Chapter LXXXIX (1)

FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR BY PHILIP.

It was during the early spring of 347 B. C., as far as we can make out, that Olynthus, after having previously seen the thirty Chalkidic cities conquered, underwent herself the like fate from the arms of Philip. Exile and poverty became the lot of such Olynthians and Chalkidians as could make their escape; while the greater number of both sexes were sold into slavery. A few painful traces present themselves of the diversities of suffering which befel these unhappy victims. Atrestidas, an Arcadian who had probably served in the Macedonian army, received from Philip a grant of thirty Olynthian slaves, chiefly women and children, who were seen following him in a string as he travelled homeward through the Grecian cities. Many young Olynthian women were bought for the purpose of having their persons turned to account by their new proprietors. Of these purchasers, one, an Athenian citizen who had exposed his new purchase at Athens, was tried and condemned for the proceeding by the Dikastery.[772] Other anecdotes come before us, inaccurate probably as to names and details,[773] yet illustrating the general hardships brought upon this once free Chalkidic population. Meanwhile the victor Philip was at the maximum of his glory. In commemoration of his conquests, he celebrated a splendid festival to the Olympian Zeus in Macedonia, with unbounded hospitality, and prizes of every sort, for matches and exhibitions, both gymnastic and poetical. His donations were munificent, as well to the Grecian and Macedonian officers who had served him, as to the eminent poets or actors who pleased his taste. Satyrus the comic actor, refusing all presents for himself, asked and obtained from him the release of two young women taken in Olynthus, daughters of his friend the Pydnæan Apollophanes, who had been one of the persons concerned in the death of Philip’s elder brother Alexander. Satyrus announced his intention not only of ensuring freedom to these young women, but likewise of providing portions for them and giving them out in marriage.[774] Philip also found at Olynthus his two exile half-brothers, who had served as pretexts for the war—and put both of them to death.[775]

[772] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 93; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
439, 440. Demosthenes asserts also that Olynthian women were
given, as a present, by Philip to Philokrates (p. 386-440). The
outrage which he imputes (p. 401) to Æschines and Phrynon in
Macedonia, against the Olynthian woman—is not to be received as
a fact, since it is indignantly denied by Æschines (Fals. Leg.
init. and p. 48). Yet it is probably but too faithful a picture
of real deeds, committed by others, if not by Æschines.

[773] The story of the old man of Olynthus (Seneca, Controv. v.
10) bought by Parrhasius the painter and tortured in order to
form a subject for a painting of the suffering Prometheus—is more
than doubtful: since Parrhasius, already in high repute as a
painter before 400 B. C. (see Xenoph. Mem. iii. 10), can hardly
have been still flourishing in 347 B. C. It discloses, however,
at least, one of the many forms of slave-suffering occasionally
realized.

[774] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 384-401; Diodor. xvi. 55.

[775] Justin, viii. 3.

It has already been stated that Athens had sent to Olynthus more than one considerable reinforcement, especially during the last year of the war. Though we are ignorant what these expeditions achieved, or even how much was their exact force, we find reason to suspect that they were employed by Chares and other generals to no good purpose. The opponents of Chares accused him, as well as Deiares and other mercenary chiefs, of having wasted the naval and military strength of the city in idle enterprises or rapacious extortions upon the traders of the Ægean. They summed up 1500 talents and 150 triremes thus lost to Athens, besides wide-spread odium incurred among the islanders by the unjust contributions levied upon them to enrich the general.[776] In addition to this disgraceful ill-success, came now the fearful ruin in Olynthus and Chalkidikê, and the great aggrandizement of their enemy Philip. The loss of Olynthus, with the miserable captivity of its population, would have been sufficient of themselves to excite powerful sentiment among the Athenians. But there was a farther circumstance which came yet more home to their feelings. Many of their own citizens were serving in Olynthus as an auxiliary garrison, and had now become captives along with the rest.[777] No such calamity as this had befallen Athens for a century past, since the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia in Bœotia. The whole Athenian people, and especially the relations of the captives, were full of agitation and anxiety, increased by alarming news from other quarters. The conquest threatened the security of all the Athenian possessions in Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese. This last peninsula, especially, was altogether unprotected against Philip, who was even reported to be on his march thither; insomuch that the Athenian settlers within it began to forsake their properties and transfer their families to Athens. Amidst the grief and apprehension which disturbed the Athenian mind, many special assemblies were held to discuss suitable remedies. What was done, we are not exactly informed. But it seems that no one knew where the general Chares, with his armament, was; so that it became necessary even for his friends in the assembly to echo the strong expressions of displeasure among the people, and to send a light vessel immediately in search of him.[778]

[776] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24.

[777] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30.

[778] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37.

The gravity of the crisis forced even Eubulus and others among the statesmen hitherto languid in the war, to hold a more energetic language than before against Philip. Denouncing him now as the common enemy of Greece,[779] they proposed missions into Peloponnesus and elsewhere for the purpose of animating the Grecian states into confederacy against him. Æschines assisted strenuously in procuring the adoption of this proposition, and was himself named as one of the envoys into Peloponnesus.[780]

[779] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ δήμῳ κατηρῶ (you,
Eubulus) Φιλίππῳ, καὶ κατὰ τῶν παίδων ὤμνυες ἦ μὴν ἀπολωλέναι
Φίλιππον ἂν βούλεσθαι, etc.

[780] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 438, 439.

