Chapter LXXXIX (2)

Having ascertained on what terms peace could be had, the envoys were competent to advise the Athenian people, and prepare them for a definite conclusion, as soon as this Macedonian mission should arrive. They first gave an account of their proceedings to the public assembly. Ktesiphon, the oldest, who spake first, expatiated on the graceful presence and manners of Philip, as well as upon the charm of his company in wine-drinking.[816] Æschines dwelt upon his powerful and pertinent oratory; after which he recounted the principal occurrences of the journey, and the debate with Philip, intimating that in the previous understanding of the envoys among themselves, the duty of speaking about Amphipolis had been confided to Demosthenes, in case any point should have been omitted by the previous speakers. Demosthenes then made his own statement, in language (according to Æschines) censorious and even insulting towards his colleagues; especially affirming that Æschines, in his vanity, chose to preoccupy all the best points in his own speech, leaving none open for any one else.[817] Demosthenes next proceeded to move various decrees; one, to greet by libation the herald who had accompanied them from Philip,—and the Macedonian envoys who were expected; another, providing that the prytanes should convene a special assembly on the eighth day of Elaphebolion, (a day sacred to Æsculapius, on which generally no public business was ever transacted), in order that if the envoys from Macedonia had then arrived, the people might discuss without delay their political relations with Philip; a third, to commend the behavior of the Athenian envoys (his colleagues and himself), and to invite them to dinner in the prytaneium. Demosthenes farther moved in the Senate, that when Philip’s envoys came, they should be accommodated with seats of honor at the Dionysiac festival.[818]

[816] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 20. τῆς ἐν τοῖς πότοις
ἐπιδεξιότητος—συμπιεῖν δεινὸς ἦν (c. 21).

[817] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35. c. 21; Dem. Fals. Leg. p.
421. Yet Æschines, when describing the same facts in his oration
against Ktesiphon (p. 62. c. 23), simply says that Demosthenes
gave to the assembly an account of the proceedings of the first
embassy, similar to that given by the other envoys—ταὐτὰ τοῖς
ἄλλοις πρέσβεσιν ἀπήγγειλε, etc.

The point noticed in the text (that Demosthenes charged Æschines
with reluctance to let any one else have anything to say) is one
which appears both in Æschines and Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat.,
and may therefore in the main be regarded as having really
occurred. But probably the statement made by Demosthenes to the
people as to the proceedings of the embassy, _was_ substantially
the same as that of his colleagues. For though the later oration
of Æschines is, in itself, less trustworthy evidence than the
earlier—yet when we find two different statements of Æschines
respecting Demosthenes, we may reasonably presume that the one
which is _least unfavorable_ is the _most credible_ of the two.

[818] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35, 42. c 20, 21, 34; Æschines
adv. Ktesiphont. p. 62, 63. c. 23, 24. In the first of the two
speeches, Æschines makes no mention of the decree proposed
by Demosthenes relative to the assembly on the eighth of
Elaphebolion. He mentions it in the speech against Ktesiphon,
with considerable specification.

Presently, these Macedonian envoys, Antipater, Parmenio and Eurylochus, arrived; yet not early enough to allow the full debate to take place on the assembly of the eighth of Elaphebolion. Accordingly (as it would seem, in that very assembly), Demosthenes proposed and carried a fresh decree, fixing two later days for the special assemblies to discuss peace and alliance with Macedonia. The days named were the eighteenth and nineteenth days of the current month Elaphebolion (March); immediately after the Dionysiac festival, and the assembly in the temple of Dionysius which followed upon it.[819] At the same time Demosthenes showed great personal civility to the Macedonian envoys, inviting them to a splendid entertainment, and not only conducting them to their place of honor at the Dionysiac festival, but also providing for them comfortable seats and cushions.[820]

[819] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 36. c. 22. ἕτερον ψήφισμα, Æsch.
adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24. This last decree, fixing the two
special days of the month, could scarcely have been proposed
until after Philip’s envoys had actually reached Athens.

[820] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34; adv. Ktesiphont. p.
62. c. 22; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414; De Coronâ, p. 234. This
courtesy and politeness towards the Macedonian envoys is admitted
by Demosthenes himself. It was not a circumstance of which he had
any reason to be ashamed.

Besides the public assembly held by the Athenians themselves, to receive report from their ten envoys returned out of Macedonia, the synod of Athenian confederates was also assembled to hear the report of Aglaokreon, who had gone as their representative along with the Ten. This synod agreed to a resolution, important in reference to the approaching debate in the Athenian assembly, yet unfortunately nowhere given to us entire, but only in partial and indirect notice from the two rival orators. It has been already mentioned that since the capture of Olynthus, the Athenians had sent forth envoys throughout a large portion of Greece, urging the various cities to unite with them either in conjoint war against Philip, or in conjoint peace to obtain some mutual guarantee against his farther encroachments. Of these missions, the greater number had altogether failed, demonstrating the hopelessness of the Athenian project. But some had been so far successful, that deputies, more or fewer, were actually present in Athens, pursuant to the invitation; while a certain number were still absent and expected to return,—the same individuals having perhaps been sent to different places at some distance from each other. The resolution of the synod (noway binding upon the Athenian people, but merely recommendatory), was adapted to this state of affairs, and to the dispositions recently manifested at Athens towards conjoint action with other Greeks against Philip. The synod advised, that immediately on the return of the envoys still absent on mission (when probably all such Greeks, as were willing even to talk over the proposition, would send their deputies also), the Athenian prytanes should convene two public assemblies, according to the laws, for the purpose of debating and deciding the question of peace. Whatever decision might be here taken, the synod adopted it beforehand as their own. They farther recommended that an article should be annexed, reserving an interval of three months for any Grecian city not a party to the peace, to declare its adhesion, to inscribe its name on the column of record, and to be included under the same conditions as the rest. Apparently this resolution of the synod was adopted before the arrival of the Macedonian deputies in Athens, and before the last-mentioned decree proposed by Demosthenes in the public assembly; which decree, fixing two days, (the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion), for decision of the question of peace and alliance with Philip, coincided in part with the resolution of the synod.[821]

[821] I insert in the text what appears to me the probable
truth about this resolution of the confederate synod. The
point is obscure, and has been differently viewed by different
commentators.

