Chapter LXXXVIII: Euboic and Olynthian Wars (1)

If even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes, the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much more serious had it become among his neighbors the Olynthians. He had gained them over, four years before, by transferring to them the territory of Anthemus—and the still more important town of Potidæa, captured by his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these cessions, they had become his allies in his war with Athens, whom they hated on every ground. But a material change had since taken place. Since the loss of Methônê, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, had ceased to be a hostile neighbor, or to inspire alarm to the Olynthians; while the immense increase in the power of Philip, combined with his ability and ambition alike manifest, had overlaid their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future. It was but too clear that a prince who stretched his encroaching arms in all directions—to Thermopylæ, to Illyria, and to Thrace—would not long suffer the fertile peninsula between the Thermaic and Strymonic gulfs to remain occupied by free Grecian communities. Accordingly, it seems that after the great victory of Philip in Thessaly over the Phokians (in the first half of 352 B. C.), the Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from alliance with him against Athens. They concluded peace with that city, and manifested such friendly sentiments that an alliance began to be thought possible. This peace seems to have been concluded before November 352 B. C.[689]

[689] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 129. ἐκεῖνοι
(Olynthians) ἕως μὲν ἑώρων αὐτὸν (Philip) τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος ὢν
πιστὸς ὑπῆρχε, σύμμαχοί τε ἦσαν, καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἡμῖν ἐπολέμουν·
ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶδον μείζω τῆς πρὸς αὑτοὺς πίστεως γιγνόμενον ...
ὑμᾶς, οὓς ἴσασιν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνου
φίλους καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκτείναντας, φίλους πεποίηνται,
φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμμάχους ποιήσεσθαι.

We know from Dionysius that this oration was delivered between
Midsummer 352 B. C. and Midsummer 351 B. C. I have already
remarked that it must have been delivered, in my judgment, before
the month Mæmakterion (November) 352 B. C.

Here was an important change of policy on the part of the Olynthians. Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of hostility against Philip, but simply as a precaution to ensure to themselves recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his attack, it was not likely that he would either draw or recognize any such distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of Potidæa, he had purchased their coöperation against Athens, and would treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable relations.

A few months afterwards (at the date of the first Philippic[690]) we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden excursions into their territory, close adjoining to his own.

[690] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20. ... ἐπὶ τὰς
ἐξαίφνης ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας, εἰς Πύλας
καὶ Χεῤῥόνησον καὶ Ὄλυνθον καὶ ὅποι βούλεται.

In this state of partial hostility, yet without proclaimed or vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year 351 B. C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian expedition, where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was for the time suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have proposed to Olynthus a scheme of decided alliance against Philip.[691] But the Olynthians had too much to fear from him, to become themselves the aggressors. They still probably hoped that he might find sufficient enemies and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians, Illyrians, Pæonians, Arymbas and the Epirots, and Athenians;[692] at any rate, they would not be the first to provoke a contest. This state of reciprocal mistrust[693] continued for several months, until at length Philip began serious operations against them; not very long after his recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly towards the middle of 350 B. C.;[694] a little before the beginning of Olympiad 107, 3.

[691] Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 7. ... νυνὶ γὰρ, ~ὃ
πάντες ἐθρύλλουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμῆσαι δεῖν~ Φιλίππῳ,
γέγονεν αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι. Εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν πεισθέντες ἀνείλοντο τὸν πόλεμον, σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι
καὶ μέχρι του ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐγνωκότες ἦσαν ἴσως, etc.

Compare Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 9. and p. 32. s. 18. οὐχ οὓς, εἰ
πολεμήσαιεν, ἑτοίμως σώσειν ὑπισχνούμεθα, οὗτοι νῦν πολεμοῦνται;

[692] Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.

[693] Demosthen. Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 8. οὔτε Φίλιππος ἐθάῤῥει
τούτους, οὔθ᾽ οὗτοι Φίλιππον, etc.

[694] Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13. ... ἠσθένησε· πάλιν
ῥαΐσας οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥᾳθυμεῖν ἀπέκλινεν, ἀλλ᾽ ~εὐθὺς Ὀλυνθίοις
ἐπεχείρησεν~.

What length of time is denoted by the adverb εὐθὺς, must of
course be matter of conjecture. If the expression had been found
in the Oration De Coronâ, delivered twenty years afterwards, we
might have construed εὐθὺς very loosely. But it occurs here in an
oration delivered probably in the latter half of 350 B. C., but
certainly not later than the first half of 348 B. C. Accordingly,
it is hardly reasonable to assign to the interval here designated
by εὐθὺς (that between Philip’s recovery and his serious attack
upon the Olynthians) a longer time than six months. We should
then suppose this attack to have been commenced about the
last quartet of Olymp. 107, 2; or in the first half of 350 B.
C. This is the view of Böhnecke, and, I think, very probable
(Forschungen, p. 211).

