Chapter LXXVI (2)

The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having previously gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, nearly equal in number to theirs; but after a hard-fought contest, in which he at first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled the Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.[55] Though thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten years after its commencement.[56] It cost them on the whole (if we may believe Isokrates)[57] fifteen thousand talents in money, and such severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized as paid by “one king to another.” Rather than concede this point of honor, he even broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to defend himself to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus of projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and thus became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already wearied out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the other side.[58]

[55] Diodor. xv, 4.

[56] Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with
Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 77.

The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of
Kilikia was still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the
Panegyrical Oration. At that time, Evagoras had maintained
the contest six years, counting either from the peace of
Antalkidas (387 B.C.) or from his naval defeat about a year
or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite
clear from what point of commencement he reckons the six
years.

We know that the war between the king of Persia and
Evagoras had begun as early as 390 B.C., in which year
an Athenian fleet was sent to assist the latter (Xenoph.
Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus state
that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the
conclusion of it in 380 or 379 B.C., soon after the date
of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates. I dissent on
this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad
annos 387-376 B.C., and his Appendix, No. 12—where the
point is discussed). He supposes the war to have begun
after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have ended in 376
B.C. I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he
appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority
of Xenophon,—or at least only to evade the necessity
of contradicting him by resorting to an inconvenient
hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian
expeditions sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390
B.C., next in 388 B.C., as relating to “_hostile measures
before the war began_” (p. 280). To me it appears more
natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the
war.

[57] Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.

[58] Diodor. xv. 8, 9.

This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the
part of Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit
on the authority of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice
a morsel for a panegyrical discourse such as that of Isokrates,
that one cannot but think he would have inserted it had it come
to his knowledge. His silence causes great surprise—not without
some suspicion as to the truth of the story.

It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies, and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war, nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.[59] His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing as it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and conflict, often with actual bloodshed.[60] But he omits to notice the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the hero throughout his life.[61] It was seemingly not very long after the peace, that a Salaminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident, before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight. He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty of the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his hand.[62]

[59] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must
be more true of Evagoras than of Nikokles.

[60] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s.
138.

[61] Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.

[62] I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the
fragment of Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract
of that author by Photius (Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed.
Didot).

Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude
to the assassination of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these
authors conceive the story differently from Theopompus. Thus
Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and
became “despot of Salamis.” This appears to be a confusion of
Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the son of Evagoras, and
the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords the surest
proof that _he_ had no hand in the death of his father.

The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ
τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ
ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. So perplexing is the passage in its
literal sense, that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his
translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname or _sobriquet_
given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês. But this
supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that
Theopompus marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch,
by another word—Θρασυδαίου ~τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος~, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ
γένος, etc.

It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently
from Theopompus, and we have to choose between the two. I
prefer the version of the latter; which is more marked as well
as more intelligible, and which furnishes the explanation why
Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the most advanced of the sons,
being left in command of the besieged Salamis when Evagoras
quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his father,
but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the
representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man
of much energy. The position of this eunuch in the family of
Nikokreon seems to mark the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.

Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence, remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and forming a strong contrast in this respect with his contemporary Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and violence. Nikoklês, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after him, and showed much regard, accompanied by munificent presents, to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the prosperity of the city.[63]

[63] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras)
s. 100; Or. xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the
assassination of Evagoras in 374 B.C.

We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting not less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus,—to the general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece. For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in 479 B.C., the Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. The satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was carried so far as to raze the town altogether.[64] And thus these cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs,—were now transferred to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more unrestrained, than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and beautiful women as inmates of their harems.[65] What was taken for their convenience admitted neither of recovery nor redress; and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than many of the native Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and seductive,—as we may read in the history of that Phokæan lady, the companion of Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came under the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of pain or torture,—maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks, but also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.[66] The difference between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this point, has been just noticed; and doubtless the difference between Greeks and Persians was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the hands of the Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in Cyprus,—and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of Asia,—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.[67] These islands were now exposed to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the genius, the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first organized, and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to whom its extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks, had destroyed the security even of the islanders.

[64] Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις
τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν,
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.

[65] See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.

[66] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.

Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ
ἐξαρκεῖ δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι
τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς
οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν.

[67] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190. How
immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the
continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also,
is seen in Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered
without resisting, to the first Cyrus, when he was master of
the continental towns, though he had no naval force (Herod. i,
143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the Spartans deemed
it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian
masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the
energy and organization of the Athenians proved that it was
possible to do so.

It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis, as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans, like Antalkidas, warned him[68] that his persevering hostility would ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it was too fully realized in the development of the great military genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.

[68] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.

