Chapter LXXXVI (2)

On the conclusion of this Eubœan enterprise, Chares with his mercenaries was sent forward to the Chersonese, where he at length extorted from Charidemus and Kersobleptes the evacuation of that peninsula and its cession to Athens, after a long train of dilatory manœuvres and bad faith on their part. I have in my last preceding volume, described these events, remarking at the same time that Athens attained at this moment the maximum of her renewed foreign power and second confederacy, which had begun in 378 B. C.[461] But this period of exaltation was very short. It was speedily overthrown by two important events—the Social war and the conquests of Philip in Thrace.

[461] See Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 381, 382.

The Athenian confederacy, recently strengthened by the rescue of Eubœa, numbered among its members a large proportion of the islands in the Ægean as well as the Grecian seaports in Thrace. The list included the islands Lesbos, Chios, Samos (this last now partially occupied by a body of Athenian Kleruchs or settlers), Kos and Rhodes; together with the important city of Byzantium. It was shortly after the recent success in Eubœa, that Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted from Athens by concert, raising a serious war against her, known by the name of the Social War.

Respecting the proximate causes of this outbreak, we find, unfortunately, little information. There was now, and had always been since 378 B. C., a synod of deputies from all the confederate cities habitually assembling at Athens; such as had not subsisted under the first Athenian empire in its full maturity. How far the Synod worked efficiently, we do not know. At least it must have afforded to the allies, if aggrieved, a full opportunity of making their complaints heard; and of criticising the application of the common fund, to which each of them contributed. But I have remarked in the preceding volume, that the Athenian confederacy, which had begun (378 B. C.) in a generous and equal spirit of common maritime defence,[462] had gradually become perverted, since the humiliation of the great enemy Sparta at Leuktra, towards purposes and interests more exclusively Athenian. Athens had been conquering the island of Samos—Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê, on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace—and the Thracian Chersonese; all of them acquisitions made for herself alone, without any advantage to the confederate synod—and made, too, in great part, to become the private property of her own citizens as kleruchs, in direct breach of her public resolution, passed in 378 B. C., not to permit any appropriation of lands by Athenian citizens out of Attica.

[462] Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 194. s. 17. παρὸν
αὐτοῖς (the Rhodians) Ἕλλησι καὶ ~βελτίοσιν αὐτῶν ὑμῖν ἐξ ἴσου
συμμαχεῖν~, etc.

In proportion as Athens came to act more for her own separate aggrandizement, and less for interests common to the whole confederacy, the adherence of the larger confederate states grew more and more reluctant. But what contributed yet farther to detach them from Athens, was, the behavior of her armaments on service, consisting in great proportion of mercenaries, scantily and irregularly paid; whose disorderly and rapacious exaction, especially at the cost of the confederates of Athens, are characterized in strong terms by all the contemporary orators—Demosthenes, Æschines, Isokrates, etc. The commander, having no means of paying his soldiers, was often compelled to obey their predatory impulses, and conduct them to the easiest place from whence money could be obtained; indeed, some of the commanders, especially Chares, were themselves not less ready than their soldiers to profit by such depredations.[463] Hence the armaments sent out by Athens sometimes saw little of the enemy whom they were sent to combat, preferring the easier and more lucrative proceeding of levying contributions from friends, and of plundering the trading-vessels met with at sea. Nor was it practicable for Athens to prevent such misconduct, when her own citizens refused to serve personally, and when she employed foreigners, hired for the occasion, but seldom regularly paid.[464] The suffering, alarm, and alienation arising from hence among the confederates, was not less mischievous than discreditable to Athens. We cannot doubt that complaints in abundance were raised in the confederate synod; but they must have been unavailing, since the abuse continued until the period shortly preceding the battle of Chæroneia.

[463] Diodor. xv. 95.

[464] Demosthenes, Philip, i. 46. s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους,
οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασιν. Καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ
τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον ἢ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον οἴχεται
πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν
μὴ διδόντα μισθόν.

Ibid. p. 53. s. 51. Ὅποι δ᾽ ἂν στρατηγὸν καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ
τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμψητε, οὐδὲν ὑμῖν τῶν δεόντων
γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ~οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνᾶσι
τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους~.

Ibid. p. 53. s. 53. Νῦν δ᾽ εἰς τοῦθ᾽ ἥκει τὰ πράγματα αἰσχύνης,
ὥστε τῶν στρατηγῶν ἕκαστος δὶς καὶ τρὶς κρίνεται παρ᾽ ὑμῖν περὶ
θανάτου, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐδεὶς οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ αὐτῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι
περὶ θανάτου τολμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ λωποδυτῶν
θάνατον μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται τοῦ προσήκοντος.

Compare Olynthiac ii. p. 26. s. 28; De Chersoneso, p. 95. s.
24-27, cont. Aristokrat. p. 639. s. 69; De Republ. Ordinand. περὶ
Συντάξεως, p. 167. s. 7. Also Æschines de Fals. Legat. p. 264. c.
24; Isokrates, De Pace, s. 57. 160.

