Chapter LX: {victoria. 1848} (1)

Warin India..... Colonial Affairs..... Foreign
Relations..... Revolutions throughout Continental
Europe..... Distress and Crime in Ireland..... Disaffection
of the Irish Roman Catholics, and attempted Revolt.....
Enforcement of Law and Order in Ireland..... Chartist
Disturbances in England, and their suppression..... Home
Incidents..... Transactions of Parliament.

{A.D. 1848}

The year 1848 was one of the most eventful which had ever occurred in the history of Europe, or in the history of the world, since the introduction of Christianity; and the relations of England to the great transactions which passed like a whirlwind over the continent were such as to enhance her dignity and her glory. It is difficult to write the History of England, during a period so interesting to continental Europe, without enlarging upon the events which took place upon other fields of action, and by which England was in many respects so much influenced. It will aid in confining the relations of this chapter within proper bounds, to narrate first those transactions in which England was exclusively interested, so far as other European powers were concerned.

THE WAR IN INDIA.

The Punjaub had, in 1847, as already related, been the theatre of most stirring incidents. The reader of this History can hardly fail to have observed, that although the defeat of the Sikhs was so complete, the subjugation of the spirit of that people was far from having been effected. The dispersed Khalsa army cherished a fierce hostility to the government of British India, and they were ready to enrol themselves under the banner of any chief who would lead them, in numbers sufficient to afford hope of success, against their recent conquerors. An opportunity occurred in the person of Moolraj, the chief of Mooltan. Mooltan is a large and fertile country, situated between the left bank of the Indus and the right bank of the Sutlej, and terminates at one end where these two rivers form a junction. It gives its name to the capital, which was protected by defences unusually strong for an eastern city.

When the British obtained the submission of the regent of the Sikh monarch, Dhuleep Singh, Mooltan was governed by Moolraj. Moolraj owed allegiance to the government at Lahore, to which the chieftainship of Mooltan had been subjected by conquest. The durbar of Lahore purposed the deposition of Moolraj, and negotiated with him for that purpose. He affected to acquiesce, and, in consequence, Mr. Agnew, a political agent of the Honourable East India Company, and Lieutenant Anderson, of the Bombay Fusileers, were deputed to attend the new governor appointed by the government of Lahore, to instal him in his office. This official was named Sirdar Khan Singh, and was an object of extreme jealousy to Moolraj. The party arrived at Mooltan, accompanied by their respective suites and a small escort of cavalry. On the 17th of April, the authority was surrendered in due form by Moolraj, and the object of the British officers seemed to be accomplished. On the 18th they were attacked and desperately wounded; it was at first supposed from a sudden impulse on the part of the soldiery of Moolraj, but it was afterwards known to be the result of treachery. The officers, accompanied by the new governor, were carried to a small fort outside the town. A fire was opened upon the place from Mooltan, but it was ineffectual. A few days afterwards, however, the fort was attacked by the soldiers of Moolraj; the Sikhs who garrisoned the place, and among whom were the escort, treacherously opened the gates, and the assailants entered, foaming with rage, and demanding vengeance upon the infidel officers. Lieutenant Anderson was in a dying state; but Mr. Agnew, although so badly wounded, defended himself with resolution to the last: both officers were murdered. Moolraj declared that he had no knowledge of the transaction, but no one believed his disclaimer. Intelligence of these barbarities reached Lahore with the speed so peculiar to the East; and a force of three thousand cavalry and some infantry was dispatched, under Sirdar Shere Singh, against the refractory city. There happened to be upon the Indus, at the head of a small force, a young and gallant officer who had served with distinction upon the staff of Lord Gough, and who was favourably known by his clever contributions to the India press on the state of the Company’s territory, civil and military: this officer was Lieutenant Edwardes. He was engaged in settling a disturbed district of country, and in collecting the land tax due to Moolraj, as Sikh governor of Mooltan. At the same time, Colonel Van Courtlandt, a native of India, and a distinguished officer in the service of the Company, occupied Dherra Ismael Khan, also in the neighbourhood. Lieutenant Edwardes crossed the river into the Deerajat, whence he wrote to the Khan of Bhawulpore, requesting him to make such a movement of troops as would prevent Moolraj from falling upon either of their forces. The khan’s territories were so situated as to enable him to effect a military disposition to accomplish this object. The khan made the required demonstration. When Edwardes crossed the Indus, he left a detachment of three hundred horse to protect the collection at Serat, where, on the 18th of May, they were attacked by a body of cavalry exceeding their own in number, sent against them from Mooltan, with ten light field-guns (zumbooruks). The British force so manoeuvred as to attain a good position, although under the fire of the zumbooruks, and then charged brilliantly, dispersing the Mooltanese, and capturing their guns.

Colonel Courtlandt was as prompt as Edwardes in the measures taken by him. He left the port of Dherra Ismael Khan, and proceeded by the base of the hills southward. On his route he was joined by a Beloochee chief, with one hundred of his wild followers. Courtlandt detached these, with a portion of his own troops, against the fortress of Sunghur, westward of the Indus. The commander of the fort refused the summons of surrender, and for six hours maintained a gallant resistance; he then brought off the garrison by a skilful manoeuvre, reaching Mooltan in safety.