I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the treaty, and attack them single-handed.[69] Their timely accession balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a series of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to the power of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed autonomous under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and interpreter, of that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have, the right of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent, from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she availed herself of this moment of change to organize in each of them a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost and garrison.[70] Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and the predominant sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been favorable to Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of Thebes. These leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, intimidated, and disqualified, under the new system, while those who had before been an opposition minority would come forward with a bold and decided policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the surrender of the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather invite than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as well as against attacks from Thebes, and as a means of placing them under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy, from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet, Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears to have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable to the Spartan alliance.[71] These two cities were strongly garrisoned by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.[72]

[69] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.

[70] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι
καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city
of Tanagra, he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ
Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).

Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages,
explains the word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones
optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ
Laconico.” This is perfectly just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν
Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation. These words allude
to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades was
the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to
the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 B.C.; and who
remained masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by
a standing Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were
overthrown by the memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon
in 379 B.C. It is to this oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes,
devoted to Spartan interests and resting on Spartan support,—that
Xenophon compares the governments planted by Sparta, after the
peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. What he says,
of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at Thebes,
is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into the
acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might
themselves exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας
εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν
πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: compare v, 2,
36). This character—conveying a strong censure in the mouth
of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to all the governments
planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace of
Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she
established throughout her empire.

[71] Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.

[72] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or.
xiv, (Plataic.) s. 14. 15.

The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.

A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its brave and faithful population, victims of an exposed position combined with numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance the capricious turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior towards them. One hundred and twenty years before, the Platæans had thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat her protection against Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then declined the obligation as too distant, and had recommended them to ally themselves with Athens.[73] This recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, was complied with; and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether from the Bœotian confederacy, turned out both advantageous and honorable to her until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At that time, it suited the policy of the Spartans to uphold and strengthen in every way the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it was altogether by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes was reëstablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service of Mardonius.[74] Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless suggested by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time (460-445 B.C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic grounds; seeing that Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted them all in the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same again if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole Bœotian federation (except Platæa), was united under Thebes, in bitter hostility against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war, king Archidamus, at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter town; which, after an heroic defence and a long blockade, at length surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; yet not before one half its brave defenders had forced their way out over the blockading wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the Platæan old men, women, and children, had been safely lodged before the siege. By a cruel act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian warfare, the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Platæan captives, two hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Platæa had been razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.[75] The surviving Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians. A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at Athens, and when Skionê was recaptured in 420 B.C., that town (vacant by the slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed over to the Platæans as a residence.[76] Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they were obliged at the close of the Peloponnesian war,[77] to return to Athens, where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their town and their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and restore it.[78]

[73] Herodot. vi, 108.

[74] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.

[75] Thucyd. iii, 68.

[76] Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or.
xii, (Panathen.) s. 101.

[77] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.

[78] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.

Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the autonomy of _existing_ towns,—or to repair previous injustice, since the prior destruction had been the deliberate act of themselves, and of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but simply as a step conducive to the present political views of Sparta. And towards this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the Thebans, not only by wresting from them what had been, for about forty years, a part of their territory and property; but also by establishing upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, calculated to prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards against Sparta. As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no less ancient and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we may probably conclude that the restoration of the town was an act acceptable to the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made of it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during their residence at Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,[79] who now, probably, accompanied their husbands to the restored little town on the north of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river Asôpus.

[79] Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.

Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost of Spartan operations against Thebes.[80] They were a part of the great revolution which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia; whereby Thebes was degraded from the president of a federation into an isolated autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had been before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth[81] in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy, in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent the reunion of Bœotia;[82] an object in which she was for a time completely successful, and was even enabled, beyond her hopes, to become possessed of Thebes itself,[83] through a party of traitors within,—as will presently appear.

[80] See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which
is a pleading probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by
the Platæans (after the second destruction of their city),
and, doubtless, founded upon their own statements. The painful
dependence and compulsion under which they were held by Sparta,
is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31, 33, 48);
together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in
their town (s. 14).

[81] Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian
cities αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long
desired to do. Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from
Thebes, was insured to them,—but in no other sense.

[82] To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian
cities, and Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the
seizure of the Kadmeia by Sparta (387-382 B.C.)—compare
the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and that of the Theban
Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34). Ὑμᾶς
(the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’
ἓν εἴη, etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν,
πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν
ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ
Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.

[83] In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it
stated among the accusations against the Thebans, that during
this period (_i. e._ between the peace of Antalkidas and the
seizure of the Kadmeia) they became sworn in as members of the
Spartan alliance and as ready to act with Sparta conjointly
against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might also
admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the
Spartan army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not
see how it can be even partially true. If it had been true, I
think Xenophon could not have failed to mention it: all that he
does say, tends to contradict it.

In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand, and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,[84] as well as by a section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local despots or oligarchies in the various cities,[85] and who contended that the autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be left to develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention on the part of Sparta.[86]

[84] Diodor. xv. 29.

[85] How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus,
may be seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica
of Xenophon; whose narrative is both so partial, and so
ill-constructed, that the most instructive information is dropped
only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where we should
not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ
λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius)
ἀπεχθάνοιτο (Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again,
v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος) εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ
πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ
πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24-26.

