Chapter LXXXVII (3)

Having by assiduous labor acquired for himself these high powers both of speech and of composition, Demosthenes stood forward in 354 B. C. to devote them to the service of the public. His first address to the assembly is not less interesting, objectively, as a memorial of the actual Hellenic political world in that year—than subjectively, as an evidence of his own manner of appreciating its exigencies.[602] At that moment, the predominant apprehension at Athens arose from reports respecting the Great King, who was said to be contemplating measures of hostility against Greece, and against Athens in particular, in consequence of the aid recently lent by the Athenian general Chares to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus. By this apprehension—which had already, in part, determined the Athenians (a year before) to make peace with their revolted insular allies, and close the Social War—the public mind still continued agitated. A Persian armament of three hundred sail, with a large force of Grecian mercenaries—and an invasion of Greece—was talked of as probable.[603] It appears that Mausôlus, prince or satrap of Karia, who had been the principal agent in inflaming the Social War, still prosecuted hostilities against the islands even after the peace, announcing that he acted in execution of the king’s designs; so that the Athenians sent envoys to remonstrate with him.[604] The Persians seem also to have been collecting inland forces, which were employed some years afterwards in reconquering Egypt, but of which the destination was not at this moment declared. Hence the alarm now prevalent at Athens. It is material to note—as a mark in the tide of events—that few persons as yet entertained apprehensions about Philip of Macedon, though that prince was augmenting steadily his military force as well as his conquests. Nay, Philip afterwards asserted that during this alarm of Persian invasion, he was himself one of the parties invited to assist in the defence of Greece.[605]

[602] The oration De Symmoriis is placed by Dionysius of
Halikarnassus in the archonship of Diotimus, 354-353 B. C.
(Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum. p. 724). And it is plainly composed
prior to the expedition sent by the Thebans under Pammenês to
assist the revolted Artabazus against the Great King; which
expedition is placed by Diodorus (xvi. 34) in the ensuing year
353-352 B. C. Whoever will examine the way in which Demosthenes
argues, in the Oration De Symmoriis (p. 187. s. 40-42), as to the
relations of the Thebans with Persia—will see that he cannot have
known anything about assistance given by the Thebans to Artabazus
against Persia.

[603] Diodor. xvi. 21.

[604] Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, s. 15; see also the second
Argument prefixed to that Oration.

[605] See Epistola Philipp. ap. Demosthen. p. 160. s. 6.

Though the Macedonian power had not yet become obviously formidable, we trace in the present speech of Demosthenes that same Pan-hellenic patriotism which afterwards rendered him so strenuous in blowing the trumpet against Philip. The obligation incumbent upon all Greeks, but upon Athens especially, on account of her traditions and her station, to uphold Hellenic liberty against the foreigner at all cost, is insisted on with an emphasis and dignity worthy of Perikles.[606] But while Demosthenes thus impresses upon his countrymen noble and Pan-hellenic purposes, he does not rest content with eloquent declamation, or negative criticism on the past. His recommendations as to means are positive and explicit; implying an attentive survey and a sagacious appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. While keeping before his countrymen a favorable view of their position, he never promises them success except on condition of earnest and persevering individual efforts, with arms and with money: and he exhausts all his invention in the unpopular task of shaming them, by direct reproach as well as by oblique insinuation, out of that aversion to personal military service, which, for the misfortune of Athens, had become a confirmed habit. Such positive and practical character as to means, always contemplating the full exigencies of a given situation—combined with the constant presentation of Athens as the pledged champion of Grecian freedom, and with appeals to Athenian foretime, not as a patrimony to rest upon, but as an example to imitate—constitute the imperishable charm of these harangues of Demosthenes, not less memorable than their excellence as rhetorical compositions. In the latter merit, indeed, his rival Æschines is less inferior to him than in the former.

[606] Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 179. s. 7. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽
ἴσης ὁρῶ τοῖς τ᾽ ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι καὶ ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα
τὴν βουλὴν οὖσαν—ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνων μὲν πολλοῖς ἐνδέχεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ
τῶν ἰδίᾳ τι συμφερόντων διοικουμένοις τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀμελῆσαι,
ὑμῖν δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀδικουμένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων καλόν ἐστι λαβεῖν
ταύτην τὴν δίκην, ἐᾶσαί τινας αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ γενέσθαι.

In no one of the speeches of Demosthenes is the spirit of practical wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse to the public assembly—on the Symmories—delivered by a young man of twenty-seven years of age, who could have had little other teaching except from the decried classes of sophists, rhetors, and actors. While proclaiming the king of Persia as the common and dangerous enemy of the Grecian name, he contends that no evidence of impending Persian attack had yet transpired, sufficiently obvious and glaring to warrant Athens in sending round[607] to invoke a general league of Greeks, as previous speakers had suggested. He deprecates on the one hand any step calculated to provoke the Persian king or bring on a war—and on the other hand, any premature appeal to the Greeks for combination, before they themselves were impressed with a feeling of common danger. Nothing but such common terror could bring about union among the different Hellenic cities; nothing else could silence those standing jealousies and antipathies, which rendered intestine war so frequent, and would probably enable the Persian king to purchase several Greeks for his own allies against the rest.

[607] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 14.

“Let us neither be immoderately afraid of the Great King, nor on the other hand be ourselves the first to begin the war and wrong him—as well on our own account as from the bad feeling and mistrust prevalent among the Greeks around us. If indeed we, with the full and unanimous force of Greece, could attack him unassisted, I should have held that even wrong, done towards him, was no wrong at all. But since this is impossible, I contend that we must take care not to give the king a pretence for enforcing claims of right on behalf of the other Greeks. While we remain quiet, he cannot do any such thing without being mistrusted; but if we have been the first to begin war, he will naturally seem to mean sincere friendship to the others, on account of their aversion to us. Do not, therefore, expose to light the sad distempers of the Hellenic world, by calling together its members when you will not persuade them, and by going to war when you will have no adequate force; but keep the peace, confiding in yourselves, and making full preparation.”[608]

[608] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 188. s. 42-46. ... Ὥστ᾽ οὔτε
φοβεῖσθαί φημι δεῖν πέρα τοῦ μετρίου, οὔθ᾽ ὑπαχθῆναι προτέρους
ἐκφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον....

