Chapter LXXVIII: Battle of Leuktra and Its Consequences (1)

Immediately after the congress at Sparta in June 371 B.C., the Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally. The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who was still at Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions against the Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should forthwith conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any captures subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they should all be restored;[365] so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,[366] in the peninsula of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their harmosts and their garrisons from every city still under occupation. Since they had already made such promise once before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but had never performed it,—commissioners,[367] not Spartans, were now named from the general congress, to enforce the execution of the agreement.

[365] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.

[366] Thucyd. iv.

[367] Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. _l. c._

Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace
between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C. I have already remarked
that they belong properly to the peace of 371 B.C.; as Wesseling
suspects in his note.

No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts; and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent insult, appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked back upon it from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods,[368]—like that of the Homeric Atê. Now that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other allies out of Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able to subdue her thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of Spartan force was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other Greeks; to a great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was anticipated that the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into villages (as they had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon her the fate which she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate her citizens and her property to the profit of the Delphian god, pursuant to the vow that had been taken more than a century before, in consequence of the assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.[369] Few persons out of Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.

[368] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον
ἦγεν, etc.

[369] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor.
xv, 51.

To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, by the peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial ascendency over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or withhold assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy task; for the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed with the Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left to enjoy their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at the moment when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was actually at the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in Phokis, on the north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on hearing of the peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions as to his future proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan authorities and assembly, with Agesilaus as the most vehement of all,[370] he was directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas), and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities. One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths, which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies, who now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never serve with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus was treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,[371] and the peremptory order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.

[370] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.

[371] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.

Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.[372] Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side) of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead of marching by the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned southward by a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated the Theban division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the ridge of Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf. Coming upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve Theban triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison to occupy the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous ground into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity of Helikon; where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of ever-memorable name, called Leuktra.[373]

[372] It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta,
or Kleombrotus from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to
Thebes, that the Bœotian cities should be left autonomous; and
the requisition was repudiated (Diodor. xv, 51; Aristeides, Or.
(Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But such mission seems
very doubtful.

[373] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.

Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence; while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen, and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents, which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra, where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp. They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege, sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch, Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish in the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians masters of the Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted to the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of Trophonius at Lebadeia:[374] and a Spartan exile named Leandrias, serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back, imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its inmates against the common enemy now present.[375]

[374] Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9,
ed. Didot.

[375] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3;
Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.

The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus,
who directed him to offer on this tomb “an auburn virgin” to
the deceased females. Pelopidas and his friends were greatly
perplexed about the fulfilment of this command; many urged
that it was necessary for some maiden to devote herself, or to
be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the
country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others
denounced the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the
debate, a mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped
not far off; upon which the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here
comes the victim required, sent by the special providence of the
gods.” The chestnut filly was caught and offered as a sacrifice
on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from a conviction
that the mandate of the gods had been executed.

The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De
Genio Socratis (c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of
Pelopidas in the conspiracy whereby the Theban oligarchy was put
down and the Lacedæmonians expelled from the Kadmeia.

While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman aid, Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting. His task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, while those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were inferior, and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even trustworthy. What the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted to know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans; Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.[376] Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and by a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all former Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line, and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had been the intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the cause was to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing from this habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, and to keep back the rest of his army comparatively out of action. Knowing that Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official persons, would be on the right of their own line, he calculated that, if successful on this point against the best troops, he should find little resistance from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his own left wing chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order of advance was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on the left should join battle first, while the centre and right kept comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive attitude.

[376] Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.

In 371 B.C., such a combination was absolutely new, and betokened high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along the whole line. But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among the Spartans, that there never was any occasion on which peculiar precautions were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp on the Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an opposite eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low ground and moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry on the decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. Both the partisans and the opponents of Kleombrotus united in provoking the order for battle, each in their own language. The former urged him, since he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to strike a blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons which rumor instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave it to be understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their suspicions would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards the Thebans.[377] Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager to fight, and so would any other Spartan general have been, under the same circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had he been otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian portion of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided resolution to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the final orders issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where copious libations of wine both attested and increased the confident temper of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and arrayed on the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with the Spartans and most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in an order of twelve deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left, but respecting the order of the other parts of the line, we have no information. The cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.

[377] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.

Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, and strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack. His cavalry too were posted in front of his line. But before he commenced his march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home to Thebes; while at the same time he made proclamation that any of his Bœotian hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also retire, if they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately availed themselves;[378] so many were there, in the Theban camp, who estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory. But when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen retiring, a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, either with or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, and forced them to return for safety to the main Theban army. The most zealous among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.

