Chapter LXXXIX (3)

The general description here given by Demosthenes, of his own conduct during the second embassy, is probably true. Indeed, it coincided substantially with the statement of Æschines, who complains of him as in a state of constant and vexatious opposition to his colleagues. We must recollect that Demosthenes had no means of knowing what the particular projects of Philip really were. This was a secret to every one except Philip himself, with his confidential agents or partisans. Whatever Demosthenes might suspect, he had no public evidence by which to impress his suspicions upon others, or to countervail confident assertions on the favorable side transmitted home by his colleagues.

The army of Philip was now ready, and he was on the point of marching southward towards Thessaly and Thermopylæ. That pass was still held by the Phokians, with a body of Lacedæmonian auxiliaries;[862] a force quite sufficient to maintain it against Philip’s open attack, and likely to be strengthened by Athens from seaward, if the Athenians came to penetrate his real purposes. It was therefore essential to Philip to keep alive a certain belief in the minds of others, that he was marching southward with intentions favorable to the Phokians,—though not to proclaim it in any such authentic manner as to alienate his actual allies the Thebans and Thessalians. And the Athenian envoys were his most useful agents in circulating the imposture.

[862] The Lacedæmonian troops remained at Thermopylæ until a
little time before Philip reached it (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365).

Some of the Macedonian officers round Philip gave explicit assurance, that the purpose of his march was to conquer Thebes, and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. So far, indeed, was this deception carried, that (according to Æschines) the Theban envoys in Macedonia, and the Thebans themselves, became seriously alarmed.[863] The movements of Philip were now the pivot on which Grecian affairs turned, and Pella the scene wherein the greatest cities in Greece were bidding for his favor. While the Thebans and Thessalians were calling upon him to proclaim himself openly Amphiktyonic champion against the Phokians,—the Phokian envoys,[864] together with those from Sparta and Athens, were endeavoring to enlist him in their cause against Thebes. Wishing to isolate the Phokians from such support, Philip made many tempting promises to the Lacedæmonian envoys; who, on their side, came to open quarrel, and indulged in open menace, against those of Thebes.[865] Such was the disgraceful auction, wherein these once great states, in prosecution of their mutual antipathies, bartered away to a foreign prince the dignity of the Hellenic name and the independence of the Hellenic world;[866] following the example set by Sparta in her applications to the Great King, during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and at the peace of Antalkidas. Amidst such a crowd of humble petitioners and expectants, all trembling to offend him,—with the aid too of Æschines, Philokrates, and the other Athenian envoys who consented to play his game,—Philip had little difficulty in keeping alive the hopes of all, and preventing the formation of any common force or decisive resolution to resist him.[867]

[863] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. ~αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἠπόρουν
καὶ ἐφοβοῦντο οἱ τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεις; ... τῶν δ᾽ ἑταίρων τινες
τῶν Φιλίππου οὐ διαῤῥήδην πρός τινας ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τὰς ἐν
Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις κατοικιεῖ Φίλιππος;~ Θηβαῖοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐξεληλύθεσαν
πανδημεὶ, ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν;

Demosthenes greatly eulogizes the incorruptibility and hearty
efforts of the Theban envoys (Fals. Leg. p. 384); which assertion
is probably nothing better at bottom, than a rhetorical contrast,
to discredit Æschines—fit to be inserted in the numerous list of
oratorical exaggerations and perversions of history, collected
in the interesting Treatise of Weiske, De Hyperbolê, errorum in
Historiâ Philippi commissorum genitrice (Meissen, 1819).

[864] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113; Justin, viii. 4. “Contra
Phocensium legati, adhibitis Lacedæmoniis et Atheniensibus,
bellum deprecabantur, cujus ab eo dilationem ter jam emerant.” I
do not understand to what facts Justin refers, when he states,
that the Phokians “had already purchased thrice from Philip a
postponement of war.”

[865] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 365. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
μετεπέμπετο, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ὑποσχόμενος πράξειν ἐκείνοις, etc.

Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. Λακεδαιμονίοι δὲ οὐ μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν
τἀναντία Θηβαίοις ἐπρέσβευον, καὶ τελευτῶντες προσέκρουον φανερῶς
ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, καὶ διηπείλουν τοῖς τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεισιν;

[866] This thought is strikingly presented by Justin (viii.
4), probably from Theopompus—“Fœdum prorsus miserandumque
spectaculum, Græciam, etiam nunc et viribus et dignitate orbis
terrarum principem, regum certo gentiumque semper victricem
et multarum adhuc urbium dominam, alienis excubare sedibus,
aut rogantem bellum aut deprecantem: in alterius ope omnem
spem posuisse orbis terrarum vindices; eoque discordia sua
civilibusque bellis redactos, ut adulentur ultro sordidam paulo
ante clientelæ suæ partem: et hæc potissimum facere Thebanos
Lacedæmoniosque, antea inter se imperii, nunc gratiæ imperantis,
æmulos.”

[867] Justin, viii. 4.

After completing his march southward through Thessaly, he reached Pheræ near the Pagasæan Gulf, at the head of a powerful army of Macedonians and allies. The Phokian envoys accompanied his march, and were treated, if not as friends, at least in such manner as to make it appear doubtful whether Philip was going to attack the Phokians or the Thebans.[868] It was at Pheræ that the Athenian envoys at length administered the oath both to Philip and to his allies.[869] This was done the last thing before they returned to Athens; which city they reached on the 13th of the month Skirrophorion;[870] after an absence of seventy days, comprising all the intervening month Thargelion, and the remnant (from the third day) of the month Munychion. They accepted, as representatives of the allied cities, all whom Philip sent to them; though Demosthenes remarks that their instructions directed them to administer the oath to the chief magistrate in each city respectively.[871] And among the cities whom they admitted to take the oath as Philip’s allies, was comprised Kardia, on the borders of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered Kardia as within the limits of the Chersonese, and therefore as belonging to them.[872]

[868] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰς Φωκέας ὡς πρὸς
συμμάχους ἐπορεύετο, καὶ πρέσβεις Φωκέων ἦσαν οἳ παρηκολούθουν
αὐτῷ πορευομένῳ· καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἤριζον πολλοὶ, Θηβαίοις οὐ
λυσιτελήσειν τὴν ἐκείνου πάροδον. The words παρ᾽ ἡμῖν denote the
Athenian envoys (of whom Demosthenes was one) and the persons
around them, marching along with Philip; the oaths not having
been yet taken.