Demosthenes affirms, in his earlier speech (De Fals. Leg. p.
346), that Æschines held disgraceful language in his speech
before the public assembly on the 19th Elaphebolion (to the
effect that Athens ought to act for herself alone, and to take no
thought for any other Greeks except such as had assisted her);
and that, too, in the presence and hearing of those envoys from
other Grecian cities, whom the Athenians had sent for at the
instigation of Æschines himself. The presence of these envoys
in the assembly, here implied, is not the main charge, but a
collateral aggravation; nevertheless, Æschines (as is often the
case throughout his defence) bestows nearly all his care upon
the aggravation, taking comparatively little notice of the main
charge. He asserts with great emphasis (Fals. Leg. p. 35), that
the envoys sent out from Athens on mission had _not returned_,
and that there were _no envoys present_ from any Grecian cities.

It seems to me reasonable here to believe the assertion of
Demosthenes, that there _were_ envoys from other Grecian cities
present; although he himself in his later oration (De Coronâ,
p. 232, 233) speaks as if such were not the fact, as if all
the Greeks had been long found out as recreants in the cause
of liberty, and as if no envoys from Athens were then absent
on mission. I accept the _positive_ assertion of Æschines as
true—that there were Athenian envoys then absent on mission, who
might possibly, on their return, bring in with them deputies from
other Greeks; but I do not admit his _negative_ assertion—that
no Athenian envoys had returned from their mission, and that no
deputies had come in from other Greeks. That among many Athenian
envoys sent out, _all_ should fail—appears to me very improbable.

If we follow the argument of Æschines (in the speech De Fals.
Leg.), we shall see that it is quite enough if we suppose _some_
of the envoys sent out on mission, and not _all_ of them, to be
absent. To prove this fact, he adduces (p. 35, 36) the resolution
of the confederate synod, alluding to the absent envoys, and
recommending a certain course to be taken after their return.
This does not necessarily imply that _all_ were absent. Stechow
remarks justly, that some of the envoys would necessarily be out
a long time, having to visit more than one city, and perhaps
cities distant from each other (Vita Æschinis, p. 41).

I also accept what Æschines says about the resolution of the
confederate synod, as being substantially true. About the actual
import of this resolution, he is consistent with himself, both
in the earlier and in the later oration. Winiewski (Comment.
Historic. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 74-77) and Westermann (De
Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, p. 38-42) affirm, I think
without reason, that the import of this resolution is differently
represented by Æschines in the earlier and in the later orations.
What is really different in the two orations, is the way in which
Æschines perverts the import of the resolution to inculpate
Demosthenes; affirming in the later oration, that if Athens had
waited for the return of her envoys on mission, she might have
made peace with Philip jointly with a large body of Grecian
allies; and that it was Demosthenes who hindered her from doing
this, by hurrying on the discussions about the peace (Æsch. adv.
Ktesiph. p. 61-63), etc. Westermann thinks that the synod would
not take upon them to prescribe how many assemblies the Athenians
should convene for the purpose of debating about peace. But it
seems to have been a common practice with the Athenians, about
peace or other special and important matters, to convene two
assemblies on two days immediately succeeding: all that the synod
here recommended was, that the Athenians should follow the usual
custom—προγράψαι τοὺς πρυτάνεις ἐκκλησίας δύο κατὰ τοὺς νόμους,
etc. That two assemblies, neither less nor more, should be
convened for the purpose, was a point of no material importance;
except that it indicated a determination to decide the question
at once—_sans désemparer_.

Accordingly, after the great Dionysiac festival, these two prescribed assemblies were held,—on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion. The three ambassadors from Philip, Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus were present, both at the festival and the assemblies.[822] The general question of the relations between Athens and Philip being here submitted for discussion, the resolution of the confederate synod was at the same time communicated. Of this resolution the most significant article was, that the synod accepted beforehand the decree of the Athenian assembly, whatever that might be; the other articles were recommendations, doubtless heard with respect, and constituting a theme for speakers to insist on, yet carrying no positive authority. But in the pleadings of the two rival orators some years afterwards, (from which alone we know the facts), the entire resolution of the synod appears invested with a factitious importance; because each of them had an interest in professing to have supported it,—each accuses the other of having opposed it; both wished to disconnect themselves from Philokrates, then a disgraced exile, and from the peace moved by him, which had become discredited. It was Philokrates who stood forward in the assembly as the prominent mover of peace and alliance with Philip. His motion did not embrace either of the recommendations of the synod, respecting absent envoys, and interval to be left for adhesions from other Greeks; nor did he confine himself, as the synod had done, to the proposition of peace with Philip. He proposed that not only peace, but alliance, should be concluded between the Athenians and Philip; who had expressed by letter his great anxiety both for one and for the other. He included in his proposition, Philip with all his allies, on one side,—and Athens, with all her allies, on the other; making special exception, however, of two among the allies of Athens, the Phokians, and the town of Halus near the Pagasæan Gulf, recently under siege by Parmenio.[823]

[822] Æschines, adv. Ktesiph. p. 64.

[823] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 391. τήν τε γὰρ εἰρήνην οὐχὶ
δυνηθέντων ὡς ἐπεχείρησαν οὗτοι, “πλὴν Ἁλέων καὶ Φωκέων,”
γράψαι—ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκασθέντος ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν τοῦ Φιλοκράτους ταῦτα μὲν
ἀπαλείψαι, γράψαι δ᾽ ἀντικρὺς “~Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων
συμμάχους~,” etc.