Amidst such apparent dispositions on the part of Athens to neglect the interests of the confederacy for purposes of her own and to tolerate or encourage the continued positive depredations of unpaid armaments—discontent naturally grew up, manifesting itself most powerfully among some of the larger dependencies near the Asiatic coast. The islands of Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, together with the important city of Byzantium on the Thracian Bosphorus, took counsel together, and declared themselves detached from Athens and her confederacy. According to the spirit of the convention, sworn at Sparta, immediately before the battle of Leuktra, and of the subsequent alliance, sworn at Athens, a few months afterwards[465]—obligatory and indefeasible confederacies stood generally condemned among the Greeks, so that these islands were justified in simply seceding when they thought fit. But their secession, which probably Athens would, under all circumstances, have resisted, was proclaimed in a hostile manner, accompanied with accusations of treacherous purposes on her part against them. It was moreover fomented by the intrigues, as well as aided by the arms, of the Karian prince Mausôlus.[466] Since the peace of Antalkidas, the whole Asiatic coast had been under the unresisted dominion either of satraps or subordinate princes dependent upon Persia, who were watching for opportunities of extending their conquests in the neighboring islands. Mausôlus appears to have occupied both Rhodes and Kos; provoking in the former island a revolution which placed it under an oligarchy, not only devoted to him, but farther sustained by the presence of a considerable force of his mercenary troops.[467] The government of Chios appears to have been always oligarchical; which fact was one ground for want of sympathy between the Chians and Athens. Lastly, the Byzantines had also a special ground for discontent; since they assumed the privilege of detaining and taxing the corn-ships from the Euxine in their passage through the Bosphorus[468]—while Athens, as chief of the insular confederacy, claimed that right for herself, and at any rate protested against the use of such power by any other city for its own separate profit.

[465] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 3, 18; vi. 5, 2.

[466] Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 191. s. 3. ᾐτιάσαντο
γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὑτοῖς Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι, καὶ
διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τουτονὶ πόλεμον·
φανήσεται δ᾽ ὁ μὲν πρυτανεύσας ταῦτα καὶ πείσας Μαύσωλος, φίλος
εἶναι φάσκων Ῥοδίων, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῶν ἀφῃρημένος.

[467] Demosthen. de Rhodior. Libert. p. 195. s. 17. p. 198 s. 34;
de Pace, p. 63. s. 25; Diodor. xvi. 7.

[468] Demosthen. de Pace, p. 63. s. 25. (ἐῶμεν) τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς
νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ ~Βυζαντίους
κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα~, etc.

Compare Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1207 s. 6. p. 1211. s. 22;
adv. Leptinem, p. 475. s. 68.

This revolt, the beginning of what is termed the Social War, was a formidable shock to the foreign ascendency of Athens. Among all her confederates, Chios was the largest and most powerful, the entire island being under one single government. Old men, like Plato and Isokrates, might perhaps recollect the affright occasioned at Athens fifty-four years before (B. C. 412) by the news of the former revolt of Chios,[469] shortly after the great disaster before Syracuse. And probably the alarm was not much less, when the Athenians were now apprised of the quadruple defection among their confederates near the Asiatic coast. The joint armament of all four was mustered at Chios, whither Mausôlus also sent a reinforcement. The Athenians equipped a fleet with land-forces on board, to attack the island; and on this critical occasion we may presume that their citizens would overcome the reluctance to serve in person. Chabrias was placed in command of the fleet, Chares of the land-force; the latter was disembarked on the island, and a joint attack upon the town of Chios, by sea and land at the same moment, was concerted. When Chares marched up to the walls, the Chians and their allies felt strong enough to come forth and hazard a battle, with no decisive result; while Chabrias at the same time attempted with the fleet to force his way into the harbor. But the precautions for defence had been effectively taken, and the Chian seamen were resolute. Chabrias, leading the attack with his characteristic impetuosity, became entangled among the enemy’s vessels, was attacked on all sides, and fell gallantly fighting. The other Athenian ships either were not forward in following him, or could make no impression. Their attack completely failed, and the fleet was obliged to retire, with little loss apparently, except that of the brave admiral. Chares with his land-force having been again taken aboard, the Athenians forthwith sailed away from Chios.[470]

[469] Thucyd. viii. 15.

[470] The account of this event comes to us in a meagre and
defective manner, Diodorus xvi. 7; Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c.
4; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6.

Demosthenes, in an harangue delivered three years afterwards,
mentions the death of Chabrias, and eulogizes his conduct at
Chios among his other glorious deeds; but gives no particulars
(Demosth. cont. Leptin. p. 481, 482).

Cornelius Nepos says that Chabrias was not commander, but
only serving as a private soldier on shipboard. I think this
less probable than the statement of Diodorus, that he was
joint-commander with Chares.

This repulse at Chios was a serious misfortune to Athens. Such was the dearth of military men and the decline of the military spirit, in that city, that the loss of a warlike citizen, daring as a soldier and tried as a commander, like Chabrias, was never afterwards repaired. To the Chians and their allies, on the other hand, the event was highly encouraging. They were enabled, not merely to maintain their revolt, but even to obtain fresh support, and to draw into the like defection other allies of Athens,—among them, seemingly, Sestos, and other cities on the Hellespont. For some months they appear to have remained masters of the sea, with a fleet of one hundred triremes, disembarking and inflicting devastation on the Athenian islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, and elsewhere, so as to collect a sum for defraying their expenses. They were even strong enough to press the town of Samos, by close siege, until at length the Athenians, not without delay and difficulty, got together a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, under the joint command of Chares, Iphikrates with his son Menestheus, and Timotheus. Notwithstanding that Samos was under siege, the Athenian admirals thought it prudent to direct their first efforts to the reduction of Byzantium; probably from the paramount importance of keeping open the two straits between the Euxine and the Ægean, in order that the corn-ships, out of the former, might come through in safety.[471] To protect Byzantium, the Chians and their allies raised the siege of Samos, and sailed forthwith to the Hellespont, in which narrow strait both fleets were collected,—as the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. A plan of naval action had been concerted by the three Athenian commanders, and was on the point of taking place, when there supervened a sudden storm, which in the judgment both of Iphikrates and Timotheus, rendered it rash and perilous to persist in the execution. They therefore held off, while Chares, judging differently, called upon the trierachs and seamen to follow him, and rushed into the fight without his colleagues. He was defeated, or at least was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything. But so incensed was he against his two colleagues, that he wrote a despatch to Athens accusing them of corruption and culpable backwardness against the enemy.[472]

[471] It appears that there was a great and general scarcity of
corn during this year 357 B. C. Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p.
467. s. 38. ~προπέρυσι~ σιτοδείας παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γενομένης,
etc. That oration was delivered in 355 B. C.