[869] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390. The oath was administered in
the inn in front of the chapel of the Dioskuri, near Pheræ.

[870] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. In more than one passage,
he states their absence from Athens to have lasted three
entire months (p. 390; also De Coronâ, p. 235). But this is
an exaggeration of the time. The decree of the Senate, which
constrained them to depart, was passed on the third of Munychion.
Assuming that they set out on that very day (though it is more
probable that they did not set out until the ensuing day), their
absence would only have lasted seventy days.

[871] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. The Magnesian and Achæan cities
round the Pagasæan Gulf, all except Halus, were included in the
oath as allies of Philip (Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen. p.
159).

[872] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 395. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De
Halonneso, p. 87.

It was thus that the envoys postponed both the execution of their special mission, and their return, until the last moment, when Philip was within three days’ march of Thermopylæ. That they so postponed it, in corrupt connivance with him, is the allegation of Demosthenes, sustained by all the probabilities of the case. Philip was anxious to come upon Thermopylæ by surprise,[873] and to leave as little time as possible either to the Phokians or to Athens for organizing defence. The oath, which ought to have been administered in Thrace,—but at any rate at Pella—was not taken until Philip had got as near as possible to the important pass; nor had the envoys visited one single city among his allies in execution of their mandate. And as Æschines was well aware that this would provoke inquiry, he took the precaution of bringing with him a letter from Philip to the Athenian people, couched in the most friendly terms; wherein Philip took upon himself any blame which might fall upon the envoys, affirming that they themselves had been anxious to go and visit the allied cities, but that he had detained them in order that they might assist him in accommodating the difference between the cities of Halus and Pharsalus. This letter, affording farther presumption of the connivance between the envoys and Philip, was besides founded on a false pretence; for Halus was (either at that very time or shortly afterwards) conquered by his arms, given up to the Pharsalians, and its population sold or expelled.[874]

[873] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 351. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἁπάντων τῶν
ἀδικημάτων, τὸ τὸν Φίλιππον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασι τούτοις, καὶ
δέον ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, εἶτα βουλεύσασθαι, μετὰ
ταῦτα δὲ πράττειν ὅ,τι δόξαι, ἅμα ἀκούειν κἀκεῖνον παρεῖναι,
καὶ μηδ᾽ ὅ,τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι. Compare Demosth.
De Coronâ, p. 236. πάλιν ὠνεῖται παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ὅπως μὴ ἄπίωμεν ἐκ
Μακεδονίας ἕως τὰ τῆς στρατείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Φωκέας εὐτρεπῆ
ποιήσαιτο, etc.

[874] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 352, 353; ad Philipp. Epistol. p.
152. Demosthenes affirms farther that Æschines himself _wrote_
the letter in Philip’s name. Æschines denies that he wrote it,
and sustains his denial upon sufficient grounds. But he does not
deny that he brought it (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 44. c. 40, 41).

The inhabitants of Pharsalus were attached to Philip; while those
of Pheræ were opposed to him as much as they dared, and even
refused (according to Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444) to join his
army on this expedition. The old rivalry between the two cities
here again appears.

In administering the oaths at Pheræ to Philip and his allies, Æschines and the majority of the Athenian envoys had formally and publicly pronounced the Phokians to be excluded and out of the treaty, and had said nothing about Kersobleptes. This was, if not a departure from their mandate, at least a step beyond it; for the Athenian people had expressly rejected the same exclusion when proposed by Philokrates at Athens; though when the Macedonian envoy declared that he could not admit the Phokians, the Athenians had consented to swear the treaty without them. Probably Philip and his allies would not consent to take the oath, to Athens and her allies, without an express declaration that the Phokians were out of the pale.[875] But though Philokrates and Æschines thus openly repudiated the Phokians, they still persisted in affirming that the intentions of Philip towards that people were highly favorable. They affirmed this probably to the Phokians themselves, as an excuse for having pronounced the special exclusion; they repeated it loudly and emphatically at Athens, immediately on their return. It was then that Demosthenes also, after having been outvoted and silenced during the mission, obtained an opportunity for making his own protest public. Being among the senators of that year, he made his report to the Senate forthwith, seemingly on the day, or the day next but one, after his arrival, before a large audience of private citizens standing by to witness so important a proceeding. He recounted all the proceedings of the embassy,—recalling the hopes and promises under which Æschines and others had persuaded the Athenians to agree to the peace,—arraigning these envoys as fabricators, in collusion with Philip, of falsehoods and delusive assurances,—and accusing them of having already by their unwarrantable delays betrayed Kersobleptes to ruin. Demosthenes at the same time made known to the Senate the near approach and rapid march of Philip; entreating them to interpose even now at the eleventh hour, for the purpose of preventing what yet remained, the Phokians and Thermopylæ, from being given up under the like treacherous fallacies.[876] A fleet of fifty triremes had been voted, and were ready at a moment’s notice to be employed on sudden occasion.[877] The majority of the Senate went decidedly along with Demosthenes, and passed a resolution[878] in that sense to be submitted to the public assembly. So adverse was this resolution to the envoys, that it neither commended them nor invited them to dinner in the prytaneium; an insult (according to Demosthenes) without any former precedent.

[875] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 355. ἐκ τοῦ, ὅτε τοὺς ὅρκους
ἤμελλε Φίλιππος ὀμνύναι τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ~ἐκσπόνδους
ἀποφανθῆναι τοὺς Φωκέας~ ὑπὸ τούτων, ὃ σιωπᾷν καὶ ἐᾷν εἰκὸς ἦν,
εἴπερ ἤμελλον σώζεσθαι. Compare p. 395. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ~Φωκεῖς
ἐκσπόνδους καὶ Ἁλεῖς ἀπέφηναν~ καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην, παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα
καὶ τὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρημένα, etc.; also p. 430.

[876] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 346.

[877] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐφ᾽ ἣν αἱ πεντήκοντα τριήρεις
ὅμως ἐφώρμουν, etc. Compare Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33.

