Chapter LXXIX (2)

Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is
erroneous, that Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as
a hostage.

2. The second was in 368 B.C.; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv,
71) and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).

Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with
the seizure and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But
it was really on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the
hostages.

3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was
in 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian
court, which happened seemingly in the beginning of 366 B.C.
In this third march, Pelopidas was seized and made prisoner
by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by Epaminondas.
Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing it
from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.);
but with this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before
the journey of Pelopidas to the Persian court; whereas it really
occurred after and in consequence of that journey, which dates in
367 B.C.

4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 B.C.; wherein he was slain
(Diodor. xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).

Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might coöperate in repelling or invading the Arcadians.[571] Reinforced by these Gauls and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every man whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to an eminence near Midea.[572] Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire, as the period to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge, that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or, as it came to be called, “the tearless battle,”—news was forthwith transmitted by the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting the example;[573]—a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a striking proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working on these minds of iron temper!

[571] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.

[572] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot
be identified. The only place of that name known, is in the
territory of Argos, quite different from what is here mentioned.
O. Müller proposes to substitute Malæa for Midea; a conjecture,
which there are no means of verifying.

[573] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch,
Agesil. c. 33.

So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos, instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of two thousand men and seven days’ provision. The Theban commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.[574] Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest. Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men), and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection either with Arcadians or Thebans.[575] Not being in a condition to resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of the oligarchical.[576] Such a proceeding was not only suitable to the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also calculated to strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,[577] which were held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.

[574] I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into
Peloponnesus belongs to 367 B.C.; being simultaneous with the
embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court. Many chronologers
place it in 366 B.C., after the conclusion of that embassy;
because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon after he has brought
the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that this proves
the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the
embassy lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made
while Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the
year 366 B.C. Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 B.C.,
there will hardly be time left for the whole career of Euphron at
Sikyon, which intervened before the peace of 366 B.C. between
Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44 _seq._).

The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of
Pelopidas to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems
indicated when we compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς
δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς
Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, etc. Then
Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, together with its
unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up the entire
space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ’ Ἐπαμεινώνδας,
βουληθεὶς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ
οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε
στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.

This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted
by the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in
the former words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.

[575] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.

The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby
Xenophon describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες
~οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον~, etc.

[576] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.

His expression marks how completely these terms were granted
by the personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling
opposition,—~ἐνδυναστεύει~ ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι
τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.

[577] Diodor. xv, 75.

But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition-party in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch during the ensuing year.[578] They sent harmosts of their own to each of the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the chief oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and combining their united forces against each city successively, were strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and active part with Sparta;[579] vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.

[578] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.

Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against
Epaminondas to the events of the preceding year. They believed
(according to Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared
the Spartans, and not pushed his victory so far as might have
been done, when he forced the lines of Mount Oneium in 369 B.C.
But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans should have been
displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines was a
capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas
achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed
to be possible.

Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with
Epaminondas, on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his
conduct in Achaia two years after the action at Oneium; that
is, in 367 B.C. This is much more probable in itself, and much
more consistent with the general series of facts, than the cause
assigned by Diodorus.

[579] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.

For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities,
congregating in a body, became strong enough to carry their
restoration in each city successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.

The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical, still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron, took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth, and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution, seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra, carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans. The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas instead of Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength. Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety, and being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious and sanguinary tyranny.[580] He caused several of his colleagues to be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism; confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid force.[581] The power which he thus acquired became very great. The money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so that they connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master of the town and harbor.

[580] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.

[581] Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.

During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring city of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I have already recounted, that in the year 369 B.C., a little before the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and resistance of its citizens.[582] In the ensuing year, 368 B.C., the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.[583] In the ensuing year 367 B.C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by Euphron, with his own mercenaries to the number of two thousand,—the armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban harmost and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the city which looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within; while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated line of ground called the _Trikaranum_ (which had been fortified by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach and ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to repair.[584]

[582] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.

[583] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.

[584] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.

An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here made prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics of Pellênê, bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.[585] Such an accession afforded sensible relief,—it might almost be said, salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment; since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for Phlius, but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.[586]

[585] This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by
Xenophon, at the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii,
4, 17) as a fact accomplished; but we must suppose it to have
occurred now, in order to reconcile sections 11-14 with sections
18-20 of vii, 2.

The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot
not only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared
with other parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave
little Phliasian community. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere,
he is obscure in the description of particular events, and still
more perplexing when we try to draw from him a clear idea of the
general series.

With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon’s narrative,
however, we must recollect that it is a description of real
events by a contemporary author who had reasonable means of
information. This is a precious ingredient, which gives value to
all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly obliged to
borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from authors who
write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators whose
purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence
I have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as
described by Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise
influence on the main course of the war.

[586] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.

Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis, and there summoned the Sikyonian _notables_ to an assembly. Under his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open partisan of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.

Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents, the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take by assault,[587]—his possession even of the town was altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do not know; except that he took with him a large sum of money for the purpose of bribery.[588] His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their alarm was still farther increased by seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.

[587] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.

[588] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.

For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death, insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage, committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon offenders who had despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated, we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation; but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the language of the accusing magistrates:—

“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that _you_ did not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,[589] whom you caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, too, guilty of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew, not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you, you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you, and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own disgrace as well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not _in_ Thebes also, when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy,—if you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of your whole body of allies.”[590]

[589] This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the
six other Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time
when the Lacedæmonians were masters of that town and garrisoned
the Kadmeia. The conspirators, through the contrivance of the
secretary Phyllidas, got access in disguise to the oligarchical
leaders of Thebes, who were governing under Lacedæmonian
ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described in a
former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 _seq._

[590] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.

To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so
characteristic and emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider
and others refer, with great probability, the allusion in
the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβῃσιν
ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς
οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.