[86] Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for
a short time; that the cities which had before been dependent
allies of Sparta were now emancipated and left to themselves;
that a reaction immediately ensued against those dekarchies
or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the cities in the
interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as
everywhere to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal
partisans of Spartan supremacy; and that the accumulated
complaints and sufferings of these exiles drove the Spartans,
after having “endured the peace like a heavy burthen” (ὥσπερ
βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and
to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the
government of their friends in all the various cities. In this
statement there is nothing intrinsically improbable. After what
we have heard of the dekarchies under Sparta, no extent of
violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor can we
doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice,
along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian
citizens were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both
after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I
believe that Diodorus is here mistaken, and that he has assigned
to the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas,
those reactionary violences which took place in many cities
about sixteen years subsequently, _after the battle of Leuktra_.
For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of
Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by
Sparta to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked;
which he would never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been
so, because it would have supplied a plausible apology for the
high-handed injustice of the Spartans, and would have thus lent
aid to the current of partiality which manifests itself in his
history.

Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an early moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and Corinth, to strain their authority over their allies beyond its previous limits. Passing in review[87] the conduct of each during the war, they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea. Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity, were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under pretence of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in time of war to the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting their disaffected feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success which she obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience a reverse.[88] The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea, denouncing all such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that the walls of the city should be demolished, as the only security for future penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for the purpose of enforcing the sentence. They intrusted the command to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the duty, on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to his father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset Sparta during the early part of his reign.[89]

[87] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
ἐπισκοποῦντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.

[88] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the
Mantineans had really shown themselves pleased, when the
Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv,
5, 18).

[89] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.

Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard, while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the middle of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;[90] thus causing it to inundate the interior of the city and threaten the stability of the walls; which seem to have been of no great height, and built of sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to Athens for aid,[91] and unable to provide extraneous support for their tottering towers, the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a capitulation. But Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except on condition that not only the fortifications of their city, but the city itself, should be in great part demolished; and that the inhabitants should be re-distributed into those five villages, which had been brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate city of Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit, and the capitulation was ratified.

[90] In 1627, during the Thirty years’ War, the German town of
Wolfenbüttel was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by
damming up the river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance
of General Count Pappenheim, the Austrian besieging commander.
See Colonel Mitchell’s Life of Wallenstein, p. 107.

The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in
385 B.C., with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing
through the middle of it, is perfectly clear. When the city,
after having been now broken up, was rebuilt in 370 B.C., the
site was so far changed that the river no longer ran through it.
But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent
modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is
at a very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in
370 B.C.; the situation of which is accurately known, since
the circuit of its walls still remains distinctly marked. The
Mantinea of 370 B.C., therefore, as compared with the Mantinea in
385 B.C., must have been removed to a considerable distance—or
else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel
Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted
from its course, in order that it might be brought through the
town of Mantinea; a supposition, which he founds on the words
of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὴ
διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2, 7). But it is very
difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look at his
own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and
Tegeatis, and observe the great distance between the river Ophis
and Mantinea; nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to
imply any artificial diversion of the river. It appears easier to
believe that the river has changed its course. See Leake, Travels
in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71; and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380;
and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who still, however,
leaves the point obscure.

[91] Diodor. xv, 5.

Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of the Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious that they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition and by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the gate by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it as a signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep their spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within their reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested the most murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to control.[92] As at Peiræus before, so here at Mantinea again,—the liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias is found interfering in the character of mediator to soften the ferocity of political antipathies.

[92] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν
ἀργολιζόντων, καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ
(see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς
ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα οὖσι. Καὶ
ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ
δόρατα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· ~καὶ
μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν
Μαντινέων~· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.

I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe
a new example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied
to the wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its
equivalent is in other languages, by writers who sympathize with
them—is divested of all genuine ethical import as to character.

The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants were distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village. Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still better satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct Arcadian villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. They assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined to the command of each allied contingent), and the military service of all was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.[93]

[93] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.

He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ
Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138,
ed. Didot) states that it was distributed into the five original
villages; and Strabo affirms that there were _five_ original
constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence it is probable that
Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to
subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus,
Strabo, and Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.

Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after the trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves decidedly bettered by the change. Such an assurance is only to be credited, on the ground that, being captives under the Grecian laws of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more terrible liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting their civic community. That their feelings towards the change were those of genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after the battle of Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed, they flocked together, with unanimous impulse, to reconstitute and refortify their dismantled city.[94] It would have been strange indeed had the fact been otherwise; for attachment to a civic community was the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind. The citizen of a town was averse—often most unhappily averse—to compromise the separate and autonomous working of his community by joining in any larger political combination, however equitably framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing less than great social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally, Spartans not excepted.[95]

[94] This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5,
3). The Lacedæmonians, though they remonstrated against it,
were at that time too much humiliated to interfere by force
and prevent it. The reason why they did not interfere by force
(according to Xenophon) was that a general peace had just then
been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct town, so
that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what
they did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει
εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of
this second peace, Athens was the originator and the voucher;
but the autonomy which it guaranteed was only the same as had
been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, of which
Sparta had been the voucher.