It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile relations that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amyntas by another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They came as his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their brothers, and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight. Whether they had committed any positive act to provoke his wrath, we are not informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the Macedonian regal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to Philip, these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were now favorably received, and may perhaps have held out hopes that in case of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To that prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a plausible pretence for war—which he doubtless would under all circumstances have prosecuted—against Olynthus; and it seems to have been so put forward in his public declarations.[695]

[695] Justin, viii. 3; Orosius, iii. 12. Justin states this as
the _cause_ of the attack made by Philip on Olynthus—which I do
not believe. But I see no ground for doubting the fact itself—or
for doubting that Philip laid hold of it as a _pretext_. He found
the half-brothers in Olynthus when the city was taken, and put
both of them to death.

But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to blend the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and to divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such insidious approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power of that city consisted, in great part, in her position as chief of a numerous confederacy, including a large proportion, though probably not all, of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidikê. Among the different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less of dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it inspired alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and jealous minorities. If, through such predisposing circumstances, he either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities of Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the neighboring peninsula of Chalkidikê. Olynthus and the other cities were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas II. had given to the Olynthians (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war[696]) a portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbê: Philip himself had given to them the district of Anthemus. Possessed of so much neighboring land, he had the means, with little loss to himself, of materially favoring or enriching such individual citizens, of Olynthus or other cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides direct bribes, where that mode of proceeding was most effective, he could grant the right of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds of one, and furnish abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as he now was of Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or close to them the speculations of the gold mines of Mount Pangæus, for which they had always hankered.[697] If his privateers harassed even the powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection, much more vexatious would they be to his neighbors in the Chalkidic peninsula, which they as it were encircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on one side to the Strymonic Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt that some individuals in these cities had found it profitable to take service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.

[696] Thucyd. i. 58.

[697] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 425, 426; Xenophon, Hellen. v.
2. 17.

It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would ensure to him the coöperation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such minority of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its purposes, among the standing political feuds of the place. These means however were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword. His seductions and presents commenced the work, but his excellent generalship and soldiers—the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the cavalry, all now brought into admirable training during the ten years of his reign—completed it.

Though Demosthenes in one passage goes so far as to say that Philip rated his established influence so high as to expect to incorporate the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious difficulty and without even real war[698]—there is ground for believing that he encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by unmeasured rigors after the victory. The two years and a half between Midsummer 350 B. C., and the commencement of 347 B. C. (the two last years of Olympiad 107 and the nine first months of Olympiad 108), were productive of phænomena more terror-striking than anything in the recent annals of Greece. No less than thirty-two free Grecian cities in Chalkidikê were taken and destroyed, the inhabitants being reduced to slavery, by Philip. Among them was Olynthus, one of the most powerful, flourishing, and energetic members of the Hellenic brotherhood; Apollonia, whose inhabitants would now repent the untoward obstinacy of their fathers (thirty-two years before) in repudiating a generous and equal confederacy with Olynthus, and invoking Spartan aid to revive the falling power of Philip’s father, Amyntas; and Stageira, the birth-place of Aristotle. The destruction of thirty-two free Hellenic communities in two years by a foreign prince, was a calamity the like of which had never occurred since the suppression of the Ionic revolt and the invasion of Xerxes. I have already recounted in a previous chapter[699] the manifestation of wrath at the festival of the ninety-ninth Olympiad (394 B. C.) against the envoys of the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, who had captured and subverted five or six free Hellenic communities in Italy and Sicily. Far more vehement would be the sentiment of awe and terror, after the Olynthian war, against the Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities. We shall find this plainly indicated in the phænomena immediately succeeding. We shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike dishonorable and improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture to oppose; we shall see Æschines passing out of a free spoken Athenian citizen into a servile worshipper, if not a paid agent, of Philip: we shall observe Isokrates, once the champion of Pan-hellenic freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time to use his power well for the purpose of conquering Persia. These were terrible times; suitably illustrated in their cruel details by the gangs of enslaved Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing even into Peloponnesus[700] as the property of new grantees who extolled the munificence of the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in by awful celestial signs, showers of fire and blood falling from the heavens to the earth, in testimony of the wrath of the gods.[701]

[698] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 22. οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν
πόλεμόν ποτε τοῦτον ἐκεῖνος, εἰ πολεμεῖν ᾠήθη δεήσειν αὐτὸν,
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιὼν ἅπαντα τότε ἤλπιζε τὰ πράγματα ἀναιρήσεσθαι, κᾆτα
διέψευσται. Τοῦτο δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ταράττει παρὰ γνώμην γεγονὸς,
etc.