... Τοῦτον ἡμεῖς φοβώμεθα; μηδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀδικῶμεν, ~αὐτῶν
ἡμῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπιστίας~· ἐπεὶ
εἴ γ᾽ ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἦν μετὰ πάντων ἐπιθέσθαι μόνῳ, οὐδ᾽ ἀδικεῖν
ἡμᾶς ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκημ᾽ ἂν ἔθηκα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει,
φυλάττεσθαί φημι δεῖν μὴ πρόφασιν δῶμεν βασιλεῖ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια
ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ζητεῖν· ἡσυχίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐχόντων ὑμῶν,
ὕποπτος ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτό τι πράττων—πόλεμον δὲ ποιησαμένων προτέρων
~εἰκότως ἂν δοκοίη διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐχθρὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλος~
εἶναι βούλεσθαι. ~Μὴ οὖν ἐξελέγξητε ὡς κακῶς ἔχει τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ,
συγκαλοῦντες ὅτ᾽ οὐ πείσετε, καὶ πολεμοῦντες ὅτ᾽ οὐ δυνήσεσθε·
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχετε ἡσυχίαν θαῤῥοῦντες καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι~.

It is this necessity of making preparation, which constitutes the special purpose of Demosthenes in his harangue. He produces an elaborate plan, matured by careful reflection,[609] for improving and extending the classification by Symmories; proposing a more convenient and systematic distribution of the leading citizens as well as of the total financial and nautical means—such as to ensure both the ready equipment of armed force whenever required, and a fair apportionment both of effort and of expense among the citizens. Into the details of this plan of economical reform, which are explained with the precision of an administrator and not with the vagueness of a rhetor, I do not here enter; especially as we do not know that it was actually adopted. But the spirit in which it was proposed deserves all attention, as proclaiming, even at this early day, the home-truth which the orator reiterates in so many subsequent harangues. “In the preparation which I propose to you, Athenians (he says), the first and most important point is, that your minds shall be so set, as that each man individually will be willing and forward in doing his duty. For you see plainly, that of all those matters on which you have determined collectively, and on which each man individually has looked upon the duty of execution as devolving upon himself—not one has ever slipped through your hands; while, on the contrary, whenever, after determination has been taken, you have stood looking at one another, no man intending to do anything himself, but every one throwing the burthen of action upon his neighbor—nothing has ever succeeded. Assuming you, therefore, to be thus disposed and wound up to the proper pitch, I recommend,”[610] etc.

[609] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 17. Τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν,
ὅπως ὡς ἄριστα καὶ τάχιστα γενήσεται, πάνυ πολλὰ πράγματα ἔσχον
σκοπῶν.

[610] Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18. Ἔστι τοίνυν
πρῶτον μὲν τῆς παρασκευῆς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μέγιστον, οὕτω
διακεῖσθαι τὰς γνώμας ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἕκαστον ἕκοντα προθύμως ὅ,τι
ἂν δέῃ ποιήσοντα. Ὁρᾶτε γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ~ὅτι, ὅσα μὲν
πώποθ᾽ ἅπαντες ὑμεῖς ἠβουλήθητε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ πράττειν αὐτὸς
ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ προσήκειν ἡγήσατο, οὐδὲν πώποθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐξέφυγεν~·
ὅσα δ᾽ ἠβουλήθητε μὲν, μετὰ ~ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀπεβλέψατε πρὸς ἀλλήλους
ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν ἕκαστος οὐ ποιήσων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πράξοντα~, οὐδὲν
πώποθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐγένετο. Ἐχόντων δ᾽ ~ὑμῶν οὕτω καὶ αρωξυμμένων~, etc.

This is the true Demosthenic vein of exhortation, running with unabated force through the Philippics and Olynthiacs, and striving to revive that conjunction—of which Perikles had boasted as an established fact in the Athenian character[611]—energetic individual action following upon full public debate and collective resolution. How often here, and elsewhere, does the orator denounce the uselessness of voters in the public assembly, even after such votes had been passed—if the citizens individually hung back, and shrunk from the fatigue or the pecuniary burthen indispensable for execution! Demus in the Pnyx (to use, in an altered sense, an Aristophanic comparison)[612] still remained Pan-hellenic and patriotic, when Demus at home had come to think that the city would march safely by itself without any sacrifice on his part, and that he was at liberty to become absorbed in his property, family, religion, and recreations. And so Athens might really have proceeded, in her enjoyment of liberty, wealth, refinement, and individual security—could the Grecian world have been guaranteed against the formidable Macedonian enemy from without.

[611] Thucyd. ii. 39, 40.

[612] Aristophanes, Equit. 750.

It was in the ensuing year, when the alarm respecting Persia had worn off, that the Athenians were called on to discuss the conflicting applications of Sparta and of Megalopolis. The success of the Phokians appeared to be such as to prevent Thebes, especially while her troops, under Pammenes, were absent in Asia, from interfering in Peloponnesus for the protection of Megalopolis. There were even at Athens politicians who confidently predicted the approaching humiliation of Thebes,[613] together with the emancipation and reconstitution of those Bœotian towns which she now held in dependence—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa; predictions cordially welcomed by the Miso-Theban sentiment at Athens. To the Spartans, the moment appeared favorable for breaking up Megalopolis and recovering Messênê; in which scheme they hoped to interest not only Athens, but also Elis, Phlius, and some other Peloponnesian states. To Athens they offered aid for the recovery of Orôpus, now and for about twelve years past in the hands of the Thebans; to Elis and Phlius they also tendered assistance for regaining respectively Triphylia and the Trikaranum, from the Arcadians and Argeians.[614] This political combination was warmly espoused by a considerable party at Athens; being recommended not less by aversion to Thebes than by the anxious desire for repossessing the border town of Orôpus. But it was combated by others, and by Demosthenes among the number, who could not be tempted by any bait to acquiesce in the reconstitution of Lacedæmonian power as it had stood before the battle of Leuktra. In the Athenian assembly, the discussion was animated and even angry; the envoys from Megalopolis, as well as those from Sparta on the other side, finding strenuous partisans.[615]

[613] Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolitanis, p. 203. s. 5. p.
210. s. 36. Ἔστι τοίνυν ἔν τινι τοιούτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πράγματα νῦν,
εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοις πολλάκις παρ᾽ ὑμῖν λόγοις τεκμήρασθαι,
ὥστε Θηβαίους μὲν Ὀρχομενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθεισῶν
ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, etc. Ἂν μὲν τοίνυν καταπολεμηθῶσιν οἱ Θηβαῖοι,
ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς δεῖ, etc.