[472] I follow chiefly the account given of these transactions
by Diodorus, meagre and unsatisfactory as it is (xvi. 21). Nepos
(Timotheus, c. 3) differs from Diodorus on several points. He
states that both Samos and the Hellespont had revolted from
Athens; and that the locality in which Chares made his attack,
contrary to the judgment of his two colleagues, was near
Samos—not in the Hellespont. He affirms farther that Menestheus,
son of Iphikrates, was named as colleague of Chares; and that
Iphikrates and Timotheus were appointed as advisers of Menestheus.

As to the last assertion—that Timotheus only served as adviser to
his junior relative and not as a general formally named—this is
not probable in itself; nor seemingly consistent with Isokrates
(Or. xv. De Permutat. s. 137), who represents Timotheus as
afterwards passing through the usual trial of accountability.
Nor can Nepos be correct in saying that Samos had now revolted:
for we find it still in possession of Athens after the Social
War, and we know that a fresh batch of Athenian Kleruchs were
afterwards sent there.

On the other hand, I think Nepos is probably right in his
assertion, that the Hellespont now revolted (“descierat
Hellespontus”). This is a fact in itself noway improbable, and
helping us to understand how it happened that Chares conquered
Sestos afterwards in 353 B. C. (Diodor. xvi. 34), and that the
Athenians are said to have _then_ recovered the Chersonesus from
Kersobleptes.

Polyænus (iii. 9, 29) has a story representing the reluctance of
Iphikrates to fight, as having been manifested near Embata; a
locality not agreeing either with Nepos or with Diodorus. Embata
was on the continent of Asia, in the territory of Erythræ.

See respecting the relations of Athens with Sestos, my last
preceding volume, Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 380 note.

Our evidence respecting this period is so very defective, that
nothing like certainty is attainable.

The three joint admirals were thus placed not merely in opposition, but in bitter conflict, among themselves. At the trial of accountability, undergone by all of them not long afterwards at Athens, Chares stood forward as the formal accuser of his two colleagues, who in their turn also accused him. He was seconded in his attack by Aristophon, one of the most practised orators of the day. Both of them charged Iphikrates and Timotheus with having received bribes from the Chians and Rhodians,[473] and betrayed their trust; by deserting Chares at the critical moment when it had been determined beforehand to fight, and when an important success might have been gained.

[473] Deinarchus cont. Philokl. s. 17. ἕκατον ταλάντων τιμήσαντες
(Τιμόθεον), ὅτι χρήματ᾽ αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι
καὶ Ῥοδίων: compare Deinarch. cont. Demosthen. s. 15, where the
same charge of bribery is alluded to, though αὐτὸς ἔφη is put
in place of αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη, seemingly by mistake of the
transcriber.

How the justice of the case stood, we cannot decide. The characters of Iphikrates and Timotheus raise strong presumption that they were in the right and their accuser in the wrong. Yet it must be recollected that the Athenian public, (and probably every other public,—ancient or modern,—Roman, English, or French), would naturally sympathize with the forward and daring admiral, who led the way into action, fearing neither the storm nor the enemy, and calling upon his colleagues to follow. Iphikrates and Timotheus doubtless insisted upon the rashness of his proceedings, and set forth the violence of the gale. But this again would be denied by Chares, and would stand as a point where the evidence was contradictory; captains and seamen being produced as witnesses on both sides, and the fleet being probably divided into two opposing parties. The feelings of the Athenian Dikasts might naturally be, that Iphikrates and Timotheus ought never to have let their colleague go into action unassisted, even though they disapproved of the proceeding. Iphikrates defended himself partly by impeaching the behavior of Chares, partly by bitter retort upon his other accuser Aristophon. “Would _you_ (he asked), betray the fleet for money?” “No,” was the reply. “Well, then, _you_, Aristophon, would not betray the fleet; shall _I_, Iphikrates do so?”[474]

[474] See Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 24; iii. 10. Quintilian, Inst.
Or. v. 12, 10.

The issue of this important cause was, that Iphikrates was acquitted, while Timotheus was found guilty and condemned to the large fine of one hundred talents. Upon what causes such difference of sentence turned, we make out imperfectly. And it appears that Iphikrates, far from exonerating himself by throwing blame on Timotheus, emphatically assumed the responsibility of the whole proceeding; while his son, Menestheus tendered an accurate account within his own knowledge, of all the funds received and disbursed by the army.[475]

[475] Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 137. εἰ τοσαύτας μὲν
πόλεις ἑλόντα, μηδεμίαν δ᾽ ἀπολέσαντα, περὶ προδοσίας ἔκρινε (ἡ
πόλις Τιμόθεον), καὶ πάλιν εἰ διδόντος εὐθύνας αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰς μὲν
πράξεις Ἰφικράτους ἀναδεχομένου, τὸν δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων λόγον
Μενεσθέως, τούτους μὲν ἀπέλυσε, Τιμόθεον δὲ τοσούτοις ἐζημίωσε
χρήμασιν, ὅσοις οὐδένα πώποτε τῶν προγεγενημένων.