[878] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 350, 351. Demosthenes causes this
resolution of the Senate (προβούλευμα) to be read to the Dikasts,
together with the testimony of the senator who moved it. The
document is not found _verbatim_, but Demosthenes comments upon
it before the Dikasts after it has been read, and especially
points out that it contains neither praise nor invitation, which
the Senate was always in the habit of voting to returning envoys.
This is sufficient to refute the allegation of Æschines (Fals.
Leg. p. 44. c. 38), that Demosthenes himself moved a resolution
to praise the envoys and invite them to a banquet in the
Prytaneium. Æschines does not produce such resolution, nor cause
it to be read before the Dikasts.

On the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, three days after the return of the envoys, the first public assembly was held: where, according to usual form, the resolution just passed by the Senate ought to have been discussed. But it was not even read to the assembly; for immediately on the opening of business (so Demosthenes tells us), Æschines rose and proceeded to address the people, who were naturally impatient to hear him before any one else, speaking as he did in the name of his colleagues generally.[879] He said nothing either about the recent statements of Demosthenes before the Senate, or the senatorial resolution following, or even the past history of the embassy—but passed at once to the actual state of affairs, and the coming future. He acquainted the people that Philip, having sworn the oaths at Pheræ, had by this time reached Thermopylæ with his army. “But he comes there (said Æschines) as the friend and ally of Athens, the protector of the Phokians, the restorer of the enslaved Bœotian cities, and the enemy of Thebes alone. We your envoys have satisfied him that the Thebans are the real wrong-doers, not only in their oppression towards the Bœotian cities, but also in regard to the spoliation of the temple, which they had conspired to perpetrate earlier than the Phokians. I (Æschines) exposed in an emphatic speech before Philip the iniquities of the Thebans, for which proceeding they have set a price on my life. You Athenians will hear, in two or three days, without any trouble of your own, that Philip is vigorously prosecuting the siege of Thebes. You will find that he will capture and break up that city—that he will exact from the Thebans compensation for the treasure ravished from Delphi—and that he will restore the subjugated communities of Platæa and Thespiæ. Nay more—you will hear of benefits still more direct, which we have determined Philip to confer upon you, but which it would not be prudent as yet to particularize. Eubœa will be restored to you as a compensation for Amphipolis: the Eubœans have already expressed the greatest alarm at the confidential relations between Athens and Philip, and the probability of his ceding to you their island. There are other matters too, on which I do not wish to speak out fully, because I have false friends even among my own colleagues.” These last ambiguous allusions were generally understood, and proclaimed by the persons round the orator, to refer to Oropus, the ancient possession of Athens, now in the hands of Thebes.[880] Such glowing promises, of benefits to come, were probably crowned by the announcement, more worthy of credit, that Philip had engaged to send back all the Athenian prisoners by the coming Panathenaic festival,[881] which fell during the next month Hekatombæon.

[879] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 347, 351, 352. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδεὶς
ἀνέγνω τῷ δήμῳ τὸ προβούλευμα, οὐδ᾽ ἤκουσεν ὁ δῆμος, ἀναστὰς
δ᾽ οὗτος ἐδημηγόρει. The date of the 16th Skirrophorion is
specified, p. 359.

[880] I have here condensed the substance of what is stated by
Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347, 348, 351, 352, 364, 411, etc.
Another statement, to the same effect, made by Demosthenes in the
Oration De Pace (delivered only a few months after the assembly
here described, and not a judicial accusation against Æschines,
but a deliberative harangue before the public assembly), is
even better evidence than the accusatory speech De Falsâ
Legatione—ἡνίκα τοὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπειληφότες
ἥκομεν οἱ πρέσβεις, τότε Θεσπιάς τινων καὶ Πλαταιὰς ὑπισχνουμένων
οἰκισθήσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φίλιππον, ἂν γένηται
κύριος, σώσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικιεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν
ὑμῖν ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀντ᾽ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀποδοθήσεσθαι,
καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φενακισμοὺς, οἷς ἐπαχθέντες ὑμεῖς οὔτε
συμφόρως οὔτ᾽ ἴσως οὔτε καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας ... οὐδὲν τούτων
οὔτ᾽ ἐξαπατήσας οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσομαι, ἀλλὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν,
ὡς οἶδ᾽ ὅτι μνημονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτα οὔτε οἶδα οὔτε προσδοκῶ,
νομίζω δὲ τὸν λέγοντα ληρεῖν (De Pace, p. 59).

Compare also Philippic ii. p. 72, 73, where Demosthenes repeats
the like assertion; also De Chersoneso, p. 105; De Coronâ, p.
236, 237.

[881] Demosthenes states (Fals. Leg. p. 394. εἰς τὰ Παναθήναια
φήσας ἀποπέμψειν) that _he_ received this assurance from Philip,
while he was busying himself during the mission in efforts to
procure the ransom or liberation of the prisoners. But we may be
sure that Æschines, so much more in the favor of Philip, must
have received it also, since it would form so admirable a point
for his first speech at Athens, in this critical juncture.

The first impression of the Athenians, on hearing Æschines, was that of surprise, alarm, and displeasure, at the unforeseen vicinity of Philip;[882] which left no time for deliberation, and scarcely the minimum of time for instant precautionary occupation of Thermopylæ, if such a step were deemed necessary. But the sequel of the speech—proclaiming to them the speedy accomplishment of such favorable results, together with the gratification of their antipathy against Thebes—effaced this sentiment, and filled them with agreeable prospects. It was in vain that Demosthenes rose to reply, arraigned the assurances as fallacious, and tried to bring forward the same statement as had already prevailed with the Senate. The people refused to hear him; Philokrates with the other friends of Æschines hooted him off; and the majority were so full of the satisfactory prospect opened to them, that all mistrust or impeachment of its truth appeared spiteful and vexatious.[883] It is to be remembered that these were the same promises previously made to them by Philokrates and others, nearly three months before, when the peace with Philip was first voted. The immediate accomplishment of them was now again promised on the same authority—by envoys who had communicated a second time with Philip, and thus had farther means of information—so that the comfortable anticipation previously raised was confirmed and strengthened. No one thought of the danger of admitting Philip within Thermopylæ, when the purpose of his coming was understood to be, the protection of the Phokians, and the punishment of the hated Thebans. Demosthenes was scarcely allowed even to make a protest, or to disclaim responsibility as to the result. Æschines triumphantly assumed the responsibility to himself; while Philokrates amused the people by saying: “No wonder, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I should not think alike; he is an ungenial water-drinker; I am fond of wine.”[884]

[882] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 352. ὥσθ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ἐκπεπληγμένους
τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Φιλίππου, καὶ τούτοις ὀργιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ
προηγγελκέναι, πρᾳοτέρους γενέσθαι τινὸς, πάνθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἐβούλεσθ᾽
ὑμῖν ἔσεσθαι προσδοκήσαντας, etc.