What part Æschines and Demosthenes took in reference to this motion, it is not easy to determine. In their speeches, delivered three years afterwards, both denounce Philokrates; each accuses the other of having supported him; each affirms himself to have advocated the recommendations of the synod. The contradictions between the two, and between Æschines in his earlier and Æschines in his later speech, are here very glaring. Thus, Demosthenes accuses his rival of having, on the 18th of the month or on the first of the two assemblies, delivered a speech strongly opposed to Philokrates;[824] but of having changed his politics during the night and spoken on the 19th in support of the latter, so warmly as to convert the hearers when they were predisposed the other way. Æschines altogether denies such sudden change of opinion; alleging that he made but one speech, and that in favor of the recommendation of the synod; and averring moreover that to speak on the second assembly-day was impossible, since that day was exclusively consecrated to putting questions and voting, so that no oratory was allowed.[825] Yet Æschines, though in his earlier harangue (De Fals. Leg.) he insists so strenuously on this impossibility of speaking on the 19th,—in his later harangue (against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having spoken at great length on that very day, the 19th, and of having thereby altered the temper of the assembly.[826]

In spite, however, of the discredit thus thrown by Æschines upon his own denial, I do not believe the sudden change of speech in the assembly, ascribed to him by Demosthenes. It is too unexplained, and in itself too improbable, to be credited on the mere assertion of a rival. But I think it certain that neither he, nor Demosthenes, can have advocated the recommendations of the synod, though both profess to have done so,—if we are to believe the statement of Æschines (we have no statement from Demosthenes), as to the tenor of those recommendations. For the synod (according to Æschines) had recommended to await the return of the absent envoys before the question of peace was debated. Now this proposition was impracticable under the circumstances; since it amounted to nothing less than an indefinite postponement of the question. But the Macedonian envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, were now in Athens, and actually present in the assembly; having come, by special invitation, for the purpose either of concluding peace or of breaking off the negotiation; and Philip had agreed (as Æschines[827] himself states), to refrain from all attack on the Chersonese, while the Athenians were debating about peace. Under these conditions, it was imperatively necessary to give some decisive and immediate answer to the Macedonian envoys. To tell them—“We can say nothing positive at present; you must wait until our absent envoys return, and until we ascertain how many Greeks we can get into our alliance,” would have been not only in itself preposterous, but would have been construed by able men like Antipater and Parmenio as a mere dilatory manœuvre for breaking off the peace altogether. Neither Demosthenes nor Æschines can have really supported such a proposition, whatever both may pretend three years afterwards. For at that time of the actual discussion, not only Æschines himself, but the general public of Athens were strongly anxious for peace; while Demosthenes, though less anxious, was favorable to it.[828] Neither of them were at all disposed to frustrate the negotiations by insidious delay; nor, if they had been so disposed, would the Athenian public have tolerated the attempt.

[824] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 345, 346.

[825] Æschines. Fals. Leg. p. 36.

[826] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64.

[827] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39.

[828] From the considerations here stated, we can appreciate the
charges of Æschines against Demosthenes, even on his own showing;
though the precise course of either is not very clear.

He accuses Demosthenes of having sold himself to Philip (adv.
Ktes. p. 63, 64); a charge utterly futile and incredible,
refuted by the whole conduct of Demosthenes, both before and
after. Whether Demosthenes received bribes from Harpalus—or from
the Persian court—will be matter of future inquiry. But the
allegation that he had been bribed by Philip is absurd. Æschines
himself confesses that it was quite at variance with the received
opinion at Athens (adv. Ktes. p. 62. c. 22).

He accuses Demosthenes of having, under the influence of these
bribes, opposed and frustrated the recommendation of the
confederate synod—of having hurried on the debate about peace at
once—and of having thus prevented Athens from waiting for the
return of her absent envoys, which would have enabled her to make
peace in conjunction with a powerful body of coöperating Greeks.
This charge is advanced by Æschines, first in the speech De Fals.
Leg. p. 36—next, with greater length and emphasis, in the later
speech, adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64. From what has been said in the
text, it will be seen that such indefinite postponement, when
Antipater and Parmenio were present in Athens by invitation, was
altogether impossible, without breaking off the negotiation.
Not to mention, that Æschines himself affirms, in the strongest
language, the ascertained impossibility of prevailing upon any
other Greeks to join Athens, and complains bitterly of their
backward dispositions (Fals. Leg. p. 38. c. 25). In this point
Demosthenes perfectly concurs with him (De Coronâ, p. 231, 232).
So that even if postponement could have been had, it would have
been productive of no benefit, nor of any increase of force, to
Athens, since the Greeks were not inclined to coöperate with her.

The charge of Æschines against Demosthenes is thus untenable, and
suggests its own refutation, even from the mouth of the accuser
himself. Demosthenes indeed replies to it in a different manner.
When Æschines says—“You hurried on the discussion about peace,
without allowing Athens to await the return of her envoys, then
absent on mission”—Demosthenes answers—“There were _no_ Athenian
envoys then absent on mission. All the Greeks had been long ago
detected as incurably apathetic.” (De Coronâ, p. 233). This is a
slashing and decisive reply, which it might perhaps be safe for
Demosthenes to hazard, at an interval of thirteen years after the
events. But it is fortunate that another answer can be provided;
for I conceive the assertion to be neither correct in point of
fact, nor consistent with the statements of Demosthenes himself
in the speech De Falsâ Legatione.

On the best conclusion which I can form, Demosthenes supported the motion of Philokrates (enacting both peace and alliance with Philip), except only that special clause which excluded both the Phokians and the town of Halus, and which was ultimately negatived by the assembly.[829] That Æschines supported the same motion entire, and in a still more unqualified manner, we may infer from his remarkable admission in the oration against Timarchus[830] (delivered in the year after the peace, and three years before his own trial), wherein he acknowledges himself as joint author of the peace along with Philokrates, and avows his hearty approbation of the conduct and language of Philip, even after the ruin of the Phokians. Eubulus, the friend and partisan of Æschines, told the Athenians[831] the plain alternative: “You must either march forthwith to Peiræus, serve on shipboard, pay direct taxes, and convert the Theôric Fund to military purposes,—or else you must vote the terms of peace moved by Philokrates.” Our inference respecting the conduct of Æschines is strengthened by what is here affirmed respecting Eubulus. Demosthenes had been vainly urging upon his countrymen, for the last five years, at a time when Philip was less formidable, the real adoption of these energetic measures; Eubulus, his opponent, now holds them out _in terrorem_, as an irksome and intolerable necessity, constraining the people to vote for the terms of peace proposed. And however painful it might be to acquiesce in the _statu quo_, which recognized Philip as master of Amphipolis and of so many other possessions once belonging to Athens,—I do not believe that even Demosthenes, at the time when the peace was actually under debate, would put the conclusion of it to hazard, by denouncing the shame of such unavoidable cession, though he professes three years afterwards to have vehemently opposed it.[832]