The cause assigned by Isokrates, the personal friend of Timotheus, is, the extreme unpopularity of the latter in the city. Though as a general and on foreign service, Timotheus conducted himself not only with scrupulous justice to every one, but with rare forbearance towards the maritime allies whom other generals vexed and plundered,—yet at home his demeanor was intolerably arrogant and offensive, especially towards the leading speakers who took part in public affairs. While recognized as a man of ability and as a general who had rendered valuable service, he had thus incurred personal unpopularity and made numerous enemies; chiefly among those most able to do him harm. Isokrates tells us that he had himself frequently remonstrated with Timotheus (as Plato admonished Dion), on this serious fault, which overclouded his real ability, caused him to be totally misunderstood, and laid up against him a fund of popular dislike sure to take melancholy effect on some suitable occasion. Timotheus (according to Isokrates), though admitting the justice of the reproof, was unable to conquer his own natural disposition.[476] If such was the bearing of this eminent man, as described by his intimate friend, we may judge how it would incense unfriendly politicians and even indifferent persons who knew him only from his obvious exterior. Iphikrates, though by nature a proud man, was more discreet and conciliatory in his demeanor, and more alive to the mischief of political odium.[477] Moreover, he seems to have been an effective speaker[478] in public, and his popularity among the military men in Athens was so marked, that on this very trial many of them manifested their sympathy by appearing in arms near the Dikastery.[479] Under these circumstances, we may easily understand that Chares and Aristophon might find it convenient to press their charge more pointedly against Timotheus than against Iphikrates; and that the Dikastery, while condemning the former, may have been less convinced of the guilt of the latter, and better satisfied in every way to acquit him.[480]

[476] Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 146. Ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀκούων
ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔφασκέ με λέγειν, οὐ μὴν οἷός τ᾽ ἦν τὴν φύσιν
μεταβαλεῖν, etc.

Isokrates goes at some length into the subject from s. 137 to s.
147. The discourse was composed seemingly in 353 B. C., about one
year after the death of Timotheus, and four years after the trial
here described.

[477] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 534, 535; Xenoph. Hellen. vi.
2. 39.

[478] Dionysius Halikarnass., Judicium de Lysiâ, p. 481; Justin,
vi. 5. Aristotle in his Rhetorica borrows several illustrations
on rhetorical points from the speeches of Iphikrates; but none
from any speeches of Timotheus.

[479] Polyænus, iii. 9, 29. That this may have been done with
the privity and even by the contrivance of Iphikrates, is
probable enough. But it seems to me that any obvious purpose of
intimidating the Dikastery would have been likely to do him more
harm than good.

[480] Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 224
_seqq._), while collecting and discussing instructively all the
facts respecting these two commanders, places the date of this
memorable trial in the year 354 B. C.; three years after the
events to which it relates, and two years after the peace which
concluded the Social War. Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hellenici, B. C.
354) gives the same statement. I dissent from their opinion on
the date and think that the trial must have occurred very soon
after the abortive battle in the Hellespont—that is in 357 B. C.
(or 356 B. C.), while the Social War was still going on.

Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton rely on the statement of Dionysius
Halikarnass. (De Dinarcho Judicium, p. 667). Speaking of an
oration falsely ascribed to Deinarchus, Dionysius says, that
it was spoken before the maturity of that orator—εἴρηται γὰρ
ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζῶντος, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς μετὰ
Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας, ἐφ᾽ ᾗ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑποσχὼν, ἑάλω. Τιμόθεος
δὲ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχηκεν ἐπὶ Διοτίμου, τοῦ μετὰ Καλλίστρατον, ὅτε
καὶ.... These are the last words in the MS., so that the sentence
stands defective; Mr. Clinton supplies ἐτελεύτησεν, which is very
probable.

The archonship of Diotimus is in 354-353 B. C.; so that Dionysius
here states the trial to have taken place in 354 B. C. But on
the other hand, the same Dionysius, in another passage, states
the same trial to have taken place while the Social War was yet
going on; that is, some time between 358 and 355 B. C. De Lysiâ
Judicium, p. 480. ἐν γὰρ τῷ συμμαχικῷ πολέμῳ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν
Ἰφικράτης ἠγώνισται, καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχηκε τῆς στρατηγίας,
~ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γίγνεται καταφανές~· οὗτος δὲ ὁ πόλεμος
πίπτει κατὰ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Ἐλπίνην ἄρχοντας. The archonships of
Agathokles and Elpines cover the interval between Midsummer 357
B. C. and Midsummer 355 B. C.

It is plain that these two passages of Dionysius contradict
each other. Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton notice the contradiction,
but treat the passage first cited as containing the truth, and
the other as erroneous. I cannot but think that the passage
last cited is entitled to most credit, and that the true date
of the trial was 357-356 B. C., not 354 B. C. When Dionysius
asserts that the trial took place while the Social War was yet
going on, he adds, “as is evident from the speech itself—ὡς ἐξ
αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τοῦ λόγου καταφανές.” Here therefore there was no
possibility of being misled by erroneous tables; the evidence
is direct and complete; whereas he does not tell us on what
authority he made the other assertion, about the archonship of
Diotimus. Next, it is surely improbable that the abortive combat
in the Hellespont, and the fierce quarrel between Chares and
his colleagues, probably accompanied with great excitement in
the fleet, could have remained without judicial settlement for
three years. Lastly, assuming the statement about the archonship
of Diotimus to be a mistake, we can easily see how the mistake
arose. Dionysius has confounded the year in which Timotheus died,
with the year of his trial. He seems to have died in 354 B. C. I
will add that the text in this passage is not beyond suspicion.

A fine of one hundred talents is said to have been imposed upon Timotheus, the largest fine (according to Isokrates), ever imposed at Athens. Upon his condemnation he retired to Chalkis, where he died three years afterwards, in 354 B. C. In the year succeeding his death, his memory was still very unpopular; yet it appears that the fine was remitted to his family, and that his son Konon was allowed to compromise the demand by a disbursement of the smaller sum of ten talents for the repairs of the city walls. It seems evident that Timotheus by his retirement evaded payment of the full fine; so that his son Konon appears after him as one of the richest citizens in Athens.[481]

[481] Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. c. 4; Rehdantz, Vit. Iph., Ch. et
Timoth. p. 235; Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 108, 110. 137.

The loss of such a citizen as Timotheus was a fresh misfortune to her. He had conducted her armies with signal success, maintained the honor of her name throughout the eastern and western seas, and greatly extended the list of her foreign allies. She had recently lost Chabrias in battle; a second general, Timotheus, was now taken from her; and the third, Iphikrates, though acquitted at the last trial, seems, as far as we can make out, never to have been subsequently employed on military command. These three were the last eminent military citizens at Athens; for Phokion, though brave and deserving, was not to be compared with either of them. On the other hand, Chares, a man of great personal courage, but of no other merit, was now in the full swing of reputation. The recent judicial feud between the three Athenian admirals had been doubly injurious to Athens, first as discrediting Iphikrates and Timotheus, next as exalting Chares, to whom the sole command was now confided.