[378] Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad, composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle, Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front, composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,[379] and the deep column of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans, with all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to stand up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the front, was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and it was only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his comrades around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve him from falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell the most eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the polemarch, Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others. After an obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing of the Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp on the higher ground.

[379] Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.

It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as Epaminondas had intended that it should. In no other part of the line does there appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through his deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of the enemy’s line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence, or even suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the command of Kleombrotus.[380] The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in the cause from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a blow at the retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining allies, after mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired to the camp as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and driven back to it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left wing, probably astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them, and by the unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in the same manner. The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying king, was thus again assembled and formed behind the entrenchment on the higher ground, where the victorious Thebans did not attempt to molest them.[381]

[380] Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress
upon this indifference or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon
says quite enough to authenticate the reality of the fact (Hellen.
vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De Offic. ii, 7, 26.

Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of
Agesilaus in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on
the part of the allies of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).

[381] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.

But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they had quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss when it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had marched forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.[382] One thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was even larger. Apart from this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an event impressive to every one, the like of which had never occurred since the fatal day of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies who stood alongside of them in arms were now altered men. All were sick of their cause, and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely concealed a positive satisfaction at the defeat. And when the surviving polemarchs, now commanders, took counsel with the principal officers as to the steps proper in the emergency, there were a few, but very few, Spartans who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for recovering by force their slain brethren in the field, or perishing in the attempt. All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the polemarchs, giving effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to solicit the regular truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans granted, after erecting their own trophy.[383] But Epaminondas, aware that the Spartans would practise every stratagem to conceal the magnitude of their losses, coupled the grant with a condition that the allies should bury their dead first. It was found that the allies had scarce any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain warrior on the field was a Lacedæmonian.[384] And thus the Theban general, while he placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment, proclaimed at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage, as to rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the score of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,[385] Diodorus at three hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight, over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased. Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.[386]

[382] Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a
thousand Lacedæmonians to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4)
gives the number as more than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four
thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless above the truth, though the
number given by Xenophon may be fairly presumed as somewhat below
it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. ii, 17) states that
seventeen hundred Spartans perished.

[383] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.

[384] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.;
Cicero, de officiis, ii, 7.

[385] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.

[386] Pausan. ix, 16, 3.

Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas quitted Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general peace, to the day when he stood victorious on the field of Leuktra.[387] The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near and distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes would be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not only she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the military majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose account of the battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that chagrin which the event occasioned to him,[388]—ascribes the defeat to untoward accidents,[389] or to the rashness and convivial carelessness of Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and his party at Sparta did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,[390] while others faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought contrary to his better judgment, under fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms, coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him. To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary, then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle, though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of the enemy’s phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus[391] expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans, cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally, was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field, with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war, against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without the like training.[392] Essentially stationary and old-fashioned, the Lykurgean discipline was now overborne by the progressive military improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician; a misfortune predicted by the Corinthians[393] at Sparta sixty years before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the field of Leuktra.

[387] This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil.
c. 28). The congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of
the Attic month Skirrophorion (June), the last month of the year
of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes; the battle was fought on the
fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon, the first month of the
next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês; about the beginning
of July.

[388] Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter
connected with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of
Agesilaus was present and fought, together with various other
circumstances, which I shall discuss presently, in a future note.
I follow Xenophon.

[389] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ’ οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν
Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans)
πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.

[390] Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called _Archidamus_ (composed
about five years after the battle, as if to be spoken by
Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts this statement distinctly
into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας
δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
σώμασι κρατηθῆναι ~διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον~, etc. (s. 9).

I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion
entertained both by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the
more natural, since the two contemporary kings of Sparta were
almost always at variance, and at the head of opposing parties;
especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus, during the life
of the latter.

Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de
Officiis, i, 24, 84—“Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera,
quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminondâ
conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes corruerunt.” Polybius remarks
(ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed) that all the
proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta, were
marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings
of the allies; while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the
opposite character.

[391] Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει
χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον
νίκην ... διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους
ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch,
Pelop. c. 23.

[392] See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.

Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους
αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους
τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 13,
14.

[393] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ
ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. ~Ἀνάγκη δ’ ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ
ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν~· καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα
ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, ~πολλῆς καὶ τῆς
ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ~, etc.

But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may turn to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when the trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings of the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. “The moan of distress (says the historian)[394] reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus to Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta, when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel, but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated, with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia was actually being celebrated, on its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going through its usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the poignancy of the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the solemnity to be either interrupted or abridged. “_Of necessity, I suppose, they were grieved_,—but they went through the whole as if nothing had happened, only communicating the names of the slain to their relations, and issuing a general order to the women, to make no noise or wailing, but to bear the misfortune in silence.” That such an order should be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it should be issued and obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it should not only be issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man could believe, if it were not expressly attested by the contemporary historian. “On the morrow (says he) you might see those whose relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and cheerful countenances; but of those whose relatives survived, scarce one showed himself; and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and humbled.”[395]

[394] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.