Lieutenant Edwardes and Colonel Courtlandt effected a Junction of their small forces, and on the 20th of May were attacked by a division of the Mooltan army. The united forces of Courtlandt and Edwardes were so disposed that not more than one thousand five hundred men could be brought into action, while the enemy numbered three thousand. The artillery force of each was about equal. Edwardes was, however, joined by a body of irregular cavalry, and a party of Beloochees, which brought up the British force more nearly to an equality of numbers. The Sikhs in British pay happily showed no disposition to fraternise with the Mooltan army, although the calculations of Moolraj were based upon such an expectation.

The enemy suffered a signal defeat and great slaughter. The Beloochees behaved remarkably well. The skill of the British officers turned the balance in favour of the native army under their command.

After this engagement, Edwardes, acting upon the authority which he possessed as a civil officer of the company, demanded a reinforcement from the Khan of Bhawulpore, and in the meantime recruited his force by Sikhs, Beloochees, Affghans, and men from the hills of various tribes. The faculty of organisation, the ceaseless activity, and the courage of this young officer were surprising. Colonel Courtlandt was also equal to the part assigned him; but, although senior to his colleague in military rank, the civil functions of the latter gave him an especial, and, in some respects, superior authority. The Khan of Bhawulpore responded to the demands of assistance, and a plan was laid for a junction of the troops. In pursuance of this, Edwardes and Courtlandt crossed the Indus on the 10th and 11th of June. Moolraj was informed by his spies of every movement, and the intelligence was conveyed to him with astonishing rapidity. He accordingly marched a large force to intercept either army, and beat both in detail. On the 14th he crossed the Chenab, leaving a considerable force on the other bank. This detachment marched to Khan Ghur, but on the following day crossed the river, being surprised at that place by the advance of Edwardes’s irregulars. The Mooltanese had barely time to cross the Chenab, when the scouts of Edwardes galloped into Khan Ghur. The Sikhs, instead of giving battle at that place, and practically attempting the scheme proposed by Moolraj, encamped on the opposite side of the river, in observation of the British officer and his little army. This delay and timidity was fatal; for Edwardes was soon joined by the infantry and a portion of the artillery of Courtlandt, whose cavalry were scouring the country. The situation of affairs became now interesting and important, for the Bhawulpore forces had arrived on the enemy’s side of the Chenab, within twelve miles. Edwardes made a retrograde movement, so as to place himself opposite the Bhawulpore encampment. The enemy advanced to within four miles of that position. In the course of the night, the raw levies of Edwardes contrived to cross the river in a very irregular manner, and within dangerous proximity to the enemy’s patrols, but were unmolested. On the 18th, early in the morning, the lieutenant crossed with the remainder of his little army, except the horses and artillery, which remained with Courtlandt on the opposite side, for a more slow and safe transport across the river. Scarcely had the lieutenant gained the opposite bank than he was attacked by the Sikh army, which had been moving up from Bugurrarah while he was gaining the passage. This was a terrible engagement. The sun had hardly risen upon river, and swamp, and undulating plains, when the Mooltanee forces fell upon the motley crowd of the British levies, and in such superior numbers that victory seemed certain. For nine hours the English lieutenant resisted the onslaught, and by his valour, activity, presence of mind, and moral influence, kept his undisciplined forces in firm front to the foe. At last Courtlandt’s guns were brought over, and made the contest somewhat equal; later in the day, two regular regiments belonging to the colonel’s division arrived, with six guns, and the enemy panic-struck fled, leaving a large, proportion of their troops upon the field, slain, wounded, and prisoners, with six guns, and their entire baggage and munitions of war. The conduct of Edwardes throughout the day was splendid, and laid a deeper foundation for his military reputation.

Moolraj retreated to Mooltan, followed by the British, and the Khan of Bhawulpore, who had rendered hitherto but little assistance, and whose movements led to the suspicion that he had more sympathy with Moolraj than he dared to avow.

On the 28th of June, a Sikh brigade under the command of Sheik-Emaum-ood-deen, which had been dispatched by the government of Lahore, arrived to reinforce the English. The whole army appeared before Mooltan, consisting of eighteen thousand men, comprising the levies of Edwardes, the division of Courtlandt, that of the Khan of Bhawulpore, and the newly arrived brigade of the sheik.

Moolraj collected his army between the city and the invaders, and intrenched himself in a strong position, near the village of Sadoosan. Edwardes attacked the camp with one portion of his force, storming the breastwork, and with another taking the intrenchments in flank. The discomfited enemy was driven in disorder within the city. The loss of the allies was about twenty killed and less than one hundred wounded: the enemy suffered severely. The difficulties of Edwardes increased with his victories, for it was impossible for him to take Mooltan by a _coup de main_, and he had no siege _matériel_. To remain inactive was dangerous, for little reliance could be placed on the sheik, still less on the khan, and even the regular regiments of Courtlandt were not very trustworthy: he had mainly to rely upon his brave but undisciplined Affghan and Beloochee levies. With such an army, so collected, and without siege train, or heavy artillery of any kind, the conquest of Mooltan was an impossibility, and yet affairs demanded speedy and decided action. He accordingly sent to Sir Frederick Currie, the British resident at Lahore, acquainting him with the delicacy of his situation, and urging the dispatch of siege guns, and such other material of war as was requisite. Communication was made to Lieutenant Edwardes by the British resident at Lahore, that troops, material, and a general officer of experience to take the command, would be sent as speedily as possible, and meanwhile Edwardes was to watch the movements of the enenry. This he effectually did; Moolraj could execute nothing beyond the walls of Mooltan, for the eyes of the vigilant English lieutenant were constantly upon his movements.