Compare Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 654. s. 120.

[614] Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 206. s. 18; compare Xenoph.
Hellen. vii. 2, 1-5.

[615] Demosthenes pro Megalopolit. p. 202. s. 1.

Demosthenes strikes a course professedly middle between the two, yet really in favor of defending Megalopolis against Spartan reconquest. We remark in this oration (as in the oration De Symmoriis, a year before) that there is no allusion to Philip; a point to be noticed as evidence of the gradual changes in the Demosthenic point of view. All the arguments urged turn upon Hellenic and Athenian interests, without reference to the likelihood of hostilities from without. In fact, Demosthenes lays down as a position not to be disputed by any one, that for the interest of Athens, both Sparta and Thebes ought to be weak; neither of them in condition to disturb her security;[616]—a position, unfortunately, but too well recognized among all the leading Grecian states in their reciprocal dealings with each other, rendering the Pan-hellenic aggregate comparatively defenceless against Philip or any skilful aggressor from without. While, however, affirming a general maxim, in itself questionable and perilous, Demosthenes deduces from it nothing but judicious consequences. In regard to Sparta, he insists only on keeping her _in statu quo_, and maintaining inviolate against her the independence of Megalopolis and Messênê. He will not be prevailed upon to surrender to her these two cities, even by the seductive prospect of assistance to Athens in recovering Orôpus, and in reviving the autonomy of the Bœotian cities. At that moment the prevalent disposition among the Athenian public was antipathy against Thebes, combined with a certain sympathy in favor of Sparta, whom they had aided at the battle of Mantineia against the Megalopolitans.[617] Though himself sharing this sentiment,[618] Demosthenes will not suffer his countrymen to be misled by it. He recommends that Athens shall herself take up the Theban policy in regard to Megalopolis and Messênê, so as to protect these two cities against Sparta; the rather, as by such a proceeding the Thebans will be excluded from Peloponnesus, and their general influence narrowed. He even goes so far as to say, that if Sparta should succeed in reconquering Megalopolis and Messênê, Athens must again become the ally of the Thebans to restrain her farther aggrandizement.[619]

[616] Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 5, 6. Compare a similar
sentiment, Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 654. s. 120.

[617] Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 7, 9. p. 207. s. 22.

[618] See Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 489. s. 172 (delivered
355 B. C.) and Olynthiac i. p. 16. s. 27.

[619] Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 207. s. 24.

As far as we make out from imperfect information, it seems that the views of Demosthenes did not prevail, and that the Athenians declined to undertake the protection of Megalopolis against Sparta; since we presently find the Thebans continuing to afford that protection, as they had done before. The aggressive schemes of Sparta appear to have been broached at the moment when the Phokians under Onomarchus were so decidedly superior to Thebes as to place that city in some embarrassment. But the superiority of the Phokians was soon lessened by their collision with a more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon.

That prince had been already partially interfering in Thessalian affairs,[620] at the instigation of Eudikus and Simus, chiefs of the Aleuadæ of Larissa, against Lykophron the despot of Pheræ. But his recent acquisition of Methônê left him more at liberty to extend his conquests southward, and to bring a larger force to bear on the dissensions of Thessaly. In that country, the great cities were,[621] as usual, contending for supremacy, and holding in subjection the smaller by means of garrisons; while Lykophron of Pheræ was exerting himself to regain that ascendency over the whole, which had once been possessed by Jason and Alexander. Philip now marched into the country and attacked him so vigorously as to constrain him to invoke aid from the Phokians. Onomarchus, at that time victorious over the Thebans and master as far as Thermopylæ, was interested in checking the farther progress of Philip southward and extending his own ascendency. He sent into Thessaly a force of seven thousand men, under his brother Phayllus, to sustain Lykophron. But Phayllus failed altogether; being defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, so that Lykophron of Pheræ was in greater danger than ever. Upon this, Onomarchus went himself thither with the full force of Phokians and foreign mercenaries. An obstinate, and seemingly a protracted contest now took place, in the course of which he was at first decidedly victorious. He defeated Philip in two battles, with such severe loss that the Macedonian army was withdrawn from Thessaly, while Lykophron with his Phokian allies remained masters of the country.[622]

[620] Diodor. xvi. 14; Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 241. s. 60.
Harpokration v. Σίμος.

[621] Isokrates, Orat. viii. (De Pace) s. 143, 144.

[622] Diodor. xvi. 35.

This great success of the Phokian arms was followed up by farther victory in Bœotia. Onomarchus renewed his invasion of that territory, defeated the Thebans in battle, and made himself master of Koroneia, in addition to Orchomenus, which he held before.[623] It would seem that the Thebans were at this time deprived of much of their force, which was serving in Asia under Artabazus, and which, perhaps from these very reverses, they presently recalled. The Phokians, on the other hand, were at the height of their power. At this juncture falls, probably, the aggressive combination of the Spartans against Megalopolis, and the debate, before noticed, in the Athenian assembly.

[623] Diodor. xvi. 35.