This able orator, immortalized as the rival of Demosthenes, has come before us hitherto only as a soldier in various Athenian expeditions—to Phlius in Peloponnesus (368)—to the battle of Mantineia (362)—and to Eubœa under Phokion (349 B. C.); in which last he had earned the favorable notice of the general, and had been sent to Athens with the news of the victory at Tamynæ. Æschines was about six years older than Demosthenes, but born in a much humbler and poorer station. His father Atromêtus taught to boys the elements of letters; his mother Glaukothea made a living by presiding over certain religious assemblies and rites of initiation, intended chiefly for poor communicants; the boy Æschines assisting both one and the other in a mental capacity. Such at least is the statement which comes to us, enriched with various degrading details, on the doubtful authority of his rival Demosthenes;[781] who also affirms, what we may accept as generally true, that Æschines had passed his early manhood partly as an actor, partly as a scribe or reader to the official boards. For both functions he possessed some natural advantages—an athletic frame, a powerful voice, a ready flow of unpremeditated speech. After some years passed as scribe, in which he made himself useful to Eubulus and others, he was chosen public scribe to the assembly—acquired familiarity with the administrative and parliamentary business of the city—and thus elevated himself by degrees to influence as a speaker. In rhetorical power, he seems to have been surpassed only by Demosthenes.[782]

[781] Demosthenes affirms this at two distinct times—Fals. Leg.
p. 415-431; De Coronâ, p. 313.

Stechow (Vita Æschinis, p. 1-10) brings together the little which
can be made out respecting Æschines.

[782] Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1063; Cicero,
Orator, c. 9, 29.

As envoy of Athens despatched under the motion of Eubulus, Æschines proceeded into Peloponnesus in the spring of 347; others being sent at the same time to other Grecian cities. Among other places, he visited Megalopolis, where he was heard before the Arcadian collective assembly called the Ten Thousand. He addressed them in a strain of animated exhortation, adjuring them to combine with Athens for the defence of the liberties of Greece against Philip, and inveighing strenuously against those traitors who, in Arcadia as well as in other parts of Greece, sold themselves to the aggressor and paralyzed all resistance. He encountered however much opposition from a speaker named Hieronymus, who espoused the interest of Philip in the assembly: and though he professed to bring back some flattering hopes, it is certain that neither in Arcadia, nor elsewhere in Peloponnesus, was his influence of any real efficacy.[783] The strongest feeling among the Arcadians was fear and dislike of Sparta, which rendered them in the main indifferent, if not favorable, to the Macedonian successes. In returning from Arcadia to Athens, Æschines met the Arcadian Atrestidas, with the unhappy troop of Olynthian slaves following; a sight which so deeply affected the Athenian orator, that he dwelt upon it afterwards in his speech before the assembly, with indignant sympathy; deploring the sad effects of Grecian dissension, and the ruin produced by Philip’s combined employment of arms and corruption.

[783] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344-438; Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 38.
The conduct of Æschines at this juncture is much the same, as
described by his rival, and as admitted by himself. It was, in
truth, among the most honorable epochs of his life.

Æschines returned probably about the middle of the summer of 347 B. C. Other envoys, sent to more distant cities, remained out longer; some indeed even until the ensuing winter. Though it appears that some envoys from other cities were induced in return to visit Athens, yet no sincere or hearty coöperation against Philip could be obtained in any part of Greece. While Philip, in the fulness of triumph, was celebrating his magnificent Olympic festival in Macedonia, the Athenians were disheartened by finding that they could expect little support from independent Greeks, and were left to act only with their own narrow synod of allies. Hence Eubulus and Æschines became earnest partisans of peace, and Demosthenes also seems to have been driven by the general despondency into a willingness to negotiate. The two orators, though they afterwards became bitter rivals, were at this juncture not very discordant in sentiment. On the other hand, the philippizing speakers at Athens held a bolder tone than ever. As Philip found his ports greatly blocked up by the Athenian cruisers, he was likely to profit by his existing ascendency for the purpose of strengthening his naval equipments. Now there was no place so abundantly supplied as Athens, with marine stores and muniments for armed ships. Probably there were agents or speculators taking measures to supply Philip with these articles, and it was against them that a decree of the assembly was now directed, adopted on the motion of a senator named Timarchus—to punish with death all who should export from Athens to Philip either arms or stores for ships of war.[784] This severe decree, however, was passed at the same time that the disposition towards peace, if peace were attainable, was on the increase at Athens.

[784] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 433. This decree must have been
proposed by Timarchus either towards the close of Olymp. 108,
1—or towards the beginning of the following year, Olymp. 108, 2;
that is, not long before, or not long after, Midsummer 347 B.
C. But which of these two dates is to be preferred, is matter
of controversy. Franke (Prolegom. ad Æschin. cont. Timarchum,
p. xxxviii.—xli.) thinks that Timarchus was senator in Olymp.
108, 1—and proposed the decree then; he supposes the oration of
Æschines to have been delivered in the beginning of Olymp. 108,
3—and that the expression (p. 11) announcing Timarchus as having
been senator “the year before” (πέρυσιν), is to be construed
loosely as signifying “the year but one before.”

Mr. Clinton, Boeckh, and Westermann, suppose the oration of
Æschines against Timarchus to have been delivered in Olymp.
108, 4—not in Olymp. 108, 3. On that supposition, if we take
the word πέρυσιν in its usual sense, Timarchus was senator in
108, 3. Now it is certain that he did not propose the decree
forbidding the export of naval stores to Philip, at a date so
late as 108, 3; because the peace with Philip was concluded
in Elaphebolion Olymp. 108, 2. (March, 346 B. C.) But the
supposition might be admissible, that Timarchus was senator in
two different years,—both in Olymp. 108, 1 and in Olymp. 108, 3
(not in two consecutive years). In that case, the senatorial year
of Timarchus, to which Æschines alludes (cont. Timarch. p. 11),
would be Olymp. 108, 3, while the other senatorial year, in which
Timarchus moved the decree prohibiting export, would be Olymp.
108, 1.