On the 18th of August General Whish arrived from Lahore with two regiments of native infantry, a regiment of irregular horse, a troop of horse artillery, and the 10th regiment of her majesty’s foot. The next day a column arrived from Ferozepore, consisting of three regiments of native infantry, two regiments of native cavalry, one regular and one irregular, a battering train, a troop of horse artillery, and her majesty’s 32nd regiment of the line. The forces before Mooltan then amounted to six thousand Europeans, and more than twenty-two thousand native troops, including the levies of Edwardes, and the khan’s forces.

Scarcely had the army under General Whish assembled before Mooltan, when other events still more formidable than the defection of Moolraj occurred elsewhere.

MUTINY OF SIKH TROOPS IN THE PUNJAUB. AND REVOLT OF CHUTTUR SINGH.

Sirdar Chuttur Singh (father of Rajah Shere Singh) was governor of the Hazareh country, under allegiance to the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, of Lahore. That chief took advantage of the revolt at Mooltan, and opened correspondence with other chiefs for the purpose of tampering with the Sikh soldiers in garrison in their different provinces. The government of Lahore was guilty of complicity in these movements, although affecting to be incensed against the refractory chiefs and provinces. A knowledge of this circumstance soon spread among the Khalsa* soldiery all over the Punjaub, and disposed them to follow any leader who had the boldness to hoist the standard of rebellion.

* “Khalsa,” or church. This name was assumed to express the
idea that the army was composed only of the faithful; the
Sikh religion being a sort of eclectic religion, chosen from
Mohammedanism, Brahminism, and other oriental systems.

Early in September the whole Hazareh country was in ostensible insurrection, and an attack was made upon Attock. Happily Major Lawrence was then, in the phraseology of the Indian political service, the assistant at Peshawur. He sent Lieutenant Nicholson, at the head of a detachment of cavalry and infantry, to take possession of: the fort. By a forced marched this was effected before the arrival of the rebellious sirdar’s troops. Cabbot Abbot, the political agent in the Hazareh, joined Lieutenant Nicholson, and their position was very precarious. Major Lawrence, whose comprehensive mind was prepared for every emergency, had troops moved to their assistance from Peshawur and Jullundur. The revolt, however, spread in every direction. Peshawur was begirt, with disciplined and fanatical enemies, and at last, early in November, Major Lawrence and family had to fly for their lives from that place, the troops in the garrison having mutinied on the approach of Chuttur Singh and his army. Major and Mrs. Lawrence, with Lieutenant Bowie, found refuge at Kohat, under the protection of Mahomed Khan. Mahomed, either through fear or treachery, or both, gave them up as prisoners to Chuttur Singh. The sirdar treated them with kindness, and frequently conversed with them on the prospects of restoring the Sikh ascendancy in the Punjaub; nor were the dissuasions of Major Lawrence of any effect, for Chuttur believed in the Khâlsa confederacy.

On the 18th of December, when Shere Singh was at the head of a numerous force, Major Lawrence was brought to his camp with the object of using him for negotiations with the governor-general. It is necessary, in order to preserve the collateral relation of events, to return to the army of Whish before the besieged city.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MOOLTAN.

General Whish pressed his operations against Mooltan with skill and energy. He was ably aided by Edwardes, Courtlandt, Brigadier-general Markham, and other officers. During the first ten days of September skirmishes were frequent, and some of these were sharp and spirited. On the 12th Whish determined to attack certain posts, the capture of which was essential to the execution of his plans. The enenry had established an extensive and formidable outpost in a village and garden near the walls. To capture this a body of the besiegers, numbering two thousand five hundred, were told off. They began the attack at break of day, under the command of Brigadier-general Harvey. The contest was very severe, but ended in the accomplishment of General Whish’s design. The slaughter of the Mooltanese was signal, and the heroism of the European regiments extraordinary. The loss on the part of the British was heavy. Major Montazambert, of the 10th foot, Colonel Pattoun, of the 32nd, Quartermaster Taylor, also of that regiment, were the officers of the royal regiments which fell. Lieutenant Cubit and Ensign Lloyd, of the Company’s service, also fell. The latter officer was treacherously cut down while parleying with the enemy. The 10th regiment fought desperately, making havoc of the Mooltanese with the bayonet.