Philip was for some time in embarrassment from his defeats in Thessaly. His soldiers, discouraged and even mutinous, would hardly consent to remain under his standard. By great pains, and animated exhortation, he at last succeeded in reanimating them. After a certain interval for restoration and reinforcement, he advanced with a fresh army into Thessaly, and resumed his operations against Lykophron; who was obliged again to solicit aid from Onomarchus, and to promise that all Thessaly should henceforward be held under his dependence. Onomarchus accordingly joined him in Thessaly with a large army, said to consist of twenty thousand foot and five hundred cavalry. But he found on this occasion, within the country, more obstinate resistance than before; for the cruel dynasty of Pheræ had probably abused their previous victory by aggravated violence and rapacity, so as to throw into the arms of their enemy a multitude of exiles. On Philip’s coming into Thessaly with a new army, the Thessalians embraced his cause so warmly, that he soon found himself at the head of an army of twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Onomarchus met him in the field, somewhere near the southern coast of Thessaly; not diffident of success, as well from his recent victories, as from the neighborhood of an Athenian fleet under Chares, coöperating with him. Here a battle was joined, and obstinately contested between the two armies, nearly equal in numbers of infantry. Philip exalted the courage of his soldiers by decorating them with laurel wreaths,[624] as crusaders in the service of the god against the despoilers of the Delphian temple; while the Thessalians also, forming the best cavalry in Greece and fighting with earnest valor, gave decisive advantage to his cause. The defeat of the forces of Onomarchus and Lykophron was complete. Six thousand of them are said to have been slain, and three thousand to have been taken prisoners; the remainder escaped either by flight, or by throwing away their arms, and swimming off to the Athenian ships. Onomarchus himself perished. According to one account, he was slain by his own mercenaries, provoked by his cowardice: according to another account, he was drowned—being carried into the sea by an unruly horse, and trying to escape to the ships. Philip caused his dead body to be crucified, and drowned all the prisoners as men guilty of sacrilege.[625]

[624] This fact is mentioned by Justin (vii. 2), and seems
likely to be true, from the severity with which Philip, after
his victory, treated the Phokian prisoners. But the farther
statement of Justin is not likely to be true—that the Phokians,
on beholding the insignia of the god, threw away their arms and
fled without resistance.

[625] Diodor. xvi. 55; Pausan. x. 2, 3; Philo Judæus apud
Eusebium Præp. Evang. viii. p. 392. Diodorus states that Chares
with the Athenian fleet was sailing by, _accidentally_. But this
seems highly improbable. It cannot but be supposed that he was
destined to coöperate with the Phokians.

This victory procured for Philip great renown as the avenger of the Delphian god—and became an important step in his career of aggrandizement. It not only terminated the power of the Phokians north of Thermopylæ, but also finally crushed the powerful dynasty of Pheræ in Thessaly. Philip laid siege to that city, upon which Lykophron and Peitholaus, surrounded by an adverse population and unable to make any long defence, capitulated, and surrendered it to him; retiring with their mercenaries, two thousand in number, into Phokis.[626] Having obtained possession of Pheræ and proclaimed it a free city, Philip proceeded to besiege the neighboring town of Pagasæ, the most valuable maritime station in Thessaly. How long Pagasæ resisted, we do not know; but long enough to send intimation to Athens, with entreaties for succor. The Athenians, alarmed at the successive conquests of Philip, were well-disposed to keep this important post out of his hands, which their naval power fully enabled them to do. But here again (as in the previous examples of Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê), the aversion to personal service among the citizens individually—and the impediments as to apportionment of duty or cost, whenever actual outgoing was called for—produced the untoward result, that though an expedition was voted and despatched, it did not arrive in time.[627] Pagasæ surrendered and came into the power of Philip; who fortified and garrisoned it for himself, thus becoming master of the Pagasæan gulf, the great maritime inlet of Thessaly.

[626] Diodor. xvi. 37.

[627] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 50. s. 40. Καίτοι, τί δήποτε
νομίζετε ... τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ὑμῖν ὑστερίζειν τῶν καιρῶν,
τὸν εἰς Μεθώνην, ~τὸν εἰς Παγασὰς~, τὸν εἰς Ποτίδαιαν, etc.

Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 9. Καὶ πάλιν ἥνικα Πύδνα,
Ποτίδαια, Μεθώνη, ~Παγασαί—πολιορκούμενα ἀπηγγέλλετο~, εἰ τότε
τούτων ἑνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμως καὶ ὡς προσῆκεν ἐβοηθήσαμεν αὐτοὶ,
etc.

The first Philippic was delivered in 352-351 B. C., which proves
that Philip’s capture of Pagasæ cannot have been later than that
year. Nor can it have been earlier than his capture of Pheræ—as
I have before remarked in reference to the passage of Diodorus
(xvi. 31), where it seems to be placed in 354-353 B. C.; if Παγὰς
is to be taken for Παγασάς.

I apprehend that the first campaign of Philip in Thessaly against
the Phokians, wherein he was beaten and driven out by Onomarchus,
may be placed in the summer of 353 B. C. The second entrance
into Thessaly, with the defeat and death of Onomarchus, belongs
to the early spring of 352 B. C. The capture of Pheræ and Pagasæ
comes immediately afterwards; then the expedition of Philip to
Thermopylæ, where his progress was arrested by the Athenians
comes about Midsummer 352 B. C.

Philip was probably occupied for a certain time in making good his dominion over Thessaly. But as soon as sufficient precautions had been taken for this purpose, he sought to push his advantage over the Phokians by invading them in their own territory. He marched to Thermopylæ, still proclaiming as his aim the liberation of the Delphian temple and the punishment of its sacrilegious robbers; while he at the same time conciliated the favor of the Thessalians by promising to restore to them the Pylæa, or half-yearly Amphiktyonic festival at Thermopylæ, which the Phokians had discontinued.[628] The Phokians, though masters of this almost inexpugnable pass, seemed to have been so much disheartened by their recent defeat, and the death of Onomarchus, that they felt unable to maintain it long. The news of such a danger, transmitted to Athens, excited extraordinary agitation. The importance of defending Thermopylæ—and of prohibiting the victorious king of Macedon from coming to coöperate with the Thebans on the southern side of it,[629] not merely against the Phokians, but probably also against Attica—were so powerfully felt, that the usual hesitations and delay of the Athenians in respect to military expeditions were overcome. Chiefly from this cause—but partly also, we may suppose, from the vexatious disappointment recently incurred in the attempt to relieve Pagasæ—an Athenian armament under Nausikles (not less than five thousand foot and four hundred horse, according to Diodorus[630]) was fitted out with not less vigor and celerity than had been displayed against the Thebans in Eubœa, seven years before. Athenian citizens shook off their lethargy, and promptly volunteered. They reached Thermopylæ in good time, placing the pass in such a condition of defence that Philip did not attack it at all. Often afterwards does Demosthenes,[631] in combating the general remissness of his countrymen when military exigencies arose, remind them of this unwonted act of energetic movement, crowned with complete effect. With little or no loss, the Athenians succeeded in guarding both themselves and their allies against a very menacing contingency, simply by the promptitude of their action. The cost of the armament altogether was more than two hundred talents; and from the stress which Demosthenes lays on that portion of the expense which was defrayed by the soldiers privately and individually,[632] we may gather that these soldiers (as in the Sicilian expedition under Nikias[633]) were in considerable proportion opulent citizens. Among a portion of the Grecian public, however, the Athenians incurred obloquy as accomplices in the Phokian sacrilege, and enemies of the Delphian god.[634]

[628] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 62. s. 23; Philippic ii. p. 71. s.
24; De Fals. Legat. p. 443. s. 365.