[883] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348, 349, 352. οἱ δ᾽ ~ἀντιλέγοντες
ὄχλος ἄλλως καὶ βασκανία κατεφαίνετο~, etc.

[884] Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 355; Phil. ii. p. 73.

It was during this temper of the assembly that the letter of Philip, brought by the envoys, was produced and read. His abundant expressions of regard, and promises of future benefit, to Athens, were warmly applauded; while, prepossessed as the hearers were, none of them discerned, nor was any speaker permitted to point out, that these expressions were thoroughly vague and general, and that not a word was said about the Thebans or the Phokians.[885] Philokrates next proposed a decree, extolling Philip for his just and beneficent promises—providing that the peace and alliance with him should be extended, not merely to the existing Athenians, but also to their posterity—and enacting that if the Phokians should still refuse to yield possession of the Delphian temple to the Amphiktyons, the people of Athens would compel them to do so by armed intervention.[886]

[885] Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 353.

[886] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356. Οὗτος (Æschines) ἦν ὁ λέγων
ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπισχνούμενος· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τούτου λόγους
ὡρμηκότας λαβὼν ὑμᾶς ὁ Φιλοκράτης, ἐγγράφει τοῦτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ψήφισμα,
ἐὰν μὴ ποιῶσι Φωκεῖς ἃ δεῖ, καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοσι τὸ
ἱερὸν, ὅτι βοηθήσει ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς διακωλύοντας
ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.

The fact, that by this motion of Philokrates the peace was
extended to “the posterity” of the Athenians—is dwelt upon by
Demosthenes as “the greatest disgrace of all;” with an intensity
of emphasis which it is difficult to enter into (Philippic ii. p.
73).

During the few days immediately succeeding the return of the envoys to Athens (on the 13th of Skirrophorion), Philip wrote two successive letters, inviting the Athenian troops to join him forthwith at Thermopylæ.[887] Probably these were sent at the moment when Phalækus, the Phokian leader at that pass, answered his first summons by a negative reply.[888] The two letters must have been despatched one immediately after the other, betraying considerable anxiety on the part of Philip; which it is not difficult to understand. He could not be at first certain what effect would be produced by his unforeseen arrival at Thermopylæ on the public mind at Athens. In spite of all the persuasions of Æschines and Philokrates, the Athenians might conceive so much alarm as to obstruct his admission within that important barrier; while Phalækus and the Phokians—having a powerful mercenary force, competent, even unaided, to a resistance of some length—were sure to attempt resistance, if any hope of aid were held out to them from Athens. Moreover it would be difficult for Philip to carry on prolonged military operations in the neighborhood, from the want of provisions; the lands having been unsown through the continued antecedent war, and the Athenian triremes being at hand to intercept his supplies by sea.[889] Hence it was important to him to keep the Athenians in illusion and quiescence for the moment; to which purpose his letters were well adapted, in whichever way they were taken. If the Athenians came to Thermopylæ, they would come as his allies—not as allies of the Phokians. Not only would they be in the midst of his superior force and therefore as it were hostages;[890] but they would be removed from contact with the Phokians, and would bring to bear upon the latter an additional force of intimidation. If, on the contrary, the Athenians determined not to come, they would at any rate interpret his desire for their presence as a proof that he contemplated no purposes at variance with their wishes and interests; and would trust the assurances, given by Æschines and his other partisans at Athens, that he secretly meant well towards the Phokians. This last alternative was what Philip both desired and anticipated. He wished only to deprive the Phokians of all chance of aid from Athens, and to be left to deal with them himself. His letters served to blind the Athenian public, but his partisans took care not to move the assembly[891] to a direct compliance with their invitation. Indeed the proposal of such an expedition (besides the standing dislike of the citizens towards military service) would have been singularly repulsive, seeing that the Athenians would have had to appear, ostensibly at least, in arms against their Phokian allies. The conditional menace of the Athenian assembly against the Phokians (in case of refusal to surrender the temple to the Amphiktyons), decreed on the motion of Philokrates, was in itself sufficiently harsh, against allies of ten years’ standing; and was tantamount at least to a declaration that Athens would not interfere on their behalf—which was all that Philip wanted.

[887] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. Demosthenes causes the two
letters to be read, and proceeds—Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπιστολαὶ καλοῦσιν
αὗται, καὶ νὴ ~Δία ἤδη γε~.

So also Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 4. ὑμῖν δὲ ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶν οὐκ
ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολὴν ὁ Φίλιππος, ἐξιέναι πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει βοηθήσοντας
τοῖς δικαίοις; Æschines only notices one of the two letters.
Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 412) conceives the letters as having
been written and sent between the 16th and 23d of the month
Skirrophorion.

[888] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359.

[889] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 379.

[890] This was among the grounds of objection, taken by
Demosthenes and his friends, against the despatch of forces to
Thermopylæ in compliance with the letter of Philip—according to
the assertion of Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41); who treats
the objection with contempt, though it seems well-grounded and
reasonable.

[891] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356, 357.

Among the hearers of these debates at Athens, were deputies from these very Phokians, whose fate now hung in suspense. It has already been stated that during the preceding September, while the Phokians were torn by intestine dissensions, Phalækus, the chief of the mercenaries, had repudiated aid (invited by his Phokian opponents), both from Athens and Sparta;[892] feeling strong enough to hold Thermopylæ by his own force. During the intervening months, however, both his strength and his pride had declined. Though he still occupied Thermopylæ with eight thousand or ten thousand mercenaries, and still retained superiority over Thebes, with possession of Orchomenus, Koroneia, and other places taken from the Thebans,[893]—yet his financial resources had become so insufficient for a numerous force, and the soldiers had grown so disorderly from want of regular pay,[894] that he thought it prudent to invite aid from Sparta during the spring,—while Athens was deserting the Phokians to make terms with Philip. Archidamus accordingly came to Thermopylæ with one thousand Lacedæmonian auxiliaries.[895] The defensive force thus assembled was amply sufficient against Philip by land; but that important pass could not be held without the coöperation of a superior fleet at sea.[896] Now the Phokians had powerful enemies even within the pass—the Thebans; and there was no obstacle, except the Athenian fleet under Proxenus at Oreus,[897] to prevent Philip from landing troops in the rear of Thermopylæ, joining the Thebans, and making himself master of Phokis from the side towards Bœotia.