The next day the besieged made a sortie against the camp of Lieutenant Edwardes, but were beaten back, the pursuit issuing in the capture of another important outpost. The defence had arrived at its crisis, but Sikh treachery averted from the city the impending blow. On the morn-, ing of the 14th, Shere Singh, with the whole of the Lahore troops, five thousand in number, went over to the enemy. This event, at once lessening the army of the besiegers, and increasing that of the besieged, made their relative numbers so disproportionate, that the siege was raised, the army withdrawing to a position a few miles distant, where they intrenched. Soon after the British took up this position, Shere Singh left Mooltan and marched along the banks of the Chenab, forming a junction with Chuttur Singh, which placed the former at the head of thirty thousand men. It became necessary for another British army to encounter this enemy, while Whish and his troops could do nothing against Mooltan until strongly reinforced. On the 21st of December, a strong division of the Bombay army arrived at General Whish’s camp, and thus strengthened, the general resolved upon active operations. His army now numbered about seventeen thousand Sikhs, Beloochees, Affghans, and other contingents, about fifteen thousand more Queen’s and Company’s troops, and one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. On the 27th General Whish resolved upon a grand attack, and moved his army forward in four columns. The enemy falling back from their outposts, the British took a position in the suburbs within five hundred yards of the walls. That day and night batteries were constructed on all appropriate points, and early on the 28th a terrible bombardment began. By the 29th, the works were carried forward to within eighty yards of the place, breaches began to be effected, the granary was fired, and the batteries and buildings of the enemy suffered much under the heavy cannonade of the besiegers. On the 30th a shell blew up the principal magazine of the city. The shock was felt for two miles, and the camp of the besiegers literally rocked above the convulsive throes of the earth. The magazine contained sixteen thousand pounds of powder. The explosion was instant; with one fierce crash and a long-continued roar, the smoke and flame gushed upwards—one of the most grandly terrible sights upon which human eye could look. Eight hundred men perished, their charred limbs and whole carcasses were cast far beyond. The houses of the chief persons, the public buildings and temples, were shaken down by the vibrations; yet the walls of the fort endured, and the bulk of the city was intact. A fire was communicated, which raged through several streets, but was extinguished. It was supposed that this event would lead to the surrender of the place, but next day Moolraj sent word to General Whish that he had still powder enough for a twelvemonth’s siege, and that he would hold out while one stone remained upon another. This was supposed to be mere bravado, and a summon was sent to surrender. Moolraj, with perfect _sang froid_, rammed the letter down one of the longest guns, and fired it at the British. During the following night a distinct breach was effected in the Delhi gate of the city, and the next day another at the Bohan gate. The fire of the besiegers was plied hotly for the two following days and nights, the city blazing like a hell, amidst the crash of falling buildings, and the outcry of wounded women and children. On the 81st the Sikhs made a sortie from the south-west gate against the camp of Edwardes. That officer, ever vigilant, and ably seconded by the engineer officer, Lieutenant Lake, repulsed the sortie, inflicting heavy loss. The cannonade continued for fifty-six hours longer, and on the 2nd of January the assault was made. The Bengal and Bombay divisions were formed into separate columns, and precipitated upon the two breaches. These columns moved forward with great daring and under a heavy fire. The Bengal column found the breach impracticable, with an open drop in front, and strong defences in the rear. While the Bengal Sepoys were obstructed by obstacles which they could not surmount, the Bombay column gained an entrance. The sergeant-major of the Bombay Fusileers boldly planted the British flag above the breach. The Bengal column turned and followed their more fortunate comrades of the other presidency. The enemy resisted at every step, receding only before superior force, and it was not until the sun went down over the blackened ruins and blood-stained streets of Mooltan that the city was completely in the hands of the conquerors. The troops of Moolraj retreated to the citadel, which was a place of surpassing strength, and could only be taken by regular approaches. Parallels were opened, and a fierce cannonade was directed against it on the 4th; but it was not until the 18th that any decided impression was made. By that date the intrenchments were carried up to the very walls, but such was their extraordinary strength that they were proof against artillery—at all events, any artillery of the calibre possessed by the besiegers. Whish resolved to effect their destruction by mines. On the 18th three mines were exploded, and the counterscarp was blown into the ditch. A shaft was then sunk under the trench, and a gallery cut towards the wall. At the same time a battery was placed on a level higher than the citadel itself; another carrying eighteen and twenty-four pounders was placed close up to the wall. From this battery the most extraordinary cannonade and bombardment was conducted. Eight-inch howitzers discharged live shells into the wall, which buried themselves in the mud and brickwork of which it was built, and, exploding, tore away large portions. On the 19th the sap reached the crest of the glacis, and on the 21st the engineer officer in charge announced that there were two practicable breaches. General Whish gave prompt orders for the storm on the following morning. Moolraj had been seriously alarmed during the progress of the works for the few days previous, and repeatedly offered to surrender if his life would be spared. The answer returned informed him that no terms but an unconditional surrender would be conceded. On the 22nd, the British columns were forming for the assault, when the garrison hauled down its flag, and Moolraj surrendered at discretion.

The scenes which followed were at once picturesque and painful. The discomfited troops marched forth as prisoners of war. First came a few hundreds of the most miserable, dispirited looking men, ill clothed, and wan with fatigue. These were fanatics who had under a vow devoted themselves to especial peril and labour in the defence, and as is so frequently the case with men under the influence of fanaticism, defeat brings reaction in the form of despair. A column of about three thousand five hundred soldiery, stern looking men, next came. With such troops it was no wonder that Moolraj made so glorious a defence. This splendid body of men laid down their arms with reluctance, and looked back upon the breaches as if they fain would return and die there, with their arms in their hands. The body-guard of Moolraj followed, a splendid body of soldiers, whose equipment in arms and uniform was superb. The chiefs, friends, and family of the governor next came. They were deeply dejected, and uttered words of expressive anguish and shame. Moolraj himself was the last man of the Khalsa host who left the citadel. He was gorgeously appareled in silks, and decorations expressive of Khalsa religious or military associations. He wore jewels, carried arms superbly ornamented and of superior make, and rode a beautiful Arab charger, covered with a scarlet saddle-cloth, with gilt or golden trappings. His personal appearance was impressive, his countenance manly and well formed, with quick, fiery, expressive eyes. Above the middle height, his form was strong, muscular, and yet elegant. His bearing was manly and gallant; there was no assumed or insolent defiance, no fanatical contempt expressed by it, nor did he allow dejection to betray itself. He and his followers became prisoners of war, and were placed at the disposal of the governor-general. It was alleged that the British army was guilty of plunder, and that officers of engineers were discovered appropriating to themselves prizes, which belonged either to the custody of the prize agents, or were sacred as private property. It would appear that these allegations were circulated by certain agents of persons in England having interests adverse to the Honourable East India Company, and were utterly unfounded. Lord Ellenborough, more than eight years afterwards, confuted the calumny.