Nevertheless, I agree with the views of Böhnecke (Forschungen,
p. 294) who thinks that the oration was delivered Olymp. 108,
3—and that Timarchus had been senator and had proposed the
decree prohibiting export of stores to Philip, in the year
preceding,—that is, Olymp. 108, 2; at the beginning of the
year,—Midsummer 347 B. C.

Some months before the capture of Olynthus, ideas of peace had already been started, partly through the indirect overtures of Philip himself. During the summer of 348 B. C., the Eubœans had tried to negotiate an accommodation with Athens; the contest in Eubœa, though we know no particulars of it, having never wholly ceased for the last year and a half. Nor does it appear that any peace was even now concluded; for Eubœa is spoken of as under the dependence of Philip during the ensuing year.[785] The Eubœan envoys, however, intimated that Philip had desired them to communicate from him a wish to finish the war and conclude peace with Athens.[786] Though Philip had at this time conquered the larger portion of Chalkidikê, and was proceeding successfully against the remainder, it was still his interest to detach Athens from the war, if he could. Her manner of carrying on war was indeed faint and slack; yet she did him much harm at sea, and she was the only city competent to organize an extensive Grecian confederacy against him; which, though it had not yet been brought about, was at least a possible contingency under her presidency.

[785] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348-445.

[786] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 29.

An Athenian of influence named Phrynon had been captured by Philip’s cruisers, during the truce of the Olympic festival in 348 B. C.: after a certain detention, he procured from home the required ransom and obtained his release. On returning to Athens, he had sufficient credit to prevail on the public assembly to send another citizen along with him, as public envoy from the city to Philip; in order to aid him in getting back his ransom, which he alleged to have been wrongfully demanded from one captured during the holy truce. Though this seems a strange proceeding during mid-war,[787] yet the Athenian people took up the case with sympathy; Ktesiphon was named envoy, and went with Phrynon to Philip, whom they must have found engaged in the war against Olynthus. Being received in the most courteous manner, they not only obtained restitution of the ransom, but were completely won over by Philip. With his usual good policy, he had seized the opportunity of gaining (we may properly say, of bribing, since the restoration of ransom was substantially a bribe) two powerful Athenian citizens, whom he now sent back to Athens as his pronounced partisans.

[787] There is more than one singularity in the narrative given
by Æschines about Phrynon. The complaint of Phrynon implies an
assumption, that the Olympic truce suspended the operations of
war everywhere throughout Greece between belligerent Greeks. But
such was not the maxim recognized or acted on; so far as we know
the operations of warfare. Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p.
246) feeling this difficulty, understands the Olympic truce, here
mentioned, to refer to the Olympic festival celebrated by Philip
himself in Macedonia, in the spring or summer of 347 B. C. This
would remove the difficulty about the effect of the truce; for
Philip of course would respect his own proclaimed truce. But it
is liable to another objection: that Æschines plainly indicates
the capture of Phrynon to have been _anterior_ to the fall of
Olynthus. Besides, Æschines would hardly use the words ἐν ταῖς
Ὀλυμπικαῖς σπονδαῖς, without any special addition, to signify the
Macedonian games.

Phrynon and Ktesiphon, on their return, expatiated warmly on the generosity of Philip, and reported much about his flattering expressions towards Athens, and his reluctance to continue the war against her. The public assembly being favorably disposed, a citizen named Philokrates, who now comes before us for the first time, proposed a decree, granting to Philip leave to send a herald and envoys, if he chose, to treat for peace; which was what Philip was anxious to do, according to the allegation of Ktesiphon. The decree was passed unanimously in the assembly, but the mover Philokrates was impeached some time afterwards before the Dikastery, as for an illegal proposition, by a citizen named Lykinus. On the cause coming to trial, the Dikastery pronounced an acquittal so triumphant, that Lykinus did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages. Philokrates being so sick as to be unable to do justice to his own case, Demosthenes stood forward as his supporter, and made a long speech in his favor.[788]

[788] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 7; cont. Ktesiph. p. 63.
Our knowledge of these events is derived almost wholly from one,
or other, or both, of the two rival orators, in their speeches
delivered four or five years afterwards, on the trial De Falsâ
Legatione. Demosthenes seeks to prove that before the embassy
to Macedonia, in which he and Æschines were jointly concerned,
Æschines was eager for continued war against Philip, and only
became the partisan of Philip during and after the embassy.
Æschines does not deny that he made efforts at that juncture to
get up more effective war against Philip; nor is the fact at
all dishonorable to him. On the other hand, he seeks to prove
against Demosthenes, that he (Demosthenes) was at that time both
a partisan of peace with Philip, and a friend of Philokrates to
whom he afterwards became so bitterly opposed. For this purpose
Æschines adverts to the motion of Philokrates about permitting
Philip to send envoys to Athens—and the speech of Demosthenes in
the Dikastery in favor of Philokrates.

It would prove nothing discreditable to Demosthenes if both these
allegations were held to be correct. The motion of Philokrates
was altogether indefinite, pledging Athens to nothing; and
Demosthenes might well think it unreasonable to impeach a
statesman for such a motion.