General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing
from general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta.
The Spartans, when they had in their own hands both the power
of interpretation and the power of enforcement, did not scruple
to falsify autonomy so completely as to lay siege to Mantinea
and break up the city by force; while, when interpretation and
enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized that
the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of
interference.

We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is
the account given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea;
how completely he keeps out of view the odious side of that
proceeding.

[95] See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they
reject the claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer
the Olympic festival (which had been their ancient privilege)
because they were χωρίται and not fit for the task (Xen. Hellen.
iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 54).

In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea was in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the severest which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive glory and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy, or of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life of the people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of her empire, was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending not only to decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated towns, but even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into villages; all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively dependent upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had exercised no such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we shall hereafter find coming forward actively to found the new and great cities of Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of Sparta are worse than those of either Athens or Thebes; including less of improving or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most systematically upon subservient factions in each subordinate city. In the very treatment of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the attack of Sparta was welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by the oligarchical party of the place, who sought to grasp the power into their own hands and to massacre their political opponents. In the first object they completely succeeded, and their government probably was more assured in the five villages than it would have been in the entire town. In the second, nothing prevented them from succeeding except the accidental intervention of the exile Pausanias; an accident, which alone rescued the Spartan name from the additional disgrace of a political massacre, over and above the lasting odium incurred by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient autonomous city, which had shown no act of overt enmity, and which was so moderate in its democratical manifestations as to receive the favorable criticism of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.[96] Thirty years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than the reduction of the city to its original district;[97] now they are satisfied with nothing less than the partition of the city into unfortified villages, though there had been no actual war preceding. So much had Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity, progressed during this interval.

[96] Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.

[97] Thucyd. v, 81.

The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,[98] indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of its members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust. During the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been lords of the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never before possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus, and the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded by Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered it on land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on their side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had enabled them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The general autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters, meant nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from Thebes,[99] and of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply to the relation between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their hands free, the Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their ascendency on land to the point where it had stood before the battle of Knidus, and even to regain as much as possible of their empire at sea. To bring back a dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts and dekarchies, and to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most devoted partisans, in each of those cities where the government had been somewhat liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their systematic policy.

[98] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or.
viii, (De Pace) s. 123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5,
9-19.

[99] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.

Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished without just cause.[100]

[100] Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10.

The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee;
they will appear in a subsequent page.

While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, efforts were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the Cyclades and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In this latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps. Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine, which latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen except constrained Helots or paid foreigners;[101] while the commerce of Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population of this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect of accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia had few artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.[102] Accordingly, in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the shadow of her former self, started at an advantage as compared with Sparta, and in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was enabled to compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies among the smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had no marine of their own, and who (like Athens herself) required habitual supplies of imported corn, it was important to obtain both access to Peiræus and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm of pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market of Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea, through the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens, at a time when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.[103] A moderate tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary island greater advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least equal protection. Probably, the influence of Athens over these islanders was farther aided by the fact, that she administered the festivals, and lent out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos. We know by inscriptions remaining, that large sums were borrowed at interest from the temple-treasure, not merely by individual islanders, but also by the island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros, Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos. The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed these loans (or at least the presiding members) were Athenians named annually at Athens.[104] Moreover, these islanders rendered religious homage and attendance at the Delian festivals, and were thus brought within the range of a central Athenian influence, capable, under favorable circumstances, of being strengthened and rendered even politically important.

[101] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.

[102] Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.

[103] Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.

[104] See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense,
which contains the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at
Delos, from 377-373 B.C.

Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1;
vol. ii, p. 78 _seq._, ed. 2nd.

The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the
temple is given in these accounts, together with the amount of
interest either paid by them, or remaining in arrear.

By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of her former empire; so that in the year 380 B.C., when Isokrates published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the peace of Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender compared with the overruling might of Sparta,[105] yet her navy had already made such progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens and Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against the Asiatic barbarians.[106]

[105] This is the description which Isokrates himself gives
(Orat. xv, (Permutat.) s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world
when he published his Panegyrical Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν
ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.

[106] The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it
being pretty exactly known, is of great value for enabling us
to understand the period immediately succeeding the peace of
Antalkidas.

He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the
competition between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the
islands in the Ægean (s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως
ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι,
πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.

... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας
τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ~τοὺς νησιώτας
δασμολογεῖν~, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ
σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, τοὺς δ’ ἠπειρώτας
δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας,
etc. (s. 151).

... Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα
πρόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ ~περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν~,
τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως
εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.

Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας,
etc.