Mooltan, and the territory of which it was the capital, was now completely subjugated, and our ally, the khan, returned to his own province a wiser if not a better man, his further services being confined to the maintenance of peace in his own territory, and to the exercise of a certain degree of vigilance in reference to surrounding provinces. The fall of Mooltan was received over all British India and the neighbouring independent states as one of the grandest events in Indian history, and filled the petty chieftains with awe, while it excited exultation in the presidencies. Far different were the feelings created in the minds of the Sikh soldiery and people; they were exasperated, and determined to hazard all upon a single throw. To avenge past disasters, and expel the British from the country of the five rivers became the passionate purpose and ambition of chieftain and soldier, and everywhere desultory bands made war, as they pressed onward to join the great chiefs, Shere Singh and Chuttur Singh who were now at the head of a powerful army.

CAMPAIGN IN THE PUNJAUB UNDER LORD GOUGH.

It has been already related that Shere Singh quitted Mooltan with a strong division of Khalsa troops, on the 9th of October, and formed a junction with Chuttur Singh.

The latter returned to the territory of Hazareh, leaving the bulk of his forces under the command of Shere Singh, who was gradually joined by other chiefs and sirdars, whose followers augmented his army,—that army consisted of men inured to combat, the flower of the Sikh nation. Lord Gough, the commander-in-chief of the army in India, was ordered to assemble an army at Ferozepore, and act against Shere Singh, and, in fact, reconquer the Punjaub. Bombay and other troops were ordered to join the army collecting at Ferozopore, and the victorious troops of Whish, Courtlandt, and Edwardes were ordered to follow and form a junction with the grand army. These troops did not join as soon as Lord Gough expected, and the Bombay division, under the Hon. Major-general Dundas, was so dilatory as to evoke from the good-natured general-in-chief a most stinging rebuke. The major-general was urged by despatches to advance with all possible celerity, but he expressed himself as not perceiving the necessity of such speed. “Tell him,” said the gallant commander, “to stay with the native troops if he likes, but to send on the Europeans!”

Before, however, the army which had acted before Mooltan could render any assistance to Lord Gough, months before that city had fallen, events gathered within the Punjaub in gloomy and rapid association. It was on the 21st of November before General Gough assumed the active command of the army at Seharun, a central position. The river Chenab is the central one of the five rivers which give name to the district, and the theatre of conflict was midway between the Chenab and its confluence with the Indus. On the left bank of the former, about a mile and a half from the river, the town of Rumnugger was situated: there Shere Singh had taken up his quarters. Opposite that town the river bends, and there was an island in mid-channel; this island was about two acres in area. The main force of Shere Singh was posted on the right bank of the river, but a strong brigade of four thousand men occupied the island, and erected batteries. These batteries commanded the only available ford, or “nullah,” as it is called in the vocabulary of the country. The opposite town of Rumnugger was favourably situated for defence; it was flanked by a grove, and by the bend in the river. This position Shere Singh had skilfully fortified. On the 22nd, at two o’clock in the morning, Lord Gough approached the enemy. While the right bank and the island were occupied by the chief forces of the sirdar, he had a strong body also posted on the left bank, and it became the first object of Lord Gough to dislodge them. Between the island and the right bank the passage was effected by boats, so that the enemy was able to preserve his communications with tolerable certainty and ease. The nullah or ford was not difficult, although the descent to it from the left bank of the river was steep. It was directly commanded by the guns on the island, and was exposed to a raking cross-fire on either side from batteries placed on the right bank. The 8th light cavalry (Company’s service) advanced along the left bank, skirmishing, supported by her majesty’s 3rd Light Dragoons. The horse artillery pushed into the deep sand on the margin of the river, and commanded the batteries at Rumnugger, but were obliged to retire before their superior metal, leaving behind one gun and two ammunition waggons embedded in the sand. The enemy took skilful and immediate advantage of this reverse, and pushed over a powerful cavalry division. Orders were given to charge them, and the 14th (Queen’s) Light Dragoons, and the 3rd light horse of the Company’s army, in spite of overwhelming numbers and of imperfect supports, cut through the enemy and dashed after them into the nullah. The passage was familiar to the latter, who made good their retreat to the island; the latter were of course ignorant of the ground, and were impeded in their pursuit by that circumstance, had none other obstructed them. As soon as the Sikh cavalry cleared the ford, the batteries of the island and the flanking batteries on the right bank opened with deadly effect. How any British officer could have been so imprudent as to give the order to charge into the nullah is almost inconceivable; that the error was not evident, while the brave men were being mowed down by an artillery fire, which they could do nothing to silence, is still more marvellous; such, however, was the case. Colonel Havelock dashed into the ford at the head of the 14th Light Dragoons, but was never seen again. A native trooper supposed he saw him in the nullah soon after he entered it, unhorsed, and several Sikh soldiers “hacking his person.” After much useless slaughter was thus incurred by Havelock’s gallant brigade, Major-general Cureton rode up with an order from Lord Gough for the troops to retire. He had scarcely given the order when he fell dead from two shots, by which he was instantaneously struck. The troops retired with a loss, in every corps engaged, of officers and men. Lord Gough considered the end attained in driving the enemy from the left bank was worth the sacrifice. The death of General Cureton was severely felt by the army, and was in some degree irreparable. He had risen from the ranks by his superior soldiership, and was deemed one of the best, perhaps the best, officer for outpost duty then in India.