[829] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 391-430. Æschines affirms strongly,
in his later oration against Ktesiphon (p. 63), that Demosthenes
warmly advocated the motion of Philokrates for alliance as well
as peace with Philip. He professes to give the precise phrase
used by Demosthenes—which he censures as an inelegant phrase—οὐ
δεῖν ἀποῤῥῆξαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν, etc. He adds that
Demosthenes called up the Macedonian ambassador Antipater to the
rostrum, put a question to him, and obtained an answer concerted
beforehand. How much of this is true, I cannot say. The version
given by Æschines in his later speech, is, as usual, different
from that in his earlier.

The accusation against Demosthenes, of corrupt collusion with
Antipater, is incredible and absurd.

[830] Æschines, adv. Timarch. p. 24, 25. c. 34. παρεμβάλλων
(Demosthenes) τὰς ἐμὰς δημηγορίας, καὶ ~ψέγων τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν
δι᾽ ἐμοῦ καὶ Φιλοκράτους γεγενημένην~, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπαντήσεσθαί με
ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπολογησόμενον, ὅταν τὰς τῆς πρεσβείας εὐθύνας
διδῶ, etc. ... Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν
ἐπαινῶ, etc.

[831] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. φήσας (Eubulus) καταβαίνειν εἰς
Πειραιᾶ δεῖν ἤδη καὶ χρήματ᾽ εἰσφέρειν καὶ τὰ θεωρικὰ στρατιωτικὰ
ποιεῖν—ἢ χειροτονεῖν ἃ συνεῖπε μὲν οὗτος (Æschines) ἔγραψε δ᾽ ὁ
βδελυρὸς Φιλοκράτης.

[832] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 385.

I suspect therefore that the terms of peace proposed by Philokrates met with unqualified support from one of our two rival orators, and with only partial opposition, to one special clause, from the other. However this may be, the proposition passed, with no other modification (so far as we know) except the omission of that clause which specially excepted Halus and the Phokians. Philokrates provided, that all the possessions actually in the hands of each of the belligerent parties, should remain to each, without disturbance from the other;[833] that on these principles, there should be both peace and alliance between Athens with all her allies on the one side, and Philip with all his allies on the other. These were the only parties included in the treaty. Nothing was said about other Greeks, not allies either of Philip or of Athens.[834] Nor was any special mention made about Kersobleptes.[835]

[833] Pseudo-Demosthen. De Halonneso, p. 81-83. Demosthenes, in
one passage (Fals. Leg. p. 385), speaks as if it were a part of
the Athenian oath—that they would oppose and treat as enemies
all who should try to save from Philip and to restore to Athens
the places now recognized as Philip’s possession for the future.
Though Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 265) and Böhnecke
(p. 303) insert these words as a part of the actual formula,
I doubt whether they are anything more than a constructive
expansion, given by Demosthenes himself, of the import of the
formula.

[834] This fact we learn from the subsequent discussions about
_amending_ the peace, mentioned in Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso,
p. 84.

[835] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33. c. 26.

Such was the decree of peace and alliance, enacted on the second of the two assembly-days,—the nineteenth of the month Elaphebolion. Of course, without the fault of any one, it was all to the advantage of Philip. He was in the superior position; and it sanctioned his retention of all his conquests. For Athens, the inferior party, the benefit to be expected was, that she would prevent these conquests from being yet farther multiplied, and protect herself against being driven from bad to worse.

But it presently appeared that even thus much was not realized. On the twenty-fifth day of the same month[836] (six days after the previous assembly), a fresh assembly was held, for the purpose of providing ratification by solemn oath for the treaty which had been just decreed. It was now moved and enacted, that the same ten citizens, who had been before accredited to Philip, should again be sent to Macedonia for the purpose of receiving the oaths from him and from his allies.[837] Next, it was resolved that the Athenians, together with the deputies of their allies then present in Athens, should take the oath forthwith, in the presence of Philip’s envoys.

[836] This date is preserved by Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 64.
c. 27. ἕκτῃ φθίνοντος τοῦ Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνὸς, etc. In the
earlier oration (De Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29) Æschines states
that Demosthenes was among the Proedri or presiding senators of
a public assembly held ἑβδόμῃ φθίνοντος—the day before. It is
possible that there might have been two public assemblies held,
on two successive days (the 23d and 24th, or the 24th and 25th,
according as the month Elaphebolion happened in that year to have
30 days or 29 days), and that Demosthenes may have been among the
Proedri in both. But the transaction described (in the oration
against Ktesiphon) as having happened on the latter of the two
days—must have preceded that which is mentioned (in the Oration
De Fals. Leg.) as having happened on the earlier of the two days;
or at least cannot have followed it; so that there seems to be
an inaccuracy in one or in the other. If the word ἕκτῃ, in the
oration against Ktesiphon, and ἑβδόμῃ in the speech on the False
Legation, are both correct, the transactions mentioned in the
one cannot be reconciled chronologically with those narrated in
the other. Various conjectural alterations have bean proposed.
See Vœmel, Prolegg. ad Demosth. Orat. De Pace, p. 257; Böhnecke,
Forschungen, p. 399.

[837] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. ἤδη δὲ ἡμῶν κεχειροτονημένων
εἰς τοὺς ὅρκους, οὔπω δὲ ἀπῃρκότων ἐπὶ τὴν ὑστέραν πρεσβείαν,
ἐκκλησία γίνεται, etc.

This ἐκκλησία seems to be the same as that which is named by
Æschines in the speech against Ktesiphon, as having been held on
the 25th Elaphebolion.