The motion of Philokrates determined nothing positive, and only made an opening; of which, however, it did not suit Philip’s purpose to avail himself. But we see that ideas of peace had been thrown out by some persons at Athens, even during the last months of the Olynthian war, and while a body of Athenian citizens were actually assisting Olynthus against the besieging force of Philip. Presently arrived the terrible news of the fall of Olynthus, and of the captivity of the Athenian citizens in garrison there. While this great alarm (as has been already stated) gave birth to new missions for anti-Macedonian alliances, it enlisted on the side of peace all the friends of those captives whose lives were now in Philip’s hands. The sorrow thus directly inflicted on many private families, together with the force of individual sympathy widely diffused among the citizens, operated powerfully upon the decisions of the public assembly. A century before, the Athenians had relinquished all their acquisitions in Bœotia, in order to recover their captives taken in the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia; and during the Peloponnesian war, the policy of the Spartans had been chiefly guided for three or four years by the anxiety to ensure the restoration of the captives of Sphakteria. Moreover, several Athenians of personal consequence were taken at Olynthus; among them, Eukratus and Iatrokles. Shortly after the news arrived, the relatives of these two men, presenting themselves before the assembly in the solemn guise of suppliants, deposited an olive branch on the altar hard by, and entreated that care might be had for the safety of their captive kinsmen.[789] This appeal, echoed as it would be by the cries of so many other citizens in the like distress, called forth unanimous sympathy in the assembly. Both Philokrates and Demosthenes spoke in favor of it; Demosthenes probably, as having been a strenuous advocate of the war, was the more anxious to shew that he was keenly alive to so much individual suffering. It was resolved to open indirect negotiations with Philip for the release of the captives, through some of the great tragic and comic actors; who, travelling in the exercise of their profession to every city in Greece, were everywhere regarded in some sort as privileged persons. One of these, Neoptolemus,[790] had already availed himself of his favored profession and liberty of transit to assist in Philip’s intrigues and correspondences at Athens; another, Aristodemus, was also in good esteem with Philip; both were probably going to Macedonia to take part in the splendid Olympic festival there preparing. They were charged to make application, and take the best steps in their power, for the safety or release of the captives.[791]

[789] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς
χρόνους Ὄλυνθος ἥλω, καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐγκατελήφθησαν
πολιτῶν, ὧν ἦν Ἰατροκλῆς καὶ Εὔκρατος. Ὑπὲρ δὴ τούτων ἱκετηρίαν
θέντες οἱ οἰκεῖοι, ἐδέοντο ὑμῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσασθαι·
παρελθόντες δ᾽ αὐτοῖς συνηγόρουν Φιλοκράτης καὶ Δημοσθένης, ἀλλ᾽
οὐκ Αἰσχίνης.

To illustrate the effect of this impressive ceremony upon the
Athenian assembly, we may recall the memorable scene mentioned
by Xenophon and Diodorus (Xen. Hell. i. 7, 8; Diodor. xiii. 101)
after the battle of Arginusæ, when the relatives of the warriors
who had perished on board of the foundered ships, presented
themselves before the assembly with shaven heads and in mourning
garb. Compare also, about presentments of solemn supplication to
the assembly, Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 262—with the note of
Dissen, and Æschines contra Timarchum p. 9. c. 13.

[790] Demosth. De Pace, p. 58.

[791] Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8) mentions only
Aristodemus. But from various passages in the oration of
Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. p. 344, 346, 371, 443), we gather
that the actor Neoptolemus must have been conjoined with him;
perhaps also the Athenian Ktesiphon, though this is less certain.
Demosthenes mentions Aristodemus again, in the speech De Coronâ
(p. 232) as the first originator of the peace.

Demosthenes (De Pace, p. 58) had, even before this, denounced
Neoptolemus as playing a corrupt game, for the purposes of
Philip, at Athens. Soon after the peace, Neoptolemus sold up all
his property at Athens, and went to reside in Macedonia.

It would appear that these actors were by no means expeditious in the performance of their mission. They probably spent some time in their professional avocations in Macedonia; and Aristodemus, not being a responsible envoy, delayed some time even after his return, before he made any report. That his mission had not been wholly fruitless, however, became presently evident from the arrival of the captive Iatrokles, whom Philip had released without ransom. The Senate then summoned Aristodemus before them, inviting him to make a general report of his proceedings, which he did; first before the Senate,—next, before the public assembly. He affirmed that Philip had entertained his propositions kindly, and that he was in the best dispositions towards Athens; desirous not only to be at peace with her, but even to be admitted as her ally. Demosthenes, then a senator, moved a vote of thanks and a wreath to Aristodemus.[792]

[792] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8.

This report, as far as we can make out, appears to have been made about September or October 347 B. C.; Æschines, and the other roving commissioners sent out by Athens to raise up anti-Macedonian combinations, had returned with nothing but disheartening announcement of refusal or lukewarmness. And there occurred also about the same time in Phokis and Thermopylæ, other events of grave augury to Athens, showing that the Sacred War and the contest between the Phokians and Thebans was turning,—as all events had turned for the last ten years,—to the farther aggrandizement of Philip.

During the preceding two years, the Phokians, now under the command of Phalækus, in place of Phayllus, had maintained their position against Thebes; had kept possession of the Bœotian towns, Orchomenus, Koroneia, and Korsia, and were still masters of Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa, as well as of the important pass of Thermopylæ adjoining.[793] But though on the whole successful in regard to Thebes, they had fallen into dissension among themselves. The mercenary force, necessary to their defence, could only be maintained by continued appropriation of the Delphian treasures; an appropriation becoming from year to year both less lucrative and more odious. By successive spoliation of gold and silver ornaments, the temple is said to have been stripped of ten thousand talents (about two million three hundred thousand pounds), all its available wealth; so that the Phokian leaders were now reduced to dig for an unauthenticated treasure, supposed (on the faith of a verse in the Iliad, as well as on other grounds of surmise), to lie concealed beneath its stone floor. Their search, however, was not only unsuccessful, but arrested, as we are told, by violent earthquakes, significant of the anger of Apollo.[794]

[793] Diodor. xvi. 58; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385-387; Æschines,
Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41.

[794] Diodor. xvi. 56.