[699] See ch. lxxxiii. p. 35 of this Volume.

[700] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 439. Æschines himself met a
person named Atrestidas followed by one of these sorrowful
troops. We may be sure that this case was only one among many.

[701] Pliny, H. N. ii. 27. “Fit et cœli ipsius hiatus, quod
vocant chasma. Fit et sanguineâ specie (quo nihil terribilius
mortalium timori est) incendium ad terras cadens inde; _sicut
Olympiadis centesimæ septimæ anno tertio, cum rex Philippus
Græciam quateret_. Atque ego hæc statis temporibus naturæ, ut
cetera, arbitror existere; non (ut plerique) variis de causis,
quas ingeniorum acumen excogitat. _Quippe ingentium malorum fuere
prænuntia_; sed ea accidisse non quia hæc facta sunt arbitror,
verum hæc ideo facta, quia incasura erant illa: raritate autem
occultam eorum esse rationem, ideoque non sicut exortus supra
dictos defectusque et multa alia nosci.”

The precision of this chronological note makes it valuable.
Olymp. 107, 3—corresponds to the year between Midsummer 350 and
Midsummer 349 B. C.

Taylor, who cites this passage in his Prolegomena ad Demosthenem
(ap. Reiske Oratt. Gr. vol. viii. p. 756), takes the liberty,
without any manuscript authority, of altering _tertio_ into
_quarto_; which Böhnecke justly pronounces to be unreasonable
(Forschungen, p. 212). The passage as it stands is an evidence,
not merely to authenticate the terrific character of the time,
but also to prove, among other evidences, that the attack of
Philip on the Olynthians and Chalkidians began in 350-349 B.
C.—not in the following Olympic year, or in the time after
Midsummer 349 B. C.

Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 201-221) has gone into an examination
of the dates and events of this Olynthian war, and has arranged
them in a manner different from any preceding critic. His
examination is acute and instructive, including however some
reasonings of little force or pertinence. I follow him generally,
in placing the beginning of the Olynthian war, and the Olynthiacs
of Demosthenes, before Olymp. 107, 4. This is the best opinion
which I can form, on matters lamentably unattested and uncertain.

While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the general result of Philip’s Olynthian war, and the terror which it struck into the Grecian mind—we are not only left without information as to its details, but are even perplexed by its chronology. I have already remarked, that though the Olynthians had contracted such suspicions of Philip, even before the beginning of 351 B. C., as to induce them to make peace with his enemy Athens—they had nevertheless, declined the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance, not wishing to bring upon themselves decided hostility from so powerful a neighbor, until his aggressions should become such as to leave them no choice. We have no precise information as to Philip’s movements after his operations in Thrace and his sickness in 351 B. C. But we know that it was not in his nature to remain inactive; that he was incessantly pushing his conquests; and that no conquest could be so important to him as that of Olynthus and the Chalkidic peninsula. Accordingly, we are not surprised to find, that the Olynthian and Chalkidian confederates became the object of his direct hostility in 350 B. C. He raised pretences for attack against one or other of these cities separately; avoiding to deal with the confederacy as a whole, and disclaiming, by special envoys,[702] all purposes injurious to Olynthus.

[702] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. That Philip not only
attacked, but even subdued, the thirty-two Chalkidic cities,
before he marched directly and finally to assail Olynthus—is
stated in the Fragment of Kallisthenes ap. Stobæum, Eclog. Tit.
vii. p. 92.

Kallisthenes, whose history is lost, was a native of Olynthus,
born a few years before the capture of the city.

Probably the philippizing party in that city may have dwelt upon this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Æschines hereafter uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to close with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to Athens to propose alliance and invite coöperation against Philip. Their first propositions were doubtless not couched in the language of urgency and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger; their power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value abroad; moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally overstate their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were offering. Of course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to Chalkidikê—since it was there that the war was being carried on; but they would ask for aid in order to act energetically against the common enemy, and repress the growth of his power—not to avert immediate danger menacing Olynthus.

There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept this alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they willingly closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised—what indeed was almost involved in the acceptance—to send a force to coöperate against Philip in Chalkidikê. On this first recognition of Olynthus as an ally—or perhaps shortly afterwards, but before circumstances had at all changed—Demosthenes delivered his earliest Olynthiac harangue. Of the three memorable compositions so denominated, the earliest is, in my judgment, that which stands _second_ in the edited order. Their true chronological order has long been, and still is, matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I can form, is that the first and the second are erroneously placed, but that the third is really the latest;[703] all of them being delivered during the six or seven last months of 350 B. C.