[892] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41.

[893] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 387.

[894] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. This statement of
Æschines—about the declining strength of the Phokians and the
causes thereof—has every appearance of being correct in point of
fact; though it will not sustain the conclusions which he builds
upon it.

Compare Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30 (delivered four years
earlier) ἀπειρηκότων δὲ χρήμασι Φωκέων, etc.

[895] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365; Diodor. xvi. 59.

[896] For the defence of Thermopylæ, at the period of the
invasion of Xerxes, the Grecian fleet at Artemisium was not less
essential than the land force of Leonidas encamped in the pass
itself.

[897] That the Phokians could not maintain Thermopylæ without
the aid of Athens—and that Philip could march to the frontier
of Attica, without any intermediate obstacle to prevent him,
if Olynthus were suffered to fall into his hand—is laid down
emphatically by Demosthenes in the first Olynthiac, nearly four
years before the month of Skirrophorion, 346 B. C.

Ἂν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν;
Θηβαῖοι; οἳ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν
ἑτοίμως. Ἀλλὰ Φωκεῖς; οἱ τὴν οἰκείαν οὐχ οἷοί τε ὄντες φυλάττειν,
ἐὰν μὴ βοηθήσεθ᾽ ὑμεῖς (Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16).

To the safety of the Phokians, therefore, the continued maritime protection of Athens was indispensable; and they doubtless watched with trembling anxiety the deceitful phases of Athenian diplomacy during the winter and spring of 347-346 B. C. Their deputies must have been present at Athens when the treaty was concluded and sworn in March 346 B. C. Though compelled to endure not only the refusal of Antipater excluding them from the oath, but also the consent of their Athenian allies, tacitly acted upon without being formally announced, to take the oath without them,—they nevertheless heard the assurances, confidently addressed by Philokrates and Æschines to the people, that this refusal was a mere feint to deceive the Thessalians and Thebans,—that Philip would stand forward as the protector of the Phokians, and that all his real hostile purposes were directed against Thebes. How the Phokians interpreted such tortuous and contradictory policy, we are not told. But their fate hung upon the determination of Athens; and during the time when the Ten Athenian envoys were negotiating or intriguing with Philip at Pella, Phokian envoys were there also, trying to establish some understanding with Philip, through Lacedæmonian and Athenian support. Both Philip and Æschines probably amused them with favorable promises. And though, when the oaths were at last administered to Philip at Pheræ, the Phokians were formally pronounced to be excluded,—still the fair words of Æschines, and his assurances of Philip’s good intentions towards them, were not discontinued.

While Philip marched straight from Pheræ to Thermopylæ,—and while the Athenian envoys returned to Athens,—Phokian deputies visited Athens also, to learn the last determination of the Athenian people, upon which their own destiny turned. Though Philip, on reaching the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, summoned the Phokian leader, Phalækus to surrender the pass, and offered him terms,—Phalækus would make no reply until his deputies returned to Athens.[898] These deputies, present at the public assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, heard the same fallacious assurances as before respecting Philip’s designs, repeated by Philokrates and Æschines with unabated impudence, and still accepted by the people. But they also heard, in the very same assembly, the decree proposed by Philokrates and adopted, that unless the Phokians restored the Delphian temple forthwith to the Amphiktyons, the Athenian people would compel them to do so by armed force. If the Phokians still cherished hopes, this conditional declaration of war, from a city which still continued by name to be their ally, opened their eyes, and satisfied them that no hope was left except to make the best terms they could with Philip.[899] To defend Thermopylæ successfully without Athens, much more against Athens, was impracticable.

[898] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. ἥκομεν δὲ δεῦρο ἀπὸ τῆς
πρεσβείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρκους τρίτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Σκιῤῥοφοριῶνος
μηνὸς, καὶ παρῆν ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν Πύλαις ἤδη καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν
ἐπηγγέλλετο ὧν οὐδὲν ἐπίστευον ἐκεῖνοι. Σημεῖον δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἂν
δεῦρ᾽ ἧκον ὡς ὑμᾶς ... παρῆσαν γὰρ οἱ τῶν Φωκέων πρέσβεις ἐνθάδε,
καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ τί ἀπαγγελοῦσιν οὗτοι (Æschines, Philokrates,
etc.) καὶ τί ψηφιεῖσθε ὑμεῖς, ἐπιμελὲς εἰδέναι.

[899] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. οἱ μὲν τοίνυν Φωκεῖς, ὡς τὰ
παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπύθοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τό τε ψήφισμα τοῦτ᾽
ἔλαβον τὸ τοῦ Φιλοκράτους, καὶ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ἐπύθοντο τὴν τούτου
καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις—κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους ἀπώλοντο.

Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41) touches upon the statements
made by Demosthenes respecting the envoys of Phalækus at Athens,
and the effect of the news which they carried back in determining
the capitulation. He complains of them generally as being “got
up against him” (ὁ κατήγορος μεμηχάνηται), but he does not
contradict them upon any specific point. Nor does he at all
succeed in repelling the main argument, brought home with great
precision of date by Demosthenes.

Leaving Athens after the assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, the Phokian deputies carried back the tidings of what had passed to Phalækus, whom they reached at Nikæa, near Thermopylæ, about the 20th of the same month.[900] Three days afterwards, Phalækus, with his powerful army of eight thousand or ten thousand mercenary infantry and one thousand cavalry, had concluded a convention with Philip. The Lacedæmonian auxiliaries, perceiving the insincere policy of Athens, and the certain ruin of the Phokians, had gone away a little before.[901] It was stipulated in the convention that Phalækus should evacuate the territory, and retire wherever else he pleased, with his entire mercenary force and with all such Phokians as chose to accompany him. The remaining natives threw themselves upon the mercy of the conqueror.

[900] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359: compare Diodor. xvi. 59. In
this passage, Demosthenes reckons up _seven_ days between the
final assembly at Athens, and the capitulation concluded by the
Phokians. In another passage, he states the same interval at only
_five_ days (p. 365); which is doubtless inaccurate. In a third
passage, the same interval, seemingly, stands at five or six
days, p. 379.