As the Delphian treasure became less and less, so the means of Phalækus to pay troops and maintain ascendency declined. While the foreign mercenaries relaxed in their obedience, his opponents in Phokis manifested increased animosity against his continued sacrilege. So greatly did these opponents increase in power, that they deposed Phalækus, elected Deinokrates with two others in his place, and instituted a strict inquiry into the antecedent appropriation of the Delphian treasure. Gross peculation was found to have been committed for the profit of individual leaders, especially one named Philon; who, on being seized and put to the torture, disclosed the names of several accomplices. These men were tried, compelled to refund, and ultimately put to death.[795] Phalækus however still retained his ascendency over the mercenaries, about eight thousand in number, so as to hold Thermopylæ and the places adjacent, and even presently to be re-appointed general.[796]

[795] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57.

[796] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 62. c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 59. Φάλαικον,
πάλιν τῆς στρατηγίας ἠξιωμένον, etc.

Such intestine dispute, combined with the gradual exhaustion of the temple-funds, sensibly diminished the power of the Phokians. Yet they still remained too strong for their enemies the Thebans; who, deprived of Orchomenus and Koroneia, impoverished by military efforts of nine years, and unable to terminate the contest by their own force, resolved to invoke foreign aid. An opportunity might perhaps have been obtained for closing the war by some compromise, if it had been possible now to bring about an accommodation between Thebes and Athens; which some of the philo-Theban orators, (Demosthenes seemingly among them), attempted, under the prevalent uneasiness about Philip.[797] But the adverse sentiments in both cities, especially in Thebes, were found invincible; and the Thebans, little anticipating consequences, determined to invoke the ruinous intervention of the conqueror of Olynthus. The Thessalians, already valuable allies of Philip, joined them in soliciting him to crush the Phokians, and to restore the ancient Thessalian privilege of the Pylæa, (or regular yearly Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ), which the Phokians had suppressed during the last ten years. This joint prayer for intervention was preferred in the name of the Delphian god, investing Philip with the august character of champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, to rescue the Delphian temple from its sacrilegious plunderers.

[797] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 73. c. 44; Demosth. De Coronâ,
p. 231. Demosthenes, in his oration De Coronâ, spoken many years
after the facts, affirms the contingency of alliance between
Athens and Thebes at this juncture, as having been much more
probable than he ventures to state it in the earlier speech De
Falsâ Legatione.

The King of Macedon, with his past conquests and his well-known spirit of aggressive enterprise, was now a sort of present deity, ready to lend force to all the selfish ambition, or blind fear and antipathy, prevalent among the discontented fractions of the Hellenic world. While his intrigues had procured numerous partisans even in the centre of Peloponnesus,—as Æschines, on return from his mission, had denounced, not having yet himself enlisted in the number,—he was now furnished with a pious pretence, and invited by powerful cities, to penetrate into the heart of Greece, within its last line of common defence, Thermopylæ.

The application of the Thebans to Philip excited much alarm in Phokis. A Macedonian army under Parmenio did actually enter Thessaly,—where we find them, three months later, besieging Halus.[798] Reports seem to have been spread, about September 347 B. C., that the Macedonians were about to march to Thermopylæ; upon which the Phokians took alarm, and sent envoys to Athens as well as to Sparta, entreating aid to enable them to hold the pass, and offering to deliver up the three important towns near it,—Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa. So much were the Athenians alarmed by the message, that they not only ordered Proxenus, their general at Oreus, to take immediate possession of the pass, but also passed a decree to equip fifty triremes, and to send forth their military citizens under thirty years of age, with an energy like that displayed when they checked Philip before at the same place. But it appears that the application had been made by the party in Phokis opposed to Phalækus. So vehemently did that chief resent the proceeding, that he threw the Phokian envoys into prison on their return; refusing to admit either Proxenus or Archidamus into possession of Thermopylæ, and even dismissing without recognition the Athenian heralds, who came in their regular rounds to proclaim the solemn truce of the Eleusinian mysteries.[799] This proceeding on the part of Phalækus was dictated seemingly by jealousy of Athens and Sparta, and by fear that they would support the party opposed to him in Phokis. It could not have originated (as Æschines alleges) in superior confidence and liking towards Philip; for if Phalækus had entertained such sentiments, he might have admitted the Macedonian troops at once; which he did not do until ten months later, under the greatest pressure of circumstances.

[798] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

[799] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 41. It is this notice of
the μυστηριωτίδες σπονδαὶ which serves as indication of time for
the event. The Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated in the month
Boëdromion (September). These events took place in September, 347
B. C., Olymp. 108, 2—the archonship of Themistokles at Athens.
There is also a farther indication of time given by Æschines:
that the event happened before he was nominated envoy,—πρὶν
ἐμὲ χειροτονηθῆναι πρεσβευτήν (p. 46. c. 41). This refutes the
supposition of Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. de Pace, p. 255),
who refers the proceeding to the following month Elaphebolion
(March), on the ground of some other words of Æschines,
intimating “that the news reached Athens while the Athenians were
deliberating about the peace.” Böhnecke, too, supposes that the
mysteries here alluded to are the lesser mysteries, celebrated
in Anthesterion; not the greater, which belong to Boëdromion.
This supposition appears to me improbable and unnecessary. We may
reasonably believe that there were many discussions on the peace
at Athens, before the envoys were actually nominated. Some of
these debates may well have taken place in the month Boëdromion.