But now arose the critical question, Who were to be included as allies of Athens? Were the Phokians and Kersobleptes to be included? The one and the other represented those two capital positions,[838] Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, which Philip was sure to covet, and which it most behooved Athens to ensure against him. The assembly, by its recent vote, had struck out the special exclusion of the Phokians proposed by Philokrates, thus by implication admitting them as allies along with the rest. They were in truth allies of old standing and valuable; they had probably envoys present in Athens, but no deputies sitting in the synod. Nor had Kersobleptes any such deputy in that body; but a citizen of Lampsakus, named Kritobulus, claimed on this occasion to act for him, and to take the oaths in his name.

[838] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 397. καίτοι δύο χρησιμωτέρους
τόπους τῆς οἰκουμένης οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἐπιδείξαι τῇ πόλει, κατὰ μὲν
γῆν, Πυλῶν—ἐκ θαλάττης δὲ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου· ἃ συναμφότερα οὗτοι
πεπράκασιν αἰσχρῶς καὶ καθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐγκεχειρίκασι Φιλίππῳ.

As to the manner of dealing with Kersobleptes, Æschines tells us two stories (one in the earlier oration, the other in the later) quite different from each other; and agreeing only in this—that in both Demosthenes is described as one of the presiding magistrates of the public assembly, as having done all that he could to prevent the envoy of Kersobleptes from being admitted to take the oaths as an ally of Athens. Amidst such discrepancies, to state in detail what passed is impossible. But it seems clear,—both from Æschines (in his earliest speech) and Demosthenes,—first, that the envoy from Kersobleptes, not having a seat in the confederate synod, but presenting himself and claiming to be sworn as an ally of Athens, found his claim disputed; secondly, that upon this dispute arising, the question was submitted to the vote of the public assembly, who decided that Kersobleptes was an ally, and should be admitted to take the oath as such.[839]

[839] Compare Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26, with Æschines
cont. Ktesiphont. p. 64. c. 27.

Franke (Proleg. ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 30, 31) has some severe
comments on the discrepancy between the two statements.

That the question was put, and affirmed by vote, to admit
Kersobleptes appears from the statement of Æschines in the speech
De Fals. Leg.—τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεψηφίσθη—ἐψηφισμένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου.
Compare Demosth. De Fals. Leg. p. 398, and Demosthen. Philipp.
iv. p. 133.

Philip, in his letter some years afterwards to the Athenians,
affirmed that Kersobleptes wished to be admitted to take the
oaths, but was excluded by the Athenian generals, who declared
him to be an enemy of Athens (Epist. Phil. ap. Demosth. p. 160).
If it be true that the generals tried to exclude him, their
exclusion must have been overruled by the vote of the assembly.

Antipater and Parmenio, on the part of Philip, did not refuse to recognize Kersobleptes as an ally of Athens, and to receive his oath. But in regard to the Phokians, they announced a determination distinctly opposite. They gave notice, at or after the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, that Philip positively refused to admit the Phokians as parties to the convention.

This determination, formally announced by Antipater at Athens, must probably have been made known by Philip himself to Philokrates and Æschines, when on mission in Macedonia. Hence Philokrates, in his motion about the terms of peace, had proposed that the Phokians and Halus should be specially excluded (as I have already related). Now, however, when the Athenian assembly, by expressly repudiating such exclusion, had determined that the Phokians should be received as parties, while the envoys of Philip were not less express in rejecting them,—the leaders of the peace, Æschines and Philokrates, were in great embarrassment. They had no other way of surmounting the difficulty, except by holding out mendacious promises, and unauthorized assurances of future intention in the name of Philip. Accordingly, they confidently announced that the King of Macedon, though precluded by his relations with the Thebans and Thessalians (necessary to him while he remained at war with Athens), from openly receiving the Phokians as allies, was nevertheless in his heart decidedly adverse to the Thebans; and that, if his hands were once set free by concluding peace with Athens, he would interfere in the quarrel just in the manner that the Athenians would desire; that he would uphold the Phokians, put down the insolence of Thebes, and even break up the integrity of the city; restoring also the autonomy of Thespiæ, Platæa and the other Bœotian towns, now in Theban dependence. The general assurances,—previously circulated by Aristodemus, Ktesiphon, and others,—of Philip’s anxiety to win favorable opinions from the Athenians, were now still farther magnified into a supposed community of antipathy against Thebes; and even into a disposition to compensate Athens for the loss of Amphipolis, by making her complete mistress of Eubœa as well as by recovering for her Orôpus.

By such glowing fabrications and falsehoods, confidently asseverated, Philokrates, Æschines, and the other partisans of Philip present, completely deluded the assembly; and induced them, not indeed to decree the special exclusion of the Phokians, as Philokrates had at first proposed,—but to swear the convention with Antipater and Parmenio without the Phokians.[840] These latter were thus shut out in fact, though by the general words of the peace, Athens had recognized their right to be included. Their deputies were probably present, claimed to be admitted, and were refused by Antipater, without any peremptory protest on the part of Athens.

[840] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐντεῦθεν ~οἱ μὲν παρ᾽
ἐκείνου πρέσβεις προὔλεγον ὑμῖν ὅτι Φωκέας οὐ προσδέχεται
Φίλιππος συμμάχους, οὗτοι δ᾽ ἐκδεχόμενοι τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐδημηγόρουν, ὡς
φανερῶς μὲν οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχει τῷ Φιλίππῳ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς Φωκέας~
συμμάχους, διὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ τοὺς Θετταλοὺς, ἂν δὲ γένηται
τῶν πραγμάτων κύριος ~καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τύχῃ~, ἅπερ ἂν συνθέσθαι
νῦν ἀξιώσαιμεν αὐτὸν, ταῦτα ποιήσει τότε. ~Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν εἰρήνην
ταύταις ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ ταῖς ἐπαγωγαῖς εὕροντο παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἄνευ
Φωκέων~.

Ibid. p. 409. Εἰ δὲ πάντα τἀναντία τούτων καὶ πολλὰ καὶ
φιλάνθρωπα εἰπόντες Φίλιππον, φιλεῖν τὴν πόλιν, Φωκέας σώσειν,
Θηβαίους παύσειν τῆς ὕβρεως, ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ~μείζονα ἢ κατ᾽
Ἀμφίπολιν εὖ ποιήσειν ὑμᾶς, ἐὰν τύχῃ τῆς εἰρήνης, Εὔβοιαν,
Ὠρωπὸν~ ἀποδώσειν—εἰ ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντες καὶ ὑποσχόμενοι πάντ᾽
ἐξηπατήκασι καὶ πεφενακίκασι, etc.

