decree marks the change of opinion at Athens. Æschines indeed tells us, that it was only procured by crafty manœuvre on the part of Demosthenes; being hurried through in a thin assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Æschines among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such insinuations; moreover Æschines, if he had still retained the public sentiment in his favor, could easily have baffled the tricks of his rival.[1042]

[1042] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.