[395] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν
Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν
τῆς τελευταίας, καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι,
ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος, ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκῃ· τὸν
μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν
ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν·
προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τὸ πάθος
φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ προσήκοντες,
λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ ζῶντες
ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ
ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29.

See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the
cutting in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about
the satisfaction and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians
who had lost relations in the battle; while every one else was
mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10). Compare also Justin, xxviii,
4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.

In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians were decidedly the better of the two. I have already recounted the prodigious and unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after the ruinous loss of her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one expected that she could have held out for six months: I am now about to recount the proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at Leuktra,—a calamity great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount inferior to what had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader will find that, looking to the intensity of active effort in both cases, the comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at least, if not justifying, the boast of Perikles[396] in his memorable funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.

[396] Thucyd. ii, 39.

It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the safety of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they put in march nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the Lacedæmonian moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the aggregate), two or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the remainder were now despatched, even including elderly citizens up to near sixty years of age, and all who had been left behind in consequence of other public offices. Archidamus took the command (Agesilaus still continuing to be disabled), and employed himself in getting together the aid promised from Tegea,—from the villages representing the disintegrated Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, and Achaia; all these places being still under the same oligarchies which had held them under Lacedæmonian patronage, and still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were equipped at Corinth, as a means of transporting the new army across to Kreusis, and thus joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port of Kreusis, the recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found inestimable, as the only means of access into Bœotia.[397]

[397] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.

Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at a moment when they were animated more by despair than by hope. They were doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation of the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like the Syracusans after their last great victory[398] over the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action. Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to indefinite exile.

[398] See Thucyd. vii, 73.

To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for the same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements, that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.[399] But when the Theban leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp in flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight up the hill and attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the enterprise as too perilous; recommending that they should permit the enemy’s departure under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the great victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it by attempting something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians driven to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago, _you_ yourselves were in despair, and that your recent victory is the fruit of that very feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure in bringing about these sudden changes of fortune.”[400] Having by such representations convinced the Thebans, he addressed a friendly message to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of their dangerous position, as well as of the little trust to be reposed in their allies,—and offering himself as mediator to negotiate for their safe retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given; and at his instance, a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedæmonians the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In spite of the agreement, however, the Lacedæmonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans or in Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him to quit the camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly, he issued public orders in the camp for every man to be ready for departure after the evening meal, and to march in the night to Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain on the next morning. Having put the enemy on this false scent, he directed his real night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to Kreusis, next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.[401] The Thebans offered no opposition; nor is it at all probable that they intended any fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he had at least no motive to break his word.

[399] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.

However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at
Leuktra, it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from
them at this moment, than at any other.

[400] Pausanias states that immediately after the battle,
Epaminondas gave permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and
go home, by which permission they profited, so that the Spartans
now stood alone in the camp (Paus. ix, 14, 1). This however is
inconsistent with the account of Xenophon (vi, 4, 26), and I
think improbable.

Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved
the Spartans by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it
appears to me that the storming of the Spartan camp was an
arduous enterprise, wherein more Thebans than Spartans would
have been slain: moreover, the Spartans were masters of the port
of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving out the
camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted by
Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.

[401] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.

The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by
which Kleombrotus arrived.

It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met Archidamus, who had advanced to that point with the Laconian forces, and was awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. The purpose of his march being now completed, he advanced no farther. The armament was disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as allies returned home.[402]

[402] This is the most convenient place for noticing the
discrepancy, as to the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and
Xenophon. I have followed Xenophon.

Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and
the out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place,
_not after_ the battle of Leuktra, but _before_ it. Jason (he
says) came with a considerable force to the aid of the Thebans.
He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who doubted the sufficiency of
his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate Bœotia.
But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus
with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by order
of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly
Kleombrotus, finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened,
openly broke the truce just concluded, and marched back with
Archidamus to Leuktra. Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus
commanding the right wing, and Archidamus the left. They
sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus was slain; the
result being the same on both statements.

We must here make our election between the narrative of
Xenophon and that of Diodorus. That the authority of the
former is greater, speaking generally, I need hardly remark;
nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities become so glaring
and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica
(where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting
the humiliation of Sparta), as to afford some color for the
suspicions of Palmerius, Morus, and Schneider, who think that
Xenophon has concealed the direct violation of truce on the part
of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred as Diodorus
has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5, 6.