Compare also, p. 346, 388, 391, about the false promises under
which the Athenians were induced to consent to the peace—τῶν
ὑποσχέσεων, ἐφ᾽ αἷς εὑρίσκετο (Philip) τὴν εἰρήνην. The same
false promises put forward _before_ the peace and determining the
Athenians to conclude it, are also noticed by Demosthenes in the
second Philippic (p. 69), τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ᾽ αἷς τῆς εἰρήνης
ἔτυχεν (Philip)—p. 72. τοὺς ἐνεγκόντας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ᾽ αἷς
ἐπείσθητε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. This second Philippic is one
year earlier in date than the oration de Falsâ Legatione, and is
better authority than that oration, not merely on account of its
earlier date, but because it is a parliamentary harangue, not
tainted with an accusatory purpose nor mentioning Æschines by
name.

This tissue, not of mere exaggerations, but of impudent and monstrous falsehood, respecting the purposes of Philip,—will be seen to continue until he had carried his point of penetrating within the pass of Thermopylæ, and even afterwards. We can hardly wonder that the people believed it, when proclaimed and guaranteed to them by Philokrates, Æschines, and the other envoys, who had been sent into Macedonia for the express purpose of examining on the spot and reporting, and whose assurance was the natural authority for the people to rely upon. In this case, the deceptions found easier credence and welcome because they were in complete harmony with the wishes and hopes of Athens, and with the prevalent thirst for peace. To betray allies like the Phokians appeared of little consequence, when once it became a settled conviction that the Phokians themselves would be no losers by it. But this plea, though sufficient as a tolerable excuse for the Athenian people, will not serve for a statesman like Demosthenes; who, on this occasion (as far as we can make out even from his own language), did not enter any emphatic protest against the tacit omission of the Phokians, though he had opposed the clause (in the motion of Philokrates) which formally omitted them by name. Three months afterwards, when the ruin of the isolated Phokians was about to be consummated as a fact, we shall find Demosthenes earnest in warning and denunciation; but there is reason to presume that his opposition[841] was at best only faint, when the positive refusal of Antipater was first proclaimed against that acquiescence on the part of Athens, whereby the Phokians were really surrendered to Philip. Yet in truth this was the great diplomatic turning-point, from whence the sin of Athens, against duty to allies as well as against her own security, took its rise. It was a false step of serious magnitude, difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve afterwards. Probably the temper of the Athenians, then eager for peace, trembling for the lives of their captives, and prepossessed with the positive assurances of Æschines and Philokrates,—would have heard with repugnance any strong protest against abandoning the Phokians, which threatened to send Antipater home in disgust and intercept the coming peace,—the more so as Demosthenes, if he called in question the assurances of Æschines as to the projects of Philip, would have no positive facts to produce in refuting them, and would be constrained to take the ground of mere scepticism and negation;[842] of which a public, charmed with hopeful auguries and already disarmed through the mere comfortable anticipations of peace, would be very impatient. Nevertheless, we might have expected from a statesman like Demosthenes, that he would have begun his energetic opposition to the disastrous treaty of 346 B. C., at that moment when the most disastrous and disgraceful portion of it,—the abandonment of the Phokians,—was first shuffled in.

[841] Demosthenes speaks of the omission of the Phokians, in
taking the oaths at Athens, as if it were a matter of small
importance (Fals. Leg. p. 387, 388; compare p. 372); that is, on
the supposition that the promises made by Æschines turned out to
be realized.

In his speech De Pace (p. 59), he takes credit for his protests
on behalf of the Phokians; but only for protests made _after
his_ return from the second embassy—not for protests made when
Antipater refused to admit the Phokians to the oaths.

Westermann (De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, p. 48)
suspects that Demosthenes did not see through the deception of
Æschines until the Phokians were utterly ruined. This, perhaps,
goes beyond the truth; but at the time when the oaths were
exchanged at Athens, he either had not clearly detected the
consequences of that miserable shuffle into which Athens was
tricked by Philokrates, etc.—or he was afraid to proclaim them
emphatically.

[842] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 355. τραχέως ~δ᾽ ὑμῶν τῷ “μηδὲ
προσδοκᾷν” σχόντων~, etc. (the Athenian public were displeased
with Demosthenes when he told them that he did not expect the
promises of Æschines to be realized; this was after the second
embassy, but it illustrates the temper of the assembly even
before the second embassy)—ibid. p. 349. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠνέσχετο,
τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα ἔσεσθαι προσδοκῶν ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ~ταῦθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ
ἔσται λέγοντός τινος~, ἢ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν πεπραγμένων τούτοις;

How unpopular it was to set up mere negative mistrust against
glowing promises of benefits to come, is here strongly urged by
Demosthenes.

Respecting the premature disarming of the Athenians, see Demosth.
De Coronâ, p. 234.

After the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, Antipater administered the oaths of peace and alliance to Athens and to all her other allies (seemingly including the envoy of Kersobleptes) in the Board-room of the Generals.[843] It now became the duty of the ten Athenian envoys, with one more from the confederate synod,—the same persons who had been employed in the first embassy,—to go and receive the oaths from Philip. Let us see how this duty was performed.

[843] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 27.