In the succeeding year, 356 B. C., Chares conducted another powerful fleet to attack the revolted allies. Being however not furnished with adequate funds from home to pay his troops, chiefly foreign mercenaries, he thought it expedient, on his own responsibility, to accept an offer from Artabazus (satrap of Daskylium and the region south of the Propontis), then in revolt against the Persian king.[482] Chares joined Artabazus with his own army, reinforced by additional bodies of mercenaries recently disbanded by the Persian satraps. With this entire force he gave battle to the king’s troops under the command of Tithraustes, and gained a splendid victory; upon which Artabazus remunerated him so liberally, as to place the whole Athenian army in temporary affluence. The Athenians at home were at first much displeased with their general, for violating his instructions, and withdrawing his army from its prescribed and legitimate task. The news of his victory, however, and of the lucrative recompense following it, somewhat mollified them. But presently they learned that the Persian king, indignant at such a gratuitous aggression on their part, was equipping a large fleet to second the operations of their enemies. Intimidated by the prospect of Persian attack, they became anxious to conclude a peace with the revolted allies; who, on their part, were not less anxious to terminate the war. Embassies being exchanged, and negotiations opened, in the ensuing year (355 B. C., the third of the war), a peace was sworn, whereby the Athenians recognized the complete autonomy, and severance from their confederacy, of the revolted cities, Chios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantium.[483]

[482] Diodor. xvi. 22. Demosthenes (Philippic. i. p. 46. s. 28)
has an emphatic passage, alluding to this proceeding on the part
of Chares; which he represents as a necessary result of the
remissness of the Athenians, who would neither serve personally
themselves, nor supply their general with money to pay his
foreign troops—and as a measure which the general could not avoid.

... ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς
φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος
γεγόνασιν, καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, ~πρὸς
Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον~ οἴχεται πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς
ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν, μὴ διδόντα μισθόν.
Compare the Scholia on the same oration, a passage which occurs
somewhat earlier, p. 44. s. 22.

It seems evident, from this passage, that the Athenians were at
first displeased with such diversion from the regular purpose of
the war, though the payment from Artabazus afterwards partially
reconciled them to it; which is somewhat different from the
statement of Diodorus.

From an inscription (cited in Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ,
etc., p. 158) we make out that Chares, Charidemus, and Phokion,
were about this time in joint-command of the Athenian fleet near
Lesbos, and that they were in some negotiation as to pecuniary
supplies with the Persian Orontes on the mainland. But the
inscription is so mutilated, that no distinct matter of fact can
be ascertained.

[483] Diodor. xvi. 22. I place little reliance on the Argument
prefixed to the Oration of Isokrates De Pace. As far as I am
able to understand the facts of this obscure period, it appears
to me that the author of that Argument has joined them together
erroneously, and misconceived the situation.

The assertion of Demosthenes, in the Oration against Leptines (p.
481. s. 90), respecting the behavior of the Chians towards the
memory of Chabrias, seems rather to imply that the peace with
Chios had been concluded before that oration was delivered. It
was delivered in the very year of the peace 355 B. C.

Such was the termination of the Social War, which fatally impaired the power, and lowered the dignity, of Athens. Imperfectly as we know the events, it seems clear that her efforts to meet this formidable revolt were feeble and inadequate; evincing a sad downfall of energy since the year 412 B. C., when she had contended with transcendent vigor against similar and even greater calamities, only a year after her irreparable disaster before Syracuse. Inglorious as the result of the Social War was, it had nevertheless been costly, and left Athens poor. The annual revenues of her confederacy were greatly lessened by the secession of so many important cities, and her public treasury was exhausted. It is just at this time that the activity of Demosthenes as a public adviser begins. In a speech delivered this year (355 B. C.), he notes the poverty of the treasury; and refers back to it in discourses of after time as a fact but too notorious.[484]

[484] Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 464. s. 26, 27; and De
Coronâ, p. 305 s. 293.

But the misfortunes arising to Athens from the Social War did not come alone. It had the farther effect of rendering her less competent for defence against the early aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

That prince, during the first year of his accession (359 B. C.), had sought to conciliate Athens by various measures, but especially by withdrawing his garrison from Amphipolis, while he was establishing his military strength in the interior against the Illyrians and Pæonians. He had employed in this manner a period apparently somewhat less than two years; and employed it with such success, as to humble his enemies in the interior, and get together a force competent for aggressive operations against the cities on the coast. During this interval, Amphipolis remained a free and independent city; formally renounced by Philip, and not assailed by the Athenians. Why they let slip this favorable opportunity of again enforcing by arms pretensions on which they laid so much stress—I have before partially (though not very satisfactorily) explained. Philip was not the man to let them enjoy the opportunity longer than he could help, or to defer the moment of active operations as they did. Towards the close of 358 B. C., finding his hands free from impediments in the interior, he forthwith commenced the siege of Amphipolis. The inhabitants are said to have been unfavorably disposed towards him, and to have given him many causes for war.[485] It is not easy to understand what these causes could have been, seeing that so short a time before, the town had been garrisoned by Macedonians invoked as protectors against Athens; nor were the inhabitants in any condition to act aggressively against Philip.

[485] Diodor. xvi. 8.