[629] Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 94. p. 446. s. 375.
Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὅτι τῷ Φωκέων πολέμῳ καὶ τῷ κυρίους
εἶναι Πυλῶν Φωκέας, ἥ τε ἀπὸ Θηβαίων ἄδεια ὑπῆρχεν ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ
μηδέποτ᾽ ἐλθεῖν ἂν εἰς Πελοπόννησον μηδ᾽ εἰς Εὔβοιαν Φίλιππον
μηδὲ Θηβαίους;

[630] Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.

[631] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20; De Coronâ, p. 236.
s. 40; De Fals. Leg. p. 444. s. 366.

[632] Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 95.

[633] Thucyd. vi. 31.

[634] Justin, vii. 2. His rhetorical exaggerations ought not to
make us reject the expression of this opinion against Athens, as
a real fact.

But though Philip was thus kept out of Southern Greece, and the Phokians enabled to reorganize themselves against Thebes, yet in Thessaly and without the straits of Thermopylæ, Macedonian ascendency was henceforward an uncontested fact. Before we follow his subsequent proceedings, however, it will be convenient to turn to events both in Phokis and in Peloponnesus.

In the depressed condition of the Phokians after the defeat of Onomarchus, they obtained reinforcement not only from Athens, but also from Sparta (one thousand men), and from the Peloponnesian Achæans (two thousand men[635]). Phayllus, the successor (by some called brother) of Onomarchus, put himself again in a condition of defence. He had recourse a third time to that yet unexhausted store—the Delphian treasures and valuables. He despoiled the temple to a greater extent than Philomelus, and not less than Onomarchus; incurring aggravated odium from the fact, that he could not now supply himself without laying hands on offerings of conspicuous magnificence and antiquity, which his two predecessors had spared. It was thus that the splendid golden donatives of the Lydian king Krœsus were now melted down and turned into money; one hundred and seventeen bricks or ingots of gold, most of them weighing two talents each; three hundred and sixty golden goblets, together with a female statue three cubits high, and a lion, of the same metal—said to have weighed in the aggregate thirty talents.[636] The abstraction of such ornaments, striking and venerable in the eyes of the numerous visitors of the temple, was doubtless deeply felt among the Grecian public. And the indignation was aggravated by the fact that beautiful youths or women, favorites of Onomarchus or Phayllus, received some of the most precious gifts, and wore the most noted ornaments, which had decorated the temple—even the necklaces of Helen and Eriphylê. One woman, a flute-player named Bromias, not only received from Phayllus a silver cup and a golden wreath (the former dedicated in the temple by the Phokæans, the latter by the Peparethians), but was also introduced by him, in his capacity of superintendent of the Pythian festival, to contend for the prize in playing the sacred Hymn. As the competitors for such prize had always been men, the assembled crowd so loudly resented the novelty, that Bromias was obliged to withdraw.[637] Moreover profuse largesses, and flagrant malversation, became more notorious than ever.[638] The Phokian leaders displayed with ostentation their newly-acquired wealth, and either imported for the first time bought slaves, or at least greatly multiplied the pre-existing number. It had before been the practice in Phokis, we are told, for the wealthy men to be served by the poor youthful freemen of the country; and complaints arose among the latter class that their daily bread was thus taken away.[639]

[635] Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 443) affirms that no one else
except Athens assisted or rescued the Phokians in this emergency.
But Diodorus (xvi. 37) mentions succors from the other allies
also; and there seems no ground for disbelieving him. The boast
of Demosthenes, however, that Athens single-handed saved the
Phokians, is not incorrect as to the main fact, though overstated
in the expression. For the Athenians, commanding a naval force,
and on this rare occasion rapid in their movements, reached
Thermopylæ in time to arrest the progress of Philip, and before
the Peloponnesian troops could arrive. The Athenian expedition to
Thermopylæ seems to have occurred about May 352 B. C.—as far as
we can make out the chronology of the time.

[636] Diodor. xvi. 56. The account of these donatives of Krœsus
may be read in Herodotus (i. 50, 51), who saw them at Delphi. As
to the exact weight and number, there is some discrepancy between
him and Diodorus; moreover the text of Herodotus himself is not
free from obscurity.

[637] Theopomp. Fragm. 182, 183; Phylarchus, Frag. 60, ed. Didot;
Anaximenes and Ephorus ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 231, 232. The Pythian
games here alluded to must have been those celebrated in August
or September 350 B. C. It would seem therefore that Phayllus
survived over that period.

[638] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57. The story annexed about Iphikrates
and the ships of Dionysius of Syracuse—a story which, at all
events, comes quite out of its chronological place—appears to me
not worthy of credit, in the manner in which Diodorus here gives
it. The squadron of Dionysius, which Iphikrates captured on the
coast of Korkyra, was coming to the aid and at the request of
the Lacedæmonians, then at war with Athens (Xenoph. Hellen. vi.
2, 33). It was therefore a fair capture for an Athenian general,
together with all on board. If, amidst the cargo, there happened
to be presents intended for Olympia and Delphi, these, as being
on board of ships of war, would follow the fate of the other
persons and things along with them. They would not be considered
as the property of the god until they had been actually dedicated
in his temple. Nor would the person sending them be entitled to
invoke the privilege of a consecrated cargo unless he divested
it of hostile accompaniment. The letter of complaint to the
Athenians, which Diodorus gives as having been sent by Dionysius,
seems to me neither genuine nor even plausible.

[639] Timæus, Fragm. 67, ed. Didot; ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 264-272.