[703] Some remarks will be found on the order of the Olynthiacs,
in an Appendix to the present chapter.

It must be understood that I always speak of the Olynthiacs as
_first_, _second_, and _third_, according to the common and
edited order; though I cannot adopt that order as correct.

In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as the second Olynthiac), Demosthenes insists upon the advantageous contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the blessing of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an ally. He recommends that aid be despatched to the new ally; the most prompt and effective aid will please him the best. But this recommendation is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of the speech; it is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically insisted upon, nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of aid to be sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of Olynthus, nor to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still less to ulterior contingencies, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On the contrary, Demosthenes adverts to the power of the Olynthians—to the situation of their territory, close on Philip’s flanks—to their fixed resolution that they will never again enter into amity or compromise with him—as evidences how valuable their alliance will prove to Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the war against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought upon her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is to inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for the prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger scheme. “I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandized himself, partly through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous means—by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by cheating successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other allies. These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting him; without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the Macedonians themselves have no sympathy with his personal ambition; they are fatigued with the labor imposed upon them by his endless military movements, and impoverished by the closing of their ports through the war. His vaunted officers are men of worthless and dissolute habits; his personal companions are thieves, vile ministers of amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good fortune imparts to all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength; and doubtless his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune of Athens, and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still greater—if only you, Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are, sitting still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his friends to work for him—much less the gods. I do not wonder, that Philip, always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for himself, never letting slip an opportunity—prevails over you who merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay—the contrary would be wonderful—if under such circumstances, he had _not_ been the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians—who in former days contended for Pan-hellenic freedom against the Lacedæmonians—who, scorning unjust aggrandizement for yourselves, fought in person and lavished your substance to protect the rights of other Greeks—that _you_ now shrink from personal service and payment of money for the defence of your own possessions. You, who have so often rescued others, can now sit still after having lost so much of your own! I wonder you do not look back to that conduct of yours which has brought your affairs into this state of ruin, and ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while such conduct remains unchanged. It was much easier at first to preserve what we once had, than to recover it now that it is lost; we have nothing now left to lose—we have everything to recover. This must be done by ourselves, and at once; we must furnish money, we must serve in person by turns; we must give our generals means to do their work well, and then exact from them a severe account afterwards—which we cannot do so long as we ourselves will neither pay nor serve. We must correct that abuse which has grown up, whereby particular symmories in the state combine to exempt themselves from burdensome duties, and to cast them all unjustly upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously and heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation.”

Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by Demosthenes on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius,[704] there is an unconscious tendency to imagine that these memorable pleadings must have worked persuasion, and to magnify the efficiency of their author as an historical and directing person. But there are no facts to bear out such an impression. Demosthenes was still comparatively a young man—thirty-one years of age; admired indeed for his speeches and his compositions written to be spoken by others;[705] but as yet not enjoying much practical influence. It is moreover certain—to his honor—that he described and measured foreign dangers before they were recognized by ordinary politicians; that he advised a course, energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the people to act upon, and disagreeable for recognized leaders to propose; that these leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were accordingly adverse to him. The tone of Demosthenes in these speeches is that of one who feels that he is contending against heavy odds—combating an habitual and deep-seated reluctance. He is an earnest remonstrant—an opposition speaker—contributing to raise up gradually a body of public sentiment and conviction which ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus is the ministerial spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property-tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theôric expenditure.

[704] Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæ. p. 736. μετὰ γὰρ ἄρχοντα Καλλίμαχον,
ἐφ᾽ οὗ τὰς εἰς Ὄλυνθον βοηθείας ἀπέστειλαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ~πεισθέντες
ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους~, etc.

He connects the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes, with the three
Athenian armaments sent to Olynthus in the year following
Midsummer 349 B. C.; for which armaments he had just before cited
Philochorus.

[705] This is evident from the sneers of Meidias: see the oration
of Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 575, 576. (spoken in the year
following—349-348 B. C.)

I observe, not without regret, that Demosthenes himself is
not ashamed to put the like sneers into the mouth of a client
speaking before the Dikastery—against Lakritus—“this very clever
man, who has paid ten minæ to Isokrates for a course of rhetoric,
and thinks himself able to talk you over as he pleases,” etc.
(Demosth. adv. Lakrit. p. 938).