It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such
suspicion ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds
for preferring the narrative of Xenophon.

1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the
Spartan army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia.
Jason arrives after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans
to allow them to retreat under a truce; Archidamus also arrives
after the battle to take them up. If the defeat had taken place
under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus and the
survivors would have found it scarcely possible to escape out of
Bœotia.

2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been
a violation of truce on the part of Kleombrotus and the
Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that occurs in Grecian history.
But such violation is never afterwards alluded to by any one,
among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.

3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus,
is, that Archidamus was present and fought at Leuktra. But we
have independent evidence rendering it almost certain that
he was not there. Whoever reads the Discourse of Isokrates
called _Archidamus_ (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will see that
such observations could not have been put into the mouth of
Archidamus, if he had been present there, and (of course) in
joint command with Kleombrotus.

4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army
from her allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace
exonerated her allies from everything like obligation to follow
her headship; and a new army, not for the purpose of extricating
defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for pure aggression against
Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.

On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.

In all communities, the return of so many defeated soldiers, liberated under a capitulation by the enemy, would have been a scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was pregnant with grave and dangerous consequences. So terrible was the scorn and ignominy heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a defeat, that life became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact sufficed for his condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying or extenuating circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, or be seen consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other family would intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with an air of cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, until he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become his degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from the panegyrist Xenophon)[403] helps to explain the satisfaction of the Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son was among the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan troops had hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners at Sphakteria, when released from captivity and brought back to a degraded existence at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some precautions deemed necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous malcontents.[404] Here was another case yet more formidable. The vanquished returning from Leuktra were numerous, while the severe loss sustained in the battle amply attested their bravery. Aware of the danger of enforcing against them the established custom, the ephors referred the case to Agesilaus; who proposed that for that time and case the customary penalties should be allowed to sleep; but should be revived afterwards and come into force as before. Such was the step accordingly taken;[405] so that the survivors from this fatal battle-field were enabled to mingle with the remaining citizens without dishonor or degradation. The step was indeed doubly necessary, considering the small aggregate number of fully qualified citizens; which number always tended to decline,—from the nature of the Spartan political franchise combined with the exigencies of Spartan training,[406]—and could not bear even so great a diminution as that of the four hundred slain at Leuktra. “Sparta (says Aristotle) could not stand up against a single defeat, but was ruined through the small number of her citizens.”[407]

[403] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

[404] Thucyd. v, 34.

[405] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214
B.; Apophtheg. Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13.

A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was
enacted after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by
Antipater, B.C. 330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the
only person at Sparta who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix,
70). He incurred the strongest unpopularity for such opposition.
Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing the public feeling at
Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.

[406] The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an
earlier part of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.

[407] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν
ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.

The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open manifestation.

The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of the Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her, and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to the full exigencies of military training; while under a leader like Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account, that they became better soldiers every month.[408] The Phokians, unable to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual defence and alliance.[409] The cities of Eubœa, together with the Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly, had assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its important site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be held as a position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.[410] The Bœotian town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians even until the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the Thebans, highly exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed to destroy the city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe as this proposition was, it would not have exceeded the customary rigors of war, nor even what might have befallen Thebes herself, had Kleombrotus been victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous remonstrance of Epaminondas prevented it from being carried into execution. Alike distinguished for mild temper and for long-sighted views, he reminded his countrymen that in their present aspiring hopes towards ascendency in Greece, it was essential to establish a character for moderation of dealing[411] not inferior to their military courage, as attested by the recent victory. Accordingly, the Orchomenians were pardoned upon submission, and re-admitted as members of the Bœotian confederacy. To the Thespians, however, the same lenity was not extended. They were expelled from Bœotia, and their territory annexed to Thebes. It will be recollected, that immediately before the battle of Leuktra, when Epaminondas caused proclamation to be made that such of the Bœotians as were disaffected to the Theban cause might march away, the Thespians had availed themselves of the permission and departed.[412] The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like the Platæans, at Athens.[413]

[408] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πάντες
ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.

These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon:
compare vii, 5, 12.

[409] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.

[410] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.

[411] Diodor. xv, 57.

[412] Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

[413] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.

I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding
chapter) for believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες
_before_ the battle of Leuktra.

While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection of a treasury chamber,[414] and the dedication of pious offerings at Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving such marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors under complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on him,—and with a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater than had ever been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea, in his return home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of Thermopylæ, so as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever he chose. His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great power, inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would direct his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he was fond of boasting,[415]—or northward against the cities in Chalkidikê—or southward against Greece.

[414] Pausanias, x, 11, 4.

[415] Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.