This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others, and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or assemblies elsewhere.

Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished preëminence of being buried in the market-place.[591] There, along with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city. He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges. A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or crushes the previously monopolizing few.

[591] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.

We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions, between the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens; and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town, aided by the Arcadians.[592]

[592] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.

It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the harbor) took place throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half of 366 B.C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen to embarrass Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year 367 B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the beginning of 366 B.C.

The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence of the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas[593]) at the Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by Athens after the battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.,—it had become a sort of recognized fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of the latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state of the Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under a Persian rescript. To attain this object,[594] Pelopidas and Ismenias now proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast, the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them. Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile envoys all went up thither in the same company.[595]

[593] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

[594] It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with
Pelopidas in his mission to the Persian court; we see this not
only from Cornelius Nepos (Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81),
but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

[595] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30;
Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to
some Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must
probably have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon
may not have heard the name.

It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted
up to the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408
B.C., envoys from hostile Greek cities were included in the same
company (Xen. Hellen. i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.

Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of prostration,[596] was favorably received by the Persian court. Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms that his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta, at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes had not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,[597] which could only reach Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra; that they had subsequently trodden down still farther the glory of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emancipating the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer in Peloponnesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle). Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta: Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force.[598] In reference to the points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced in favor of the Eleians;[599] probably at the instance of Pelopidas, since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.

[596] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his
ring, and then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before
the king; thus going through the prostration.

[597] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

[598] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ
βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι
Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Ἀθηναίους
ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’
αὐτούς· ~εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν~, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον
ἰέναι.

It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of
367 B.C., though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas
(387 B.C.) Xenophon seems to have given the rescript in its
exact words (v, 1, 31).

What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia
proves that other matters were included. Accordingly I do not
hesitate to believe that Amphipolis also was recognized as
autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 383,
c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν δούλην
κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), ~ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ
φίλην~ ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect
produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in
his proceedings, when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to
death on returning to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to
the rescript given when Timagoras was present.

In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι
~ἀκολουθεῖν~,—the headship of Thebes is declared or implied.
Compare the convention imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the
latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)

[599] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος
Ἀρχίδαμος, ὅτι ~προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων~, ἐπήνει τὰ
τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίοχος, ὅτι ~ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν~, οὔτε
τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.

Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King.” This remark, made in the King’s hearing and interpreted to him, produced the following addition to the rescript: “If the Athenians have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and inform him.” So vague a modification, however, did little to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in treasonable promises, and of receiving large bribes from the Persian King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.[600] The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript; refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras.[601] Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia, made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for men competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden plane-tree was not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.[602]

[600] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.

In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400),
Demosthenes says that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras
_for four years_. Certainly this mission of Pelopidas to the
Persian court cannot have lasted four years; and Xenophon states
that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they heard that
Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras
may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the
battle of Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the
former rescript of the Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens
as head into the place of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2).
This was exactly four years before (371-367 B.C.). Leon and
Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently returned
from their first embassy, were now sent _jointly_ on a second.
Demosthenes has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.

[601] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras
from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται
(Fals. Leg. p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences.
Compare also Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22.

[602] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.

On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who, after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of Antalkidas.[603]

[603] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.

But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes. All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst. Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy; upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had refused to take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of the synod was defeated.

Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively, calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium, and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure, was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her headship;[604] though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt the dignity, of that new-born city.

[604] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν
Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.

In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by the example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys (whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.

Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture, and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes. Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of their neighbor and rival.[605] They immediately despatched to his aid thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who, unable to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay eight thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover or avenge him. Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander since his last year’s proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies in the country. But the army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians, and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes, acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable to make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy’s cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their perils. Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in consummate order,—took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army safely back to Thebes.[606]

[605] The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a
remarkable effect was produced by the news at Athens (cont.
Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).

Τί δ’; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ’ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον
δήσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ’ οἰκείως
διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ’
αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ’ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.

Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a
supply of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at
Athens (Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)

[606] Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.

This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too, appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second expedition.

At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than a temporary truce,[607] coupled with the engagement of evacuating Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.[608] That event with its consequences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence and connection at Athens.[609]

[607] Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days;
but it is difficult to believe that Alexander would have been
satisfied with a term so very short.

[608] The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander,
with its consequences, is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv,
71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5;
Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does not mention it.

I have placed the seizure in the year 366 B.C., after the return
of Pelopidas from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree
with Mr. Fynes Clinton in referring to the year 367 B.C. Plutarch
places the seizure before the embassy; Diodorus places it in the
year between Midsummer 368 and Midsummer 367 B.C.; but he does
not mention the embassy at all, in its regular chronological
order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits at the
close of the career of Pelopidas.

Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367
B.C., the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.

The year 368 B.C. seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas
made his second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned
victorious, bringing back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.

The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when
Epaminondas was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army.
Now it seems to have been not until the close of 367 B.C., after
the accusations arising out of his proceedings in Achaia, that
Epaminondas missed being rechosen as general.

Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia,
mentions his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and
the matters which he had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if
Pelopidas, immediately before, had been seized and detained for
some months in prison by Alexander of Pheræ, surely Xenophon
would have alluded to it as an item on the other side. I know
that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always to
be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes
both the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where
he is enumerating the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly
have failed to mention a signal disgrace, if there had been one,
immediately preceding.

Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but
when in pacific mission, and under circumstances in which
no man less infamous than Alexander would have seized him
(παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph. p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1;
“legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur” Corn. Nep.). His
imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances to such
a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others.
But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or
explained by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation
of the Persian rescript appears to me to present the most
reasonable explanation of his proceeding.

On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any
probabilities on the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of
Pelopidas in 366 B.C., after the embassy to Persia; not without
feeling, however, that the chronology of this period cannot be
rendered absolutely certain.

[609] Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.