The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenes. They accepted the Olynthian alliance, but took no active step to coöperate with Olynthus in the war against Philip.[706] Such unhappily was their usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no witness to satisfy us, that he would not slacken in his attack—and that in the course of a month or two, he would master more than one of the Chalkidic cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by their new allies; while the philippizing party among themselves would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation with the enemy.[707] Complaints would presently reach Athens, brought by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from the Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip’s arms. They would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid more urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip’s conquest of Chalkidikê. It was in this advanced stage of the proceedings that Demosthenes again exerted himself in the cause, delivering that speech which stands first in the printed order of the Olynthiacs.

[706] An orator of the next generation (Deinarchus cont.
Demosthen. p. 102, s. 99) taunts Demosthenes as a mere
opposition-talker, in contrast with the excellent administration
of the finances and marine under Eubulus—ποῖαι γὰρ τριήρεις εἰσὶ
κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον (Demosthenes) ὥσπερ επὶ Εὐβούλου,
τῇ πόλει; ἢ ποῖοι νεώσοικοι τούτου πολιτευομένου γεγόνασι;
The administration of Eubulus must have left a creditable
remembrance, to be thus cited afterwards.

See Theopompus ap. Harpokr. v. Εὔβουλος; Plutarch, Reipubl.
Gerend. Præcept. p. 812. Compare also Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 435;
and Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 57. c. 11.

[707] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9. ὡς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος, μὴ
πανοῦργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἅνθρωπος (Philip) πράγμασι χρῆσθαι τὰ
μὲν εἴκων ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν τύχῃ, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπειλῶν, τὰ δ᾽ ἡμᾶς διαβάλλων καὶ
~τὴν ἀπουσίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν~ τρέψῃ τε καὶ παρασπάσηταί τι τῶν ὅλων
πραγμάτων.

This occurs in the next subsequent speech of Demosthenes,
intimating what Philip and his partisans had already deduced as
inference from the past neglect of the Athenians to send any aid
to Olynthus. Of course, no such inference could be started until
some time had been allowed for expectation and disappointment;
which is one among many reasons for believing the first Olynthiac
to be posterior in time to the second.

Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is no longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of which Demosthenes intends to discourse; but stands out as the prominent feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now pronounced to be in danger and in pressing need of succor; moreover its preservation is strenuously pressed upon the Athenians, as essential to their own safety. While it stands with its confederacy around it, the Athenians can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls, there is nothing to prevent him from transferring the war into Attica, and assailing them on their own soil.[708] Demosthenes is wound up to a higher pitch of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of his countrymen on a crisis which calls aloud for instant action.[709] He again urges that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and two armaments despatched as quickly as possible; one to preserve to Olynthus her confederate cities—the other, to make a diversion by simultaneous attack on Philip at home. Without such two-fold aid (he says) the cities cannot be preserved.[710] Advice of aid generally he had already given, though less emphatically, in his previous harangue; but he now superadds a new suggestion—that Athenian envoys shall be sent thither, not merely to announce the coming of the force, but also to remain at Olynthus and watch over the course of events. For he is afraid, that unless such immediate encouragement be sent, Philip may, even without the tedious process of a siege, frighten or cajole the Olynthian confederacy into submission; partly by reminding them that Athens had done nothing for them, and by denouncing her as a treacherous and worthless ally.[711] Philip would be glad to entrap them into some plausible capitulation; and though they knew that they could have no security for his keeping the terms of it afterwards, still he might succeed, if Athens remained idle. Now, if ever, was the time for Athenians to come forward and do their duty without default; to serve in person and submit to the necessary amount of direct taxation. They had no longer the smallest pretence for continued inaction; the very conjuncture which they had so long desired, had turned up of itself—war between Olynthus and Philip, and that too upon grounds special to Olynthus—not at the instigation of Athens.[712] The Olynthian alliance had been thrown in the way of Athens by the peculiar goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair her numerous past errors and short-comings. She ought to look well and deal rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order to wipe off the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus and suffer Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him from marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable, his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her careless inaction, he would carry the war forward from Thrace into Attica—of which the ruinous consequences were but too clear.[713]

[708] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13.

[709] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9.

[710] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 14. Φημὶ δὴ διχῆ βοηθητέον εἶναι
τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν· ~τῷ τε τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις σῴζειν~,
καὶ τοὺς τοῦτο ποιήσοντας στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπειν—καὶ τῷ τὴν ἐκείνου
χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ τριήρεσι καὶ στρατιώταις ἑτέροις· εἰ δὲ
θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγωρήσετε, ὀκνῶ μὴ μάταιος ὑμῶν ἡ στρατεία
γένηται.

[711] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9, 10.

[712] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 11.