Having in vain summoned Amphipolis to surrender, Philip commenced a strenuous siege, assailing the walls with battering-rams and other military engines. The weak points of the fortification must have been well known to him, from his own soldiers who had been recently in garrison. The inhabitants defended themselves with vigor; but such was now the change of circumstances, that they were forced to solicit their ancient enemy Athens for aid against the Macedonian prince. Their envoys Hierax and Stratokles, reaching Athens shortly after the successful close of the Athenian expedition to Eubœa, presented themselves before the public assembly, urgently inviting the Athenians to come forthwith and occupy Amphipolis, as the only chance of rescue from Macedonian dominion.[486] We are not certain whether the Social War had yet broken out; if it had, Athens would be too much pressed with anxieties arising out of so formidable a revolt, to have means disposable even for the tempting recovery of the long-lost Amphipolis. But at any rate Philip had foreseen and counterworked the prayers of the Amphipolitans. He sent a courteous letter to the Athenians, acquainting them that he was besieging the town, yet recognizing it as belonging of right to them, and promising to restore it to them when he should have succeeded in the capture.[487]

[486] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 8 ... εἰ γὰρ, ὅθ᾽
ἥκομεν Εὐβοεῦσι βεβοηθηκότες καὶ παρῆσαν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν Ἱέραξ
καὶ Στρατοκλῆς ἐπὶ τουτὶ τὸ βῆμα, κελεύοντες ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ
παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πόλιν, τὴν αὐτὴν παρειχόμεθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν
προθυμίαν ἥνπερ ὑπὲρ τῆς Εὐβοέων σωτηρίας, εἴχετ᾽ ἂν Ἀμφίπολιν
τότε καὶ πάντων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἦτε ἀπαλλαγμένοι πραγμάτων.

[487] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 659. s. 138. ... κἀκεῖνο
εἰδότες, ὅτι Φίλιππος, ὅτε μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρκει, ἵν᾽
ὑμῖν παραδῷ, πολιορκεῖν ἔφη· ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἔλαβε, καὶ Ποτείδαιαν
προσαφείλετο.

Also the Oration De Halonneso, p. 83. s. 28. ... τῆς δ᾽
ἐπιστολῆς, ἣν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔπεμψεν (Philip) ὅτ᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν
ἐπολιόρκει, ἐπιλέλησται, ἐν ᾗ ὡμολόγει τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ὑμετέραν
εἶναι· ἔφη γὰρ ἐκπολιορκήσας ὑμῖν ἀποδώσειν ὡς οὖσαν ὑμετέραν,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων.

Much of the future history of Greece turned upon the manner in which Athens dealt with these two conflicting messages. The situation of Amphipolis, commanding the passage over the Strymon, was not only all-important—as shutting up Macedonia to the eastward and as opening the gold regions around Mount Pangæus—but was also easily defensible by the Athenians from seaward, if once acquired. Had they been clear-sighted in the appreciation of chances, and vigilant in respect to future defence, they might now have acquired this important place, and might have held it against the utmost efforts of Philip. But that fatal inaction which had become their general besetting sin, was on the present occasion encouraged by some plausible, yet delusive, pleas. The news of the danger of the Amphipolitans would be not unwelcome at Athens—where strong aversion was entertained towards them, as refractory occupants of a territory not their own, and as having occasioned repeated loss and humiliation to the Athenian arms. Nor could the Athenians at once shift their point of view, so as to contemplate the question on the ground of policy alone, and to recognize these old enemies as persons whose interests had now come into harmony with their own. On the other hand, the present temper of the Athenians towards Philip was highly favorable. Not only had they made peace with him during the preceding year, but they also felt that he had treated them well both in evacuating Amphipolis and in dismissing honorably their citizens who had been taken prisoners in the army of his competitor Argæus.[488] Hence they were predisposed to credit his positive assurance, that he only wished to take the place in order to expel a troublesome population who had wronged and annoyed him, and that he would readily hand it over to its rightful owners the Athenians. To grant the application of the Amphipolitans for aid, would thus appear, at Athens, to be courting a new war and breaking with a valuable friend, in order to protect an odious enemy, and to secure an acquisition which would at all events come to them, even if they remained still, through the cession of Philip. It is necessary to dwell upon the motives which determined Athens on this occasion to refrain from interference; since there were probably few of her resolutions which she afterwards more bitterly regretted. The letter of assurance from Philip was received and trusted; the envoys from Amphipolis were dismissed with a refusal.

[488] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144.

Deprived of all hope of aid from Athens, the Amphipolitans still held out as long as they could. But a party in the town entered into correspondence with Philip to betray it, and the defence thus gradually became feebler. At length he made a breach in the walls, sufficient, with the aid of partisans within, to carry the city by assault, not without a brave resistance from those who still remained faithful. All the citizens unfriendly to him were expelled or fled, the rest were treated with lenity; but we are told that little favor was shown by Philip towards those who had helped in the betrayal.[489]

[489] Diodor. xvi. 8, with the passage from Libanius cited in
Wesseling’s note. Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5.

Hierax and Stratokles were the Amphipolitan envoys despatched to
Athens to ask for aid against Philip. An Inscription yet remains,
recording the sentence of perpetual banishment of Philo and
Stratokles. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2008.

Amphipolis was to Philip an acquisition of unspeakable importance, not less for defence than for offence. It was not only the most convenient maritime station in Thrace, but it also threw open to him all the country east of the Strymon, and especially the gold region near Mount Pangæus. He established himself firmly in his new position, which continued from henceforward one of the bulwarks of Macedonia, until the conquest of that kingdom by the Romans. He took no steps to fulfil his promise of handing over the place to the Athenians, who doubtless sent embassies to demand it. The Social War, indeed, which just now broke out, absorbed all their care and all their forces, so that they were unable, amidst their disastrous reverses at Chios and elsewhere, to take energetic measures in reference to Philip and Amphipolis. Nevertheless he still did not peremptorily refuse the surrender, but continued to amuse the Athenians with delusive hopes, suggested through his partisans, paid or voluntary, in the public assembly.