[901] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356-365. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἧκεν (Philip) εἰς
Πύλας, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ᾽ αἰσθόμενοι τὴν ἐνέδραν ὑπεχώρησαν, etc.

All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, together with the pass of Thermopylæ, were placed in the hands of Philip; all surrendering at discretion; all without resistance. The moment Philip was thus master of the country, he joined his forces with those of the Thebans, and proclaimed his purpose of acting thoroughly upon their policy; of transferring to them a considerable portion of Phokis; of restoring to them Orchomenus, Korsiæ, and Koroneia, Bœotian towns which the Phokians had taken from them; and of keeping the rest of Bœotia in their dependence, just as he found it.[902]

[902] Demosth. Fals. Leg p. 359, 360, 365, 379, 413. ὁ δὲ
(Æschines) τοσοῦτον δεῖ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τινα αἰχμάλωτον σῶσαι,
ὥσθ᾽ ὅλον τόπον καὶ πλεῖν ἢ μυρίους μὲν ὁπλίτας, ὁμοῦ δὲ χιλίους
ἱππέας τῶν ὑπαρχόντων συμμάχων, ὅπως αἰχμάλωτοι γένωνται Φιλίππῳ
συμπαρεσκεύασεν.

Diodorus (xvi. 59) states the mercenaries of Phalækus at eight
thousand men.

Because the Phokians capitulated to Philip and not to the
Thebans (p. 360)—because not one of their towns made any
resistance—Demosthenes argues that this proves their confidence
in the favorable dispositions of Philip, as testified by
Æschines. But he overstrains this argument against Æschines. The
Phokians had no choice but to surrender, as soon as all chance
of Athenian aid was manifestly shut out. The belief of favorable
dispositions on the part of Philip, was doubtless an auxiliary
motive, but not the primary or predominant.

In the meantime, the Athenians, after having passed the decree above mentioned, re-appointed (in the very same assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, June), the same ten envoys to carry intelligence of it to Philip, and to be witnesses of the accomplishment of the splendid promises made in his name. But Demosthenes immediately swore off, and refused to serve; while Æschines, though he did not swear off, was nevertheless so much indisposed, as to be unable to go. This at least is his own statement; though Demosthenes affirms that the illness was a mere concerted pretence, in order that Æschines might remain at home to counterwork any reaction of public feeling at Athens, likely to arise on the arrival of the bad news, which Æschines knew to be at hand, from Phokis.[903] Others having been chosen in place of Æschines and Demosthenes,[904] the ten envoys set out, and proceeded as far as Chalkis in Eubœa. It was there that they learned the fatal intelligence from the main land on the other side of the Eubœan strait. On the 23d of Skirrophorion, Phalækus and all the Phokian towns had surrendered; Philip was master of Thermopylæ, had joined his forces with the Thebans, and proclaimed an unqualified philo-Theban policy; on the 27th of Skirrophorion, Derkyllus, one of the envoys, arrived in haste back at Athens, having stopped short in his mission on hearing the facts.

[903] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 378; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40.
c. 30. It appears that the ten envoys were not all the same—τῶν
ἄλλων ~τοῦς πλείστους~ τοὺς αὐτοὺς, etc.

[904] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380. οὔθ᾽ ὅτι πρεσβευτὴς ἄλλος
ᾕρητο ἀνθ᾽ αὑτοῦ, etc.

Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 43) does not seem to deny this
distinctly.

At the moment when he arrived, the people were holding an assembly in the Peiræus, on matters connected with the docks and arsenal; and to this assembly, actually sitting, Derkyllus made his unexpected report.[905] The shock to the public of Athens was prodigious. Not only were all their splendid anticipations of anti-Theban policy from Philip (hitherto believed and welcomed by the people on the positive assurances of Philokrates and Æschines) now dashed to the ground—not only were the Athenians smitten with the consciousness that they had been overreached by Philip, that they had played into the hands of their enemies the Thebans, and that they had betrayed their allies the Phokians to ruin—but they felt also that they had yielded up Thermopylæ, the defence at once of Attica and of Greece, and that the road to Athens lay open to their worst enemies the Thebans, now aided by Macedonian force. Under this pressure of surprise, sorrow, and terror, the Athenians, on the motion of Kallisthenes, passed these votes:—To put the Peiræus, as well as the fortresses throughout Attica, in immediate defence—To bring within these walls, for safety, all the women and children, and all the movable property, now spread abroad in Attica—To celebrate the approaching festival of the Herakleia, not in the country, as was usual, but in the interior of Athens.[906]

[905] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 359, 360, 365, 379.

[906] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 368-379. Æschines also
acknowledges the passing of this vote, for bringing in the
movable property of Athens into a place of safety; though he
naturally says very little about it (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 42).

In the oration of Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 238, this decree,
moved by Kallisthenes, is not only alluded to, but purports to
be given _verbatim_. The date as we there read it—the 21st of
the month Mæmakterion—is unquestionably wrong; for the real
decree must have been passed in the concluding days of the month
Skirrophorion, immediately after hearing the report of Derkyllus.
This manifest error of date will not permit us to believe in
the authenticity of the document. Of these supposed original
documents, inserted in the oration De Coronâ, Droysen and other
critics have shown some to be decidedly spurious; and all are so
doubtful that I forbear to cite them as authority.

Such were the significant votes, the like of which had not been passed at Athens since the Peloponnesian war, attesting the terrible reaction of feeling occasioned at Athens by the disastrous news from Phokis. Æschines had now recovered from his indisposition; or (if we are to believe Demosthenes) found it convenient to lay aside the pretence. He set out as self-appointed envoy, without any new nomination by the people—probably with such of the Ten as were favorable to his views—to Philip and to the joint Macedonian and Theban army in Phokis. And what is yet more remarkable, he took his journey thither through Thebes itself;[907] though his speeches and his policy had been for months past (according to his own statement) violently anti-Theban;[908] and though he had affirmed (this, however, rests upon the testimony of his rival) that the Thebans had set a price upon his head. Having joined Philip, Æschines took part in the festive sacrifices and solemn pæans celebrated by the Macedonians, Thebans and Thessalians,[909] in commemoration and thanksgiving for their easy, though long-deferred, triumph over the Phokians, and for the conclusion of the Ten-Years Sacred War.