The decree of the assembly, under which these envoys held their trust, was large and comprehensive. They were to receive an oath, of amity and alliance with Athens and her allies, from Philip as well as from the chief magistrate in each city allied with him. They were forbidden (by a curious restriction) to hold any intercourse singly and individually with Philip;[844] but they were farther enjoined, by a comprehensive general clause, “to do anything else which might be within their power for the advantage of Athens.”—“It was our duty as prudent envoys (says Æschines to the Athenian people) to take a right measure of the whole state of affairs, as they concerned either you or Philip.”[845] Upon these rational views of the duties of the envoys, however, Æschines unfortunately did not act. It was Demosthenes who acted upon them, and who insisted, immediately after the departure of Antipater and Parmenio, on going straight to the place where Philip actually was; in order that they might administer the oath to him with as little delay as possible. It was not only certain that the King of Macedon, the most active of living men, would push his conquests up to the last moment; but it was farther known to Æschines and the envoys, that he had left Pella to make war against Kersobleptes in Thrace, at the time when they returned from their first embassy.[846] Moreover, on the day of, or the day after, the public assembly last described (that is, on the 25th or 26th of the month Elaphebolion), a despatch had reached Athens from Chares, the Athenian commander at the Hellespont, intimating that Philip had gained important advantages in Thrace, had taken the important place called the Sacred Mountain, and deprived Kersobleptes of great part of his kingdom.[847] Such successive conquests on the part of Philip strengthened the reasons for despatch on the part of the envoys, and for going straight to Thrace to arrest his progress. As the peace concluded was based on the _uti possidetis_, dating from the day on which the Macedonian envoys had administered the oaths at Athens,—Philip was bound to restore all conquests made after that day. But it did not escape Demosthenes, that this was an obligation which Philip was likely to evade; and which the Athenian people, bent as they were on peace, were very unlikely to enforce.[848] The more quickly the envoys reached him, the fewer would be the places in dispute, the sooner would he be reduced to inaction,—or at least, if he still continued to act, the more speedily would his insincerity be exposed.

[844] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. οὐ τὸ μὲν ψήφισμα “οὐδαμοῦ
μόνους ἐντυγχάνειν Φιλίππῳ,” οὗτοι δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἐπαύσαντο ἰδίᾳ
χρηματίζοντες;

[845] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. Τὸ δὲ ~ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων
ὀρθῶς βουλεύσασθαι~, ὅσα καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ~ἐστιν~ ἢ Φίλιππον, τοῦτο ἤδη
ἔργον ἐστὶ πρεσβέων φρονίμων.... Ἀφίγμεθα δ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἔχοντες τοῦ
δήμου ψήφισμα, ἐν ᾧ γέγραπται, ~Πράττειν δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ
ἄλλ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν δύνωνται ἀγαθόν~.

[846] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26.

[847] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29. ὅτι Κερσοβλέπτης
ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ὄρος κατείληφε Φίλιππος.

There is no fair ground for supposing that the words ἀπολώλεκε
τὴν ἀρχὴν are the actual words used by Chares, or that
Kersobleptes was affirmed by Chares to have lost everything that
he had. It suited the argument of Æschines to give the statement
in a sweeping and exaggerated form.

[848] See the just and prudent reasoning of Demosthenes, Fals.
Leg. p. 388, and De Coronâ, p. 234.

Compare also Pseudo-Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 85, 86.

Impressed with this necessity for an immediate interview with Philip, Demosthenes urged his colleagues to set out at once. But they resisted his remonstrances, and chose to remain at Athens; which, we may remark, was probably in a state of rejoicing and festivity in consequence of the recent peace. So reckless was their procrastination and reluctance to depart, that on the 3d of the month Munychion (April—nine days after the solemnity of oath-taking before Antipater and Parmenio) Demosthenes made complaint and moved a resolution in the Senate, peremptorily ordering them to begin their journey forthwith, and enjoining Proxenus the Athenian commander at Oreus in Eubœa, to transport them without delay to the place where Philip was, wherever that might be.[849] But though the envoys were forced to leave Athens and repair to Oreus, nothing was gained in respect to the main object; for they, as well as Proxenus, took upon them to disobey the express order of the Senate, and never went to find Philip. After a certain stay at Oreus, they moved forward by leisurely journeys to Macedonia; where they remained inactive at Pella until the return of Philip from Thrace, fifty days after they had left Athens.[850]

[849] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 389; De Coronâ, p. 234. Æschines
(Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29, 30) recognizes the fact that this
decree was passed by the Senate on the 3d of Munychion, and that
the envoys left Athens in consequence of it. He does not mention
that it was proposed by Demosthenes. Æschines here confirms, in
a very important manner, the fact of the delay, as alleged by
Demosthenes, while the explanation which he gives, why the envoys
did not go to Thrace, is altogether without value.

A document, purporting to be this decree, is given in Demosth. De
Coronâ, p. 234, but the authenticity is too doubtful to admit of
citing it.

[850] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.

Had the envoys done their duty as Demosthenes recommended, they might have reached the camp of Philip in Thrace within five or six days after the conclusion of the peace at Athens; had they been even content to obey the express orders of the Senate, they might have reached it within the same interval after the 3d of Munychion; so that from pure neglect, or deliberate collusion, on their part, Philip was allowed more than a month to prosecute his conquests in Thrace, after the Athenians on their side had sworn to peace. During this interval, he captured Doriskus with several other Thracian towns; some of them garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; and completely reduced Kersobleptes, whose son he brought back as prisoner and hostage.[851] The manner in which these envoys, employed in an important mission at the public expense, wasted six weeks of a critical juncture in doing nothing—and that too in defiance of an express order from the Senate—confirms the supposition before stated, and would even of itself raise a strong presumption, that the leaders among them were lending themselves corruptly to the schemes of Philip.

[851] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 38. c. 26; Demosth. De Halonneso,
p. 85; Fals. Leg. p. 390-448: compare Philippic iii. p. 114.
Among the Thracian places captured by Philip during this
interval, Demosthenes enumerates the Sacred Mountain. But this
is said to have been captured before the end of Elaphebolion, if
Æschines quotes correctly from the letter of Chares, Fals. Leg.
p. 40. c. 29.

The protests and remonstrances addressed by Demosthenes to his colleagues, became warmer and more unmeasured as the delay was prolonged.[852] His colleagues doubtless grew angry on their side, so that the harmony of the embassy was overthrown. Æschines affirms that none of the other envoys would associate with Demosthenes, either in the road or at the resting-places.[853]

[852] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.

[853] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 30. Demosthenes (and
doubtless the other envoys also) walked on the journey, with two
slaves to carry his clothes and bedding. In the pack carried by
one slave, was a talent in money, destined to aid some of the
poor prisoners towards their ransom.