It was the more necessary for him to postpone any open breach with Athens, because the Olynthians had conceived serious alarm from his conquest of Amphipolis, and had sent to negotiate a treaty of amity and alliance with the Athenians. Such an alliance, had it been concluded, would have impeded the farther schemes of Philip. But his partisans at Athens procured the dismissal of the Olynthian envoys, by renewed assurances that the Macedonian prince was still the friend of Athens, and still disposed to cede Amphipolis as her legitimate possession. They represented, however, that he had good ground for complaining that Athens continued to retain Pydna, an ancient Macedonian seaport.[490] Accordingly they proposed to open negotiations with him for the exchange of Pydna against Amphipolis. But as the Pydnæans were known to be adverse to the transfer, secrecy was indispensable in the preliminary proceedings, so that Antiphon and Charidemus, the two envoys named, took their instructions from the Senate and made their reports only to the Senate. The public assembly being informed that negotiations, unavoidably secret, were proceeding, to ensure the acquisition of Amphipolis—was persuaded to repel the advances of Olynthus, as well as to look upon Philip still as a friend.[491]

[490] Thucyd. i. 61, 137; Diodor. xiii. 49. Pydna had been
acquired to Athens by Timotheus.

[491] This secret negotiation, about the exchange of Pydna for
Amphipolis, is alluded to briefly by Demosthenes, and appears to
have been fully noticed by Theopompus (Demosthenes, Olynth. ii.
p. 19. s. 6. with the comments of Ulpian; Theopompus, Fr. 189,
ed. Didot).

The proffered alliance of the Olynthians was thus rejected, as the entreaty of the Amphipolitans for aid had previously been. Athens had good reason to repent of both. The secret negotiation brought her no nearer to the possession of Amphipolis. It ended in nothing, or in worse than nothing, as it amused her with delusive expectations, while Philip opened a treaty with the Olynthians, irritated, of course, by their recent repulse at Athens. As yet he had maintained pacific relations with the Athenians, even while holding Amphipolis contrary to his engagement. But he now altered his policy, and contracted alliance with the Olynthians; whose friendship he purchased not only by ceding to them the district of Anthemus (lying between Olynthus and Therma, and disputed by the Olynthians with former Macedonian kings), but also by conquering and handing over to them the important Athenian possession of Potidæa.[492] We know no particulars of these important transactions. Our scanty authorities merely inform us, that during the first two years (358-356 B. C.), while Athens was absorbed by her disastrous Social War, Philip began to act as her avowed enemy. He conquered from her not only Pydna and other places for himself, but also Potidæa for the Olynthians. We are told that Pydna was betrayed to Philip by a party of traitors in the town;[493] and he probably availed himself of the secret propositions made by Athens respecting the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, to exasperate the Pydnæans against her bad faith; since they would have good ground for resenting the project of transferring them underhand, contrary to their own inclination. Pydna was the first place besieged and captured. Several of its inhabitants, on the ground of prior offence towards Macedonia,[494] are said to have been slain, while even those who had betrayed the town were contemptuously treated. The siege lasted long enough to transmit news to Athens, and to receive aid, had the Athenians acted with proper celerity in despatching forces. But either the pressure of the Social War—or the impatience of personal service as well as of pecuniary payment—or both causes operating together—made them behindhand with the exigency. Several Athenian citizens were taken in Pydna and sold into slavery, some being ransomed by Demosthenes out of his own funds; yet we cannot make out clearly that any relief at all was sent from Athens.[495] If any was sent, it came too late.

[492] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22.

[493] Demosthen. adv. Leptinem, p. 476. s. 71. ... φέρε δὴ
κἀκεῖνο ἐξετάσωμεν, οἱ προδόντες τὴν Πύδναν καὶ τἄλλα χωρία τῷ
Φιλίππῳ τῷ ποτ᾽ ἐπαρθέντες ὑμᾶς ἠδίκουν; ἢ πᾶσι πρόδηλον τοῦτο,
ὅτι ταῖς παρ᾽ ἐκείνου δωρειαῖς, ἃς διὰ ταῦτα ἔσεσθαι σφίσιν
ἡγοῦντο;

Compare Olynthiac i. p. 10. s. 5.

This discourse was pronounced in 355 B. C., thus affording
confirmatory evidence of the date assigned to the surrender of
Pydna and Potidæa.

What the “other places” here alluded to by Demosthenes are
(besides Pydna and Potidæa), we do not know. It appears by
Diodorus (xvi. 31) that Methônê was not taken till 354-353 B. C.

[494] The conquests of Philip are always enumerated by
Demosthenes in this order, Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê,
etc., Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9. p. 12. s. 13; Philippic i. p. 41.
s. 6; De Coronâ, p. 248. s. 85.

See Ulpian ad Demosthenem, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5; also Diodor.
xvi. 8 and Wesseling’s note.

[495] In the public vote of gratitude passed many years
afterwards by the Athenian assembly towards Demosthenes, his
merits are recited; and among them we find this contribution
towards the relief of captives at Pydna, Methônê, and Olynthus
(Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 851).

Equal tardiness was shown in the relief sent to Potidæa[496]—though the siege, carried on jointly by Philip and the Olynthians, was both long and costly[497]—and though there were a body of Athenian settlers (Kleruchs) resident there, whom the capture of the place expelled from their houses and properties.[498] Even for the rescue of these fellow-citizens, it does not appear that any native Athenians would undertake the burden of personal service; the relieving force despatched seems to have consisted of a general with mercenary foreigners; who, as no pay was provided for them, postponed the enterprise on which they were sent to the temptation of plundering elsewhere for their own profit.[499] It was thus that Philip, without any express declaration of war, commenced a series of hostile measures against Athens, and deprived her of several valuable maritime possessions on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace, besides his breach of faith respecting the cession of Amphipolis.[500] After her losses from the Social War, and her disappointment about Amphipolis, she was yet farther mortified by seeing Pydna pass into his hands, and Potidæa (the most important possession in Thrace next to Amphipolis) into those of Olynthus. Her impoverished settlers returned home, doubtless with bitter complaint against the aggression, but also with just vexation against the tardiness of their countrymen in sending relief.