Notwithstanding the indignation excited by these proceedings not only throughout Greece, but even in Phokis itself,—Phayllus carried his point of levying a fresh army of mercenaries, and of purchasing new alliances among the smaller cities. Both Athens and Sparta profited more or less by the distribution; though the cost of the Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ, which rescued the Phokians from destruction, seems clearly to have been paid by the Athenians themselves.[640] Phayllus carried on war for some time against both the Bœotians and Lokrians. He is represented by Diodorus to have lost several battles. But it is certain that the general result was not unfavorable to him; that he kept possession of Orchomenus in Bœotia; and that his power remained without substantial diminution.[641]

[640] Diodor. xvi. 57: compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 367.

[641] Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.

The stress of war seems, for the time, to have been transferred to Peloponnesus, whither a portion both of the Phokian and Theban troops went to coöperate. The Lacedæmonians had at length opened their campaign against Megalopolis, of which I have already spoken as having been debated before the Athenian public assembly. Their plan seems to have been formed some months before, when Onomarchus was at the maximum of his power, and when Thebes was supposed to be in danger; but it was not executed until after his defeat and death, when the Phokians, depressed for the time, were rescued only by the prompt interference of Athens,—and when the Thebans had their hands comparatively free. Moreover, the Theban division which had been sent into Asia under Pammenes a year or two before, to assist Artabazus, may now be presumed to have returned; especially as we know that no very long time afterwards, Artabazus appears as completely defeated by the Persian troops,—expelled from Asia, and constrained to take refuge, together with his brother-in-law Memnon, under the protection of Philip.[642] The Megalopolitans had sent envoys to entreat aid from Athens, under the apprehension that Thebes would not be in a condition to assist them. It may be doubted whether Athens would have granted their prayer, in spite of the advice of Demosthenes,—but the Thebans had now again become strong enough to uphold with their own force their natural allies in Peloponnesus.

[642] Diodor. xvi. 52.

Accordingly, when the Lacedæmonian army under king Archidamus invaded the Megalopolitan territory, a competent force was soon brought together to oppose them; furnished partly by the Argeians,—who had been engaged during the preceding year in a border warfare with Sparta, and had experienced a partial defeat at Orneæ,[643]—partly by the Sikyonians and Messenians, who came in full muster. Besides this, the forces on both sides from Bœotia and Phokis were transferred to Peloponnesus. The Thebans sent four thousand foot, and five hundred horse, under Kephision, to the aid of Megalopolis; while the Spartans not only recalled their own troops from Phokis, but also procured three thousand of the mercenaries in the service of Phayllus, and one hundred and fifty Thessalian horse from Likophron, the expelled despot of Pheræ. Archidamus received his reinforcements, and got together his aggregate forces earlier than the enemy. He advanced first into Arcadia, where he posted himself near Mantinea, thus cutting off the Argeians from Megalopolis; he next invaded the territory of Argos, attacked Orneæ, and defeated the Argeians in a partial action. Presently the Thebans arrived, and effected a junction with their Argeian and Arcadian allies. The united force was greatly superior in number to the Lacedæmonians; but such superiority was counterbalanced by the bad discipline of the Thebans, who had sadly declined on this point during the interval of ten years since the death of Epaminondas. A battle ensued, partially advantageous to the Lacedæmonians; while the Argeians and Arcadians chose to go home to their neighboring cities. The Lacedæmonians also, having ravaged a portion of Arcadia, and stormed the Arcadian town of Helissus, presently recrossed their own frontier and returned to Sparta. They left, however, a division in Arcadia under Anaxander, who, engaging with the Thebans near Telphusa, was worsted with great loss and made prisoner. In two other battles, also, the Thebans were successively victorious; in a third, they were vanquished by the Lacedæmonians. With such balanced and undecided success was the war carried on until, at length, the Lacedæmonians proposed and concluded peace with Megalopolis. Either formally, or by implication, they were forced to recognize the autonomy of that city; thus abandoning, for the time at least, their aggressive purposes, which Demosthenes had combated and sought to frustrate before the Athenian assembly. The Thebans on their side returned home, having accomplished their object of protecting Megalopolis and Messênê; and we may presume that the Phokian allies of Sparta were sent home also.[644]

[643] Diodor. xvi. 34.

[644] Diodor. xvi. 39.

The war between the Bœotians and Phokians had doubtless slackened during this episode in Peloponnesus; but it still went on in a series of partial actions, on the river Kephissus, at Koroneia, at Abæ in Phokis, and near the Lokrian town of Naryx. For the most part, the Phokians are said to have been worsted; and their commander, Phayllus, presently died of a painful disease,—the suitable punishment (in the point of view of a Grecian historian[645]) for his sacrilegious deeds. He left as his successor Phalækus, a young man, son of Onomarchus, under the guardianship and advice of an experienced friend named Mnaseas. But Mnaseas was soon surprised at night, defeated, and slain, by the Thebans while Phalækus, left to his own resources, was defeated in two battles near Chæroneia, and was unable to hinder his enemies from ravaging a large part of the Phokian territory.[646]

[645] Diodor. xvi. 38.

[646] Diodor. xvi. 38, 39.

We know the successive incidents of this ten years’ Sacred War only from the meagre annals of Diodorus,—whose warm sympathy in favor of the religious side of the question seems to betray him into exaggeration of the victories of the Thebans, or at least into some omission of counterbalancing reverses. For in spite of these successive victories, the Phokians were noway put down, but remained in possession of the Bœotian town of Orchomenus; moreover, the Thebans became so tired out and impoverished by the war, that they confined themselves presently to desultory incursions and skirmishes.[647] Their losses fell wholly upon their own citizens and their own funds; while the Phokians fought with foreign mercenaries and with the treasures of the temple.[648] The increasing poverty of the Thebans even induced them to send an embassy to the Persian king, entreating pecuniary aid; which drew from him a present of three hundred talents. As he was at this time organizing a fresh expedition on an immense scale, for the reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, after more than one preceding failure, he required Grecian soldiers as much as the Greeks required his money. Hence we shall see presently that the Thebans were able to send him an equivalent.

[647] Diodor. xvi. 40. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων, Θηβαῖοι κάμνοντες τῷ πρὸς
Φωκεῖς πολέμῳ, καὶ χρημάτων ἀπορούμενοι, πρέσβεις ἐξέπεμψαν πρὸς
τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα.... Τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν
ἀκροβολισμοὶ μὲν καὶ χώρας καταδρομαὶ συνέστησαν, πράξεις δὲ κατὰ
τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν (351-350 B. C.—according to the chronology of
Diodorus) οὐ συνετελέσθησαν.