On the 30th of November Lieutenant-general Thackwell was ordered to cross the Chenab above Rumnugger, where an indifferent ford had been discovered, and where Captain Nicholson had provided boats. Thackwell was to take the Sikhs in the flank and rear, while Lord Gough observed them from his old position, ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity for attack which the manouvre of General Thackwell might create. That gallant and skilful officer performed well the part assigned to him. He gained the right bank of the river; but Shere Singh was also a skilful commander, and did not allow Thackwell even to menace his rear or flank, for he detached a strong force to attack the intruder, as soon as he saw that the river had been forded. It was the 3rd of December before Thackwell secured the passage, and on the fourth he began his march along the right bank towards the lines at Rumnugger. He soon discovered that a strong body of Sikhs were marching in a north-west direction. They threatened his flank with cavalry, and cannonaded him severely. Thackwell’s orders did not allow of his taking any measure for attack, and the enemy drew off after a sharp and heavy cannonade. As soon as this officer’s artillery was allowed to open upon them, they marched towards the Jhelum. Perhaps the enemy were decided in abandoning their strong positions, not only from fear of their left flank being turned by General Thackwell, but also by the energetic proceedings of Lord Gough, after the force detached to observe Thackwell had departed. Lord Gough opened a heavy cannonade upon the island, and upon the batteries on the right bank of the Chenab. On the morning of the 3rd a brigade of infantry, under Brigadier Godby, passed by a ford not far from Rumnugger, his passage being covered by the approach of General Thackwell, who had by that time been advancing from the passage at Wuzerabad. Shortly after, the 9th Lancers and 14th Light Dragoons, under General Gilbert, were ordered to cross the river, and harass as much as possible the retreating enemy. The British generals seem to have believed that the Khalsa army would abandon their chiefs and disperse to their homes, and this impression influenced their proceedings; for although Gilbert with his cavalry followed the enemy briskly, there was not that celerity in the movements of the British which actual circumstances demanded.

On the 28th of December Lord Gough, with his whole army, crossed the river and encamped. The right bank was now clear of the enemy, Shere Singh having followed the previous division of his army to the Jhelum, where he ultimately took post in the formidable position of Russool, with a force which was augmented to forty thousand men, and a powerful artillery, estimated variously from sixty-two to ninety guns.

While these events were passing, Chuttur Singh, who, as before noticed, had retired to his own province, pressed the fort of Attock, which had been long and gallantly maintained by Major Herbert. When it fell the major contrived to send tidings to Lord Gough, and to warn him that Chuttur Singh had repaired with his army to the upper Jhelum, to form a junction with the army of Shere Singh. Lord Gough determined at once to follow the Sikh forces, and bring them to a decisive action. On the morning of the 12th of January he marched from Loah Tibbah to Dingee. The sirdar was represented by the British commander-in-chief in his despatch as holding with his right the village of Lukhneewalla and Futteh Shah-ke-Chuck, having the great body of his force at the village of Lollianwalla, with his left at Eussool, on the Jhelum. This position lay on the southern extremity of a low range of hills, intersected by ravines, and difficult of access to assailants. The post was well chosen by the sirdar, who showed a subtle generalship throughout the war. The information furnished by Lord Gough’s spies was not always faithful, and his lordship, therefore, was not accurately in possession of the forces of the sirdar, nor of the topographical peculiarities of his position. The British commander directed his march upon the village of Bussool, and there reconnoitred.

The advance to the ground chosen by the sirdar was impeded by a jungle, to avoid which, and to distract the enemy’s attention, Lord Gough took a considerable _détour_ to the right. He succeeded in avoiding the intricacies of the jungle, but not in distracting the attention of Shere Singh. That general moved from his encampment, and took ground in advance, a manouvre calculated to hide the strength of his position, and to disconcert any previous arrangements of the British commander.

About noon on the 13th, Lord Gough was before the village of Bussool, and finding a very strong picket of the enemy on a mound close to that place, his lordship, after some fighting, dislodged it. Ascending the mound, the general and his staff beheld the Khalsa army ranged along the furrowed hills in all the majestic array of war. The British officers gazed with admiration and professional ardour upon the long lines of compact infantry and the well-marshalled cavalry, mustered in their relative proportions and positions with scientific exactness. The sirdar’s batteries were chiefly masked by jungle. The scene was striking in its aspect, from the magnitude of the events associated with it, and the excitement it stirred up within the hearts of the brave. Alas, how many noble hearts were necessarily to bleed before victory crowned the arms of England, and that fine Khalsa army succumbed to the destiny of England’s Asiatic foes!