[907] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380.

[908] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. p. 43. c. 36. Æschines
accuses Demosthenes of traitorous partiality for Thebes.

[909] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380; De Coronâ, p. 321. Æschines
(Fals. Leg. p. 49, 50) admits, and tries to justify, the
proceeding.

Shortly after Philip had become master of Thermopylæ and Phokis, he communicated his success in a letter to the Athenians. His letter betokened a full consciousness of the fear and repugnance which his recent unexpected proceedings had excited at Athens:[910] but in other respects, it was conciliatory and even seductive; expressing great regard for them as his sworn allies, and promising again that they should reap solid fruits from the alliance. It allayed that keen apprehension of Macedonian and Theban attack, which had induced the Athenians recently to sanction the precautionary measures proposed by Kallisthenes. In his subsequent communications also with Athens, Philip found his advantage in continuing to profess the same friendship and to intersperse similar promises;[911] which, when enlarged upon by his partisans in the assembly, contributed to please the Athenians and to lull them into repose, thus enabling him to carry on without opposition real measures of an insidious or hostile character. Even shortly after Philip’s passage of Thermopylæ, when he was in full coöperation with the Thebans and Thessalians, Æschines boldly justified him by the assertion, that these Thebans and Thessalians had been too strong for him, and had constrained him against his will to act on their policy, both to the ruin of the Phokians and to the offence of Athens.[912] And we cannot doubt that the restoration of the prisoners taken at Olynthus, which must soon have occurred, diffused a lively satisfaction at Athens, and tended for the time to countervail the mortifying public results of her recent policy.

[910] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 237, 238, 239. It is evident that
Demosthenes found little in the letter which could be turned
against Philip. Its tone must have been plausible and winning.

A letter is inserted _verbatim_ in this oration, professing to
be the letter of Philip to the Athenians. I agree with those
critics who doubt or disbelieve the genuineness of this letter,
and therefore I do not cite it. If Demosthenes had had before him
a letter so peremptory and insolent in its tone, he would have
animadverted upon it much more severely.

[911] Æschines went on boasting about the excellent dispositions
of Philip towards Athens, and the great benefits which Philip
promised to confer upon her, for at least several months after
this capture of Thermopylæ Æschines, cont. Timarch. p. 24. c. 33.
Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ· ἐὰν δ᾽
αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔργοις γένηται, οἷος νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς
ὑποσχέσεσιν, ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὸν καθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ποιήσεται ἔπαινον.

This oration was delivered apparently about the middle of Olymp.
108, 3; some months after the conquest of Thermopylæ by Philip.

[912] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, Philippic ii. p. 69.

Master as he now was of Phokis, at the head of an irresistible force of Macedonians and Thebans, Philip restored the Delphian temple to its inhabitants, and convoked anew the Amphiktyonic assembly, which had not met since the seizure of the temple by Philomelus. The Amphiktyons reassembled under feelings of vindictive antipathy against the Phokians, and of unqualified devotion to Philip. Their first vote was to dispossess the Phokians of their place in the assembly as one of the twelve ancient Amphiktyonic races, and to confer upon Philip the place and two votes (each of the twelve races had two votes) thus left vacant. All the rights to which the Phokians laid claim over the Delphian temple were formally cancelled. All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, were dismantled and broken up into villages. Abæ alone was spared; being preserved by its ancient and oracular temple of Apollo, and by the fact that its inhabitants had taken no part in the spoliation of Delphi.[913] No village was allowed to contain more than fifty houses, nor to be nearer to another than a minimum distance of one furlong. Under such restriction, the Phokians were still allowed to possess and cultivate their territory, with the exception of a certain portion of the frontier transferred to the Thebans;[914] but they were required to pay to the Delphian temple an annual tribute of fifty talents, until the wealth taken away should have been made good. The horses of the Phokians were directed to be sold; their arms were to be cast down the precipices of Parnassus, or burnt. Such Phokians as had participated individually in the spoliation, were proclaimed accursed, and rendered liable to arrest wherever they were found.[915]

[913] Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

[914] This transfer to the Thebans is not mentioned by Diodorus,
but seems contained in the words of Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p.
385)—τῆς τῶν Φωκέων χώρας ὁπόσην βούλονται: compare p. 380.

[915] Diodor. xvi. 60; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385. ὅλων τῶν
τειχῶν καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἀναιρέσεις. Demosthenes causes this severe
sentence of the Amphiktyonic council to be read to the Dikastery
(Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361.) Unfortunately it has not been
preserved.

By the same Amphiktyonic assembly, farther, the Lacedæmonians, as having been allies of the Phokians, were dispossessed of their franchise, that is, of their right to concur in the Amphiktyonic suffrage of the Dorian nation. This vote probably emanated from the political antipathies of the Argeians and Messenians.[916]

[916] Pausanias, x. 8, 2.

The sentence, rigorous as it is, pronounced by the Amphiktyons against the Phokians, was merciful as compared with some of the propositions made in the assembly. The Œtæans went so far as to propose, that all the Phokians of military age should be cast down the precipice; and Æschines takes credit to himself for having induced the assembly to hear their defence, and thereby preserved their lives.[917] But though the terms of the sentence may have been thus softened, we may be sure that the execution of it by Thebans, Thessalians, and other foreigners quartered on the country,—all bitter enemies of the Phokian name, and giving vent to their antipathies under the mask of pious indignation against sacrilege,—went far beyond the literal terms in active cruelty. That the Phokians were stripped and slain[918]—that children were torn from their parents, wives from their husbands, and the images of the gods from their temples,—that Philip took for himself the lion’s share of the plunder and movable property,—all these are facts naturally to be expected, as incidental to the violent measure of breaking up the cities and scattering the inhabitants. Of those, however, who had taken known part in the spoliation of the temple, the greater number went into exile with Phalækus; and not they alone, but even all such of the moderate and meritorious citizens as could find means to emigrate.[919] Many of them obtained shelter at Athens. The poorer Phokians remained at home by necessity. But such was the destruction inflicted by the conquerors, that even two or three years afterwards, when Demosthenes and other Athenian envoys passed through the country in their way to the Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi, they saw nothing but evidences of misery; old men, women and little children, without adults,—ruined houses, impoverished villages, half-cultivated fields.[920] Well might Demosthenes say that events more terrific and momentous had never occurred in the Grecian world, either in his own time or in that of his predecessors.[921]

[917] Æschines, Fals. Leg p. 47. c. 44.