Such insulting repudiation of the aid tendered by Proxenus at Thermopylæ, combined with the distracted state of parties in Phokis, menaced Athens with a new embarrassment. Though Phalækus still held the pass, his conduct had been such as to raise doubts whether he might not treat separately with Philip. Here was another circumstance operating on Athens,—besides the refusal of coöperation from other Greeks and the danger of her captives at Olynthus,—to dishearten her in the prosecution of the war, and to strengthen the case of those who advocated peace. It was a circumstance the more weighty, because it really involved the question of safety or exposure to her own territory, through the opening of the pass of Thermopylæ. It was here that she was now under the necessity of keeping watch; being thrown on the defensive for her own security at home,—not, as before, stretching out a long arm for the protection of distant possessions such as the Chersonese, or distant allies such as the Olynthians. So speedily had the predictions of Demosthenes been realized, that if the Athenians refused to carry on strenuous war against Philip on _his_ coast, they would bring upon themselves the graver evil of having to resist him on or near their own frontier.

The maintenance of freedom in the Hellenic world against the extra-Hellenic invader, now turned once more upon the pass of Thermopylæ; as it had turned one hundred and thirty-three years before, during the onward march of the Persian Xerxes.

To Philip, that pass was of incalculable importance. It was his only road into Greece; it could not be forced by any land-army; while at sea the Athenian fleet was stronger than his. In spite of the general remissness of Athens in warlike undertakings, she had now twice manifested her readiness for a vigorous effort to maintain Thermopylæ against him. To become master of the position, it was necessary that he should disarm Athens by concluding peace,—keep her in ignorance or delusion as to his real purposes,—prevent her from conceiving alarm or sending aid to Thermopylæ,—and then overawe or buy off the isolated Phokians. How ably and cunningly his diplomacy was managed for this purpose, will presently appear.[800]

[800] It is at this juncture, in trying to make out the
diplomatic transactions between Athens and Philip, from the
summer of 347 to that of 346 B. C., that we find ourselves
plunged amidst the contradictory assertions of the two rival
orators,—Demosthenes and Æschines; with very little of genuine
historical authority to control them. In 343-342 B. C.,
Demosthenes impeached Æschines for corrupt betrayal of the
interest of Athens in the second of his three embassies to
Philip (in 346 B. C.). The long harangue (De Falsâ Legatione),
still remaining, wherein his charge stands embodied, enters
into copious details respecting the peace with its immediate
antecedents and consequents. We possess also the speech delivered
by Æschines in his own defence, and in counter-accusation of
Demosthenes; a speech going over the same ground, suitably to his
own purpose and point of view. Lastly, we have the two speeches,
delivered several years later (in 330 B. C.), of Æschines in
prosecuting Ktesiphon, and of Demosthenes in defending him;
wherein the conduct of Demosthenes as to the peace of 346 B. C.
again becomes matter of controversy. All these harangues are
interesting, not merely as eloquent compositions, but also from
the striking conception which they impart of the living sentiment
and controversy of the time. But when we try to extract from
them real and authentic matter of history, they become painfully
embarrassing; so glaring are the contradictions not only between
the two rivals, but also between the earlier and later discourses
of the same orator himself, especially Æschines; so evident is
the spirit of perversion, so unscrupulous are the manifestations
of hostile feeling, on both sides. We can place little faith
in the allegations of either orator against the other, except
where some collateral grounds of fact or probability can be
adduced in confirmation. But the allegations of each as to
matters which do not make against the other, are valuable; even
the misrepresentations, since we have them on both sides, will
sometimes afford mutual correction: and we shall often find it
practicable to detect a basis of real matter of fact which one or
both may seek to pervert, but which neither can venture to set
aside, or can keep wholly out of sight. It is indeed deeply to be
lamented that we know little of the history except so much as it
suits the one or the other of these rival orators, each animated
by purposes totally at variance with that of the historian, to
make known either by direct notice or oblique allusion.

On the other hand, to Athens, to Sparta, and to the general cause of Pan-hellenic independence, it was of capital moment that Philip should be kept on the outside of Thermopylæ. And here Athens had more at stake than the rest; since not merely her influence abroad, but the safety of her own city and territory against invasion, was involved in the question. The Thebans had already invited the presence of Philip, himself always ready even without invitation, to come within the pass; it was the first interest, as well as the first duty, of Athens, to counterwork them, and to keep him out. With tolerable prudence, her guarantee of the past might have been made effective; but we shall find her measures ending only in shame and disappointment, through the flagrant improvidence, and apparent corruption, of her own negotiators.

The increasing discouragement as to war, and yearning for peace, which prevailed at Athens during the summer and autumn of 347 B. C., has been already described. We may be sure that the friends of the captives taken at Olynthus would be importunate in demanding peace, because there was no other way of procuring their release; since Philip did not choose to exchange them for money, reserving them as an item in political negotiation. At length, about the month of November, the public assembly decreed that envoys should be sent to Philip to ascertain on what conditions peace could be made; ten Athenian envoys, and one from the synod of confederate allies, sitting at Athens. The mover of the decree was Philokrates, the same who had moved the previous decree permitting Philip to send envoys if he chose. Of this permission Philip had not availed himself, in spite of all that the philippizers at Athens had alleged about his anxiety for peace and alliance with the city. It suited his purpose to have the negotiations carried on in Macedonia, where he could act better upon the individual negotiators of Athens.

The decree having been passed in the assembly, ten envoys were chosen: Philokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês, Derkyllus, Kimon, Nausiklês, and Aristodemus the actor. Aglaokreon of Tenedos was selected to accompany them, as representative of the allied synod. Of these envoys, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, and Iatroklês, had already been gained over as partisans by Philip while in Macedonia; moreover, Aristodemus was a person to whom, in his histrionic profession, the favor of Philip was more valuable than the interests of Athens. Æschines was proposed by Nausiklês; Demosthenes, by Philokrates the mover.[801] Though Demosthenes had been before so earnest in advocating vigorous prosecution of the war, it does not appear that he was now adverse to the opening of negotiations. Had he been ever so adverse, he would probably have failed in obtaining even a hearing, in the existing temper of the public mind. He thought indeed that Athens inflicted so much damage on her enemy by ruining the Macedonian maritime commerce, that she was not under the necessity of submitting to peace on bad or humiliating terms.[802] But still he did not oppose the overtures, nor did his opposition begin until afterwards, when he saw the turn which the negotiations were taking. Nor, on the other hand, was Æschines as yet suspected of a leaning towards Philip. Both he and Demosthenes obeyed, at this moment, the impulse of opinion generally prevalent at Athens. Their subsequent discordant views and bitter rivalry grew out of the embassy itself; out of its result and the behavior of Æschines.