Lord Gough found that he could not turn the flanks of the sirdar’s army, they were so protected by jungle, unless he detached a portion of his army to a considerable distance, which he deemed unsafe. The day was too far advanced to begin any operations. The engineer officers were ordered to examine the country in front, and the quartermaster-general was about to take up ground for the encampment, when the enemy advanced some horse artillery, and opened a fire upon the skirmishers in front of Bussool. Lord Gough ordered his heavy guns to open upon the enemy’s artillery, and for this purpose they were advanced to an open space in front of the village. Shere Singh did not act with his usual good strategy, in exposing the positions of so many of his cannon, which the jungle had concealed, and which might have remained hidden until an attack upon his line would have afforded him opportunity to use them with sudden and terrible advantage, as he afterwards was enabled to use those on his right. As it was, he replied to the British cannonade with such a powerful field-artillery as constrained Lord Gough to draw up in order of battle, lest in the night the sirdar’s guns should be moved still more forward, and open on his camp. His lordship, keeping the heavy guns on his centre, placed Sir Walter Gilbert’s division on his right, flanked by Brigadier Pope’s brigade of cavalry, strengthened by her majesty’s 14th Light Dragoons, and three troops of horse artillery, under Colonel Grant. This arrangement was necessitated by the large force of cavalry observed upon the enemy’s left. On the left of the British line, Brigadier-general Campbell’s division was formed, flanked by Brigadier White’s cavalry, and three troops of horse artillery under Colonel Brind.

The demonstrations of the enemy were such that, late as was the hour, and weary as the troops were with marching, Lord Gough determined to attack at once. His lordship’s critics, influenced by the events which followed, have severely censured him for attacking under such circumstances, more especially as the ground was unknown to his lordship. It was true that sufficient time had not been obtained to reconnoitre the enemy’s positions, but it was not correct to allege that Lord Gough was entirely unacquainted with the ground, as he had previously known it, especially the country to the left of the enemy. It was generally supposed by his lordship’s censors that the attack was a wanton waste of life, and arose from the brave, rash, and unreflecting temperament of the general, and the irritation caused by the sudden and severe artillery fire opened upon him. On the other hand, the Duke of Wellington declared that he would, in Lord Gough’s place, have acted as he had done; and so full of confidence were the Sikhs in their numbers and resolution, that had not the general given battle, he would have been obliged to defend himself from a desperate night attack under circumstances far less favourable. There can be no doubt, on the part of any who know the noble old soldier, that he acted from his sense of duty to his army and his country, and not from personal irritation.

The battle began, or, it may be said, was resumed, by a heavy cannonade which lasted for more than an hour when Lord Gough ordered his left to advance, making a flank movement. In executing this manouvre, the troops exposed their own flank to a galling fire from heavy guns, the positions of which had remained covered by jungle, and the Sikh batteries were so placed as to pour a most destructive cross-fire upon the British. When the 3rd and 4th brigades reached the enemy’s guns, they were received by a cannonade so overwhelming that they were obliged to retire. As soon as it was known that these two brigades were engaged, the 5th, under Brigadier Mountain, was ordered to storm the centre. They were received with round-shot the moment they moved; with grape and canister as they advanced through the jungle; and, finally, with musketry within close and deadly range. Many of the Sikh soldiers, at the cost of their own life, advanced and shot down the British officers. Brigadier Mountain had distinguished himself in China, and had the entire confidence of Lord Gough, under whom he had served there. Under his able guidance, the British stormed the batteries and spiked the guns, under a flank fire from other guns which they also spiked, while the enemy, without giving way, poured upon them musket balls thick as hail. Detachments of musketeers took them on each flank, and some getting to their rear among the jungle, fired upon them with deadly aim. The British were thus compelled to cut their way back to their own lines through hosts of encircling foes. While this was going on upon the centre, Sir Walter Gilbert advanced against the enemy’s left. That general occupied the extreme right of his division, and Brigadier Godby the extreme left. They marched through a dense jungle almost unmolested, and then were confronted by infantry. Had the British at once charged with the bayonet, the result might for them have been less sanguinary; they, however, opened fire, and the Sikhs, more numerous, returned the fire and outflanked them. Two companies of the 2nd (or Queen’s) British regiment charged with the bayonet, but were surrounded. These gallant and skilful soldiers immediately faced about, and after some file-firing charged, rear-rank in front. At this critical moment, Deane’s battery arrived, and drove back the enemy by the precision of their fire. Several guns were here captured by the British. The heroism and losses of the 2nd regiment were very great. While the infantry had thus been engaged in close and deadly battle, the cavalry also were occupied both on the left and right. On the former flank of the British, Brigadier White’s brigade charged the enemy, covering the retreat of the infantry. On the extreme right Brigadier Pope’s brigade, strengthened, as has been already shown, by the temporary attachment of the 14th Light Dragoons of the Queen’s army, was ordered to charge a body of the enemy’s cavalry, the numbers of which were much superior. Instead of obeying the orders given, they wheeled right about, and galloped off the field, breaking through the artillery, upsetting artillerymen, drivers, and waggons in their course, until they reached the field hospital. According to some narrations of this transaction, the men galloped away under a mistake of orders; other accounts represent this to have been impossible, because their own officers and officers of the artillery endeavoured to stop and rally them without success, except so far as a portion of the 9th Lancers was concerned. The enemy was not slow to take advantage of this extraordinary flight; they pursued—dashed in among the horse artillery—cut down seventy-five gunners, and took six guns. The arrival of artillery reserves, the rallying of a portion of the 9th Lancers, and the steadiness of the infantry, prevented the destruction of the whole right wing. The fresh artillery which came up opened upon the Sikh cavalry with grape and canister, with such precision and fury that they retreated. Two of the captured guns were recovered in the retreat. The Sikhs gradually withdrew, leaving the field of battle in possession of the British, who, on this account, claimed the victory. The enemy, in the night, carried away all the guns which the British had spiked during the action, the four pieces of horse artillery which they took on the British right, and five stand of colours, and on these grounds also claimed the victory; and a salute of twenty-one guns in honour of the triumph was, as the English thought, most impudently fired. This was also done at Attock, in the capital of Chuttur Singh, and wherever the Sikh troops held a position. The Sikhs also claimed the victory for the same reason as the English did—being left in possession of the field. It was, in truth, a drawn battle. The Sikhs having began the engagement, and the English having retained the ground on which they fought, while the former retired their line, the battle may more correctly be said to have been won by the British; but the advantages gained were altogether on the part of the Sikhs, who continued to occupy for a month positions from which the British did not attempt to dislodge them. During that time Lord Gough waited for reinforcements, and felt the tardy arrival of some of the troops whose presence had been detained before Mooltan, as has already been shown.