[918] Justin, viii. 5. “Victi igitur necessitate, pactâ salute
se dediderunt. Sed pactio ejus fidei fuit, cujus antea fuerat
deprecati belli promissio. Igitur cæduntur passim rapiunturque:
non liberi parentibus, non conjuges maritis, non deorum simulacra
templis suis relinquuntur. Unum tantum miseris solatium fuit,
quod cum Philippus portione prædæ socios fraudasset, nihil rerum
suarum apud inimicos viderunt.”

Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 366.

[919] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 47. c. 44; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
366; Demosthen. De Pace, p. 61. ὅτι τοὺς Φωκέων φυγάδας σώζομεν,
etc.

[920] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 361. θέαμα δεινὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν·
ὅτε γὰρ ~νῦν ἐπορευόμεθα εἰς Δελφοὺς~ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἦν ὁρᾷν ἡμῖν
πάντα ταῦτα, οἰκίας κατεσκαμμένας, τείχη περιῃρημένα, χώραν
ἔρημον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρια ὀλίγα καὶ
πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτροὺς, οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς δύναιτ᾽ ἐφικέσθαι τῷ
λόγῳ ~τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν νῦν ὄντων~.

As this oration was delivered in 343-342 B. C., the adverb of
time νῦν may be reasonably referred to the early part of that
year, and the journey to Delphi was perhaps undertaken for the
spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic council of that year; between
two and three years after the destruction of the Phokians by
Philip.

[921] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361.

It was but two years since the conquest and ruin of Olynthus, and of thirty-two Chalkidic Grecian cities besides, had spread abroad everywhere the terror and majesty of Philip’s name. But he was now exalted to a still higher pinnacle by the destruction of the Phokians, the capture of Thermopylæ, and the sight of a permanent Macedonian garrison, occupying from henceforward Nikæa and other places commanding the pass.[922] He was extolled as restorer of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and as avenging champion of the Delphian god, against the sacrilegious Phokians. That he should have acquired possession of an unassailable pass, dismissed the formidable force of Phalækus, and become master of twenty-two Phokian cites, all without striking a blow,—was accounted the most wonderful of all his exploits. It strengthened more than ever the prestige of his constant good fortune. Having been now, by the vote of the Amphiktyons, invested with the right of Amphiktyonic suffrage previously exercised by the Phokians, he acquired a new Hellenic rank, with increased facilities for encroachment and predominance in Hellenic affairs. Moreover, in the month of August 346 B. C., about two months after the surrender of Phokis to Philip, the season recurring for celebrating the great Pythian festival, after the usual interval of four years, the Amphiktyons conferred upon Philip the signal honor of nominating him president to celebrate this festival, in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians;[923] an honorary preëminence, which ranked among the loftiest aspirations of ambitious Grecian despots, and which Jason, of Pheræ, had prepared to appropriate for himself twenty-four years before, at the moment when he was assassinated.[924] It was in vain that the Athenians, mortified and indignant at the unexpected prostration of their hopes and the utter ruin of their allies, refused to send deputies to the Amphiktyons,—affected even to disregard the assembly as irregular,—and refrained from despatching their sacred legation as usual, to sacrifice at the Pythian festival.[925] The Amphiktyonic vote did not the less pass; without the concurrence, indeed, either of Athens or of Sparta, yet with the hearty support not only of Thebans and Thessalians, but also of Argeians, Messenians, Arcadians, and all those who counted upon Philip as a probable auxiliary against their dangerous Spartan neighbor.[926] And when envoys from Philip and from the Thessalians arrived at Athens, notifying that he had been invested with the Amphiktyonic suffrage, and inviting the concurrence of Athens in his reception,—prudential considerations obliged the Athenians, though against their feelings, to pass a vote of concurrence. Even Demosthenes was afraid to break the recent peace, however inglorious,—and to draw upon Athens a general Amphiktyonic war, headed by the King of Macedon.[927]

[922] Demosth. ad Philipp. Epistolam, p. 153. Νικαίαν μὲν φρουρᾷ
κατέχων, etc.

[923] Diodor. xvi. 60. τιθέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Πυθίων
Φίλιππον μετὰ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θετταλῶν, διὰ τὸ ~Κορινθίους~
μετεσχηκέναι τοῖς Φωκεῦσι τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον παρανομίας.

The reason here assigned by Diodorus, why the Amphiktyons placed
the celebration of the Pythian festival in the hands of Philip,
cannot be understood. It may be true, as matter of fact, that the
Corinthians had allied themselves with the Phokians during the
Sacred War—though there is no other evidence of the fact except
this passage. But the Corinthians were never invested with any
authoritative character in reference to the _Pythian_ festival.
They were the recognized presidents of the _Isthmian_ festival. I
cannot but think that Diodorus has been misled by a confusion of
these two festivals one with the other.

[924] Xenoph. Hellen. vi.

[925] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380-398. οὕτω δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλια
ἡγουμένων τοὺς ταλαιπώρους πάσχειν Φωκέας, ὥστε μήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
βουλῆς θεωροὺς μήτε τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέμψαι, ἀλλ᾽
ἀποστῆναι τῆς πατρίου θεωρίας, etc. Demosth. De Pace, p. 60.
~τοὺς συνεληλυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας εἶναι~, etc.

[926] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 68, 69.

[927] Demosth. De Pace, p. 60-63; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375.
In the latter passage, p. 375, Demosthenes accuses Æschines of
having been the only orator in the city who spoke in favor of the
proposition, there being a strong feeling in the assembly and in
the people against it. Demosthenes must have forgotten, or did
not wish to remember, his own harangue De Pace, delivered three
years before. In spite of the repugnance of the people, very
easy to understand, I conclude that the decree must have passed;
since, if it had been rejected, consequences must have arisen
which would have come to our knowledge.

Here then was a momentous political change doubly fatal to the Hellenic world; first, in the new position of Philip both as master of the keys of Greece and as recognized Amphiktyonic leader, with means of direct access and influence even on the inmost cities of Peloponnesus; next, in the lowered banner, and uncovered frontier, of Athens, disgraced by the betrayal both of her Phokian allies and of the general safety of Greece,—and recompensed only in so far as she regained her captives.