Pella was now the centre of hope, fear, and intrigue, for the entire Grecian world. Ambassadors were already there from Thebes, Sparta, Eubœa, and Phokis; moreover a large Macedonian army was assembled around, ready for immediate action.

At length the Athenian envoys, after so long a delay of their own making, found themselves in the presence of Philip. And we should have expected that they would forthwith perform their special commission by administering the oaths. But they still went on postponing this ceremony, and saying nothing about the obligation incumbent on him, to restore all the places captured since the day of taking the oaths to Antipater at Athens;[854] places, which had now indeed become so numerous, through waste of time on the part of the envoys themselves, that Philip was not likely to yield the point even if demanded. In a conference held with his colleagues, Æschines—assuming credit to himself for a view larger than that taken by them, of the ambassadorial duties—treated the administration of the oath as merely secondary; he insisted on the propriety of addressing Philip on the subject of the intended expedition to Thermopylæ (which he was on the point of undertaking, as was plain from the large force mustered near Pella), and exhorting him to employ it so as to humble Thebes and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. The envoys (he said) ought not to be afraid of braving any ill-will that might be manifested by the Thebans. Demosthenes (according to the statement of Æschines) opposed this recommendation—insisting that the envoys ought not to mingle in disputes belonging to other parts of Greece, but to confine themselves to their special mission—and declared that he should take no notice of Philip’s march to Thermopylæ.[855] At length, after much discussion, it was agreed among the envoys, that each of them, when called before Philip, should say what he thought fit, and that the youngest should speak first.

[854] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 388. ἢ γὰρ παρόντων (we the envoys)
καὶ κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα αὐτὸν (Philip) ἐξορκωσάντων, ἃ μὲν εἰλήφει
τῆς πόλεως, ἀποδώσειν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀφέξεσθαι—ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντος
ταῦτα ἀπαγγελεῖν ἡμᾶς εὐθέως δεῦρο, etc.

[855] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 33. πορεύεται Φίλιππος εἰς
Πύλας· ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐγκαλύπτομαι, etc. This is the language which
Æschines affirms to have been held by Demosthenes during the
embassy. It is totally at variance with all that Demosthenes
affirms, over and over again, respecting his own proceedings; and
(in my judgment) with all the probabilities of the case.

According to this rule, Demosthenes was first heard, and delivered a speech (if we are to believe Æschines) not only leaving out all useful comment upon the actual situation, but so spiteful towards his colleagues, and so full of extravagant flattery to Philip, as to put the hearers to shame.[856] The turn now came to Æschines, who repeats in abridgment his own long oration delivered to Philip. We can reason upon it with some confidence, in our estimate of Æschines, though we cannot trust his reports about Demosthenes. Æschines addressed himself exclusively to the subject of Philip’s intended expedition to Thermopylæ. He exhorted Philip to settle the controversy, pending with respect to the Amphiktyons and the Delphian temple, by peaceful arbitration and not by arms. But if armed interference was inevitable, Philip ought carefully to inform himself of the ancient and holy bond whereby the Amphiktyonic synod was held together. That synod consisted of twelve different nations or sections of the Hellenic name, each including many cities small as well as great; each holding two votes and no more; each binding itself by an impressive oath, to uphold and protect every other Amphiktyonic city. Under this venerable sanction, the Bœotian cities, being Amphiktyonic like the rest, were entitled to protection against the Thebans their destroyers. The purpose of Philip’s expedition, to restore the Amphiktyonic council, was (Æschines admitted) holy and just.[857] He ought to carry it through in the same spirit; punishing the individuals originally concerned in the seizure of the Delphian temple, but not the cities to which they belonged, provided those cities were willing to give up the wrong-doers. But if Philip should go beyond this point, and confirm the unjust dominion of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, he would do wrong on his own side, add to the number of his enemies, and reap no gratitude from those whom he favored.[858]

[856] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34.

[857] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν τῆς
στρατείας ταύτης ὁσίαν καὶ δικαίαν ἀπεφηνάμην εἶναι, etc.

... Ἀπεφηνάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, μὴ περιορᾷν
κατεσκαμμένας τὰς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς πόλεις, ὅτι δὴ ἦσαν Ἀμφικτυονίδες
καὶ ἔνορκοι.

[858] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37; compare Demosth. Fals.
Leg. p. 347.

Demosthenes, in his comments upon this second embassy, touches little on what either Æschines or himself said to Philip. He professes to have gone on the second embassy with much reluctance, having detected the treacherous purposes of Æschines and Philokrates. Nay, he would have positively refused to go (he tells us) had he not bound himself by a promise made during the first embassy, to some of the poor Athenian prisoners in Macedonia, to provide for them the means of release. He dwells much upon his disbursements for their ransom during the second embassy, and his efforts to obtain the consent of Philip.[859] This (he says) was all that lay in his power to do, as an individual; in regard to the collective proceedings of the embassy, he was constantly outvoted. He affirms that he detected the foul play of Æschines and the rest with Philip; that he had written a despatch to send home for the purpose of exposing it; that his colleagues not only prevented him from forwarding it, but sent another despatch of their own with false information.[860] Then, he had resolved to come home personally, for the same purpose, sooner than his colleagues, and had actually hired a merchant-vessel—but was hindered by Philip from sailing out of Macedonia.[861]

[859] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 393, 394, 395.

[860] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 396. καὶ τὴν μὲν γραφεῖσαν ἐπιστολὴν
ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπεψηφίσαντο μὴ πέμπειν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν
ὑγιὲς γράψαντες ἔπεμψαν. Compare p. 419.

[861] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 445. ἐγὼ δ᾽, ὥσπερ ἀκηκόατ᾽ ἤδη
πολλάκις, οὐχὶ δυνηθεὶς προαπελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ ~καὶ μισθωσάμενος
πλοῖον κατακωλυθεὶς ἐκπλεῦσαι~. Compare p. 357.—οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐμὲ,
ἡνίκα δεῦρο ἀποπλεῖν ἐβουλόμην, κατεκώλυεν (Philip), etc.