[801] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. s. 9. p. 31. c. 10. p. 34. c.
20; Argumentum ii ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.

[802] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p 442. Compare p. 369, 387, 391.

The eleven envoys were appointed to visit Philip, not with any power of concluding peace, but simply to discuss with him and ascertain on what terms peace could be had. So much is certain; though we do not possess the original decree under which they were nominated. Having sent before them a herald to obtain a safe-conduct from Philip, they left Athens about December 347 B. C., and proceeded by sea to Oreus, on the northern coast of Eubœa, where they expected to meet the returning herald. Finding that he had not yet come back, they crossed the strait at once, without waiting for him, into the Pagasæan Gulf, where Parmenio with a Macedonian army was then besieging Halus. To him they notified their arrival, and received permission to pass on, first to Pagasæ, next to Larissa. Here they met their own returning herald, under whose safeguard they pursued their journey to Pella.[803]

[803] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

Our information respecting this (first) embassy proceeds almost wholly from Æschines. He tells us that Demosthenes was, from the very day of setting out, intolerably troublesome both to him and to his brother envoys; malignant, faithless, and watching for such matters as might be turned against them in the way of accusation afterwards; lastly, boastful even to absurd excess, of his own powers of eloquence. In Greece, it was the usual habit to transact diplomatic business, like other political matters, publicly before the governing number—the council, if the constitution happened to be oligarchical—the general assembly, if democratical. Pursuant to this habit, the envoys were called upon to appear before Philip in his full pomp and state, and there address to him formal harangues (either by one or more of their number as they chose), setting forth the case of Athens; after which Philip would deliver his reply in the like publicity, either with his own lips or by those of a chosen minister. The Athenian envoys resolved among themselves, that when introduced, each of them should address Philip, in the order of seniority; Demosthenes being the youngest of the Ten, and Æschines next above him. Accordingly, when summoned before Philip, Ktesiphon, the oldest envoy, began with a short address; the other seven followed with equal brevity, while the stress of the business was left to Æschines and Demosthenes.[804]

[804] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 10, 11.

Æschines recounts in abridgment to the Athenians, with much satisfaction, his own elaborate harangue, establishing the right of Athens to Amphipolis, the wrong done by Philip in taking it and holding it against her, and his paramount obligation to make restitution—but touching upon no other subject whatever.[805] He then proceeds to state—probably with yet greater satisfaction—that Demosthenes, who followed next, becoming terrified and confused, utterly broke down, forgot his prepared speech, and was obliged to stop short, in spite of courteous encouragements from Philip.[806] Gross failure, after full preparation, on the part of the greatest orator of ancient or modern times, appears at first hearing so incredible, that we are disposed to treat it as a pure fabrication of his opponent. Yet I incline to believe that the fact was substantially as Æschines states it; and that Demosthenes was partially divested of his oratorical powers by finding himself not only speaking before the enemy whom he had so bitterly denounced, but surrounded by all the evidences of Macedonian power, and doubtless exposed to unequivocal marks of well-earned hatred, from those Macedonians who took less pains than Philip to disguise their real feelings.[807]

[805] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 11.

[806] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 32. c. 13, 14.

[807] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 32, 33. c. 15. Demosthenes himself
says little or nothing about this first embassy, and nothing at
all either about his own speech or that of Æschines.

Having dismissed the envoys after their harangues, and taken a short time for consideration, Philip recalled them into his presence. He then delivered his reply with his own lips, combating especially the arguments of Æschines, and according to that orator, with such pertinence and presence of mind, as to excite the admiration of all the envoys, Demosthenes among the rest. What Philip said, we do not learn from Æschines; who expatiates only on the shuffling, artifice, and false pretences of Demosthenes, to conceal his failure as an orator, and to put himself on a point of advantage above his colleagues. Of these personalities it is impossible to say how much is true; and even were they true, they are scarcely matter of general history.

It was about the beginning of March when the envoys returned to Athens. Some were completely fascinated by the hospitable treatment and engaging manners of Philip,[808] especially when entertaining them at the banquet: with others, he had come to an understanding at once more intimate and more corrupt. They brought back a letter from Philip, which was read both in the Senate and the assembly; while Demosthenes, senator of that year, not only praised them all in the Senate, but also became himself the mover of a resolution that they should be crowned with a wreath of honor, and invited to dine next day in the prytaneium.[809]

[808] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33. c. 17, 18. The effect of the
manner and behavior of Philip upon Ktesiphon the envoy, is
forcibly stated here by Æschines.

[809] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 19; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.
414. This vote of thanks, and invitation to dinner, appears to
have been so uniform a custom, that Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p.
350) comments upon the withholding of the compliment, when the
second embassy returned, as a disgrace without parallel. That
Demosthenes should have proposed a motion of such customary
formality, is a fact of little moment any way. It rather proves
that the relations of Demosthenes with his colleagues during
the embassy, cannot have been so ill-tempered as Æschines had
affirmed. Demosthenes himself admits that he did not begin to
suspect his colleagues until the debates at Athens after the
return of this first embassy.