[496] Compare Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9; Philippic
i. p. 50. s. 40 (where he mentions the expedition to Potidæa as
having come too late, but does not mention any expedition for
relief of Pydna.)

[497] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 128. πρὸς ὑμᾶς
πολεμῶν, χρήματα πολλὰ ἀναλώσας (Philip, in the siege of
Potidæa). In this oration (delivered B. C. 352) Demosthenes
treats the capture of Potidæa as mainly the work of Philip; in
the second Olynthiac, he speaks as if Philip had been a secondary
agent, a useful adjunct to the Olynthians in the siege, πάλιν αὖ
πρὸς Ποτίδαιαν Ὀλυνθίοις ἐφάνη τι τοῦτο συναμφότερον—_i. e._
the Macedonian power was προσθήκη τις οὐ σμικρά.... The first
representation, delivered two or three years before the second,
is doubtless the more correct.

[498] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22. Ποτίδαιαν δ᾽
ἐδίδου, τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀποίκους ἐκβάλλων (Philip gave it to the
Olynthians), καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐχθρὰν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτὸς ἀνῄρητο, τὴν
χώραν δ᾽ ἐκείνοις ἐδεδώκει καρποῦσθαι. The passage in the Oratio
de Halonneso (p. 79. s. 10) alludes to this same extrusion and
expropriation of the Athenian Kleruchs, though Vœmel and Franke
(erroneously, I think) suppose it to allude to the treatment of
these Kleruchs by Philip some years afterwards, when he took
Potidæa for himself. We may be sure that no Athenian Kleruchs
were permitted to stay at Potidæa even after the first capture.

[499] The general description given in the first Philippic of
Demosthenes of the ἀπόστολοι from Athens, may doubtless be
applied to the expedition for the relief of Potidæa—Demosthenes,
Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. p. 53, s. 52. and the general tenor of
the harangue.

[500] Diodorus (xvi. 8), in mentioning the capture of Potidæa,
considers it an evidence of the kind disposition of Philip, and
of his great respect for the dignity of Athens (φιλανθρώπως
προσενεγκάμενος) that he spared the persons of these Athenians
in the place, and permitted them to depart. But it was a great
wrong, under the circumstances, that he should expel and
expropriate them, when no offence had been given to him, and when
there was no formal war (Demosth. Or. de Halonneso, p. 79. s. 10).

Diodorus states also that Philip gave Pydna, as well as Potidæa,
to the Olynthians; which is not correct.

These two years had been so employed by Philip as to advance prodigiously his power and ascendency. He had deprived Athens of her hold upon the Thermaic gulf, in which she now seems only to have retained the town of Methônê, instead of the series of ports round the gulf acquired for her by Timotheus.[501] He had conciliated the good-will of the Olynthians by his cession of Anthemus and Potidæa; the latter place, from its commanding situation on the isthmus of Pallenê, giving them the mastery of that peninsula,[502] and ensuring (what to Philip was of great importance) their enmity with Athens. He not only improved the maritime conveniences of Amphipolis, but also extended his acquisitions into the auriferous regions of Mount Pangæus eastward of the Strymon. He possessed himself of that productive country immediately facing the island of Thasos; where both Thasians and Athenians had once contended for the rights of mining, and from whence, apparently, both had extracted valuable produce. In the interior of this region he founded a new city called Philippi, enlarged from a previous town called Krenides, recently founded by the Thasians; and he took such effective measures for increasing the metallic works in the neighborhood, that they presently yielded to him a large revenue; according to Diodorus, not less than one thousand talents per annum.[503] He caused a new gold coin to be struck, bearing a name derived from his own. The fresh source of wealth thus opened was of the greatest moment to him, as furnishing means to meet the constantly increasing expense of his military force. He had full employment to keep his soldiers in training: for the nations of the interior—Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians—humbled but not subdued, rose again in arms, and tried again jointly to reclaim their independence. The army of Philip—under his general Parmenio, of whom we now hear for the first time—defeated them, and again reduced them to submission.[504]

[501] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 41. s. 6 ... εἴχομέν ποτε
ἡμεῖς Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην, καὶ ~πάντα τὸν τόπον
τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ~, etc.

[502] Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 70. s. 22.

[503] Diodor. xvi. 4-8; Harpokration v. Δάτον. Herodot. ix. 74.

[504] Diodor. xvi. 22; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3.

It was during this interval too that Philip married Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemus prince of the Molossi,[505] and descended from the ancient Molossian kings, who boasted of an heroic Æakid genealogy. Philip had seen her at the religious mysteries in the island of Samothrace, where both were initiated at the same time. In violence of temper—in jealous, cruel, and vindictive disposition—she forms almost a parallel to the Persian queens Amestris and Parysatis. The Epirotic women, as well as the Thracian, were much given to the Bacchanalian religious rites, celebrated with fierce ecstasy amid the mountain solitudes in honor of Dionysius.[506] To this species of religious excitement Olympias was peculiarly susceptible. She is said to have been fond of tame snakes playing around her, and to have indulged in ceremonies of magic and incantation.[507] Her temper and character became, after no long time, repulsive and even alarming to Philip. But in the year 356 B. C. she bore to him a son, afterwards renowned as Alexander the Great. It was in the summer of this year, not long after the taking of Potidæa, that Philip received nearly at the same time, three messages with good news—the birth of his son; the defeat of the Illyrians by Parmenio; and the success of one of his running horses at the Olympic games.[508]

[505] Justin, vii. 6.

[506] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. 3. The Bacchæ of Euripides
contains a powerful description of these exciting ceremonies.

[507] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς μᾶλλον ἑτέρων
ζηλώσασα τὰς κατοχὰς, καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς ἐξάγουσα
βαρβαρικώτερον, ὄφεις μεγάλους χειροήθεις ἐφείλκετο τοῖς θιάσοις,
etc.

Compare Duris apud Athenæum, xiii. p. 560.

[508] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3; Justin, xii. 19.