[648] Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp.) s. 61.

In the war just recounted on the Laconian and Arcadian frontier, the Athenians had taken no part. Their struggle with Philip had been becoming from month to month more serious and embarrassing. By occupying in time the defensible pass of Thermopylæ, they had indeed prevented him both from crushing the Phokians and from meddling with the Southern states of Greece. But the final battle wherein he had defeated Onomarchus, had materially increased both his power and his military reputation. The numbers on both sides were very great; the result was decisive, and ruinous to the vanquished; moreover, we cannot doubt that the Macedonian phalanx, with the other military improvements and manœuvres which Philip had been gradually organizing since his accession, was now exhibited in formidable efficiency. The King of Macedon had become the ascendent soldier and potentate, hanging on the skirts of the Grecian world, exciting fears or hopes, or both at once, in every city throughout its limits. In the first Philippic of Demosthenes, and in his oration against Aristokrates, (delivered between midsummer 352 B. C. and midsummer 351 B. C.), we discern evident marks of the terrors which Philip had come to inspire, within a year after his repulse from Thermopylæ, to reflecting Grecian politicians. “It is impossible for Athens (says the orator[649]) to provide any land-force competent to contend in the field against that of Philip.”

[649] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 26. (352-351 B. C.)

Compare Philippic iii. p. 124. s. 63.

The reputation of his generalship and his indefatigable activity was already everywhere felt; as well as that of the officers and soldiers, partly native Macedonians, partly chosen Greeks, whom he had assembled round him,[650]—especially the lochages or front-rank men of the phalanx and the hypaspistæ. Moreover, the excellent cavalry of Thessaly became embodied from henceforward as an element in the Macedonian army; since Philip had acquired unbounded ascendency in that country, from his expulsion of the Pheræan despots and their auxiliaries the Phokians. The philo-Macedonian party in the Thessalian cities had constituted him federal chief (or in some sort Tagus) of the country, not only enrolling their cavalry in his armies, but also placing at his disposal the customs and market-dues, which formed a standing common fund for supporting the Thessalian collective administration.[651] The financial means of Philip, for payment of his foreign troops, and prosecution of his military enterprises, were thus materially increased.

[650] Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 23. s. 17. (delivered in 350 B.
C.) ... Οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες ξένοι καὶ πεζέταιροι δόξαν μὲν
καὶ ἔχουσιν ὡς εἰσὶ θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου,
etc.

[651] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 133 (352-351
B. C.); also Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. (349 B. C.)
ἤκουον δ᾽ ἔγωγέ τινων ὡς ~οὐδὲ~ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς
~ἔτι δώσοιεν~ αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι· τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ
τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν· εἰ δὲ τούτων
ἀποστερηθήσεται τῶν χρημάτων, εἰς στενὸν κομιδῇ τὰ τῆς τροφῆς
τοῖς ξένοις αὐτῷ καταστήσεται.

But besides his irresistible land-force, Philip had now become master of no inconsiderable naval power also. During the early years of the war, though he had taken not only Amphipolis, but also all the Athenian possessions on the Macedonian coast, yet the exports from his territory had been interrupted by the naval force of Athens, so as to lessen seriously the produce of his export duties.[652] But he had now contrived to get together a sufficient number of armed ships and privateers, if not to ward off such damage from himself, at least to retaliate it upon Athens. Her navy, indeed, was still incomparably superior, but the languor and remissness of her citizens refused to bring it out with efficiency; while Philip had opened for himself a new avenue to maritime power by his acquisition of Pheræ and Pagasæ, and by establishing his ascendency over the Magnêtes and their territory, round the eastern border of the Pagasæan Gulf. That gulf (now known by the name of Volo), is still the great inlet and outlet for Thessalian trade; the eastern coast of Thessaly, along the line of Mount Pelion, being craggy and harborless.[653] The naval force belonging to Pheræ and its seaport Pagasæ, was very considerable, and had been so even from the times of the despots, Jason and Alexander;[654] at one moment painfully felt even by Athens. All these ships now passed into the service of Philip, together with the dues on export and import levied round the Pagasæan Gulf; the command of which he farther secured by erecting suitable fortifications on the Magnesian shore, and by placing a garrison in Pagasæ.[655] Such additional naval means, combined with what he already possessed at Amphipolis and elsewhere, made him speedily annoying, if not formidable, to Athens, even at sea. His triremes showed themselves everywhere, probably in small and rapidly moving squadrons. He levied large contributions on the insular allies of Athens, and paid the costs of war greatly out of the capture of merchant vessels in the Ægean. His squadrons made incursions on the Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off several Athenian citizens as prisoners. They even stretched southward as far as Geræstus, the southern promontory of Eubœa, where they not only fell in with and captured a lucrative squadron of corn-ships, but also insulted the coast of Attica itself in the opposite bay of Marathon, towing off as a prize one of the sacred triremes.[656] Such was the mischief successfully inflicted by the flying squadrons of Philip, though Athens had probably a considerable number of cruisers at sea, and certainly a far superior number of ships at home in Peiræus. Her commerce, and even her coasts, were disturbed and endangered; her insular allies suffered yet more. Eubœa especially, the nearest and most important of all her allies, separated only by a narrow strait from the Pagasæan Gulf and the southern coast of Phthiotis, was now within the immediate reach not only of Philip’s marauding vessels, but also of his political intrigues.

[652] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 131-133 (352-351
B. C.); compare Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp. s. 5.)

[653] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 56; Hermippus ap. Athenæum, i. p.
27. About the lucrative commerce in the Gulf, in reference to
Demetrias and Thebæ Phthiotides, see Livy, xxxix. 25.

[654] Demosthenes cont. Polykl. p. 1207; De Coronâ Trierarchicâ,
p. 1230; Diodor. xv. 95; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 11.