We have hardly any means of appreciating the real proceedings of this embassy, or the matters treated in discussion with Philip. Æschines tells us nothing, except the formalities of the interview, and the speeches about Amphipolis. But we shall at any rate do him no injustice, if we judge him upon his own account; which, if it does not represent what he actually did, represents what he wished to be thought to have done. His own account certainly shows a strange misconception of the actual situation of affairs. In order to justify himself for being desirous of peace, he lays considerable stress on the losing game which Athens had been playing during the war, and on the probability of yet farther loss if she persisted. He completes the cheerless picture by adding—what was doubtless but too familiar to his Athenian audience—that Philip on his side, marching from one success to another, had raised the Macedonian kingdom to an elevation truly formidable, by the recent extinction of Olynthus. Yet under this state of comparative force between the two contending parties, Æschines presents himself before Philip with a demand of exorbitant magnitude,—for the cession of Amphipolis. He says not a word about anything else. He delivers an eloquent harangue to convince Philip of the incontestible right of Athens to Amphipolis, and to prove to him that he was in the wrong for taking and keeping it. He affects to think, that by this process he should induce Philip to part with a town, the most capital and unparalleled position in all his dominions; which he had now possessed for twelve years, and which placed him in communication with his new foundation Philippi and the auriferous region around it. The arguments of Æschines would have been much to the purpose, in an action tried between two litigants before an impartial Dikastery at Athens. But here were two belligerent parties, in a given ratio of strength and position as to the future, debating terms of peace. That an envoy on the part of Athens, the losing party, should now stand forward to demand from a victorious enemy the very place which formed the original cause of the war, and which had become far more valuable to Philip than when he first took it—was a pretension altogether preposterous. When Æschines reproduces his eloquent speech reclaiming Amphipolis, as having been the principal necessity and most honorable achievement of his diplomatic mission, he only shows how little qualified he was to render real service to Athens in that capacity—to say nothing as yet about corruption. The Athenian people, extremely retentive of past convictions, had it deeply impressed on their minds that Amphipolis was theirs by right; and probably the first envoys to Macedonia,—Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ktesiphon, Phrynon,[810] etc.—had been so cajoled by the courteous phrases, deceptions, and presents of Philip, that they represented him on their return as not unwilling to purchase friendship with Athens by the restoration of Amphipolis. To this delusive expectation in the Athenian mind Æschines addressed himself, when he took credit for his earnest pleading before Philip on behalf of Athenian right to the place, as if it were the sole purpose of his mission.[811] We shall see him throughout, in his character of envoy, not only fostering the actual delusions of the public at Athens, but even circulating gross fictions and impostures of his own, respecting the proceedings and purposes of Philip.

[810] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344. Compare p. 371. τοὺς περὶ τῆς
εἰρήνης πρέσβεις πέμπειν ὡς Φίλιππον ἐπείσθητε ὑπ᾽ Ἀριστοδήμου
καὶ Νεοπτολέμου καὶ Κτησιφῶντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν
ἀπαγγελλόντων οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑγιὲς, etc.

[811] There is great contradiction between the two orators,
Æschines and Demosthenes, as to this speech of Æschines before
Philip respecting Amphipolis. Demosthenes represents Æschines
as having said in this report to the people on his return, “I
(Æschines) said nothing about Amphipolis, in order that I might
leave that subject fresh for Demosthenes,” etc.

Compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 421; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33,
34. c. 18, 19, 21.

As to this particular matter of fact, I incline to believe
Æschines rather than his rival. He probably did make an eloquent
speech about Amphipolis before Philip.

It was on or about the first day of the month Elaphebolion[812] (March) when the envoys reached Athens on returning from the court of Philip. They brought a letter from him couched in the most friendly terms; expressing great anxiety not only to be at peace with Athens, but also to become her ally; stating moreover that he was prepared to render her valuable service, and that he would have specified more particularly what the service would be, if he could have felt certain that he should be received as her ally.[813] But in spite of such amenities of language, affording an occasion for his partisans in the assembly, Æschines, Philokrates, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês and others, to expatiate upon his excellent dispositions, Philip would grant no better terms of peace than that each party should retain what they already possessed. Pursuant to this general principle, the Chersonesus was assured to Athens, of which Æschines appears to have made some boast.[814] Moreover, at the moment when the envoys were quitting Pella to return home, Philip was also leaving it at the head of his army on an expedition against Kersobleptes in Thrace. He gave a special pledge to the envoys that he would not attack the Chersonese, until the Athenians should have had an opportunity of debating,—accepting or rejecting the propositions of peace. His envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, received orders to visit Athens with little delay; and a Macedonian herald accompanied the Athenian envoys on their return.[815]

[812] The eighth day of Elaphebolion fell some little time after
their arrival, so that possibly they may have even reached
Athens on the last days of the month Anthesterion (Æschines
adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24). The reader will understand that
the Grecian lunar months do not correspond precisely, but only
approximatively, with ours.

[813] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 353, 354. ... ὁ γὰρ εἰς τὴν
~προτέραν~ γράψας ~ἐπιστολὴν, ἣν ἠνέγκαμεν ἡμεῖς~, ὅτι “ἔγραφόν
τ᾽ ἂν καὶ διαῤῥήδην, ἥλικα ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιήσω, εἰ εὖ ᾔδειν καὶ τὴν
συμμαχίαν μοι γενησομένην,” etc. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De
Halonneso, p. 85. Æschines alludes to this letter, Fals. Leg. p.
34. c. 21.

[814] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p 365.

[815] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26; Æschines cont.
Ktesiphont. p. 63. c. 23. παρηγγέλλετο δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν
(Kersobleptes) ἤδη στρατεία, etc.