The loss sustained by the Sikhs it is impossible to calculate; according to themselves it was much less than that of the English; and this is credible when the strength of their position is considered, and the losses to which the unaccountable flight of Pope’s brigade exposed the British light. The English loss, according to the official returns, was three thousand men in killed and wounded, nearly one-third of whom belonged to the former class; this, however, did not comprehend all the slain, for many were so horribly wounded by the close discharge of artillery that they died in a few days. The proportion of the wounded who were hit mortally was beyond that which usually occurs in battle. There were also many desertions of Sepoy soldiers to Shere Singh, but more especially of Sikh soldiery under Lord Gough’s command.

The flight of the large body of cavalry under Brigadier Pope was the subject of much investigation and of shame. The brigadier was too old for the duties imposed upon him; he had no experience in war, and was placed in the command from seniority. This gave occasion, in England, to denounce the substitution of seniority for fitness, so common in the British army. Unhappily, the officer himself who was so much concerned in the responsibility of the event, and who had been much respected by his brother officers and his commander, was placed beyond all human accountability, for he fell in front of his fugitive soldiers. Colonel King, of the 14th Light Dragoons, who succeeded Colonel Havelock, who fell at Rumnugger, was also much censured. His defence was, that he did his utmost to rally his men in vain; that they were generally light small men, mounted upon light small horses; whereas the cavalry immediately opposed to them were not only much more numerous, but cuirassiers—powerful, heavy men, with long and superior swords, and admirably mounted. The colonel complained of the bad manufacture of the English weapons, which bent or broke against the swords and cuirasses of the Sikh cavalry, When Sir Charles Napier arrived to command the forces in India late in the spring, he inspected the 14th, and addressed them, referring to the allegations of their colonel, and telling them that they were fine, stalwart, broad-chested fellows, that would follow anywhere that they were led. Colonel King took this so much to heart, that he retired from the field of inspection and shot himself. Sir William Napier (brother to Sir Charles) afterwards denied in the London newspapers that his brother intended to cast any reflection upon Colonel King. It was, however, generally believed in the army, that Sir Charles levelled a censure at the unfortunate officer, whose sensitive honour could not endure such a reflection from so high an authority. His fate excited deep commisseration, and the address of Sir Charles was disapproved of indignantly by the whole army.

The generalship of Lord Gough became the subject of anonymous criticism in India, and open attack in England; but the brave and skilful general proved at the subsequent battle of Goojerat that he knew how to gain victory at as little cost of blood as it was possible for military knowledge to ensure. The late drawn battle—if such it may be called—was designated the battle of Chillianwallah, after a village in the immediate neighbourhood of which the British had encamped. The Sikhs know it as the battle of Russool, the more appropriate name to give it, as it was in its vicinity the chief strength of the Sikh position was found.

Leaving the movements of the two armies confronting one another to the narrative of another chapter, it is now necessary to turn to other scenes of interest.

CANADA.

This fine colony continued prosperous and powerful, yet the dissatisfaction of previous years with the imperial administration was not removed. On the 28th of February the first session of the new parliament was opened by the governor-general, who delivered a speech which was intended to be concilatory, but which did not accomplish its purpose. An amendment was proposed to the address, which was carried against the government by a majority of fifty-four to twenty. In this amendment the legislature plainly declared its want of confidence in the governor’s advisers; the ministry therefore resigned.

THE WEST INDIES.

During this year the West India colonists were discontented, and complained of distress, while at home they were regarded with suspicion by the religious and anti-slavery public, as designing, if possible, to restore slavery.