[713] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13, 16. ... εἰ δὲ προησόμεθα
καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εἶτ᾽ Ὄλυνθον ἐκεῖνος καταστρέψεται,
φρασάτω τις ἐμοὶ, τί τὸ κωλῦον ἔτ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι
βούλεται.

... τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον
δεῦρο ἥξοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν;

“I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid at the present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that express purpose—and by employing at the same time other troops and other triremes to act aggressively against Philip’s own coast. If you neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will fail. As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money than any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that money to soldiers on service, no need exists for farther provision—if not, then need exists; but above all things, money _must_ be found. What then! I shall be asked—are you moving that the Theôric fund shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express my conviction, that soldiers _must_ be equipped, and that receipt of public money, and performance of public service, ought to go hand in hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any such condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted—little, if little will suffice. Money must be had; without it, not a single essential step can be taken. There are moreover different ways and means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you think advantageous; and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the opportunity still lasts.”[714]

[714] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 15.

It was thus that Demosthenes addressed his countrymen some time after the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any auxiliary force had been either sent to them or even positively decreed—yet when such postponement of action had inspired them with mistrust, threatening to throw them, even without resistance, into the hands of Philip and their own philippizing party. We observe in Demosthenes the same sagacious appreciation, both of the present and the future, as we have already remarked in the first Philippic—foresight of the terrible consequences of this Olynthian war, while as yet distant and unobserved by others. We perceive the same good sense and courage in invoking the right remedies; though his propositions of personal military service, direct taxation, or the diversion of the Theôric fund—were all of them the most unpopular which could be made. The last of the three, indeed, he does not embody in a substantive motion; nor could he move it without positive illegality, which would have rendered him liable to the indictment called Graphê Paranomon. But he approaches it near enough to raise in the public mind the question as it really stood—that money must be had; that there were only two ways of getting it—direct taxation, and appropriation of the festival fund; and that the latter of these ought to be restored as well as the former. We shall find this question about the Theôric Fund coming forward again more than once, and shall have presently to notice it more at large.

At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenes—how long after it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot say—the Athenians commissioned and sent a body of foreign mercenaries to the aid of the Olynthians and Chalkidians. The outfit and transport of these troops was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from rich Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent; nor was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries. The expedition appears to have been sent towards the autumn of 350 B. C., as far as we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the obscure chronology of this period.[715] It presently gained some victory over Philip or Philip’s generals, and was enabled to transmit good news to Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led the people to fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on Philip for past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only were the Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a fair way of being punished and humbled. It is indeed possible that the success may really have been something considerable, such as to check Philip’s progress for the time. Though victorious on the whole, he must have experienced partial and temporary reverses, otherwise he would have concluded the war before the early spring of 347 B. C. Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian general Chares over Philip’s general Adæus,[716] we cannot say.

[715] In my view, it is necessary to separate entirely the
proceedings alluded to in the Demosthenic Olynthiacs, from the
three expeditions to Olynthus mentioned by Philochorus during
the following year—349-348 B. C., the archonship of Kallimachus.
I see no reason to controvert the statement of Philochorus,
that there were three expeditions during that year, such as he
describes. But he must be mistaken (or Dionysius must have copied
him erroneously) in setting forth those three expeditions _as the
whole Olynthian war_, and the first of the three as being the
beginning of the war. The Olynthian war began in 350 B. C., and
the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes refer, in my judgment, to the
first months of the war. But it lasted until the early spring of
347 B. C., so that the armaments mentioned by Philochorus may
have occurred during the last half of the war. I cannot but think
that Dionysius, being satisfied with finding _three_ expeditions
to Olynthus which might be attached as results to the _three_
orations of Demosthenes, was too hastily copied out the three
from Philochorus, and has assigned the date of 349-348 B. C. to
the three _orations_, simply because he found that date given to
the three _expeditions_ by Philochorus.

The revolt in Eubœa, the expedition of Phokion with the battle of
Tamynæ and the prolonged war in that island, began about January
or February 349 B. C., and continued throughout that year and the
next. Mr. Clinton even places these events a year earlier; in
which I do not concur, but which, if adopted, would throw back
the beginning of the Olynthian war one year farther still. It is
certain that there was one Athenian expedition at least sent to
Olynthus _before the Eubœan war_, (Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p.
566-578)—an expedition so considerable that voluntary donations
from the rich citizens were obtained towards the cost. Here is
good proof (better than Philochorus, if indeed it be inconsistent
with what he really said) that the Athenians not only contracted
the alliance of Olynthus, but actually assisted Olynthus, during
the year 350 B. C. Now the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes present to
my mind strong evidence of belonging to the earliest months of
the Olynthian war. I think it reasonable, therefore, to suppose
that the expedition of foreign mercenaries to Olynthus, which the
third Olynthiac implies as having been sent, is the same as that
for which the ἐπιδόσεις mentioned in the Meidiana were required.
See Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 202; and K. F. Hermann, De Anno
Natali Demosthenis, p. 9.