[655] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. Καὶ γὰρ Παγασὰς
ἀπαιτεῖν αὐτόν εἰσιν ἐψηφισμένοι (the Thessalians re-demand
the place from Philip), καὶ Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασι τειχίζειν. In
Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 11. it stands—καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἰσὶν ἐψηφισμένοι
Παγασὰς ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίας λόγους ποιεῖσθαι. I take the
latter expression to state the fact with more strict precision;
the Thessalians passed a vote to _remonstrate_ with Philip; it
is not probable that they _actually hindered him_. And if he
afterwards “gave to them Magnesia,” as we are told in a later
oration delivered 344 B. C. (Philippic ii. p. 71. s. 24), he
probably gave it with reserve of the fortified posts to himself;
since we know that his ascendency over Thessaly was not only not
relaxed, but became more violent and compressive.

The value which the Macedonian kings always continued to
set, from this time forward, upon Magnesia and the recess of
the Pagasæan Gulf, is shown in the foundation of the city of
Demetrias in that important position, by Demetrius Poliorketes,
about sixty years afterwards. Demetrias, Chalkis, and Corinth
came to be considered the most commanding positions in Greece.

This fine bay, with the fertile territory lying on its shores
under Mount Pelion, are well described by colonel Leake, Travels
in Northern Greece, vol. iv. ch. 41. p. 373 _seqq._ I doubt
whether either Ulpian (ad Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 24) or colonel
Leake (p. 381) are borne out in supposing that there was any
_town_ called _Magnesia_ on the shores of the Gulf. None such is
mentioned either by Strabo or by Skylax; and I apprehend that the
passages above cited from Demosthenes mean _Magnesia the region_
inhabited by the Magnetes; as in Demosthenes cont. Neæram. p.
1382. s. 141.

[656] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 25. δεῖ γὰρ, ἔχοντος
ἐκείνου ναυτικὸν, καὶ ταχειῶν τριηρῶν ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἡ
δύναμις πλέῃ.—p. 49. s. 38. Πρῶτον μὲν, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἐκείνου
πόρων ἀφαιρήσεσθε· ἔστι δ᾽ οὗτος τίς; ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν
πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θάλασσαν.
Ἔπειτα, τί πρὸς τούτῳ; τοῦ πάσχειν αὐτοὶ κακῶς ἔξω γενήσεσθε,
οὐχ ὥσπερ τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον εἰς Λῆμνον καὶ Ἴμβρον ἐμβαλὼν
αἰχμαλώτους πολίτας ὑμετέρους ᾤχετ᾽ ἄγων, πρὸς τῷ Γεραιστῷ τὰ
πλοῖα συλλαβὼν ἀμύθητα χρήματ᾽ ἐξέλεξε, τὰ τελευταῖα εἰς Μαραθῶνα
ἀπέβη, καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ᾤχετ᾽ ἔχων τριήρη, etc.

We can hardly be certain that the Sacred Trireme thus taken was
either the Paralus or the Salaminia; there may have been other
sacred triremes besides these two.

It was thus that the war against Philip turned more and more to the disgrace and disadvantage of the Athenians. Though they had begun it in the hope of punishing him for his duplicity in appropriating Amphipolis, they had been themselves the losers by the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, etc.; and they were now thrown upon the defensive, without security for their maritime allies, their commerce, or their coasts.[657] The intelligence of these various losses and insults endured at sea, in spite of indisputable maritime preponderance, called forth at Athens acrimonious complaints against the generals of the state, and exaggerated outbursts of enmity against Philip.[658] That prince, having spent a few months, after his repulse from Thermopylæ, in Thessaly, and having so far established his ascendency over that country that he could leave the completion of the task to his officers, pushed with his characteristic activity into Thrace. He there took part in the disputes between various native princes, expelling some, confirming or installing others, and extending his own dominion at the cost of all.[659] Among these princes were probably Kersobleptes, and Amadokus; for Philip carried his aggressions to the immediate neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese.

[657] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 52. s. 49. ὁρῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν
τοῦ πολέμου γεγενημένην ὑπὲρ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον, τὴν
δὲ τελευτὴν οὖσαν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου.
(Between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B. C.)

[658] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144. p. 656. s.
130. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Φίλιππος οὑτοσί,
etc. (this harangue also between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351
B. C.)

[659] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.

In November, 352 B. C., intelligence reached Athens, that he was in Thrace besieging Heræon Teichos; a place so near to the Chersonese,[660] that the Athenian possessions and colonists in that peninsula were threatened with considerable danger. So great was the alarm and excitement caused by this news, that a vote was immediately passed in the public assembly to equip a fleet of forty triremes,—to man it with Athenian citizens, all persons up to the age of forty-five being made liable to serve on the expedition,—and to raise sixty talents by a direct property tax. At first active steps were taken to accelerate the armament. But before the difficulties of detail could be surmounted,—before it could be determined, amidst the general aversion to personal service, what citizens should go abroad, and how the burthen of trierarchy should be distributed,—fresh messengers arrived from the Chersonese, reporting first that Philip had fallen sick, next that he was actually dead.[661] The last-mentioned report proved false; but the sickness of Philip was an actual fact, and seems to have been severe enough to cause a temporary suspension of his military operations. Though the opportunity became thus only the more favorable for attacking Philip, yet the Athenians, no longer spurred on by the fear of farther immediate danger, relapsed into their former languor, and renounced or postponed their intended armament. After passing the whole ensuing summer in inaction, they could only be prevailed upon, in the month of September 351, to despatch to Thrace a feeble force under the mercenary chief Charidemus; ten triremes, without any soldiers aboard, and with no more than five talents in money.[662]

[660] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5 (delivered in the
latter half of 350 B. C.)

... ἀπηγγέλθη Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ, τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον
ἔτος τουτὶ, Ἡραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν, τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν
Μαιμακτηριὼν, etc.

This Thracian expedition of Philip (alluded to also in
Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13) stands fixed to the date of
November 352 B. C., on reasonably good grounds.

That the town or fortress called Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was near to the
Chersonese, cannot be doubted. The commentators identify it with
Ἡραῖον, mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 90) as being near Perinthus.
But this hypothesis is open to much doubt. Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος is not
quite the same as Ἡραῖον; nor was the latter place very near to
the Chersonese; nor would Philip be yet in a condition to provoke
or menace so powerful a city as Perinthus—though he did so ten
years afterwards. (Diodor. xvi. 74).

I cannot think that we know where Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was situated;
except that it was in Thrace, and near the Chersonese.