[716] Theopompus ap. Athenæ;, xii. p. 532. This victory would
seem to belong more naturally (as Dr. Thirlwall remarks) to the
operations of Chares and Onomarchus against Philip in Thessaly,
in 353-352 B. C. But the point cannot be determined.

But Demosthenes had sagacity enough to perceive, and frankness to proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the war generally; worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to fancy that they had carried their point.

To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done—to combat that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily found encouragement and excuses for inaction—to revive in them the conviction, that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, towards their Olynthian allies and towards their own ultimate security—is the scope of Demosthenes in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the printed order, and third also, according to my judgment, in order of time; delivered towards the close of the year 350 B. C.[717] Like Perikles, he was not less watchful to abate extravagant and unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.[718]

[717] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 29. μέμνησθε, ὅτ᾽ ἀπηγγέλθη
Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τουτὶ, Ἡραῖον
τεῖχος πολιορκῶν· τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν Μαιμακτηριὼν, etc. This
was the month Mæmakterion or November 352 B. C. Calculating
forward from that date, τρίτον ἔτος means _the next year but
one_; that is the Attic year Olymp. 107. 3, or the year between
Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B. C. Dionysius of Halikarnassus
says (p. 726)—Καλλιμάχου τοῦ τρίτου μετὰ Θέσσαλον ἄρξαντος—though
there was only one archon between Thessalus and Kallimachus. When
Demosthenes says τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος—it is clear that both
cannot be accurate; we must choose one or the other; and τρίτον
ἔτος brings us to the year 350-349 B. C.

To show that the oration was probably spoken during the first
half of that year, or before February 349 B. C., another point of
evidence may be noticed.

At the time when the third Olynthiac was spoken, _no_ expedition
of Athenian _citizens_ had yet been sent to the help of Olynthus.
But we shall see, presently, that Athenian citizens _were_ sent
thither during the first half of 349 B. C.

Indeed, it would be singular, if the Olynthiacs had been spoken
_after_ the expedition to Eubœa, that Demosthenes should make no
allusion in any one of them to that expedition, an affair of so
much moment and interest, which kept Athens in serious agitation
during much of the year, and was followed by prolonged war in
that neighboring island. In the third Olynthiac, Demosthenes
alludes to taking arms against Corinth and Megara (p. 34). Would
he be likely to leave the far more important proceedings in
Eubœa unnoticed? Would he say nothing about the grave crisis in
which the decree of Apollodorus was proposed? This difficulty
disappears when we recognize the Olynthiacs as anterior to the
Euboic war.

[718] Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν
ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν (Perikles) εἰς τὸ φοβεῖσθαι·
καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

Compare the Argument of the third Olynthiac by Libanius.

“The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demosthenes, in substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case teach us a very different lesson.[719] They bid us look well to our own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we preserve our allies. There _was_ indeed a time—and that too within my remembrance not long ago—when we might have held our own and punished Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time to think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heræum in Thrace, you passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him: presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary, and you let it drop. If you had executed promptly what you resolved, Philip would have been put down _then_, and would have given you no further trouble.[720]

[719] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 28, 29. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους περὶ
τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματα εἰς
τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥστε ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς
σκέψασθαι δέον.

... τοῦθ᾽ ἱκανὸν προλαβεῖν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην, ὅπως τοὺς
συμμάχους σώσομεν.

[720] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30.

“Those matters indeed are past, and cannot be mended. But I advert to them now, because the present war-crisis is very similar, and I trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not send aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play Philip’s game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been long anxious and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip. This has now happened: what choice remains, except to aid them heartily and vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do not. But this is not all. Your own security at home requires it of you also; for there is nothing to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus, from invading Attica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds—and the Thebans are your enemies.

“All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved unanimously to succor Olynthus, and we will succor it. We only want you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my answer. Appoint Nomothetæ at once.[721] Do not submit to them any propositions for new laws, for you have laws enough already—but only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present juncture—I mean, those which regard the Theôric fund (I speak out thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military service. By the former, you hand over money, which ought to go to soldiers on service, in Theôric distribution among those who stay at home. By the latter, you let off without penalty those who evade service, and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When you have repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to proclaim salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with a formal motion such as you all know to be required. But until you do this, expect not that any one will make these indispensable propositions on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your hands. You will find no such man; especially as he would only incur unjust punishment for himself, without any benefit to the city—while his punishment would make it yet more formidable to speak out upon that subject in future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men who proposed these laws should also take upon them to propose the repeal; for it is not right that these men should continue to enjoy a popularity which is working mischief to the whole city, while the unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of the reforming mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can neither tolerate that any one among you shall be powerful enough to infringe a law with impunity—nor expect that any one will be fool enough to run with his eyes open into punishment.”

[721] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 31, 32.

I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meagre abstract of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered—the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes. The partial advantage gained over Philip being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy that they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution to assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many other occasions, so on this—Demosthenes undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment which he deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage, wisdom, and dexterity—so superior to the insulting sarcasms of Phokion—does he execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its unpopularity!

Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in consequence of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes, we cannot determine. We have no ground for believing the affirmative; while we are certain that the specific measure which he recommended—the sending of an armament of citizens personally serving—was not at that time (before the end of 350 B. C.) carried into effect. At or before the commencement of 349 B. C., the foreign relations of Athens began to be disturbed by another supervening embarrassment—the revolt of Eubœa.

After the successful expedition of 358 B. C., whereby the Athenians had expelled the Thebans from Eubœa, that island remained for some years in undisturbed connection with Athens. Chalkis, Eretria, and Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a member to the synod of allies holding session at Athens, and paid their annual quota (seemingly five talents each) to the confederate fund.[722] During the third quarter of 352 B. C., Menestratus the despot or principal citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted friend of Athens.[723] But this state of things changed shortly after Philip conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the Pagasæan Gulf (in 353 and the first half of 352 B. C.). His power was then established immediately over against Oreus and the northern coast of Eubœa, with which island his means of communication became easy and frequent. Before the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes (seemingly towards the summer of 351 B. C.) Philip had opened correspondences in Eubœa, and had despatched thither various letters, some of which the orator reads in the course of that speech to the Athenian assembly. The actual words of the letters are not given; but from the criticism of the orator himself, we discern that they were highly offensive to Athenian feelings; instigating the Eubœans probably to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of Macedonian aid towards that object.[724] Philip’s naval warfare also brought his cruisers to Geræstus in Eubœa, where they captured several Athenian corn-ships;[725] insulting even the opposite coast of Attica at Marathon, so as to lower the reputation of Athens among her allies. Accordingly, in each of the Eubœan cities, parties were soon formed aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the support of Philip; while for the same purpose detachments of mercenaries could also be procured across the western Eubœan strait, out of the large numbers now under arms in Phokis.

[722] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68.

[723] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. φέρ᾽, ἐὰν δὲ δὴ καὶ
Μενέστρατος ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐρετριεὺς ἀξιοῖ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὑτῷ ψηφίσασθαι, ἢ
Φάϋλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς, etc.

[724] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51.

[725] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49.

About the beginning of 349 B. C.—while the war of Philip, unknown to us in its details, against the Olynthians and Chalkidians, was still going on, with more or less of help from mercenaries sent by Athens—hostilities, probably raised by the intrigues of Philip, broke out at Eretria in Eubœa. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do not know what had become of Menestratus), with a certain number of soldiers at his disposal, but opposed by enemies yet more powerful, professed to represent Athenian interests in his city, and sent to Athens to ask for aid. Demosthenes, suspecting this man to be a traitor, dissuaded compliance with the application.[726] But Plutarch had powerful friends at Athens, seemingly among the party of Eubulus; one of whom, Meidias, a violent personal enemy of Demosthenes, while advocating the grant of aid, tried even to get up a charge against Demosthenes, of having himself fomented these troubles in Eubœa against the reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch.[727] The Athenian assembly determined to despatch a force under Phokion; who accordingly crossed into the island, somewhat before the time of the festival Anthesteria (February) with a body of hoplites.[728] The cost of fitting out triremes for this transport, was in part defrayed by voluntary contributions from rich Athenians; several of whom, Nikêratus, Euktêmon, Euthydemus, contributed each the outfit of one vessel.[729] A certain proportion of the horsemen of the city were sent also; yet the entire force was not very large, as it was supposed that the partisans there to be found would make up the deficiency.

[726] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58.

[727] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 550. ... καὶ τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ
πραγμάτων, ἃ Πλούταρχος ὁ τούτου ξένος καὶ φίλος διεπράξατο, ὡς
ἐγὼ αἴτιός εἰμι κατεσκεύαζε, πρὸ τοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα γενέσθαι φανερὸν
διὰ Πλουτάρχου γεγονός.

[728] Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 558; cont. Bœotum de Nomine, p.
999. The mention of the χόες in the latter passage, being the
second day of the festival called Anthesteria, identifies the
month.

[729] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566, 567.